Safe Memory Deallocation for Non-Terminating Programs

Author Name

1

sample@example.ac.jp

2

example@sample.net

Abstract We propose an approach to guarantee safe memory deallocation for non-terminating programs. The main idea is to guarantee the property using two type systems: the type system for partial memory-leak freedom (i.e., not leaking memory if a program terminates) by Suenaga and Kobayashi and a type system proposed in this paper which abstracts the behavior of memory allocation and deallocation by CCS-like processes. First leveraging the former type system to ensure memory safety(no use after deallocation and no memory leaks) for terminating programs, and then by latter type system we can estimate the upper bound of the consumed memory cells soundly.

1 Introduction

Manual memory management primitives (e.g., malloc and free in C) often cause serious problems such as double frees, memory leaks, and illegal read/write to a deallocated memory cell. Verifying safe memory deallocation – a program not leading to such an unsafe state – is an important problem.

Most of safe memory deallocation verification techniques proposed so far [1, 2, 3, 4] focus on the partial memory-leak freedom: if a program terminates, the program satisfies safe memory deallocation. For example, the type system by Suenaga and Kobayashi [1], which is called **SK** type system in our paper, guarantees that (1) a well-typed program does not perform read/write/free operations to any deallocated memory cell and that (2) after execution of a well-typed program, all the memory cells are deallocated. We should notice that these two properties are guaranteed if a well-typed program terminates and the type system does not guarantee anything for non-terminating programs.

The function g shown in Figure 1 describe this situation. It executes like allocating a memory cell, calling it self again and then deallocating the allocated memory cell. That is, at end of this function the allocated memory cell is deallocated and there is no double frees. Because this function is a non-terminating program, partial correctness of it is guaranteed by previous type system. However, it infinitely allocates a memory cell, which causes a dangerous situation – memory leaks.

A program leaks memory if the program consumes unbounded number of memory cells. For example, function g in Figure 1 leaks memory, whereas function f does not; the former consumes unbounded number of memory cells but the latter consumes at most one memory cell at once. Notice that these two programs are all partially corrected by the previous type system, because they do not terminate.

```
\begin{array}{lll} 1 & g(x) = & f(x) = \\ 2 & \mathbf{let} \ x = \mathbf{malloc}() \ \mathbf{in} & \mathbf{let} \ x = \mathbf{malloc}() \ \mathbf{in} \\ 3 & g(x) \ ; & \mathbf{free}(x) & \mathbf{free}(x); \end{array}
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Figure 1. Explanation for partial correctness and memory leak

In the real-world programs, non-terminating programs such as Web servers and operating systems are very important. To guarantee safe memory deallocation for non-terminating programs has great practical significance.

We notice that, for non-terminating programs, a possible way to ensure memory-leak freedom is to count that the number of allocated consumed cells does not go out of memory scope. Thanks to the previous type system which proves partial correctness, we can focus on the abstraction of behavior of allocation and deallocation.

The key idea of our approach is to decompose this problem into two subproblems: (1) partial correctness and (2) behavioral correctness. The partial correctness has been described above. The behavioral correctness means a program does not leak memory. It is verified by behavioral type system which is mainly used to abstact the behavior of a program. Behavioral types are heavily used in the context of concurrent program verification [5, 6, 7]. The main procedure to guarantee safe memory deallocation for non-terminating programs is to first ensure partial correctness by previous type system, and then verifing memory-leak freedom by behavioral type system.

```
 h(x) = 2 
 let  x = malloc()  in 
 let  y = malloc()  in 
 4   free(x);  free(y);  h(x)
```

Figure 2. Example for demonstrating the main observation.

We should notice that once partial correctness is guaranteed, we can guarantee memory-leak freedom by estimating the upper bound of memory consumption ignoring the relationship between variables and pointers to memory cells. For demonstrating this observation, we use an example in Figure 2. The function h is first partially corrected. The behavior of h is that it consumes two memory cells at once. In order to verify this behavior, we ignore the variables x and y in h to focus on the fact that h executes **malloc** twice, **free** twice, and then calls h. This abstraction is sound because the correspondence between allocations and deallocations is guaranteed by the partial correctness verification.

In our paper, the behaviour of a program is abstracted as CCS-like processes. For

example, the behaviour of f is abstracted as $\mu\alpha$.malloc; free; α ; the behaviour of g is abstracted as $\mu\alpha$.malloc; α ; free; the behaviour of h is abstracted as $\mu\alpha$.malloc; malloc; free; free; α . And then passing these behavior(types) to $OK_n(P)$, where P denotes behavior(types). The $OK_n(P)$ elaborated in subsection 3.3 traces every steps about allocation and deal-location, and it will reject a memory-leak program.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple imperative language, as well as its syntax and operational semantics. Section 3 introduces the behavioral type system, which describes how to guarantee memory-leak freedom for non-terminating programs. Section 4 proposes an inference algorithm, and talks about syntax directed typing rules. Section 5 describes current status and future work.

2 Language

This section introduces a sublanguage of Suenaga and Kobayashi [1] with primitives for memory allocation/deallocation. And the values in our paper are only pointers. The syntax of language is as follows.

2.1 Syntax

