

CS151: Midterm

1 Extended Euclidean Algorithm

a.

$$\begin{aligned}\gcd(216, 85) &= \gcd(46, 85) = \gcd(46, 29) = \gcd(17, 29) = \gcd(17, 12) \\ &= \gcd(5, 12) = \gcd(5, 2) = \gcd(1, 2) = 1\end{aligned}$$

b.

$$a = -2197, \quad b = 6133$$

c.

$$7843^{-1} \equiv -2197 \pmod{21894}$$

because

$$a \cdot 7843 = 1 - b \cdot 21897 \equiv 1 \pmod{21894}.$$

2 Practice with the Chinese Remainder Theorem

a.

Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, we have

$$\begin{aligned}(33 \cdot 58)^{-1} &\equiv 5 \pmod{17} \\ (17 \cdot 58)^{-1} &\equiv 8 \pmod{33} \\ (17 \cdot 33)^{-1} &\equiv 3 \pmod{58}.\end{aligned}$$

b.

We can use the inverses we computed in **part a**. By the Chinese remainder theorem, x can be computed by

$$\begin{aligned}x &\equiv 5 \cdot 5 \cdot (33 \cdot 58) + 28 \cdot 8 \cdot (17 \cdot 58) + 5 \cdot 3 \cdot (17 \cdot 33) \\ &\equiv 181429 \equiv 18736 \pmod{17 \cdot 33 \cdot 58}\end{aligned}$$

3 Tricky Bits

We first prove the intermediate step:

$$|P(x_0 \leftarrow QR_N; x_1 \leftarrow -x_0; b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}; b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(N, x_b) : b = b') - \frac{1}{2}|$$

is negligible under the quadratic residuosity assumption. Given any adversary \mathcal{A} , we want to construct an adversary \mathcal{A}' to the quadratic residuosity problem. Consider the following construction:

Challenger

$$N \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^k); x_0 \leftarrow QR_N; x_1 \leftarrow QNR_N; b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$$

$$\mathcal{A}'(N, x_b)$$

$$y_0 \leftarrow x_b; y_1 \leftarrow -x_b; d \leftarrow \{0, 1\}; b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(N, y_b);$$

and output b'' such that

- if $d = 0$: $b'' = b'$
- if $d = 1$: $b'' = \bar{b}'$

Next we can compute $P(b'' = b)$

$$\begin{aligned} P(b'' = b) &= \frac{1}{4}P(b'' = b | b = 0, d = 0) + \frac{1}{4}P(b'' = b | b = 0, d = 1) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{4}P(b'' = b | b = 1, d = 0) + \frac{1}{4}P(b'' = b | b = 1, d = 1). \end{aligned}$$

We compute the four conditional probabilities one by one:

$$\begin{aligned} P(b'' = b | b = 0, d = 0) &= P(b'' = 0 | b = 0, d = 0) = P(b' = 0 | x_0) \\ P(b'' = b | b = 0, d = 1) &= P(b'' = 0 | b = 0, d = 1) = P(b' = 1 | -x_0) \\ P(b'' = b | b = 1, d = 0) &= P(b'' = 1 | b = 1, d = 0) = P(b' = 1 | x_1) \\ P(b'' = b | b = 1, d = 1) &= P(b'' = 1 | b = 1, d = 1) = P(b' = 0 | -x_1). \end{aligned}$$

We also have

$$P(b' = b | x_0) + P(b' = 1 | -x_0) = P(b' = 1 | x_1) + P(b' = 0 | -x_1)$$

for $x_0 \leftarrow QR_N$ and $x_1 \leftarrow QNR_N$ using the fact that $x \mapsto -x$ is a bijection from between QR_N and QNR_N .

Therefore,

$$P(b'' = b) = P(x_0 \leftarrow QR_N; x_1 \leftarrow -x_0; b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}; b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(N, x_b) : b = b')$$

and by the quadratic residuosity assumption, we know

$$|P(x_0 \leftarrow QR_N; x_1 \leftarrow -x_0; b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}; b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(N, x_b) : b = b') - \frac{1}{2}|$$

is negligible.

