UDK 355/359 CODEN SMOOAM ISSN 1409-8199

МЕЃУНАРОДНО НАУЧНО СПИСАНИЕ

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

CMD
ONTEMPORARY
ACEDONIAN
EFENCE

Vol. 19, Number 36, 2019

36

VOL. XIX
SKOPJE
JUNE 2019

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА	Год. 19	Број 36	Стр. 1-116	Скопје 2019
CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE	Vol.	No	pp	Skopje

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE

ISSN 1409-8199
e-ISSN 1857-887X

Година 19, бр. 36, јуни 2019 / Vol. 19, No. 36, June 2019

Skopje
June 2019

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

Издавач:
МИНИСТЕРСТВО ЗА ОДБРАНА НА РЕПУБЛИКА СЕВЕРНА МАКЕДОНИЈА

Министерство за одбрана
„СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА“
„Орце Николов“ 116 1000 Скопје
Телефони: 02 3128 276, 02 3113 527
Интернет адреса:
WEB на Министерството за одбрана:
http://www.morm.gov.mk/sovremena-makedonska-odbrana/
Списанието излегува два пати годишно.
ISSN 1409-8199
Скопје, јуни 2019 година

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CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE

Publisher:
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

Ministry of Defence
„CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE“
„Orce Nikolov“ 116 1000 Skopje
Tel.: 02 3128 276, 02 3113 527
Internet address:
WEB of the Ministry of Defence:
www.morm.gov.mk/contemporary-macedonian-defence/
The magazine is published twice a year
ISSN 1409-8199
Skopje, June 2019

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CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL OF
THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

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351.57
Original scientific article

THE PROCESS OF EVALUATION OF NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THE BASIS FOR SECURITY POLICY-MAKING AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

Yantsislav YANAKIEV[1]

Abstract:*The first part of the article presents a theoretical analysis of different approaches to define the concept of "national interest", as well as ways and means for classification and prioritisation of national interests. In addition, it presents a brief analysis of the inter-relation between the concepts of national interests and national power, as well as security risks and threats. Finally, it summarises some guidelines how to organize a subject matter expert study to evaluate the national interests of a particular country as the first step in security policy formulation.*

Keywords:*national interests, national power, security policy, security risks and threats*

Introduction

The goal of this article is to suggest a practical approach to evaluate national interests as the basis for security policy-making and strategy development of any country.

We are going to use in this publication the umbrella term "evaluation of national interests" to define the process of identification, classification and prioritization of the interests of any nation.

To achieve this goal, the first part is focused on the analyses of different theoretical models and practical approaches to define, classify and prioritise national interests. The following part presents a practical example of a subject matter expert study in Bulgaria to evaluate national interests. As a final point, it deals with the interrelationships between the processes of evaluation of national interests, identification of risks to those interests and the defence strategies development to guarantee the national purposes and goals.

Before going into the real analysis, we would like to present two citations which demonstrate the role and the importance of the concept of "national interest" in international politics. The first one is of the British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston from 1848: "We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." (Cited from Don McNamara, 2016).

The second quote is of the former Czech President Václav Havel from 1999 who, about a century later, stated: "Individual countries must gradually abandon a foreign policy category that, so far, has usually been critical to their thinking: the category of national interests. National interests are more likely to divide us than bring us together" (Havel, 1999, pp. 4-5).

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Definition of the concept of "national interest"

From a linguistic point of view, according to Webster's dictionary, the definition of "national interest" is "the interest of a nation as a whole held to be an independent entity separate from the interests of subordinate areas or groups and of other nations or supranational groups" (Merriam-Webster Dictionary online, no date).

One of the most frequently cited political scientists, Donald Neuchterlein, argues that the term "national interest" has been used by political leaders and scholars since the founding of the nation-states to describe the aspiration and goals of sovereign entities in the international area (Neuchterlein, 1976, p. 246). In his latter works, Neuchterlein further developed the use of the concept of "national interest" as a tool for both analysis and policy development. He defined the term "national interests" as "the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to the sovereign states comprising its external environment". In addition, the author developed a template that offers definitions of four versions of national interest (Survival, Vital, Major, and Peripheral), based on their relative intensity (Neuchterlein, 1983, p. 38).

Another prominent political scientist, Hans Morgenthau in the 50's of the past century stated: "The meaning of national interest is survival - the protection of physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nation-states" (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 86). In addition, the author describes "National Interest" as a key concept in international relations. Furthermore, he claims that all the nation-states are constantly engaged in the process of fulfilling or securing the goals of their national interests, and the foreign policy of each nation is formulated based on its national interest. Therefore, it is a universally accepted right of each state to secure its national interests (Morgenthau, 1951, p. 134). Finally, Morgenthau defines two levels of national interest, the vital and the secondary. Vital interests assure a state its security, its freedom and independence, protection of its institutions, and enshrinement of its values. Vital interests also negate compromise and represent issues over which the state is willing to wage war. Secondary interests are more difficult to define, but do involve compromise and negotiation (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 191). In this way, Morgenthau discusses what the national interest is in the face of the actual world of power politics.

Charles Lerche and Abdul Said define the concept of national Interest as "The general, long-term and continuing purpose which the state, the nation, and the government all see themselves as serving" (Lerche and Said, 1963, p. 19).

Another well-known political scientist from the sixties of the 20th century, Vernon Von Dyke argues, "National Interest is, that which states seek to protect or achieve in relation to each other. It means desires on the part of sovereign states" (Van Dyke, 1962, pp. 567–576).

According to Liotta, "the national interest demands the willingness of a state to uphold its morals and national values with the commitment of its blood, treasure,

time, and energy, to achieve sometimes specific and sometimes in specific ends. National interests reflect the identity of the people, i.e. their geography, culture, political sympathies, social consensus, as well as their levels of economic prosperity and demographic makeup. Thus, national interests are little more than a broad set of often abstract guidelines that allow a nation to function the way it believes it best should function" (Liotta, 2004, pp. 46-57).

Similarly, to Morgenthau, Dawn stresses the vital interests of a state of which survival is the first and foremost interest. A state's independence and territorial integrity come above all other interests (Dawn, 2010, no page).

Classification of National Interests

This part of the article presents a review of the Methodology for Determining Interests and Levels of Intensity developed for the U.S. Army War College. In order to be more precise in examining the interest, which a nation seeks to secure, the document presents a six-fold classification of interests, which nations try to secure. The Methodology outlines the following classification of national interests.

First, the primary interests or those interests in respect of which no nation can compromise. They include the preservation of physical, political and cultural identity against possible violations by other states. A state has to defend these at all costs

Second, secondary interests, which are less important than the primary interests are, but in the same time are quite vital for the existence of the state. This includes for example, the protection of the citizens abroad and ensuring of diplomatic immunities for the diplomatic staff.

Third, permanent interests, which refer to the relatively constant long-term interests of the state. These are subject to very slow changes. The U.S. interest to preserve its spheres of influence and to maintain freedom of navigation in all the oceans is the examples of such interests.

Fourth, variable interests or those interests of a nation, which are considered vital for national good in a given set of circumstances. In this sense, these can diverge from both primary and permanent interests. The variable interests are largely determined by "the cross currents of personalities, public opinion, sectional interests, partisan politics and political and moral folkways."

Fifth, the general interests refer to those positive conditions, which apply to a large number of nations or in several specified fields such as economic, trade, diplomatic relations etc. To maintain international peace is a general interest of all the nations. Similar is the case of disarmament and arms control.

Sixth, specific Interests, which are the logical outgrowths of the general interests and these are defined in terms of time and space (Yarger and Barber, 1997, pp. 118-125).

Approaches for prioritisation of national interests

As we discussed earlier, Donald Neuchterlein suggests a prioritisation of national interests in the following four categories: survival, vital, major, and peripheral and four types: defence, economic, favourable world order, and ideological (Neuchterlein, 1983, p. 38).

Following Neuchterlein's approach, some current authors suggest more practice-oriented classification of national interests for the purposes of political decision-making process. For example, Liotta suggests grouping national interests in two groups: Core Strategic Interests and Interests of Significant Value. The author introduces working definitions of "survival interest" as a nation's physical existence if threatened by an attack. The use of military force is unquestionably advanced in support of survival interests.

Next on the intensity scale are "vital interests" where serious harm to the nation occurs unless dealt with using strong measures, including force. Nations are unwilling to compromise these interests; the maintenance of territorial integrity is an example of a vital national interest.

"Major interests" are next on the intensity scale. Similar to vital interests, a primary difference between the two is that use of force is not deemed necessary in the defence of major interests. Finally, "peripheral interests" affect nation's overall interests but do not really pose a threat to the nation as a whole (Liotta, 2004, pp. 46-57).

The suggested definitions are expected to enable consistency to be applied in determining what actions and means are necessary to achieve which desired ends.

The next publication which deserves attention with regards to prioritisation of national interests is "A Report from the Commission on America's National Interests" from 2000.

The report suggests several steps in the process of national interests' evaluation and the use of this evaluation for policy-making and strategy development.

The first step is to evaluate the necessity interests (Primarily - Secondary) and to prioritise making a hierarchy of interests.

The document outlines four groups of national interests: vital, extremely important, important, and less important or secondary. The definition used for vital interest is "essential to the existence or continuance of something; indispensable for survival". "Extremely important" interests are precisely those interests or conditions that if compromised would severely prejudice, but not strictly imperil, the ability of the US government to safeguard and enhance Americans' well-being in a free and secure nation. "Important" interests are again not irrelevant, but also not critical to the survival, or even prosperity, of Americans. Compromise of "important" interests could, however, have negative consequences for the safeguarding and enhancing of Americans' well-being. Finally, the interests listed under "less important or secondary" are intrinsically desirable, but have no major effect on the ability of the US government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans.

The next step in the analysis focuses on the links among national interests, current opportunities to advance national interests and threats to those interests, as well as longer-term developments that could threaten or advance these interests.

Third, once interests are identified and prioritised, choices about preferred policies require complex analyses of threats and opportunities, options for action, costs and benefits, and capacities for implementation (America's National Interests, 2000).

The interrelation between the concepts of "national interest" and "national power"

The concept of "national interest" is closely linked to the concept of "national power". We maintain that actually, both concepts are key components of international politics and they describe the process of struggle for power among Nations in which each nation seeks to secure its desired goals and objectives of national interests.

A noted scholar, Hans Morgenthau defines international politics as "the struggle for power" and "power politics." "The aspiration for power," he wrote, "is "the distinguishing element of international politics." "The struggle for power," he continued, "is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience." In addition, Morgenthau identifies the elements of national power as geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, and the quality of government." Finally, he underlines the close link between national interests and national power. (Morgenthau, 1968, pp. 25-27).

Another frequently quoted scholar Frederick Hartman defines National Power as "the ability of a nation to fulfil national goals. It tells us as to how much powerful or weak a particular nation is in securing its national goals" (Hartman, 1978, p. 26).

Abramo Organski argues: "National Power is the ability of a nation to influence the behaviour of others in accordance with its own ends." (Organski, 1968, p. 172).

Some scholars, for example John Spanier and Robert L. Wendzel, focus on power as a means, the strength or capacity that provides the "ability to influence the behaviour of other actors in accordance with one's own objectives" (Spanier and Wendzel, 1996, p. 128).

Without going deep in theoretical discussion on the topic of national power, for the purpose of this publication we can agree to use the following definition of the term "National Power": The ability and capability of a nation to secure the long-term goals and objectives in international relations and to achieve its national interests; It involves the capacity to use force or threat of use of force or influence over others for securing the national interests.

Many authors, for example David Jablonsky describes three major dimensions of national power in international politics: 1.) Military Power; 2.) Economic Power;

3.) Psychological Power. The three forms of national power are inseparable from each other. Without economic power, no nation can develop its military power, and without the latter, no nation can play an active role in international relations. Psychological power can be enduringly and really effective only when it is backed by economic and military power. The instruments of national power (Geographic, natural resources, and population/demographics; military, informational, diplomatic, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic; and the national will) are the means, or resources, which a nation can use to achieve the desired end in international policy (Jablonsky, 1997).

What have we learned from the analysis so far?

Based on the review of different approaches to define the concepts of "national interest" and the identified relationships with the concept of national power, we can summarize several conclusions.

First, both politicians and scholars have broadly used the concept of "national interest" for quite a long time as the basis for international relations and politics. This concept is as old as the founding the nation-states. The foreign policy of each nation has been formulated on the basis of its national interest. The central element of the concept of national interest in the 50's of the 20th century is the survival of the nations in the context of the world of power politics. In this context, state's independence, sovereignty and protection of the state territory are key values. Some current publications add to the survival of the nation as the key component of national interest, the identity of the people, their culture, social consensus, levels of economic prosperity, demographic situation, etc.

Second, most often national interests are defined as the claims, objectives, ends, goals, demands and well-being that a sovereign nation always tries to preserve, protect, defend and secure in relations with other nations. In addition, the concept of "national interest" is generally related to national values. The focus is on long-term and comparatively stable ends that the nations aim to achieve. In this regard, it is important to remember the statement of Lord Palmerston that Britain has no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies. British interests are eternal and perpetual.

Third, it is clear that one can use the concept of "national interest" both as a tool for analysis and policy development. In this regard, the view of Morgenthau of national interest as vital and secondary and the classification of Neuchterlein of national interests as Vital, Major, Humanitarian, and Peripheral according to their relative intensity deserve particular attention from the view point of policy-making and strategy development.

Fourth, the lack of ability of scholars and policy-makers to determine and distinguish core strategic interests (vital) from significant (secondary) and peripheral interests might lead to a problem with respect to concentrating resources (means) and taking the right actions (ways) to achieve their ends and objectives. This is a very important and definitely

not easy task. Indeed, the misrepresentation of what constitutes a vital national interest may lead to strategic mistakes and can threaten the future of the states.

Fifth, it is important to underline the interrelationship among national interests, national power, strategy and disruptive defence technologies development. The national interests were defined as the highest level of long-term and comparatively unchangeable national goals or ends that a nation or group of nations aim to achieve. The National Power is the means that a nation can use to secure the long-term goals and objectives in the international relations and to achieve its national interests. The role of the strategy is to balance the ends, ways, and means to protect, preserve, and promote national interests applying the instruments of national power. Finally, the role of new disruptive technologies is crucial in this process because the technological progress directly influences the national power and development of defence strategies.

A Case study: Determination of the Bulgarian national interests by 2035[2]

Introduction

This part of the article presents an approach for identification, classification and prioritisation of the Bulgarian interests according to National Interest Matrix based on a Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) study. The aim is to demonstrate a practical approach how to implement an evaluation of national interests based on SMEs study.

The text is based on an expert assessment carried out with 54 participants from the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence and other structures of the security sector, academia and non-governmental organisations.

The goal of the study was to evaluate the Bulgarian national interests and the associated risks to those interests in order to formulate policy guidelines on how to guarantee the national interests in perspective up to 2035.

The methodology included a round table discussion and brainstorming with relevant experts. It started with introductory briefings to achieve common situational awareness of:

- The main trends in the development of the security environment by 2035 (global regional and national dimensions)
- The main developments in technology, economy, environment and human factors by 2035;
- Approaches to scenario development, introduction of common working terminology in the group in terms of security risks, threats, favourable events and factors, etc.

2 This part of the report is based on an unpublished paper from 2014 by authors Yantsislav Yanakiev and Peter Mollov on the topic of Determination of the Bulgarian national interests and the main risk factors for the Bulgarian security by 2035.

The experts worked in parallel and independently in three groups for two days. Representatives of different structures and departments formed the groups. All groups had the same tasks.

Results

As a first step, during the brainstorming session, the SMEs started by writing down an exhaustive list of national interests. After that, they were asked to cluster the identified national interests in 4-5 groups and prioritise them from vital interests to peripheral. Each group prepared a presentation for the plenary session. At the plenary, the group spokespersons presented a report on the results of the work and the assessments received. After the reports, a general discussion was held and the conclusions were formulated. They outline the zones of agreement and the subject areas where there were large differences between the groups.

On the basis of the general perception of the world in 2035 and the brainstorming sessions at the end of the expert assessment, the Bulgarian national interests were defined and clustered in five groups 1) "Security", 2) "Prosperity of the Bulgarian citizens", 3) "A modern state", 4) "Preserved identity, culture and moral values", and 5) "Conserved nature and resources". The content of each group is presented in Table 1.

Classification of the National Interests of the Republic of Bulgaria
1. Security (Individual, national, collective, regional stability) **(Vital interest of the nation)**
Sovereignty and Territorial integrity
The unity of the nation
Personal security of the Bulgarian citizens
Internal security and order
Rule of law
Strong national military power
Developed democratic institutions
Influence in the Black Sea region
Low Crime
Low Corruption
Integration into NATO and the EU
Regional security
Energy security, diversified energy resources
Integration of neighbouring countries in NATO and EU
Harmonized interests with Allies
2. Prosperity of the Bulgarian citizens (Other important interests)
High level welfare of the Bulgarian citizens
Overcoming demographic crises
Ethnic and religious tolerance

	Highly efficient and well-functioning health system
	Highly efficient and well-functioning education system
	Protected Minority Rights
	Protected democratic values
	Protected civil rights
	Guaranteed education
	Guaranteed healthcare
	Guaranteed social security and support
3.	**A modern state (Other important interests)**
	Industrial development
	Economic prosperity based on the latest technology development
	Financial prosperity and stability, national financial independence
	High Tech economy development
	Low power consumption
	Equal socio-economic development of the regions
	Developed transport infrastructure
	Developed tourism
	Developed trade
	Developed agriculture (GMO free)
	Efficient use of national assets and resources
	Full use of national marine resources
	Full control of national natural resources
	Developed science and technology
	Active participation in joint international research projects
	Advanced technologies (development and use)
	Protection of Critical Infrastructure, High Tech Management, Cyber-security.
	Developed civil society
	Attractive investment environment
	A good business environment
4.	**Preserved identity, culture and moral values (Other important interests)**
	Spiritually united Bulgarians around the world
	Preserved Bulgarian national identity
	Integrated population with a common culture and national identity
	Preserved cultural and historical heritage
	Pride of belonging to the Bulgarian nation
	Ethnic and religious tolerance
	Protected rights and freedoms of the Bulgarian communities outside the country
5.	**Conserved nature and resources (Peripheral)**
	Restored flora and fauna (forests, diverse plants and animals)
	Clean environment
	Healthy environment
	Preserved nature
	Full control of natural resources (preserved)

Table 1: Classification of the National interests of the Republic of Bulgaria

It is important to mention that the identified five groups of national interests did not fully correspond with the definitions and classification given in the official documents (The Bulgarian National Security Concept). The results from the SMEs study gave an opportunity to identify broader list of interests and to enrich the existing definitions.

During the SMEs study, we identified some methodological lessons that may be useful. The first lesson is related to the selection of the experts. It is important to attract as diverse as possible a panel of experts to cover all structures of the security sector and state institutions, academia, non-governmental organisations and other stakeholders. Second, our approach was qualitative based on round table discussions and brainstorming. It would be better to apply both qualitative as a first step followed by a quantitative methodology (e.g. Delphi method) to measure the SMEs assessments. Moreover, in order to obtain reliable results, several rounds of SMEs assessment need to be organised in an attempt to reach agreement among the experts. Finally, yet equally important, it is necessary to achieve a shared situational awareness among the experts at the very beginning of the SMEs study. Therefore, it is critical to start with an introduction of common terminology and briefings on the topics of the study (national interests, threats and security risks).

Practical guidelines on how to identify, classify and prioritize national interests of a particular country

The suggested approach for identification, classification and prioritisation of national interests of a particular country can be implemented into practice by using a panel of relevant SMEs. Having in mind our experience, we would suggest some practical methodological recommendations.

First, it is important how the SMEs are selected and motivated. It is necessary to guarantee that the experts in the country under scrutiny are represented in the study as much as possible (decision-makers in the defence and security sector, military, law enforcement agencies, intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, academia, civil society, media, etc.). It is important to guarantee as broad as possible opinions and include the viewpoints of different stakeholders.

To achieve this goal, there are at least two approaches. First, to ask different institutions to identify their relevant experts which means that the institution X identifies the expert Y as a person who will present in the best possible way the position and the viewpoint of the institution. The second approach is to apply a snowball sample starting from a list of well-known experts and asking them to recommend their colleagues who are authorities in the field. After several rounds of names collection, the list of experts can be finalized because the names will start to repeat. This is the so-called “snowball sample”. Both approaches are useful in defining the sample of SEMs to participate in the evaluation process.

A second important requirement is to identify the data collection methodology for the SMEs. The first option is to use a quantitative methodology (a detailed questionnaire for the experts) to fill out and give their assessments and arguments. The other option is to use a qualitative methodology, as the example of the Bulgarian case study by means of brainstorming, round table discussions, etc.

The advantage of the qualitative approach is that it provides an opportunity to apply the Delphi method in several rounds of data collection from the SMEs in order to achieve consensus among their opinions. This method is originally developed as a systematic, interactive forecasting technique, which counts on a panel of experts. It is based on the principle that forecasts (or evaluations) from a structured group of individuals are more accurate than those from unstructured groups. The experts fill out the questionnaire in two or more rounds depending on when consensus among them will be achieved. After each round, the SMEs study director provides an anonymised summary of the experts' evaluations from the previous round, as well as the reasons they provided for their judgments. Thus, experts are encouraged to review and possibly revise their earlier answers in light of the replies of the other members of the panel in order to achieve consensus. The evaluation process can stop after reaching a predefined criterion (e.g., achievement of consensus, fixed number of rounds, stability of results, etc.). Then the basic statistics like mean, mode and median scores of the final results are calculated and interpreted (Okoli and Pawlowski, 204, pp. 15-29).

It is important to underline that some authors warn about possible weaknesses and inaccuracies of the Delphi method, which is related to the fact that future developments are not always predicted correctly by consensus of experts. The typical human factor of ignorance is important. If panellists are not informed about a topic, or they maintain very divergent opinions, the use of the Delphi method may not produce proper results (Green, Armstrong & Graefe, 2007, pp. 17–20).

Another methodological issue that has to be taken into account is the limited ability of Delphi to make complex forecasts with multiple factors. Initially, the potential future elements were usually considered as if they had no effect on each other. Later on, several extensions to the Delphi method were developed to address this problem such as the Cross Impact Analysis that takes into consideration the possibility that the occurrence of one event may change the probabilities of the other events covered in the survey.

The Cross-Impact Analysis is the umbrella term given to a family of techniques designed to evaluate changes in the probability of occurrence of a set of events arising from the actual occurrence of one. The Model was introduced as a tool for reporting interactions between a set of forecasts when these interactions may not be taken into account when making individual estimates. Thus, the Cross-Impact Analysis provides a framework for examining and assessing the impact of multiple related components for future scenarios among themselves, while facilitating additional information about the system's relevant properties (Green, Armstrong & Graefe, 2007), pp. 17–20).

Briefly, the combined application of Delphi and Cross Impact Analysis as possible instruments for data collection and analysis in SMEs study will be a successful approach to evaluate the national interests of a particular country. Based on our experience, we would recommend using both the quantitative and the qualitative methodology for the SMEs study to evaluate national interests in order to achieve more reliable and representative results. The qualitative approach can be used as an initial study to help identify and define criteria/items to be included in the SMEs questionnaire and then measured in a quantitative survey. As the Bulgarian case study demonstrated, we applied a qualitative methodology (brainstorming and round table discussions) in several rounds for identification and prioritisation of the Bulgarian national interests according to National Interest Matrix.

Regarding the organization of the SEMs study, it is important to start with an information session for presenting the goal, the expected results, a brief presentation of each expert on the panel, introduction of common terminology and briefings on the topics of the study (national interests, threats and security risks). The goal is to achieve a shared situational awareness among the experts because usually before the study they have different level of information and knowledge on the topic, use different concepts and definitions and have different experience in participating in such endeavours. Therefore, it is critical for the success of the study that the experts attain a common initial picture of the situation, to know very well what are the expected results and the sequence of the activities during the study. It is important also from the viewpoint of motivation, to give them information on how the results will be used and in which way they can influence the decision-making process. Finally, yet just as important, it is recommended that the organizers of the SMEs study include at least one question that will help prove the level of expertise of the participants. This could be questions about their level of knowledge, source of information, previous experience, etc.

Conclusions

This section of the article summarizes some ideas of how to link up the processes of evaluation of national interests, the identification of risks to those interests and the defence policy to guarantee the national purposes and goals.

First, the concept of "national interest" is and will continue to be the basis of international relations and politics. Nowadays we are witnesses of broadening the meaning of the concept which, in addition to the survival of the nations, also includes the well-being of the people, their culture, social consensus, levels of economic prosperity, demographic situation, etc. The focus of the definitions is on the long-term and comparatively stable ends that the nations aim to achieve. The concept of "national interest" is both a tool for analysis and policy development. In this regard, from the viewpoint of practical approach, their classification as Vital, Major, Humanitarian, and Peripheral according to their relative intensity is particularly important for evaluating national interests. The appropriate classification and prioritisation of the national interests is the starting point for identification of security risks and defence policy formulation and implementation in order to allocate adequate resources and to take proper actions to achieve

the desired ends. In this regard, national interests and national power are closely interlinked concepts and they are basis of international relations.

Second, over the centuries the concept of national interest has been related to continuous conflicts and wars because of the pursuit of national interest by all nations. There exists close interrelation between geopolitics and national interests. Often, we are witnesses of "asymmetry of interest" (Friedman, 2018, no page), particularly among the Great Powers. Therefore, it is obvious that this conflict potential has to be minimised through continuous adjustment of contradictory interests by diplomatic means. While we are on the subject, it is very important to have in mind the warning of President Havel that focusing too much on the concept of national interests in foreign policy formulation can have a more dividing effect than bringing the nations together in the European Union. This is critical in a situation of rising nationalisms and the return to the rules of "power politics" in international relations.

Fourth, the aim of the article was to summarize a practical approach to evaluate the national interests of a particular country as the basis for security policy-making and strategy development. Based on the analysed theoretical models and practical approaches to define and classify national interests, several sequential steps are recommended as building blocks in this approach. First, defining the main trends that will shape the security environment in the decades to come. Second, identifying national interests and how the described trends are expected to influence them. Third, evaluating the necessity interests on the axes primarily – secondary. Fourth, prioritising and making a hierarchy of interests from survival to less important. Fifth, analysing the links among national interests and current opportunities to advance national interests and threats to those interests, as well as longer-term developments that could threaten these interests. Sixth, formulating policy options including possible actions (i.e., courses of action or ways), using the resources (i.e., means or capabilities) resident in the instruments of national power to deter and contain, deny and disrupt, discredit and delegitimize, and decisively defeat these threats and protect national interests.

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314.15:351.75(4)
Original scientific article

MIGRATION IN THE SECURITY POLICIES OF THE CENTRAL AND SOUTH EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

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Abstract: *This paper deals with migration as a matter that is increasingly faced by European countries, especially those on the migration path, or those that are the ultimate destination of migrants. Over the past decade, especially after the intensification of the conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East, migration to Europe is becoming more and more intense and attracts growing public attention. Connecting these migrations with increased threats of terrorism and rising crime has also influenced the securitization of migration in a number of states. In order to establish the linkages between migration and security, the national security strategies of the selected countries will be analyzed before and after the major migration wave 2015/2016 which moved from Greece to Germany. The theoretical concept of this paper is the securitization theory introduced by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies.*

Key words: *migration, Europe, security, security policy, securitization.*

1. Introduction

Contemporary migration is attracting an ever increasing attention not only by decision-makers, but also by researchers who are trying to respond to the growing number of issues related to migration. Political decision-makers are trying to shape more appropriate policies they need to respond to the challenges of modern migration. For this purpose, important research on migration and scientific responses to fundamental issues related to the causes, course and consequences of modern, especially illegal migrations, are important. Migrations traditionally have a humanitarian and economic dimensionalism and in various ways have marked human history. Because of the growing environmental problems and climate change in some parts of the world, migration also has an ecological dimension. War conflicts, military interventions, ethnic conflicts and political crises are increasingly burdening the modern world, giving migrations a greater security dimension. This applies not only to the security of the countries which migrants are forced to leave, but also to transit countries that are on the way to their ultimate destination. The link between security and migration has always existed, and has become especially apparent since the end of the Cold War. This has led to migration being also studied in the framework of security studies and the emergence of new approaches to security studies in

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which military dimensions are also beginning to study other dimensions of security. Immediately before the end of the Cold War, in the 1980s, security studies began to spread the concept of security both vertically and horizontally (Buzan, 1991). Vertical expansion meant that besides national security, security began to be observed both at the individual and international levels. Horizontal expansion meant that the military dimension of security must be associated with the social, economic, ecological and political dimensions. This development was primarily related and attributed to authors such as Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde and Ole Wæver, representatives of the Copenhagen Security Study (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). The changed access to security has also affected a change in the perception of whose security is more important, or which are the dominant threats to security. Although after the Cold War the state remained the central level and the most important reference security object, other security reference objects have emerged. In addition to the war as a traditional source of security threats, numerous other sources of security threats, including migration, have emerged. Another important concept developed within the Copenhagen School of Security Studies is the concept of securitization - which, relying on social constructivism, explains how under certain circumstances an issue becomes a security risk and requires the implementation of extraordinary measures by different subjects. Representatives of the securitization theory do not advocate the view that the process of securitization is the right solution to overcome the challenges motivated by various social phenomena and processes, such as migration. They advocate something quite the opposite - de-securitization, as a process of managing a particular situation or process within the standards of administrative and political procedures.[3] In order to manage migrations and respond to migration as a challenge, contemporary states introduce into their legislation provisions that are differently related to migration and which are taken from international legal documents or defined in terms of the specific interests of each country. An increasing number of countries, especially those increasingly exposed to migration, additionally introduce into their legislation strategic document provisions that migration is not only understood as a humanitarian and economic, but also as a security issue. To do this, this paper will try to answer the question: Does modern migration affect the change of the legislative framework and especially the strategic documents in the area of national security in Central and South Eastern Europe and, if so, how? In answering this question, the assumption is that modern migration, in particular illegal migration, directly or indirectly, changed the country's approach to migration in Central and South-Eastern Europe, and that this approach evolved from a humanitarian to a security issue.

2. Security policies of countries exposed to migration in Central and South-Eastern

Europe

Security activity is organized in society as a system that represents the organization of the society's ability to carry out security functions. Such a security system is articulated through a security policy that "(...) encompasses goals, measures and activities for the design and functioning of the national security system and is

3 Jakešević, R., Tatalović, S., Securitization (and de-Securitization) of the European Refugee Crisis: Croatia in the Regional Context, *Teorija in Praksa* Vol. 53, 5/2016., str. 1249-1250

defined in the laws and other documents of contemporary states." This is a "complex and interdependent set of measures, plans and programs "that are defined to" protect, maintain, and enhance security ... according to available resources." It always raises the issue of security - the international, national, security of a group or individual, with regard to a political, economic, social, military or another aspect. To analyze the impact of migration on the security policies of the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe, and especially the impact of the migration crisis 2015/16, the fundamental security documents of those countries that will form the policy-making platform, particularly in relation to migration, will be analyzed.

Greece

In 1997, the White Paper of the Armed Forces stated that "Challenges stem from continuing fluctuations and instability in the triangle surrounding the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, as well as from the strong international antagonism of industrial countries with respect to providing access to the natural resources of Central Asia." The same document states that "the international environment after the Cold War offers important opportunities to strengthen Greek security, given the central geopolitical position of Greece, as well as shifting the fundamental orientation of international politics from the relationship between the East and the West toward the relations between the North and the South. The focus of the international political system has shifted from Central Europe to the outdated conflict between the East and the West on the periphery of the European continent, and in particular in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. "The current assessment is still the same, but not as an opportunity for strengthening security, but primarily as a threat. The National Security Policy is managed by the Governmental Council for Foreign and Defense Affairs, defining strategic orientation, approving military programs and assessing crisis situations. The development of the Greek security policy in the post-Cold War era shows a shift from the emphasis on the military component of security to the now-dominant threats such as terrorism and illegal migration. Turkey no longer represents a military threat that determines Greek security, today Turkey's space from / to which the migration wave flows towards Greece is a significant determinant of modern Greek security. It is important to emphasize that Greece faced a migration problem, if not in crisis, even before the outbreak of the migration crisis that affected all countries from Greece to Germany in 2015/2016. The 1997 White Paper, related to the organization of the Armed Forces, as one of the tasks of the Navy, among other things, states the assistance the Navy has to provide to the Coast Guard in intercepting the infiltration of illegal immigrants to Greece ... This is a confirmation that the problem of illegal migration in Greece was recognized very early, in fact, earlier than in other countries affected by the recent migration crisis. At that time, Greece "understood and managed security in terms of security". This resulted in the absence of integration policies and an anarchic approach of the authorities towards the migrants, on the one hand, and of

the migrants toward the labor market on the other hand. The growing pressure from illegal migrants on Greece has been fueling the problem, which is confirmed by the treatment of migrant issues in the White Paper of 2014, just before the outbreak of the migration crisis in its full scope. The White Paper in Chapter 1, which introduces the definition of the features of the geopolitical environment of Greece and the threats, such as the spread of terrorism, international crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the threat of unimpeded transit through the sea and energy pathways, also referred to "... uncontrollable expansion of migratory flows towards the developed western world. " In this regard, in the part related to the regional security environment - challenges and threats in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean, it states that Greece's geographic position "is extremely exposed to waves of immigrants and refugees ... ". The origins of migrant threats are seen in "the inequalities that stimulate globalization, political, demographic and economic imbalances between the West and the developing world, as well as regional and civil conflicts ...". In addition, terrorism in Syria and Iraq in combination with extreme violence and the violation of the structural principles and values of Western societies causes a chain reaction that stretches far beyond its sphere of action... " among which is the rise of illegal migration. It warned that "southern Europe must bear the bulk of the burden of managing illegal immigrants globally. This fact, combined with the problems brought about by the EU immigration policy, exacerbates the problem and imposes it as a major challenge for national and European security. "In defining security policies, Greece starts from the assessment that it is still facing the conventional threat posed by allies and potential EU Partner (Turkey's op.), which demands that the Greek Armed Forces retain the ability to deter any aggression and the new, growing threats that can only be partially responded to by military means. As a member of the EU, Greece therefore considers that further integration of European policies and participation in European efforts to protect and secure the EU external borders must be achieved and a clear response must be provided for the capacities of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy in the protection and defense of the Member States' borders. We can agree with Alexandros P. Mallias that the doctrine of national security must "develop at two levels - political-diplomatic and military-operational level," in which "the political and diplomatic factor shapes and promotes the positions that impose Greece's interests and is linked both social and political cohesion." This is an important observation, bearing in mind that with the migration crisis triggered by a significant influx of migrants from Turkey to the Greek islands, Greece faced the moment of the all-out crisis of the state generated by a financial crisis and bankruptcy of the state. The Greek approach to migration was based on the humanitarian concept of providing and organizing the reception, accommodation and transit of migrants in the direction of Macedonia. Greek authorities have been constantly pointing to the "international and European problem" and are therefore urging the provision of European funds to support the resolution of the crisis, division of responsibility and solidarity of EU members.

Macedonia

The development of Macedonian security policy during the first decade of the 21st century was entirely aimed at aligning with the requirements of NATO membership and achieving interoperability with NATO, based on Macedonia's strategic aspirations to join the Alliance. The 2005 White Paper on defense defines threats as follows "The Republic of Macedonia cannot respond to security challenges on its own. The development of the internal security system integrated into the collective security structure is a strategic investment for the country and a significant contribution to the Euro-Atlantic security area. Macedonia, ultimately, due to Greece's 2008 opposition to its name, did not enter NATO, which led to some stagnation in the development of the security sector, but not to a change in strategic commitment. In Macedonia's White Paper of Defense 2012, Macedonia's Defense Minister Fatmir Besimi clearly states that "the Republic of Macedonia views its future in its integration into NATO and the EU." Macedonia affirms the importance of regional cooperation. The democratic change in the countries of Southeast Europe, as well as NATO and EU support, have increased the importance of the Euro-Atlantic integration process. These positive changes create a modern political and security environment in the Western Balkans, where peace, cooperation and economic and democratic development between the states contribute to the progress of the whole region, including Macedonia. The problem of illegal migration in Macedonia is mentioned in addition to the other threats in the 2005 White Paper on Defense, stating that not only Macedonia, but also other Balkan states can be found under the influence of activities related to illegal migration. For this claim, Macedonia had a strong point not so long ago. Macedonia was already forced to become a host country for refugees: during the Kosovo conflict in 1999 when it had to provide humanitarian aid and a safe haven for more than 400,000 ethnic Albanians ... " In 2005, which is particularly important in the context of illegal migration, integration of state border control management and a complete transfer of the border security responsibility from the military to the Border Police were carried out. The White Book on Defense 2012 states that the security environment of Macedonia "is characterized by rapid, complex and dynamic changes, and is faced with emerging asymmetric threats and risks." These are primarily terrorism, international organized crime, fourth generation conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, religious radicalism and extremism, as well as unstable and dysfunctional states and computer attacks, and what is particularly important in the context of this analysis is illegal migration. Exposure to illegal migration, but also to terrorism and smuggling of drugs, people and weapons is linked to the country's geographical position. "The Republic of Macedonia is in the central part of Southeast Europe as a geographical intersection between Europe, Asia and Africa, which is significant for its development. From a security perspective, its location at the intersection of the main routes means greater possibility for terrorism, illegal migration, smuggling of drugs, people and weapons. "The outbreak of conflicts

in Iraq and Syria, especially the migration crisis 2015/16, fully confirmed these ratings and concerns, as well as the assessments of possible responses to threats such as illegal migration, namely, the geographic location of the state and the potential threats outlined in the White Paper, as well as the possible access to security by assessing how the threats "impose the need for active co-operation with neighboring countries and the international community". Macedonia has included all sector-responsible state institutions from the military and police to social protection in the management of the migration crisis. Blazevski and Juberias group the measures taken by Macedonia in five categories:

1. Measures for securing and protecting national borders and preventing illegal entry-checkpoints, a fence, closing the border on 9.3.2016.
2. Measures for enhancing cooperation with other European countries with the specific purpose of obtaining material and technical assistance.
3. Measures for providing humanitarian aid.
4. Measures for assisting the transit of refugees through Macedonia.
5. Measures for fighting organized crime, more specifically, the smuggling of people.

Being exposed to frequent migration, Macedonia had largely found itself dependent on international co-operation and assistance. This was also accompanied by a complicated internal situation, which was clearly worsened by the refugee crisis, the controversy over the 2014 elections, prompted by a political crisis, the disputing election results, the affair of illegal interception of senior government officials, street demonstrations, repeated allegations of corruption and cronyism and unemployment. Those events in 2015 were a reminder that Macedonia had a potential for political unrest and ethnic mobilization. The Republic of Macedonia as part of the global community, within its means, must necessarily engage in efforts to impose the concept of co-operation and friendship over the concept of power and domination. The Macedonian authorities' approach to addressing the migration crisis was based on the operational and technical part of the humanitarian concept, but at the same time with clear political goals of such an engagement both on the internal and international political agenda. Thus, by resolving the migration crisis, Macedonia imposed itself as a constructive EU partner in view of accelerating its own approach towards the EU.

Serbia

The National Security Strategy, adopted by the Republic of Serbia in 2009, states in the introductory section that "it is the basis for the development of strategic documents in all areas of social life and the functioning of state bodies and institutions in order to preserve and protect the security of citizens, society and the state." The Strategy defines a wide range of military and non-military threats. It should also be borne in mind that the essential component, although not seen in the strategy itself,

is the military neutrality that Serbia declared in 2007. The Republic of Serbia bases its National Security Strategy on an extended and deepened concept of security interpretation. This approach is clearly reflected in the statement that "the last decade of the past and the beginning of this century marked the new security movements in the world. The security from the predominantly military sphere has been extended to other areas, primarily economic, energy, social and environmental security, including the security of the individual and society as a whole.[4] The strategy in point 1 related to the security environment of illegal migration is cited as one of the threats coming from the global security environment. It states that "the essence of these challenges, risks and threats is that they become increasingly unpredictable, asymmetric and transnational.[5] In describing the challenges, the risks and threats to security imposed by illegal migration appear in the part that defines organized crime as a threat which, inter alia, is classified in the field of illegal migration.[6] Illegal migration thus becomes an aspect in relation to which security policies in the Republic of Serbia are also defined. Hence, in the part related to foreign policy as an element of security policy, illegal migration, in addition to terrorism, organized crime and corruption, trafficking in human beings, protection against natural disasters and techno-technological accidents, and the protection of the environment, natural resources and the health of the citizens, appears as one of the threats in terms of which "Republic of Serbia advocates for regional cooperation in areas of joint training and engagement of security system elements in multinational operations, crisis management and border management".[7] The implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy of the Republic of Serbia and the Convention on Police Cooperation in South East Europe, through exchange of data with the countries in the region, coordination of work and capacity building of all border services, allows ... the prevention and suppression of illegal migration.[8] In order to manage the migration in 2012, Serbia also adopted the Law on Migration Management,[9] dealing with the issue of migration and related asylum issues and completed the second part of Serbia's negotiating process for EU membership. This is also confirmed by the provisions of the Strategy for Countering Illegal Migration in the Republic of Serbia for the period 2009-2014, which comprehensively addresses the issue of illegal migration and defines the systematic approach to illegal migration. In Section 5, which deals with strategy priorities, four priorities are stated: 1) Meeting the criteria for visa liberalization (White Schengen); 2) Accelerating the Stabilization and Association Process of the Republic of Serbia to the European Union; 3) Strengthening the security capacities and potential of

4 Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije, 2009.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Zakon o upravljanju migracijama, Službeni glasnik, br. 107/2012.

the Republic of Serbia; 4) Implementing an Integrated Border Management Concept.[10] Serbia has established its approach to the migration crisis 2015/16 on humanitarian and political aspects (...). Serbia has been cooperating with neighboring states and the EU. With such an approach, Serbia has striven for international affirmation and strengthening of its own credibility towards the EU in order to accelerate the process of membership.[11]

Hungary

In the preamble of the 2012 Hungarian National Security Strategy, János Martony, the then Hungarian Foreign Minister stated, "In a historical context, today's Hungary enjoys an unprecedented level of security."[12] This assessment is a continuation of the assessment of Hungary's security status set out in the 2007 National Security Strategy which states that "Hungary is not threatened by military aggression and the risk of any other form of traditional threat is also minimal."[13] Three years later, in 2015, Hungary faced the migration pressure at its borders impelling it to resolve the problem of illegal migration as a highest level of security threats and to securitize illegal migration. The Hungarian approach to the migration crisis is the most striking example of securitization of migration issues.[14] The Hungarian concept of security interprets it in a comprehensive manner. "In continual security challenges, threats and risks occur at multiple levels - at the individual, social, national, regional and global level - and have an impact on a wide range of individuals, governmental and non-governmental organizations and transnational actors." It starts from the assumption that "Comprehensive management of political, military, economic, financial and social - including human and minority rights - and ecological dimensions of security has become necessary in today's world."[15] If we analyze in more detail the provisions of the Hungarian national security strategies, we will see that the issue of migration is represented in various aspects. In assessing the security environment as a driving factor for migration, poverty alleviation, human rights violations, the emergence of extremist ideologies with the consequent spread of corruption, the strengthening of ethnic and religious differences, as well as interstate and regional conflicts, are stated to lead to the destabilization of entire regions; moreover, the failure of the state increases

10 Strategija za suprotstavljanje ilegalnim migracijama u Republici Srbiji za period 2009-2014.

11 Tatalović, S. i Malnar, D., Migracijska i izbjeglička kriza u Europi: države balkanskog migracijskog pravca između sekuritizacije i humanitarizma, Međunarodni problemi, Vol. LXVIII, No. 4/2016, Beograd, str. 299.

12 Hungary's National Security Strategy, 2012., str. 2.

13 The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary, 2007, str.1

14 Tatalović, S. i Malnar, D., Migracijska i izbjeglička kriza u Europi: države balkanskog migracijskog pravca između sekuritizacije i humanitarizma, Međunarodni problemi, Vol. LXVIII, No. 4/2016, Beograd, str. 300.

15 Hungary's National Security Strategy, 2012., str. 4.

the challenge of migration. A special stimulus that contributes to the emergence of migration crises comes from terrorism.[16] Hungary's migration is treated as a natural, but complex phenomenon that brings about economic and demographic benefits as well as security risks. The 2012 Strategy perceives one of the risks in the interrelationship between migration and organized crime and drug production - it is noted that "drug abuse and human trafficking in Hungary have dramatically increased and become a social problem." The reason is that "Hungary has become a target country, where drug production - intertwined with migration and organized crime - is also growing."[17] It is further stated that effective solving of these security risks is not only an obligation deriving from the membership in the EU, but also in the interest of their own national security interests. It stresses that the possibility that criminal organizations or terrorist groups may try to use migration channels to establish or strengthen their positions in Hungary cannot be ruled out.[18] The migration in 2015/16 confirmed these fears, some of the terrorists involved in the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels in Western Europe came precisely as part of the migrant wave. Hungary has thus rightfully outlined the problem of the security of the EU external borders in the context of illegal migration in 2007 and expects that the "borders of Hungary will remain the external borders of the EU and the Schengen area for a long period of time, which brings along responsibilities and burdens related to the EU border management. Specifically, that determination to preserve the Schengen area and prevent illegal migration can be considered as the starting point of the later securitization of this issue. It is stated that "Illegal migration is primarily a matter of law enforcement" and that "Following the accession to the Schengen regime, enhanced external border protection requires effective cooperation between Hungarian border guards and immigration authorities."[19] In accordance with the assessment that Hungary is not at risk of armed aggression, the security concept is based on the affirmation of cooperation and the strengthening of the security that comes through the EU and NATO membership on a wide range of social measures. The tools for implementing the Strategy and responding to risks and threats include, inter alia, a comprehensive government approach and increased civil - military co - operation.[20] This includes strengthening of the economic basis for the state's security and stability and successfully managing social and demographic problems based on a general national consensus, a comprehensive approach to the government, and an active foreign policy engagement.[21] Such a comprehensive approach can be seen in Hungary's approach to the migrant crisis. Then the governmental structures in their entirety communicated

16 The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary, 2007, str. 3.

17 Hungary's National Security Strategy, 2012., str. 16.

18 The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary, 2007, 1.4. Illegal migration, str. 3-4. Hungary's National Security Strategy, 2012., str. 17. - 18.

19 The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary, 2007, str. 4. and 12.-13.

20 Hungary's National Security Strategy, 2012., str. 18

21 Ibid, str. 18.-23.

the security character of the migrant wave to the entire national public and successfully securitized the migration, which was followed by a communication strategy that set up the engagement of the international public on the full commitment to protect the Schengen area.

Croatia

Migration has been an issue that Croatia has faced since gaining its independence. Initially, it was related to the war, which would later be migration across Croatian territory towards the countries of Western Europe. Although the number of migrants is not large, Croatia has given specific attention to this issue in its strategic documents and laws. Already in the 2002 National Security Strategy on Migration, it states: "As a significant security risk, the issue of smuggling weapons, narcotics, illegal migration and trafficking in human beings, especially women and children, should be highlighted. The Republic of Croatia, due to the fact that it is located in an area in which the smuggling routes from Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe pass toward Western Europe, is particularly vulnerable to this kind of threat to its security."[22] Croatia has devoted itself to the development of a new paradigm-based security policy, which implies co-operation and joint action at the international level. From the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia adopted in 2002[23], it is clear that the security concept is oriented towards acting in an international environment together with other states to maintain peace and stability in that environment.[24] In order to implement these commitments from the Strategy, membership of the EU and NATO is defined as one of the key objectives of foreign and security policy. This interest has determined the institutional development and part of the security policy aligned with the requirements of the integration processes, which were completed with the membership of the Republic of Croatia in NATO in 2009 and in the EU in 2013. In the National Security Strategy on Illegal Migration, migration is recognized, albeit not defined separately from terrorism, arms smuggling, narcotics and trafficking, as one of the threats of transnational character. The geographic determinant of the problem is evident here. The Republic of Croatia, due to the fact that it is located in the area in which the smuggling routes from Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe to Western Europe pass, is particularly vulnerable to such a threat to its security.[25] In response to these threats "In addition to political dialogue and military-defense co-operation, Croatia also attaches importance to co-operation and harmonization of policy and practical action

22 Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti Republike Hrvatske (11.05.2018.).

23 Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti Republike Hrvatske, Narodne novine br.32/2002.

24 Tatalović, S., Grizold, A., Cvrtila, V., Suvremene sigurnosne politike, Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, Zagreb, 2008, str. 99.

25 Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti Republike Hrvatske, Narodne novine br.32/2002.

..."[26] The strategy is an instrument that can be utilized to enable the integration into the EU and the European Security and Defense Policy. In addition, it does not neglect the regional aspect and emphasizes "cooperation in the area of border control and overall cooperation in the area of internal affairs" in the section on neighbors' relations and regional cooperation.[27] At national level, this meant taking a series of specific measures to neutralize these dangers, "establishing an effective border control system in the Republic of Croatia, deepening police and intelligence cooperation with neighboring states ..."[28] If we analyze the Croatian approach to the migration crisis, it is evident that Croatia has opted for "the concept of migrant transfer based on a humanitarian approach to admission and assistance to migrants (...).[29]Migration in Croatia is "defined as one of the foreign policy priorities. Croatia strives to maintain an active migration policy based on the principles of freedom of movement, solidarity and humanity, taking into account national, economic, social and cultural development. The issue of migration goes to all segments of social development (economy, culture, health, crime, education), and therefore requires inter-ministerial approach. The Ministry of Interior is the Coordinator of the Migration Policy."[30]

Slovenia

Slovenia's security policy is defined as a balanced set of activities and programs, consisting of an external, defense, economic, ecological, social and cultural policy. The most important goal of the security policy is to preserve security, preserve national identity and participate in peace-building in the international community.[31] By joining the EU and NATO, the national security of the Republic of Slovenia is no longer merely an orientation towards fulfilling national interests and goals, but a focus on common action. It has retained, as well as other Member States, its national capacity to defend national sovereignty and integrity, but at the same time develops such capabilities with other EU and NATO members, the ability to carry out common interests in the international community.[32] It was precisely on the basis of the above mentioned commitments that Slovenia has been working on dealing with the migration crisis, and the unity of interest in the security of Slovenia and the EU is continuously emphasized

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Tatalović, S. i Malnar, D., Migracijska i izbjeglička kriza u Europi: države balkanskog migracijskog pravca između sekuritizacije i humanitarizma, Međunarodni problemi, Vol. LXVIII, No. 4/2016, Beograd, str. 301.

30 http://www.mvep.hr/hr/vanjska-politika/multilateralni-odnosi0/globalne-teme/migracije/ (11.02.2019.)

31 Tatalović, S., Grizold, A., Cvrtila, V., Suvremene sigurnosne politike, Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, Zagreb, 2008, str. 215.

32 Ibid, str. 220.

as a platform for the securitization of the problems. Slovenia has a well-defined set of strategic documents – the Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia 2010 is a conceptual document that systematically analyzes Slovene strategic needs and is followed by numerous implementation and operational documents.[33] In the National Security Strategy 2010 Slovenia deals with the issue of illegal migration on several levels. Illegal migration, as this threat is called in the Slovenian Strategy, is treated as one of the transnational sources of threats and risks to national security. It is based on allegations that illegal migration affects the Republic of Slovenia primarily because of the extension of migration routes through its territory. With the entry of Slovenia into the Schengen area and taking over the protection of the European Union's external borders, there was a ... increase in the number of illegal migrants in transit through Slovenia. Slovenia, as well as Greece and Macedonia, in addition to dealing with illegal migrations of non-European origin, also pays attention to migrants from Southeast Europe. It is estimated that "the pressure on migration flows to the Republic of Slovenia ... will have a significant impact on the socio-economic and political-security situation in the future". It is interesting to note that "a wider range of illegal migration can easily endanger the safety and health of the citizens of Slovenia."[34] The Strategy also contains a separate section on Health and Epidemiological Threats which states that "In the context of growing globalization and global integration, the security and prosperity of the people of the Republic of Slovenia can be found threatened by the outbreak of major human, animal and plant diseases" and "The probability of occurrence and the spread of contagious diseases further increase population migration, natural and other disasters and terrorism."[35] Illegal migration in the context of public security at the national level, along with poverty and other social problems, the consequences of climate change, natural and other disasters are among the phenomena that can further influence the new forms and intensity of crime and the conditions for its emergence.[36] The Slovene Strategy on Illegal Migration contextualizes illegal migration in relation to a greater number of threats which clearly outlines the interdependence and interdependence of modern threats. The strategy states: (1) Climate change as a consequence of political, economic and energy crises, social, health-epidemiological and other threats and risks, including the possibility of emergence of new and deterioration of the existing conflicts, may cause migration; (2) Crises triggering armed conflicts and low-intensity conflicts lead to the spread of unstable and defective states, which promotes the spread of organized crime and serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and

33 European Strategic Observatory, The facts of European security - Slovenia, accessed on http://stratobs.eu/profile-slovenia-25.php (22.02.2019.)

34 Resolucijo o strategiji nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije, 2010, str. 16. file:///C:/Users/User/Desktop/SStrategije/Slovénie%20-%202010%20-%20Resolution%20on%20the%20National%20Security%20Strategy%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20Slovenia.pdf

35 Ibid, str. 25.

36 Ibid, str. 21.

directly affects migration flows; (3) The unfinished post-conflict reconstruction of the Western Balkans is assessed to have the greatest impact on the national security of the Republic of Slovenia and leads to an increased probability of emergence of non-military sources of threats, including, inter alia, illegal migration; (4) Terrorism as one of today's major security threats and risks in the world is in contemporary terms associated with other security threats, including illegal migration; (5) Organized crime poses a threat to international and national security closely related to states with ineffective or weak institutions. Particularly important are cross-border security threats associated with organized crime, including illegal migration.[37] Slovenia's response to transnational sources of threats and risks to national security also refers to illegal migration. It states that "the Republic of Slovenia will pursue a policy of prevention of illegal migration and migration management in accordance with national laws and documents and with the standards and guidelines of the European Union and the United Nations".[38] In order to limit and prevent illegal migration, internal and border control measures, promotion of cooperation with neighboring countries, cooperation and data exchange, and joint activities in the context of the European Union are planned. Particularly important in this regard is the cooperation with the police of the countries of Southeast Europe and within the EU. Particular importance is placed on timely collection of "intelligence and security data necessary for the successful functioning of the Republic of Slovenia's national security system as an important basis for effective response of the state to contemporary security threats and risks".[39] The Slovenian Strategic Document defines the country's approach to dealing with risks and threats. Slovenia firmly sets the goals of defense policy in the broader framework of NATO and the EU. Participation in NATO is the priority of Slovenian foreign policy. The Slovenian document deals specifically with the cooperation with the countries of Southeast Europe, the Western Balkans and countries that are only partially integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security structures.[40] In accordance with the provisions of the Strategy and national interests, which define illegal migration as a significant threat, Slovenia reacted to the migration crisis of 2015/16, when it cowardly "carried out securitization or, at the very least, prepared for the securitization of illegal migration."[41]

37 Ibid, str. 10-17.

38 Ibid, str. 38-39.

39 Resolucijo o strategiji nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije, 2010, str. 39-41.

40 European Strategic Observatory, The facts of European security - Slovenia, http://stratobs.eu/profile-slovenia-25.php (22.02.2019.)

41 Tatalović, S. i Malnar, D., Migracijska i izbjeglička kriza u Europi: države balkanskog migracijskog pravca između sekuritizacije i humanitarizma, Međunarodni problemi, Vol. LXVIII, No. 4/2016, Beograd, str. 303.

Austria

The Austrian Security Strategy states in its preamble a fundamental change in the security of Austria and the EU which is the result of the earlier periods of confrontation between the East and the West. An optimistic assessment is expressed that the European integration and cooperation processes allow the European states to achieve a common future for the first time, in which peace, freedom, security and justice will prevail. Evidently, the importance of individual security increases, and fundamental human rights and the needs of people are at the origin of all security-related considerations. Contrary to this affirmation of the individual, Austria partially securitized the issue of migration during and after the migration wave 2015/16 which brought, to a large extent, refugees from the war-affected areas. Austria, as it derives from the Strategy, looks at its security and security policies through EU membership discourse and the potential of the EU policies. It is estimated that a conventional attack on Austria is unlikely, but "Austria and the EU are influenced by new challenges, risks and threats, including illegal migration. It adds that "a relatively high share of migrant backgrounds living in Austria encourages additional analyzes to be used in the interests of security. At the same time, it also brings specific challenges to internal security."

Austrian Migration Security Policy Goals:

- Effective combating of asylum abuse, illegal migration and trafficking in human beings to facilitate the process of granting asylum to refugees.
- Migration control in accordance with Austrian requirements.
- Development and implementation of a comprehensive EU-wide approach to asylum, migration, integration, border management, fight against illegal migration, smuggling and trafficking, and the promotion of intercultural dialogue.
- Implementing concrete, mutually coordinated, migration management initiatives.
- Contribution to the implementation and further development of strategies, internal security architecture and EU cooperation in the fight against illegal migration.

Through the strategic document of national migration security, Austria is not seen primarily as a threat, but as a possibility. Therefore, migration-related underlying goals have been defined to allow controlled and unhindered migration flows on the basis of consistent prescribed procedures and thus prevent the transformation of migration into a security issue. In defining the concept of facing threats, assessments are based on the fact that, given the complexity of security issues, only international cooperation can be the solution. Contemporary security policy is a cross-border issue that needs to be taken into account in almost every sphere of life and politics. It must be based on a comprehensive and integrated approach, enable active participation and be implemented in the spirit of solidarity. Comprehensive security policy means that the external and internal aspects of security, as well as civil and military aspects, are inextricably linked to each other. The development of security policy within Europe has been determined

by the activities of international organizations, in particular the EU, which shows the readiness for increased efforts to address the new security policy challenges that must provide a flexible response to threats and the development of compatible new instruments and mechanisms to deal with the security impacts of regional crises, environmental disasters, migration or climate change. In this regard, the main priorities are to promote citizens' rights by ensuring that Europe offers protection, dealing with migration and asylum issues, and strengthening external aspects of freedom, security and justice. Austria wants to improve regional cooperation: it supports the integration of the Balkan countries into the European process and the mitigation of regional conflicts in the Black Sea. It also seeks to support the cooperation within the countries in the region. Austria has treated the migration crisis primarily from humanitarian positions. At the same time, however, it is strongly aimed at strengthening control of the entry of illegal migrants into the country. In the case of Austria (...), indicators (...), although in a smaller extent than in Slovenia, indicated to preparations for securitization of illegal migrations.

Germany

The Federal Republic of Germany is certainly one of the most politically active states in European integration. The promoter has various security activities and its policy seeks to build and maintain the arrangements aimed at building peace in its near neighborhood, but also outside the European space. The defense policy guidelines define the mission, functions and responsibilities of the German army. In addition to protecting the national territory and its citizens, the goals include contributing to NATO collective defense, peace and international stability, crisis management, multinational co-operation, civilian security and strengthening European integration in all areas. Germany also had a central role to play in the migration crisis 2015/16. Germany's security policy is based on a comprehensive concept of security; focused on its future and multilateral cooperation. The transatlantic partnership is considered to be based on German and common European security. With regard to its potentials and international significance, Germany has the widest discourse in observing and defining the security policies of all the observed countries. The German 2006 White Paper estimates that many risks and security challenges are associated with globalization, have a transnational character, and their stakeholders are mainly non-state actors. In this context, factors that pose fertile ground for illegal migration, among other threats, are poverty, underdevelopment, poor education, lack of resources, natural disasters, environmental degradation, disease, inequality and human rights violations. Precisely due to these factors, Germany is also considering "development policy instruments" to reflect on security threats in the underdeveloped countries, that is, to address modern security challenges by using the instruments of foreign, security and defense policy. Since 2014, German political leadership has begun to promote the need to take on greater

responsibility in the security policy, including the military, in its efforts to achieve a free and peaceful global order. This turnaround has been fueled by several factors, including the continuing deterioration of the security situation in European environment and the war in Syria and Iraq, followed by millions of refugees and the spread of jihadist terrorism, which began to affect Europe and bring unprecedented uncertainty to the German public. The German White Paper on Assessing the Strategic Context - Global Challenges, Opportunities, Risks and Hazards assesses that "the effects of uncontrolled migration on domestic politics as a consequence of the evolution of refugees is a growing problem for European societies, due to the possibility of overflowing with the integration of refugees and economic migrants." It also states that "growing volumes of migration, international mobility and global trade are conducive to the spread of epidemics and pandemics" which can develop into a serious threat to stability and peace. The German threats to migration are viewed at two levels, as a threat to German and European security and as a factor influencing national and regional security in the area of its origin, as a factor contributing to instability and generating other threats for these areas, and then Germany and Europe. Germany itself has a multilayer and multidimensional approach to the Migration Crisis 2015/16, which is considered to be largely motivated by German activities. The analysis of the German approach shows that it is based on humanitarian, economic, social and political aspects as Germany avoided linking migration with security and securitization of illegal migration.

3. Influence of the migration crisis 2015/2016 on the security policies of the countries involved in the crisis and changes in the security system

Considering the position in relation to the migration crisis of an analyzed state, we can observe the criterion of transit states or target destinations and the way it approaches the migration crisis - humanitarian, economic, securitization. With regard to the first criterion, we can state that all countries other than Germany and partly Austria were transit states and therefore the migrants did not express their desire to stay there. The fundamental approach of these states was based on the commitment to ensure the fastest and worst transit of migrants across their territory, as this transit has the least impact on everyday life in those countries. Two of these countries, Hungary and Slovenia, and partly Austria, showed strong orientation towards securitization of migration and preventing migrants from entering their territory. Hungary's securitization of migration has been fully implemented in practice. Transition countries have also tried to use the migration wave for certain political gains. Greece, Macedonia and Serbia have been indicated for using the migration wave to gain importance in the EU. In the period after the migration crisis, Germany and Croatia adopted new strategic security documents, Germany adopted in 2016 the White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the German Army, the White Paper on the German Security

Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr Security. Of course, migration was not the exclusive initiator of the adoption of these documents, but these documents refer to this threat as well. It is evident that the experiences of the migration crisis are also reflected in these documents and that the issues are comprehensively defined with regard to the origin of the problem, the elements of threats and the necessary policy, taking into account the fact that the migration pressure will grow and, most importantly, is "the area of South Eastern Europe has become one of the most frequent migratory transit routes. The states that did not react with new strategic documents after the crisis politically used the solutions they had implemented in response to the crisis. It is evident that there was alignment and refinement on the organizational-normative plan based on the experiences and concepts that were applied or derived from the response to the migration crisis in 20015/16. Thus, no qualitatively new conceptual solutions are noted. The German White Paper in 2016 states that the underlying elements of German security policy are aimed at the promotion of peace and stability as part of German identity at the European and global level, with particular emphasis on the significance of a strong German economy that is "based on high social stability, high-quality infrastructure and highly skilled workforce that is complementary to migration". Germany has thus unambiguously placed migration in the context of economic development. This is directly linked to one of the factors influencing changes in the security environment, the age structure: "some are older societies, others have a large share of young people," "the number of people, especially in the poor and underdeveloped states, as well as the needs for resources continues to increase significantly. Inequalities between developed and underdeveloped states are one of the causes of major migration trends." In order for other globally competitive aging societies to find new ways of receiving a sufficient number of qualified immigrants, they retain skilled workers and adjust the production conditions to older workers. On the other hand, younger societies face the fundamental challenge of providing perspectives to young people and creating the necessary training and job training programs. It is also estimated that climate change, which already affects hundreds of millions of lives, has significant existential implications for many states and their populations. These changes, with a lack of resources and population growth in the most complex areas, lead to destabilization and conflict and encourage migrant movements and are increasingly important for security. Climate change, environmental pollution, an increase in all forms of international traffic and mass migration of the population favor new viruses and drug-resistant bacteria, which increase the threats to the health of the population. Migration is therefore the result of a number of factors, such as war conflicts, weak states, poverty, unemployment and climate change, which is why the influx of migrants towards Europe will be continued in the long run. Massive migration trends towards Europe are "a social, developmental, economic, political, cultural, health, integration and security challenge for European societies." Numerous European countries are faced with falling birth rates and aging populations, and demographic deficits can only be replaced by immigration, and managing and

controlling of this process is a big challenge for these countries. Germany estimates that "strong population growth in African and Asian countries, as well as demographic changes in Germany itself, will put Germany under increased pressure that qualifying immigrants can be downplayed, but not stopped. If we are concentrating on the countries that are the subject of this analysis, then we can state that this assessment can be applied to all these countries, where, of course, Germany and Austria, as destinations face the fullest of this problem. The challenge that emerges in this context from the experience of the recent migration crisis is "further application of international law towards migrants and refugees." Namely, the recent migration crisis has opened up many issues related to the qualification of migrants (economic migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, etc.), such as the Schengen Rules, the Dublin Protocols and others. Despite this, Germany states in its strategic document that "migration by itself does not pose a risk to Germany's security. On the contrary, Germany needs legal and controlled immigration to compensate for the demographic losses conditioned by aging populations. However, numerous, uncontrolled and irregular migrations can pose risks to both the directly affected area and to Europe and Germany as a whole. The ability to absorb and integrate migrants can be hampered leading to social instability. "Security policies are finally defined in relation to the issue of migration. The causes of irregular migration must be tackled by the joint efforts of the international community and the countries of origin and transit. It is particularly important to provide support to internally displaced persons and refugees who have fled to neighboring countries. This challenge can be adequately controlled and managed only on the basis of an effective European strategy and practice. It is necessary, as stated in the Croatian strategy, "to meet the needs of the labor market and the economic development of the country by planning adequate immigration policies and increasing the integration potential of society." Croatia starts from the cooperative concept of security both at national and international level. Croatia "will continue to develop its integrated border management capabilities as an external border of the European Union. It will actively participate and initiate legislative and operational measures at EU level to strengthen the overall capacity and readiness to respond to migration challenges and oversee the external border. Illegal migration, particularly illegal border crossings and cross-border crime, will continue, but intensive measures will be taken to return third-country nationals illegally resident in Croatia and to increase the overall security of the Republic of Croatia and the European Union. In order to meet these requirements, Croatia's National Security Strategy from 2017 has led to a comprehensive transformation of the national security system through the concept of the Homeland Security System, which is the concrete implementation of national security policy. The goal is to achieve a synergistic preventive effect of multiple factors, quickly and efficiently preventing or eliminating the adverse consequences of an emergency or a crisis event, and reducing the recovery period and returning to the state of functionality before the occurrence of the incident. The system seeks to coordinate capabilities, institutions, state administration bodies, local and regional self-government

and the public and private sectors in planning, responding to and managing emergency and crisis situations. Croatia builds a partnership for security in response to complex risks, based on the principles of respect for human rights and freedoms, transparency, solidarity, tolerance and dialogue. The Homeland Security System will provide support for emergency and crisis management that will also include participation in crisis management at NATO and European Union level. It makes an encompassing and sustainable framework defining the outcomes and incentives for migrant movements, assessing the threats that these trends may cause and the policies required for regulating migration. In particular, it is important to note that immigration, in conditions where most European countries are characterized by population aging, is not only a threat, but also an opportunity and a need for economic sustainability and future European prosperity. All in all, the strategic document outlined the German approach to the migration crisis of 2015/16. The Hungarian view of migration in general, especially in the context of identity and possible demographic changes, is in contrast to the German, and to a large extent, to the Croatian, and provides continuity of the Hungarian approach to the migration crisis characterized by the securitization of migration. Hungarian Prime Minister Orban in his presentation on the state of the nation in 2018 devoted great attention to these issues. In his presentation, Orban started from the statement that "Hungarians have a future only if Hungarians retain Hungarian language, Christianity and Hungarian culture and independence and freedom." Orban stressed that Western European countries' estimates of the potential number of immigrants will need to increase rapidly. He stressed that Hungary has successfully defended its southern boundaries by building a fence and introducing legal and physical border barriers and a tight border police. He stated that the threat to Hungary is now coming "from the west by politicians in Brussels, Berlin and Paris who want Hungary to accept their policies that have turned them into immigrant countries and which led to the weakening of Christianity and the spread of Islam." Hungarian security policy in relation to migration is based on the protection of Hungarian identity and demographic configuration, as well as physical and legal impediment to the entry of migrants into Hungary. This was also followed by the refusal of the possibility to take a portion of the immigrants on the basis of an agreement within the EU. The positions of the new Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz put Austria's security policy into the space between the German and Hungarian approaches with a visible tendency to take on a stronger stance on migration. In assessing the migration crisis, he noted that it had been significantly stimulated by the quick and easy transition on the so-called "the Balkan route and therefore Austria lost control over the situation. When the passage of migrants was stopped, there was a significant decrease in migrants' inflows into Greek islands. He stated that one of the crisis experiences was that it soon became clear that "the successful integration of such a large number of people with different cultural heritage and often low education represents a huge challenge for Austrian society." Therefore, it is necessary to keep control over the situation, and close the Balkan routes, as the

migration pressure continues to grow - it is expected that the population of Africa will double to two billion over the next thirty years. In order to do so, "strong control of the EU external borders remains a prerequisite for sustainable solutions to the migration crisis." The role of FRONTEX, the EU agency responsible for the development and coordination of European border management, is also important. Kurz estimates that FRONTEX is becoming more effective and needs to be further strengthened to become a true European border and coast guard. Stopping and returning illegal migrants to the countries of origin must become a standard procedure. In order to strengthen the readmission policy, the EU should use all available instruments, including the fact that it is the most important donor of development aid around the world. Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann positioned Austria between Germany (linked to open politics) and Hungary (a symbol of a closed-door policy) in an interview with Die Krone following the end of the crisis. The attitudes of Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz are to a large extent close to those of Hungarian Prime Minister Orban. Austria had already, in 2016, amended the legislative regulations to strengthen the powers of the executive and, as Amnesty International considered at the time, restricted the right to asylum and opened the possibility of declaring a state of emergency in the event of major migration pressures. The spokeswoman of the Austrian Interior Ministry Karl-Heinz Grundboeck then stated that the adopted legal provisions allow the Austrian government to declare a state of emergency due to migration if it considers that the country has no ability to receive, care for and integrate the people who want to enter.

However, unlike Orban, Kurz believes there must be resettlement programs that will enable those who need the most secure protection a safe and legitimate road to Europe. Finally, Kurz emphasizes that in the spirit of European co-operation through the EU, it must use a targeted approach to development assistance to the countries of origin and the transit countries to solve the root causes of migration, in close co-operation with the private sector. Based on the experiences of migration crisis management and the securitization of migrant issues, Slovenia has implemented certain organizational and normative adjustments. The basis is to protect the border and prevent the illegal entry of migrants. In this sense, the boundary was further strengthened with fences that were built during the migration crisis itself. In addition, the Law on Amendments to the Law on Organization and Work in Police and the Law on Amendments to the Defense Law were adopted with the aim of strengthening the border control. The Act on Amendments to the Law on Organization and Police Work increased the age of the reserve police officers to 60 years, which allows for the fast engagement of a larger number of retired police officers. This was triggered by the assessment that migration crises and other similar events have shown the need for engaging well-trained reserve officers. The Law on amendments to the Law on Defense allowed the Slovene Assembly, by a two-thirds majority of the votes of the present deputies, to decide on the proposal of the Government for the members of the Slovenian armed forces to cooperate with the police in the protection of the state border and give certain powers prescribed by

Law to the police in performing their duties. Hence, Slovenia factually treats this issue very similarly to Hungary, but unlike Hungary, it applies a more ruthless rhetoric based on European policy calls and the protection of the Schengen area. The European Commission in Macedonia's Reports for 2015 and 2016 concludes that the Macedonian authorities have taken positive, but perhaps insufficient measures to address the humanitarian consequences of the refugee crisis. It is also stated that in 2016, when the humanitarian tension was reduced, Macedonian authorities should have increased the pressure on illegal smuggling activities. Based on the estimates made, the Commission made three recommendations, two of which remain unchanged in both Reports. The first need is to ensure effective border management and set as a priority the strengthening of anti-smuggling activities and human trafficking. The other is that Macedonia needs to strengthen and continue building capacities for mixed migration management - in its 2015 report, the emphasis is put on the early identification of vulnerable groups, and in 2016, the focus is on the asylum system. The third recommendation in the 2016 Report highlights the adequate accommodation and protection of vulnerable categories of migrants, such as unmarried minors and women with children. Macedonia has not made any significant changes or amendments in its security policies and security systems in relation to the actions during the migration crisis and any possible future migration crises in the Macedonian Government Program for the period 2017-2020. Although, in some parts, it calls on the European Commission's reports, it does not address the issue of migration, and it can be concluded that the issue of migration as such has been neglected. The analysis of the government program shows that "membership of NATO and the European Union is the strategic commitment of the Republic of Macedonia", and we can assume that in this process, Macedonia will align its security policies with those of the EU and NATO. In addition, a provision in the program, which can indirectly address the issue of migration management, also states that the government will allocate funds for the reconstruction of police stations, especially those protecting the state borders and that "in co-operation with neighboring and European countries with the support of EU and NATO member states to invest in the effective implementation of an integrated border management system."