```
s \; (statements) ::= \mathbf{skip} \; | \; s_1; s_2 \; | \; *x \leftarrow y \; | \; \mathbf{free}(x)
| \; \mathbf{let} \; x = \mathbf{malloc}() \; \mathbf{in} \; s \; | \; \mathbf{let} \; x = \mathbf{null} \; \mathbf{in} \; s
| \; \mathbf{let} \; x = y \; \mathbf{in} \; s \; | \; \mathbf{let} \; x = *y \; \mathbf{in} \; s
| \; \mathbf{ifnull} \; (x) \; \mathbf{then} \; s_1 \; \mathbf{else} \; s_2 \; | \; f(\vec{x})
d \; (definition) ::= f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = s
```

A program is a pair (D, s), where D is the set of definition.

The command skip does nothing. The command s_1 ; s_2 is executed as a sequence, first executing s_1 and then s_2 . The command $*x \leftarrow y$ updates the content of the memory cell which is pointed by pointer x with value y. The command free(x) deallocates the memory cell which is pointed by a pointer x. Then command let x = e in s first evaluates the expression e and binds the return value of e to x and then executes statement s. The command let x =malloc in s first allocates a memory cell to a pointer x and then executes the statement s. The command let x = null in s first allocates a null pointer to x and then executes s. The command let x = y in s assign the pointer y to x, so the pointer x and y are said aliases for the same memory cell, and then executes statement s. The command let x = *y in s transfers a part of memory cells pointed by y and then executes statement s. The command if s_1 then s_1 else s_2 denotes that executing statement s_1 if pointer x is a null pointer, otherwise executing statement s_2 . The command $f(\vec{x})$ is a function call in which \vec{x} denotes mutually distinct variables like $\{x_1,\ldots,x_n\}$. The notation d denotes the definition of function $f(\vec{x})$ which has a body of statement s. And examples are described by this syntax you can see in Figure 1 and Figure 2.

2.2 Operational Semantics

Because we want to estimate the number of available memory cells at every operation step, we extend the triple $\langle H, R, s \rangle$ that is represented as run-time state in previous type system to a quadruple $\langle H, R, s, n \rangle$ in our paper. The introduced notation n denotes the number of available memory cells, a nature number. When executing the operation **malloc**, the number of available memory cells will decrease 1, which is denoted as (n-1); when executing the operation **free**, the number of available memory cells will increase 1, which is denoted as (n+1). The notation H, which models heap memory, is a mapping from finite subset of \mathcal{H} to $\mathcal{H} \cup \{null\}$, where \mathcal{H} represents the set of heap addresses. R, which models registers, is a mapping from finite set of variables to $\mathcal{H} \cup \{null\}$.

Transition rules are listed in Figure 3. In these rules, $f\{x \to v\}$ is defined as a function f' such that f'(y) = v if x = y, otherwise f'(y) = f(y) and $y \in dom(f)$. There are three rules about **NullEx** which denotes accessing a null pointer, three rules about **Error** for accessing a deallocated memory cell, and one rule about **Error** which denotes allocating a memory cell when there is no memory space.

$$\frac{n \in \mathbb{N}}{\langle H, R, \operatorname{skip}; s, n \rangle \longrightarrow_D \langle H, R, s, n \rangle} \quad \text{(E-Skip)}$$

$$\frac{R(x) \in \operatorname{dom}(H), n \in \mathbb{N}}{\langle H, R, *x \leftarrow y, n \rangle \longrightarrow_D \langle H \{R(x) \rightarrow R(y)\}, R, \operatorname{skip}, n \rangle} \quad \text{(E-Assign)}$$

$$\frac{R(x) \in \operatorname{dom}(H), n \in \mathbb{N}}{\langle H, R, \operatorname{free}(\mathbf{x}), n \rangle} \stackrel{\text{free}}{\longrightarrow_D \langle H \{R(x)\}, R, \operatorname{skip}, n + 1 \rangle} \quad \text{(E-Free)}$$

$$\frac{x' \notin \operatorname{dom}(R)}{\langle H, R, \operatorname{let} x = \operatorname{null} \operatorname{in} s, n \rangle \longrightarrow_D \langle H, R \{x' \rightarrow \operatorname{null}\}, [x'/x] s, n \rangle} \quad \text{(E-LetNull)}$$

$$\frac{x' \notin \operatorname{dom}(R)}{\langle H, R, \operatorname{let} x = y \operatorname{in} s, n \rangle \longrightarrow_D \langle H, R \{x' \rightarrow R(y)\}, [x'/x] s, n \rangle} \quad \text{(E-LetDref)}$$

$$\frac{x' \notin \operatorname{dom}(R)}{\langle H, R, \operatorname{let} x = *y \operatorname{in} s, n \rangle \longrightarrow_D \langle H, R \{x' \rightarrow H(R(y))\}, [x'/x] s, n \rangle} \quad \text{(E-LetDref)}$$

$$\frac{h \notin \operatorname{dom}(H)}{\langle H, R, \operatorname{let} x = \operatorname{malloc}() \operatorname{in} s, n \rangle} \stackrel{\operatorname{malloc}}{\longrightarrow_D \langle H \{h \rightarrow v\}, R \{x' \rightarrow h\}, [x'/x] s, n - 1 \rangle} \quad \text{(E-Malloc)}$$

$$\frac{R(x) = \operatorname{null}}{\langle H, R, \operatorname{ifnull}(x) \operatorname{then} s_1 \operatorname{else} s_2, n \rangle \longrightarrow_D \langle H, R, s_1, n \rangle} \quad \text{(E-IfNullT)}$$

