40 years
Faculty of security
Skopje

МЕЃУНАРОДНА НАУЧНА КОНФЕРЕНЦИЈА

БЕЗБЕДНОСНИ КОНЦЕПТИ И ПОЛИТИКИ - НОВА ГЕНЕРАЦИЈА НА РИЗИЦИ И ЗАКАНИ

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

SECURITY CONCEPTS AND POLICIES - NEW GENERATION OF RISKS AND THREATS

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PREFACE

The states of the contemporary world are feeling the consequences of the existence of dynamic and complex living conditions, conducive to asymmetric threats and risks, terrorism threats, transnational crime, dangers related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, religious radicalism and extremism, illegal migration, cyber attacks and the like.

The security assessment needs to encompass the changes in the character of the risks, threats and potential conflicts. It means that the actors that cause the risks, threats, potential conflicts and dangers are diverse, multilayered and, as certain threats, sometimes even asymmetric. Their identification is much more difficult than before, when the state was the sole actor. As risks and threats are acquiring an increasingly internal character, sub-national groups and ethnic communities have an ever more significant role. Organized crime oftentimes participates and cooperates with the involved actors, exploiting the situation, the shortage of resources, diseases, epidemics, natural disasters, the vulnerability of the social system; moreover, crime and terrorism are increasingly becoming trans-national to a great extent. The above reasons have led to a change in the matter of interest of the security policy, that is, to a change in the policy approach, and to adopting a broader concept rather than exclusively following a political – military standpoint. This change and the new security concept and its policy have affected the national security to follow the same trend.

With regard to security development, the threats and risks to the state and to the social, economic and political relations, the state order, the human potential and civic concept, the objective need for organizing independent protection of the entire territory, the international position of the state and the realistic capacities of the country play the key role.

The vulnerability of national security ranks among the top problems that people face as individuals. Unlike the theories and practice in the past period, and the forms of threats and security of that period, the development of contemporary societies determines many more security threats relating to the economic, social, health and other spheres, even internal security. At the national level, the security of the Republic of Macedonia is a precondition for successful external and internal stability and comprehensive development of the social life of institutions and citizens.

As stability is a precondition for the approach of this region to the European Union, building common mechanisms for protection against risks and threats and crisis management are important assumptions for security consolidation and swift democratic transition of the SEE countries.

The expansion of the security concept involves the emergence of new and broader potential security threats, primarily targeting economic growth, environmental destruction, violation of human rights and migration movements.

Pursuant to the risks and threats, it is necessary to conduct a demographic analysis with the focus on the demographic movements in the country and the region, taking into account the shifts in the ethnic and religious structure (which appears as the most serious ground for separation and conflict), as well as the shifts in age structure, spatial distribution and living style based on ethnic and religious affiliation and the shifts in the ratio between the working and military capable population and the dependant population.

As a political concept, security is evidently a precondition for the existence of individual and social life and means an absence of threats and protection against them. Understanding security as an inherent interest of every individual and the broader human collectives – family, society, nation and state, the international system implies the need to expand the security concept to include these collectives. Hence, theory shapes concepts such as national and international security, and in recent times, individual, societal and global security, which indicates a significant extension of new security dimensions.

The expansion of the security concept in the Republic of Macedonia provides for inclusion of new and broader potential threats to security, primarily targeting economic growth, environmental destruction, violation of human rights and migration movements.

Mission

The mission of this conference is to encourage the academia and the security experts to share information based on their use of scientific research methods and to exploit practical experience so as to create a scientific – research dimension. The idea for organizing this conference coincides with the new trends in the security field, specifically, with the new generations of security risks and threats and the interdependence of the security concepts, strategies and policies in addressing these threats.

The papers submitted through an announcement offer solutions for identifying the security risks and threats, or the destabilizing factors that cause conflicts. In this context, and in correlation with the title of the Conference and the rational assumption for full application of the offered security concepts presented in the papers treating security issues in a number of security science sub-disciplines, they should contribute to confirming the current and creating new solutions within the existing security concepts, based on a holistic approach in view of efficient and timely dealing with the security risks and threats.

Hence, the mission of the conference is to encourage the scientific researchers to share scientific knowledge aiming to shed some light on the new generation of security risks and threats and, determine at the same time the security concept and policy for dealing with such risks.

Aims

The practical aim of this conference is multifaceted, primarily given the fact that scientific and expert literature is scarce in works and analyses on this particular issue, or even if there are such works, they are characterized by a partial scientific approach, which indicates imposed effects in practice. The aim of the conference is to obtain valid results and scientifically verified knowledge in view of implementing a rational and acceptable solution for sustaining security and addressing risks and threats. The well reasoned proofs and presentations of the obtained results and the insight in the overall situation will enable considering systemic and institutional solutions, that is, a new stage in the qualitative development of this segment.

The scientific and practical objective of this scientific conference is stimulated by the following assumptions:

▪ How do the contemporary concepts affect the maintenance of security in our country?

▪ What is the impact of the complexity and specificity of the approaches to security, particularly to its development and the social political situation in the country?

▪ How many and what type (both in terms of quality and quantity) of researches of the basic factors for successful implementation of the basic concepts in the national security system have been conducted to date and to what extent have they affected the strategic documents with respect to using the results thereof?

▪ Which of the basic concepts are most suitable and applicable in the security system of the Republic of Macedonia?

▪ Which are the critical areas in the security system of the Republic of Macedonia that need elements for change?

▪ How can we come to proposals and solutions for building an efficient security system in the Republic of Macedonia, i.e. for tracing directions for creating an appropriate security policy.

Tasks

The scientific conference in Ohrid 2017, by debating its scientific works, contributes to providing answers to questions that spur scientific and public social interest. One of these issues is the definition of the new generation of security risks and threats.

Security concepts and policies will be discussed at the conference through an open and well reasoned debate.

In this way, the Faculty of Security – Skopje continues its orientation towards organizing international conferences in the area of security, contributing to the development of scientific thought and helping the policy creators (political level) and the decision makers (senior level of practitioners) on the regional, national and local level to overcome practical problems more swiftly, simply and timely they are facing using the presented knowledge and research results.

To that end, the following topics are discussed at the conference:

Topics:

- ❖ Contemporary security – a state or a social problem
- ❖ Security as a public good and its transformation in the spirit of the new generation of security risks and threats
- ❖ Peace, security and technological development
- ❖ Risk society and risk dynamics
- ❖ Threat and risk theories
- ❖ Security and insecurity, realistic and subjective threats
- ❖ Sectors and levels of security and risks (military, economic, environmental, societal and political risks).
- ❖ Systemic risks, dependence of the technological and social risks.
- ❖ Risk assessment, exposure and vulnerability
- ❖ Risk management and conflict and crisis prevention
- ❖ Possible manifestations of extremist nationalism, racial and religious intolerance
- ❖ Forms and activities related to international terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, illegal drugs, human and weapons trafficking, dual use materials, and the consequences of weapons of mass destruction use
- ❖ Possession of substantial quantities of illegal weapons;
- ❖ Transition problems, such as corruption, urban terrorism, serious crime, including blackmails, racketeering, murders, attacks on citizens' property, economic crime,

tax evasion, insufficient building of democratic institutions system, judiciary problems
- ❖ Social problems and unemployment
- ❖ Activities of foreign special services aimed at deteriorating the security situation and thus slowing down the democratic and integration processes, particularly those related to NATO and the EU
- ❖ The consequences of the conflict of interests in terms of using the sources and roads of the strategic energy resources and impeding and blocking their import to the Republic of Macedonia
- ❖ Natural and other disasters, technical – technological disasters, human epidemics and animal diseases caused by domestic and/or external factors
- ❖ Computer crime, piracy and misuse of information technology, especially in the domain of personal data, business, official and state secret
- ❖ Degradation and destruction of the environment
- ❖ Security integration and risk prevention
- ❖ Deep political and social turmoil
- ❖ Crash of the global management system
- ❖ Corporate security as a new way of risk management.

With regard to the organization of the Conference, for eight consecutive years, it has acquired a highly renowned place in the scientific circles in the region and it has been constantly expanded in view of its further development.

Chairman of the Organizational Board
of the International Scientific Conference
Assistant Professor Marjan Gjurovski, Dr.Sc

Country	Original scientific paper	Review scientific paper	Professional paper	Negative reviews	Total work papers
Albania				1	1
Bulgaria	3				3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	1			2
Croatia	2	2	1		5
France	1				1
Italy	1	1			2
Kosovo		2			2
Macedonia	7	31	14	2	53
Poland		2	1		3
Romania		6	1		7
Republic of Srpska,BiH	1	2		1	4
Slovenia		2			2
Serbia	5	11	6	1	23
Turkey		1			1
United Kingdom			1		1
Total work papers	21	62	24	5	112

Dear participants,

The Faculty of Security - Skopje organizes the International Scientific Conference in the area of security for an eighth consecutive year in view of contributing to the development of scientific thought and helping the decision makers at the state level to overcome the practical problems they are facing.

The title of this year's Conference is: "SECURITY CONCEPTS AND POLICIES - A NEW GENERATION OF RISKS AND THREATS."

The 2017 Conference is organized with the support of the "Hanns Seidel" Foundation and the Chamber of the Republic of Macedonia for Private Security to whom I hereby express our immense gratitude.

The scientific debate should address the issues that arouse the interest of the scientific and social public with regard to the ways of causing and dealing with the dangers and risks in the world, the region and in the Republic of Macedonia.

This scientific forum of academicians and practical experts is meant to raise an open and well-reasoned debate about the general functioning of the early warning system and dealing with the risks of crises and disasters as an integral part of the security system. Based on the presentations of the keynote speakers, the presentations of the papers and the discussion of the participants, we expect to arrive at proposals and possible solutions for building an effective security system.

The danger, that is, the exposure to injuries and damages, is the key element in the so-called security alphabet. If there is no danger, there is no need to talk about security. Hence, although it may sound paradoxical, the world without dangers would not be a safe world, but a world without security. Danger may be manifested in the form of challenges, risks and threats to security. The notion of danger in security science bears the same meaning as strength in physics, supply / demand in economy, personality in psychology or power in politics, crime in criminology or victim in victimology.

Security challenges, risks and threats may be classified on the basis of numerous criteria. According to the broad concept of security which stems from the so-called Copenhagen School, the challenges, risks and threats can be divided into war, political, societal, economic and environmental. This division is an analytical framework that has been used in the past.

According to their origin, security challenges, risks and threats can be divided into internal challenges - those that arise within the political community and external challenges - those occurring outside the community.

From a theoretical viewpoint, the police has the primary task to prevent the internal challenges, risks and threats, while the military is responsible for external security threats. However, in times of ever increasing globalization, which brings into question the sacrosanct importance of international borders and creates an intermestic area, there are less and less challenges, risks and threats that may be defined in this way. The boundary between internal and external security is increasingly difficult to draw. All this leads to overlapping of the security functions of the different security departments, which is reflected in creating a police character of the military and militarization of the police. In regard to their source, risks and threats can be caused by a human or a natural factor. In terms of the stakeholder, there are challenges caused by actors and risks and threats that arise from processes. The actors can be state or non-state actors, such as terrorist or

criminal groups. However, the challenges, risks and threats can also be caused by processes. Globalization in certain areas is experienced as a challenge. In such case, the actors, as multinational companies, are only indirect stakeholders of the challenges, risks and threats, while the essence of the danger comes from within the structure and dynamics of global capitalism. In terms of the trends of a certain age, challenges, risks and threats are often divided into old and new.

Challenges, depending on the time necessary for their materialization, can be divided into short, medium and long term. In terms of the degree of severity of the damage caused by risks and threats, low, medium and high intensity risks and threats can be distinguished.

As stability is a condition for rapprochement of this region to the European Union, building common mechanisms for protection against risks and threats and crisis management are important prerequisites for consolidating security and rapid democratic transition of the countries from Southeast Europe.

The process of globalization has had as its consequence some destructive phenomena that have caused regional and local tense situations and conflicts. The emerging security challenges, risks and threats are conditioned by increasingly pronounced differences in the economic development of certain countries and peoples. Therefore, modern world is overburdened by many uncertainties and its main characteristic in the area of security is reducing the dangers of traditional military conflicts and direct confrontations of the great powers on the one hand and the emergence of a plethora of new non-military challenges, risks and threats, on the other.

I anticipate that the scientific researchers from the higher education institutions from the region and Europe participating in our Conference will raise substantive issues in the area of security, opening and seeking answers to important questions that are current not only in Macedonia, but also important for the region and beyond.

The process of integrating the region into NATO and the EU enable ever more rejecting the empty phrase for the Balkans as a "powder keg". It is exactly science that will provide the answers to complex security issues.

We have received 116 papers from 15 countries for the International Scientific Conference Ohrid 2017, out of which 5 papers were given negative reviews. 20 of them are original scientific papers, 62 review scientific papers and 24 are expert papers.

In closing, I would like to take this opportunity, on my personal behalf and on behalf of the employees of the Security Faculty – Skopje, part of the University "St. Kliment Ohridski "- Bitola, to welcome you and wish you successful work and a pleasant stay in our beautiful Ohrid.

Dean of the Faculty of Security-Skopje and
Chairman of the Organizing Board of the Conference
Prof. Dr. Oliver Bachanovic

WELCOME ADDRESSE

Hanns Seidel Foundation was founded in 1967 as a German political foundation based in Munich, in the service of democracy, peace and development. Central, South and Southeast Europe are an important focus of the international projects of the Hanns Seidel Foundation.

In the Republic of Macedonia, the work of the Foundation is aimed at the stabilization efforts in context of democratization, building a pluralistic society and inter-regional cooperation as a factor of stability and security. Our consulting engagements contribute to the consolidation of the process of integration into the institutional and socio-political areas.

In terms of crisis prevention, minimization of conflicts and democratic stabilization, Hanns Seidel focuses its work in the framework of the projects in the whole region of South-eastEurope. The goal set for all events in the project region remains to support the countries intheir effortsto integrate into the structures of the European Union, in particular adjusting the assistance according to EU standards. The focus is directed towards the area of reform as the fundamental pillar of democratic change.

Our activities contribute to the establishment of a transparent and functional administration at central and local level, which is oriented to the postulates of the rule of law and, above all,oriented to the citizen. Special activities
are in support of conferences, seminars and training in the field of internal security. Democracy, in accordance with the rule of law and internal security are mutually conditioned and of outstanding importance to the citizens.

Over the past 25 years, the Balkans countries, the politicians, but mostly the experts, the academia and the media have been looking for ways to overcome the existing misunderstandings, not with weapons, but through communication. It is a good fact that at such scientific conferences ofthe Security Faculty in Skopje issues are raisedwhich are of particular importance for the region, not using the outdated methods of police and military cooperation, but rather through possibilities for finding models and harmonizing the common values and interests.

It is necessary that all factors in the Balkans understand that open communication and dialogue should be the unifying factor that will contribute to finding ways, methods and models for handling and preventing security risks of any kind.

No security threat can be prevented without regional cooperation, regardless of whether it relates to internal political conflicts, organized crime, human trafficking, terrorism, trafficking in human organs or artifacts.

The high level of unity and solidarity that the countries of the region have demonstrated in the activities for overcoming the consequences of the recent natural disasters can be pointed out as an example of good cooperation, which should serve as a model of cooperation that can be applied in the field of security, through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. If we succeed regionally, through bilateral and multilateral communication, in establishing serious models of cooperation in the field of security, theSEE countries will likely be prepared to be part of the system of European security policy.

Dr. Klaus Fiesinger
Regional Director of the Department of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe of
"Hanns Seidel" Foundation

WELCOME ADDRESSE

The „New Normal"

Accepting and following the term "The New Normal", which was introduced in the CoESS fifth White Paper by the President Marc Pissens, while commenting on the actual conditions, I will allow myself to start with my personal view regarding today's complex living and working conditions and the imposed need for daily adaptation to the newly created reality. In this sense I believe it is completely justified, acceptable and applicable to refer to the "new normal" environment, "new normal" risks and threats, "new normal" security concept. Still, how to proceed further?

Primarily, the existence in the new context is guaranteed by the national integrated security systems, which include the private security as a strategic, equal partner for guarantying the national security. The "new normal" is airports, power plants, telecommunication systems, hospitals, schools and other critical infrastructure to entrust their protection and security to the private security companies.

At the same time, this new security "architecture" inevitably requires and imposes professionalism and high quality of the private security services. Therefore, the "new normal" private security company is focused on three segments: specialized normative framework, upgrading sectoral standard qualifications and motivation of staff through trainings and improving working conditions. Apart from the tendency for intensive progress, additional indicator i.e. confirmation for the correct positioning of the private security sector is the growth of the demand for this service. Moreover, the increased demand for the private security service directly corresponds to the responsibility for the public authorities and the scope of the work of these companies. In this sense, it is important to emphasis that "the traditional private security guarding market, lunched as a business at the beginning of the last century, is expressing bigger growth then the growth of the GDP of most European countries."

Bearing into consideration all the "new normal" aspects of functioning, such as: the integrated security concept, critical infrastructure protection by private security companies, professionalization and quality of the service etc, additional factor which continually in all phases contributes for successful accommodation to the "new normal" reality is the continual connection, synergy between the relevant stakeholders and involvement of all relevant entities, providing input from their professional domains.

In this context the international conference "Security concepts and policies-new generation of risks and threats" represents the essential connecting factor. The scientific and research work, the initiation of a productive debate by linking the theory with the practice, aimed at improving overall security concept expresses the "new normal" functioning of the academic and educational institutions.

Hence, the Chamber of Republic of Macedonia for private security, in terms of shaping the private security sector into "new normal" professional, standardized sector, competent for response to the new security risks and threats and changed working environment, has accepted the initiative from the Faculty of Security to support this conference. We strongly believe that with these activities we will contribute for further development and improvement of the private security sector in Republic of Macedonia.

Chamber of Republic of Macedonia for private security
Verica Mileska Stefanovska, MSc.
Chairman

Security, security system and approaches to risks and threats

THEORETICAL GROUNDS FOR RESEARCHING THE SECURITY RISKS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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ABSTRACT

Although according to many security scholars and sociologists around the world we are living in an era where security risks dominate the contemporary security horizon, there is an evident lack of sound theoretical grounds in much of the scientific researches that deal with security risks. This can be especially observed in the Republic of Macedonia, where scientific researches of security risks have been very rare, let alone the fact that almost all of them lack the necessary theoretical grounds. This paper attempts to point out to the necessity of using contemporary, up-to-date and appropriate theoretical grounds for researching the security risks in the Republic of Macedonia. In actual fact, we are using the reflexive theoretical approach of Ulrich Beck's risk society theory, the theory of ontological security and the risk-trust theoretical considerations of Anthony Giddens, as well as the theory of liquid modernity and living in an age of uncertainty by Zygmunt Bauman. All of these three theoretical views complement each other and could give a sound and reliable theoretical framework for researching the security risks in the Republic of Macedonia. They could also guarantee reliable and objective results in case of their implementation in an empirical research. The authors of this paper suggest the many advantages of this theoretical approach and the benefits for the scientific research of the security risk in the Republic of Macedonia, such as: testing the risk society thesis, the character of risks, main risk management strategies, risk assessment and ways of security risks treatment.

Keywords: security risks, risk society, ontological security, liquid modernity

1. INTRODUCTION

Risks have always intrigued human curiosity, from the dawn of humanity till nowadays. Peter Bernstein rightly remarks that "all human history is in fact history of risk and that the very idea of mastery of risk defined the boundary between past and modern times" (Bernstein, 1996: 1). The concept of risk, usually understood in security terms as "*security risk*", and defined as "*probable, expected event, possible danger that could cause some detrimental consequences to values*", has become a central notion in social and security sciences in the last few decades (Спасески, Николовски, Герасимоски, 2010: 179). Security as an instrumental and one of the most important values is mostly related to

the security risks and various ways of dealing with them. The era that we are living today in could be even named, without much exaggeration, an era of uncertainty and risk society. Thus, it is not surprising at all to know that the majority of the most eminent scholars in the security and sociology field of our times have devoted much of their scientific efforts in an attempt to research and explain the risks, especially the risks viewed from a security and sociological aspect. Their contribution has made significant breakthroughs in science and thanks to their scientific efforts, a lot of new scientific notions, concepts and theories have emerged.

It is almost unimaginable that a sound scientific research about risks and security risks in particular, could be done without taking into consideration and implementing the theoretical knowledge provided by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt Bauman. Their insightful and influential findings are unavoidable for everyone who is to carry out any kind of research that includes risks, their character, their aetiology and phenomenology, and in security terms, their prevention, assessment and treatment. Although their contributions are mainly theoretical and cover wide scientific areas of risk research, they could be fairly easily implemented in almost all areas of scientific risk research, and are quite suitable for security researches. In this respect, their theoretical grounds are found to be very adequate for researching the security risks in every society, organizations, security institutions or individuals and the results gained from this research could surely shed new light on the contemporary character and developments of security risks. Likewise, their theoretical grounds could also be used as contemporary sociological ground and paradigm that suits to present the situation with the security risks in the Republic of Macedonia, since the security risks in the country could no longer be successfully researched by using the old fashioned, obsolete and classical security and sociological theories, which, in one or another way, have proven to be inadequate for researching, explaining, assessing and treating the contemporary security risks. Additionally, it must be underlined that most of the scientific researches in the Republic of Macedonia have not included researches of security risks, of course, with few exceptions (Мојаноски, Димовски, Ѓуровски, Илијевски, 2015; Герасимоски,2010b). The majority of researches that have already been conducted in this field do not include any of the stated theoretical approaches to security risk research, due to the poor reception of these theoretical concepts, or probably, due to the lack of knowledge about them. Therefore, this paper will make, to our knowledge, for the first time in Macedonian security science, an attempt to point out the advantages of using the theoretical grounds of Beck's, Giddens' and Bauman's theories in understanding, explaining and researching the security risks. We put special emphasis on the quality scientific results that could be expected in case of their implementation in researching the security risks, as well as the implementation of policies undertaken by the security institutions and the whole society who could benefit from these researches. We base this kind of optimism relying on many studies and researches that have already been made in the world, which use the abovementioned theoretical grounds within their studies and researches.

2. ULRICH BECK'S RISK SOCIETY THEORY

Ulrich Beck's and Anthony Giddens' theories of risk belong to the group of theoretical orientations known as reflexivity risk theories. This group of risk theories considers the processes of reflexive modernization, individualization and institutional reexamination as processes that try to reveal the character of the risk in contemporary society and to identify ways of dealing with it. In addition to this group of risk theories,

there are also two other groups of risk theories: rationalistic theories and social and cultural constructivist theories (Gerasimoski, Mojsoska, Trajkovska, 2013; Герасимоски, 2010a). The point of reflexive modernization, according to the founder of this coinage, the German sociologist Ulrich Beck in his brilliant book *The Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, lies in the development of the character of the risks and their manifestation in what he calls the second or new modernity, and that is in fact the era of "*the risk society that increases our sensitivity and ability of thinking and changing the societal conditions of existence*" (Bruce & Yearley, 2006: 256). He considers the risk as a very ambivalent concept (Yates, 2001: 101). Modern society has become a risk society in the sense that it is increasinglyoccupied with debating, preventing and managing risks that it itself hasproduced (Beck, 2006: 332). He metonymically calls the global risk society "*melting of the iron cage of modernity*", i.e., breaking out with the first modernity described by *Max Weber* as "*an iron cage of modernity*" (Beck, 2003: 125). Namely, in the era of industrial society and first modernity, the solid structure of society contained the logic of production and distribution of the goods. Here, we have a domination of the so called external risks, i.e., risks that primarily come from the nature and known societal reality. As modernity progresses, the character of the risks changes, meaning that from external they are becoming more and more fabricated, new and more numerous, diversified, unpredictable and all-present (Godard, Henry, Lagadec et Michel-Kerjan, 2002). In that way, the risks and living with them becomes one of the fundamental determinants of the second modernity and so called reflexive modernization, in which the previous logic of production and distribution of goods has been substituted by production and distribution of risks, dangers and evils (Маршал, 2004: 453-454). Reflexivity and individualization as processes characteristic of the "risk society", in actual fact, signify everyday living, facing and dealing with risks by the people, which to some extent could represent a kind of allusion of some postmodern view of seeing things to which Beck is opposing, seeing the second or progressive modernity more in a *Jurgen Habermas'* style, as an "*unfinished project*" (Бест, Келнер, 1996: 333). Beck most plastically puts forward the difference between the first and second (progressive) modernity through the differences between class and risk positions, thus entirely turning around the Marx's thesis and claiming that "*within class positions the being determines the consciousness, within the risk positions it is reverse, consciousness (knowledge) determines the being*" (Beck, 2001: 78). Hence, it can be seen as a substantially epistemological level, so that is why this theory has often been named a cognitive theory (theory of knowing the reality through risks) or, simply, a cognitive approach towards risk society (Neary & Taylor, 1998: 54). In his theory of the risk society, Beck looks back to the relatedness of the risk society with the process of globalization. Hence, since the risk itself is peculiarly globalizing, the advent of the risk society accelerates the process of globalization. The reflexive character of risk, combined with its lack of limitlessness in space, forces the consciousness in a globalization direction (Вотерс, 2003: 103-104). With that, Beck sees risk as one of the major generators of globalization itself, but, at the same time, as one of the most important consequences of that process, especially evident through the thesis of the so-called "*risks boomerang curve*", according to which the negative risks (possible dangers) created in one part of the world, with the help of the globalized interaction in the sphere of trade and other forms of exchange, come back to the very creator. Thus, "*the multiplication of risks causes the world society to shrink into the danger community*", by which, Beck consistently concludes, also comes to a change within the value systems of those societies "*from the*

value system of the unequal society, to the value system of the uncertain society" (Beck, 2001: 73).

Regarding the theoretical contributions of Ulrich Beck's theory of risk society, this theory could be especially helpful in researching these issues related to modern security risks in Macedonian security context:

- Researching and testing the risk society thesis in Macedonian societal and security context;
- Studying the existence and extent of the differentiation between external and manufactured risks;
- Researching and explaining the existence and level of risk reflexivity within Macedonian society in general and within Macedonian security institutions in specific.

3. ANTHONY GIDDENS' THEORY OF ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY

The second founder of the reflexivity theoretical orientations within the risk theories is the outstanding British sociologist *Anthony Giddens* with his influential series of Read Lectures on BBC, held in the course of 1999 and then published in the book *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping our Lives*. The significance that Giddens places on risk as a phenomenon in the society that we are living in is a special one. According to him, risk falls within the five most important phenomena in late modernity or in late modern society. Following the sociological studies of risk made by Beck, Giddens speaks of risk reflexivity as a kind of a strategy for dealing and living with in a society of risks. Namely, he accepts the division of risks to external and fabricated, thus making significant contribution to differentiating between risks that are considered as old and fairly known, and new risks that are much less known and are a product of incompetent human intervention. Giddens speaks that since not so far away we have started to care less about what nature and the living environment (external risks) could do to us, and much more about what we could do to nature and the living environment (fabricated risks) and that we have created risks which no previous generation had to confront (Gidens and Haton, 2003: 15).

He also considers the outstanding importance of the relation with experts, public and individuals in understanding and dealing with risks. Thus, Giddens talks about three different relations, which are at the same time some kinds of strategies for dealing with risks, such as: intimidating, concealing and the so-called "*cautiousness principle*" (Giddens, 2002: 30). Finding that it is impossible to guarantee the successfulness of some of these strategies in certain cases of dealing with risks owing to the very nature of the risk, nonetheless, Giddens holds on the most to the need of redefining and reexamining the institutional and mutual response of experts, public and individuals in choosing and implementing the most suitable ways, strategies and actions for dealing and living with the omnipresent risks and their chameleon nature. In his theory of risk, Giddens devotes significant place to studying of the socio-cultural fundaments and implications of risk, especially in studying the relations "*risk-trust*" and "*risk-ontological security*" (Giddens,1990). Through them, he tries to prove that trust is a key socio-cultural category that creates ontological security in contemporary societies, i.e., the security of the human being. The increased trust reduces the anxieties and fears caused by contemporary risks and acts as a powerful social, cultural and psychological mechanism when dealing even with the most dangerous risks. The same has been realized through the process of "*routinization*", which Giddens understands as "*vital psychological mechanism where the*

feeling of trust and ontological security is being achieved throughout the everyday activities of the societal life" (Giddens, 1984: 373-377). According to Giddens, the trust as a key to ontological security in the contemporary society of late modernity must surmount the dark side of modernity that creates the most significant negative risks (Giddens, 1990: 7-10; 92-100). In addition, Giddens also holds that risk is one of the defining concepts of modern society. Namely, the risk determines what Giddens calls "*juggernaut of modernity*", which could be translated as "*uncontrollable force of modernity*", as something that slips the ability of modern man to keep it under control and manage it, which leads to the creation of a runaway world that overflows us with ontological insecurity (Ritzer, 1997: 146). Anthony Giddens' reflexivity theory of risk can also be found in his basic theory of structuration, where, through the explication of the routinization process as a fundamental concept of his theory of structuration, he encompasses the question of risk, trust and ontological security (somewhere translated with safety, although safety is subjectivized security, not ontological state, the state of the being). He says that "*a theory of the everyday life in terms of modernity can be developed by using the notions of trust and risk*" (Giddens, 2006: 251).

Having the theoretical contributions of Anthony Giddens' theory of ontological security, we could single out the following points that could be especially helpful in researching these issues related to modern security risks in a Macedonian security context:

- Studying the most optimal strategy (intimidation, concealment, cautiousness) for dealing with the security risks within the security institutions and society;
- Analyzing the contribution of different factors (agents) in dealing with risks, such as science, nature, politics, religion and lay expertness (so-called privatization of risk);
- Researching the existence and influence of the risk-trust nexus and the theory of ontological security within contemporary Macedonian security institutions and in society;
- Defining the character of contemporary security risks (are they neutral or negative /security/ risks) and answering the question of whether we live in a specific risk culture.

4. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN'S LIQUID MODERNITY THEORY

One of the most influential social thinkers of our time is surely the renowned British sociologist and philosopher of Jewish descent Zygmunt Bauman. Although at an old age, during his prolific academic career, he has written numerous books and scientific articles that deal partly or entirely with the problem of risks. His contributions to the theoretical study of contemporary risks must be viewed within his broader theories of liquid modernity and living in an age of uncertainty. Thus, his ideas about risks and security risks in particular, have much in common and complement with the theoretical understanding of risks by Beck and Giddens, but, also, in some important aspects differ from them. In order to understand and evaluate the contribution of Bauman to risk studies, we have to refer to his main theoretical concepts.

First of all, Bauman's main theory of liquid modernity rests on his assumption that the solid modernity structures and notions no longer exist nowadays and that they have melted or dissolved in a way that they have become liquid or fluid. Though he uses "*fluidity*" of "*liquidity*" as fitting metaphors, by that he understands that there are no longer fixed, solid or stable grounds on which the modern structures and notions could stand, or, as Bauman remarks, we are now living on "*quick sands*" (Bauman, 2000: 2). This is an era

where postmodern societal relations have created such uncertainties where "*risks and fears became privatized*" (Bauman, 1992: 18; Bauman, 2005: 345). Nothing is stable or sure, and it is changing with every passing day. No one seems to be in control. This instability comes mainly from the basic forces of societal change that are found in societal relations shaped within globalization and postmodernization processes. These tensions in societal relations are mainly located in what Bauman calls the break-up and consequent "*divorce*" between power and politics (Бауман,2016: 5-6). Namely, the power is becoming more and more global, while politics remains local. Therefore, the state and its institutions can no longer lead effective policy since the power has evaporated, creating uncertainty, risk and fear. The old institutions can no longer deliver the effective policy solutions, while its institutions have lost their capability of resolving the everyday community issues. In this sense, Bauman's theory of liquid modernity has similarities with the so called structuration theory and Giddens' notion of "*shell institutions*" that can no longer deliver democracy and democratic solutions (Giddens, 1984). The very changeable character of institutions, according to Bauman, derives mainly from the lack of power that has emigrated in the global levels, while the local institutions have been stripped of power, but have kept only their impotent policy. In other words, they have kept their ability to decide which things ought to be done, but have lost their ability to get things done. This has created an air of impotence, powerlessness and lack of political effectiveness of contemporary institutions which have to change constantly and live in a fluid time of an ever changing world, where the main features are instability, uncertainty and everyday living with risks.

Bauman also considers the freedom-security nexus as some kind of a sand watch and he believes that nowadays, we are trading much more freedom for security. Security seems to be the value that is much more needed in the globalized and postmodern world, although it may sound and look paradoxical, since the very essence of both processes is freedom as a value. In fact, the unbridled and uncontrolled search for freedom has made security much more needed and desirable than freedom. In this sense, he understands both the risky and uncertain societal age in which we live, but he also recognizes, as many other influential scientists of our times, the unprecedented growth and development of security industry with its omnipresence, especially the private security industry (Свендсен, 2010: 109; Krahmann, 2008: 31; Furedi, 1997: 14-16; Кековиќ, Бакрески, Стефановски, Павловиќ, 2016).

If we have to enumerate the theoretical contributions of Zygmunt Bauman's theory of liquid modernity, we could find several contributions that stand out in the sense of their helpfulness and usefulness in researching the issues related to modern security risks in Macedonian security context:

- Researching the globalization and postmodernization influences on the capacity of the security institutions to deal effectively with the contemporary security risks;
- Studying the freedom-security value relation in contemporary Macedonian societal and security context;
- Researching the influence of living in an age of risk and uncertainty referring to the growth of security fears and consequent growth and development of security industry, security risk management, security risk assessments and security risk programmes for risk treatment.

5. CONCLUSION

The contemporary societal and security sciences have profited much from the original and remarkable theoretical contributions in the sphere of risk research done by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt Bauman. Though each theory is original in its way, they complement in some crucial aspects, which makes them usable in researching the contemporary risks both as societal and security phenomena. We believe that the theoretical contributions of the Ulrich Beck's theory of risk society, Anthony Giddens' theory of ontological security and Zygmunt Bauman's theory of liquid modernity and living in an age of uncertainty, could proven to be very helpful in researching the contemporary risks within Macedonian society and Macedonian security institutions. They can bring a new, fresh point of view that can give an answer to many questions that are almost impossible to research and answer without taking into consideration the above mentioned risk theories. In this way, the present character of risks, the influence of globalization and postmodernity to the definition of risk, risk society and culture of risk, the division between external and manufactured risks, the implementation of adequate strategies for risk management etc., could be much more easily researched using the given theories, and above all, they could also guarantee a high level of scientific relevance of the results, interpretations and conclusions.

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CAUSES OF SUICIDE TERRORISM, ONE OF THE NEW GENERATION'S THREATS (COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF SUICIDE TERRORISTS' PERSONALITY)

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ABSTRACT

Despite the large number of papers dealing with terrorism, it is difficult to determine the causes of terrorism. Accordingly, it is even more difficult to define the causes of suicide terrorism, one of the new generation's threats. Given that suicide terrorism is a social phenomenon, its causes should be sought in the social parameters. One of the important social parameters are the demographic characteristics of the suicide terrorists' personality, including, *inter alia*: gender, age, marital status, family status, social status, religiosity... For the reasons above, the aim of this paper is to seek the causes of suicide terrorism in certain demographic characteristics of the suicide terrorists.

Keywords: New Generation of Risks and Threats; Suicide Terrorism; Causes of Suicide Terrorism; Suicide Terrorists; Demographic Characteristics of Suicide Terrorists.

INTRODUCTION

"Despite the large number of scientific papers dealing with terrorism, it is indicative that only a few authors have dared to define and clearly specify the causes of terrorism. It is difficult to give a certain answer to the relatively simple questions - how and why terrorism occurs" (Stajić, 2003, p. 232). The same thing applies to the new generation's threat –suicide terrorism.

The best mode of counter-terrorism is prevention of the suicide terrorist attacks, i. e. detection of the causes that induce this type of terrorist action. Oftentimes, the causes of suicide terrorism do not receive due attention. Mostly, we talk about the number of victims and the damages arising as a result of the attack, while the motives of the attacks are rarely discussed. However, it is important to know that the clarification of the causes of such attacks, and respectively, the motives that suicidal terrorists are driven by, would be a significant step in the prevention of potential suicide terrorist activities.

As suicide terrorism is a social phenomenon, its causes should be sought in society. Every society is composed of individuals and their relationships, and the relationship between the individuals and the community is not the same in every community. Thus, for example, in civilized societies, an individual in one religious community will not take the consequences if he/she does not agree with the religious authorities and faith regulations. In the worst case, that person can be excommunicated. On the other hand, a resident of a country (which is a specific collectivity because in addition to the population, it also has a territory) must respect the constitution and laws of the country which citizenship he/she holds. In case this is not done, certain legal measures or measures of coercion, which are at the government's disposal, will be undertaken against

that person,. Regarding the terrorist collectivity, the individual must respect the rules of the collectivity, since if there are any disagreements, the collectivity would be brought in danger of being exposed.

On the other hand, the question is: "Why do terrorists appear in some communities, while in other communities that exist under the same conditions, there are no terrorists?" The personal characteristics of the individuals stand out as a crucial factor thereof. This is an especially important issue as terrorists (especially the organizers of suicide attacks) are often highly educated and well-off people.

1. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE AND MOTIVES OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

Suicide terrorism is an important political and strategic issue for the countries that are affected by this form of terrorism. This view has gained in importance after the 9/11 attacks. However, even before these attacks, suicide attacks had far-reaching political consequences. The attacks on the US and French forces in Lebanon in 1983[1] had resulted in the withdrawal of the international forces from that country (Cronin, August 2003, p. 4). This enabled Syria and its forces to occupy a large part of Lebanon and thus achieve a huge impact on the Lebanese politics in the following years (Fletcher, 2008).

The basic explanation of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism can be found in a form of the islamistic view pattern. Putting the emphasis on the islamistic pattern can help us understand the background incentives for this kind of self-sacrifice (Israeli, 1997). Also, the personal role of the terrorists contributes to the emergence of suicide terrorism. There are three main characteristics of suicide terrorists: 1) They are young and they have a little responsibility in their lives; 2) They are unsuccessful so both the family and society avoid them and they feel lonely; 3) They have little self-esteem (Israeli, 1997, p. 106). For these reasons, they are depressed and they try to find the appropriate solution to their problems. They find that solution in martyrdom, in which resentment turns into glory, defeat into victory and the desperation turns into public admiration. However, the decision to sacrifice lives for certain goals can also be attributed to indoctrination, as well as "brainwashing", which seeks to create single-minded persons who commit suicide for "higher" interests. Some argue that suicide bombings are an ancient phenomenon and some authors claim that the first suicide attacks were performed by Assassins (Chaliand & Blin, 2007, pp. 55-78). However, this opinion can be challenged, as it can be said that the Assassins performed attacks in which there was a great danger that they will be killed, sometimes involving the risk of certain death, but strictly speaking, these attacks were not suicidal. The attacks in which the attackers deliberately kill themselves to kill others are a contemporary phenomenon (of course, if we exclude examples pertaining to warfare, such as kamikaze). The first recorded example of organized suicide terrorist attack was the car-bomb attack on the US embassy in Beirut on 18 April 1983. At the beginning of the 21st century, there was a huge increase in terrorist attacks, for instance, with respect to the 583 suicide attacks carried out from 1981 to 2004, 75% of these attacks occurred between 2000 and 2004 (Figure 1). (Merari, 2007, p. 102)

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[1] On April 18 1983, a suicide attack was carried out on the US embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people (including 17 Americans) and 88 people were wounded. Among the casualties, there were several officials of the United States State Department and the United States Department of Defense. On October 23 1983, a double suicide attack was carried out on the headquarters of the French paratroopers and the US Marine barracks, which resulted in 58 killed French soldiers and 241 killed Marines (Karmon, 2003, p. 6).

Figure 1 Suicide attacks by years (Source: Merari, 2007; Author)

After the first suicide attacks carried out by the Hezbollah in 1983, terrorist groups around the world have begun to apply this method of terrorism. These groups include eight groups in Lebanon (six Lebanese and two Palestinian), four Palestinian groups in the area of Israel and Palestine, two Egyptian groups, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK – Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), the Turkish Revolutionary People's Liberation Front (leftist group), the Chechen rebels, the Tamil tigers, the Islamic militant groups in Kashmir, Al Qaeda, the Armed Islamic group in Algeria, ISIS and anti-American groups in Iraq. Many of these groups have carried out only several suicide attacks. Only a few of these groups are conducting an ongoing campaign of suicide terrorism as a central way of their struggle. In line with the previously presented data on the number of attacks, Table 1 presents the countries in which the attacks were carried out, how many attacks have been carried out and how many terrorists conducted them, considering that some of these attacks were multiple. The data refer to the period from 1981 to April 2005.

Table 1 Number of suicide attacks and attackers from 1981 to April 2005 (Source: Merari, 2007)

Country	Period of time	Number of attacks	Number of suicide bombers
Afghanistan	2001-2004	6	7
Argentina	1992-1994	2	2
Bangladesh	2001	2	4
Bolivia	2004	1	1

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China	1998-2002	3	3
Croatia	1995	1	1
Egypt	1993-2005	5	6
India	1991-2001	9	9
Indonesia	2002-2004	4	5
Iraq	1988-2005	256	291
Israel	1988-2005	175	195
Kenya	1998-2002	2	4
Kuwait	1983-1985	2	2
Lebanon	1981-1999	41	41
Morocco	1995-2003	6	13
Pakistan	1995-2004	15	20
Philippines	2003	1	1
Portugal	1983	1	5
Qatar	2005	1	1
Russia	2000-2004	33	40
Saudi Arabia	2001-2004	8	15
Spain	2004	1	7
Sri Lanka*	1987-2004	68	113
Tanzania	1998	1	1
Tunisia	2002	1	1
Turkey	1996-2004	25	26
Uganda	1998	1	1
USA	2001	5	20
Uzbekistan	2004	4	6
Yemen	2000-2002	2	4
In total	*1981-2005*	*682*	*845*

* The number of attacks in Sri Lanka is debatable due to the difference of opinion as to what is a suicide attack.

During this period, attacks were carried out in 30 countries, but the vast majority of the attacks, almost 88%, occurred in 6 countries: Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Israel, Turkey, Russia and Iraq. In fact, 73% of the attacks occurred in 3 countries: Sri Lanka, Israel and Iraq, of which 63% of the attacks are associated with Israel and Iraq (Merari, 2007, p. 103). These facts illustrate an important feature of the nature of prevalence of suicide terrorism. However, although there has been a rise of suicide attacks since their introduction, to date, this growth is not compatible with, for example, the improvement and advancement of information and telecommunication technologies. Nevertheless, the truth is that suicide terrorism of today is greater than ever.

2. SUICIDE TERRORISTS' PERSONALITY PROFILE

The social and psychological profile of a suicide terrorist's personality is related to two types of data: demographic and psychological characteristics. The demographic description, such as age and sex, is easy to do. On the other hand, the psychological characteristics, in particular, personality traits and motives, are not easy to describe. Most of the psychological traits are pulled out on the basis of biographical data (Hudson (1999); Weinberg, Pedahzur, Canetti-Nisim (2003); Cronin (2003); Kimhi and Even (2004); Ricolfi and Holmes (Gambetta & others, 2005)). A small portion of the reports is based on interviews with potential suicide bombers and their families (Andoni (1997); Hassan (2001)).

3. SUICIDE TERRORISTS' DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

In this paper, we will focus on the social profile of terrorists. In this context, the most important demographic characteristics of suicide terrorists will be described. We will encompass gender, age, marital status, religiosity, education level and economic status. Hence, we will present data which were obtained by some of the world's most prestigious experts and we will compare the demographic profiles of different suicide terrorists' personalities - Lebanese, Palestinians, Kurds and Tamils.

3.1. AGE AS A SUICIDE TERRORISTS' DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC

When we talk about the age of suicide bombers, which was studied by several authors (Pape (2005); Ergil (2001); Schweitzer and Shea (2002)), it differs in various terrorist groups. The average age of the Lebanese suicide terrorists is 21 years (ranging from 16 to 28 years). The average age of the Palestinian suicide bombers is 22 (18-38). For the Tamil Tigers, the average age is also 22 years, while for the members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party it is 27 years (Figure 2). It is obvious that the Kurdish suicide terrorists are slightly older than the other listed groups. As to why is that so, scientists have no unique explanation.

Figure 2 The suicide terrorists' average age (Source: Author)

3.2. MARITAL STATUS AS A SUICIDE TERRORISTS' DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC

The marital status of terrorists is also an important factor for understanding the terrorist activities. The data on the marital status of the Lebanese suicide terrorists vary, but generally we speak about singles. On the other hand, when we talk about other forms of terrorism, even 55% of terrorists are married (Hurwitz, 1999). Regarding the Palestinians, only 10% of the suicide bombers were found in marriage (Merari, 2007, p. 105), while no data is available for the Tamil Tigers and the members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party. From these data, it is evident that in most cases the suicide terrorists are not married.

3.3. GENDER AS A SUICIDE TERRORISTS' DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC

Gender is also an important demographic characteristic and there are notable differences between certain categories of terrorists. 16% of the Lebanese suicide attacks were carried out by women and all of those women were members of secular terrorist groups (Merari, 2007, p. 105). At the beginning, the suicide bombers among the Palestinians were predominantly males, while Hamas was the main executor of the terrorist attacks. Following a period when the secular groups Fatah and the Popular Front for the

Liberation of Palestine began to carry out suicide attacks by sending female suicide bombers, this tactic was taken by Hamas too. However, the percentage of female suicide bombers is only 4% (Merari, 2007, p. 105). On the other hand, there is a significant number of female suicide bombers in the secular terrorist organizations in Turkey and Sri Lanka. Thus, in the Kurdistan Workers' Party in the 1995-1999 period, the percentage of female suicide bombers is as high as 73% (Ergil, 2001, pp. 82-87). For the Tamil Tigers, the proportion of female suicide terrorists is 33% (Schweitzer, Suicide Terrorism: Development & Characteristics, 2000, pp. 3-4). The large percentage of male suicide bombers among the Lebanese and Palestinians can lead to the fact that there is a predominant presence of males in the religious terrorist organizations.

3.4. EDUCATION LEVEL AS A SUICIDE TERRORISTS' DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC

The education level is among the key demographic characteristics. Suicide terrorists have different levels of education. Table 1 presents data about the level of education. The mentioned data pertains to the Palestinian population, comparing the level of education of the suicide bombers and the Palestinian population in general.

Table 2 Education level of the Palestinian suicide bombers and of the general Palestinian population (percentage) (Source: Merari, 2007)

Education	No schooling	Partial elementary	Elementary	High school	Partial university	Full university
Suicides	0	2.9	8.8	62	23.5	2.9
General Population	10.5	29.2	25.3	23	11.9	

From these data it is evident that the suicide terrorists have a better education than the average population. For example, the percentage of suicide bombers with high school and university education is 88.4%, while this percentage among the general population is only 34.9%.

3.5. SOCIAL STATUS AS A SUICIDE TERRORISTS' DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC

The social status of the families of the suicide terrorists is different, as well as their education level. In Palestine, in relation to the social status, the families of the suicide terrorists belong to different classes. About 12% are very poor families, 21% are poor, 26% belong to the lower middle class, 32% belong to the middle class and 9% belong to the higher caste (Merari, 2007, p. 106).

There are opinions (Joshi (2000), Fisk (2001)) that the suicide attacks are a retaliation for a personal tragedy in the family of the suicide bombers, ie. a revenge for the murder of a family member, close friend or revenge for previous arrests and harassments. However, this can only be considered as one of the possible causes of the suicide attacks.

3.6. RELIGIOSITY AS A SUICIDE TERRORISTS' DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC

The Lebanese religious terrorist organization was the first that began to carry out suicide attacks, but over time this tactic was adopted by the secular terrorist groups, so that the attacks of the secular groups rose to two-thirds of the total number of suicide attacks (Reich & others, 1990, pp. 192-207). In Palestine the first suicide terrorists were religious fanatics too. Namely, Hamas and Islamic Jihad started with this kind of terrorist activity in the first Palestinian uprising (intifada).[2] The members of Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine began to act as suicide terrorists since the Second Intifada.[3] The final portion of the secular Palestinian suicide terrorists is 27% (Merari, 2007, p. 106). The other two groups (Kurdistan Workers' Party and Tamil Tigers) are secular.

CONCLUSION

The September 11 attacks directed the attention of the entire world toward the risk of suicide terrorism. These attacks have proved that suicide terrorism is a serious threat to the security of the countries and that it can be a destructive and violent phenomenon. However, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey and Sri Lanka have been struggling with this phenomenon for years. These countries are trying to forestall these and other terrorist acts through better prevention, which includes the study of the psychological and social profile of the suicide terrorists' personalities. These measures include the study of the suicide terrorists' demographic characteristics (gender, age, education level, marital status, social status).

In these countries, the danger of suicide terrorism is always present despite the fact that the number of suicide attacks has decreased in recent years. This risk indicates the need for continuous work in order to improve counter-terrorism.

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[2] The first Palestinian uprising (First Intifada) began in late 1987 in the Gaza Strip and quickly spread to the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The uprising lasted until 1993.
[3] The second Palestinian uprising (Second Intifada) began in September 2000 in East Jerusalem from where it spread to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The uprising lasted until 2005.

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STATE TROJAN: THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA OF THE CITIZENS

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ABSTRACT

In the current historical context characterized by technology of information and a massive spread of digitalization in various fields, new forms of terrorism threaten the security of the States which, in most cases, are unprepared to address catastrophic consequences of terrorism, both of traditional type and, so to say, computer type.

The States, therefore, have to face new types of threats to their national security; with respect to these threats, the traditional defensive measures have proven to be totally inadequate. Threats like these need multilateral responses and a more focused effort at the level of international cooperation.

However, technological development has been used also by the States which, through the use of spy software (computer virus) installed in cell phones, are able to monitor electronic communications, and to acquire remotely, in addition to the content of the communications, all the data in the respective cloud of pertinence of the phone users or the PC in question.

This study aims to analyze the Italian, European and international legislation (if any) in the field of interceptions by spy software and to make a comparative analysis of the existing legislation in different States of the international Community in order to identify possible solutions in regard to the balance of the conflicting demands of protection: on the one hand, the safety of the citizens and, on the other hand, the secrecy of communications.

Keywords: spy software; technology of information; computer virus.

1.   **Introduction**

In the current historical context characterized by technology of information and a massive spread of digitalization in various fields, new forms of terrorism threaten the security of the States which, in most cases, are unprepared to address the catastrophic consequences of terrorism, both of traditional type and, so to say, computer type.

The States, therefore, have to face new types of threats to their national security; with respect to these threats the traditional defensive measures have proven to be totally inadequate. Threats like these need multilateral responses and a more focused effort at the level of international cooperation.

However, technological development has also been used by the States which, through the use of spy software (computer virus) installed in cell phones, are able to monitor electronic communications, and to acquire remotely, in addition to the content of the communications, all the data in the respective cloud of pertinence of the phone users or the PC in question.

The use of information technologies by the police for investigative purposes can be, on the one hand, a useful tool in the fight against crime in general and terrorism in particular; however, on the other hand, it conflicts with other needs of the citizens equally worthy of attention and defence by the legislator. Some of these needs are also constitutionally protected; they include, for example, the protection of the confidentiality of communications ex art. 15 Cost., to the extent that the interception through installation of a computer virus in the electronic device allows interception between the present persons wherever they are, with no precise details of the places where the interceptions are to be carried out. In this way, persons who have nothing to do with the investigation needs can also be investigated.

This study aims to analyze the Italian legislation in the field of interceptions by spy software and conduct an analysis of the existing legislation in another State of Europe (Germany) in order to identify possible solutions in regard to the balance of the conflicting demands of protection: on the one hand, the safety of the citizens and, on the other hand, the secrecy of communications.

2.   **StateTrojan**

Technological development has also been used by the States which, through the use of spy software (computer sensors, intruder agents or State Trojans) installed by sending an email, a text message or an upgrade application in mobile phones, tablets and PCs, secretly monitor the electronic communications for remote acquisition of the content of the communications, as well as all the data in the cloud pertaining to the users of the phone, tablet or PC[1].

It is a particular survey instrument, *remote searching*, very useful especially for the purpose of crime prevention (not only of the computer type) which allows wiretapping not only in public places or places open to the public, but also inside the home of the person to be monitored[2].

These programs are essentially similar to those used by cybercriminals against the victims of the crimes they commit and they function in a way that does not reveal their presence to the controlled person[3].

Through this self-installing software, investigative authorities can control all the equipment in each of the hardware devices in question. For this reason, computer sensors, unlike other survey instruments, are particularly intrusive, on the one hand, because they allow wiretapping from a distance almost unnoticed and, on the other hand, because they

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[1] See GIGLIO, I virus informatici per scopi intercettivi nei procedimenti di criminalità organizzata: mezzi di cura o agenti patogeni? Riflessioni su Sezioni unite penali RG 6889/2016 del 29 aprile 2016, on the website filodiritto.com, June 20, 2016. The Author clarifies that "The virus is usually installed remotely by sending an e-mail or a text message to the selected target (a personal computer, a smartphone or a tablet), of course without the knowledge of those using the devices. Once the operation is completed, its implementer has multiple options and in particular: remote control of the infected device (the operator can use it without limits, carrying out each type of activity); visualization of all operations undertaken by the holder; visualization and extraction of all the data contained in the device; putting it out of order; launching the microphone and the webcam of the device and, then, a possibility to get audio and video recordings. Basically, the operator has complete control not only of the IT activities performed by the user of the device, but also of his movements and communications".

[2] See ORTIZ PRADILLO, Fighting against Cybercrime in Europe: The Admissibility of Remote Searches in Spain, in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2011, Vol. 19, pp. 363-395.

[3] See ABBAGNALE, In tema di captatore informatico, in Archivio penale, 2, 2016.

allow collection and recording of a large quantity of data by activating the microphone and the camera of the devices on which they are installed[4].

The use of information technologies by the police for investigative purposes is a useful tool for combating crime in general and terrorism in particular. This is because they are investigative tools that enable surveillance activities that are not limited to a specific place, but extended wherever the controlled person brings the electronic device in which the Trojan was installed[5].

It is hardly necessary to point out that the installation of computer sensors is exempt from any space-time restriction and allows the control of the private life not only of the person under investigation, but also of all the people who come into contact with the latter. This refers both for the private dwellings and for the places where the criminal activity takes place.

Under this specific profile, as it will be discussed, it is necessary to balance the use of these investigative tools with the individual rights guaranteed in the Constitution and the European Charters on Human Rights (ECHR and the Charter of Nice), which can be seriously breached by the use of such investigative tools[6].

3.   **The German Case Law and the Necessity of Reconciling Counterposed Interests**

The use of IT tools by the investigating authorities conflicts with other important issues, such as those relating to the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the human person that need to be protected and taken into account by the legislator at the moment of the predisposition of direct legislative instruments to regulate the use of computer sensors.

In view of the invasiveness of the instrument in question, it is easy to understand that the indiscriminate use, or worse, the inappropriate use of such software by persons unrelated to the activity of investigation, can interfere even more unlawfully with the privacy of the citizens, with harmful consequences to the "endurance" of the constitutional guarantees related to the levels of democracy of a State.

The German Constitutional Court has dealt with this issue when, required to assess the constitutionality of the law authorizing the intelligence services of North Rhine-Westphalia to use computer sensors for investigative purposes, it declared them unconstitutional by a judgment of November 27, 2008.

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[4] See VECCHIO, Le intercettazioni da remoto e i diversi modelli di bilanciamento tra esigenze investigative e diritto alla riservatezza e all'integrità dei sistemi informatici, in La cittadinanza europea, 1, 2016, p. 108: "It is therefore an exceptionally important tool that, although close to the operation of certain computer viruses (in this sense we speak of "State Trojan"), allows police authorities to keep up with the times and to face criminal organizations that do not hesitate to use technology to facilitate the pursuit of their aims".

[5] See LASAGNI, L'uso di captatori informatici (trojans) nelle intercettazioni fra presenti, in Diritto Penale Contemporaneo, october 7, 2016, on the website penalecontemporaneo.it.

[6] One of the requirements to be considered by States is the protection of the confidentiality of communications (Art. 8 ECHR, Art. 7 Charter of Nice and Art. 15 of the Italian Constitution). In fact, it should be noted that the interception through installation of a computer virus in the electronic device allows the execution of wiretapping of the persons wherever they are, with no precise details regarding the places where the wiretapping has to be conducted. Moreover, this type of interception also allows investigation of persons that have nothing to do with the investigation needs.

According to the German Court, these types of investigative activities were interfering with the constitutionally guaranteed rights, highlighting the need to establish that any law allowing them must justify its usability within the limits of the protection of the constitutionally guaranteed rights, or in terms of the guarantee of the collective interests.

The German Constitutional Court has clarified that it is not to exclude absolutely the use of agent intruders. However, the Court has specified that the law object of its judgment did not guarantee the constitutional rights of protecting the privacy of communications and the inviolability of domicile and has identified a new constitutional right: the fundamental right to privacy and integrity of the technological systems.

This right has been placed within the broader right to integrity of personality, by specifying, however, that the right to privacy and integrity of the information technology systems is not absolute, but that this right can be limited both for preventive reasons and to prosecute crimes[7].

In December 2008, the German Parliament approved a law "on defence against the dangers of international terrorism by the federal police" admitting the use of the State Trojan exclusively for preventive investigations.

By judgment of 20 April 2016, the German Constitutional Court has re-examined the question of legality of the investigations carried out by the Federal Police with the use of computerized sensors to prevent offenses for terrorist purposes. The Court specified that the use of such tools of investigation, on the one hand, can be considered compatible with the fundamental rights of the individual recognized by the Constitution. On the other hand, however (and in some ways because of their highly pervasive nature and the potentially serious interferences with private life), it violates the principle of proportionality by virtue of which the balance between conflicting interests must be conducted: individual interests and the interests of general nature and of public importance[8].

The task of the legislator is therefore to achieve an appropriate balance between the State's duty to protect the community from organized crime, prevent crime and ensure the fundamental rights of the individual to inviolability of domicile, secrecy of communications and confidentiality and integrity of information systems.

In accordance with the principle of proportionality, therefore, the legislator must limit the use of such tools of investigation only to protect significant interests, always keeping in mind the guarantees for protection of private life.

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[7] See VACIAGO, Digital evidence. I mezzi di ricerca della prova digitale nel procedimento penale e le garanzie dell'indagato, Torino, 2012, pp. 127-128.

[8] See, in this regard, REGI, La Corte Costituzionale tedesca affronta il tema dei limiti alle investigazioni compiute con strumenti di sorveglianza occulta: come contemperare il dovere dello Stato di proteggere la popolazione dalle gravi forme di criminalità con la garanzia dei diritti fondamentali della persona?, on the website filodiritto.com, June 22, 2016; VENEGONI-GIORDANO, La Corte Costituzionale tedesca sulle misure di sorveglianza occulta e sulla captazione di conversazioni da remoto a mezzo di strumenti informatici, in Diritto Penale Contemporaneo, May 8, 2016, on the website penalecontemporaneo.it.

4. **The Italian Case Law**

In Italy is not uncommon to use computer sensors for investigative purposes[9] and the Italian Court of Cassation has pronounced on several occasions their use, affirming, ultimately, the legitimacy of the so-called State Trojan.

By judgment of 1 July 2016, n. 26889, the Court of Cassation in a Joint Session decided in the sense that "within the limit of the proceedings for organized crime offenses, the interception of conversations or communications between the persons in question is allowed through the installation of a "sensor computer" in portable electronics (such as personal computers, tablets, smart phones, etc.), even in places of private abode ex Art. 614 c.p., even though not individually identified and even if no criminal activity is taking place there".

The Court further stated that "For offenses of organized crime it must be understood that they refer not only to those listed in art. 51, paragraph 3-bis and 3-quater, c.p.p., but also those referring to a criminal organization (art. 416 c.p.), related to different criminal activities, excluding the mere contest of persons in the offense".

Even earlier, the Court of Cassation had been appealed by the Sixth Criminal Section in the context of a criminal proceeding in which, on the basis of the evidence obtained by means of Trojans installed in the smart phones of the persons accused, the judge had issued an arrest warrant against the person under investigation. The Court had ruled disposition of the annulment of the order for remand in prison issued substantially on the basis of wiretapping acquired by means of a Trojan[10].

The Sixth Section of the Court of Cassation, in contrast to the view taken earlier[11], claimed that the proofs gathered by means of computer sensors are to be considered as environmental interceptions (Art. 266 Criminal Procedure Code) and as such can be taken within the limits specified by paragraph 2 of the mentioned Art. 266 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, *id est* in circumscribed and identified places and not in all places where the person under investigation is.

However, Art. 15 of the Italian Constitution affirms the principle of freedom and secrecy of communications; hence, the provision that authorizes the so-called environmental interceptions must be interpreted in the most restrictive way possible and may not include the admissibility of a "reception accomplishable wherever the subject is moving".

A similar practice is permitted only by a justified act of the judicial authority with the guarantees established by law and to the extent that the authorization decree of the judicial authority identifies "with precision, the places where the interception of the communications between the present persons must be carried out".

Furthermore, since the remote activation of the phone microphone is a "pick up technique that has specific characteristics and that adds a *quid pluris* compared to ordinary potentiality of the interception", its use cannot go beyond what is provided for by Art. 266, paragraph 2, Code of Criminal Procedure, nor beyond what is specifically inhibited by Art. 15 of the Italian Constitution. Consequently, "the authorization decree should identify, with precision, the places where the interception of communications between the present persons will be carried out".Otherwise, "the receptions are illegitimate and therefore

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[9] See TESTAGUZZA, I sistemi di controllo remoto fra normativa e prassi, in Diritto penale e processo, 2014, p. 759, ss.; TORRE, Il virus di Stato nel diritto vivente tra esigenze investigative e tutela dei diritti fondamentali, in Diritto penale e processo, 2015, p. 1167.

[10] Judgment of the Court of Cassation n. 27100 of May 26, 2015.

[11] Cass., Sez. V, judgment 14 October 2009 n. 16556, Virruso; Cass., Sez. VI, 27 November 2012, Bisignani.

unusable, because interceptions between the present persons is not allowed everywhere". The same considerations have been made for video recordings.