Migration did not find its place as a priority issue in the government program of the Republic of Serbia in 2016, but the approach changed with the government formed the following year. The government program announced further increase of the operational and functional capabilities of the Serbian Army, and one of the tasks was to participate in joint forces to secure the state border to Montenegro, Macedonia and Bulgaria due to the migration crisis. As part of the efforts to raise border control efficiency, the Government of the Republic of Serbia has taken a series of measures to raise the level of security and further secure those points along its border under the greatest pressure of the refugee crisis. A response plan was adopted in the event of an increased inflow of migrants, and police and army activities were agreed to jointly secure borders, cut off smuggling channels and protect against illegal entry of migrants

and criminal behavior of smugglers. Along with measures to protect the border and prevent the entry of illegal migrants into the country, other measures are planned as well. For example, the announcement of "providing assistance to migrants in the field (including the international legal protection of persons and fulfilling the conditions in accordance with the Asylum Act), providing conditions for admission and care, as well as cooperation with local communities in order to maintain the level of tolerance. Serbia takes into account the activation of EU civil protection mechanisms and material assistance for housing and care for migrants. The European Union has approved funds to "strengthen the capacity to tackle the migration / refugee crisis". The material and technical assistance of the EU is largely dependent on Greece as the entry state of the Balkan route and the country which is still the most exposed to migration pressure. The closure of the Western Balkan route and the activation of the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016 had a double impact on the coalition Government's SYRIZA / ANEL policy. On the one hand, they have begun to intensify asylum policy, detention, deportation and external border controls, and on the other, they initiated a policy that imposed the issue of integration of refugees into Greek society. Greek authorities have received migrants who came from Turkey after March 2016, and have the possibility for individual decision-making on whether Turkey will be considered a safe country. This rating depends on whether the migrants will be allowed to remain in Greece or be deported back to Turkey. Greece has, to a large extent, gained control of the migrants, allowing them to remain in Greece. This opened up the possibility of dealing with migrant issues in the political sphere through work on solutions related not only to the conditions of stay at the reception centers, but also of the migrants in Greece and their inclusion in the labor market. Of course, cooperation with the EU remains of paramount importance, and Greece is constantly pushing for the definition of coherent European policies for solidarity on the migrant/asylum problem.

Conclusion

The paper analyzes the impact of migration on the security policies of the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe, where there is a growing number of illegal migrants, especially from Greece to Germany. This migrant route is one of the European routes for migrants from Africa and Asia to reach Europe. Migrant waves intensified after 2011 and the Arab spring, and migration has shifted significantly from a humanitarian to a security issue. This became especially evident after the migration crisis on the Balkan route in 2015/2016 and the increasingly frequent terrorist attacks in some European countries involving illegal migrants. The shift of migration from a humanitarian to a security issue in individual states, i.e. the securitization of migration, has been marked not only by engaging security forces in preventing illegal migration, but also by changes in the security policies of the analyzed European states and changes in their respective national security systems. These have been done not only by the countries directly facing more intense illegal migrations, but also by those with only potential threats. The paper analyzes the security policies of selected countries before and after the migration is

perceived as a potential security issue and the factors that led to this. It can be concluded that contemporary, especially illegal migration, directly or indirectly, has changed the way in which migrants migrate in Central and South-Eastern Europe, and that this approach has evolved from the humanitarian to the security sphere.

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327.8(460)
Original scientific article

SOFT POWER AS A STRONG DIPLOMACY TOOL – LEARNING FROM GERMAN EXPERIENCE

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Abstract:*The challenge facing all countries nowadays is the effort to achieve a successful foreign policy in a very complex and interdependent world. Challenges and opportunities are decreasingly moving within the national borders. Power has never been more diffused, moving not only from the West to the East, but also from the governments themselves towards non-governmental actors. Digital revolution accelerates the diffusion of power and allows citizens to unite inside and outside borders in a way that they have not been able to do so to date.*

In this new world, it becomes clear to states that with the help of militaristic and economic power, the traditional so-called "hard power", they can no longer achieve their goals. What appears to be more effective in the new complex world is the ability to co-operate and network, i.e., the ability to attract and persuade rather than compel. As Professor Joseph Nights (2011), who introduced for the first time the term "soft power" in his book "The Future of Power" in the early nineties of the last century, stresses that "power with others can be much more effective than power over others".

Republic of North Macedonia will soon officially become the 30th NATO member state and a part of an economic, political and military-industrial complex of "hard power". But still, the power of the Republic of North Macedonia, both internally and externally, can mostly be taken from the national culture and the country should also consider developing a strategy on the available "soft power" mechanisms by using the experience of successful examples, such as Germany.

Key words*: soft power, hard power, diplomacy, foreign policy*

Introduction

The term "soft power" was introduced by Harvard University Professor, Joseph Nye (2004), to describe the ability to attain the desired goal by attracting and co-opting, not through coercion and money as a means of persuasion and forcing. Soft power is defined as the ability to shape the attitudes of others through appearance and attraction. What defines soft power is

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its unpredictability, and its main features are culture, political values and foreign policy (Nye, 2004). Lately, the term is also used to change and influence public opinion through relatively less transparent channels and lobbying through political and non-political organizations.

The development of the definition of "soft power" is closely linked to the evolution of the concept of power, which began in the early 1960s with the exploration of various aspects of power by scientists. Dahl (1961) focuses on the forced influence of power, but in response to his approach other researchers dedicate themselves to finding other complementary sides of power. Bachrach and Barats (1962) and Steven Lukes (2005) identify the other face of power, setting the agenda. Stephen Lukes (2005) distinguishes the third person of power, the setting of demands and the influence of the formation of beliefs. After Bakhrach and Barac (1962) discovered the influential side of national power in certain societies, they began to concentrate on immeasurable variables, which have until then been ignored by literature on power.

As the literature on power develops, Nye's initial definition also experiences its own transformations. The early version of its definition implies "the ability to get the desired results by attracting, not by coercion and money" encompassing "culture, values and foreign policy" (Nye, 2004:11). Later, the same definition is extended to "the ability to influence others through co-opting ways of framing the agenda, persuading, and creating a positive attraction in order to achieve the desired results." (Nye, 2004: 21-22). By further developing its definition, Nye focuses on the results of soft power.

Despite the rich history, soft power has drawn attention to international relations since the end of the Cold War. By then, most international interactions were based on military and economic assistance. The United States and the Soviet Union use precisely such incentives to attract allies in search of the desired economic systems and governance systems. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, both economic and military losses on both sides, the United States has strengthened its soft-power strategy.

As a viable approach to foreign policy, soft power is experiencing rapid progress over the past two decades, mainly for three reasons. First, "soft power" strategies are an adequate response to the changing nature of foreign policy, driven by the diffusion of power and the digital revolution. Second, the use of soft-power resources is more cost-effective and worthwhile than the hard power tactics. And third, cooperation becomes the most effective approach in creating the main global results. Otherwise, unilateral performances are with increased costs and open to challenges. An example of this is Russia and the economic losses it has suffered with the annexation of Crimea. Despite the increased progress, in reality soft power is difficult to deploy effectively and the ability to use it is really hard.

In international relations, soft power is generated only where governments act through their policies and public diplomacy. The generation of soft power is also influenced in a positive (but also negative) way by non-state players inside and outside the country. These players influence both the public and the government elites in other countries, and thus create a favourable or inconvenient disposition for government policies.

On the other hand, the success of the use of soft power mechanisms depends, above all, on the reputation that the player enjoys in the international community, as well as the flow of information among stakeholders. For years, Germany has been ranked in the top five countries of all relevant world rankings for the impact of "soft power". Germany is becoming the main driving force of European policies. First, due to the advanced production of goods, engineering power, a rational approach to foreign policy and an economy that knows how to transform growth in welfare better than most other countries.

1. The distinction between the terms "hard" and "soft" power

Joseph Nye (2009, p. 61-63) defines power as "the ability to influence others in order to achieve the desired results," and the use of hard power as a coercive power realized through a threat. Hard power is based on military interventions, forced diplomacy and economic sanctions (Galotti, 2011) and relies on material sources of power, such as armed forces or economic means (Wilson, 2008). But, as Nye stresses in 1990, "today, the definition of power loses the emphasis on military forces and conquests that marked the earlier eras. Factors such as technology, education and economic growth are becoming increasingly important in international influence, while geography, population, and raw materials are becoming less important" (Nye, 1990:54).

Contrary to hard power, cooperative or soft power is the ability to persuade the rest in order to achieve the desired result (Wilson, 2008). According to Nye (2009), the power of persuasion is based on attraction and emulation and followed by intangible sources of power, such as culture, ideology, and institutions. However, others point out that the idea of soft power has been evaluated since the time of Nye's initial discussion on soft power and that it did not initially include international assistance and international investments, and today they are an additional aspect of soft power (Kurlantzik, 2006). Others, like Breslin (2001), consider that soft power is perceived as an idea of aligning others with oneself and their political preferences because they are attracted by the political and social system, values and policies. Cooper (2004) emphasizes the importance of the legitimacy of the soft power concept. State activities should be considered legitimate in order to improve soft power. The enlargement processes of the European Union are indicators of the soft power of the European Union. (Nye, 2009)

Historically, the concept of power in the context of international relations is traditionally treated as a realistic concept. Therefore, power tends to be within the framework of the Dalian terminology: one factor - most often a state - uses material resources to make another country act as it would otherwise have failed in another case. (Dahl, 1957) In line with realistic perspectives, only the quantified components of power, such as militaristic capabilities, population, territory, natural resources and GDP, deserve attention in international relations. Early realists exclude the effects of values, norms and global public opinion in creating a concept of power in international relations that is easy to measure, map and model (Rothmann, 2011). This defined power is the basis of the military forces and economic power - the main sources of "hard power".

Soft power, on the other hand, avoids the traditional tools of the foreign policy of "carrot and stick", working in the direction of constructing and mobilizing networks, developing and communicating attractive narratives, setting international norms and building coalitions. It is therefore related and is close to the liberal tradition, although Nye believes that there is no contradiction between the soft power and the realism. Or rather, soft power is relevant to the three solutions that the liberals offer as a solution

to the problem of war and warfare. First, the view that democratic societies do not fight other democracies, hence, democratic societies are more inclined to practicing soft than hard power. The second solution that the liberals offer is economic interdependence. Although economic co-operation can be seen more as blackmail rather than attraction (i.e. as closer to the concept of hard than soft power), free trade economy produces soft power through the attraction that this model offers. And the third solution is the international institutions that promote cooperation and, through common rules and norms, create peaceful relations. This is at the same time the main assumption of neo-liberals that is also supported by Nye (2005: 10) who says that "the institutions can improve the soft power of one country" in a way that gives the opportunity to promote the values, ideas and policies of that country before the other members.

Neo-realists, however, reject soft power because they argue that actors in international relations react only to two types of incentive: economic incentive and force.

The sceptics of the soft power concept argue that hard power is the only effective foreign policy tool. Gray (2011) claims that hard power must remain an essential policy instrument, since soft power is inadequate to run a control policy because it relies heavily on perceptions of other countries. The rest, like Ferguson (2004), conclude that there is nothing new in soft power, once called imperialism. He also believes that soft power has a limited reach and that the real engine of cultural imperialism is still hard power, and calls soft power "velvet glove for an iron hand".

When we talk about the effectiveness of the use of hard and soft power, it should be emphasized that it depends, above all, on the available resources of power (Heywood, 2011). Larger countries, such as Germany, with high national income are financially capable of maintaining bulk military forces and putting other countries under economic pressure. For smaller countries like Macedonia, it is difficult to provide these traditional tools of hard power. On the other hand, the availability of soft power resources does not depend to that extent on the size of the state. Smaller countries have an absolute opportunity to build soft power (Nye, 2004), although soft power is difficult to achieve because it takes a long time for a state to be able to develop adequate capacities of soft power, in contrast to the short time it takes to generate hard power, given that its resources are tangible.

Nye (2004) considered that soft power is a much harder instrument for any governing structure than hard power for two reasons: many of its key resources are beyond the control of the government, and secondly, soft power tends to "work indirectly by creating policy space and sometimes it takes years to produce the desired results".

Regarding the conduct of foreign policy, the characteristics of the world order weaken the effectiveness of the strategy of hard power. An example of an unsuccessful foreign policy based on hard power is the US attack on Iraq in 2003. However, the concept of soft power has its own weaknesses. Cooper (2004) cites three points of weakness - the question of culture as a resource of soft power, bearing in mind that cultural influence can not be compared to political power, then the dependence of the

results of a soft power strategy from certain states that do not depend on the countries themselves and lastly, the benefit of setting an agenda, bearing in mind that the results of this practice are visible much later. However, unsuccessful soft power strategies are an exception, while there are many examples of the successful application of soft power. First of all, the most successful example is the European Union and its ability to attract new members, which on the one hand provides peace and security among member states, and on the other hand, the enlargement process strengthens its position on a global level, achieving therefore dual benefit - both for the member states and for the Union itself.

2. Introduction of the term "smart power"

Smart power has been introduced to overcome the challenge of when and where to use the full range of power that countries have at their disposal, from hard to soft power. Smart Power is based on the position that the exclusive use of hard or soft power is unlikely to achieve the desired results in creating global policies. In doing so, Nye points out examples of fighting terrorism, where soft-power resources are ineffective, and components of hard power are needed. In the process of establishing relations with the Muslim world, however, the resources of soft power are necessary, because the use of hard power would have harmful effects.

After the term "smart power" was introduced by Nossel and Nye (2004), Armitage and Nye (2007) define the concept based on both types of hard and soft power resources as an approach that emphasizes the need for a strong army, but at the same time invests in alliances, partnerships and institutions. Wilson (2008) believes that smart power is the ability to combine elements of hard and soft power in a way that they would complement each other. According to Chester A. Crocker (2007), smart power should involve the strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, and projection of power and influence in ways that are cost effective and have political and social legitimacy - in fact involving military force and all forms of diplomacy.

According to the symposium "Dealing with Today's Asymmetric Threat to US and Global Security" (2012), sponsored by CACI, the effective strategy of smart power faces challenges in the transition from theory into practice. The application of smart power today is causing difficulties because it operates in an environment with asymmetric threats, from Internet security to terrorism. These threats exist in a dynamic international environment, which adds another challenge to the use of a smart power strategy. In order to effectively address the asymmetric threats that arise in a dynamic international environment, the symposium proposes the use of the following factors: rule of law, organizational blocks, smart power financing and strategic communications.

3. Germany as a leading country in soft power mechanism in Europe and the presence in Republic of North Macedonia

There are numerous researches and rankings in the world's scientific literature on the specific tools of soft power, as well as measurements of their effectiveness and impact. Research has been done on a global and European level, but there are also surveys in certain countries at the national level.

The first attempt to measure soft power through a composite index was made and released by the Institute for Government and the Monocle media in 2010. The Composite index called the IfG-Monocle Soft Power Index combines a range of statistical measurements and results to measure the soft power resources of 26 countries. Measurements are organized according to a framework of 5 sub indexes, including culture, diplomacy, education, business / innovation and governance. The index is created to measure the resources of countries' soft power, and it does not involve the ability to influence. Since then, Monocle has published the annual rankings, which in 2017 included in its list 50 factors that influence soft power, among others, the number of cultural missions (language schools), Olympic medals, the quality of the country's architecture and business brands.

Monocle's Soft Power Survey			
	Report 2018/2019	Report 2017/2018	Report 2016/2017
1.	France	Canada	USA
2.	Germany	Germany	Germany
3.	Japan	France	Japan
4.	Canada	Japan	UK
5.	Switzerland	UK	France

Table 1. Overview of the world's top five countries in the impact of soft power according to the Monocle's Soft Power Survey in the last three years.

According to the results of this ranking, Germany has been in the last years the second-best country in practicing soft power in the world. The newspaper Monocle says: "The country traditionally does great in spreading its ideas, values and goals by using diplomatic, cultural and economic tools. By quietly making small successes, it manages to become a global world power, and all others can feel comfortable with that fact. "

Germany is among the first three most successful countries in soft power in the Soft Power 30 ranking published by the media outlet Portland as well. The ranking is based on "the quality of the country's political institutions, the scope of cultural performances, the strength of the diplomatic network, the global reputation of the

education system, the attractiveness of the educational model and the country's digital engagement in the world."

The results of the survey show that, despite the problems that Germany faced in recent years, such as the migration waves and the rise of extreme right and terrorist attacks, it manages to remain faithful to its own values of tolerance and fairness and to remain a pillar of stability not only in Europe, but also in the world.

The ranking gives a detailed overview of the top 30 countries in the world, but for the needs of this paper, the table shows the top 5 places in the past 3 years.

	The Soft Power 30 Report 2018	The Soft Power 30 Report 2017	The Soft Power 30 Report 2016
1.	United Kingdom	France	USA
2.	France	United Kingdom	United Kingdom
3.	Germany	USA	Germany
4.	USA	Germany	Canada
5.	Japan	Canada	France

Table 2. Overview of the world's top five countries in the impact of soft power according to the Soft Power 30 in the last three years

The Elcano Global Presence Report is a ranking whose index measures the global presence of countries in the world, which means effective positioning of countries (sold products, number of tourists, number of wins in international sports competitions, etc.). And according to the results of this survey, Germany is ranked third with no change in the past three years. Interesting about this research is that it shows the European Union as the world leader in the presence of soft power, if Member States are excluded and we see the European Union as a whole.

Elcano's Global Presence Report, Soft Presence			
	Report 2017	Report 2016	Report 2015
1.	USA	USA	USA
2.	China	China	United Kingdom
3.	Germany	Germany	Germany
4.	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	France
5.	France	Russia	Japan

Table 3. Overview of the world's top five countries in the impact of soft power according to the Elcano's Global Presence Report in the last three years

The factors of German soft power in Republic of North Macedonia and their presence and representation in the country, as well as the impacts and effects of such "soft power" have been scientifically analysed in the research named Key Stakeholders of the German Soft Power and their way of functioning in the Republic of Macedonia" in 2017. This survey, as a start, gives a complete picture of the factors and the influence of German soft power in Macedonia, their presence, representation and way of working, the spheres in which the collaborators and the institutions with which they work cooperate (direct and indirect users), and it is further recommended to measure their impacts and effects, i.e. to measure the effectiveness of German soft power in Macedonia, according to the example of world rankings and indexes they create.

4. Results of the analysis of the key players of the German "soft power" in the Republic of North Macedonia

Germany, as the leading soft power country in Europe has its interest in North Macedonia, as well as in the region, generally due to the pragmatism to secure the neighbourhood on the one hand. On the other hand, it is due to the spread of its own political and economic interests, which in principled policy means that for Germany to be a stable country, it is necessary for Europe to be economically and politically stable.

In 2017 a research with the title "Key stakeholders of the German soft power and the way of their functioning in Republic of Macedonia" has analysed all of the key stakeholders of German soft power that promote the interests of the state in Macedonia, and through their work, they aim to create a positive image of Germany and its direct or indirect representation in the Republic of North Macedonia since gaining its independence. The research studies and divides the factors of German soft power according to the areas that Professor Nye states as the main features of soft power - culture, political values and foreign policy. In addition to this division, the ways and means by which each of the stakeholders project their interests using soft power, are explored.

The research has a descriptive character, gathers all the data on the key players of the German soft power in the Republic of North Macedonia and systematically and reasonably describes and defines their specific characteristics by analysing the documentation, i.e. analysing their statutes, websites, work programs, set and achieved goals, reports on achievements and other documents available. Furthermore, the research explores the ways in which those key stakeholders promote the interests of Germany in the country, i.e. who are their main contributors and what are the ways in which they cooperate with them in the Republic of North Macedonia. With the help of 32 implemented in-depth unstructured interviews with representatives of key stakeholders and managers, long-term employees in the organizations and institutions themselves, and their associates, direct and indirect beneficiaries, representatives of political

parties, diplomats and lawmakers in the Republic of North Macedonia, the ways of their action in the country are qualitatively explored and interpreted. The subject basis for the selection of this sample was to be people who are aware of the work of key stakeholders in terms of leadership, but also from the aspect of cooperation with those key players on the other side.

The main conclusion of the research on the key stakeholders of the German soft power in North Macedonia showed that the profit of the German influence on the "soft power" in the country is mutual. While Germany's reasons for investing and allocating huge financial resources for organizations to act and for spreading particular influences in different areas, are based on their own reasons and visions of economic, as well as security stability in Europe. On the other hand, North Macedonia has its benefits from co-operation, first financially, but also because of the support in the creation of certain policies aimed at improving the living standard in the country.

But in certain segments of this cooperation, the research results showed that North Macedonia is not sufficiently using the opportunities that German "soft power" offers at its disposal for various reasons, such as lack of interest by the institutions, poor interest or lack of knowledge of the cooperation capacities offered from these German partnerships by the individuals or institutions in charge of their coordination. In some cases, the success or the intensity of the cooperation depends on the human factor, i.e. the capacities of the leading collaborators on both sides. And in some other cases, the political pressure of influence is seen as a problem. This is mostly obvious from the assessment reports of infrastructural bilateral projects, for example, the report on the project for protection of Ohrid Lake (2011). The implementation of the project is assessed as successful, but sustainability is considered critical, because the Macedonian project holder is financially and technically unsustainable and under strong political influence.

Conclusions

A country's recipe for success in foreign policy is the correct combination of hard and soft power, resulting in the so-called smart power. Smart power is not a prerogative only of larger states, such as Germany. It also applies to small countries, if they develop a strategy for combining its considerable military resources with extensive participation in international networks and organisations, as well its cultural appeal.

North Macedonia will soon officially join NATO and will become part of an economic, political and military-industrial complex of "hard power". In the same time, the new government has made a big success in foreign policies, first of all, by improving the bilateral relations with its neighbouring countries. In order to proceed in this direction, North Macedonia needs to develop a strategy and use the available soft power tools. Being a small country, the power of the Republic of North Macedonia, both internally and externally, can mostly be taken from the national culture. A successful example of action strategies and influence, "soft power" can

serve as an example in developing the Macedonian foreign policy or cultural diplomacy. The survey results show that North Macedonia may not be able to implement such an impact strategy as Germany because of the economic, territorial and political power that Germany has, but it can therefore apply some of these strategies in further development of the good neighbourly relations, primarily because of the closeness of the topics and overcoming the problems, but also to facilitate the European integration processes that largely depend on the relations with the neighbouring countries.

The presence of the key stakeholder in German soft power in the country is important and it is necessary to identify the problems that arise in certain segments of the cooperation and try to eliminate them in order to exploit opportunities at full capacity. Or, certain programs need to develop strategies for making full use of their capacities. If we go a step further, a recommendation could also be considered in the direction of creating Macedonian state programs or strategies for cultural diplomacy and cooperation with other countries according to the German model.

According to the example of world rankings and indexes they create, it could be useful to measure the impacts and effects, i.e. to measure the effectiveness not only of the German soft power in North Macedonia, but also of the presence of all the foreign stakeholders in soft power.

