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Wybrane artykuły lub inne prace z usługi Cross-Ref:

Robust Benchmark Design, DOI: 10.3386/w20540

Benchmarks in Search Markets, DOI: 10.3386/w20620

Między rynkiem a państwem, DOI: 10.24425/academiapan.2023.147443

The Persuasion Duality, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3474376

The Persuasion Duality, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4206116

Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2600767

Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3523114

Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2859206

Benchmarks in Search Markets, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2515582

The Effects of Post-Auction Bargaining between Bidders, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2550653

Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3609182

The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2785970

Redistribution through Markets, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3143887

Comparison of Screening Devices, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4456198

What Type of Transparency in OTC Markets?, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4431190

A mechanism-design approach to property rights, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4637366

A General Equilibrium Approach to Multidimensional Screening, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2605306

Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms, DOI: 10.3982/ecta15768

Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: On the Optimality of Cutoff Mechanisms, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2892083

Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: On the Impossibility of Pure Information Intermediation, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2892085

Dominujący współpracownicy: