

# Section Notes 12

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## Agenda

1. Monopoly and Price Discrimination
2. Learning-By-Doing (Practice Problem 23.3)
3. Bertrand (Price Competition) vs. Cournot (Quantity Competition)<sup>1</sup>
4. Stackelberg Model (variant of Cournot)<sup>2</sup>
5. Kreps-Sheinkman (1983) (time permitting)<sup>3</sup>

## 1 Price Discrimination and Monopoly

Types of price discrimination<sup>4</sup>

1. First Degree Price Discrimination: Monopolist observes the type of the consumer and is able to calculate each consumer's demand correspondences (or their willingness to pay). The monopolist uses this to charge each individual his or her willingness to pay. AKA perfect price discrimination or individual pricing. Generally, the FB outcome can be implemented, but the monopolist seller gets all of the surplus.
2. Second Degree Price Discrimination: Monopolist is unable to observe the types of each consumer, and so proposes a menu of prices and quantities. Consumers self-select themselves into their optimal quantity and price, which can be derived using the Revelation Principle (see MWG 14.C.2 for more information). Screening models. Ex) Intel's 486 DX and SX, and 487 micro processors, where SX is just a damaged version of the DX, and 487 was an upgrade of the SX to the DX.

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<sup>1</sup>To be covered in Econ 2020b.

<sup>2</sup>To be covered in Econ 2020b.

<sup>3</sup>To be covered in Econ 2020b.

<sup>4</sup>This taxonomy isn't really helpful in understanding price discrimination, but almost all of the text books have it.

3. Third Degree Price Discrimination: Monopolist is unable to observe types, but is able to observe something immutable that is related to a consumer's willingness to pay. Monopolist charges based on this characteristic.

## 1.1 Basic Monopolist's Problem

Recall that a producer/seller of goods in a competitive market must solve its profit maximization problem which can be written as follows:

$$\max_q [pq - c(q)] \Rightarrow p = c'(q^C),$$

or the price (which is exogenous) is equal to the marginal cost.

The monopolist's problem is slightly different:

<sup>5</sup>

$$\max_q p(q)q - c(q) \Rightarrow p(q^M) + p'(q^M)q^M = c'(q^M), \quad (1)$$

where the LHS of equation 1 is the marginal revenue  $\left(\frac{d[p(q)q]}{dq}\right)$  of the monopolist and the RHS is the marginal cost. We see that  $p(q^M) > c'(q^M)$  because  $p'(\cdot) < 0$ , which means that the price under a monopoly exceeds the marginal cost of production. This in turn means that  $q^M < q^C$ .

## 1.2 Harvard Football Example

Assume that the good of interest is The Game football tickets, which are being supplied by a monopolistic seller with cost function equal to:  $c(Q) = \frac{Q^2}{20}$ , where  $Q$  is the total number of tickets supplied to the market, including both those supplied to alumni and to students:  $Q = q_a + q_s$ .

Further assume that there are two types of consumers: alumni and students. The demand function for alumni can be written as:  $q_a(p_a) = 100 - p_a$  and  $q_s(p_s) = 200 - 10p_s$ . The monopolist has information on whether a consumer is a student or an alumni and so is able to engage in Third Degree Price Discrimination.

### 1.2.1 No Students

If we assume that students are in reading period and unable to attend, the monopolist's problem is:

$$\max_{q_a=Q} \{p_a(Q) \cdot Q - c(Q)\} = \max_Q \left\{ (100 - Q) \cdot Q - \frac{Q^2}{20} \right\}, \quad (2)$$

the FOCs are (assuming an interior solution):

$$100 - 2Q - \frac{Q}{10} = 0 \Rightarrow Q^* = q_a^* \approx 47.6,$$

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<sup>5</sup>Notice that we use the inverse demand function  $p(\cdot)$  in the objective function.

and the resulting optimal price and profit are:  $p_a^* \approx 52.4$  and  $\pi_{npd}^* = q_a^* \cdot p_a^* - c(q_a^*) \approx 2381$ .