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351.78(73)

Original scientific article

THE CONCEPT OF RESILIENCE TO CRISIS AND DISASTERS: CASE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Vasko POPOVSKI[1]

Abstract: *The United States of America is one of the most exposed countries globally to natural and security risks. The aim of this paper is to research the inclusion of the concept of resilience and resilient society in the homeland security and the emergency management of the country by using the content analysis and comparative analysis methods. Resilience is defined as an ability of the individuals, communities, systems and states to withstand or absorb shocks and stresses, adapting to the new situation so as to achieve early recovery and positive change aiming to better handle the future shocks and stresses. Consequently, it can be concluded that the system is based on the pillars of mitigation, preparedness and quick recovery with bottom-to-top approach in the practical implementation i.e. from the level of local communities to the federal level. The concept of resilience is not fully included in the homeland security even though there are fundamental basis for that. Aiming to establish a society resilient to crisis and disasters, it is necessary to fully include the concept of resilience in the normative and strategic basis, having into consideration the national system's contexts. Within this approach, the effects of the crisis and disasters can be absorbed and can transform the crisis into possibilities and the existing shortcomings into long-term consolidation and strengthening of the society.*

Key words: *resilience, resilient society, crisis management, emergency management, disaster risk management*

INTRODUCTION

During recent decades, the contemporary world has been characterized with an increased number of crises resulting from frequent security risks, intensified conflicts, and increased number of severe natural and human-made disasters. Recent research from the University of Uppsala[2] states that in 2017 there were 49 state-based armed conflicts[3] out of which 10 were

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2 http://ucdp.uu.se/

3 The University of Uppsala defines the "state-based armed conflict"as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year. On the other side, "non-state conflict" is the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. https://tinyurl.com/y8smgs9z

on the level of war and the Syria conflict was ranked as number one. Non-state conflicts also increased, reaching the number of 82 events annually. As a result, these conflicts resulted in the loss of 90,358 human lives during the same year. Following the 9/11 attacks in the United States of America (USA) until the end of 2016 there were 97,000 acts of terrorism on a global level (Roser et al., 2018). With respect to the natural and human-made disasters, there is an increased number of events with 2017 being a record year, in terms of disaster, damages and losses (335 natural disastrous events with 9,697 human casualties, affecting a population of 96 million and accumulating damages in the amount of 334 billion USD)[4].

The United States of America is considered to be one of the most exposed countries, both to the impacts of natural and human-made disasters and specific security threats e.g. terrorism, resulting in great damages and losses. CREDandUNISDRReport (2018: 4) states that during the period 1998 – 2017, it had the biggest losses in absolute monetary amount of 945 billion USD as a result of frequent disasters during the last two decades and the great value of the affected assets. Its hazard profile is dominated by weather related disasters (hurricanes, storms, floods, tornadoes) with damages and losses that are surpassing all forecasts. For example, during 2017 three out of five most expensive storms during the last two decades happened – hurricanes Harvey (95 billion USD), Maria (70 billion USD) and Irma (81 billion USD) that placed a price tag of 245 billion USD. With regards to the terrorist attacks to the American sovereignty and the state system, it can be emphasized that from the 9/11 attacks to the recent Pittsburgh Synagogue Massacre[5] on 27 October 2018 a total of 65 significant terrorist attacks happened with 9,673 human casualties (2,966 deaths and 6,707 injuries).[6]

This is expected to additionally worsen with the projected climate changes impact resulting in hotter and severer events, rise of new security challenges, risks and threats, including cyber security, affecting broad segments of societies including sustainable development of the countries. The Global Risk Report 2017[7] profiled the top future 5 risks in terms of possibility of appearance: extreme weather conditions, forced migration, major natural disasters, big terrorist attacks and massive data theft and/or forgery. The USA will face more frequent and severe coastal flooding, larger precipitation events, prolonged heatwaves, intense hurricanes, large wildfires, prolonged droughts (Wuebbles et al., 2017).

Therefore, there is a need of continuous research in the areas of crisis and disaster risk management aimed at understanding the underlying risk factors, formulating policies and enhancing the process of providing support to the establishment of a structured system for prevention, early warning, preparedness, response to and recovery from crisis and disasters. Additionally, the modern research literature refers to the need to research and analyze beyond the existing scope of the crisis management in order to address the high levels of uncertainty and the new challenges to the security of the societal and other systems (Linkov et al, 2014). In this endeavour it is important to mainstream the concept of resilience as a foundation of the proactive crisis and disaster risk reduction systems that are based on the pillars of prevention and

4 https://www.preventionweb.net/publications/view/60351

5 Pittsburgh Synagogue Massacre was a mass shooting incident that happened on 27 October 2018 at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, that resulted in death of eleven persons and injuries to seven persons.

6 This number includes all armed attacks that are characterized as terrorist attacks, no matter whether they are attacks by ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), Muslim fanatics or domestic terrorism by radical groups and individuals.

7 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GRR17_Report_web.pdf

mitigation, instead of reactive systems that are stemming from the orientation to preparedness and response to crises and disasters. Accordingly, this paper presents the analysis of integration of the concept of resilience in the essential normative framework of the crisis management system[8] in the USA. The fundamental question is how the concept of resilience is mainstreamed in this framework aiming to support the establishment of a resilient society to crises and disasters as a societal structure that can transform the crises in opportunities and the momentary shortcomings into long-term consolidation and strengthening of the society. This research is done using the content analysis and comparative analysis methods.

RESILENCE – ESSENTIAL CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The concept of resilience is generally new for the crisis and disaster risk management areas with theoretical and practical research endeavours starting from the beginning of this century. As a theoretical concept it has initially appeared during the middle of the last century in the technical sciences as a property of the materials to bounce back to their original condition as a result of external disturbance. In psychology, resilience is the level of capability of individuals to respond to worsened conditions, and in the ecology it refers to the durability of relations of the ecological systems and their ability of absorptions of influences i.e. changes while bouncing back to the original condition (Holling, 1973: 17). In the socio-ecologic context, Folke et al. (2010) defines the resilience as adaptability to changes for transformation and creation of a new, improved system. With this understanding quality of improvement of the system as a result of the reaction to acute shocks (e.g. natural disasters, terrorist attacks, etc.) and chronic stresses (failure of critical infrastructure, pollution, political and nationalistic tensions, etc.) was attributed to the resilience concept.

Within the framework of the security studies and practices in the USA, the resilience is defined in many different ways with the foundations built upon the pillars of ability and capacity of the system/society/community to respond to the disturbances and to recover from them. Each individual definition has its own features that consider different properties of the system in general or opportunities for improvement of the system while returning to the previous condition and so-called productive recovery. Chronologically, Bruneau et al. (2003) understands the capability of social units (organizations/communities) to alleviate hazards that contain impacts of disasters and to continue the recovery activities with minimized social disturbance, whether Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003: 48) attributed the resilience of the community to the individual resilience of organizations in the community e.g. economically strong communities are

8 During this research endeavor it is necessary to emphasize that the crisis management in USA is based on the homeland security which is a basis for development of a contemporary multi-sectoral system for crisis management, including the emergency management. This system has been established after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 with aim for better preparedness and multi-sector response to new risks and threats, predominantly the terroristic ones.

better able to respond to disastrous events than the economically weak ones. According to Haimes and Horowitz (2006: 3) resilience is the capability of the system for prevention and withstanding of the main disturbance with acceptable parameters of degradation and recovery within the framework of acceptable expenses and time. Cutter et al. 2008 formulated resilience as a capability of the system to respond and to recover from disasters including inherited conditions that enable the system to absorb the impacts, manage the response to the event, as well as enable the processes of adaptation to facilitate the capability of the system to re-organize, change and learn how to respond to a threat. Finally, Wilbanks (2009) considered the resilience to include anticipation of the questions and possibilities, decrease and mitigation of the vulnerability, effective response and quick and proper recovery. Actually, disaster resilience is considered as emphasizing the importance of pre-disaster mitigation measures that enhance the performance of the structures, infrastructure elements and institutions in reducing losses from a disaster or withstanding the accepted level of losses (Mileti, 1999: 5).

Further to this corpus of theoretical research on resilience, there was a separate research stream in the USA that appeared during the first decade of the century predominantly emerging from the engineering resilience area which connected the resilience with the unexpected events and the uncertainty, including the anticipation of the future, through future oriented, foresight methodologies. Woods (2005: 20) included the ability to create possibilities for foresight i.e. anticipation of possible events in the future – anticipation of the change of the form of the risk before the damage is done, where Hollnagel et al. (2006) includes the ability for creation of anticipation or forecasting and foresighting and defence from the failure that is appearing with the organizational and technological change. Fuerth (2009: 29) introduces the anticipatory resilience as "a system of institutions, rules and norms that provide a way to use foresight for the purpose of reducing risk, and to increase capacity to respond to events at early rather than later stages of their development".

Consequently, even though there is not an unique definition of resilience, we can identify the conceptual framework of resilience that includes the following elements: ability of the system/community/individuals to withstand external pressure, absorb the effects and hazards consequences, ensure continuity in functions, provide a sound and quick recovery, as well as consider the uncertainties and changes provided by the adequate capacities for foresight. Accordingly, all of these elements are in relation with the definition of resilience as the *ability of the individuals, communities, systems or countries to withstand or absorb shocks and stresses, adapting to new conditions with the aim to achieve a quick recovery and positive change, in order to be better prepared for response to future shock and stresses* (Popovski, 2018: 76). In the context of the later statement, the approach is to take into consideration the moment of improvement through gained experience and lessons learned, including the uncertainties in the anticipation, risk analysis and unexpected futures, through the use of strategic foresight or forecast for developing methodologies and tools.

THE CONCEPT OF RESILIENCE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

As one of the most exposed countries to numerous natural and human-made disasters and security risks, a significant percentage of American citizens live on locations that are marked from average to high risk for occurrence of natural hazards such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, wildfires, tornadoes, etc. Despite the significant exposure and increased number of disastrous events during recent years, the national system continues to function with smaller or greater tremors, while keeping the planned economic growth mainly based on the positive correlation of the long-term economic development and the frequency of disasters (Chul Kyu Kim: 19). With regards to the existence of an approach to integration of resilience, Kendra et al. (2018: 93) consider that even though resilience is not fully operationalized, it is an important part of the disaster policy milieu. On the other hand, communities in the USA use disaster mitigation and recovery as an opportunity to build resilience for similar future events. This reveals a certain level of resilience to chronic stress and acute shocks to which the texture of the American society is exposed. In that sense, it is necessary to understand the level of resilience mainstreaming, and therefore the starting point is the review of its inclusion in the essential strategic, normative and planning framework for crisis and disaster risk management. This research is firmly established on the established normative and institutional frameworks in the USA (federal legislation, legislation of the states, federal policies, plans and measures of the federal and state institutions, cities, counties, etc.). Consequently, the level and scope of mainstreaming of resilience in the essential normative framework is done in the context of the policies of the federal executive government, federal legislation, main plans and programmes of the federal agencies and acts of state and local authorities.

Within the framework of the first group of policies are the *Presidential Directives and Executive Orders* that have the power of a law and guide the competencies of the federal agencies. The most important directive in the context of this research is the *Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8: National Preparedness)*[9], issued by the US President Barack Obama in 2011. This Directive established the National Preparedness System that is able to respond to threats that have the biggest risk to the security of the nations, including the acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics and natural disasters. National preparedness was established as a shared competence and responsibility of all levels of government, private and non-profit sectors and citizens as individuals. Resilience was defined as the ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies (PPD-8, 2011:16). Similar to the objectives of national preparedness, it clearly stipulates that the resilience is a responsibility of all entities of the national system. It can be stated that the mainstreaming of resilience was done in a way to include terminological aspects and

9 https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness

to become a foundation for preparation and adoption of specific documents for the relevant federal policies. It had a positive influence for resilience mainstreaming in a number of documents ranging from protection of the critical infrastructure, continuous implementation of the authority in events of disasters and threats, up to the adoption of the National Preparedness Goals in 2011. Nonetheless, the concept of resilience was not applied as a major strategic driver or practical planning factor, since the focus was on preparedness with resilience being only an outcome (Kahan, 2014: 13).

The second group of normative acts is related to the federal legislation and consists of a number of relevant federal legislative acts: The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act - *The Stafford Act of 1988*, *Homeland Security Act of 2002*, *Disaster Mitigation Act of 2002*, and *Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA)*. It is obvious that they belong to different time periods, mainly before the appearance of the concept of resilience on the crisis and disaster risk management horizon and its adequate terminological and conceptual defining. *The Stafford Act* established the foundations for emergency management response for the purposes of alleviation of the suffering and damages resulting from natural disaster and terrorism. As a key legislative solution it has not mainstreamed resilience as a separate category. In that sense, "the Stafford Act is primarily a guide for responding to disaster incidents and does not refer explicitly to resilience" (National Research Council, 2012: 179). This act was amended with the *Disaster Mitigation Act from 2002* with which the component of mitigation was introduced through implementation of mitigation measures for minimization of damages and losses, as well as through the establishment and provision of the necessary financial mechanisms in coordination with the state and local authorities. The *Homeland Security Act of 2002* is the first federal legislative solution after the 9/11 terrorist acts and has established the normative and institutional framework of the newly introduced homeland security area and the Department of the Homeland Security as a key institution. The main objective of this act was to respond to the newly created present situation by preventing the terrorist attacks, reducing vulnerability and minimizing the damages, as well as providing support in the recovery process. Alongside these priorities, all disaster events, including natural disasters, were taken into consideration, through the programme for risk management of the emergency situation and through a set of planned measures and activities for mitigation, response and resilience. As we can see, the emergency management system in the country has shifted from reactive to proactive (from response oriented to mitigation and preparedness oriented). However, the concept of resilience was not clearly mainstreamed, but certain aspects of the resilience could be found in separate areas of the responsibilities on the institutions in different stages of the disaster (e.g. reduction of hazard, preparation for response and quick recovery, rebuilding with protection against future events, etc.). Consequently, the profile of prioritized preparedness to disasters and crisis prevails also in the latest legislative solution being the *Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018.* The existing legislative act is "the largest single piece of legislation to impact disaster response and recovery in

decades" (Abbot et al., 2018). This normative solution presents major reform in the segments of the financing mechanisms (e.g. new Pre-Disaster Mitigation account, additional funds for FEMA Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant Programme, National Public Infrastructure Pre-Disaster Mitigation Assistance Program, etc.), enhanced processes, competencies and coordination of the federal agency, as well as improvement of the post-disaster recovery aspect through streamlined supporting of disaster relief activities. "The provisions constituting the DRRA represent a significant improvement in U.S. disaster resilience policy, providing states with access to an enhanced, on-budget pre-disaster mitigation fund for activities that provide a measurable reduction of risk and focusing recovery funds toward resilient building code adoption and enforcement" (Brady, 2018). Nonetheless, the resilience is not directly mainstreamed as a separate objective, but it can be indirectly sensed in the measures and actions that are stipulated to be implemented and that will ultimately lead to fulfilment of some of the resilience properties (e.g. increased capacity, adaptability and transformability, quick recovery).

In addition to this key normative acts, there are number of *sectoral acts* that can serve as an indirect, sectoral sources for emergency management (e.g. sustainability and resilience of the infrastructure in the water sector, National Resilience Development Act of 2011, earthquake prevention, etc.), where resilience is referred mainly as a resistance of the facilities/infrastructure. This can lead to understanding that the disaster risk management system in the USA in terms of essential normative solutions is predominantly based upon the postulate of preparedness to response to the risks and quick recovery, whether the resilience is not mainstreamed in the context of the resilience of the system that is integrated within the whole disaster cycle.

The third level of normative acts reviewed within the objective of this research are the *plans and programmes of the federal agencies* through coordination and adoption of relevant plans and programmes. One of the main characteristics of the US system is the existence of various specialized agencies that through the integrated multi-hazard, multi-risk and multi-sector approach are contributing to the overall strengthening of resilience of the society. All of them participate in the segments of mitigation, preparedness and recovery with the aim of building resilience of the country, where their activities are in accordance with the vision for national resilience and ensuring the homeland security of the country. For example, they can be as FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency, NOAA – National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US Forest Service, US Geodetic Survey, etc. However, "a key challenge to the federal government is how to maintain motivation and accountability among all of the federal agencies in the pursuit of defined, common goals toward increasing resilience (National Research Council, 2012: 168). One of the modalities is through dedicated normative instruments/plans and programmes. For example, in the *National Disaster Recovery Framework from 2011* the resilience is one of the vital principles and it is included in the hazard mitigation area through strategies for planning of the land use, protection of the critical infrastructure, environment and cultural heritage, as well

as sustainable practices for reconstruction of the built environment and revitalization of the economic, social and natural environment. All appropriate policies and activities shall ensure resilience for all, and resilience from future events. Another important document is the *National Mitigation Framework from 2016* according to which the nation is increasing its resilience when it is managing the risks comprehensively, from local incidents to huge, widespread disasters. Building and maintenance of the culture of preparedness and access to mitigation shall make the nation more economically, socially and environmentally resilient than before. Resilience of communities and the nation depends on the joint work of all. Furthermore, community resilience is one of the basic principles of mitigation and ensures recognition, understanding, communication, risk planning and strengthening the knowledge and capacities of the individuals and the communities for risk informed decision making with the aim to adapt, withstand and quickly recover from future incidents.

On the lowest hierarchical level are the *normative solutions, programmes and plans of the state and local authorities' i.e. so-called first responders/first providers*, entities that have the competence to respond first in the events of emergency situations or even disasters. The local authorities and the states have the responsibility to respond to the event as long as it is potentially possible i.e. as long they can respond with all of their available resources. When this is no longer the case, then the federal resources are taking over the consequent disaster relief. On the other hand, the implementation of competences is decentralized and state and local authorities predominantly have responsibilities in the land zoning and urban planning, housing, local communal and critical infrastructure, etc. Consequently, these are the areas where the principle of resilience is practically mainstreamed during prevention and mitigation, as well as recovery. There is an obligation for all entities in the communities to participate in the emergency management which refers to the "All of Society" approach from the Sendai Disaster Risk Reduction Framework[10]. Accordingly, "the state and local authorities, the private sector, and individual citizens have key responsibilities and opportunities to improve resilience (National Research Council, 2012: 182). Therefore, there are a number of practical examples in various state programmes (Silver Jackets Programme: US Climate Resilience Toolkit, Flood Resilience and Recovery Assistance for the State of Vermont, Resilient NJ Programme), strategic documents for urban resilience of the cities (Baltimore, Seattle, etc.), municipal regulations, plans and programmes, etc. Regardless of the fact that all other acts and programmes from the federal level regulate the area from the framework point of view, this is the level where the concept of resilience is being materialized in concrete measures and actions and is transformed to community resilience or resilient society.

10 https://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/sendai-framework

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this research was to review and analyze the mainstreaming of resilience in the normative framework of the crisis management system in the USA through the use of the content analysis and comparative analysis methods. Starting point was the review of terminological and theoretical development of resilience in the disaster risk management through a chronological and thematic analysis. Seeing that no unified definition of resilience was stipulated and based on the reviewed attributes, we can state that the resilience is defined as the ability of the individuals, communities, systems or the countries to withstand or absorb shocks and stresses, adapting to new conditions with the aim of achieving a quick recovery and positive change, in order to be better prepared for response to future shock and stresses.

From the analysis of mainstreaming the concept of resilience in the normative and strategic framework of the crisis management in USA we can conclude that the existing system is based on the pillars of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery, with bottom to top approach (from the local communities to the federal level) in the practical execution of competences and responsibilities of the institutions. The concept of resilience is not fully mainstreamed in the segments of homeland security and emergency management as a core principle on which the adequate proactive policies and measures will be built, even though there are established foundations for that. On the other side, having in mind the level of decentralization of the emergency management, there are a number of positive examples and lessons learned that can be used for further advancing of the resilience agenda.

With the aim of building a resilient society to crisis and disasters in the USA, it is necessary to fully mainstream the concept of resilience in the normative and strategic frameworks, having in mind the specifics of the national context. Only this approach is the modus operandi for development of a resilient society that not only will absorb the impacts of the crises and disasters, but will be capable of transforming crises into opportunities and the present shortcomings into long-term consolidation and strengthening of the society, thus ensuring sustainable development.

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005.96:351.78

Original scientific article

DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE SYSTEM OF PROTECTION AND RESCUE IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

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Abstract: *Natural disasters and other incidents are a reality that continuously occurs in the Republic of North Macedonia. Human resources are the core resources for an effective and efficient protection and rescue system in cases of natural disasters and other incidents in the Republic of North Macedonia. Hence, developing human resources is a key factor for dealing with them successfully. Development of human resources consists of several consecutive steps.*

This paper gives a brief presentation of the latest findings regarding the development of human resources as a function of the overall human resource management in the Protection and Rescue System as a precondition for an effective and efficient protection and rescue of the population and material goods from natural disasters and other incidents in the Republic of North Macedonia.

Key words: *development, human resources, protection and rescue*

Introduction

The Republic of North Macedonia (RNM) faces numerous natural disasters and other incidents (NDOIs) that occur during different periods of time and on different parts of the territory. They cause big material damage, and often result in human casualties.

To successfully deal with NDOIs, the Republic organizes the Protection and Rescue System (PRS). Human resources are the most important resources in the PRS. Their successful management results in minimal material damage and human casualties. Human resource management consists of four basic functions. Developing human resources is one of the functions of the human resource management in the PRS.

Subject of this paper is a brief theoretical and empirical presentation of the human resource development in the Protection and Rescue Directorate (PRD) Local Government Units (LGUs) Territorial Fire Fighting Units (TFFUs) and protection and rescue forces as most important for the effective and efficient protection and rescuing of the population and material goods from NDOIs in the Republic of North Macedonia.

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General information about human resource development

Development of human resources as a function of human resource management comprises the following steps:

- Familiarizing all newly employed or appointed personnel with the work for the job/ workplace;
- Regular training to meet any changes that have occurred in the current or future operation of the current or new post or appointment of each employee;
- Career development of each employee or appointed personnel by providing normative, educational and mentoring assumptions about their work.[3]

Familiarizing with the work or the orientation is a form of socialization. It is a process which helps new members to adjust to the organization's way of work. The extent to which the members will like the organization and the work largely depends on it.[4] Getting acquainted with the work implies three types of information: (1) general, which relates to the everyday work; (2) information about the organization's history, its objectives and mission, the current organizational structure and how their work fits into the organizational goals; and (3) a detailed presentation, perhaps in a form of a brochure on the benefits, rules and policies of the organization.[5]

Training is a learning process, whereby its tendency is to transfer knowledge that will improve the skills and abilities to perform a certain job and will change the attitude and behaviour of an individual or group.[6]

Career development of the human resources comprises: competence and knowledge; values and life goals; personal style and career approach.

1. Competence and knowledge show what the individual has in relation to the skills to perform his/her work. They are acquired as a result of the completed education, training for the work the person carries out, as well as their work and the life experience.
2. Values and life goals represent the aspirations of the individual and are related to its motivation. They are achieved by planning the life activities.
3. Personal style, style of interaction and character are related to the values and goals, but nevertheless, they are a special aspect, since they influence the behaviour of individuals, both towards themselves and others. Personal style correction can occur as a result of feedback from others in the work environment.
4. Knowing opportunities and how to access them in order to advance one's own career, represent the individual perceptions of what the individual can achieve in the career and how it relates to the work he/she is doing. An employee can obtain information

3 Smilevski ,C. and other., Management of human recourse, Detra, Skopje, 2007, pg.55
4 Shermerhorn, J., Management 11e (Management 11 e) Europa 92 Kocani, 2013, pg.296.
5 Kralev, T. Fundamentals of management, fourth edition, part one, CIM,Skopje, 2005, pg 268.
6 Kelvin C. Matering Human Resource Management, Palgrave, 2001, page 150.

about career development opportunities via their introduction to the job by collecting information through the work activities.[7]

Developing human resources in the Protection and Rescue System

Natural disasters are a natural process or phenomena that can cause loss of life, injury or other health effects, damage to property, human life and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage. They are usually characterized by their size or intensity, the speed at the occurrence, duration, and the area of the degree.[8]

One of the major current challenges in the field of disaster data is to overcome the limitations induced by the lack of clear standards and definitions, which leads to inconsistent reliability and poor interoperability of different disaster data compilation initiatives. The new classification distinguishes two generic disaster groups: natural and technological disasters. The natural disaster category being divided into six disaster groups: Biological, Geophysical, Meteorological, Hydrological, Climatological and Extra-Terrestrial. Each group covers different main disaster types, each having different disaster sub-types.

The harmonizing of the disaster category classification as well as the definition of common standards is an important contribution to the improvement of the quality and reliability of the international disaster databases. Both disaster classification and definition of common standards serve the community, users and developers of databases at national or sub-national levels and enable them to have a better understanding of the management of disaster data. It demonstrates the importance to develop the capacity of information exchange, integration and comparability between disaster databases.

Natural disasters are classified into: *Geophysical*: Events originating from solid earth which include-Earthquake, Volcano, Mass Movement (dry), *Meteorological*: Events caused by short-lived/small to mesoscale atmospheric processes (in the spectrum from minutes to days which include-Storm), *Hydrological:* Events caused by deviations in the normal water cycle and/or overflow of bodies of water caused by wind set-up which include-Flood, Mass Movement (wet), Climatological: Events caused by long-lived/meso to macro scale processes (in the spectrum from intra-seasonal to multi-decadal climate variability) which include- Extreme Temperature, Drought, Wildfire, *Biological:* Disaster caused by the exposure of living organisms to germs and toxic substances which include - Epidemic, Insect Infestation, Animal Stampede.