Next we prove the indistinguishability from the intermediate step. More precisely, given any adversary \mathcal{A} to the problem

$$N \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^k); s \leftarrow QR_N; b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(N, s^2)$$

we want to construct an adversary \mathcal{A}' to our intermediate problem. Consider the following construction:

Challenger

$$N \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^k); x_0 \leftarrow QR_N; x_1 \leftarrow -x_0; b \leftarrow \{0, 1\};$$

$$\mathcal{A}'(N, x_b)$$

$$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(N, x_b^2)$$

and outputs b'' such that

- if $b' = \text{LSB}(x_b)$: $b'' = 0$
- if $b' \neq \text{LSB}(x_b)$: $b'' = 1$

The advantage of \mathcal{A}' can be computed by

$$\begin{aligned} P(b'' = b) &= \frac{1}{4}P(b'' = b | b = 0, \text{LSB}(x_0) = 0) + \frac{1}{4}P(b'' = b | b = 0, \text{LSB}(x_0) = 1) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{4}P(b'' = b | b = 1, \text{LSB}(x_0) = 0) + \frac{1}{4}P(b'' = b | b = 1, \text{LSB}(x_0) = 1) \end{aligned}$$

Also, because N is an odd number, we have

$$\text{LSB}(x_0) \neq \text{LSB}(x_1).$$

The conditional probabilities can be computed by

$$\begin{aligned} P(b'' = b | b = 0, \text{LSB}(x_0) = 0) &= P(b' = 0 | x_0^2, \text{LSB}(x_0) = 0) \\ P(b'' = b | b = 0, \text{LSB}(x_0) = 1) &= P(b' = 1 | x_0^2, \text{LSB}(x_0) = 1) \\ P(b'' = b | b = 1, \text{LSB}(x_0) = 0) &= P(b' = 0 | x_1^2, \text{LSB}(x_0) = 0) \\ P(b'' = b | b = 1, \text{LSB}(x_0) = 1) &= P(b' = 1 | x_1^2, \text{LSB}(x_0) = 1) \end{aligned}$$

Using the fact that

$$x_0^2 = x_1^2,$$

we have

$$\begin{aligned} &P(b' = 0|x_0^2, LSB(x_0) = 0) + P(b' = 0|x_1^2, LSB(x_0) = 0) \\ &= 2P(b' = LSB(x_0)|x_0^2, LSB(x_0) = 0). \end{aligned}$$

and similarly

$$\begin{aligned} &P(b' = 1|x_0^2, LSB(x_0) = 1) + P(b' = 1|x_1^2, LSB(x_0) = 1) \\ &= 2P(b' = LSB(x_0)|x_0^2, LSB(x_0) = 1). \end{aligned}$$

Combined together, we have

$$P(b'' = b) = P(b' = LSB(x_0)|x_0^2)$$

and therefore, the indistinguishability follows from our intermediate step that

$$|P(b'' = b) - 1/2| \leq \nu(k)$$

for some negligible ν .

b.

In order to show the two distributions are indistinguishable, we can build an adversary to the quadratic residuosity problem from a distinguisher of the two distributions.

We start by defining the distinguisher for two distributions. Consider the following game:

Challenger

$$N \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^k); x_0 \leftarrow QR_N; x_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}; b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$$

and outputs the tuple (N, x_0^2, x_b) .

When $b = 0$, the output is from D_0 and when $b = 1$, the output is from D_1 .

Distinguisher \mathcal{A}

$$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(N, x_0^2, x_b)$$

and the advantage of the distinguisher is defined as

$$\text{Adv}(\mathcal{A}) = |P(b' = 0|b = 0) - P(b' = 0|b = 1)|.$$

We first show

$$\begin{aligned}
& Adv(\mathcal{A}) \\
&= \frac{1}{4} |P(\mathcal{A}(N, s^2, 0) = 0 | LSB(s) = 0) - P(\mathcal{A}(N, s^2, 1) = 0 | LSB(s) = 0) \\
&+ P(\mathcal{A}(N, s^2, 1) = 0 | LSB(s) = 1) - P(\mathcal{A}(N, s^2, 0) = 0 | LSB(s) = 1)|.
\end{aligned}$$

We denote the right hand side by $Adv^*(\mathcal{A})$. The intuition is that for fixed s , $LSB(s)$ is a fixed bit while the random bit b can take values 0 or 1.