$$\frac{R(x) \neq \operatorname{null}}{\langle H, R, \operatorname{ifnull}(x) \operatorname{then} s_1 \operatorname{else} s_2, n \rangle \longrightarrow_D \langle H, R, s_2, n, \rangle} \quad \text{(E-IfNullF)}$$

$$\frac{f(\vec{y}) = s \in D}{\langle H, R, f(\vec{x}), n \rangle \longrightarrow_D \langle H, R, [\vec{x}/\vec{y}] s, n \rangle} \quad \text{(E-Call)}$$

$$\frac{R(x) = \operatorname{null}}{\langle H, R, *x \leftarrow y, n \rangle \longrightarrow_D \operatorname{NullEx}} \quad \text{(E-AssignNullError)}$$

$$\frac{R(y) = null}{\langle H, R, x = *y, n \rangle \longrightarrow_{D} \mathbf{NullEx}} \quad \text{(E-DrefNullError)}$$

$$\frac{R(x) = null}{\langle H, R, \mathbf{free}(\mathbf{x}), n \rangle} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{free}}_{D} \mathbf{NullEx} \quad \text{(E-FreeNullError)}$$

$$\frac{R(x) \notin dom(H) \cup \{null\}}{\langle H, R, *x \leftarrow y, n \rangle \longrightarrow_{D} \mathbf{Error}} \quad \text{(E-AssignError)}$$

$$\frac{R(y) \notin dom(H) \cup \{null\}}{\langle H, R, \mathbf{let} \ x = *y \ \mathbf{in} \ s, n \rangle \longrightarrow_{D} \mathbf{Error}} \quad \text{(E-DrefError)}$$

$$\frac{R(x) \notin dom(H) \cup \{null\}}{\langle H, R, \mathbf{free}(\mathbf{x}), n \rangle} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{free}}_{D} \mathbf{Error} \quad \text{(E-FreeError)}$$

$$\langle H, R, \mathbf{let} \ x = \mathbf{malloc}() \ \mathbf{in} \ s, 0 \rangle \xrightarrow{\mathbf{malloc}}_{D} \mathbf{Error} \quad \text{(E-MallocError)}$$

Figure 3. Operational Semantics

3 Type System

This section elaborate the behavioral type system to prevent leaking memory in non-terminating programs. We define behavioral types, CCS-like processes that abstract the behavior of programs, as follows.

3.1 Syntax of Types

$$P(behavioral\ types) ::=$$
 $\mathbf{0} \mid P_1; P_2 \mid P_1 + P_2 \mid \mathbf{malloc}$ $\mid \mathbf{free} \mid \alpha \mid \mu \alpha.P$ $\tau(value\ types) ::=$ \mathbf{Ref} $\sigma(function\ types) ::=$ $(\tau_1, \dots, \tau_n)P$

The type $\mathbf{0}$ abstracts the behavior of **skip** and means "does nothing". $P_1; P_2$ is for sequential execution. $P_1 + P_2$ is abstracted as conditional. **malloc** is the behavior of a statement that allocates a memory cell exactly once. **free** is for deallocating memory cell exactly once. $\mu\alpha.P$ is a recursive type. For example, the behavior of the body of function h in Figure 2 is abstracted as $\mu\alpha.$ malloc; malloc; free; free; α . α is a type variable and bounded to the recursive constructor $\mu\alpha$.

The only value in our paper is reference, and its type is **Ref**.

The function type is described as $(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)P$, which means a function receives some pointers as arguments and its body is abstracted as a behavioral type P.

3.2 Semantics of Behavioral Types

The semantics of behavioral type are given by labeled transition system, and listed as follows:

$$0; P \rightarrow P$$

$$\mathbf{malloc} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{free}} 0$$

$$\mathbf{free} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{free}} 0$$

$$\mu\alpha.P \rightarrow [\mu\alpha.P/\alpha]P$$

$$P_1 + P_2 \longrightarrow P_1$$

$$P_1 + P_2 \longrightarrow P_2$$

$$\frac{P_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha} P_1'}{P_1; P_2 \xrightarrow{\alpha} P_1'; P_2}$$

The notation \to denotes that a behavioral type can be reduced by the internal action. Notation $\stackrel{\alpha}{\longrightarrow}$ means that a behavioral type can be reduced by executing α actions, and the α here is {malloc, free}.

3.3 Typing Rules

The type judgment of our type system is given by the form Θ ; $\Gamma \vdash s : P$, where Θ is a mapping from function variables to function types, Γ is a type environment that denotes a mapping from variables to value types. It reads "the behavior of s is abstracted as P under Θ and Γ environments". We design the type system so that this type judgment implies the property: when s executes $\mathbf{malloc}(\text{resp.free})$, then P is equivalent to \mathbf{malloc} ; P'(resp.free; P') for a type P' such that Θ ; $\Gamma \vdash s' : P'$, where s' is the continuation of s. This property guarantees the behavioral type soundly abstracts the upper bound of the consumed memory cells.

Typing rules are presented in Figure 4. In the rule for assignment, the behavior of $*x \leftarrow y$ is **0**. The rule for **free** represents that the behavior of **free**(x) is **free**. The rule T-Malloc represents that **let** x =**malloc**() **in** x has the behavior **malloc**; x, where x is the behavior of statement x. The rule for function call represents that function x has the behavior x which is the behavior of the body of this function .

In the rule for subtyping, $P_1 \leq P_2$ represents that P_1 is the subtype of P_2 and means that:

(1) if
$$P_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha} P_1'$$
 then $\exists P_2'$ s.t. $P_2 \xrightarrow{\alpha} P_2'$ and $P_1' \leq P_2'$ (2) if $P_1 \to P_1'$ then $\exists P_2'$ s.t. $P_2 \to^* P_2'$ and $P_1' \leq P_2'$ where $\stackrel{\alpha}{\Longrightarrow}$ means that: $\to^* \stackrel{\alpha}{\longrightarrow} \to^*$.