### 1.2.2 Third Degree Price Discrimination<sup>6</sup>

Now the monopolist solve the following problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{q_a, q_s} \{p_a(q_a) \cdot q_a + p_s(q_s) \cdot q_s - c(q_a + q_s)\} &\Rightarrow \\ \max_{q_a, q_s} \left\{ (100 - q_a) \cdot q_a + \left(20 - \frac{q_s}{10}\right) \cdot q_s - \frac{(q_a + q_s)^2}{20} \right\} \end{aligned}$$

which has the following FOCs:

$$100 - 2q_a = \frac{(q_a + q_s)}{10} \quad (3)$$

$$20 - \frac{q_s}{5} = \frac{(q_a + q_s)}{10} \quad (4)$$

Solving the system of linear equations 3 and 4 results in  $q_a^* \approx 45.2$ ,  $p_a^* \approx 54.8$ ,  $q_s^* \approx 51.6$ ,  $p_s^* \approx 14.84$ , and  $\pi_{pd}^* = q_a^* \cdot p_a^* + q_s^* \cdot p_s^* - c(q_a^* + q_s^*) \approx 2774 > \pi_{npd}^*$ .

## 2 Learning-By-Doing, Practice Problem 23.3

See solutions.

## 3 Bertrand vs. Cournot Duopoly

**Proposition 3.1.** *In the Bertrand Duopoly model, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium  $(p_1^*, p_2^*)$ , where the two identical firms set their prices equal to the marginal cost  $c$ .*

- Both firms earn zero profits.
- Since price is equal to marginal cost, we get the perfectly competitive outcome with only two firms.
- Because of Bertrand competition, each firm faces infinitely elastic demand correspondences given the price of the other firm.
- Therefore, monopoly is the only form of price distortion that can arise.

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<sup>6</sup>We're going to see this problem again when we start adverse selection. Consider the optimization problem of a monopolist who is unable to engage in Third Degree Price Discrimination and so can't tell whether the ticket buyer is a student or alumni.

**Proposition 3.2.** *In the Cournot Duopoly model where per unit cost  $c > 0$  for both firms and the inverse demand function  $p(q)$  is such that  $p'(q) < 0$  and  $p(0) > c$ ; any Nash Equilibrium  $(q_1^*, q_2^*)$  will result in market prices greater than  $c$  and smaller than the monopoly price.*

- Firms earn positive profits and we are not in a perfectly competitive equilibrium.
- Oligopolies arise under the Cournot model.

Let's look at an example with linear inverse demand functions and constant marginal costs. Assume that both firms have marginal costs equal to  $c$ , and the inverse demand function is linear:  $P(Q) = \alpha - Q$ , where  $Q = q_1 + q_2$ . Further assume that  $\alpha > c$ . The profit function for each firm can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_1(q_1; q_2) &= q_1 P(q_1 + q_2) - cq_1 = (\alpha - c - q_2)q_1 - q_1^2 \\ \pi_2(q_2; q_1) &= q_2 P(q_1 + q_2) - cq_2 = (\alpha - c - q_1)q_2 - q_2^2.\end{aligned}$$

We can derive the best response functions<sup>7</sup> for each firm by using the FOCs of each firms' profit maximization problem. Therefore, the best response function for firm  $i$  is:<sup>8</sup>

$$q_i = b_i(q_j) = \frac{\alpha - c - q_j}{2} \quad \forall i \in \{1, 2\}. \quad (5)$$

By the definition of Nash Equilibrium,<sup>9</sup> we know that the following two equations must hold at  $(q_1^*, q_2^*)$ :

$$\begin{aligned}q_1^* &= \frac{\alpha - c - q_2^*}{2} \\ q_2^* &= \frac{\alpha - c - q_1^*}{2}.\end{aligned}$$

Solving the two equations above defines the Nash Equilibrium:

$$(q_1^*, q_2^*) = \left( \frac{\alpha - c}{3}, \frac{\alpha - c}{3} \right), \quad (6)$$

which results in total output  $Q_{Cournot} = \frac{2}{3} \cdot (\alpha - c)$  and equilibrium price  $P_{Cournot} = P\left(\frac{2}{3} \cdot (\alpha - c)\right) = \frac{1}{3} \cdot (\alpha + 2c)$ .

Three remarks:

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<sup>7</sup>More on best response functions next semester. For now, note that the best response function for player  $i$  maps player  $j$ 's strategy onto the optimal strategy for player  $i$ . In short,  $B_i : \Sigma_j \rightarrow \Sigma_i$ , where player  $i$ 's strategy is an element of  $\Sigma_i$  and player  $j$ 's strategy is an element of  $\Sigma_j$ .