This can be proved by writing $P(b' = 0 | b)$ as sum of conditional probabilities:

$$\begin{aligned}
P(b' = 0 | b = 0) &= \frac{1}{2} P(b' = 0 | LSB(x_0) = 0) + \frac{1}{2} P(b' = 0 | LSB(x_0) = 1) \\
&= \frac{1}{2} P(b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(N, x_0^2, 0) : b' = 0 | LSB(x_0) = 0) \\
&+ \frac{1}{2} P(b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(N, x_0^2, 1) : b' = 0 | LSB(x_0) = 1)
\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
P(b' = 0 | b = 1) &= \frac{1}{4} P(b' = 0 | LSB(x_0) = 0, b = 0) + \frac{1}{4} P(b' = 0 | LSB(x_0) = 1, b = 0) \\
&+ \frac{1}{4} P(b' = 0 | LSB(x_0) = 0, b = 1) + \frac{1}{4} P(b' = 0 | LSB(x_0) = 1, b = 1) \\
&= \frac{1}{4} P(b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(N, x_0^2, 0) : b' = 0 | LSB(x_0) = 0) \\
&+ \frac{1}{4} P(b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(N, x_0^2, 1) : b' = 0 | LSB(x_0) = 0) \\
&+ \frac{1}{4} P(b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(N, x_0^2, 0) : b' = 0 | LSB(x_0) = 1) \\
&+ \frac{1}{4} P(b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(N, x_0^2, 1) : b' = 0 | LSB(x_0) = 1)
\end{aligned}$$

Taking the difference, we get

$$Adv(\mathcal{A}) = Adv^*(\mathcal{A}).$$

Given a distinguisher of the above game, we can construct an adversary to the quadratic residuosity problem by using results from **part a**. More specifically, if we can construct a LSB adversary \mathcal{A}' such that

$$|P(LSB(s) = \mathcal{A}'(N, s^2)) - \frac{1}{2}| = Adv^*(\mathcal{A}),$$

we know the advantage of \mathcal{A} is negligible under quadratic residuosity assumption. Consider the following construction:

Challenger

$$N \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^k); s \leftarrow QR_N;$$

$$\mathcal{A}'(N, s^2)$$

$$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}; b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(N, s^2, b)$$

and outputs b'' such that

- if $b = 0, b'' = b'$
- if $b = 1, b'' = \overline{b'}$

The probability that $b'' = LSB(s)$ can be computed by

$$\begin{aligned} P(b'' = LSB(s)) &= \frac{1}{2}P(b'' = LSB(s)|b = 0) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{2}P(b'' = LSB(s)|b = 1). \end{aligned}$$

Next we compute the conditional probabilities:

$$\begin{aligned} &P(b'' = LSB(s)|b = 0) \\ &= \frac{1}{2}P(b' = 0|b = 0, LSB(s) = 0) + \frac{1}{2}P(b' = 1|b = 0, LSB(s) = 1) \\ &= \frac{1}{2}(P(b' = 0|b = 0, LSB(s) = 0) + 1 - P(b' = 0|b = 0, LSB(s) = 1)) \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} &P(b'' = LSB(s)|b = 1) \\ &= \frac{1}{2}P(b' = 1|b = 1, LSB(s) = 0) + \frac{1}{2}P(b' = 0|b = 1, LSB(s) = 1) \\ &= \frac{1}{2}(1 - P(b' = 0|b = 1, LSB(s) = 0) + P(b' = 0|b = 1, LSB(s) = 1)). \end{aligned}$$

Combined together, we get exactly what we need:

$$\begin{aligned} &|P(b'' = LSB(s)) - \frac{1}{2}| \\ &= \frac{1}{4}|P(b' = 0|b = 0, LSB(s) = 0) - P(b' = 0|b = 1, LSB(s) = 0) \\ &\quad + P(b' = 0|b = 1, LSB(s) = 1) - P(b' = 0|b = 0, LSB(s) = 1)| \\ &= Adv^*(\mathcal{A}). \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, by quadratic residuosity assumption, no ppt adversary can guess the bit $LSB(s)$ which implies $Adv^*(\mathcal{A})$ is negligible.

c.

If the statement from **part b** is true, in each of the iterations, $b_i = LSB(s_{i-1})$ is indistinguishable from a random bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$. Intuitively, the resulting bits

$$R = b_1 b_2 \dots b_L$$

should be indistinguishable from L bits randomly generated from $\{0, 1\}^L$.