In the rule for program, the main statement s is executed under Θ and Γ environments without free variables. At the end of s, memory leak freedom is guaranteed by $OK_n(P)$, where P is the behavior of s. $OK_n(P)$ is defined as **Definition 1** in which $\sharp_{malloc}(\alpha)$ and $\sharp_{free}(\alpha)$ are functions to count the number of **malloc** and **free** actions in α respectively. This definition, intuitively, means at every running step the number of allocated memory cells will never go out of memory scope.

Definition 1. $OK_n(P) \iff \forall P', \ P \xrightarrow{\alpha}^* P' \ then \ \sharp_{malloc}(\alpha) - \sharp_{free}(\alpha) \leq n.$

$$\begin{array}{c} \Theta; \Gamma \vdash \mathbf{skip} : \mathbf{0} \quad (\text{T-Skip}) \\ \frac{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash s_1 : P_1 \quad \Theta; \Gamma \vdash s_2 : P_2}{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash s_1; s_2 : P_1; P_2} \quad (\text{T-Seq}) \\ \frac{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash y : \mathbf{Ref} \quad \Theta; \Gamma \vdash x : \mathbf{Ref}}{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash *x \leftarrow y : \mathbf{0}} \quad (\text{T-Assign}) \\ \frac{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash x : \mathbf{Ref}}{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash \mathsf{free}(x) : \mathsf{free}} \quad (\text{T-Free}) \\ \frac{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash \mathsf{het} \ x = \mathsf{malloc}() \ \ \mathsf{in} \ s : \mathsf{malloc}; P}{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash \mathsf{let} \ x = \mathsf{malloc}() \ \ \mathsf{in} \ s : \mathsf{malloc}; P} \quad (\mathsf{T-Malloc}) \\ \frac{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash y : \mathsf{Ref} \quad \Theta; \Gamma, x : \mathsf{Ref} \vdash s : P}{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash \mathsf{let} \ x = y \ \mathsf{in} \ s : P} \quad (\mathsf{T-LetEq}) \\ \frac{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash y : \mathsf{Ref} \quad \Theta; \Gamma, x : \mathsf{Ref} \vdash s : P}{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash \mathsf{let} \ x = *y \ \mathsf{in} \ s : P} \quad (\mathsf{T-LetDref}) \\ \frac{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash \mathsf{let} \ x = *y \ \mathsf{in} \ s : P}{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash \mathsf{let} \ x = \mathsf{null} \ \mathsf{in} \ s : P} \quad (\mathsf{T-LetNull}) \\ \frac{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash s : P_1 \quad P_1 \leq P_2}{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash s : P_2} \quad (\mathsf{T-Sub}) \\ \frac{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash x : \mathsf{Ref} \quad \Theta; \Gamma \vdash s_1 : P}{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash \mathsf{s} : P_2} \quad (\mathsf{T-IfNull}) \\ \frac{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash \mathsf{re} \ \mathsf{Ref} \quad \Theta; \Gamma \vdash s_1 : P}{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash \mathsf{ifnull} \ (x) \ \mathsf{then} \ s_1 \ \mathsf{else} \ s_2 : P} \quad (\mathsf{T-IfNull}) \\ \frac{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash \mathsf{ned} \ \mathsf{C}}{\Theta; \Gamma, x : \tau \vdash f(\tau) : P} \quad (\mathsf{T-Call}) \\ \frac{\vdash D : \Theta \quad \Theta; \emptyset \vdash s : P \quad OK_n(P)}{\Theta; \Gamma, S} \quad (\mathsf{T-Program}) \\ \frac{\vdash D : \Theta \quad \Theta; \emptyset \vdash s : P \quad OK_n(P)}{\vdash (D, s)} \quad (\mathsf{T-Program}) \\ \end{array}$$

Figure 4. Typing Rules

3.4 Type Soundness

This subsection describes some theorems and lemmas for type safety.

Theorem 3.1. If $\vdash (D, s)$ then (D, s) does not lead to memory leak. Memory leak freedom: $\exists n \in \mathbb{N} \text{ s.t. } \langle \emptyset, \emptyset, s, n \rangle \rightarrow^* Error$

This theorem says that a well typed program guarantees memory leak freedom.

Lemma 3.2 (Preservation I). If $OK_n(P)$, Θ ; $\Gamma \vdash s : P$ and $\langle H, R, s, n \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle H', R', s', n' \rangle$, then $\exists P'$ s.t.

- (1) Θ ; $\Gamma \vdash s' : P'$
- (2) $P \stackrel{\alpha}{\Longrightarrow} P'$
- (3) $OK_{n'}(P')$

Lemma 3.3 (Preservation II). If $OK_n(P)$, Θ ; $\Gamma \vdash s : P$ and $\langle H, R, s, n \rangle \rightarrow \langle H', R', s', n' \rangle$, then $\exists P'$ s.t.

- (1) Θ ; $\Gamma \vdash s' : P'$
- (2) $P \rightarrow^* P'$
- (3) $OK_{n'}(P')$

Lemma 3.4. The partial correctness is guaranteed $\vdash \langle H, R, s \rangle$, so that if $\vdash \langle H, R, s, n \rangle$, then $\vdash \langle H', R', s', n' \rangle \nrightarrow Error$

4 Type Inference Algorithm

This section describes how to construct syntax directed typing rules according to the typing rules of above section ,and it provides an algorithm which inputs statements and returns a pair containing constraints and behavior types.

4.1 Syntax Directed Typing Rules