<sup>8</sup>Note that the profit functions for the firms are symmetric. This means that the FOCs will be symmetric leading to symmetric best response functions.

<sup>9</sup>For now, just note that at the Nash Equilibrium, all player's best response functions must hold.

1.  $P_{Cournot} = \frac{1}{3} \cdot (\alpha + 2c) > c$  ( $\because \alpha > c$ ).
2.  $Q_{Cournot} = \frac{2}{3} \cdot (\alpha - c) > Q_{Monopoly} = \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\alpha - c)$ .
3. Each firm earns profits equal to:  $\frac{1}{9} \cdot (\alpha - c)^2$ <sup>10</sup>

## 4 Stackelberg Model

One of the assumptions underlying the Cournot model above was that each firm didn't know how much the other firm was producing. However, what happens if firm 2 is now able to observe how much firm 1 produces and produces accordingly?<sup>11</sup> Further, since firm 1 knows that firm 2 is observing its output, will firm 1 change its output from the Cournot equilibrium identified above?

To repeat the set up from Section 1: Assume that both firms have marginal costs equal to  $c$ , and the inverse demand function is linear:  $P(Q) = \alpha - Q$ , where  $Q = q_1 + q_2$ . Further assume that  $\alpha > c$  and that firm 1 produces first and then firm 2 produces.

In equilibrium, let's assume that firm produces  $q_1^*$ . The firm 2's profit maximization problem is equal to:

$$\max_{q_2} P(q_1^* + q_2)q_2 - cq_2 = \max_{q_2} (\alpha - c - q_1^*)q_2 - q_2^2,$$

the FOC for the above optimization problem results in:

$$q_2^* = b_2(q_1^*) = \frac{\alpha - c - q_1^*}{2}. \quad (7)$$

Because firm 1 knows that firm 2 will best respond to any output  $q_1$  that firm 1 produces, firm 1's profit maximization problem is:

$$\max_{q_1} P\left(q_1 + \frac{\alpha - c - q_1}{2}\right) q_1 - cq_1 \Rightarrow \max_{q_1} \frac{1}{2} \cdot q_1 \cdot (\alpha - c - q_1). \quad (8)$$

The FOC identifies the optimal level of production for firm 1 as:

$$q_1^* = \frac{\alpha - c}{2}, \quad (9)$$

and equation 7 identifies the optimal production of firm 2 as:

$$q_2^* = \frac{\alpha - c}{4}. \quad (10)$$

Two remarks in relation to the Cournot model above:

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<sup>10</sup>The monopolist's profit maximization problem is:

$$\max_Q P(Q) \cdot Q - cQ \Rightarrow \max_Q (\alpha - c)Q - Q^2.$$

FOC identifies the monopolist's optimal production level:  $Q_{Monopoly} = \frac{\alpha - c}{2}$ . Plugging this back into the objective function leads to profit equal to  $\frac{1}{9}(\alpha - c)^2$ .

<sup>11</sup>In game theory, this is sequential action, and the relevant equilibrium concept is subgame perfect equilibrium.

1.  $Q_{Stackelberg} = \frac{3}{4} \cdot (\alpha - c) > Q_{Cournot} = \frac{2}{3} \cdot (\alpha - c) > Q_{Monopoly} = \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\alpha - c)$ , which means that the equilibrium price in the Stackelberg model is less than that of the Cournot model.
2. Comparing the profits of each firm to that of the Cournot model:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_1^{Stackelberg} &= \frac{1}{8} \cdot (\alpha - c)^2 > \frac{1}{9} \cdot (\alpha - c)^2 = \pi_1^{Cournot} \\ \pi_2^{Stackelberg} &= \frac{1}{16} \cdot (\alpha - c)^2 < \frac{1}{9} \cdot (\alpha - c)^2 = \pi_2^{Cournot}.\end{aligned}$$

## 5 Kreps-Scheinkman (1983)

In the Cournot model, we assume that firms compete on the basis of quantity produced. We can interpret this as a firm choosing its production capacity. If that is the case, then what is the equilibrium when firms first choose their capacity levels and then engage in Bertrand price competition? This is the question addressed by David M. Kreps and Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983, *Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes*, Bell Journal of Economics, 14(2): 326-337. The result of the paper is clearly stated in the title of the article.

