

CSC1300

Asymmetric
Encryption



Today

- Posted issue of HW:
 - #1: use all 3 types
 - #2: If no soln,
tell me why
- HW due Friday

Last time

AES:

(also a bunch of Z_n)

Since working in
 Z_{256} or Z_{512} ,
addition is XOR

Weakness:

Need a common key
(secret)

More interesting :

How do we agree on a secret key?

Best way: Physically exchange

However, impractical for things like web traffic or email.

Public Key Cryptography:

Encryption function E ,
decryption D ,

Goals:

$$\textcircled{1} \quad D(E(M)) = M \\ (\text{and } E(D(M)) = M)$$

\textcircled{2} $E + D$ are fast

\textcircled{3} Given E , hard to derive D

Diffe-Hellman Key exchange

From "New directions in
cryptography"

by Diffie & Hellman in 1976

Daily conspiracy tidbit:

Actually discovered by UK
government in 1973!

Key exchange:

- Start with \mathbb{Z}_p

(p prime or power of a
prime)

These groups have
multiplicative inverses:

$$\text{i.e. } 2x \equiv 1 \pmod{5}$$

$x = 3$ is inverse

The protocol: Alice + Bob:

- p + $s < p$ are both public
- Alice chooses secret $a < p$
Bob chooses secret $b < p$
- Alice ~~sends~~ $A = s^a \bmod p$
Bob ~~sends~~ $B = s^b \bmod p$

Alice computes:

$$K = B^a \bmod p$$

Bob computes:

$$K = A^b \bmod p$$

$$\begin{aligned} B^a &= (s^b)^a \\ A^b &= (s^a)^b \end{aligned} \quad \left. \right\} = S^{ab}$$

Example:

- $s = 2$, $p = 29$
- Alice picks $a = 3$
Bob picks $b = 7$

$$A = 2^3 \bmod 29 \\ \equiv 8 \quad \text{← Alice sends}$$

$$B = 2^7 \bmod 29 \\ = 12 \quad \text{← Bob sends}$$

$$8^7 \bmod 29 \\ 12^3 \bmod 29 \quad \} = 17$$

Why?

Common key is $k = s^{ab} \bmod p$

Public info: $p, s, A = s^a \bmod p$
and $B = s^b \bmod p$

What can an attacker try?

$$\begin{aligned} A \cdot B &= (s^a)(s^b) \\ &= s^{a+b} \quad X \end{aligned}$$

Attacker must find
"hidden" exponent.

Hardness?

At its root, the key to why this is difficult is the discrete log problem:

Remember logarithms?

$$\log_{10} 1000 =$$

$$\log_2 1024 =$$

Here, discrete version:

Given A , find $\log_s A$

$= \log_s s^A \pmod{p}$

How hard?

This problem is connected
to factoring

↳ NOT NP-Hard!
But no efficient ^{Poly}^{ynomial} algorithms
are known.

Other key exchange algorithms
work in other groups
(like elliptic curves)

RSA := Rivest, Shamir & Adleman

Its hardness is tied to factoring

⇒ any fast algorithm to factor a number would break RSA.

First: More number theory!

Euler's totient function, $\Phi(n)$:

$\Phi(n) :=$ # of positive integers $\leq n$ that are relatively prime to n .

Ex.: $\Phi(12) = \cancel{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11}$

If p is prime:

$$\Phi(p) = p - 1$$

$$\Phi(7) = \cancel{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}$$

What about non-primes?

Interesting special case when

$$\underline{n = pq}, \quad p \text{ & } q \text{ prime}$$

What is not relatively prime with n ?

Divisors: $p+q$
 $2p, 3p, \dots, q \cdot p$
 $2q, 3q, \dots, p \cdot q$

So $\overline{\Phi}(pq) =$
 $pq - p - (q-1)$
 $\dots = (q-1)(p-1)$

Why we care:

Remember, a number k has to be relatively prime to n in order to have a multiplicative inverse in \mathbb{Z}_n .

Ex: 5 in \mathbb{Z}_{22}

$$5 \cdot 9 = 45 \equiv 1 \pmod{22}$$

\swarrow \nwarrow
 9 is 5's inverse

Euler's Thm: $n \in \mathbb{Z}$, and

$x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ s.t. $\gcd(x, n) = 1$.

Then $x^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$.