Meteorological (storm with a hail, strong wind, storms, thunderstorms, lightning, high and low temperatures, tornadoes, hurricanes, tropical storms, etc.); seismic (earthquakes, lateral cracks, tsunami, etc.); geological / hydrological (expansive soil, falling rocks, landslides, etc.); hydrological (coastal flooding, river flood, more severe

7 Gareth R. Jones., Jennifer M. George., Modern Management Skopje, 2010, pg.492.

8 https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology / (Accessed: August 30, 2018)

flood, avalanche, drought, erosion, sedimentation, desertification); volcanoes (Tephra, volcanic gases, lava evacuation, mud ejection, lateral explosions, explosive wave, pyroclastic lava); fires (shrubs, forests, grasses) and biogens (episodes, epiphytotics, epidemics).[9]

Other incidents are events that result from certain errors in the performance of the everyday economic and other activities, as well as negligence when handling dangerous goods and means in the process of production, storage and transport of such goods (fires, traffic accidents, accidents in mines, industrial accidents, explosions, etc.)[10]

According to the Protection and Rescue Law, natural disasters are events caused by the uncontrolled action of natural forces that endanger the life and health of people and animals and cause damage to property, cultural heritage and the environment. Other incidents are events that result from certain errors in the performance of the everyday economic and other activities, as well as negligence when handling dangerous goods and means during production, storage and transport of such goods (fires, accidents, accidents in mines, industrial accidents, explosions, etc.)[11]

Due to their phenomena complexity, natural disasters and other incidents are often elaborated together. Development of human resources for effective and efficient protection of the population against natural disasters and other incidents/accidents is accomplished through training for: self-protection, protection and rescue measures and protection and rescue forces.[12]

Self-protection training is carried out for the population that is not deployed in the structures on the basis of: military obligation, work obligation and protection and rescue.[13] In order to train the population for self-protection, curricula and programs (CPs) for self-protection training are prepared. Competent institutions, educational institutions, primarily the primary and secondary schools, as well as non-governmental organizations, can train every citizen-resident of the Republic of North Macedonia for self-protection.[14]

Familiarization/introduction and the orientation of human resources is carried out by familiarizing the new employees with the regulations, rules and standards for work in the protection and rescue system. Orientation programs are developed as to in-process the employees. Familiarization and orientation of human resources in the protection and rescue forces is carried out by general and specific introductions of the members/forces in the area of protection and rescue. The general introduction refers to the objectives and tasks of the protection and rescue forces and the functions of the

9 Rima Dima (Risk management Disaster management), Project EU-EAP, Skopje, 2008, pg.6
10 Soluncevski, M., Modern management SPR, MND2018, Bitola, 134.
11 Protection and Rescue Law "Official gazette of RM" No. 93/12, article 2
12 Protection and Rescue Law "Official gazette of RM" No. 93/12
13 Defence Law "Official gazette of RM" No. 185/11, article 2
14 Protection and Rescue Law "Official gazette of RM" No. 93/12

Protection and Rescue System (PRS) in the Republic.

The **training of human resources** is carried out in the Training Centre of the PRD and in other institutions for training in the Republic and abroad. The training is realized through training plans and programs. Training is accomplished by courses, counselling, seminars, etc.

The training of the members of the protection and rescue forces is one of the most important categories in the training of the forces for protection and rescue of the population and material goods from NDOIs. The training is regulated by law and is mandatory for all members deployed in the protection and rescue forces.[15]

CPs for training of protection and rescue units have been prepared as: CPs for basic training of the entire composition, i.e. all the groups for universal and specialized protection and the rescue units, for the specialized protection and rescue units at the level of the Republic and for the commanders of spatial and specialized protection and rescue units at the level of the Republic. They consist of a theoretical and a practical part.[16]

Career development is carried out through human resource development programs. Development programs are implemented through various methods for training and development. Courses, seminars, counselling, job enrichment, job rotation, mentoring, practical/on the job training, visits, games and simulations, personal development, etc. are the key methods for training and development.

Research and results for the development of human resources in the Protection and Rescue System

The population is not capable of providing self-protection from NDOIs. No self-protection CPs have been developed/prepared. The program content for familiarizing the students with self-protection has not been included in the classes in primary and secondary schools.[17] The PRD has developed guidelines for self-protection from a certain type of NDOIs.[18] Research conducted by the first director of the PRD has shown that the ratio of the total number of the national protection and rescue force members and the number of forces who have attended training is 4.19%. The number of trained members of the remaining/forces is even lower.[19]

The latest research on human resources development in the System for Protection and Rescue shows:

15 Protection and Rescue Law "Official Gazette of the RM" No. 93/12, Article 121-122.

16 NPP for the training of protection and rescue forces, PRD, 2006

17 Soluncevski, M., Shtit, N. 83, Ministry of Defence, Skopje, 2018

18 www.dzs.gov.mk//

19 Atanasov, K. Atanasovski , D., The situation in the training of the citizens and the forces for protection and rescue of the Republic of Macedonia, Europa-92, Kocani, 2016, 201

Table 1. Overview of the way of familiarization with/introducing to the work

RESPONSES	Employed in PRD and LGU		Employees in TFFU		Forces for PR		TOTAL	
1	2		3		4		5	
	Number	**%**	**Number**	**%**	**Number**	**%**	**Number**	**%**
Person responsible for HR	9	11.4	4	3.3	54	22.5	67	15.2
Superior	38	48.2	31	25.6	39	16.2	108	24.5
Colleague at the working place	12	15.3	84	69.4	6	2.5	102	23.2
From another person	6	7.5	2	1.6	111	46.2	119	27.0
No response	14	16.6	0	0	30	16.6	44	10.1
TOTAL	79	100	121	100	240	100	440	100

Introduction to/Familiarization with the work of the newly employed and members of the protection and rescue forces is being conducted realized. The experience of the respondents regarding the introduction of the employees or members of the forces for protection and rescue with/to the job/work is different. 24.5%, of the respondents, were introduced to the work by their superiors, 23.2% by the colleague at the workplace, 15.2% by the HR person. The largest number or 27% were familiarized by another person. There is diversity in terms of introducing into the job/work: at the employees. PRD and LGUs newly employed were most often familiarized by the superiors. TFFUs were familiarized by a colleague at the workplace, while in the case of the PR Forces, it was another person.

We distinguish: individual and group training; general and special training; on-the-job training and training centre. The types of trainings proposed in the table above show that some of the respondents have attended all kinds of trainings, while some have attended one or several types. The largest number of respondents received group training 38.4%, and at least special training was received by 14.7%. Divided by categories: PRD employees and LGUs in 44.3% have attended group training while 16.4%.have had a minimum of specific/special training.

TFFUs employees are generally the most/best trained. 69.4% of them had taken most of the training at their workplace, by exercising/practicing certain methods and procedures at work, while 23.9% of them have had special training. The members of the protection and rescue forces have dominantly attended individual training, i.e. 38.3%, with 9.5% of them having attended minimum special training.

Table 2. Overview of types of training attended/taken

RESPOSES	Employ at the PRD and LGUs		Employees at the TFFU		PR Forces		Total	
1	**2**		**3**		**4**		**5**	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	**%**
Individual	29	36.7	38	31.4	92	38.3	159	36.1
Group	35	44.4	59	48.7	75	31.2	169	38.4
No response	15	18.9	24	19.9	73	30.5	112	25.5
TOTAL	79	100	121	100	240	100	440	100
General	18	22.8	53	43.8	75	31.2	146	33.1
Special	13	16.4	29	23.9	23	9.5	65	14.7
No response	48	60.8	39	32.3	142	59.3	229	52.2
TOTAL	79	100	121	100	240	100	440	100
At work place	13	16.4	84	69.4	68	28.3	165	37.5
At Training Centre	21	26.5	65	53.7	24	10.0	110	25.0
No response	45	56.1	0	0	148	61.7	193	43.5
TOTAL	79	100	121	100	240	100	440	100

For protection and rescue, training without exercising activities is not sufficient. Practice and checking/probing the functionality of the System for PR, especially during the protection and rescue actions/events, Exercising activities for protection and rescue, in which the members of the PR System have participated, corresponds to the actual needs on the ground and are in accordance with the threats from NDOIs and the planned solutions for protection and rescue.

This attitude is represented by 66.3% versus 23.5% who consider it corresponds to the actual needs. 10.2% of the respondents did not respond. Divided into categories: 81% of the employees of the PRD and the LGUs are satisfied with the conducted exercise activities. 71.1% of the employees in the TFFUs and 59.1% of the members of the protection and rescue forces belong to this category too. There is a need to correct elaborates and also to do something in that respect with the implementation of exercises especially with the protection and rescue forces.

Table 3. Overview of participation in exercises

RESPONSES	Employees at PRD and LGUs		Employees at TFFU		PR Forces		TOTAL	
1	2		3		4		5	
	Num-ber	%	Num-ber	%	Num-ber	%	Num-ber	%
Training	17	21,5	41	33,9	56	23,3	114	25,9
Group occupation	9	11,4	40	33,0	39	16,2	88	20,0
Exercise mobilization	23	29,1	29	23,9	84	35,1	136	30,9
PR exercise of various NDOIs	13	16,4	11	9,2	22	9,2	46	10,5
No response	17	21,5	0	0	39	16,2	56	12,7
TOTAL	79	100	121	100	240	100	440	100

Related to the offered types of exercise activities, the largest percentage of respondents i.e., 30.9% have attended mobilization exercises, 25.9% have attended trainings, 20% have participated in group occupations and 10.5% protection and rescue exercises of various NDOIs 12.7% of the respondents did not attend any exercise activities. When analyzed by categories, it turns out that PRD and LGUs as well as members of the protection and rescue forces dominate with the mobilization exercises. On the other hand the most practiced activities for the TFFUs employees are trainings and group occupations.

Table 4. Overview of training and development methods

RESPONSES	PRD and LGUs employees		TFFU employees		TOTAL	
1	2		3		4	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Courses	29	36,7	33	27,3	62	31,0
Seminars	19	24,1	6	4,9	25	12,8
Workshops	8	10,1	5	4,1	13	6,5
Conferences	6	7,6	0	0	6	3,0
Exercises	4	5,1	77	63,6	81	40,5
No response	13	16,4	0	0	13	6,5
TOTAL	79	100	121	100	200	100

The table shows that the most practiced methods for training and development of employees are the exercises and courses. About 40.5% of respondents answered positively about their participation in the exercises, while 31% of the employees in the PRD, LGUs and TFFUs were more inclined towards the courses. When individually analyzed it turns that PRD and LGUs employees are professionally developed by attending courses and seminars. Exercises are more typical for the TFFUs employees.

Table 5. Overview of countries where members of the Sector for PR who attended training

RESPONSES	PRD and LGUs employees		TFFU employees		PR FORCES		TOTAL	
1	2		3		4		5	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Albania	2	2.5	0	0	0	0	2	0.4
Belgium	0	0	0	0	2	1.6	2	0.4
Great Britain	0	0	12	9.9	0	0	12	2.7
Bosnia &Herzegovina	2	2.5	0	0	0	0	2	0.4
Germany	2	2.5	0	0	0	0	2	0.4
Greece	0	0	2	1.6	0	0	2	0.4
Moldova	0	0	0	0	2	0.1	2	0.4
Serbia	2	2.5	2	1.6	0	0	4	0.8
Slovakia	0	0	1	0.8	0	0	1	0.2
Slovenia	7	0	0	0	1	0.8	8	1.8
Turkey	1	1.3	0	0	0	0	1	0.2
France	0	0	2	1.6	0	0	2	0.4
Croatia	7	8.8	10	8.0	1	0.8	18	4.1
Montenegro	4	4.0	3	2.4	1	0.8	8	1.8
Sweden	0	0	3	2.4	0	0	3	0.6
No response	52	65.8	76	38.0	233	97.1	361	82.0
TOTAL	79	100	121	100	240	100	440	100

Only 18% of the members of the PR System have attended trainings, exercises or other forms of education abroad. Prevalent trainings, exercises or other forms of education by members taken abroad have been in the Balkan countries and on the European continent. The training on the Balkans was mostly conducted in Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia, while as far as the other European countries are concerned

it was in the UK. When broken into categories, most members who participated in trainings, exercise activities and other forms of education are the TFFUs employees with 62%. The least training was taken by the members of the protection and rescue forces i.e. 2.9%. As far as the PR System and LGUs employees are concerned they participated in trainings, exercises and other forms of education with 34.2%.

Their job position, trainings and the exercises contribute to the career development of the members of the PR System. The employees in the PR System have various opinions when it comes to career development. 56.5% think they have continuous career development. 43.5% disagree with their own career development in the PR System. If categories are considered, higher quality career development is open to the PRDs and LGUs employees i.e., 64.5%, compared to the employees in TFFUs with 48.7%. In the future, the career development system and its implementation should be corrected.

Table 6. Overview of segments that influence career development

RESPONSES	PRD and LGUs employee		TFFUs employee		TOTAL	
1	**2**		**3**		**5**	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Education and knowledge	39	49,3	60	49,6	99	49,5
Ambitions and goals	15	18,9	21	17,3	36	18,0
Personal style and character	13	16,5	18	14,8	31	15,5
Situational/circumstances	12	15,3	22	18,3	34	17,0
TOTAL	79	100	121	100	200	100

The most significant factors influencing the career development of human resources in the PR System are: formal education and knowledge with 49.5%, ambitions and goals 18%, the situations/circumstances 17% and personal style and character with 15.5%. Analyzed by category, the ratio is the same.[20]

Conclusion

Regarding the development of human resources in the Protection and Rescue System the following conclusions can be made:

The population is not trained/prepared sufficiently for self-protection from NDOIs. Guidelines for self-protection of some types of NDOIs have been prepared. A program for training the population for self-protection should be developed. The self-protection program

20 See more: Modern Management of the Protection and Rescue System in RM, MND, Bitola, 2018

can contain several topics that will concern self-protection from different types of NDOIs, and above all the dominant ones that are typical for the territory of the Republic of North Macedonia.

The PRD can carry out trainings in its own training centres, LGUs in its own facilities, educational institutions through the teaching contents in one or more subjects, and NGOs in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and Science. PRD and LGUs can engage in training the population for self-protection through various projects.

A high percentage of human resources have been introduced/familiarized to their work/job. The experiences of the respondents regarding the way and the person to get to introduce the employees or members of the forces for protection and rescue to the work/job are different.

Most often, the training attended by the members corresponds to the threat by NDOIs and the tasks employees have in accordance with their job positions and duties. Most exercised trainings according to several criteria are: general and special, individual and group, as well as training at the workplace and in training centres.

Exercise activities for protection and rescue, in which the members of the PR System participated, correspond to the actual needs of the terrain according to the threats from the NDOIs and the planned solutions for protection and rescue. Mobilization exercises are the most practiced among the various types of exercises. Next are: trainings, group occupations and exercises for protection and rescue from various NDOIs.

Prevalent trainings, exercises or other forms of education were carried out in the Republic of North Macedonia. There are trainings and exercises performed/taken abroad. Largest percentage of the members who were abroad was in the countries of the European continent. Most often they were trained in: Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia.

Opinions about career development of human resources in the PR System vary. Half of them think they have continuous career development, and half do not agree with their own career development in the PR System. Most important factors influencing the career development of human resources in the PR System are: formal education and knowledge, ambitions and goals, circumstances and personal style and character

In the future, introduction to/familiarization with the job/work should be a practice for all new employees in the responsible entities and well established human resources in the protection and rescue forces. It is necessary to train all employees and members of the protection and rescue forces, to intensify the exercise activities and to involve all the members of the protection and rescue forces. This approach will enable continuous and affirmative career development of the human resources for protection and rescue from the NDOIs in the Republic of North Macedonia.

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351.742
Scientific article

THE CONCEPT OF GENDARMERY - SOLUTION TO CONTEMPORARY SECURITY THREATS

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Abstract: *The contemporary security threats more often come from non-state actors, such as criminal, radical, extreme, insurgent and terrorist groups. In order to defeat them, it is essential to keep the conflict at lower intensity. Some of these groups aim precisely at achieving escalation by provoking the state to use all defense capabilities. If the police forces are not sufficient enough against non-state actors with greater capabilities for armed violence, the next in line for deployment are the military forces. The problem is that in order to keep the conflict at lower intensity, less force is needed, not bigger. Using military forces against violent groups that have strong, but still limited capabilities can adverse the effects and unnecessarily spur the conflict. The problem frame of today's changed operational environment is how to organize a security system so the states could best respond to contemporary threats; is the synergy of the police and the military forces sufficient enough, or a third security structure is needed in the form of gendarmery.*

Keywords: *security, defense, army, police, gendarmery.*

Introduction

Since the establishment of NATO and its enlargement, the member states are not concerned that armed aggression could be a threat from a state within the alliance. NATO visibly altered the security on the European soil. In addition to collective defense, the essence of NATO enlargement is precisely to create a secure environment that will provide stable and lasting peace. (Fassi et al, 2015) The role of the militaries in NATO is largely focused on carrying out tasks deriving from the concept of collective defense. (Atlantic Treaty Association, 2018) However, there are still threats, risks and challenges to the internal security of the states against which they must protect themselves. Contemporary security threats are complex and come in various forms. In the spectrum of conflicts, they can be non-military, such as cyber-attacks, media propaganda, fake news, various forms of subversive actions and organized crime; more seriously initiated by radical, extreme and terrorist groups and organizations; and up to insurgencies and violence that creates conditions for a general war. (Jacobs et al, 2015)

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Regardless if we describe this combination of threats using the concept of nonlinear, hybrid or asymmetric warfare, in essence, all these are considered as part of the unconventional doctrine. Therefore, besides organizing, equipping and training to fight a conventional opponent, most of the militaries necessarily build capabilities for unconventional warfare, usually special operations forces. However, even the most powerful states cannot sustain enough forces in such numbers to respond simultaneously to all unconventional threats at once. At the same time, states must not wait for the security to be endangered to such extent that they will have to use the military. Even if that happens, usually the legislation in democratic states has numerous limitations on the role of the military for internal defense, which means deploying only limited defense capabilities. Today, any increased role of the military in a democratic state could be considered as a militarization of the society. Therefore, states tend to primarily use the police forces in order to suppress unconventional threats.

To respond against threats to internal security, several European states which are also NATO members, have integrated forces in their defense system that have military capabilities with police jurisdiction, commonly known as gendarmeries. This is not a new concept, but it could be argued that it is an appropriate solution to the new operational environment and contemporary security threats. The existence of a security structure in the form of gendarmery with greater firepower, capable of applying military tactics, techniques and procedures, yet still being under the operational command of the police forces, so far has proved to be an effective solution in dealing with the non-state actors.

Changed operational environment

There is no doubt that there is still a linear threat to NATO countries from several traditional adversaries that sustain and strengthen their capabilities to challenge world peace and security. (NATO Review, 2018) However, there is a wide range of threats that are nonlinear in nature, standing outside the framework of the conventional military doctrine. The main characteristic of nonlinear warfare is that the battlefield is everywhere, with the enemy who is not necessarily armed. Today's threats are hybrid, a combination of all possible ways, military and non-military, regular and irregular, kinetic and non-kinetic, with the purpose to directly or indirectly cause destabilization of states.

In the past two decades, the traditional danger to NATO from state actors has expanded considerably with the danger from the non-state actors, groups, organizations and individuals that are almost always supported by third countries. (Drent et al, 2015) In addition to criminal and terrorist activities, they can do immense damage using various non-military methods, for example through cyberspace and the media using it for propaganda. On the list of global threats, the perception management is also highlighted as particularly dangerous to national, regional and global security. After the attacks across the European capitals, it is obvious that terrorism evolved. Unlike the stereotype that terrorists must be armed, trained and visibly dangerous, in reality ordinary people easily make terrorist attacks simply using vehicles, knives and sharp

objects. The terrorists have always been perceived as an invisible threat, but today they are even more difficult to detect and identify.

As a direct consequence of the terrorist attacks in Europe that overlapped with the latest migrant crisis, an increased role of the militaries across European cities emerged as a new trend in order to deter attacks and control migration. So far, the core narrative of the European Union was "Europe without borders". Because of fear of terrorism and migrant waves, the member states again raised fences between them. In this changed operational environment, the question arises whether the militaries should have such an increased role for the internal security. (Edmunds, 2006) The purpose of terrorism is to force the governments to subdue to the will and demands of the terrorists by spreading fear and insecurity among the population. It is already obvious that the presence of the military on the streets throughout Europe helps this agenda. The fear of terrorism has caused people in some European countries not only to get used to soldiers on the streets, but also demand their presence so they feel safe.

The dilemma is not only the risk of militarization of a democratic society, it is also the created perception that people are living in paranoia and are under constant threat. (Dinucci, 2018) Terrorism will remain as a threat for a long time. In addition, the migration which is not a new phenomenon, but a product of globalization, will also remain a challenge in the future. The problem is that a military organization cannot simultaneously focus on both security and defence. There is a reason why militaries develop different branches and services, equipped and trained to perform various tasks. The military doctrine periodically adjusts to new threats coming from the new weapons, tactics and techniques of the potential adversary. For a specific type of threat, states need specific security structures with appropriate capabilities.

Problem frame

The national concept for building security and defence of any country is based on three variables. First, an assessment of current and future threats, risks and challenges; second, understanding of the operational environment of the state; and third, acknowledging the real financial strength and resources of the state. Accordingly, the operational art of any state is giving an answer to the following question: how should the state build its security and defence system to protect itself from all internal and external forms of threat, given the actual financial strength and resources.

Although the principle of cost-effectiveness of the defence is just one element of the equation, it is probably the most important, because it represents the real power of the state to provide means for security and defence. Rational budget spending in this domain is a huge challenge even for the richest states, as resources are never sufficient enough to protect against threats that could be expected. Very often the military plan resources that the state can hardly provide just to develop forces against threats that

are unlikely to happen. The real question for any state in the context of security and defence is against what kind of threats to the system should be prepared, what would the next war look like, where will it be, and against what kind of opponent? Is the system ready for the upcoming threats and what the state needs to do to prepare itself: what would be the most appropriate strategy, tactics, doctrine and organizational structure of the defence and security system?

When the state is part of a collective defence system, the capabilities that should be developed must meet two needs: its own and the collective ones. Usually, in order to demonstrate greater sovereignty, regardless of the obvious benefits from the collective security system, the states develop ambitious capabilities that often exceed their actual needs. This is mostly done by states that have the means to do so, but there are cases when states risk developing and maintaining forces with not enough resources to keep them operational.

When the defence is built using realistic and critical estimates, the states first develop the most necessary capabilities as a demonstration of their sovereignty, and then invest to meet the needs of the collective defence system. There are examples where NATO members allocate far more resources for their own needs, even when there are no threats to such an extent, in contrast to members that spend resources primarily to serve the collective defence. Usually the smaller states are the latter, because maintaining a military larger than necessary can be a burden on the economy. If these forces are non-deployable in operations for the needs of the collective defence system, then the motive for membership in the alliance may be questioned. For these reasons, the allies often discuss the size of forces that members declare compared to the capacities and capabilities they own.

Taking over the responsibility for internal security and building capacities and capabilities to handle police tasks may distance the military from its primary mission. (Lutterbeck, 2005) There are many debates that counterterrorism should be in the realm of police jurisdiction, as defined in the West. However, due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with the narrative that it is a war against terrorism on a global scale, the perception was created that the military should also take part in the fight against terrorists. However, it is already clear that what is happening in the Middle East and Afghanistan is an insurgency using methods of terrorism, while the operational environment and the circumstances allowed the West to use all military capabilities in such conflict. In the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, it was believed that the special forces would be alone sufficient to defeat the Taliban, soon to become clear that much larger conventional forces must be deployed.

The goal of terrorism is to create fear among the population that the state is not capable of securing peace and stability. The Western democracies have already begun to reduce freedom at the expense of security. The presence of soldiers on the streets in Europe is more likely desirable objective of the terrorists. If the long-term strategy of terrorism is uncertainty, the greater presence of military units in urban areas favours their

strategy. As long as the military is on the streets, it means that the state is vulnerable and unstable. The presence of the military portrays escalation, assuming the police forces are not sufficient for security of the people. In contrast, the presence of the police on the streets is common because they have always had a connection with the population. In this sense, the gendarmery as a security structure is appropriate same as the police force. With the increasing trend of nonlinear threats involving terrorism, insurgencies, riots, organized crime aimed to erode country's internal security, it is justified for the states to have an organization in the form of gendarmery. (Garth, 2011)

In many countries the concept of a security structure that is between the military and the police is proving to be an elegant solution against threats from non-state actors: a military force with police jurisdiction, or a police force with military capabilities that goes beyond the usual police structures. (Schumacher, 2011) After the terrorist attacks in France, the gendarmery proved to be a suitable tool in securing the country's both rural and urban terrain. So far, a total of 10 NATO members have a gendarmery or a structure with a similar concept, and 11 members have had similar organizations in the past.