At a later time, the Sixth Section of the Court of Cassation has considered that, because of the itinerant nature of the interception via computer sensor, it is impossible for the judicial authority identify in advance the physical place where it is possible to allow the interception. Hence, in order to avoid jurisprudential conflicts, the matter was referred to the United Sections. In the judgment of 1 July 2016, n. 26889, they specified that the technical characteristic of the *remote* reception set aside the reference to the place, being an environmental interception *itinerant* for its nature.

Considering that there is a special discipline for the investigations relating to organized crime, according to Law by Decree n. 152 of 1991, Art. 13 (converted into Law no. 203 of 1991), home interception is allowed "if there is reason to believe that a criminal activity is taking place in the aforementioned places".

In the last judgment cited by the United Sections of the Court of Cassation, they have specified that domiciliary interceptions are permitted despite the absence of gravity of evidence on the conduct of a criminal activity at a particular place and time. The reason is that the legislator has obviously achieved a specific balance of interests, opting for a more meaningful limitation of the secrecy of communications and protection of the domicile, taking into account the exceptional seriousness and danger, for the whole community, of the offenses covered by the investigative activities for the purpose of acquisition of evidence.

A result of the balance is the possibility of making, on the basis of a reasoned assessment by the judge, interceptions "between the present persons" in a private domicile "regardless" of the demonstration of their being at a location where criminal activities are under way and, therefore, without any need for prior individuation and designation of the sites themselves[12].

5.   **Conclusions**

To conclude this brief examination on the use of information technology as a useful investigative tool, it should be highlighted that there is an urgent need to provide an adequate discipline of the phenomenon through legislation that without affecting, in particular, the rights and fundamental freedoms, should enable prevention and repression of any kind of criminal activity.

The case law of the Italian Court of Cassation, beyond any consideration of the possibility to share the judgment of July 2016 of the United Sections (which potentially extends the use of computer sensors to almost unlimited types of crimes), allows to highlight that the current Italian legislation on interceptions is totally outdated and inadequate compared to the diffusion of new technologies and the most serious crimes.

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[12] "The threats posed to society and to individuals by structured criminal organizations, equipped with sophisticated technologies and significant financial resources, require a vigorous response by the State with all the means that modern technology offers, in order to adapt the detective effectiveness to the technological evolution of the means used by the criminals. Therefore, the Supreme Court sets out the following principle of law: Only for proceedings for organized crime offenses, the interception of conversations or communications between those present by installing a computerized sensor in portable electronic devices (eg., personal computer, tablet, smart phone, etc.) is allowed, also in the places of private domicile ex art. 614 c.p., though not individually identified and even if no criminal activity is taking place.

Even today the existing regulatory framework is not sufficiently adapted, on the one hand, to the different types of offenses constantly evolving -and that can also be committed through the use of information technologies- and, on the other hand, it is not adequate to the specific legislation on the use of new investigative techniques made possible by technology.

In other words, the criminal and procedural legislative production is still unable to "keep pace" with respect to the speedy evolution of the subject considered in the presence of various problems due to the distorted use of technologies, or with respect to the use of the mentioned technologies by the judicial and police authorities.

Hence, we highlight the urgent need to develop procedural and criminal rules that were not and could not be provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure, enacted in temporal circumstances when the current computer technologies did not exist.

TERRORIST ACTS WITH IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, THE THREAT TO THE MODERN-WORLD, THE EXAMPLE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
The use of improvised explosive devices in the execution of terrorist acts in Afghanistan

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ABSTRACT

The latest developments on the international scene have made the safety factor an unavoidable issue in international relations and political debate. Today, the world we are living in is facing complex threats coming from the largest modern international security danger - terrorism. Terrorists intensify their activities using violence as a means of political action and create an atmosphere of uncertainty and instability. The trend of using unconventional methods of warfare, tactics and procedures continued during the first and second decade of the XXI century, causing unconventional resources to become the dominant mode of extremist activity worldwide. The use of unconventional weapons brings great success and losses and is also accompanied by great media attention, which is one of the main goals of the extremists that will be presented in this paper. The relatively easy access to weapons and bio-chemical substances is an effective and relatively easy tool to use against civilians and against security structures. Extremists will continue to change and promote their tactics, techniques and procedures of action in view of inflicting maximum damage with minimum risk. Afghanistan is facing a complex threat from terrorism throughout their territory, which historically refers to the period starting from 1979. These extremist terrorist activities include the use of conventional weapons and conventional mode of action and use of improvised explosive devices as a way to inflict serious losses on the forces in Afghanistan. Statistics show an enormous number of civilian casualties as a result of the use of unconventional weapons and improvised explosive devices in the territory of Afghanistan, among which the most frequently used include the so-called "vest" terrorist bombers and improvised explosive devices - "car bombs".

Keywords: terrorism, Afghanistan, a suicide bomber, car bomb, an explosive device

THE EXECUTION OF TERRORIST ATTACKS WITH IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES IN AFGHANISTAN

INTRODUCTION

In the course of 2012 and the first half of 2013, according to the available information, an exceptionally high number of movements in lines had been noticed by the international security forces, the Afghan national security forces and the international factor throughout Afghanistan. The potential danger from improvised explosive devices is still present, given the fact that their use still remains to be the most practiced tactic of the extremists and the antigovernment elements. It has been shown that this is one of the effective ways of intimidation, where the psychological effects of the incidents with improvised explosive devices are directed towards the local population, despite the efforts of the international military presence and the Afghan national security forces to fight these occurrences. The estimation that follows is a compilation and analysis of the tactics, techniques and procedures which are used by the extremists and antigovernment elements in Afghanistan and their influence on the general safety situation.

1. Defining the improvised explosive device[1]

According to the explanation given by the dictionary of the US Department of Defense, "an improvised explosive device is a device which is set or produced in an improvised manner, which contains destructive, deadly, dangerous pyrotechnical or inflammable chemicals and is created with the purpose to destroy, incapacitate, attack or draw attention. It may contain military materials, however this improvised device is mainly created by components of no military nature."

Picture 1 - An example of an improvised explosive device manufactured in domestic environment and found in a house in "Helmand Province" in Afghanistan in May, 2009, UNAMA, UN, Safety device, intern report

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[1] www.securitymanagement.com/library/000339.html.

1.2 General characteristics of the improvised explosive devices used in Afghanistan[2]

The improvised explosive devices can be divided into several categories. Namely, these devices include:
- Bombs planted along the way,
- Booby traps,
- Vest-bombs worn by suicide bombers,
- Bombs in vehicles,
- Static bombs, or bombs carried by suicide bombers, and
- Different improvised explosive devices with a shaped charge.

Essentially, any explosive weaponry that does not come from industrial production can be considered an improvised explosive device. In Afghanistan, the improvised explosive devices are produced with diesel fuel and sometimes mortar rounds or metal plates are used. Some of the devices use a cell phone as a remote control. However, some improvised explosive devices can explode by giving a signal through a button, or with the touch of wires and batteries. Thanks to the Internet, in recent years there has been an advancement in the techniques for creating improvised explosive devices. Most of the improvised explosive devices are special in some way, because the creator improvises with the material available to him at the given moment. The improvised explosive devices are created to defeat a certain target or type of targets, so they are harder to be discovered or prevented, because as time goes by they have an increasingly complex structure.

1.3 Components of the improvised explosive devices according to the registered incidents in Afghanistan

Generally, the improvised explosive devices have four main components:
- Energy source,
- Initiator,
- Explosive, and
- Switch.

Picture 2 - An example of a set improvised explosive device with remote control

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[2] www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-18- 2012/august/ieds-the-home-made-bombs-that-changed-modern-war/

The energy source fuels the system of the improvised explosive device with electric energy. Most improvised explosive devices have an electric plant, which as such, seeks a source of electric energy.

Picture 3- An example of an energy source

The initiator causes an explosion of the main charge and they can be improvised explosives or explosives of high quality. The main charge must be activated, because it will not explode by itself.

The explosive material or the explosive is a reactive substance which contains a large quantity of potential energy, which creates an explosion when released all at once. Along with the explosion, it creates light, heat, sound and pressure.

The switch is found in the device as a switch for activation or a detonator. The switch can have a simple or complex structure. Many improvised explosive devices contain an activation switch, as well as a detonator-switch. The activation switch is a backup part of the improvised explosive device and acts through deactivation (electric disabling) of the detonator switch. When the activation switch is armed, the detonation switch functions, however the wheel is still closed. When the detonation switch is activated, then the wheel is opened, the battery charge is connected to the initiator (a hat that explodes) and the detonation takes place.

Picture 4 - An example of switches

1.4 Ways of delivering the improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan

1.4.1. Wire-controlled improvised explosive devices

The wire-controlled improvised explosive devices are activated with the help of a moving wire. The command wire-controlled improvised explosive devices are set in motion by a moving operator. A special modified type of this improvised explosive device is the one that is directed by the victim itself and is activated by the target itself, while moving through so called plates under pressure.

Picture 5 - An example of a wire-controlled improvised explosive device

1.4.2. Car-bomb

Car-bombs are automobiles or trucks full of explosives. A special kind of a car-bomb is a vehicle which has an explosive device installed underneath (Sub-vehicle borne). These vehicles are controlled by suicide bombers on the territory of Afghanistan. The construction of these devices needs a lot more time and knowledge of logistics than the construction of other types of improvised explosive devices. However, the use of vehicles enables the delivery or setting of higher quantities of explosives on the planned targets in a faster manner. The use of multi-purpose car-bombs against a single target can improve the attack itself. The vehicle bombs use higher quantities of explosives and the explosive charge varies between 45-450kg. The explosive charge may contain parts like grenades, mine-throwers, projectile motors, rockets, warheads, C4 explosives and artillery grenades. The attack technique of car-bombs is increasingly present and includes the use of multipurpose vehicles. In such cases, the leading or the first vehicle is used as a bait or a destroyer of barriers. This was one of the most commonly used methods as part of a "complex attack" in Afghanistan in 2012 and 2014.

Picture 6 - A vehicle-bomb with 107mm rockets discovered in the Kunduz Province, Afghanistan, according to UNAMA, UN Security Administration, intern report – document.

1.4.2.1. Indicators

The following characteristics can be indicators of a possible risk posed by a car-bomb:

-Lowered vehicle: A visibly lowered vehicle on the suspension is a sign of a large quantity of explosives.

-Covered windows: Darkened or covered windows to hide the content of the vehicle.

-Unusual items inside the vehicle: fuel cylinders, wires, leaflets, large bags or cardboards and batteries in addition to the usual batteries (accumulators) for the vehicle.

-Abandoned vehicles: The presence of vehicles in the area where their presence is not usual.

-Holes in the vehicles: Holes made in the vehicle itself to conceal the explosives, which are roughly covered.

-Changes on the doors from the inside: Proof that the part from the inside is removed to hider the explosive.

-Presence of gunpowder: The presence of gunpowder that remains after the explosive materials have been loaded in the vehicle.

- Recently painted vehicle: recently painted vehicle to cover the vehicle's changes.

-Additional fuel tanks: The presence of additional fuel tanks.

-Unusual smell: Unusual smells, for example the smell of timed fuse, gasoline or waste.

-Additional antennas: The presence of additional antennas on the vehicle for radio controlled devices.

Indicators for drivers of car-bombs:

-Irregular driving speed: Irregular driving speed, driving too slow or too fast when passing in front of the Afghan Government and the controlled security stations.

-Ignoring orders: Ignoring the orders to stop, an attempt to go around a controlled security station or an attempt to maneuver, especially to get close to the locations of the international military forces.

-Improper clothing: wearing improper dress or improper clothing for driving such a vehicle. Also, signs of anxiety, sweating, trembling or unusual expression.

-Number of people in the vehicle: The presence of a driver only in the vehicle is common for the operations of car-bombs. However, there can be any number of people in the vehicle, except if the person that drives the car-bomb is not a suspect.

-Difficulties that the driver faces: The inability for the driver to properly move the vehicle or use the equipment he/she has.

1.4.2.2. Tactics, techniques and procedures of the car-bombs used in Afghanistan

The primary purpose of car-bombs is to attack fixed targets. They are used in several attacks of the controlled stations of the international military forces, as well as their infrastructure. However, car-bombs are also used for convoys. The tactics, techniques and procedures of the car-bombs used by the rebels in Afghanistan are as follows:

-Multipurpose vehicles: Three vehicles are used to escort the car-bomb. The first vehicle is a hunter – its purpose is to identify the targets. The second vehicle carries a person with a camera, whose task is to film the event. The third vehicle is the car-bomb.

-Car-bait: The first or the leading vehicle serves as the bait, it draws the attention of the security forces from the car-bomb, which approaches fast.

-Destroyed vehicles: The car-bombs are made from the remains of destroyed vehicles, or damaged vehicles on the road; when the convoy passes near a car-bomb, it is activated from a distance. Some of the vehicles that have not been used long and can be found near the road can be turned into an immobile fixed car-bomb.

1.4.3. Remotely controlled improvised explosive device

The detonation is mainly controlled from a distance with different wireless devices. They are taken out of remote controls for toys (with the reach of around 100 meters) to transmitters (with the reach of around 5 kilometers). They may also use car alarms and keyless entry systems (reach of around 200 meters), wireless phones (reach of around 100 meters) and cell phones.

Picture 7- Examples of improvised explosive devices with remote controlled transmitters

1.4.4. Magnetically set improvised explosive devices

There are many kinds of magnetically attached improvised explosive devices used in the region of Afghanistan. One of the most common is the so called "sticky bomb" – an improvised explosive device set in the vehicle's engine. In practice, the bomb is usually connected with a masking tape or magnets. The antigovernment elements and extremists use a wide range of devices to hide the magnetically improvised explosive devices.

Picture 8 - Examples of magnetically attached improvised explosive devices and their setting

Picture 9 - Locations with detonation of magnetically attached improvised explosive devices, in which ISAF transport vehicles are burned, Samangan Province, Afghanistan, July 2012, according to UNAMA, UN, Security Administration, intern report – document.

1.4.5. Improvised explosive devices – vest[3]

The suicide bombers in the region of Afghanistan in most registered cases use a jacket full of explosives and they activate the device themselves or through another operator from a distance. The suicide bomber poses a notably great danger to the safety of the international security forces personnel and civilians. The purpose of these terrorists is not only to commit suicide, but also to kill or injure as many soldiers or other civilians as possible. The suicide bombers mainly use highly explosive and fragmented effects and a command system for detonation, or in other words, some kind of a switch or button that is activated manually. The explosives with the fragments can be carried in a vest, belt or

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[3] Kix, P.: "The Truth About Suicide Bombers," *Boston Globe*, December 5, 2010.

specially manufactured clothes where the explosive is hidden. The suicide bomber usually wears clothing or a belt that contains explosives. Unlike the former robust devices, today the devices are particularly small and the explosive can be easily hidden.

Picture 10 - Suicide bombers General description of the acting of improvised explosive devices during the execution of terrorist acts in Afghanistan

The improvised explosive devices remain one of the biggest threats facing the civilians, the international military presence and the Afghan security forces in Afghanistan. One example indicates that in the period January – June 2012, the improvised explosive devices caused 29% of the total number of deaths of civilians.

According to the International Organization for Victim Assistance, since the beginning of 2012 there have been 108 victims of the International Security Assistance Force – ISAF caused by improvised explosive devices, out of the total 240 deaths, as a result of these incidents, or 45% of the total number of deaths.

According to the information of UNAMA, the Department for human rights, improvised explosive devices were the single greatest killer of Afghan children, men and women in 2011, taking 967 lives of civilians or nearly one out of every three victims (32%) murdered in the conflict. The improvised explosive devices were the cause of 41% of civilian victims related to the antigovernment elements. In 2012, the improvised explosive devices continued to be the greatest threat to civilians. Antigovernment elements continued using improvised explosive devices in a way that is threatening and illegal. For example – in the period from January 1 to June 30, 2012, the improvised explosive devices were the specific reason behind 33% of all civilian victims, killing 327 and injuring 689 civilians. Considering the tactics used by improvised explosive devices, like the suicide and complex attacks, the improvised explosive devices caused a total of 53% of the victims and injured civilians during the first six months of 2012. According to the United Nations report, it is concluded that most of the improvised explosive devices that caused civilian victims were not directed towards a certain military target, but were regularly set on the sides of the roads, resulting in terrifying deaths and injuries of civilians while breaking the international humanitarian law.

In 2012, a large percentage of improvised explosive devices was discovered and deactivated by members of the international military forces before they were used, however the antigovernment elements and extremists are trying to improve these devices and find better and more effective ways of their use. During the period of January – June 2012, according to the UN mission in Afghanistan, there were 1195 detonations noted and 1490 improvised explosive devices were found.

The increased activity of attacks with improvised explosive devices in 2012 – 2013 implies that the operations of the international military forces and the antigovernment forces progressively destroyed the rebels' capacity of executing direct attacks. This indicates that the rebels, instead of being defeated, turned to other tactics and their continuous ability to execute serious attacks and maintain control over the local population can be noted.

2. General features of the operations with improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan[4]

Historically speaking, the first improvised explosive devices were used by the Mujahideen in the fight against the Russians. Starting six months before the invasion of the USSR in Afghanistan, on December 27 1979, the Afghan militants possessed high quantities of military equipment. There were different kinds of anti-tank mines between them. The rebels removed the explosive from several anti-tank mines and combined them with a can of cooking oil, with the purpose of creating a stronger explosion. After the detonation of the improvised explosive devices, the users would use weapons to "open fire", like automatic rifles and rocket grenades, with the purpose of continuing the attack. Since 2001, the Taliban and other antigovernment elements used improvised explosive devices in the fight against the international military forces and the Afghan forces, but not against civilian targets. The increased use of improvised explosive devices indicates the determination of the rebels to avoid victims in conventional armed conflicts. The improvised explosive devices became a weapon which gives an advantage and whose effects are the main cause of victims. Currently, in Afghanistan the improvised explosive devices can be made of any kind of material and designed in such a way that they can kill or seriously wound the wanted target, kill or incapacitate their victims. Considering the small number of asphalt roads in Afghanistan, it is relatively easy to set up any kind of device without any track.

2.1 Attacks with use of improvised explosive devices

In the last couple of years, the engagement of extremists and antigovernment elements whose acting is spread across the territory of Afghanistan, has led to an improvement in the tactics of the attack in several cases on a very high technological, operative and executive level. The complexity of some attacks indicates an increased level of training in camps and improved availability of sophisticated conventional weaponry, reforming the way of executing the attack, as well as a highly developed logistic support - the infiltration with using vehicles, which are completely identical to those of the international security forces, uniforms of the operatives – perpetrators of the attacks which are identical with those worn by the international forces and the members of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Afghanistan. The identity documents and passports used to infiltrate the attackers are very high quality copies. On the basis of the analysis of the extremist attacks in the last 10 years used in Afghanistan, the most efficient has been identified as the tactic called "complex attack". According to the definition of the UN mission in Afghanistan, "a complex attack" is an intentional and coordinated attack which uses a suicidal improvised explosive device (ex. car-bomb, suicide bomber

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[4] Lankford, A.: "Could Suicide Terrorists Actually Be Suicidal?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34 (2011), 337-366; Ronald W. Maris.

etc.), with more than one attacker and more than one kind of weapon and explosive device (ex. a suicide bomber armed with a rocket launcher). All three elements must be present in the attacks, so that it can be considered "complex".

2.2 Potential indicators of the improvised explosive devices

The attacks with improvised explosive devices can occur at any time. These means are mainly set during the night when the visibility is limited. Even when the improvised explosive device does not kill or wound the victim, the danger complicates the movement of different convoys of the security forces, the international organization, the UN and civilians. Up to date analyses indicate that the networks controlled by the extremists, including the Taliban, are multilevel. They include financiers, logistic experts, experts for improvised explosive devices and trainers. At the bottom of the ladder are those that set the bombs, usually farmers and shepherds paid 10$ or less to dig holes or be engaged as observers.

Indicators for potential improvised explosive devices are as follows:

-Wires. Electrical wires, batteries, traps, cables etc.

-Markers. Markers are used to activate the improvised explosive device at the right time. Usually, capacities are needed to be used as markers. When the vehicle passes the marker, the operator of the improvised explosive device can activate the device at the right time.

-Shapes of objects that are unusual for that environment.

-Unexploded explosive device

-Vehicles: abandoned vehicles, war equipment, weapons, uniforms, documents

-Terrain abnormality: Footprints that suddenly stop, fresh holes, new dust, lots of stones are indicators that someone buried something there recently, which can be an improvised explosive device.

-Unusual vehicle behavior: The vehicles behave unusually, follow the convoys or are far ahead of them, a car parked on the side of the road with activated turn signals are also indicators that something is not right.

-Road barriers: The man-made road barriers can be set so they can obstruct the vehicles or direct the convoy before the attack with an improvised explosive device.