4 More Fun with One-Way Functions and Pseudorandom Generators

a.

From the definition of a PRG, it has to generate bits that are indistinguishable from a random uniform $y \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ from a random uniform key k . We can consider the OWF as in the homework:

$$f : \{0, 1\}^{2k} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2k}, \quad f(x_1 \circ x_2) = 0^k \circ f_0(x_2)$$

for any OWF $f_0 : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$. The generated distribution is obviously distinguishable from the uniform distribution because the first k bits will always be 0.

b.

$f_b = f(G(x))$ is a one-way function. Given any OWF adversary \mathcal{A} to f_b , we construct a PRG adversary \mathcal{A}' to G .

Challenger

$$k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k; \quad x_0 \leftarrow G(k); \quad x_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2k}; \quad b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$$

$$\mathcal{A}'(1^k, x_b)$$

$$y \leftarrow f(x_b); \quad x' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^k, y)$$

and outputs b' :

- if $f(G(x')) = y$: $b' = 0$
- if $f(G(x')) \neq y$: $b' = 1$

Next we try to compute the probability $P(b' = b)$:

$$P(b' = b) = \frac{1}{2}P(b' = 0|b = 0) + \frac{1}{2}P(b' = 1|b = 1)$$

For each of the conditional probability:

$$\begin{aligned} P(b' = 0|b = 0) &= P(\mathcal{A} \text{ inverts } f(G(k))) \\ P(b' = 1|b = 1) &= 1 - P(b' = 0|b = 1) \end{aligned}$$

In order to bound the second probability, we notice

$$\begin{aligned} P(b' = 0|b = 1) &= P(f(G(\mathcal{A}(1^k), y)) = y|b = 1) \\ &= P(x_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2k}; y \leftarrow f(x_1); x'_1 \leftarrow G(\mathcal{A}(1^k), y) : f(x_1) = f(x'_1)). \end{aligned}$$

If this probability is not negligible, we will get an adversary to the OWF f that outputs inverse with non-negligible probability. Therefore, we have

$$|P(b' = 1|b = 1) - 1| \leq \nu_1(k)$$

for some negligible ν_1 .

Combined together, we have

$$\begin{aligned} |P(b' = b) - \frac{1}{2}| &= \frac{1}{2}|P(\mathcal{A} \text{ inverts } f(G(k))) - P(G(\mathcal{A}) \text{ inverts } f)| \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2}(P(\mathcal{A} \text{ inverts } f(G(k))) - \nu_1(k)). \end{aligned}$$

By our assumption that G is a PRG, we know the left hand side of the inequality is negligible and therefore

$$P(\mathcal{A} \text{ inverts } f(G(k)))$$

is also negligible.

c.

$G_c(x) = G(f(x))$ is not necessarily a PRG because the range of f might not guarantee a uniform distribution over the domain of G . For instance, we can again take f such that

$$f : \{0, 1\}^{2k} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2k}; \quad f(x_1 \circ x_2) = 0^k \circ f_0(x_2) \circ 0,$$

where

$$f_0 : \{0, 1\}^{k-1} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{k-1}$$

is any length-preserving OWF.

Our PRG G will be the length-doubling Blum PRG constructed as in **Problem 3**:

$$G : \mathbb{Z}_N^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{4k+2},$$

where $N = pq$ with two $2k + 2$ -bit primes p and q . We start by showing that

Claim $f(x_1 \circ x_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$.

This can be shown by directly counting the number of bits. Both p and q are $2k$ -bits while $f(x_1 \circ x_2) \leq 2^{k+1}$. Therefore, none of p, q divides $f(x_1 \circ x_2)$, which proves our statement.

For the Blum PRG, the first step is to take the square $f(x_1 \circ x_2)^2 \bmod N$. Next we show

Claim $f(x_1 \circ x_2)^2 \leq N$.

This follows from the fact that

$$f(x_1 \circ x_2) \leq p, \quad f(x_1 \circ x_2) \leq q.$$

Finally, we conclude that the distribution generated by $G(f(x_1 \circ x_2))$ is distinguishable from the uniform random distribution on $\{0, 1\}^{4k+2}$ because

$$LSB(f(x_1 \circ x_2)^2) = 0.$$

This follows from the fact that $f(x_1 \circ x_2)$ is even.