Justification of the concept

All countries develop several different security structures because the national security threats may be internal, external or combined. Traditionally, the police are responsible for the internal security, while the military for the external security. However, the strategy of the non-state actors is to provoke a fierce response from the state using unconventional doctrine. At the same time, the goal of the state is to keep the conflict to low intensity. The different outcome will vary if the state uses only police forces, or engage the military power as well. In today's paradigm of the international law, states that use military for their internal security are risking the legitimacy of their actions.

The use of gendarmery is an appropriate substitute of the military force for internal security in peace or crisis. (Lioe, 2010) States that have secured a stable peace, prepare their militaries for external security or deployment abroad in multinational operations. However, there are numerous asymmetric threats to the internal security that require a more powerful force than the police. For example, well armed criminal groups and extreme or radical organizations that use methods of terrorism or act as insurgents. Having a gendarmery is particularly suitable for use in rural areas where police forces do not have adequate mobility to access isolated areas.

Around eighty countries around the world have a gendarmery or similarly shaped organization as part of their security and defence system. The experience from several European countries show that unlike the militaries, the advantage of the gendarmeries lies in the police jurisdiction for the internal security of the state, such as maintaining public order and law enforcement. Gendarmeries have units that have better mobility and firepower than the police forces, and legitimacy to use force both in peace and

crisis. (Schumacher, 2011)

The French National Gendarmery is the best example of this concept. Although the gendarmery is part of the French armed forces, it is under the authority of the Ministry of Interior when used for police operations. (FIEP, 2019) The French Gendarmery's area of responsibility covers 95% of the country's territory, where 50% of the total population live. (FIEP, 2019) The disproportion is due to the fact that 50% of the population live in the remaining 5%, which are the urban areas where the national police is responsible. Similar to the French gendarmery which is regarded as a military force with police jurisdiction, the Italian carabinieri are also part of the Italian armed forces as a separate branch. (Crone, 2017) They have police responsibilities with the main task of providing public order and law enforcement.

The biggest challenge for the development of a gendarmery is its organizational culture. The military and the police force have different missions, tasks and jurisdictions, which shape differently the profile of the personnel in both organizations. Some soldiers while serving in the military may acquire skills, discipline and training that could be easily applied later in the execution of police tasks. (Peterson, 2019) However, there are positive and negative examples of soldiers who become policemen and vice versa. In most cases, the individual adjusts to the environment, but there are cases when the obtained organizational culture cannot be changed. This can affect the task performance. In the United States, studies show that it was easier for the police officers who were soldiers deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan to use force than those who were not in the military. (Weichselbaum, 2018)

The best characteristic of the gendarmery is the flexibility when operating around the population. In accordance with the latest military doctrine, in order to prepare the military for stability operations soldiers train to work with the population, while the police mindset is traditionally already adjusted to civilian relations. (Weger, 2009) The civil-military relations are singled out as a specialized skill for soldiers to be trained for. In the contemporary warfare, civilian population is a significant part of the area of operations. In contrast to the military, the police are inherently working with the population daily. The relations between civilians and security forces have always been more acceptable in cases when they saw a police uniform instead of the military one. This paradigm was shifted across Western Europe after the attacks in 2015, when the governments of the UK, Italy, France and Belgium decided to deploy soldiers in the cities.

In order to reduce the asymmetry of the conflict, it is necessary for the state to use a proportional force. Everything above that is a political risk that may open a debate about the legitimacy of the actions. Since the international community is inconsistent on this issue, it is the better political choice for the state to use something less than military power. (Lioe, 2010) In addition, maintaining a military to have capabilities against all kinds of threats is a far more expensive option, and for smaller countries nearly impossible. Larger states have the resources to develop a hybrid force that will

have various capabilities, but in reality they are prone to prepare for asymmetric threats either with better equipped police forces or a gendarmery force.

Another justification for the concept of gendarmery is the fact that hybrid threats impose the necessity for creating hybrid forces, able to combine various capabilities. Such capability based planning costs more, therefore the states are forced to integrate all of their security structures to close capability gaps. The hybrid threats include various criminal activities of non-state actors, mercenaries, proxies, terrorist, radical, extreme and other violent groups and organizations. Having gendarmery to counter such threats is more cost effective than maintaining more numerous armed forces. The intensity of violence from such groups should not exceed the capabilities of a gendarmery force. If that happens and the situation escalates, the engagement of the armed forces will always remain as the last option.

The perspective of the gendarmery as a concept is also justified because of the possibility to deploy abroad in peacekeeping and stability operations. The European Gendarmery forces were established in 2006 with seven members of the European Union (France, Portugal, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Romania and Poland), with Lithuania as a partner and Turkey as an observer. EU members can participate "if they possess a police force with military status". (European Gendarmerie Force, 2019)

However, there is a further justification to have a gendarmery force since it can be a useful part of the crisis management system especially in rural areas. Apart from the use of force in case of armed violence, such a structure is adequate, equipped and trained to help the civilian population in the event of natural disasters and accidents. In many countries around the world, the crisis management engages primarily the local forces designated for such mission, and then the military. Gendarmeries of many countries are usually responsible for designated areas of responsibility, they are familiar with the terrain and the population, and already have plans in case of a crisis.

Eligibility to intervene against armed groups

The assessment of future threats, risks and challenges for the security of the state should be realistic. Any exaggeration not only costs money spent on building capabilities that are unlikely to be used, but also affects the mindset of the security forces. Instead of using the information from the operational environment for shaping the defence capabilities, states tend to build capabilities that affect the operational environment. There is no other way to explain the arms race between states. In today's reality of hybrid threats, especially terrorism, this is exactly the goal of the initiator, or the actor that aims at destabilization of a state: to create a perception that the threats are much larger, for the state to invest in capabilities that are too expensive to sustain, and unlikely to be used.

All states have various security forces to protect their sovereignty from armed

violence. However, for the internal security and control of low intensity conflicts, states primarily build a well-organized, equipped and trained police force. The flexible relation between the police and the population allows better collection of information in order to detect illegal activities and networks of criminal groups. The presence of a gendarmery force in the rural areas can deter spillover of illegal activities in the urban areas. (Lutterbeck, 2004) The increased presence of military personnel can be perceived as a projection of better security, but can also be understood as a form of pressure on the population. Therefore, the police force or gendarmerie, if there is one, is a more adequate solution for providing internal security. (Den Heyer, 2011)

The experiences show that in the pre-conflict phase the state has the initiative and the peaceful resolution of the conflict is still possible. If the hidden activities of the non-state actors are recognized, the state can take timely measures to prevent the conflict from getting more violent. To prevent an escalation of the conflict, the state should identify all indicators that increase violence while there is still control over the territory. Not recognizing or concealment of the root causes of violence is the main reason for failure to prevent an escalation.

In order to prevent the infiltration of armed groups and their external assistance, it is necessary to control the state borders and block all illegal routes and networks of illegal trade. When the armed groups threaten security in the rural areas, a gendarmery force is appropriate to implement measures to control their access to the population and prevent their logistical support. In such scenarios, an important task of the gendarmery is to ensure a presence in the border areas and isolated regions. (Lutterbeck, 2004) The presence of police authorities throughout the whole territory is essential for the functioning of any state. In the contemporary security environment, this provides better intelligence and counterintelligence, especially as a measure to protect the state from radical, extreme, or terrorist groups.

There are numerous examples which show that if the government strategy is to suppress insurgencies, it is necessary to strengthen the link between rural and urban areas. If the terrain is mountainous, it is always better to connect the rural and urban areas with paved roads and essential infrastructure. During the stability operations, the security forces aim to stay close to the rural population to prevent their isolation from the state authorities. Improving living conditions and social services in the rural areas means improving the confidence of the population in their government. For example, in the Afghan war, the Taliban often uses violence and threats to end this relationship between the population and the authorities. Therefore, the state's priority in such cases is to enable law enforcement in the crisis regions to marginalize the influence of the armed groups. Through a direct contact with the civilian population a range of activities are undertaken such as protection and improvement of living conditions through social and economic measures. However, to implement these efforts, the state needs appropriate security forces to provide safe environment.

The first incidents that demonstrate that a violent group is well organized and strong enough to carry out armed attacks on the security forces should be taken most seriously. A security structure such as the gendarmery allows quick and proportional response, avoiding collateral damage and unnecessary destruction. Increasing control of the territory using lower intensity forces is a much better solution than hasty military operations. There are many examples when states unnecessarily escalate the conflict because they use more violence than necessary. In modern warfare any damage to infrastructure has negative consequences on the population.

Compared to the military, a gendarmery force is more eligible for quiet isolation of the incidents. (Den Heyer, 2011) The essence of unconventional doctrine is to provoke major reaction from the security forces with delivering small action. Security forces should tend not to use excessive force in a way that would cause collateral damage. The biggest challenge is to detect and identify armed groups in rural areas. If the police forces do not have specialized units for rural terrain, the state will have to engage the military, usually special operation forces equipped and trained for mountain warfare. Hence the necessity to have a security structure that has capabilities that go beyond the police, but are close to the military, at the same time having legitimacy to be used for internal security. (Lutterbeck, 2004)

Conclusion

In the future, hybrid threats will increasingly challenge national, regional and global security. Through various forms of non-linear warfare, independent or sponsored non-state actors will combine various unconventional ways and means to achieve their end state. The main problem today is that there are armed groups that can easily overcome the capabilities of the police forces. When they are not sufficient to suppress them, the state would be forced to use a much greater force (military) that will drastically exceed the capacity of the armed groups. Today, around eighty countries in the world, ten of which are NATO members filled this gap by having a security organization in the form of gendarmery.

The concept of gendarmery forces is nothing new, but in today's changed operational environment it has become more relevant. There are several important advantages of maintaining such a structure: it has the military capabilities with police jurisdiction; it can be used for internal defence, but also in operations abroad; it is suitable for low-intensity conflicts and their de-escalation; it can be used in crisis management during natural disasters, epidemics, migratory waves, especially in rural and isolated areas; the civilian population better accepts the gendarmery around; and it is close to the so-called "hybrid force" because it can simultaneously handle multiple threats that are unconventional by nature.

It is an economical investment because the state can easily use it in all possible scenarios: peace, crisis or war. The resources spent on equipment, training and sustainment are cost-effective compared to the military capabilities that may never be used. Last but not least, a security structure in the form of gendarmery is an appropriate solution against contemporary threats because it provides better internal security without militarization of the society, at the same time allowing the military to focus on its primary function.

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341.75

Scientific article

PROTOCOL AND TRADITIONS: E pluribus unum

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Abstract: *Adequate execution of protocol activities is one of the fundamental elements of effective and efficient diplomacy. In order for this to be achieved, one needs to know the essence of this practical profession. In itself this means knowing the history, lessons learned from the past, as well as the traditions as a threat weaving together the historical characteristics and culture of one nation, one region into this profession's tapestry. Having this in mind, one can say that protocol is a set of rules which shape what good behavior means. At the same time it is a set of rules which have a historical background, and norms based on traditions and customs, both of which shape what modern protocol is in the diplomatic, defence, and security sense of the matter, which is why the latest three characteristic cannot be viewed as isolated islands, but rather as integral elements of a complex and complicated system.*

Key words: *protocol, traditions, culture, diplomacy.*

INTRODUCTION

To put it plainly Protocol is an invisible profession which is the joining tissue of the international developments and international arrangements. This is a profession which represents a vital bloodline which ensures the uninterrupted course of international relations and this in itself creates international community mobility. Protocol can be viewed as a practical profession which has academic foundations since it has been based on theories developed for centuries. The failiure of some states to understand protocol rules, norms, and even traditions and customs, which is what protocol historical backbones are based on, can have huge consequence upon them and can simply put lead to their collapse as members of the worldwide scene. This is why it is of crucial importance for members of this profession, which is yet to be more clearly defined (for the boarder masses), to raise themselves above the common average and get to know the beginning of this exceptional profession. This would mean that specialists from our country must get familiar with the beginnings of Macedonian protocol, live with the current modern protocol, and at the same time be well aware of the restrictions coming as a result of culture and traditional differences between nations. This is exactly as its sounds – complex and very serious.

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I. PROTOCOL AND CEREMONY: THE SCIENCE AND ITS PRACTICAL USE

1.1 Basic definition of the word protocol and its history

Protocol is a set of rules that call for proper behavior during official meetings and ceremonies conducted by governments and nations, as well as their representatives. It is a recognized system of international courtesy[2].

Etymologically the term "***protocol***" comes from the Greek word "protkollon"(formed from the words "protos" - first and "kolla" - glue) which literally translates into first glued leaflet, which is the leaflet that the Greek used to mark documents[3]. Later, Protoculum meant drafting of official public documents, some of which were called protocols.

Protocol demands "**etiquette**", a term deriving from the French word "**étiquette**", meaning good behavior[4]. There is also another definition which says that protocol is a set of rules that regulates the matters of etiquette, commendation and order of precedence during official ceremonies. **"Diplomacy is the art of telling the bad things in the best possible way."**

Protocol was first applied as far back as during the times of the ancient Egyptians who published the book "***The Maxims of Ptahhotep***". Having this in mind one can freely say that in addition to the plow and the calendar, they also invented the policy of good behavior. This book was written in 2000 BC and is kept in the National Library in Paris where it is known as "***Papyrus of Preuss***" (according to the name of the donor).

By the XIX century French terms "***protocole diplomatique***" or "***protocol della chancellerie***"[5] referred to the ceremonial rules that had to be followed in written official contacts between states and their ministers. Nowadays protocol serves as an international code of courtesy which includes diplomatic forms, ceremonials and etiquette. In the current business world the word protocol is used instead of the word etiquette, simply because it sounds more formal.

As part of their culture, many companies have established their own protocol rules. Knowing etiquette has always been a powerful business tool. John Molloy, a business guru and author of the book "*Dress for Success*" said that everyone whom he had talked to claims that the biggest indicators of someone's style are his social skills.

Ninety-nine out of a hundred businessmen have claimed that possessing these skills is a precondition to success in the business and social life. They said that everyone has to have table manners, be able to keep a polite conversation, know how to represent

2 https://www.state.gov/discoverdiplomacy/references/169792.htm, accessed 30.03.2019
3 http://www.psow.edu/, Protocol School of Washington, accessed 10.02.2019
4 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/etiquette, accessed 30.03.2019
5 https://establishyourselfny.com/origin-of-etiquette/, accessed 30.03.2019

himself and others, and know the basic rules of courtesy.

Molloy also explains that the majority of businessmen appreciate if their employees behave properly at a party or a dinner. Nowadays, a capable businessman knows how to conquer new markets, open new opportunities anywhere in the world, and can overcome the techniques needed to prevail over the competition. Etiquette and protocol are skills that give any businessman a worldly image. Good manners are an essential part of any good leader.

Today in the twenty first century, technological boom, and development of communications, has led protocol to become the most important social discipline without which meeting of highest ranking leaders like presidents of states, governments, parliaments, and others, would lose their meaning. Protocol leads to meeting of world leaders, and royal families, fitting into a frame of common sence and proper behavior, which in its self leads to successful communication.

Going back to the core of the word protocol, we can point out that in its narrower sense it refers to originals of public documents, written minutes from international conferences, and agreements.

On the other hand in its broader sense, it means a **collection of rules which needs to be implemented as part of protocol, state, and diplomatic ceremonies, as well as during all official relations and social life events.** Rules of protocol are a form of a safety fuse for the reputation of each state.

Protocol is a set of rules which calls for proper behavior not only during times of ceremonies between high ranking state and military official, but in everyday ceremonies as well. This discipline is a well recognized system of internationally established politeness and good manners, which leads to respect of rights, status, and dignity of others. We can safely say that protocol is both science and art in constant development and progress.

Key to success in organizing and planning any protocol event is dedicating attention to details, respecting pre-established customs, traditions, and rules of ethics, politeness and common sense.

Responsibilities that new nations get during worldwide events, as well as the increase of multilateral diplomacy through institutions such as the United Nations, inevitably leads to the "flourishing" of diplomatic ties[6]. This turnout of events points out to importance of protocol, and at the same time reminds us that preparations for visits of statesman and state officials are both science and art: science because shades of protocol can be crucial: art because everyday protocol activities contain a dose of subtlety, delicacy and personal touch.

6 Stanzel, V.S. (2018), "New Realities in Foreign Affairs: Diplomacy in the 21st Century", Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft undPolitik.

1.2 The Ceremonial and its ties to protocol

The Ceremonial is a strict adherence to the prescribed or standard formalities during ceremonies. This definition would lead us to imagining magnificent festivities viewed through the media, some of them being enthronement of a monarch or a pope, a presidential inauguration or lavish ceremonies on the eastern courtyards. During all these ceremonies attendants are wearing formal clothing, feather hats, ceremonial uniforms, thus creating picturesque parades in all their glorious beauty. However, the ceremonial is after all far more than this. **Protocol** is a form of a hierarchical order and expression of good conduct between nations. Just as decency is one of the fundamental rules of everyday life, so is protocol when it comes to rules of behavior for governments and their representatives during official and unofficial events.

Maintaining peaceful relations between participants in the international diplomacy and avoiding insult are just some of the basics in international relations. Good behavior and respect towards independent states and their envoys is of fundamental importance.

Importance of all of this can be seen in the statement of John F. Kennedy, who at times when unpleasant behavior was an integral part of the diplomacy of certain governments, during his inauguration speech stressed that kindness and politeness **are not weaknesses**. Bismark, on the other hand reminded that even during declarations of war certain rules of good behavior are respected. Jules Cambon, a French Diplomat, wrote that during peace agreements there is no difference between the winners and the defeated, whereas Khrushchev publicly stated that pure insults would not help defeat capitalism.

Abandoning or alleviating protocol customs is often a result of pleasing someone. The Vatican which is probably the oldest courtyard in Europe is well known for its refined protocol procedures.

Off-protocol moves can also be seen coming from heads of states and other dignitaries. There is a well known story about a president of an African country who visited the "Colonial Williamsburg" Museum in Williamsburg, Virginia (USA). After the tour through the museum he returned to the vehicle where he realized he hadn't thanked the lady-curator. The next thing he did was get out of the vehicle, and return to the museum, where he thanked the lady and gave her a souvenir from his country. Examples like these are sufficient proof that protocol is not devoid of human sentiment to such an extent to which one might imagine and that the people obliged to adhere to protocol know when and how to dispose of its stricter strains when they want to show warmth towards people welcoming them[7].

7 Вуд. Р. Ц., Серес. Ц. (2009): *„Дипломатски церемонијал и протокол"*, Скопје: Издавачки центар Три

1.3 Protocol throughout Macedonian history

The state protocol of North Macedonia has very strong roots dating to its earliest history. Oldest data of protocol activities in the state tradition of North Macedonia can be found in the works of ancient authors who observed the activities of rulers of the Argead Dynasty that formed the first Macedonian state in the 7th century BC. This is the dynasty out of which emerged the most famous rulers of Ancient Macedonia, Philip II and Alexander III of Macedonia. In historical records state protocol activities are not elaborated in detail. Book like "History" written by the father of history, Herodotus in the 5th century BC, works of Roman historian Quintus Curtius Rufus "History of Alexander the Great", and "History of Campaigns of Alexander the Great" by Arrian, all describe certain interesting activities, about the state protocol in Macedonia. Data is provided through the descriptions of receptions of high-level delegations from foreign countries, military protocol before heading to a battle, reports of daily activities of the state and military apparatus, as well as protocols for funeral ceremonies of dignitaries.

One of the more important periods for the state protocol in Macedonia was that during the medieval period when the Macedonian state was led by Tsar Samuel from Prespa and Ohrid.

Although there is no special and detail data according to historic sources and archeological finds it can be noted that there was presence of state protocol.

Modern Macedonian state is rich with important events during which protocol rules, regulations and procedures were a necessity. Latest in the line of historic moments which changed the course of the state (without prejudices whether positive or negative but looking at it only from professional point of view) was the signing of the Prespa agreement which solved the three decades long historical name dispute. Details incorporated in the event point out that both sides (Greek and Macedonian) put a lot of taught into the protocol norms - location of signing (lake that connects us both), the event was taking place on both sides, and pictures which give a feeling of triumph and perfection.

II. PROTOCOL AND TRADITIONS THROUGH PRACTICAL EXAMPLES

2.1 Domestic state traditions

Protocol is a science and practice that develops through time – a large number of tools and channels for implementing modern protocol have changed, thus resorting to more effective and efficient ways for conducting protocol activities.

Still, if the intention of protocol is to function meticulously and in accordance with norms, traditions and cultural differences have to be respected.

Tradition is one of the most important factors for presenting professionalism and high level of knowledge in the area of protocol.

Following are several examples used to portray the importance of including tradition in protocol activities.

Example no. 1: In the course of one summer visit by the Defense Minister of Ukraine who came to the Republic of Macedonia, by plane, during the official lunch he was served watermelon as a dessert. He enjoyed the watermelon so much that when leaving, he brought with him "one ton" of watermelons from Macedonia. This represents a situation where tradition was put in the service of creating friendly relations.

Example no. 2: In 2011, during the visit by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Tani to our country, as part of the official lunch he was served traditional Macedonian food - Macedonian kebabs and baked beans, which are characteristic for our country and several other countries in the world only.

During the official welcoming of VIP's right at the arrival when stepping down from a plane, two girls dressed in beautiful traditional Macedonian clothing hold trays with traditional Macedonian bread with salt. This is served as a welcome gesture to the guests and is a traditional and innovative presentation of our host country. Also, during cultural events (programs) as part of official visits, during lunches there are often cultural and artistic programs by our cultural and artistic associations, which gives foreign VIP a unique presentation of our culture.

2.2 Tradition in other parts of the world

A. Middle East

Except for Israel, all the other states in the Middle East are of predominant Islamic religion. If having this in mind diplomatic representatives serving in this part of the world need to be observant of a bunch of rules and specifications which can lead to success or failure during their diplomatic representation. Here are some of the customs and traditions from this part of the world:

- With the Muslims, men and women do not sit together at the same table.
- Before entering a house you are suppose to take your shoes of.
- Pork meat and alcohol are not allowed.
- Muslims are fasting during the holly month of Ramadan
- Never shake hands or great them with your left hand since for them this hand is considered impure.

- Eat only with your right hand even if you are a lefty.
- Never sit on the ground by crossing your legs in a manner in which your ankle is supporting your knee.
- Do not raise your thumb to signal that something is OK. For the Muslim this is insulting gesture.
- Women need to respect strict dress code of covering their hair with a scarf, while wearing long sleeve skirts or pants. They never drive alone in a car.
- Men always wear long sleeve shirts and pants and never have jewelry on their necks.
- There should be no bodily contact between people of opposite sex. This applies for kids as well.
- Avoid doing business on Friday. This is a holly day for the Muslim.
- Muslims are not very punctual[8].
- Muslim men shake hand women do not. Do not make eye contact with Muslim women.
- Never ask you Muslim counterpart how his wife and daughters are. Women are never a conversation topic.
- Muslims pray five times a day and under no circumstances are you to interrupt this religious act.
- Very often if they offer you a deal they expect you to appraise the deal.
- Holiday: Eid Al-Fitr and Eid Al-Adha.

B) Israel

Although located in the Middle East Israel and the Israelis practice traditions quite differently then those by the Arab states. Here is a look at customs by people of Jewish religion:

- For the Jews the holly day is Sabbath. Sabbath starts at sundown on Friday and last till sundown on Saturday. During this period no deals are made.
- Jews reach decisions very slowly. They negotiate very fiercely and strongly, so do not be intimidated.
- Business cards are highly valued.
- Your business partner from Israel may not introduce his wife. Accept this.
- Hebrew is read from right to left, which is why your business partner from Israel may first open the last page of the agreement.
- When talking to you they might come closer to you then you would be usually use to.
- The Jews have very strict feeding codex.
- Never eat all the food in your plate. Always leave a small portion behind.
- Wear conservative and modest clothing.
- Religious holidays: Yom Kippur, Rosh Hashanah, Hanukkah[9], etc.