-Changes in the way of life: Sudden absence of playing children, normal traffic course and other daily activities can be an indicator that something is going to happen.

2.3 Possible locations for setting improvised explosive devices

Possible locations for setting improvised explosive devices are the following:

-Roads as a main or secondary communication, unpaved roadsides, the devices can also be buried under the road surface, in the vehicle tires of the Afghan security forces and the international military forces, or in the channels for underground cables under the road.

-Road holes. The improvised explosive devices can be set in the holes of the road, inside, around or under any kind of package or cargo.

Locations that are identified as especially suitable for setting improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan are:

-Soft sand

-Sharp parts

-Riverbeds, channels for underground cables

-On hillsides or through them

Picture 11 – Examples for set improvised explosive devices on the road

2.3 Roads of delivery of the improvised explosive devices to Afghanistan

The delivery of the improvised explosive devices to Afghanistan can be from Pakistan, Iran or the former USSR countries. According to the information from JIEDDO (Pentagon's Joint IED Defeat Organization – organization for fighting the improvised explosive devices), Pakistan is the source of 80% of the bombs in Afghanistan, which are domestic and based on fertilizers that cause 90% of the victims from the members of the international military forces. The porous border with Pakistan is a big problem in the fight against terrorism. Almost all devices found in the southern provinces Helmand and Kandahar contain explosives made of ammonium nitrate. The most common form of domestic explosive is ANFO, which is a combination of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and diesel fuel, which makes it highly explosive. Although it is not legal in Afghanistan, it is still produced in Pakistan in large quantities and smuggled across the border. There are collaborative efforts of the security forces to discover and prevent the smuggling of fertilizer with calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Almost 80% of the improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan contain domestic explosive, mainly CAN which is smuggled from Pakistan. On many security forums in Afghanistan, Iran is accused of supplying weapons for the Afghan rebels, including the explosively formed penetrator (EFP). This type of improvised explosive device, according to the available information, was successfully used by the Shiite militants against armored vehicles (as it is previously stated, there are no confirmed reports of using the EFP on the territory of Afghanistan). What has been found, according to the ISAF sources, is commercially manufactured Iranian merchandise like batteries and bulb wires. It is known that some of the components necessary to create an improvised explosive device come through the transparent borders of the former Soviet Union. There are some presumptions that some commercial explosives used by the rebels are manufactured in the countries of the former Soviet Union, where the weapon industry is well developed.

2.4 **Most distinctive attacks in Kabul with the use of improvised explosive**

Devices as part of the tactics, techniques and procedures of the extremists.

The following table shows the suicide attacks in Kabul executed in the period between December 2012 and June 2013, with the use of improvised explosive devices.

DATE	DAY	TIME	TARGET	EXTREMIST TACTIC
December 2012		19:00	The head of the national security directorate	1 suicide bomber (explosives in the body – rectal part)
16 January 2013	Wednesday	12:12	National security directorate	Combined attack: 1 car-bomb + 6 suiciders
21 January 2013	Monday	05:50	Main headquarters of the traffic police	5 suiciders
27 February 2013	Wednesday	07:30	Afghan army – employee transport bus	1 suicider
9 March 2013	Saturday	09:00	Ministry of Defense	1 suicider
16 May 2013	Thursday	08:00	ISAF Convoy	1 car bomb
24 May 2013	Friday	16:05	International migration organization of the UN	combined attack: 1 car-bomb + 4 suiciders
10 June 2013	Monday	04:40	ISAD camp on the north-eastern end of the international Kabul airport	7 suiciders
11 June 2013	Tuesday	16:14	High Court in Kabul	1 car-bomb
25 June 2013	Tuesday	06:30	President palace in Kabul	8 suiciders
2 July 2013	Tuesday	04:33	Logistic camp „Pinnacle"in Kabul	Combined attack: 1 car-bomb + 3 suiciders
25 November 2014	Tuesday	06:30	Kabul	Magnet bomb
11 December 2014	Thursday	07:15	Kabul	Suicide bomber

Picture 12 – The attack on June 11, 2013, which caused 17 victims and 40 wounded, but also damage on 48 vehicles

Picture 13 – The attack on November 25, 2014 in Kabul

Picture 13 – The attack on December 11, 2014 in Kabul

Conclusion and recommendations

One of the leading threats presented in this paper is the use of improvised explosive devices through reputed modalities of production on the territory of Afghanistan. As stated, the potential danger of improvised explosive devices is still present, because their use still remains the most practiced tactic of the extremists and antigovernment elements. It has been shown that it is one of the effective ways of intimidation, where the psychological effect of the incidents with improvised explosive devices on the local population is unmatched, despite the efforts of the international military presence and the Afghan national security force to fight these events. On the basis of the reported statistical data, it is concluded that the improvised explosive devices continue to be the largest threat that the civilians, the international military forces and the Afghan security forces face in Afghanistan. The trend of large numbers of civilian victims and victims from the members of the security forces in Afghanistan confirm the data presented by this study, covering the period 2012-2014. Further analysis of the statistical data points out that the improvised explosive devices were the greatest killer of Afghan children, men and women in 2011, taking the lives of 967 civilians or nearly one of three civilian victims (32%) killed in the conflict. The improvised explosive devices were the reason behind 41% of civilian victims related to the attacks of the antigovernment elements. As stated, even in 2012 the improvised explosive devices remained to be the biggest threat for civilians and that trend continued in the first half of 2013, which contributes to the most important incidents stated in the paper.

The activities which are the basis of any kind of initiative in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan include:

-Building the required capacity through training and education, as well as equipping the security forces in direction of discovering the improvised explosive devices and preventing terrorist activities.

-Establishing an elite antiterrorist unit, which will be adequately equipped and financed by the government with the purpose of dislocating the terrorists in the country, through special operations for catching and eliminating the extremists who are inclined to violence.

-Improving the legal capacities and adopting a strong and sustainable strategy for the security forces, led by investigating and informative acting in direction of identifying the threats which are multidimensional and international in their nature, such as terrorism, through the exchange of information and coordination between the countries in the region.

-Identifying the threats, vulnerability and risk evaluation and a wide-range concept of security management, which must be integrated in the process of building the capacities of the security forces with the purpose of addressing the phenomenon of terrorism from the perspective of risk management.

-Implementation of sanctions against the persons, business and financial entities in the region, identified as facilitators in the transfer of cash for the terrorists through their internal financial systems with the purpose of money laundering.

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SECURITY ASSESSMENT IN THE FUNCTION OF UNDERCOVER AGENT ENGAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

There has always been, throughout human history, a need to protect certain values that were threatened in different ways. Man as an individual, but also as part of human collectivity, possesses values that he/she seeks to preserve and develop. His/her efforts to survive and to develop his/her own values, as well as the overall functioning of society aiming to create conditions that guarantee a safe environment for development of both the individual and the community as a whole, include a set of interdependent activities whose security aspect is extremely important.

One of the security requirements of any society is the suppression of all, and particularly the organized, forms of crime. In this regard, special importance is placed on the measures of covert operations, among which the engagement of undercover investigators stands out. However, having in mind the limitations of the application conditions and the sensitivity (in operational terms) of their use in all phases of the engagement, security assessment imposes itself as a key component in this process.

Beginning with the current importance of the subject, this paper points to the conceptual definition, function and importance of the security assessment, but it also emphasizes the need to follow certain principles in its drafting. Considering the specifics of the engagement of the undercover agent, particular attention, in this respect, is paid to the development of security assessments for each stage of the engagement.

Key words: security assessment, undercover agent, special investigative methods.

1 INTRODUCTION

Each state places a focus on a large part of its activities for protection against various forms of destructiveness. These activities are primarily focused on specific interests proclaimed by its security policy. State, therefore, national interests, represent one of the main factors of the security policy, given the function of protection of interests, which defines the challenges, risks and threats to security following defined targets and tasks, which are the main content of every national security strategy.

However, there is no agreement in the literature on the protected values and the ways of their protection, which is directly linked with the definition of security interests. Value is an ideal feature attached by people to certain objects (items, actions, contents of consciousness) which makes them more desirable to man, because they are used to improve life and people enjoy them (Lukić, 1982:121). On the other hand, security is the absence of danger to the acquired values, therefore absence of endangering the vital values of a certain human collectivity (Mijalkovski and Djordjevic, 2010:285). Hence, if there is no danger to the acquired value, there is no need for security; however, any value can be in danger.

There is no unique definition of security in theory. The differences are reflected in the multitude of synonyms for security but also in certain, deeper, terminological determinations. However, security in general can be defined as a condition of any subject or object that normally or relatively exists and functions undisturbed (Ilic, 2012:125). These are determined "conditions", which are commonly, or less commonly, special. Hence, the word security has a general meaning and it is concretized by the appropriate attribute, such as a condition, a situation, an organization and the like (Kostic, 1977:191). In the objective sense, it is the absence of danger to the acquired values, while in the subjective sense, security represents the absence of fear that these values will be endangered (CCMR, 2009).

Thus, if there are certain values, different activities will certainly endanger them, hence there is a need for their protection. Endangerment means every event, occurrence, violent action by human, natural or tehnical cources which occur suddenly, unexpectedly and unannounced in different (longer or shorter) time intervals and with varying intensity, leading to certain adverse consequences (starvation of people and material goods). In such circumstances, it is necessary to analyze all possible forms of the danger, identify the imminent (instant) and future directions of the endangerment and anticipate the possible adverse effects and their scope. Directing the entire security system towards a possible destruction is based on this type of predictions, creating conditions to reduce their effect depending on the intensity and shape of the destructive infuence of the phenomenon. Therefore, timely evaluation is the basic precondition for proper action against any form of endangerment.

2   FUNCTION AND IMPORTANCE OF THE SECURITY ASSESSMENT

In the broadest sense, the term *assessment* means determinig the value of something, of some area of life and work. On the other hand, security assessment represents a phrase consisting of the terms security and assessment. Combining the terms security and assessment into an etymological sense and aligning them in a hierarchical logical string, we get the meaning of the phrase that reflects its substantial semantic and syntactic character. Hence, the assessment is a congitive and practical process, based on reliable and grain data and facts and on application of scientific methods, which results in conclusions adopted on the specific case assessment (Milosavljević, 2012: 141). This is a special type of explanation of the security phenomenon, since it does not stop at explaining only the casual relationships within the phenomenon and between the phenomenon and the world. It endeavours to explain other internal and external relations of a certain phenomenon, but also the relation and the strength of these connections and relationships, which directs the phenomenon in a certain direction and affecta its character, manifestation forms and caused consequences (Markovic, 1988). Security assessment is the analysis of certain factors which, individually or together, affect the level of security in a certain environment and society. It is also an analysis of the system and the readiness of the security services to confront the endangering activites. Various latent and current conflict situations, their cuses and possible further development are estimated in the analysis of the security situation. Finally, as the part of the conclusion, the assessment should include a prediction of the future behavior and activities of the security endangering holders (Djordjevic, 1986). The purpose of the security assessment is to timely identify the phenomena that have a destructive character, determine their intensity, action directions and assess the possible scope of the negative infuence and the possible development of such phenomena in the future. This means that the security assessment has to identify the security challenges, risks

and threats and to determine their potential, according to their conceptual definition and the infuence that they may have on the security situation. The successful monitoring of the security situation and the condition and operation of the security organization means that the responsibilities for the security situation are based on three main goals (Stajic,1999:124):

− *first*, to take the security situation and their own organization under control and to govern the security situation and its own organization;
− *second,* to successfully predict (assess) the possible development of the security situation and the situation of its own organization in the future;
− *third,* to make the best choice when deciding on the basis of the considered threats, opportunities, needs and possibilities.

Security challenges, risks and threats, are different manifestations of the danger, with different certainty of appearance and extent of their adverse effects. In this sense, danger is a feature or ability of something or someone to potentially cause damage. It can be caused by human intention, unintentional activities or occurrences that cannot be influenced, such as natural disasters. The phrase "security challenges, risks and threats" is used in modern conditions and it may be synonymous with the previously used phrase "factors of security endangerment", but not satisfactorily. There are two reasons: because of the fact that the phrase "security challenge" does not refer only to the negative factors of security, but also to the positive ones and because in the context of that phrase there is no clear demarcation of the factors and subjects of the security endangerment (Ilic, 2013).

The identification of the security challenges, risks and threats, as well as the analysis of their potential is performed in accordance with their conceptual determination and the influence they can have on the security situation.

In this sense, the term*challenge* symbolizes the phenomenon or process that is possible or probable, comprehensive, multi directed and at first value-neutral. Initial neutrality may get a negative or positive direction over time. If the negative direction prevails, the challenge turns into a risk and the possibility of an adverse effect on a certain object of security gradually increases. The positive direction is actually the definition of the goal that has to be achieved in order to improve the security situation of the object endangered by the negative side of challenge (Oxford, 1981: 886). The challenge is the lowest level of the security endangering, which may or may not be a source of security risks and threats, bearing in mind its initial neutral value (Cvetkovic, 2010: 631). It is a about the endangering phenomenon with the highest level of generality and the lowest intensity of direct destructiveness (Mijalkovic, 2009: 127).It is a potential danger or form of endangering the object security (secured value), a situation that precedes the threat (Mijalkovski Djordjevic, 2010a), therefore a certain activity, process, phenomenon or a specific event, which, by its own nature and dynamic or potential energy, may change or influence the changes of certain conditions, beliefs, needs, interests, etc. and encourage concrete actors to a certain reaction as a concrete response to this challenge. (Bajagic, 2007: 130). Risk is the possibility that a certain goal will not be achieved as a whole or that it will be achieved only partially (Opca enciklopedija, 1981: 139). Risk is a higher level of danger or the likelihood of causing some harm. They are closer, more visible and more clearly measurable forms of endangering the sovereignty and identity of the state and society. These are sources of security threats, and the breadth of their infuence has a clearer form of appearance (Orlic, 2004). Risk is the potential for harm to national security, combined with the probability of occurence and measurement of consequences (DoD, 2008: 20). They represent endangering phenomena with a lower level of generality and

greater destructiveness than the security challenges and their reality and likelihood of occurrence is higher (Mijalkovic, 2009: 127). When it comes to the risk, it is about the failure to achieve the strategic goal at an acceptable cost (Holcomb, 2004: 119).

In relation to the challenge and risk, threat is the kind of pressure from a position of force, which is used to intimidate and exhaust the opposite side in order to force it to certain concessions and can be defined as the ability to increase intentions (Pravna enciklopedija, 1979: 1101). These are direct forms of state and society endangering. It is a concrete, endangering phenomenon whose occurrence is the least uncertain (with the lowest level of generality) and undisputed adverse effects, with the highest dose of destructiveness (Cvetkovic, 2010: 631). The threat is any indication, circumstance or event that has the potential to cause loss or harm to the protected values (Kesetovic, 2012: 41).

3   BASIC PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY ASSESSMENT BUILDING

The variety of security challenges, risks and threats, on the one hand, and their identification and the determination of the intensity and dynamics of their manifestation, on the other, represent one of the main problems in the process of building the security assessment. Therefore, the assessment methodology should have four distinct, but integrated set of steps. The first step is to identify issues that are likely to have a significant infuence on national security. The second step is the prediction of the infuence of each issue on the vital security interests of the state, using alternative scenarios which can provide an assessment of the duration and intensity of their influence. These individual assessments will provide a basis for assessment of the consequences of all issues and for clarification of the issues that represent the greatest risk to national security. The third step is to determine the state's readiness to solve specific vulnerabilities and assess its ability to prevent, mitigate or resolve the predicted security risks to national security. The final step is the development of the national security priorities and their treatment as interconnected entireties (Dupont, 2012).

Security assessment represents an analysis of the security situation, with consideration of all potential challenges, risks and threats, but also a definition of the "establishing" of the protection system against such endangering forms. It should define:
– potential challenges, risks and threats;
– basic characteristics and types of their manifestation in the valued timeframe;
– main subjects of the security challenges, risks and threats;
– the size of the adverse consequences that may arise from their implementation;
– available capacities for resistance against security challenges, risks and threats;
– the time required for rehabilitation of the protection system, in case of disruption due to adverse events.

The quality of the security assessment is the most essential link in the entire security system. The readiness of the protection system depends on the security assessment quality and the responses to the security challenges, risks and threats are planned on its basis. Therefore, if the security assesment is to respond to the requirements, it is necessary to avoid all stereotypes in its building, remove all excessive details, general and known facts and everything what makes the security assessment unnecessarily lengthy (Marrin, 2002: 7). This means that certain principles should be respected in the course of its building. These principles are (Milosavljevic, 2012):
– *The principle of objectivity*, which is the most general characteristic in the study of the security phenomenon. This objectivity has two aspects: a certain relationship with reality and the basic characteristics of the formal process of gaining knowledge (Milic,

1978: 280). It involves an impartial, objective approach to the collection and study of certain facts;

− *The principle of systematicity*, involves the interconnection of all parts that represent an entirety on the subject of evaluation and the logical order of the document content. Among the data that the security assessment is made of and that are structurally different, there is a certain logical order, where certain systematicity brings them all in connection and makes the real logical entirety. The principle of systematicity must be already represented in the process of data filtering, selection, assessment, classification and linking with other data and the previous knowledge;

− *The principle of completeness*, it is directly related to the determination of the security assessment content. It arises from the legal norms which determine the security assessment content. However, the determination of the security assessment content cannot be understood and implemented briskly, because it can lead to an incomplete assessment. As long as there is no sufficient data and information necessary for the assessment, it is necessary to look for further data, because it is the only way to achieve the quality required for a valid assessment;

− *The principle of privacy*, includes necessary restrictions on the information exchange and the use of the security assessment only under certain circumstances and by the persons who are entitled to it. This is the reason for the need of the necessary restrictions in terms of potential users, distribution and storage of the security assessment content, or for the limitation to the public and the availability of information and data that are sought for the purposes of the assessment;

− *The principle of timeliness*, means that the available data is delivered in advance in the appropriate form to certain users. The value of the security assessment increases if it is built on time. Otherwise, the security assessment loses its value. However, it is necessary that this principle does not influence negatively the other principles essential for the security assessment building and its quality;

− *The principle of prediction (prognosis)* represents a strictly controlled methodological process, based on facts, on previously acquired knowledge and experience of those engaged in predicting and prognosis (Sesic, 1974: 358). The prognostic character of the security assessment stems from the fact that it is an imagined picture of a future situation or event, where concerns and conditions are predicted on the basis of past and current factors and future trends. Prediction is the crown of the security assessment.

4   UNDERCOVER AGENT AS A SPECIAL INVESTIGATION METHOD

Modern conditions of crime development and manifestation impose the need for different, innovative methods in its countering. For a long time it has become clear that criminal organizations are often far ahead of the prosecuting authorities in their actions. This requires changes of the working modes, if they want to achieve good results in fighting all, especially the organized forms of action. For many years, countries with "tradition" of organized crime apply new, proactive methods as a response to the modern criminal. These are special investigative methods, among which covert operations have a special place. Undercover (secret) operations are operations that are carried out secretly, without the knowledge of the persons against whom they are directed, in a manner in which we can not see their real purpose and under such circumstances that the persons against whom they are directed are not conscious of the officiality of the person who is carrying out the operation. The engagement of the undercover agent is certainly the most

complex method of covert operations, both from the point of law enforcement and in operational meaning,

The undercover agent is defined as a police officer assigned to a changed identity, therefore a "legend", to act secretly in a given period, in contact with certain criminal circles and to collect information that can be used for detection, clarification and prevention of crimes, primarily those related to organized crime (Skulic, 2003: 394). The fulfillment of certain material and formal requirements is necessary for this engagement. Material requirements mean that there is an existence of suspicion that some person, alone or together with other persons, has participated or is participating in offenses that are criminal acts of organized crime, or some other serious crimes and that such crime is not detected, prevented or proven otherwise, or that it may be identified with considerable difficulties. The material requirement depends on the assessment of the authorities. The formal requirement is reflected in the need for a certain process initiative (proposal of the prosecutor) and the decision which approves this initiative and which is generally made by the Court.

However, the limitatation of the conditions for engagement of an undercover agent affects sufficiently the sensitivity of its use. If we add to this the fact that it is an engagement of a police member with a changed identity, in a criminal environment, the process of engagement is even more complex. His/her specific position when engaged, lies on the following:

– The undercover agent will be infiltrated in a criminal milieu for a long time, although the majority of laws have time limits, it may take several months or years;
– It takes longer to gain such a position in the organization to be able to collect evidence and that the involvement becomes "profitable". Based on its own experience, in Germany it is estimated that it takes about 22 months;
– His/her task is to collect criminal activity evidence of the organization he/she is infiltrated in. Hence, it means that his/her role can be constantly checked by the organization;
– Although the agent operates undercover, he/she has to operate as an official (which shoud not be known), so the evidence collected with his/her operation has probative value in court;
– His/her involvement means a prohibition of the operation as 'agent provocateur';
– It is forbidden to committ crimes, although this can often be the way of cheking the agent's loyalty to the organization;
– Living a "double life" leads to a large psychological pressure, which can lead to operational mistakes and disclosure of the identity;
– Disclosure of the identity can lead to the death of the undercover agent.