So:

To compute inverses, need

- gcd algorithm ↗
- $\Phi(n)$

Then Euler's thm:

$$x^{\overline{\Phi(n)}} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

$$\Rightarrow x \circ (x^{\overline{\Phi(n)}^{-1}}) \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

More generally, inverses
in \mathbb{Z}_n are a bit
more complex...

Back to RSA: (ie why we care!)

Steps: Select 2 large primes $p \neq q$

• Let $n = pq$

$$\hookrightarrow \varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$$

• Select $e \neq d$ s.t.

- e and $\varphi(n)$ are relatively prime

$$- ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$$

→ How to get d ?

Computing inverses:

Remember Euclidean alg:

$$\text{gcd}(x, n) = d$$

$$\text{gcd here} = 1$$

Can augment EA to give

$$ix + jn = \text{gcd}(x, n) = d$$

Now, if $\text{gcd}(x, n) = 1$:

$$(x + j)n = 1$$

in \mathbb{Z}_n ,

$$x = 1 \pmod{n}$$

Extended Euclidean Algorithm:

Euclidean algorithm
computed:

$$d = \gcd(a, b)$$

by doing

$$\gcd(a, b) = \gcd(b, a \bmod b)$$


Let $r = a \bmod b$

$$\Rightarrow a = bq + r$$

for some $q \in \mathbb{Z}$

We will modify Euc Alg so that each call returns not just the gcd, but also i & j

$$\text{where } d = i \cdot b + j \cdot r$$

$i =$  inverse mod b

Some ugly math:

Goal:

Had $r = a \bmod b$
and $a = qb + r$
 $\Rightarrow r = a - qb$

If $d = ib + jr$
 $= (b + j)(a - qb)$
 $= (j \cdot a + (i-j)b)$

j here is
 a 's inverse mod b .

Extended Euc Alg (a, b):

If $b = 0$ return $(a, 1, 0)$ } $a = 1 \cdot a + 0 \cdot b$

else

{ $r \leftarrow a \bmod b$

{ $q \leftarrow$ integer part of $\frac{a}{b}$

$(d, i, j) \leftarrow$ Extended Euc Alg (b, r)

return $(d, j, i - jq)$

Runtime:

$\mathcal{O}(\log n)$

So : RSA (finally!)

Bob: Selects 2 large primes $p \neq q$

• Let $n = pq$

$$\hookrightarrow \varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$$

• Select $e \neq d$ s.t.

- e and $\varphi(n)$ are relatively prime

- $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$

\hookrightarrow Extended Euc Alg

Now:

- (e, n) is public key
- d is private key
(also $p \neq q$)

Encrypting : Alice gets (e, n) .

She takes a message M ,
with $0 < M < n$.
(chops into pieces)

Then:

$$C \leftarrow M^e \bmod n$$

(Remember public part:
 (e, n) was key)

Alice sends C to Bob

Decrypting: Bob gets C

$$C = M^e \bmod n$$

Bob calculate:

$$C^d \bmod n \leftarrow M$$

Claim:

Why?

$$\begin{aligned} C^d \bmod n &= (M^e)^d \bmod n \\ &= M^{ed} \bmod n \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Know } ed = 1 \bmod \Phi(n)$$

$$M^{ed} = M^{(\frac{\Phi(n)}{2} + 1)} \bmod n$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= (M^{\frac{\Phi(n)}{2}})^k \cdot M^1 \bmod n \\ &= \underbrace{(M^{\frac{\Phi(n)}{2}})^k}_{\text{Euler theorem}} \cdot M^1 \bmod n = M \end{aligned}$$

So: Why secure?

Bob can decrypt!

He knows (secret) d .

Attacker Eve's goal:
Figure out d !

How?

- o Bob needed $\Phi(n)$, since d is e 's inverse mod n .

- o Attacker knows n (but not $\Phi(n)$).

How to find $\Phi(n)$?

So:

whole thing is secure, as long as we can't get $\Phi(n)$, or $p+q$.

Bad news: Factoring is NOT NP-Hard.

Best algorithm:

Number field sieve:

$$\mathcal{O}(e^{(\frac{44}{d} \log n)^{1/3}} (\log \log n)^{2/3})$$

Some practical notes

- RSA can be used to encrypt entire message
(but usually isn't)
- Slow (compared to XOR-ing)
- Easier to break than AES or other symmetric protocols
- Also: I was assuming $(M, n) = 1$!
Here, saved since $n = p \cdot q$,
 $\& M$ will be relatively prime to p or q .