8 Copyright©1995 – 2008 by the ProtocolSchool of Washington®

9 http://www.psow.edu/, Protocol School of Washington, accessed 10.01.2019

C) Japan

Japan and the Japanese are traditionally and culturally different from the rest of the states from the so called "western world" which North Macedonian aspires to join. Here are some of their traditions and customs which can influence protocol and diplomatic activities.

- Japanese avoid eye contact.
- If asked "aren't you tired" they will answer with "Yes" meaning "I am not tired". Bear this in mind.
- During business negotiations they practice periods of silence.
- Traditional greeting is by bowing. The deeper the bow, the greater the respect. Japanese accept handshakes but it would be appropriate if you bow as well. Hands need to be next to ties.
- Address them by their last name and add "san" in the end.
- Business cards are always exchanged. They are offered and accepted with both hands.
- Every act is ceremonial, especially drinking tea. This also includes giving or accepting presents which should never be wrapped in white or black paper.
- White color means death.
- Never give presents is sets of four.
- Rank and age are very important. Show most respect for the oldest one.
- Holding open mouth is unacceptable so watch out even when you are yawning.
- Drinking is part of a business party so never reject it.
- Favorite pass time is karaoke.
- If smoking a Japanese will not offer you a cigarette. For them this is a very intimate act.
- Blowing your nose is offensive. Spiting and burping are acceptable. Use only a paper towel.
- Take your shoes when entering a house. Different sets of slippers are worn for different parts of the house.
- Meals take long time. Do not use the sticks you ate with to point a direction.
- The one who invites you for a meal is the one who pays for the meal.
- After a toast you flip your glass down this way showing it is empty.
- Term OK means money.
- Winking has no meaning.
- Do not wear heals. Japanese do not like to be looked at from high up.
- Kimono is wrapped by putting left side above the right.
- Shame is a great deal for the Japanese, and is often related to suicide.
- Holidays: Ganjitsu, Labor Day, Emperor's birthday, etc.

D) People's Republic of China

By number of residents the People's Republic of China is the largest country in the world. This is why diplomatic representation with this state is very important and needs to be at the highest level. Here are some of the customs and traditions which need to be observed when interacting with officials from this state.

- Never schedule a meeting during Chinese New year.
- Greeting is with a handshake or a small bow.
- Chinese bow first.
- When visiting an institution you might be welcomed with applause. Respond with applause as well.
- Always have your own interpreter.
- Chinese go into details during negotiations. Show patience.
- Talks are always led by the elders. The young never interfere.
- After lunch Chinese take a rest, and they will not change this.
- When entering a room the oldest person enters first. Guests leave first.
- Always use black ink pen, never red.
- Never discuss business during a meal.
- There are a lot of rules during meals. Never put chop-sticks on the plate, do not poke the rice with them and never start eating before them.
- When the Chinese invite you to lunch they pay for the meal.
- Women keep their last names when they get married so best way to address them is with Madame or Miss.
- There are only 400 or so last names in China.
- Chinese do not like gestures or touching with strangers.
- Do not point with a finger but rather with an open palm.
- Avoid gifts. For the Chinese they are unacceptable, unless they are a token from the entire company and are something very modest. Traditionally they refuse the gift three times before accepting them. Gifts are presented at the end of the deal and never before.
- Avoid watches and handkerchiefs because they are related to funerals. And never wrap gifts in white, black or blue paper.
- Chinese holidays: Chinese New Year, May 1st, and 8th of March;

E) USA

Simply put the most powerful state in the world, state present worldwide, a state which is one of the leaders is the most powerful military – political alliance of today – the NATO Alliance. This is why there is not need to discuss to what extent the diplomatic representation in this state needs to be professional, and with serious understanding of protocol rules and norms. Traditionally, very close to our state and society, but still with its own distinctions. Here are some of them:

- Americans write dates by putting month, day, year.
- Punctuality is highly valued.
- Deals are made very fast. They do not like long introductions and go straight down to business. Everything else is a waste of time.
- They often use compliments. Follow suit.
- Business card are offered only if you intent to contact the person later. If you present a business card do not expect to get one in return. Accept this without an insult.
- Lunch is usually light. If invited to dinner they are bestowing you with great honor.
- Bill is usually split, so even if you get invited for a meal, have some money on you.
- Americans are not very formal during meals.
- Handshakes are firm. Men expect women to put up their hand first.
- Hold distance when talking. Do not get into their personal space.
- When sitting down always be casual. You can even cross your legs.
- Law prohibits presents more expensive then 25 dollars.
- If invited for a home meal, bring flowers, wine, and something you have prepared. Offer to help with dishes or picking up the table.
- Thank you card are a standard practice.
- When having a birthday, friends take you out for dinner and buy you cake. This is their present to you.
- Holidays: 4th of July, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas, Easter, etc.

F) India

Global player with a great number of interesting complexities. Parts of their specifics are:

- Meetings are scheduled at least one month in advance. Best period to schedule a meeting would be between October and March.
- India has a lot of religious holidays so always check in advance. In India they never work on a holiday.
- Term “time is money” does not exist in India. They are never in a hurry.
- They take business on a personal level. If they like you, you will have a success.
- In India they do not like it if you say categorically No. Always say “we will see.”
- Always have change money on you. They never have change to give you for the bill.
- Hindus do not eat beef.
- If invited for a meal, come 15 minutes late.
- Never eat with your left hand, and do not offer someone else food from your plate.
- Never say thank you for a meal because to them this implies money, and they find this offending.
- Traditional greeting is the Namaste were you bow your head. This is a practical way of avoiding handshakes.

- More modern people in India do handshakes with both men and women. Women from abroad do not shake hands with Indians.
- In India the majority are Hindu and Muslim, so try to be observant of this as well. Hindu population avoids contact between men and women. With the Muslims this practice is even stronger. Never offer a handshake to Muslim Indian men or women.
- Never touch them on the head, even if you want to caress a child. For them the head is the center of the soul.
- Never point a finger, whistle, or wink.
- Never point at something with your feet (shoes). If you touch someone with your shoe apologize.
- Do not open presents before the person who gave them to you.
- Presents should not be wrapped in white or black paper. Green, yellow, and red are happy colors.
- Never present them with presents which have a picture of a dog. Never present them with presents that include leather.
- Always be dressed conservatively and without leather.

G) Important facts

1. Muslims have very strict laws. Any form of pork meat is forbidden.
   In some Muslim states it forbidden to eat any kind of meat coming from animals which have feasted on garbage (goats, dogs, bird, and even crab and lobster).
2. Often Indians, Pakistani and Bangladeshi are vegetarians, although Buddhism does not impose any food restrictions.
3. Jewish people don't eat pork and mussels, as well as some parts of the cow. They eat strictly kosher – before being killed, the animal must undergo a strict religious ritual; milk and meat cannot be served together and kitchen utensils for dairy and meat products must be used separately.
4. Hong Kong and South Korea have no stray dogs.
5. Japan is famous for their skill in arranging food so that it looks beautiful. Each meal is displayed in a showcase packed in plastic bowls.
6. In Italy and France, the salad is often eaten after the main meal.
7. In Germany, if a person is sitting alone at the table, you can ask whether it is free to sit on the table. In other countries this is unacceptable.

Interesting facts:

1. In Oriental countries, you must decline twice if you do not want a refill;
3. In Finland, if someone asks you to pass the salt, you need to leave it on the table close to the person instead of handing it to him;

CONCLUSION

Protocol is a complex science, and even more complex profession. This is not because of the gravity of the matter it covers, but rather because of the great number of details that must be taken into consideration during each of its activities. There is also the fact that the protocol is actively connected with the diplomacy and with this the safety of one nation, region, or even broader areas. Knowing where this profession comes from, its historical thread transcended through tradition and customs is the basis for adequate implementing of protocol elements during any activity. All cultural and custom enforced rules and norms are of great importance for people working in the protocol sector due to the fact that one gesture can be very positive in one, and very negative in another state. True professional does not leave even one single detail to chance but rather takes all these rules (and much more) as a "must have" starting point before any event.

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351.75(497.5)
Review

NEW SECURITY PARADIGM OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECURITY OF SOUTH EAST EUROPE[1]

Krunoslav ANTOLIŠ[2]

Abstract: *The regional geopolitical area of South East Europe (SEE) of today surrounding the Republic of Croatia (RoC) inevitably influences its security environment. That area was formed mostly through transitional changes, primarily as the result of the breakup of one-party systems in the countries such as Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and others. Multi-party systems, both real and bogus, have brought to the SEE countries some positive changes, yet there are still very present tendencies to return to the old ways of security patterns, albeit under new, Americanised names.*

The development of new strategic paradigms in the contemporary world must recognize hybrid warfare as an important and unavoidable risk for exploiting vulnerabilities of the state and society, so we must primarily recognize our weaknesses to be taken into account when assessing threats.

The goal of this paper is to offer the new security paradigm of RoC to the other SEE countries facing similar challenges, as a model for a way out of the used-up organisational forms and obsolete security patterns.

The paper discusses new development directions and ways to step out of the existing inherited security concepts through the switch of the security paradigm in a manner that is based on national objectives, on the change of attitude towards the intellectual capital and its role in the development of security models and systems, and on the functional and organisational combination of the research capacities.

Key words: *hybrid threats, security paradigm, national objective, national values, intellectual capital*

Introduction

Nowadays we can no longer perceive our own security as an isolated issue, but rather as a partnership oriented towards global security, based on commonly accepted principles and obligations.

1 All statements made in this article are solely those of the author and in no way reflects the official positions or policies of the Republic of Croatia, Croat's Parliament, Croat's Government or Ministry of interior.

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The SEE countries, today more than ever, have become a factor of European and global security. Yet, the national security concepts and obligations that some of those countries have taken with their membership in NATO and/or the EU, and as part of the Partnership for Peace, put considerable emphasis on the necessity to create a balanced sustainable security concept of SEE that will both honour the taken obligations and keep in mind the particularities of the national security guidelines of the various SEE countries.

The geopolitical circumstances have fundamentally changed in the past 20 years, shaking the old security concepts that were centred on one-party systems, and thus focused on protecting the political elites and narrow interest groups.

Strategic Driving Forces of Changes

Life of the contemporary man in the 21st century and the development of a global environment are determined by strategic driving forces of change.

Strategic driving forces such as globalisation, political geometry, demographic changes, climate change, as well as the impact of new bio- and nano-technologies, information and communications technologies (ICT), and the Internet, are determiners of the global processes and relations of today, and they will certainly continue to be the same tomorrow (Antoliš, 2018).

The impact of globalisation is apparent in the process of action and reaction, in reaction to the changes caused by democratisation, e.g. in unstable countries (Antoliš, March, 2013). In those processes, the ideas and concepts of globalisation are spread by heavy usage of its main information-communications infrastructure – the Internet. However, in the meantime, the very same Internet, abused by terrorists, has enabled global terrorism to become the world threat number one (Antoliš, 2013). The Internet abuse is definitely one of the biggest risks in the life of people today. As a security challenge, it requires a special place in the national security system of each country. Croatia has already recognised this fact.

Changes in the field of political geometry are largely related to the transfer of a part of the sovereignty of nation states onto new or already existing alliances. This description should also include the problems of unstable states as well as non-state actors and non-conventional threats that often require coordinated response of the international institutions and alliances.

Another global driving force are demographic changes caused by various factors such as the lack of food and water, unemployment, poverty, famine, diseases and wars. A result of all that are mass migrations numbered in millions of people. The migrations of historically huge proportions must not be omitted from security considerations in the near future, especially their multifaceted influence on security in the world, the EU but also in Croatia. Migrations as cultural, economic and, particularly, a security challenge, also have to be ranked in Croatia's new security concept as one of the high-intensity risks.

Unfortunately, the lack of trust between the states, as well as the impeded decision-making in common institutions, mark the geopolitical situation in the world, but also in the EU, today. For Europe not to become a fortress of individual welfare, encircled with insurmountable wall of the Schengen Area, but to manage a sustainable level of both openness and security, it has to urgently conceive a strategy of solving the issues such as migrations in the areas where they occur, lest Europe itself becomes flooded with them.

Until the final European immigration concept, acceptable to the Europeans, is devised and implemented, it is necessary to use national measures for a viable immigration policy and not to miss the first selection opportunity, taking into account the cultural, religious and political aspects of the integration processes, where Croatia should also give its strategic and operative contribution.

Having one of the longest external borders in the entire EU, Croatia should present its future membership in the Schengen Area as a significant additional quality in the entire process, as well as in the activation of the parts of the Lisbon Treaty which firmly recommend "permanent structured cooperation" among the EU member-states in the domain of defence.

Hybrid threats

The term hybrid warfare was coined nearly a decade ago in the US military writings to describe a "new" type of battlefield adversary confronting American forces that did not fit neatly into the traditional Western analytical categories of either conventional or unconventional threat. Instead, these new hybrid threats blurred the two, combining mixtures of high-tech and low-tech weaponry, new strategy and tactics, and a wide and confusing array of state and non-state combatants with overlapping political, criminal, informational, economic and terroristic methods and agendas (Cullen, P. 2015).

Hybrid wars are not new, but they are different. In this kind of warfare, forces become blurred into the same force or are applied in the same battle space. The combination of irregular and conventional force capabilities, either operationally or tactically integrated, is quite challenging, but historically it is not necessarily a unique phenomenon (Mattis, J. N. 2005).

Hybrid threat, as a potential, or hybrid warfare, as an act, is a complex phenomenon. It is complex as it results from the convergence and interconnection of different components which together form a more multifaceted and multidimensional threat. Complexity thus makes the traditional approach to strategic planning - which focuses exclusively on organizational interests (e.g. national values and interests) and the environment (e.g. global and regional security environment) - inadequate. (Smiljanić, D. 2017).

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg: "We have increased the number and size of our exercises, sped up our decision making, and developed the strategy to deal

with hybrid threats. Improving our resilience to hybrid warfare and strengthening Allied cyber defence. There is a great deal to do."

With regard to means to respond to hybrid threats, while the traditional means (conventional armed forces) may still be valid as an instrument for ensuring territorial defence, protection of sovereignty and deterrence, they need to be used in conjunction with other state instruments of power to respond adequately to hybrid threats.

Croatian National Goals

In the aforementioned international environment, both global and European, Croatia needs a new concept of national security to ensure achieving national goals as defined in the Croatian National Strategy. It would be based on national values and enable appropriate assessment of national interests aimed at achieving the national goals.

So, the Republic of Croatia's National Security Strategy would support the Croatian National Strategy aimed at defining strategic, long-term national goals (2050) in the fields of traffic, agriculture, tourism, sports, information and communications technologies, etc., based on comparative advantages of Croatia's position as well as its natural and human resources. Such concept of national security widely opens the door to the experts in (natural) sciences, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), and to medical doctors, psychologists, sociologists, economists, legal experts and other scientists from various scientific fields, to contribute with their work to build up the national security system and to strengthen the existing teams which lack the required knowledge in the mentioned fields, that are necessary for development and establishment of thus devised Croatian security concept.

Such a National Security strategy Would be aimed at assessing the security situation, and at creating efficient organisational and functional framework for the areas and modus operandi of the security system, in order to reach a desired level of security in the Republic of Croatia on its way towards achieving Croatian national objectives. Namely, by no means should it be in service of para-political elites and narrow interest groups, but rather in service of the national interest aimed at obtaining the national goals of the Republic of Croatia.

Croatian National Values & Intellectual Capital

On the topic of American national values, recently in his speech at the funeral of John McCain, former President Barack Obama said: "John understood, as JFK understood, as Ronald Reagan understood, that part of what makes our country great is that our membership is based not on our bloodline, not on what we look like, what our last names are, it's not based on where our parents or grandparents came from,

or how recently they arrived, but on adherence to a common creed, that all of us are created equal. Endowed by our creator with certain inalienable rights."[3]

Messages about endangering the fundamental values that the European Union has built, mentioned at the 13th Dubrovnik Forum, clearly point to the need to see whether Croatian national values are endangered. To be able to do so, we must first define them and adopt them with consensus, as have America and Europe.[4]

As a starting point, Croatian national values (CNV) are derived from the universal human moral and ethical values, as well as from the historically and geopolitically determined relations of Croatia at global, regional and national level. The defining framework of CNV encompasses a number of freedoms (demographic, educational, linguistic, religious, artistic, scientific, sporting, technological, economic), and equalities (of ethnicities/nationalities, gender/sex), and principles and protections (respect of human rights, inalienability of material and intellectual property, social justice, pacifism, preservation of natural environment, the rule of law, democratic multi-party system), as well as geopolitics and defence and the critical national infrastructure (Antoliš, K., Mišević, P., Miličević, A. 2015),.

It is important to note the crucial strategic importance of re-introducing the attribute of property into the definition of critical national infrastructure (CNI), just as the property is included in the definition of CNI for instance in Hungary, but it was also present in the first version of the Croatian National Strategy for Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism.

Critical national infrastructure (CNI) compromises (also) property, networks and facilities of national importance whose breakdown or disruption of delivery of goods or services can have serious consequences to the national security, health and life of people, property and environment, security and economic stability, and uninterrupted functioning of authorities. Croatian national wealth, which is substantial, the intellectual capital i.e. knowledge and experience of Croatian working people – especially those who lost their job or had to take early retirement due to the criminal manner of privatisation and transformation of ownership of Croatia's famous companies such as "Prvomajska", "Jedinstvo", "Sisak ironworks", etc., cannot be adequately protected, nor used to attain national objectives, unless the attribute of property is included into the definition of CNI.

Intellectual capital is of a vital interest for further development of the Republic of Croatia and should be recognised and given a high position in Croatian society as a strategic, vital value. First of all, intellectual capital ought to be deemed a property of the Republic of Croatia, which has not been given an appropriate role so far (Antoliš, September, 2013).

The Critical Infrastructure Act provides a definition of critical national infrastructure that does not include the basic attribute: property. It reopens the space

3 https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/barack-obama/read-full-text-barack-obama-s-speech-john-mccain-s-n905721

4 https://akademija-art.hr/hr/politika/predsjednik-vlade-na-dubrovnik-forumu/

for neglecting and marginalising the intellectual capital, which might and must be a key factor and support to Croatia's economy on its way out of a long-term crisis.

Therefore, in the risk analyses of economic entities but also of the state-owned enterprises, it is necessary to designate e.g. jeopardising of intellectual capital/ intellectual property as a high-level risk. Also, a particular segment of the security policy of the Republic of Croatia should be devoted to methods and techniques of combating such types of threats, and because of that all, by giving the attribute of critical national infrastructure to the intellectual capital of the Republic of Croatia, new possibilities of its protection would be opened. Yet, all this would be made possible only if the attribute property is again included in the definition of critical national infrastructure, which primarily requires the political will, because the professional justifications are plenty.

Croatian National Interests & Sectors' Objectives

Croatian national interests are geopolitically determined by the following: the Republic of Croatia is a sovereign, unitary and indivisible democratic state; member-state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and member-state of the European Union (EU); the power in the Republic of Croatia derives from the people and rests with the people as a community of free and equal citizens. Croatian national interests are as changeable as geopolitics itself, but they always have to comply with Croatian national values and lead to achieving Croatian national goals.

The sectors' objectives of the components of Croatia's security system, according to the National Security Strategy, are those that are derived from legally defined division of responsibilities between various departments. The components of the security system of the Republic of Croatia are: MoI (Ministry of the Interior), SAORoC (State's Attorney Office of the Republic of Croatia), MoJ (Ministry of Justice), SIA (Security-Intelligence Agency), MSIA (Military Security-Intelligence Agency), MoD (Ministry of Defence), MoFEA (The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs), MF (Ministry of Finance).

It is justified to require from the components of Croatia's security system to entirely master their legally defined domains of work, based on legal authorities, i.e. that each of them, in their own domain, takes responsibility for the functioning of the legal state, based on the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Croatia. For, the components of Croatia's security system can legally and properly serve the people and the state of Croatia only if those components and that system are independent of extra-institutional influence of para-political elites and narrow interest groups. And it is also an imperative to abandon the old norms of behaviour once and for all. The examples of those old ways in the area of former Yugoslavia were slogans: "Find a way, comrade" and "Don't stick blindly to each letter of the law", the instances of approach that is not strengthening, but rather destroying legal state (Antoliš, K., Mišević, P. 2014).

Democratic Oversight and Establishment of a Legal State

Establishing and maturing of democratic forms of oversight over Croatia's security-intelligence system plays an important role in development a legal state (Antoliš, K., Mišević, P. March, 2014). For example, it is a legitimate tendency to improve democratic (civil) oversight over the security system, thus reaching a higher level of transparency but also of information security of the national security system. Within the national security system, the civil oversight is currently established over the security-intelligence part of the system, and over the MoI where significant improvements are still possible. Still left to be devised is a democratic (civil) oversight over the homeland security system.

Some parts of democratic oversight, such as Croatian model of oversight over security-intelligence system, are unique in many ways, but at the same time more democratic than many similar solutions in the European Union. The Croatian step forward, based on similar solutions in Norway and Portugal, has enabled a significant increase in transparency of the security-intelligence system's functioning, and in the same time it has contributed to further professionalization and depolitisation of that system. But, although the system of the civil oversight has changed in the Republic of Croatia during the past period, there is still a space for substantial improvements, under the condition that the politicians are willing to accept them, and the parliamentarians ready to vote for them. At the same time, it is one of the best indicators how much our society is ready for true transparency in its most delicate segment – the national security system.

Our solutions in this domain could certainly, through development of democratic (civil) oversight, contribute to a better quality work of the security-intelligence systems of countries in the region (Macedonia), but also beyond, for example in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Ultimately, it could be our contribution to the international security.

Strategic Organizational Framework for Research and Development

Establishing the Strategic Institute for National Security (SINS) would create the institutional pre-requisite necessary for increasing the level of national security. The Institute's activity would target the security needs and requirements of economic entities and of the entire civil society.

Croatia was among the first countries to join the anti-terrorist coalition as a partner. Owing to the experience from the Homeland War, the attributes of which included fight against terrorism, and relying on the intellectual resources it owns, Croatia performs its partnership role in a responsible and professional manner. An adequate approach to this multi-disciplinary topic is necessary, though, in order to create

the organisational pre-conditions needed for its more successful solving. It is of utter importance to build the needed information resources which, enriched with knowledge and experience from the Homeland War, can guarantee success of the future system.

The multidisciplinary nature of the approach to national security imposes the need for adjusting the metrics by which the problem is defined and described in particular segments. That kind of attitude causes the necessity to create and define areas of understanding that are situated in intersections of certain fields, as well as to conceptualise methods of understanding and harmonising mutually different metrics for those areas.

The aim is to create linked metrics (interfaces) to ensure the integration of the newly built model and interoperability of the expert teams. The approach defined in that way makes obvious the need to establish an organisational form which is the pre-condition to reviving such a concept of national security.

Establishing the Strategic Institute for National Security (SINS) would be a historical step towards establishing a firm pillar for the national security system. But the role of SINS would be recognisable not only at national but also at regional and global level, especially through the following aspects: exchange of knowledge and technologies, coordination, integration, designing, implementation and oversight over the national security systems. The power of this approach lies also in the creation of preconditions for establishing similar systems in the region in accordance with the same model, which would make preconditions for building a network of such institutions that would afterward be capable of raising the multilateral security level in the neighbourhood, consequently achieving increased level of the global security as well.

The advantage of such a model is in the staff stability that would also meet the required academic criteria. It should ensure a necessary level of invariance with respect to political changes in expert teams of the proposed model and prevent replacing competent professionals with suitable staff directly affecting the security system efficiency. The political determinism in selecting the security system staff, which is visible in numerous and radical staff reshuffle on national and regional level, each time badly affecting the national security level of some countries in the region, frequently causes negative consequences on the regional and even global level of security.

Conclusion

The new security paradigm of RoC provides Croatia's contribution to the security of SEE, and as a model to the other countries in the region it offers them a possibility to consider a similar approach to improve their concepts of security.

In designing new security paradigms, it is important to include hybrid threats as well as the possibility of a hybrid war. The complexity of the process stems from the convergence and interconnection of different components, which together make a more prominent and multidimensional threat. Apart from the resistance of state power instruments, the whole society's importance is also important to ensure timely prevention and good response to hybrid threats.

The future brings new security challenges that will have to be faced only by prompt, preventive security models liable to changes, oriented to achieving national goals, and not the objectives of the para-political elites and narrow interest groups.

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Skopje, 12.04.2018 ***„Sovremena makedonska odbrana“***

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