These specifics of the undercover agent engagement are the consequence of certain limitations which he/she has in the process of the operation. These limitations may be legal, related to the limitations that the undercover agent has based on the legally established limits of his/her activities. These are, above all, limitations on the prohibition of committing crime and the prohibition of operating as an "agent provocateur". Crime - operational limiting factors are those that directly affect the status, operation and the objective of the covert operation, or the detection, prevention and proving of crimes. So, it means that the operation of the undercover agent imposes resolving of two diametrically opposing demands: *first*, that the undercover agent remains undiscovered and effective at the same time, in sitiuations when the criminal expects proof of his/her loyalty, mostly by

committing crimes; *the second*, which is the entry ban "punishable zone"- the prohibition of committing crimes (Nincic, 2015).

Bearing this in mind, the engagement of the undercover agent must be precisely planned at all stages of the engagement. For planning, it is necessary to build a quality security assessment of all factors that can influence the engagement. The assessment should not be routine, but detailed with all the necessary elements, because it should always be kept in mind that a live person, a police officer, is engaged in a criminal environment and that any mistake in his/her engagement can be fatal. Therefore, the security assessment must precede each stage of the engagement of the undercover agent, allowing adequate monitoring and responding to all possible threats to the undercover agent.

5 SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND ENGAGEMENT OF THE UNDERCOVER AGENT– specificity of building

Bearing in mind the sensitivity of the engagement of the undercover agent, both in normative – legal and purely operational (practical) sense, it is necessary to precisely plan his entire operation. Planning starts with adequate selection, preparation and training of the person whose engagement is permitted by law, from his/her infiltration into the criminal milieu, until his/her "retrieval" after the task has been completed. Therefore, the plan of the engagement of the undercover agent must contain: a *selection plan*, which is mainly conditioned by the needs of the specific operations and it defines the basic psychological and physical character and other qualities of the person who is engaged; a *preparation plan*, which means preparation for the specific operation and includes operational and technical preparation; an "*infiltration" plan*, which defines the way of making a "contact" with the members, or the 'entry' in the criminal organization; a *communication plan*, which defines the time, place, manner and duration of the contact of the undercover agent with the person who „leads" him/her, way of receiving orders, sending reports, procedures in case of a need for changing the work methods (if it can be predicted); a *take out plan*, which specifies the method of "taking out" after the completion of the task ("ordinary" circumstances), or if the situation requires unplanned "take out"; a *protection plan*, which includes measures to protect the undercover investigator, in all phases of his/her engagement. Pursuant to the plan of engagement, the activity of the undercover agent (in operational terms) is carried out in several phases: a preparation phase, an infiltration phase, a phase of data collection (operational work), a"take out of criminal association phase", a phase of the undercover agent appearing as a witness. Furthermore, all activities must take place in accordance with the conspiratorial character of the undercover agent (Nincic, 2015a: 217).

In accordance with the need for engagement of the undercover agent, quite naturally, there is the issue of the risk in such an engagement, bearing in mind the specificity of his/her role in collecting evidence for the most serious forms of crime. While the undercover agent (as a member of the police structures) belongs to one of the rare categories that must be exposed to danger (even in cases where this danger is a direct threat to life), the question of his/her physical and psychological integrity protection is a basic precondition for the success of the covert operation. In this regard, the security assessment of the risks and threats to the undercover agent at all stages of the engagement leads to the fulfillment of one of the primary goals of using this special investigative method - protection of the undercover agent.

The security assessment materializes certain facts that are established in the process of its adoption and it includes the formalization of all knowledge that has been acquired on a

certain phenomenon, the future forms of expression are predicted and its influence on the goods that are protected, determining the most effective ways of reacting in order to minimize the negative effects of the assessed phenomenon. Since the negative effects of certain observed phenomena can endanger the life of the undercover agent when he/she is engaged, the security assessment has to cover all aspects important for his/her engagement. The key elements that must be addressed while buiding the security assessment of the undercover agent engagement, by phases, include:

a) *The preparation phase*

– Consolidation of all information which is currently available and is related to the activity of a criminal organization that is the subject of the engagement of an undercover agent. This uses data from all available official database (criminal, misdemeanor and other records), which are consolidated with the currently available data obtained from other sources. In this way, currently available "mass" of knowledge is created and that "mass" serves as the basis forn planning the future work and directions of data collection, depending on the specific needs of the covert operations;

– Regardless of whether any or all of the knowledge is derived from one or more sources (informant, a collaborator ...), it is necessary to check their reliability, in order to confirm this knowledge. In this regard, it is necessary to determine which and how reliable knowledge was provided by the source in the past, in order to assess the reliability of the source and the veracity of the data provided by the source;

– After establishing and consolidating the existing data, it is necessary to focus the activities on further expansion of the knowledge. This means collection of additional data on the person or persons against whom the measure is directed, such as: the usual daily activities; places that are usually visited; previous types of criminal activity; the usual way of dressing; specific preferences and hobbies; the means and manner of communication most commonly used; narrower and broader circle of people whom he meets and communicates with; whether the person carries a weapon and which type; is he/she a violent person; a recent photo and video documentation of the person with whom the undercover agent can be in touch when he/she stays in a criminal environment and the like;

– Performing additional operational checks on people who might appear during the covert operation. In this regard, it is necessary to get information about the past activities of the person who will be in the role of an undercover agent, in order to determine its possible connections, as well as the possible friendly and family links with people that might appear during the implementation of the measure;

– Indicating to the places and people that must be "avoided" during the execution of the operation. Special attention should be paid to possible "traps" that can be placed to the undercover agent with the goal of his/her deconspiration, as well as to the possible ways of action in this case. The criminal group may, for example, "book" the arrest of an undercover investigator to check his "legend", through their corrupt relationships;

– Determination of the communication ways of the undercover agent and the person who "leads" him/her or other officials involved in the implementation of the operation. Communication can be *visual* (direct contact) and *electronic means of communication* (listening devices, telephones ...). It is very important to eliminate the possibility of involvement of other police officers who are not ivolved in covert operation, in order to avoid certain side effects. Thus, in Houston, USA, the first woman police officer

killed while she was working as a secret agent in civilian clothes in a case of illegal drug trade, where she, as a "customer", was killed by a police officer in a uniform carrying out his duty in the area, who noticed a group of dealers and reacted thinking that it was a real dangerous situation (Chapman, 1986: 375);

– The possibility of using the agreed signals for danger, both *visual* (when the undercover agent has to make a pre-arranged movement) or *verbal* (when the undercover agent is supposed to say pre-arranged words as a sign of danger);

– Dynamics of providing the undercover investigator with all the collected information, as well as the entire photo and video documentation of the persons who are the subject of the covert operations and the persons whom he/she may encounter during his/her stay in the criminal environment.

b) *Infiltration phase*

– On the basis of the data collected in the preparation phase, it is necessary to define the "profile" of the criminal organization. This involves detailed assessment of the criminal organization and its activities through the "interests fields" (murders, drugs, weapons, human trafficking, prostitution ...), certain peculiarities in the mode of operating, possible connections with government representatives, the number of the organization members who are directly involved in its activities, material resources which the organization has (real estate, vehicles, possible "phantom" companies as a screen for disguising the operations ...);

– The assessment of the whole criminal organization is followed by a detailed assessment of each organization member individually. It involves their status in the organization, property (in the country and possibly abroad), usual movements (daily, occasionally ...), the most frequent contacts and the character of these contacts (contacts with family members, "business" with representatives of other criminal organizations, contacts with representatives of state authorities and the possible existence of elements of the offense in them ...), the level of "caution" in its activities;

– On the basis of an individual assessment of each member of the organization, their "profiles" are made. It helps to predict (estimate) their behavior in different situations, detect and establish "patterns" of behavior and determine the "weakest link" in the organization, as a possible "point of contact". All this is necessary to focus the activities for the "infiltration" and the future operation of the undercover agent in the organization;

– Definition of the safest spots of the "first contact" with representatives of the criminal organization. This means collection of data, on the basis of which, the most appropriate place, persons and ways of establisahing contact of the undercover agent with a member of the criminal organization are defined. The first contact is often the most important, because it can provide additional information on the readiness of the opposite side to deepen the contact, the first reactions to the "legend" of the undercover agent and confirmation of the assessment adequacy of the person who is "selected" for contact. Such information is of great importance for further planning and implementation of the activities for "infiltration" of the undercover agent in a criminal organization;

– The assessment of the endangering level for the undercover agent by members of the criminal organizations, in cases where it is possible to "check". This is very important, bearing in mind the fact that the members of the criminal organization are aware of the

constant attempts of infiltration of police officers, so they wil constantly demonstrate a certain amount of distrust. Therefore, it is necessary to make an assessment and prediction of all possible "check" scenarios, especially in the infiltration process.

c) *Data collection phase (operational actions)*

– Defining the level of danger to the undercover agent at the phase of collecting material evidence. It means assessment in the collection of documentary evidence, instrumentalities, proceeds from crime, recordings of telephone and other forms of communication, etc;
– Defining the level of danger to the undercover agent during the collection of information and knowledge, which, do not constitute evidence by itself, but which can, by applying other conventional or special investigation methods, lead to concrete evidence (for example, an undercover agent discovers that a criminal organization corrupts certain civil servants and so the evidence is collected by applying measures of secret surveillance, secret audio and video recording or control of communications);
– Defining the level of danger in using technical devices. If an undercover agent is a "carrier" of technical devices (if he is wired, for example), account must be taken that during the performance of the task the devices are not detected for it may endanger the agent's life. If an undercover agent actively uses technical devices (secretly sets the devices and uses them...), the danger in implementing such activities must be thoroughly assessed. Also, the possibility that the technique "fails" and thus endangers the undercover agent must be kept in mind.

d) *Phase of withdrawal from a criminal association*

– Defining the safe way to leave in cases where enough evidence is collected. This case is somewhat easier since it is a so-called "regular leaving" when sufficient evidence is collected for criminal proceedings and a safe leaving can be precisely planned. The assessment must cover the risks in relation to the place, time and method of leaving of an undercover agent, especially if it is not possible to avoid his/her presence during the arrest of members of the criminal organization;
– Defining a safe way to withdraw in an emergency, when the situation demands a swift response. The reasons for withdrawal may be different (usually a risk of/or disclosure of the identity of the undercover agent). Therefore, it is very important that an assessment of what kind of situation can lead to an immediate withdrawal is made in the preparation phase, that these situations are foreseen as much as possible and that ane accurate plan of action if such situations occur is made (elaborating them with a withdrawal plan). This enables going ahead with the events, which contributes to the protection of the undercover agent in such situations;
– Defining the matter of the undercover agent's action in the final stage of execution of the operation, therefore in the arrest of members of a criminal organization (the matter of his/her participation in that activity). This is particularly important, given the further "usability" of the undercover agent if his/her identity is discovered during the execution of the action.

e) Phase of appearance of an undercover agent as a witness

–   Vulnerability assessment of an undercover agent, if he/she appears in criminal proceedings as a witness, without hiding his/her identity. This assessment includes assessment of the threat to his/her physical integrity (result of the identity disclosure), vulnerability assessment of family members and vulnerability assessment of other related persons. This should serve as the basis for planning the modalities of the undercover agent's protection, as well as the protection of other related parties (in the most drastic cases, entry into a special protection program);
–   Vulnerability assessment in cases where the undercover agent appears in criminal proceedings but does not reveal his/her identity, and the testimony is conductede in accordance with the rules for the hearing of protected witnesses. Then the rules of procedural protection are applied. However, practice has shown that in the course of the proceedings, the identity of the undercover agent can be revealed, so it is necessary to estimate the possibility of discovering his/her identity and, accordingly, plan appropriate protection measures.

The engagement of an undercover agent is set up in such a way that prior to the implementation of each stage, the potential risks and threats which can jeopardize the engagement are assessed. The engagement of an undercover agent represents a basic precondition for success of the covert operations. The security assessment of the undercover agent's engagement helps us perceive all elements that may have a particular infuence on the covert operation itself, discover and analyze the causal links between those elements and foresee all possible (negative) effects of the engagement of an undercover agent. Thus, an adequate security assessment creates the preconditions for the agent's security, enables the planned action and the "cost-effectiveness" of this method, and hence guarantees detection, prevention and proving of the most serious crimes.

6   CONCLUSION

Security assessment enables identification and monitoring of the threats to those who are endangered, their influence, strength and resources; as well as undertaking specific measures for their elimination or for the elimination of the circumstances in which they occurr. Therefore, the collection and analysis of security relevant data is a precondition for development of high-quality security assessments. The real evaluation of the data on a phenomenon that can affect security and the ability to predict future phenomena and events and their infuence on the security situation is essential for an adequate response and prevention of the negative infuence.

Security assessment is especially important during the implementation of the undercover agent's engagement rate. Given the sensitivity of the agent's engagement, particularly the need to "infiltrate" in a criminal milieu, working under changed identity ("legend") and the necessity of achieving an appropriate relationship with the criminal milieu for the purpose of acquiring a position which justifies his/her actions (detection, prevention and proving of the most serious crimes), the adequate security assessment guarantees his/her security and the success of the covert operation. Therefore, a detailed assessment of all the elements that may negatively affect the functioning of the undercover agent and threaten his/her physical integrity first and foremost is necessary in all stages of the engagement.

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THE SHIFTING MODUS OPERANDI OF THE "LONE WOLF" TERRORISTS

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ABSTRACT

The recent terrorist attacks on European soil point to a shift in the course of perpetrating terrorist attacks modus operandi. Unlike the previous terrorist attacks carried out by terrorist cells, nowadays more prevalent are the so-called "lone wolf" terrorists with a relatively changed modus operandi. This is due to the increased security measures in European countries, making it more difficult to act in a group or cell to get to explosives or materials necessary to make improvised explosive devices. The successful counter terrorism measures against Islamist terrorist networks lead to increased terrorist propaganda that encourages the supporters to take solo actions without waiting for instructions. This adds up to the calls to attack the West that were made prior to Ramadan by ISIS spokesman, Abu Mohammed al Adnani, whospoke about using a vehicle to run over innocent civiliansor slaughter the "infidels" with a knife. This wasexactly themodus operandi in the latest terrorist attacks. The case studies of these terrorist attacks perpetrated on Western European soil indicate a recent change of tactics in carrying out the terrorist attacks.The change in the modus operandi of "lone wolf" terrorists calls into question the effectiveness of the standard counter-terrorist techniques of the security agencies. This suggests the need to change the approach of the security agencies to this phenomenon and thus be able to prevent such terrorist attacks.

Keywords:*terrorism, "lone wolf" terrorist, counter terrorism*

1. INTRODUCTION

After the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, the security measures in Western Europeans countries were set on the highest level as a response to the growing domestic security threat posed by groups like the Islamic State. On 20 November 2015, on a meeting in Brussels, Europe's Justice and Interior Ministers agreed guidelines that step up the security measures in EU. Some of the measures being considered are: Boosting border controls as there were concerns that one or more of the Paris attackers may have taken popular migrant routes into Europe, pushing through Europe to examine its porous border regime. The EU member states agreed to step up the checks at these borders to help track "suspicious" movements by individuals by ramping up existing databases, boosting staff and "reinforcing" border equipment; Travel records that include information cards filled out by passengers containing names, travel dates, seats, itineraries, payment details and baggage info, with current drafts to the law proposing that this information be kept for up to five years; Firearms - the EU member states will aim to revise the existing firearm laws and increase the countries' cooperation with Europe's border agency, Frontex, as well as the bloc's policing organization, Europol, in order to crack down on weapon smuggling; Information sharing - it has been decided to boost anti-terrorism cooperation by exchanging information through the existing EU databases (European Council, 2015). In

addition to these measures, massive searches were carried out across France, Belgium and other countries of Western Europe. During these searches, many terrorists were arrested and some of them were shot dead. All these measures undertaken by the authorities narrow down the area of acting of the terrorist groups. That means that it is becoming increasingly difficult to perform terrorist attacks by terrorist groups and attacks with bombs and firearms. Finding components to make bombs or IED cannot remain unnoticed by the security agencies. Successful actions for arresting many suspects for planning terrorist attacks across Europe were undertaken in support of this prevention. We will present here only a few of them, in Germany and France, countries that are the most frequent targets of the terrorist attacks in Western Europe. We can highlight the following successful counter-terrorist preventive actions in which several suspected terrorists were arrested in Germany: Leipzig, October 2016, the Police in Leipzig arrested 22-year-old Syrian refugee Jaber al-Bakr after a two-day manhunt following the discovery of explosives and other bomb-making equipment in his apartment in Chemnitz. He was suspected of plotting to attack a Berlin airport. Two days later, he hanged himself in his prison cell; Düsseldorf, May 2016, three suspected members of the "Islamic State" terror network were arrested in the German states of North Rhine-Westphalia, Brandenburg and Baden Württemberg. The authorities say two of the men planned to blow themselves up in downtown Düsseldorf, while the other attacker and a fourth jihadist arrested in France planned to target pedestrians with guns and explosive devices; Berlin, February 2016, in separate raids across the country, the police arrested three Algerians suspected of links with the "Islamic State" militant group and of having planned a terrorist attack in Berlin; Oberursel, April 2015, the Eschborn-Frankfurt City loop bike race was called off after the German police discovered it may have been the target of an Islamist terror attack. A 35-year-old German with Turkish background and his 34-year-old wife were arrested on suspicion of planning the attack. The police found bomb-making materials in their home near the bike route (Breitenbach, 2016). Among the numerous successful anti-terrorist police actions in France, we can single out the action on 20 November 2016, in which the French police foiled a terror plot following arrests in Strasbourg and Marseille. Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve confirmed that the police detained seven people of French, Moroccan and Afghan origin. According to Strasbourg's Mayor, the focus of the plot was "the Paris region" (Reuters, 2016).

Considering the above stated, the terrorists are starting to change their tactics of action, from small cells orienting towards "lone wolves", which means lone operators who act on their own without any chain of command or any connection with the terrorist base. However, in the last two years there has been an evident change in the modus operandi of the "lone wolf" terrorists. If the weapons which these terrorists used in the past were mostly small arms and bombs, now due to the increase of security measures, they increasingly switch to cold weapons and attacks with vehicles. This way of carrying out a terrorist act allows the perpetrator to be able to act without prior training for firearms or for making explosive devices and with undetectable approach to the target.

An occasion to change the modus operandi was the call for attacking the West conveyed before Ramadan by ISIS spokesman, Abu Mohammed al Adnani,whichmentioned using a vehicle to run over innocent civilians. In September 2014 Adnani urged ISIS supporters: "If you can kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French – or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way, however it may

be…Smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car, or throw him down from a high place, or choke him, or poison him" (Yayla et. al., 2016).

The real change in the modus operandi of the "lone wolf" terrorists by using knives and vehicles, occurred after the Paris attacks and the increase of the security measures by the Western countries. These attacks were intensified especially at the end of 2015 and throughout 2016.

2. LONE WOLF TERRORISTS

The term LoneWolf terrorist is used to refer to individualspursuing Islamist terrorist goals alone, either driven bypersonal reasons or their belief that they are part of anideological group (meaning a group of individuals who allclaim to believe or follow a similar ideology).

The term "lone wolf" was popularised in thelate 1990s by white supremacists TomMetzger and Alex Curtis as part of anencouragement to fellow racists to act alonein committing violent crimes for tacticalreasons. Other terms that have been used todescribe similar or comparable forms ofpolitical violence include "leaderlessresistance" (Beam, 1992) and "freelance terrorism"(Clemons, 2010).

Perhaps one of the most puzzling andunpredictable forms of terrorism is providedby violentacts committed by a singleindividual. These so-called lone wolves are anightmare for the police and intelligencecommunity as they are extremely difficult todetect and to defend against. Compared togroup terrorism or network-sponsoredterrorists, lone operators have a criticaladvantage in avoiding identification anddetection before and after their attacks, sincemost of them do not communicate withothers with regard to their intentions.Although lone wolves might have thedisadvantage of lacking the means, skills,and "professional" support of terroristgroups, some of them nonetheless haveproven to be very lethal.

"Lone wolves" terrorists are usually radicalized through the Internet and through widely available jihadist propaganda. In addition, these terrorists get radicalized through contacts with members of a certain terrorist group or by persons in charge of recruiting persons for the terrorist organization.

Internet is the accelerator of the phenomenon of terrorist lone wolves. It is very popular among the Islamic militants and a very effective tool, which provides space where they can get material for radicalization, training manuals and videos. This global network provides direct access to a community of likeminded worldwide, thus Islamic militants may be linked to provide additional encouragement and guidance to carry out certain activities.