Let's examine this result using MWG 12.C.11(a).<sup>12</sup>

Consider a capacity constrained duopoly pricing game. Firm  $j$ 's capacity is  $q_j$  for  $j = 1, 2$ , and it has a constant cost per unit of output of  $c \geq 0$  up to this capacity limit. Assume that the market demand function  $x(p)$  is continuous and strictly decreasing at all  $p$  such that  $x(p) > 0$  and that there exists a price  $\bar{p}$  such that  $x(\bar{p}) = q_1 + q_2$ . Suppose also that  $x(p)$  is concave and let  $p(\cdot) = x^{-1}(\cdot)$  denote the inverse demand function.

The rationing scheme is as follows:

If  $p_j > p_i$ :

$$x_i(p_1, p_2) = \min \{q_i, x(p_i)\} \quad (11)$$

$$x_j(p_1, p_2) = \min \{q_j, \max \{x(p_j) - q_i, 0\}\} \quad (12)$$

and if  $p_j = p_i = p$ :

$$x_i(p_1, p_2) = \min \left\{ q_i, \max \left\{ \frac{x(p)}{2}, x(p) - q_j \right\} \right\}, \forall i \in \{1, 2\}.$$

Further assume that the higher value consumers (those consumers with a higher willingness to pay) are served first.

Suppose that  $q_1 < b_1(q_2)$  and  $q_2 < b_2(q_1)$ , where  $b_i(q_j)$  is the best response function for a firm  $i$  given production level  $q_j$  by firm  $j$ . Show that  $p_1^* = p_2^* = p(q_1 + q_2)$  is a Nash Equilibrium.

<sup>12</sup>I won't cover 12.C.11(b), since you need to know some game theory concepts.

Assume that firm 2 charges  $p_2^* = p(q_1 + q_2)$ , the price at which both firms are producing at their respective capacities. If firm 1 charges  $p_1 \leq p(q_1 + q_2)$ , firm 1 will sell its full capacity level  $q_1$ , resulting in profits equal to  $(p_1 - c)q_1$ , which is less than the profits that firm 1 would get if it charged  $p_1^* = p_2^* = p(q_1 + q_2)$ ,  $(p_1^* - c)q_1$ .<sup>13</sup> Therefore, there is no profitable deviation for firm 1 to charge below  $p_2^*$ .

Is there a profitable deviation for firm 1 to charge above  $p_2^* = p(q_1 + q_2)$ ? Note that from the rationing scheme set out above in equations 11 and 12, the residual demand for firm 1 can be rewritten as follows:

$$x_1(p_1, p_2) = \min \{q_1, x(p_1) - q_2\}.$$

Note that  $x(p_1) - q_2$  is the solution to firm 1's profit maximization problem:

$$\max_{x_1} \{p(x_1 + q_2) - c\} x_1 \text{ s.t. } x_1 \leq q_1.$$

Solving the maximization problem results in a best response function:  $x_1^* = b_1(q_2)$ , which by assumption is greater than firm 1's capacity:  $b_1(q_2) > q_1$ , meaning that firm 1 can't produce  $b_1(q_2)$ . Therefore, we have a corner solution to the problem, where  $x_1^* = q_1$ . Therefore,  $p_1 = p(q_1 + q_2) = p_2^*$  and we have contradiction.

Therefore, it is optimal for firm 1 to charge  $p(q_1 + q_2)$  given that firm 2 does the same.

By symmetry, the same argument applies to firm 2 and so we are at an equilibrium.

Since we know the result of the Bertrand price competition given capacity constraints, firms will now maximize profits by solving for the optimal capacities  $(q_1^*, q_2^*)$ , given prices will equal  $p(q_1 + q_2)$ . Sound familiar? It should, because this is the set up of the Cournot model.

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<sup>13</sup>Notice how important the capacity constraints are. Unlike in our previous Bertrand example, firm 1 does *not* produce goods to satisfy the entire demand.

(e) Explain in words how the monopolist's maximization problem is analogous to a consumer problem with quasilinear utility.

(f) For what values of  $F$  can the firm operate profitably? What is the firm's average total cost as a function of  $F$ ?