Typing rules showed in Figure 4 are not immediately suitable for type inference. The reason is that the subtyping rule can be applied to any kind of term. This means that, any kind of term s can be applied by either subtyping rule or the other rule whose conclusion matches the shape of the s [8].

In order to yield a type inference algorithm, we should do something with the subtyping rule. The method is to merge the subtyping rule with the other rules by introducing a set C of constraints, where C consists of subtype constraints on behavioral types of the form $P_1 \leq P_2$ and $OK_n(P)$.

Syntax directed typing rules are listed in Figure 5.

$$\frac{C = \emptyset}{\Theta; \Gamma; C \vdash \mathbf{skip} : \mathbf{0}} \quad (\text{ST-Skip})$$

$$\frac{\Theta; \Gamma; C_1 \vdash s_1 : P_1 \quad \Theta; \Gamma; C_2 \vdash s_2 : P_2 \quad C = C_1 \cup C_2 \cup \{P_1; P_2 \le P\}}{\Theta; \Gamma; C \vdash s_1; s_2 : P} \quad (\text{ST-Seq})$$

$$\frac{\Theta; \Gamma; C_1 \vdash y \quad \Theta; \Gamma; C_2 \vdash x : \mathbf{Ref} \quad C = C_1 \cup C_2}{\Theta; \Gamma; C \vdash *x \leftarrow y : \mathbf{0}} \quad (\text{ST-Assign})$$

$$\frac{C = \emptyset}{\Gamma; C \vdash \mathbf{free}() : \mathbf{free}} \quad (\text{ST-Free})$$

$$\frac{\Theta; \Gamma, x; C_1 \vdash s : P_1 \quad C = C_1 \cup \{P_1 \le P\}}{\Theta; \Gamma; C \vdash \mathbf{let} \ x = \mathbf{malloc}() \ \mathbf{in} \ s : \mathbf{malloc}; P} \quad (\text{ST-Malloc})$$

$$\frac{\Theta; \Gamma; C_1 \vdash y \quad \Theta; \Gamma, x; C_2 \vdash s : P_1 \quad C = C_1 \cup C_2 \cup \{P_1 \le P\}}{\Theta; \Gamma; C \vdash \mathbf{let} \ x = y \ \mathbf{in} \ s : P} \quad (\text{ST-LetEq})$$

$$\frac{\Theta; \Gamma; C_1 \vdash y : \mathbf{Ref} \quad \Theta; \Gamma, x; C_2 \vdash s : P_1 \quad C = C_1 \cup C_2 \cup \{P_1 \le P\}}{\Theta; \Gamma; C \vdash \mathbf{let} \ x = *y \ \mathbf{in} \ s : P} \quad (\text{ST-LetDref})$$

$$\frac{\Theta; \Gamma; C_1 \vdash x \quad \Theta; \Gamma; C_2 \vdash s_1 : P_1 \quad \Theta; \Gamma; C_3 \vdash s_2 : P_2 \quad C = C_1 \cup C_2 \cup C_3 \{P_1 \le P, P_2 \le P\}}{\Theta; \Gamma; C \vdash \mathbf{ifnull} \ (x) \mathbf{then} \ s_1 \mathbf{else} \ s_2 : P} \quad (\text{ST-IfNull})$$

$$\frac{\Theta(f) = P_1 \quad C = P_1 \leq P}{\Gamma, \vec{x} : \vec{\tau} \vdash f(\vec{x}) : P} \quad \text{(ST-Call)}$$

$$\frac{\Theta \vdash D : \Theta \quad \Theta; \emptyset; C_1 \vdash s : P \quad C = C_1 \cup \{OK_n(P)\}}{C \vdash (D, s)} \quad \text{(ST-Program)}$$

Figure 5. Syntax Directed Typing Rules

4.2 Algorithm

By syntax directed typing rules, the type inference algorithm has been designed as in Figure 6.

Function $PT_v(x) = (C, \emptyset)$ denotes that it receives a pointer variable x and outputs a pair consisting of constraints set C and an empty set. $PT_{\Theta}(s) = (C, P)$ is a mapping from statements to a pair – constraints set C and behavioral types P, where Θ is mapping from function names to function types. $PT(\langle D, s \rangle) = (C, P)$ denotes that it receives a program and produces a pair (C, P). α_i and β are fresh type variables.

$$\begin{split} PT_{\Theta}(f) &= \\ \mathbf{let} \ \alpha &= \Theta(f) \\ \mathbf{in} \ (C = \{\alpha \leq \beta\}, \beta) \end{split}$$

$$PT_{\Theta}(\mathbf{skip}) &= (\emptyset, 0)$$

$$PT_{\Theta}(s_1; s_2) &= \\ \mathbf{let} \ (C_1, P_1) &= PT_{\Theta}(s_1) \\ \ (C_2, P_2) &= PT_{\Theta}(s_2) \\ \mathbf{in} \ (C_1 \cup C_2 \cup \{P_1; P_2 \leq \beta\}, \beta) \end{split}$$

$$PT_{\Theta}(*x \leftarrow y) &= \\ \mathbf{let} \ (C_1, \emptyset) &= PT_v(*x) \\ \ (C_2, \emptyset) &= PT_v(y) \\ \mathbf{in} \ (C_1 \cup C_2, 0) \end{split}$$

$$PT_{\Theta}(\mathbf{free}(x)) &= (\emptyset, \mathbf{free})$$

$$PT_{\Theta}(\mathbf{let} \ x = \mathbf{malloc}() \ \mathbf{in} \ s) = \\ \mathbf{let} \ (C_1, P_1) &= PT_v(s) \\ \mathbf{in} \ (C_1 \cup \{P_1 \leq \beta\}, \mathbf{malloc}; \beta) \end{split}$$

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PT_{\Theta}(\mathbf{let}\ x = y\ \mathbf{in}\ s) =
          let (C_1,\emptyset) = PT_v(y)
                (C_2, P_1) = PT_{\Theta}(s)
           in (C_1 \cup C_2 \cup \{P_1 \le \beta\}, \beta)
PT_{\Theta}(\mathbf{let}\ x = *y\ \mathbf{in}\ s) =
          let (C_1,\emptyset) = PT_v(y)
                (C_2, P_1) = PT_{\Theta}(s)
            in (C_1 \cup C_2 \cup \{P_1 \le \beta\}, \beta)
PT_{\Theta}(\mathbf{ifnull}\ (x)\ \mathbf{then}\ s_1\ \mathbf{else}\ s_2) =
                  let (C_1, P_1) = PT_{\Theta}(s_1)
                        (C_2, P_2) = PT_{\Theta}(s_2)
                        (C_3,\emptyset) = PT_v(x)
                   in (C_1 \cup C_2 \cup C_3 \cup \{P_1 \le \beta, P_2 \le \beta\}, \beta)
PT(\langle D, s \rangle) =
                let \Theta = \{f_1 : \alpha_1, \dots, f_n : \alpha_n\}
                      where \{f_1, \ldots, f_n\} = dom(D) and \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n are fresh
                 in let (C_i, P_i) = PT_{\Theta}(D(f_i)) for each i
                 in let C'_i = \{\alpha_i \leq P_i\} for each i
                 in let (C, P) = PT_{\Theta}(s)
                 in (C_i \cup C_i') \cup C \cup \{OK(P)\}, P)
```