Previous domestic terrorist plots were disrupted by exploiting thevulnerabilities inherent in the groups themselves through surveillance,informants and community information. Lone wolves do not have the vulnerabilitiesof groups, but this same tactical evolution causes lone wolves to lack theinherent strengths of group terrorism. Institutional support provides the terroristswith advanced training, deadlier weapons and more manpower with which toexecute attacks, precisely the characteristics that would allow lone wolves toinflict more harm, but which lie beyond their reach (Barnes, 2012).

3. KNIFE AND VEHICLE ATTACKS

Terrorist attacks involving changed modus operandi of lone wolf terrorists on Western European soil began at the end of 2014 with an attack with a knife at a police station in Tours, France. Such terrorist attacks using knives started to take place massively in Israel at the end of 2015. There were about 120 attacks and attempted assaults by Palestinians against Israelis in three months, an average of more than one a day. These attacks perpetrated by young Palestinians with kitchen knives that are waging a ceaseless campaign of near-suicidal violence are called "a new kind of terrorism" by the Israeli leaders (Booth, 2015).

The wave of terrorist attacks with knives and vehicles in 2015 and 2016 spread across the countries of Western Europe. Most of these attacks were in France, Germany, England and Belgium.

After the knife attack in Nice at the beginning of 2015, where two soldiers were injured, the French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve stated that France is confronting a new phenomenon "easy access terrorism" (Euro news, 2015). Easy access terrorism refers to the ease with which "lone wolves" can perform such terrorist attacks. The unpredictability of lone wolves and practical impossibility of their detection and prevention is now supported by a selection of weapons that are easily accessible and which arouse no doubts among the security agencies. The attacks that occurred across Europe make it clear that the weapons to carry out these terrorist attacks can be different knives for everyday use, even kitchen knives. The same applies to the attacks with vehicles, since the terrorists use cars and commercial heavy vehicles such as trucks that are in no way adapted to carry out terrorist attacks (such as vehicles that are used for terrorist attacks in Iraq and Syria which are loaded with explosives and are often strengthened on the side of the driver) and thus cannot be detected by the security agencies.

4. CASE STUDIES

- **Tours police station stabbing** - On 20 December 2014, a man in Joué-lès-Tours near the city of Tours in central France entered a police station shouting the Islamic takbir Allahu Akbar ("God is Great") and proceeded to attack officers with a knife, injuring three before he was shot and killed. The attacker was identified as Bertrand Nzohabonayo, age 20, a French citizen. The attacker had taken Bilal as his new name upon conversion to Islam and had been posting Islamist material on his Facebook page, including a photograph of the black flag of the Islamic State (Mulholland, 2014).

- **Knife attack at London underground station** - On 5 December 2015, a man reportedly shouting "This is for Syria" carried out a knife attack at an east London underground station, injuring three people. The attacker was arrested after being hit by police Taser fire. Somali-born Muhiddin Mire, 30, targeted strangers at random in the ticket hall at Leytonstone Underground station in east London. He declared he was going to "spill blood" for his "Syrian brothers".Judge Nicholas Hilliard QC, Recorder of London, said that he had been motivated by events in Syria (Telegraph, 2016).

- **The knife attack in Hanover** - On February 26, 2016 a 15-year-old a German-Moroccan girl walked into a German railway station on a Friday and almost fatally stabbed the first officer who approached her. Chats uncovered by German media show that a 15-year-old who stabbed a police officer in Hanover may have been commanded to do so by the so-called "Islamic State." The chat logs showed that the 15-year-old met IS members during a trip to Turkey in January. She intended on crossing into Syria, but wrote that there was a "change of plans." The IS members asked her to travel back to Germany to "surprise

the unbelievers." "They told me it has a greater benefit," Safia S. wrote, adding that it would be "really fun." She also wrote about a "martyr operation" (Staudenmaier, 2016).

- **German train attack** - On 18 July 2016, an asylum seeker from Pakistan Riaz Khan Ahmadzai, injured four people, two critically, with a knife and hatchet on a train near Würzburg in Germany. The state office of criminal investigations called it a terrorist attack with an Islamist religious motive.The attacker's Islamic State instructor "ordered" him "to use an axe rather than a knife" in his attack. German authorities later discovered evidence showing that Ahmadzai was in contact with a suspected Islamic State member in Saudi Arabia and had originally been asked to drive a car into a crowd of people. Ahmadzai declined this suggestion as he was not able to drive the car.Instead, Ahmadzai announced that he would board a train and attack the first passengers that are convenient (Ulrich, 2016).

- **Belgium machete attack on police officers** - 6 Aug, 2016 - Two female officers were injured after being attacked by a machete-wielding man near the police station in the Belgian city of Charleroi. The perpetrator, who could be heard shouting "Allahu Akbar," was shot by a third officer on site. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the machete attack in the Belgian city of Charleroi. The perpetratorwas identified as a 33-year-old Algerian assailant, who had resided in Belgium since 2012 and was known to the police for criminal offenses, but not for terrorist links. According to the Belgian prosecutors, there are indications that the attack may have been inspired by a terrorist motive. A statement by the Islamic State-affiliated Amaq news agency, on an Isis-linked Twitter account, said the attack on the officers was in response to the "crusader coalition's" military campaign against the Islamic State and its self-declared caliphate in Iraq and Syriacarried out by one of its "soldiers"(Associated Press, 2016).

- **Bastille Day truck attack in Nice -** On the evening of 14 July 2016, a 19 ton cargo truck was deliberately driven into crowds celebrating Bastille Day on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, France, resulting in the deaths of 86 people and injuring 434. The driver was Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a Tunisian resident of France. The attack ended following an exchange of gunfire, during which Lahouaiej-Bouhlel was shot and killed by the police.The French Interior Minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, said the attacker "appears to have become radicalised very quickly.Investigators examining Bouhlel's phone records found evidence that he was in contact with known Islamic radicals (Chazan, 2016).

- **Truck attack on Berlin Christmas market -** On 19 December 2016, a truck was deliberately driven into the Christmas market beside Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church at Breitscheidplatz in Berlin. The terrorist attack left 12 people dead and 56 others injured. One of the victims was the truck's original driver, Łukasz Urban, who was found shot dead in the passenger seat. The perpetrator was Anis Amri, a Tunisian failed asylum seeker. Four days after the attack he was killed in a shootout with the police near Milan in Italy. According to the police reports, Amri was in contact with Abu Walaa who wasrecruiting volunteers to travel to the Middle East to fight for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Isis has claimed responsibility for the Berlin attack. The extremist group says the man who rammed a speeding truck into a busy Christmas market killing 12 people was a 'soldier of the Islamic State'. 'The executor of the operation in Berlin is a soldier of the Islamic state and he executed the operation in response to calls to target nationals of the coalition countries,' the militant group's Amaq news agency said (Morley, 2016).

ANALYSIS - These cases clearly indicate a certain pattern in which the terrorist attacks are carried out. These attacks are executed with easily available objects from everyday life, such as kitchen and other knives, axes and vehicles, in this case, trucks. With the exception of the first two cases (Tours and London), in all other cases, the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks had some loosely connections with members of the terrorist organization, which played a role in their radicalization or gave them instructions on how to carry out the terrorist attacks (the case of 15 years girl from Hanover and the asylum seeker from Pakistan in Germany). The terrorist attacks in all cases were triggered by a catalyst event. Thus, most of these attacks were carried out because of the situation in Syria and the struggle of the "West against their Muslim brothers" and in one case the catalyst was the refusal of asylum (case Anis Amri and the attack with a truck at the Berlin Christmas market).

By analyzing these terrorist attacks we come to the conclusion that the perpetrators are not members of terrorist groups and that they have no training with weapons or any military training. This only confirms the new modus operandi of lone wolf terrorists to commit terrorist attacks with easily available objects in everyday life and perpetrators who do not need prior training with weapons. Therefore this terrorism can be called easy access terrorism.

5. CONCLUSION

As the Islamic State does not seem to devote their resources to a major operation in the west, they are more likely to continue to praise and encourage the lone-wolves model, which represents a real and long-lasting threat. This strategy is very effective as demonstrated by the recent attacks in Europe. This kind of terrorist attacks will continue on European soil in the future, because the applied modus operandi in the recent attacks does not require any previous training in weapons or any military training of the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks. Before changing the modus operandi of lone wolf terrorists, the circle of potential radicalized individuals that might become lone wolves, has been narrowed to persons who have been members of terrorist organizations or who had fought on the battlefields in the Middle East, as well as those who have some foreknowledge of making improvised explosive devices. It is no longer necessary for the terrorists to have high capacities in building an explosive device or even to know how to use a weapon. Indeed, simple objects of daily life such as knives and vehicles are enough to carry a high impact attack and this modus is easier and safer than using explosive devices.

The security services must react appropriately to this evident change of the modus operandi of the "lone wolf" terrorists. It is generally known that the "lone wolf" phenomenon is one of the greatest challenges for all security services in the world. The alienation of these terrorists from society and their limited communication with the world makes them an enigma for the security agencies. Therefore, their timely detection and prevention is almost impossible.

The biggest problem in lone wolf terrorism is the self-radicalization of the person who acts as lone wolf through the internet. A method of deterring people from radicalization, in other words, of de- radicalization, can be the use of counter narrative of the negative experiences of the persons who have been on the battlefields in the Middle East and were members of the IS. It is likely that many people who were in the Middle East and fought as members of the IS and have returned to the countries where they live, have a negative experience of their "adventure". Their experience is probably not the same with what they viewed on the recruiting videos released by the terrorist group or from what

they had been told and promised by the activists or radical imams, who radicalized them with their sermons. Exactly these negative experiences may become the most powerful weapon in the hands of the security agencies to combat radicalization, and thus fight the terrorist lone wolves.

The effective counter - radicalization strategy depends on effective community engagement. It is essential to promote the condemnation of terrorists by the community to which they belong, and all this to be achieved with close cooperation and help of influential members of relevant communities. Such a community-based approach should ultimately foster a more advantageous operating environment for the counter-terrorism actors providing them with more information on the ground and increased capacity.

It is also important to promote awareness programs for parents, schools, universities – obviously without launching large scale public campaigns that only serve to create moral panic.

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ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES FOR COUNTERTERRORISM

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Terrorists have excellent operational security and they hide well. They present immense challenges to the anticipating and pursuing intelligence analyst as terrorists cover their activities with cultural noise and culturally laden deceptive activities. These capabilities make them very difficult to notice, let alone find.

This paper discusses the analytic techniques that are used in counterterrorism analysis:

1. Threat analysis. Threat analysis acknowledges two key factors—that there needs to be a threat agent and an object of the threat;
2. Vulnerability analysis. In short, vulnerability is a weakness in an asset that can be exploited by a threat agent.Vulnerability is a function of several factors—attractiveness of the target, feasibility of carrying out an attack and potential impact;
3. Risk analysis. Risk is a function of likelihood and consequence;
4. Prevention, preparation, response, and recovery planning.There are four elements to PPRR policy development—prevention, preparation, response, and recovery. Prevention considers the risk and attempts to implement ways that could stop them. Preparedness acknowledges that despite the preventative measures, the event may still occur, so one should prepare for it. If it does occur, the response is the part of the plan that deals with how the agencies will mobilize and take action (and what type of action, etc.). The final element provides guidance for the recovery operation. This aspect of the plan anticipates the worst-case scenario. That is, the preventative measures have failed and the preparation measures may have mitigated the impact to some degree, but it still occurred; the response has contained and brought the event to an end and it is now time to recover from the event's effects.

The goal of this paper is first and foremost to develop and contribute to the educational literature of the intelligence profession.

Keywords: security,counterterrorism, analysis.

1. Introduction

Terror Adversary is an organization, group or individual that carries out an action or takes part in an action, or threatens to carry out an action, aimed at causing casualties and/or damage to civilians or to facilities in the country's territory.Terrorist Organizations – Categories: State terrorism; Fundamentalist Islamic organizations; Local terror organizations; Foreign terror organizations; The lone attacker.

Terrorists have excellent operational security and they hide well. They present immense challenges to the anticipating and pursuing intelligence analyst as terrorists cover their activities with cultural noise and culturally laden deceptive activities. These capabilities make them very difficult to notice, let alone find.Thus, the challenge for the advanced analyst is to understand the Operational Environment (OE), understand the culture and understand the enemy and how all three relate. In the center of the struggle to

outwit the enemy is learning how he thinks, plans, makes decisions, acts, receives feedback, and adjusts, by learning from his perspectives and thoughts.To support commanders' decisions, analysts must think more broadly to gain depth of knowledge and find relationships leading to a well-hidden foe. They must find, track and neutralize embedded terrorists and insurgents and do so without committing gross errors of logic, without creating undo negative outcomes through ill-conceived actions and a corollary increase in credibility problems with the populace and without causing unwarranted collateral damage to the populace and personal and commercial property.

The urban OE is complex and fluid, primarily because of the nature of busy cities, the movement of people and machines, the invisible movement of data and RF energy and the constant interaction of complex adaptive systems as they intersect and collide. In addition, the enemies operate in the urban OE to accomplish their strategies and goals. They view it as a safe haven owing to the strangeness of the foreign urban OE to individuals and organizations. It is this notion of the criticality of the urban OE as a perceived safe haven that is so important to the embedded insurgent and therefore must be of high importance to the advanced intelligence analyst.

The enemy operation:
1. Intent: Trigger or Opportunity, Discussion, Decision;
2. Planning: Choice of target,Intelligence gathering for attack, Modes of operation, Chosen Mode of operation, Logistics;
3. Execution:Assembly of attack group, Training, Intelligence gathering for attack, Setting off for attack;
4. Attack: Penetration of target, Movement at target, Attack;
5. Impact:Results;
6. Effects:Takingresponsibility.

Security isprofitable.True security requires resources, but the lack of security costs a fortune. Security and safety are not goals in themselves.

Theanalysis of intelligence data has always been as significantas the collection, because data analysis and report synthesis createmeaningfromtheoften-scant samples of data about the subject of interest.

This paper discusses the analytic techniques that are used in counterterrorism analysis:
1. Threat analysis and assessment.Identify the threat(s);
2. Vulnerability analysis and assessment.Explore vulnerabilities to this threat(s);
3. Risk analysis and assessment. Gauge the likelihood that the threat(s) will eventuate;

Threat analysis is the first of three integrated phases in developing a counterterrorism plan. The two subsequent phases are vulnerability analysis and risk analysis. The results of these three pieces of analytic work lay the groundwork for crafting a policy that addresses prevention, preparation, response, and recovery. In other words, all of the techniques contained within this paper are intrinsically linked and act as building blocks to form a comprehensive "toolkit" for analyzing counterterrorism. These steps in summary are:

2. Threat Analysis and Assessment

A threat is a person's resolve to inflict harm on another. Threats can be made against most entities—people, organizations, and nations (i.e., by a threat agent). Threat analysis acknowledges two key factors—that there needs to be a threat agent (which could be anything from a physical substance to a person or a body corporate/organization) and an object of the threat (i.e., the target—which does not have to be a material target such as a

shopping mall or an individual—can be intangible such as the threat to national security or the security of a particular venue or event).

In short, threat is an event, incident or a statement of an intention to inflict injury, damage, or other hostile action as retribution

Threat Level = Motivation x Capability

When analysts assess a threat agent, they are gauging whether the agent has intent and capability to produce harm to a target. To weigh whether the agent has the intent and capability, the analysts need to establish two elements for each of these factors: desire and expectation (or ability) for intent and knowledge and resources for capability. These considerations are shown diagrammatically in Figure 1. As an equation, threat is expressed as:

threat = (desire + expectation) + (knowledge + resources)

Desire can be described as the threat agents' enthusiasm to cause harm in pursuit of their goal. Expectation is the confidence the threat agents have in that they will achieve their goal if their plan is carried out. Knowledge is having information that will allow the threat agents to use or construct devices or carry out processes that are necessary for achieving their goal.

Resources include skills (or experience) and materials needed to act on their plan.

threat intent = the optimism a threat agent has about successfully attacking a target
threat capability = the force a threat agent can bring to bear on a target

Figure 1. Threat analysis

Threat Methodology:
- A threat exists when an individual or a group have both the motivation and the capability to attack;
- Motivation is a subjective state of mind and therefore is the most challenging element to define and quantify;
- The motivation level of a potential attacker may be in direct correlation with the projected consequence of a successful attack.

Process:
- Review of Intelligence Study;
- Formulated relevant threats and scenarios;
- Analysis and score scenarios.

Threat Level= Motivation x Capability

Analysts need to consider the context of the threat, their agency's mission and the list of potential targets when adopting a model in order to aid them in determining the threat environment.

Law enforcement officials with companies or organizations located in their jurisdictions that may be potential terrorist targets could ask such questions as:

1. Has the company or organization ever been the target of a terrorist attack?
2. Has the company or organization's name ever been mentioned in a derogatory manner in any radical oratory, literature, on Web sites or online chat rooms, or in any other communication medium? This includes whether the company has been the target of demonstrations locally or at facilities outside local jurisdiction.
3. Is the entity in any way affiliated with a company or organization that would have answered in the affirmative to either of the first two questions?
4. Does the company supply raw material, packaging or any other goods or services to such a company or organization?
5. Does the company or organization receive materials from or ship goods to or through "sensitive" countries or territories?

When compiling a threat profile, targets can and should be considered in terms of their criticality, cost (either as a direct loss or an indirect or consequential loss due to disruption), or sensitivity (e.g., compromised information). The model of Sumdamageat the event is shown diagrammatically in Figure 2. This is because targets that do not possess any of these attributes may not be considered by threat agents with the same weight.

Figure2. The model of Sumdamageat

Potential target is the Critical Infrastructure. A Critical Infrastructure facility is a facility that facilitates the normal operation of the infrastructure sector to which it belongs. Alternatively, a facility that -if damaged -could potentially begin a process which would lead to the collapse of the infrastructure in question.

Critical Infrastructure is a physical or virtual system that is used by the country to defend itself, or to conduct regular activities in the domains of the economy, public health (nutrition –food and water) and security. The neutralization or destruction of these systems could paralyze the country and ultimately lead to its collapse.

Strategic Infrastructure is a physical or cybernetic system that constitutes the base for the operation of the other national infrastructures. These infrastructures include the ENERGY, COMMUNICATIONS and TRANSPORTATION (sea and airports) sectors. Damage to any of these infrastructures could cause lateral damage to the country's economic infrastructure as a whole and bring about a process of systemic-national collapse.

Critical Sectors are Health, Water & Sewage Disposal, Energy (Electricity, Oil, Gas), Transportation (Air, Sea, Land), Emergency services, Governmental Institutions, Communications, Chemical industry & Hazardous materials, National Symbols, Food & Consumer products, Banking & Finance.

Threat Assessmentis shown in Table 1:
- Determine relevant threats and scenarios;
- According to capabilities and motivation;
- Based on past incidents and future trends.

Table 1. Threat Assessment

		Threat Assessment				
	5	10	15	20	25	
Motivation	4	8	12	16	20	Resulting
	3	6	9	12	15	matrix
	2	4	6	8	10	
	1	2	3	4	5	
	Capability (of the adversary)					

(with "Threat level" alongside the Resulting matrix column)

3. Vulnerability Analysis and Assessment

There is no absolute target for terrorists. The best target for terrorists is the most vulnerable so that they can kill a lot of people in order to shock both the government and the citizens. Terrorist attacks are kinds of propaganda tools to show the power of the organization to the government and to terrorize the people. Therefore, the more shocking and lethal the attacks are, the more success for the terrorist organizations. Bennet points out the costs of terrorism and says because of this reason terrorists want to be successful in their attacks.

If vulnerability can be controlled, everything must be done because the life of a human being is valuable. The liabilities of vulnerability, risk and susceptibility must be assessed very carefully in terrorism events.

To reduce terrorism vulnerability, empathy, education, intelligence, coordination and technology must be examined very carefully. The characteristics of countries can change, but risk and susceptibility factors can be determined by the authorities. The unforeseeable character of terrorist attacks makes terrorism vulnerability very important and complex. Thus, the analyst must think as the terrorist does in order to define the vulnerabilities. Information and perception of the organization and the supporters are

needed to empathize. Although empathy is very hard to practice, knowledge about terrorism organizations and terrorists may help.

Vulnerability is a physical feature or an operational attribute that renders an entity open to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard or attack.

Vulnerability Level = Accessibility x Visibility x (inverse of) Ability to Prevent or Control

Also, vulnerability is a weakness in an asset that can be exploited by a threat agent (the term asset is being used in this context to denote a resource that requires protection). Viewed in another way, vulnerability is an asset's capability to withstand harm inflected by a threat. Harm can be anything from experiencing a minor nuisance event to a situation that is catastrophic.