(g) Identify a range of values for  $F$  such that (1) the firm makes a profit with  $y^*, z^* > 0$ ; and (2) the firm's average total cost is greater than 30, the price in the world market. Could the firm be accused of "dumping" its product on the world market when  $F$  is in this range of values and it sells in both markets?

### 23.3 Learning by Doing (Adapted from MWG 12.B.8)

Consider the following two-period model. A firm is a monopolist in a market with the same inverse demand function in each period:  $p(Q) = 48 - Q$ . The cost per unit in period 1 is 24. In period 2, however, the monopolist has "learned by doing" and so its constant cost per unit of output is  $c_2 = 24 - Q_1/2$  where  $Q_1$  is the period 1 output level.

(a) Assume that the monopolist acts myopically in period 1 – maximizing period 1 profits without accounting for the effect of period 1 output on period 2 costs. What level of output will the monopolist choose in each period?

(b) Assume that the monopolist chooses output in both periods simultaneously – maximizing the (undiscounted) sum of profits in the two periods after accounting for the effect of period 1 output on period 2 costs. What level of output will the monopolist choose in each period? Explain the relationship between the monopolist's first-period output in (a) and in (b).

(c) What level of output would be implemented by a benevolent, but myopic social planner who directs the firm to set price = marginal cost in each period without accounting for the effect of period 1 production on period 2 marginal costs.

(d) What level of output would be implemented by a benevolent social planner who wishes to maximize the (undiscounted) sum of social surplus (value of goods to consumers minus costs of production) across the two periods? NOTE: It may be helpful to compute separately (1) the total value of goods produced in period 1 as a function of  $Q_1$ , (2) the total value of goods produced in period 2 as a function of  $Q_2$ , (3) the total cost of goods produced in period 1 as a function of  $Q_1$ , (4) the total value of goods produced in period 2 as a function of  $Q_1$  and  $Q_2$ .

(e) Is there any sense in which the planner's choice of period 1 output is selected so that "price equals marginal cost"?



where price = 55 is much greater than the price on the world market (and “dumping” is an artifact of that behavior).

### 23.3 Learning by Doing

(a) The first-order conditions for myopic monopoly profit maximization are given by  $MR = MC$  in each period.

In Period 1,  $MR_1 = 48 - 2Q_1$  and  $MC_1 = 24$ , so the myopic optimal quantity is given by  $Q_{1m} = 12$ .

Then period 2  $MC = MC_2 = 18$ . Setting  $MR_2 = MC_2$  yields  $48 - 2Q_2 = 18$ , so the myopic optimal quantity is given by  $Q_{2m} = 15$ .

(b) Given  $Q_1$  and  $Q_2$ , the monopolist has

Period 1 Revenue:  $(48 - Q_1) Q_1$

Period 1 Cost :  $24 Q_1$

Period 2 Revenue:  $(48 - Q_2) Q_2$

Period 1 Cost :  $(24 - Q_1 / 2) Q_2$

So the monopolist's total profit over two periods is given by

$$\pi(Q_1, Q_2) = (48 - Q_1) Q_1 + (48 - Q_2) Q_2 - 24 Q_1 - (24 - Q_1 / 2) Q_2$$

The first-order conditions are given by

$$\partial \pi / \partial Q_1 = 48 - 2Q_1 - 24 + Q_2 / 2 = 0; \quad (1)$$

$$\partial \pi / \partial Q_2 = 48 - 2Q_2 - 24 + Q_1 / 2 = 0. \quad (2)$$

Solving (2) for  $Q_2$  gives  $Q_2 = 12 + Q_1 / 4$ . Substituting this into (1) gives

$$24 - 2Q_1 + (12 + Q_1 / 4) / 2 = 0$$

$$\text{OR } 30 - 15 Q_1 / 8 = 0$$

$$\text{OR } Q_1 = 16.$$

Solving for  $Q_2$  given  $Q_1 = 16$  gives  $Q_2 = 16$ . Note that you could also solve (1) and (2) by inspection, observing that the symmetry of these conditions should produce an optimal pair of quantities where  $Q_1 = Q_2$ .