Figure 6. Type Inference Algorithm

5 Future Work

We have described a type-based approach to safe memory deallocation for non-terminating programs. The approach is based on the idea of decomposing safe memory memory deallocation into partial correctness, which is verified by previous type system, and behavioral correctness. We designed a behavioral type system in our paper for verification of behavioral correctness. Currently, we are looking for a model checker to estimate an upper bound of consumption given a behavioral type and planning to implement a verifier and conduct experiment to see whether our approach is feasible.

References

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Appendix

1. Proof for Lemma Preservation

By induction on the derivation of evaluation rules.

Case:
$$\langle H, R, \mathbf{free}(\mathbf{x}), n \rangle \xrightarrow{\mathbf{free}} \langle H', R', \mathbf{skip}, n+1 \rangle$$
.

From the assumption, we have known that: ① $OK_n(P)$, and ② Θ ; $\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{free}(x) : P$. By the inversion lemma on ②, we have: ③ $\mathbf{free} \leq P$.

From the definition of subtyping, 3 and rule free $\xrightarrow{\text{free}} 0$, we get:

$$\exists P'' \text{ s.t. } \textcircled{1} P \overset{\mathbf{free}}{\Longrightarrow} P'', \text{ and } \textcircled{5} 0 \leq P''$$

We need to prove that there exists P' and Γ' such that:

(6)
$$\Theta$$
; $\Gamma' \vdash \mathbf{skip} : P'$, and (7) $P \stackrel{\mathbf{free}}{\Longrightarrow} P'$

Take P'' as P'. Then \bigcirc holds. By the typing rule T-Skip and \bigcirc , we get:

$$\frac{\Theta; \Gamma' \vdash \mathbf{skip} : 0 \quad 0 \le P''}{\Theta; \Gamma' \vdash \mathbf{skip} : P''} \quad \text{(T-Sub)}$$

Therefore, (6) holds.

Case:
$$\langle H, R, \mathbf{let} \ x = \mathbf{malloc}() \ \mathbf{in} \ s_1, n \rangle \xrightarrow{\mathbf{malloc}} \langle H', R', [x'/x]s_1, n-1 \rangle.$$

From the assumption, we already have $\textcircled{1}\Theta$; $\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{let} \ x = \mathbf{malloc}() \ \mathbf{in} \ s_1 : P$, and $\textcircled{2}OK_n(P)$.

By the inversion lemma and ①, we have ③ **malloc**; $P_1 \leq P$, and ④ Θ ; $\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P_1$ We need to find P' and Γ' such that ⑤ Θ ; $\Gamma' \vdash s_1 : P'$, and ⑥ $P \stackrel{\textbf{malloc}}{\Longrightarrow} P'$ Because of the following derivation:

$$\frac{\mathbf{malloc} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{malloc}} 0}{\mathbf{malloc}; P_1 \xrightarrow{\mathbf{malloc}} 0; P_1}$$

and $0; P_1 \Rightarrow P_1$. Therefore **malloc**; $P_1 \xrightarrow{\text{malloc}} P_1$.

