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Week 4 - April 24, 2020

These practice problems are pulled from Ljungqvist and Sargent (2018).

1. Random discount factor Consider a Huggett-style incomplete markets model where individual households face discount factor shocks. A household has preferences over consumption of a single good ordered by a value function defined recursively by

$$v(\beta_t, a_t, s_t) = u(c_t) + \beta_t \mathbb{E}_t \Big[ v(\beta_{t+1}, a_{t+1}, s_{t+1}) \Big]$$

where  $\beta_t \in (0,1)$  is the time t value of a discount factor, and  $a_t$  is time t holding of a single asset. Here v is the discounted utility for a consumer with asset holding  $a_t$ , discount factor  $\beta_t$ , and employment state  $s_t$ . The discount factor evolves according to a three-state Markov chain with transition probabilities  $P(\beta'|\beta) = Prob(\beta_{t+1} = \beta'|\beta_t = \beta)$ . The discount factor and employment state at t are both known. The household faces the sequence of budget constraints

$$c_t + qa_{t+1} \le a_t + s_t$$

where  $s_t$  evolves according to an n-state Markov chain with transition probability  $Q(s'|s) = Prob(s_{t+1} = s'|s_t = s)$ . The household faces the borrowing constraint  $a_{t+1} \ge -\phi$  for all t. Formulate Bellman equations for the household's problem and define a stationary equilibrium for this economy.

- 2. Unemployment There is a continuum of workers with identical probabilities  $\lambda$  of being fired each period when they are employed. With probability  $\mu \in (0,1)$ , each unemployed worker receives one offer to work at wage w drawn from the cumulative distribution function F with the support [0,B]. If he accepts the offer, the worker receives the offered wage each period until he is fired. With probability  $1-\mu$ , an unemployed worker receives no offer this period. The probability  $\mu$  is determined by the function  $\mu = f(U)$ , where U is the unemployment rate, and f'(U) < 0, f(0) = 1, f(1) = 0. A worker's utility is given by  $\mathbb{E}_{t=1}^{\infty} = \beta^t y_t$ , where  $\beta \in (0,1)$  and  $y_t$  is income in period t, which equals the wage if employed and zero otherwise. There is no unemployment compensation. Each worker regards U as fixed and constant over time in making his decisions.
  - a. For fixed U, write the Bellman equation for the worker. Argue that his optimal policy has the reservation wage property.

**b.** Given the typical worker's policy (i.e., his reservation wage), display a difference equation for the unemployment rate. Show that a stationary unemployment

$$\lambda(1-U) = Uf(U)[1-F(\bar{w})],$$

where  $\bar{w}$  is the reservation wage.

**c.** Define a stationary equilibrium.