A forward-looking monopolist increases  $Q_1$  from the myopic value of 12 from (a) to account for the effect of  $Q_1$  in reducing marginal costs in period 2. In addition, the monopolist also increases  $Q_2$  from the myopic value of 15 from (a) as a result of increased production in period 1 – and thus reduced marginal costs in period 2.

(c) Setting  $48 - Q_1 = 24$  yields  $Q_1 = 24$ . In turn,  $Q_1 = 24$  reduces marginal cost from 24 to 12 in period 2.

With  $MC = 12$  in period 2, the planner directs the firm to choose quantity  $Q_2$  satisfying  $48 - Q_2 = 12$  or  $Q_2 = 36$ .

(d) Figure 21.3 shows the demand curve and marginal cost curves in period 1, assuming quantity  $Q_1 = 32$ .

**Figure 21.3(a) Learning by Doing Values**



Total Value of Goods in Period 1: The total value of goods produced in period 1 is the area under the demand curve for quantities up to 32 and is equal to the sum of (1) the triangle with endpoints  $(0, 48)$ ,  $(0, 16)$ ,  $(32, 16)$ ; (2) the rectangle with endpoints  $(0, 0)$ ,  $(0, 16)$ ,  $(32, 0)$ ,  $(32, 16)$ .

As a function of  $Q_1$  the triangle has height  $Q_1$  and base  $Q_1$  so its area is half the product or  $1/2 Q_1^2$ . As a function of  $Q_1$ , the rectangle has area  $Q_1 (48 - Q_1)$ . Adding these two gives the value of goods produced in period 1:  $Q_1 (48 - Q_1) + 1/2 Q_1^2$  or  $48 Q_1 - 1/2 Q_1^2$ .

Total Value of Goods in Period 2: Iterating this reasoning, the total value of goods produced in period 2 takes the similar form  $48 Q_1 - 1/2 Q_1^2$ .

Total Cost of Goods in Period 1: The total cost of goods produced in period 1 is simply  $Q_1 * MC_1 = 24 Q_1$ .

Total Cost of Goods in Period 2: The total cost of goods produced in period 1 is simply  $Q_2 * MC_2 = (24 - Q_1 / 2) Q_2$ .

Adding values and subtracting costs in periods 1 and 2 gives the objective function for the social planner:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Social Surplus}(Q_1, Q_2) &= 48 Q_1 - 1/2 Q_1^2 + 48 Q_2 - 1/2 Q_2^2 - 24 Q_1 - (24 - Q_1/2) Q_2 \\ &= 24 Q_1 - 1/2 Q_1^2 + 24 Q_2 - 1/2 Q_2^2 + Q_1 Q_2 / 2\end{aligned}$$

Differentiating with respect to  $Q_1$  and  $Q_2$  gives the first-order conditions for the two-period planner's problem:

$$24 - Q_1 + Q_2 / 2 = 0, \quad (3)$$

$$24 - Q_2 + Q_1 / 2 = 0. \quad (4)$$

Solving for  $Q_1$  in (3) yields  $Q_1 = 24 + Q_2 / 2$ . Substituting this equation in (4) yields

$$\begin{aligned}24 - Q_2 + 12 + Q_2 / 4 &= 0, \\ \text{OR } Q_2 &= 48,\end{aligned}$$

which in turn identifies  $Q_1 = 48$ .

Comparing the results of (c) and (d), the planner also produces too little in both periods by myopically setting price = MC in each period.

Note that the benevolent social planner solves the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{Q_1, Q_2} \left[ \int_0^{Q_1} (48 - Q_1) dQ_1 + \int_0^{Q_2} (48 - Q_2) dQ_2 - 24Q_1 - \left( 24Q_2 - \frac{Q_1 Q_2}{2} \right) \right]$$

(e) Given any choice of  $Q_1$ , the marginal cost in the second period will be  $24 - Q_1 / 2$ . Thus, a one unit increase (say) in  $Q_1$  will cause a one-half unit reduction in marginal cost in period 2, corresponding to a reduction in total costs in period 2 of  $Q_2 / 2$ .

Combining the direct (immediate cost) and indirect (reduced future costs) of production in the first period yields an "Adjusted Marginal Cost" of  $24 - Q_2 / 2$ .

With this adjustment, the planner can be seen as choosing first-period quantity to set first-period price = adjusted marginal cost:

$$48 - Q_1 = 24 - Q_2 / 2$$