By the definition of subtyping and **malloc**; $P_1 \xrightarrow{\mathbf{malloc}} P_1$, we have that:

$$\exists P'' \text{ s.t. } \circlearrowleft P \stackrel{\mathbf{malloc}}{\Longrightarrow} P'', \text{ and } \otimes P_1 \leq P''$$

Taking P'' as P', then 6 holds.

And by using subtyping rule T-Sub with premises 4 and 8

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P_1 \quad P_1 \le P''}{\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P''} \quad \text{(T-Sub)}$$

Therefore we prove that $\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P'$, \mathfrak{S} holds.

Case: $\langle H, R, \mathbf{skip}; s_1, n \rangle \rightarrow \langle H', R', s_1, n \rangle$.

From the assumption, we have

①
$$\Theta$$
; $\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{skip}$; $s_1 : P$, and ② $OK_n(P)$

By the inversion lemma on ①, we have

(3)
$$\Theta$$
; $\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P_1$, and (4) $0; P_1 \leq P$

We need to prove that there exists P' and Γ' such that

(5)
$$\Theta$$
; $\Gamma' \vdash s_1 : P'$, and (6) $P \to^* P'$

By the definition of subtyping and $0; P_1 \to P_1$, then we get that $\exists P''$

$$(7) P \rightarrow^* P''$$
, and $(8) P_1 \leq P''$

Taking P'' as P', we get $P \to^* P'$

And by using rule T-Sub with premises $\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P_1$ and $P_1 \leq P''$, then we have

$$\frac{\Theta; \Gamma \vdash s_1 : P_1 \quad P_1 \le P''}{\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P''} \quad \text{(T-Sub)}$$

Therefore, we prove that $\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P'$

Case: $\langle H, R, *x \leftarrow y, n \rangle \rightarrow \langle H', R', \mathbf{skip}, n \rangle$.

From the assumption, we already have

$$\bigcirc$$
 \bigcirc \bigcirc \cap $\vdash *x \leftarrow y : P$, and \bigcirc $OK_n(P)$

From the inversion lemma on \bigcirc , we have \bigcirc $0 \le P$.

We need to find P' and Γ' such that

$$(4) \Theta; \Gamma' \vdash \mathbf{skip} : P', \text{ and } (5) P \rightarrow^* P'$$

Taking P as P', then \mathfrak{D} holds.

And because of the following derivation:

$$\frac{\Theta ; \Gamma' \vdash \mathbf{skip} : 0 \quad 0 \leq P}{\Theta ; \Gamma' \vdash \mathbf{skip} : P} \quad \text{(T-Sub)}$$

therefore 4 holds.

Case: $\langle H, R, \mathbf{let} \ x = y \ \mathbf{in} \ s_1, n \rangle \to \langle H', R', [x'/x]s_1, n \rangle$.

From assumption, we have

(1)
$$\Theta$$
; $\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{let} \ x = y \ \mathbf{in} \ s_1 : P$, and (2) $OK_n(P)$.

From the inversion lemma and (1), we have

(3)
$$\Theta$$
; $\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P_1$, and $P_1 \leq P$.

We need to find P' and Γ' such that:

$$\Theta; \Gamma' \vdash s_1 : P' \quad and \tag{1}$$

$$P \xrightarrow{\tau}^* P' \tag{2}$$

Taking P as P'. Therefore (2) holds, because of the definition of \rightarrow^* . And because of the following derivation, (??) holds.

$$\frac{\Theta; \Gamma' \vdash s_1 : P_1 \quad P_1 \le P}{\Theta; \Gamma' \vdash s_1 : P} \quad \text{(T-Sub)}$$

Case: $\langle H, R, \mathbf{let} \ x = \mathbf{null} \ \mathbf{in} \ s_1, n \rangle \to \langle H', R', [x'/x]s_1, n \rangle$

From the assumption, we know that

$$(\mathbb{D}\Theta; \Gamma \vdash \mathbf{let} \ x = \mathbf{null} \ \mathbf{in} \ s_1 : P, \ \mathrm{and} \ (2) \ OK_n(P).$$

By inversion lemma on (??), we get:

$$\Theta$$
; $\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P_1$, and $P_1 \leq P$.

We need to prove that there exists P' and Γ' such that

$$\Theta$$
; $\Gamma' \vdash s_1 : P'$, and $P \to^* P'$.

Taking P as P'. Because of the following derivation, the (??) holds.

$$\frac{\Theta; \Gamma' \vdash s_1 : P_1 \quad P_1 \le P}{\Theta; \Gamma' \vdash s_1 : P} \quad \text{(T-Sub)}$$

And because of the definition of $\stackrel{\tau}{\longrightarrow}^*$, the (??) holds.

Case:
$$\langle H, R, \mathbf{let} \ x = *y \ \mathbf{in} \ s_1, n \rangle \to \langle H', R', [x'/x]s_1, n \rangle$$

From the assumption, we know that

$$\Theta$$
; $\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{let} \ x = *y \ \mathbf{in} \ s_1 : P$, and $OK_n(P)$.

By the inversion lemma on (??), we get:

$$\Theta$$
; $\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P_1$, and $P_1 < P$.

We need to prove there exists P' and Γ' such that:

$$\Theta$$
; $\Gamma' \vdash s_1 : P'$, and $P \to^* P'$.

Taking P as P'. Because of following derivation, the (??) holds.

$$\frac{\Theta; \Gamma' \vdash s_1 : P_1 \quad P_1 \le P}{\Theta; \Gamma' \vdash s_1 : P} \quad \text{(T-Sub)}$$

And because of the definition of $\stackrel{\tau}{\longrightarrow}^*$, (??) holds.

Case
$$\langle H, R, \text{ifnull } (x) \text{ then } s_1 \text{ else } s_2, n \rangle \rightarrow \langle H', R', s_1, n \rangle$$

From the assumption, we have that:

$$\Theta$$
; $\Gamma \vdash$ if $null(x)$ then s_1 else $s_2 : P$, and $OK_n(P)$.

By the inversion learns on (??), we get:

$$\Theta$$
; $\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P_1$, and $p_1 \leq P'$.

We need to prove that there exists P' and Γ' such that:

$$\Theta$$
; $\Gamma' \vdash s_1 : P_1$, and $P \to^* P'$.

Taking P as P'. Because of the following derivation, (??) holds.

$$\frac{\Theta; \Gamma' \vdash s_1 : P_1 \quad P_1 \le P}{\Theta; \Gamma' \vdash s_1 : P} \quad \text{(T-Sub)}$$

And by the definition of $\stackrel{\tau}{\longrightarrow}^*$, (??) holds.

Case: $\langle H, R, f(x), n \rangle \to \langle H', R', [x'/x]s_1, n \rangle$ where the body of function f(x) is s_1 . we can see f(x) and s_1 as s and s' respectively.

From the assumption, we already have

$$\Gamma \vdash f(x) : P$$
, and $OK_n(P)$.

By the inversion lemma and (??), we have

$$P_1 \leq P$$
, and $\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P_1$.

From the definition of subtyping and $P_1 \xrightarrow{0} P_1$, we get $\exists P''$ s.t.

$$P \xrightarrow{0} P''$$
, and $P_1 \leq P''$.

Taking the P'' to be P', then we get $P \xrightarrow{0} P'$. And by using the subtyping rule with premises (??) and (??), we have

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P_1 \quad P_1 \le P'}{\Gamma \vdash s_1 : P'}$$

Therefore we prove that $\Gamma \vdash s' : P'$ where s' is the command s_1 . Finally to prove $OK_{n'}P'$ that is, $\sharp_m(P') - \sharp_f(P') \leq n'$. And proceed by case analysis.

Case $P = \mathbf{skip}; P'$

According to rule E-Skip, we should prove $\sharp_m(P') - \sharp_f(P') \leq n'$ where n' is n. Because we have

$$OK_n(P)$$
 = $OK_n(\mathbf{skip}; P')$
 $\Rightarrow \sharp_m(\mathbf{skip}; P') - \sharp_f(\mathbf{skip}; P') \le n$
 $\Rightarrow \sharp_m(P') - \sharp_f(P') \le n$

Then it is proved.

Case $P = \mathbf{malloc}; P'$

Here according to rule E-Malloc, we know the n' is n-1. Therefore we should prove $\sharp_m(P')-\sharp_f(P')\leq n-1$

$$OK_n(P) = OK_n(\mathbf{malloc}; P')$$

$$\Rightarrow \sharp_m(\mathbf{malloc}; P') - \sharp_f(\mathbf{malloc}; P') \le n$$

$$\Rightarrow \sharp_m(P') + 1 - \sharp_f(P') \le n$$

$$\Rightarrow \sharp_m(P') - \sharp_f(P') < n - 1$$

Then it is proved.

Case $P = \mathbf{free}; P'$

According to rule E-Free, we should prove $\sharp_m(P') - \sharp_f(P') \leq n+1$.

$$OK_n(P) = OK_n(\mathbf{free}; P')$$

$$\Rightarrow \sharp_m(\mathbf{free}; P') - \sharp_f(\mathbf{free}; P') \le n$$

$$\Rightarrow \sharp_m(P') - \sharp_f(P') - 1 \le n$$

$$\Rightarrow \sharp_m(P') - \sharp_f(P') \le n + 1$$

Then it is proved.

Case $P = P_1; P_2$

To prove it by contradiction.

Suppose that $OK_{n'}(P'_1; P_2)$ does not hold. Then we have $P_1; P_2 \xrightarrow{\alpha} P'_1; P_2 \xrightarrow{\exists \sigma} Q$, s.t. $\sharp_m(\sigma) - \sharp_f(\sigma) > n'$

From the premise $OK_n(P) = OK_n(P_1; P_2)$, we get

$$\sharp_m(\alpha \cdot \sigma) - \sharp_f(\alpha \cdot \sigma) \le n \tag{1}$$

From (1), we get

$$\sharp_m(\alpha) + \sharp_m(\sigma) - \sharp_f(\alpha) - \sharp_f(\sigma) \tag{2}$$

and with

$$n' = \begin{cases} n+1, & \alpha = \mathbf{free} \\ n-1, & \alpha = \mathbf{malloc} \\ n, & otherwise \end{cases}$$

Therefore, we get

$$n' + \sharp_m(\alpha) - \sharp_f(\alpha) < \sharp_m(\alpha) + \sharp_m(\sigma) - \sharp_f(\alpha) - \sharp_f(\sigma) \le n$$

When $\alpha =$ free, we get that n + 1 - 1 < n

When $\alpha =$ malloc, we get that n - 1 + 1 < n

When $\alpha = other$, we get that n < n

All of the three cases are equal to n. Therefore we get the contradiction.