Vulnerability is a function of several factors—attractiveness of the target, feasibility of carrying out an attack and potential impact. This model is shown diagrammatically in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Vulnerability analysis

Usually, these factors entail such considerations as: status of the target, potential for the attack to succeed, potential for the threat agent to get away with the attack and potential to inflict loss. These factors can be weighed against measures to mitigate loss and to deter or prevent an attack on an asset (e.g., through a force field analysis).

Formulae-based analyses are popular among law enforcement and security agencies engaged in counterterrorism and although these vary from agency to agency, they follow a basic stepwise formula:

1. Define what constitutes an asset (critical infrastructure, transport network, food chain, distribution hubs, or any of the essential services—e.g., electric power, gas, potable water, sewerage, etc.);
2. Sort these assets into categories;
3. Assign a grade or level of importance to each asset; and
4. Identify potential impact on the asset if it suffers harm.

As there is no one single criterion for calculating vulnerability because each class of assets may require special considerations to be taken into account (and there may be agency protocols that take precedence also), one general approach is to use a model such as:

vulnerability = target attractiveness + ease of attack + impact

To operationalize *attractiveness*, the analyst could ask questions along the following lines and tabulate the results to insert them into the model:

- Is the target readily recognizable?
- Is the target the subject of media attention/coverage?

- Does the target have a symbolic status in terms of historical, cultural, religious or other importance?

Attractiveness needs to be placed in context with the threat agent. Say, for instance, some Islamic extremist groups may see assets that represent Western culture or symbolize Western values as attractive. To operationalize the concept ease of attack, the analyst could ask these types of questions:

- How difficult would it be for the threat agent to predict the peak attendance times at the target?
- Are there security measures in place (e.g., calculated on a scale of low to high deterrence or low to high prevention)?

Impact could be operationalized by questions like:

- What are the numbers of people frequenting the target?
- In financial terms, what would the financial impact of an attack be if the asset was: disrupted, incapacitated, or destroyed?

Vulnerability Assessment is shown in Table 2. Vulnerability Criteria are Visibility; Accessibility, Positions, Directions, No. of Targets and Ability to Prevent.

Table 2. Vulnerability Assessment

	Threat Assessment							
Visibility	5	10	15	20	25			Vulnerability Level
	4	8	12	16	20		Score is	
	3	6	9	12	15		multiplied	
	2	4	6	8	10	Resulting	by the	
	1	2	3	4	5	matrix	inverse of	
		Accessibility					prevention capability	

5. Risk Analysis and Assessment

Target analysis was discussed earlier, with guidelines for assessing whether or not a potential target is, in fact, a likely target. In risk analysis, an attempt is made to evaluate that likelihood and assign a degree of risk to it. The questions asked are more detailed, the modeling more complex, the analysis more sophisticated and the conclusions more serious.

Risk is a function of *likelihood* and *consequence.* A risk assessment can be carried out in relation to almost any situation; it is not just for issues of grave concern. Nor is risk management solely for counterterrorism; risk analysis techniques can be applied to situations that may be the target of criminals or criminal organizations not associated with terrorism. Nevertheless, analyzing risk allows analysts to recommend measures that will provide field commanders with the ability to:

- Accept the risk as is; or
- Treat the risk (which includes such decisions as to avoid the risk altogether, mitigate the risk, or defer the risk to another person or agency).

Internationally, risk analysis is the subject of a standard. The Swiss based International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has published a document that puts forward a common approach for dealing with risk by providing generic guidelines in relation to the principles for how risk is managed.

Understanding these terms helps distinguish the process of managing risk from the analytic process of assessing risk using the equation:

$$risk = likelihood + consequence$$

Likelihood refers to the probability that "a specific event or outcome, measured by a ratio of specific events or outcomes to the total number of possible events or outcomes." AS/NZ 4360:2004 defines consequence as: "The outcome of an event expressed qualitatively or quantitatively,being loss, injury, disadvantage or gain." Likelihood and consequence are evaluated in the analysis phase of the risk management cycle. This analytic cycle comprises five phases shown in Figure 4. Step by step:

I. Use two tools—in the form of scales—to evaluate a target's risk rating (i.e., the asset under consideration). These two scales consist of a likelihood scale and the consequences scale.

Typical Example of a Likelihood Scale:

Rank Likelihood Descriptors:

1. Almost certain. The situation is expected to occur;
2. Likely. The situation will probably occur;
3. Possible. The situation should occur at some time;
4. Unlikely. The situation could occur at some time;
5. Rare. The situation would only occur under exceptional Circumstances.

Figure 4. The risk management cycle

Typical Example of a Consequences Scale:
Rank Consequences Descriptors:

1. Insignificant. Will result in little disruption;
2. Minor. Will result in minor disruption;
3. Moderate. Will cause considerable inconvenience;
4. Major. Causes noticeable impact;
5. Catastrophic. Causes function/services to totally fail with high impact.
   Consequence Assessment is:

- Assessment of damage or consequence;
- Resulting from effectively executed attack scenario.

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Consequence Assessment is Sum damage at the event (Economical loss, Casualties, Environment damage, Domino effect, National Security effect, Psychological Effect and Disruptions in services supply).

II. The results of these two assessments are then fed into a risk rating matrix (see table 3) that returns a risk rating coefficient.

Typical Example of a Risk Rating Matrix (Table 3):

Consequences: 1 2 3 4 5.

Likelihood (Probability):

1. Almost certain;
2. Likely;
3. Possible;
4. Unlikely;
5. Rare.

Table 3. Risk Rating Matrix.

Probability	Consequence				
	Very low	low	medium	high	Very high
Very high	5	10	15	20	25
high	4	8	12	16	20
Medium	3	6	9	12	20
low	2	4	6	8	10
Very low	1	2	3	4	5

III. Finally, the analyst looks up the risk rating coefficient on the risk evaluation scale (see Table 3) in order to determine what actions (if any) are required.

Typical Example of a Risk Evaluation Scale (Table 4)**:**

Risk Rating and Suggested Actions for Treatment

- Low risk Manage using standard operating procedures;
- Moderate risk Outline specific management actions that need to be taken;
- High risk Create a business contiguity plan and a response plan (test annually);
- Extreme risk Urgent actions are necessary (in addition to those per high risk).

Once each risk is assessed in this way, they can be positioned on the risk rating matrix (see Table 4) so they can be compared with each other in order to prioritize treatment options.

Table 4. Typical Example of a Risk Rating Matrix

6. CONCLUSION

Risk analysis is a survey to ascertain how high the probability is of one of these dangers occurring, how well the organization can respond should the threat become a reality and how well the organization can carry on once that reality materializes. The identification of the vulnerabilities and threats that go along with the risk are inherent in the analysis.

In the course of the analysis, one of the things to be determined is the extent of the organization's exposure, which could materially contribute to loss or damage in the event of a terrorist attack. Thus, a branch office or nonessential satellite facility is more susceptible to an attack than the central office. Similarly, a police call box or a temporary post is more vulnerable than headquarters or the communications center. In the private sector, a chain of retail stores exposes a company to more risks than does a manufacturing operation concentrated in a single location. Other factors in the risk analysis equation include considerations as to what could cause injury to employees and, in the event injuries are sustained, how well the organization could continue to function.

Pre-incident involves all the planning, anticipation, and "what if" modeling and intelligence-gathering that can be done in advance. Cooperation between the police and the private sector is especially crucial here, since information and intelligence can be shared and the most efficient use of resources can be made.

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CONTEMPORARY SECURITY CHALLENGES FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF TERRORISM

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ABSTRACT

After the Cold War, the risk of a military conflict on a global scale has been significantly reduced. However, the world is still confronted with many traditional and new challenges, risks and threats to security. The increasingly unpredictable, asymmetric and trans-national character is an essential feature of these challenges, risks and threats.

The subject of this research is the identification, definition and analysis of terrorism as one of the largest transnational security threats. The purpose of this paper is to approach the meaning of terrorism and bring it close to the professional and scientific community.

One of the goals of the security, political and legal studies is to determine the structure, content and reasons underlying the conduct of terrorist acts. Terrorism is essentially a historical phenomenon that is as old as the state itself, although it is often seen as a phenomenon of contemporary human security. However, the current forms of terrorism have a completely new dimension arising from different historical, socio-economic and political reasons, as well as the development of science and technology.

There is still no generally accepted and universal definition of terrorism, considering the fact that terrorism is not easy to define. Terrorism has many forms and it is characterized by a variability of its features, in addition to being complex. The meaning of the word „terrorism" has changed throughout history in order to accommodate the risk of any subsequent period. Hence, it is difficult to determine a permanent definition of the term.In a growing number of countries there is an increasing political priority to solve this problem and it must be assessed primarily or exclusively in terms of national security and the protection of national interests. Moreover, the interests and values of human and international security must not be neglected. In this paper, the author will present a terminological definition of contemporary terrorism, its features, characteristics, manifestations and the complexity in the forms of its manifestation and volatility.

Keywords: *contemporary challenges, terrorism, violence.*

1. INTRODUCTION

After the Cold War, the risk of a military conflict on a global scale has been significantly reduced. However, the world is still confronted with many traditional and new challenges, risks and threats to security, such as: regional and local conflicts, ethnic and religious extremism, terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal migration, climate change and a more pronounced deficit of energy resources, threatening the stability of individual countries and the region in general, as well as global security. The development of technology, trade and investment, and the spread of democracy, have brought freedom and prosperity to many people, but others perceived globalization as a cause of disappointment and injustice. In most developing countries, poverty and diseases cause suffering and serious security problems. In most developing

countries, poverty and diseases cause suffering and serious safety problems. The increasingly unpredictable, asymmetric and trans-national character is an essential feature of these challenges, risks and threats (Gerginova, 2005).

The first chapter of the European Security Strategy presents the key global challenges and threats to European security, including modern terrorism. Due to the further development of Europe as an area of freedom, security and justice, the internal security strategy defines common global threats, sets the principles and policies of internal security and defines the model of European security.In late 2010, the European Commission in cooperation with the European Parliament and the Councilof EU, produced a document entitled"The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps Towards a More Secure Europe", and this document presents an action plan for implementation of the European Strategy for Homeland Security.This action plan proposed five strategic objectives for the period 2010-2014, including prevention of radicalization and terrorist recruitment. It is about a common approach and a response to the security challenges and risks that lie ahead and which must cooperate to increase the citizens and the security environment in the EU (Gerginova, 2005).

The problems relating to internal and international security have increased in recent years. The growing number of existing and the emergence of new security problems, especially in countries which are in transition, largely is a consequence of the structural crisis in modern society (world), as well as the new international circumstances and relationships that have significantly increased the terrorist acts and organized crime. The new forms of endangering safety threaten global security, and their very existence and negative actions threaten the security of society in general. In addition, these events and other forms of threats may cause more dangerous types of threats to national and international safety in the future.

In modern world, the problems are created from the interaction between man and nature and from the interaction between humans, between man and community or from the social relations. In this regard, science should establish its role in responding to these modern challenges and threats. At the beginning of the 21st century, contemporary security reality is characterized by harsh and severe forms of violence for political purposes both on national and international level. Given the existence of internal states of ethnically and religiously motivated violent antagonisms, in the past ten years the world has experienced terrorism with violent conflicts and transnational crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become a global security threat.

Terrorism is one of the most serious transnational non-military threats to security in the post-Cold era. This thesis is confirmed in the strategy of the national security of many countries and in the international documents and conventions that define policy fundamentals for prevention and suppression of this security problem. Modern terrorism is equally interesting as the problem of security and crime.

Today, terrorism represents one of the largest transnational security threats and a serious form of violence in modern world. It is considered to be a more serious threat to the rule of law, democracy, international peace and stability. Terror basically represents a historical phenomenon that is as old as the country itself and it is often seen as a phenomenon of modern society. However, modern forms of terrorism have a completely new dimension arising from different historical, socio-economic and political reasons, as well as the development of science and technology. There is still no generally accepted and universal definition of terrorism, considering the fact that terrorism is not easy to define. Terrorism has a multitude of manifestations and there is a complexity in the forms of its

manifestation and volatility. The meaning of the word terrorism has changed throughout history to adjust to the risk of each subsequent period. It is therefore difficult to determine the permanent definition of this term. With the rapid development of technology and information systems, as well as traffic, many forms of endangering security, such as terrorism and organized crime, are being spread to all countries and are becoming the largest problem presenting danger to global security (due to their great financial strength and organizational structures). In the national security strategy of most countries, modern terrorism is defined as a major threat to national and international security. In line with this, it is necessary to establish bilateral, regional and international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.It is also necessary to monitor the impact of any other significant factors that lead to endangering national security and global peace and security, so that the social order values can be adequately protected.

2. TERMINOLOGICAL DETERMINATION OF THE CONCEPT OF TERRORISM

Today there is no accepted definition for Terrorism as a social and political phenomenon for many reasons. Generally, terrorism means the use or the threat to use violence to achieve a political goal (Horgan, 2005). The basic characteristic of most researches on terrorism is the absence of a definition due to many reasons, because it is an extremely broad phenomenon that is difficult to define. The reasons are varied and complex. However, it can be said that the basic task is to determine the precise methodological and conceptual framework that will consider the nature and essence of terrorism as multidimensional (Bajagić, 2007).

For that purpose, Charles Kegley (Charles Kegley, 2003 : Bajagić, 2011) proposes three primary tasks in the analysis of terrorism: description of terrorism (description), explanation and proposed measures for its suppression (explanation), (prescription) that proposes establishing of the concept and elements which constitute terrorism; the reasons that some entities present to be able to achieve their goal with terrorist acts and the definition of measures (preventive and repressive) that can curb terrorism globally.[1] As one type of political violence, terrorism is a phenomenon that destroys the moral values and causes conflicts not only between the people and the community associated with terrorist activities, but also the moral values of man and through them the personal and social life (Kegley, 2003 : Bajagić, 2011).

In the broadest sense, terrorism means the use of violence or the threat of violence that is applied for political reasons to intimidate and break the resistance of those that are targeted (Gaćinović. 2010).Valter Leker (Walter Laquer) defines terrorism as the use of violence in order to realize political goals aimed against the government, ethnic groups, classes, race, religion or political movement (Laquer, 1999 : Bajagić, 2011). The broader definition of terrorism is that terrorism means premeditated use of violence in order to achieve specific political, social or religious purposes, inflicting fear on the general public (Falkenrath, 2001 : Bajagić, 2011).

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[1]For this see more: Bajagić, M. – Samoubilački terorizam – savršeno terorističko oružje– trud objaven vo Zbornik radova sa medzunarodna naucho strucha konferencija Suprotstavljanje terorizmu - medzunarodni standardi i pravna regulative, Kozara, 29. – 30. marta 2011. Godine, Izdavač Visoka škola unutrašnjih poslova, Banja Luka.

Terrorism is defined as a "synthesis of war and theater", dramatization of the most prohibited types of violence inflicted on innocent victims before the public eye, in the hope that it will cause fear in political objectives (Combs,1997 : Bajagić, 2011). However, after the 11 September 2001 attack by the Al-Qaeda on the World Trade Center in New York, the nature of that "theatrical terrorism" has significantly changed since the terrorists began to look for new targets that intensively require not only a change in the policy of the enemy, but also a way to cause a lot of casualties. This change in the tactics of the terrorists suggests that terrorism is developing in a new direction and is becoming a global security threat. The aim of modern terrorism is causing fear, "nameless and misplaced terror" for publicity – aspiring to get attention and to win sympathy for the terrorist purposes and the death of a large number of people - this is the hallmark of terrorism in the first decade the XXI century, the most appalling "violence destined to create alarm and fear" (Kegley, 2003 : Bajagić, 2011).

In order to define terrorism more accurately, it is necessary to bear in mind the following: 1 / the terrorists commit violence or threatens with violence – they are inevitably politically motivated (animus terrorandi) and they belong to an organization; 2 / the actions of the terrorists are targeting psychological consequences (the terrorists do not care about the target of the attack, but rather the political response to the action; 3 / terrorism is mostly covert action, deadly, murderous and technologically modernized with devastating effects; 4 / the terrorists' requirements are not real and law-based, they are always unlawful; 5 / the terrorist acts are thoroughly planned and target so-called soft targets (innocent people) and are carried out at a time when they will achieve the greatest effects etc. (Gaćinović, 2010 : Bajagić, 2011).

In literature there is an enormous number of different determinations about terrorism. When the new research and the identification of the essence of this phenomenon are taken into account, they acknowledge a high degree of agreement, particularly bearing in mind the characteristics of the terrorist act, the objectives and motives and other constitutive elements of terrorism as an eminent political act and an act of violence. There are frequent discussions about the crucial importance of the basic elements of terrorism and that in order to properly understand the essence of terrorism, it is most important to draw attention to the identification of its constitutive elements (motives, causes, effects and etc.). From the previous analysis, we ascertain that the basic elements of the terrorist act are: 1 / the act of violence (conscious and deliberate use of violence or a threat of violence; 2 / an illegal and criminal act; 3 / political, religious and ethnic motivation; 4 / political goals and messages; 5 / a criminal character, unpredictability, cruelty and raged, 6 / creation of an atmosphere of fear, terror, panic and distrust; 7 / innocent (intentional) civilian victims and 8 / the public, desire for publicity. It also lists other constituent elements of terrorism such as the method, means, tactics, impersonality, blackmail, coercion, lack of discrimination, stating obedience etc. Considering the most of definitions, the above elements can serve to determine properly the content of the notion of terrorism in relation to similar concepts (terror, violence, etc.). (Bajagić, 2011)

It is necessary to reach an international compromise over the definition of terrorism in view of enabling all nations to develop a common anti-terrorism policy that supports bilateral and multilateral goals. In international legal terms, the definition of terrorism creates a foundation for understanding and making a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable criminal actions. With this definition of terrorism, the problem regarding the differences between political and ordinary crime can be avoided.

A clear picture of these categories helps us plan a course of anti-terrorist actions against legitimate opponents that will not be characterized as acts of repression.

Despite the numerous problems we face in defining terrorism, there is an agreement that terrorist acts determine terrorists as criminals. The only element common to all definitions of terrorism is that the victims of terrorism suffer (murder, injury or threats) by means of actions that are basically unlawful. One dictionary definition states that terrorism constitutes "using violence and intimidation to exercise control over the population or to achieve political goals or intentions." Based on this definition, terrorism is any action that causes fear, panic, uncertainty among certain groups of people. However, this definition from the dictionary is not sufficient to differentiate terrorism from other forms of violent illegal acts of individuals or groups.[2] Ordinary criminals and terrorists are using violence and intimidation to achieve their goals. The attacks, armed robberies and murders are common tactics to achieve criminal goals. However, these criminal acts are not terrorist acts in the sense that the term is used in the modern world.It is also known that some governments use violence and intimidation as a means of control over the population. For most people, this behavior is unacceptable, but also some will define terrorism as control of the people by the state. When governments use terrorism against their citizens, all acts of violence that particular government applies against its citizens cannot be qualified as terrorism. Experts in terrorism perceive terrorism as a form of warfare. Some believe that the categorization of terrorism in the form of warfare rather than crime gives legitimacy to terrorism and sets terrorist actions in the context of acceptable international behavior.

In the US, the universally accepted definition of terrorism has been the subject of numerous and lengthy debates. Each ministry, each agency and even the government propose their own definition of terrorism. The problem about this definition creates additional problems with jurisdiction and the principles of conduct of court proceedings, which often affect the efforts of the police forces in the fight against terrorist actions. The working definition of the US administration is as follows: Terrorism is currently a criminal action that is performed by multiple actors to achieve greater power or economic gain and who use force or pressure to promote or protect their work. The general definition by the US administration follows: Pre-planned, politically motivated violence that is carried out in a violent way over nonviolent goals for the realization of certain political, economic or other purposes by terrorist organizations, national groups, individuals or secret agents of individual states. Academic and administrative definitions are present in the conceptual determination of contemporary terrorism. The academic definition of terrorism confirms that the most common element in the definition of terrorism is the use of violence as a method aimed at citizens and governments as a target, then the use of fear and extortion of political or social changes for such purposes. Causing large numbers of casualties, as one of the targets of the terrorists, suggests publicity as an element of the definition of terrorism.Hence, the political motive of the perpetrator is the precondition to define a certain action as terrorist because this component of the definition separates terrorism from ordinary crime.

The meaning of the term terrorism has changed throughout history and adapting to the political risk in each subsequent period. It is therefore difficult to determine a permanent definition of terrorism.Most authors believe that the political component is one of the important elements of terrorism. This is reflected in the bilateral agreements and legislation of many countries, as well as in the documents of the repressive state bodies. By

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[2] Dictionary of Law, OxfordUniversity Press, OxfordNew York, 2002.

analyzing the current definitions of terrorism, the elements of the term terrorism are clearly defined: violence, fear, purpose and motive (Gaćinović, 2008 : Bajagić, 2011).

In the broadest sense, terrorism can be defined as the use of force against civilians in order to achieve political goals.[3]The Convention on the Prevention of Terrorist Attacks of the UN General Assembly defines terrorism as "criminal acts intended to create a state of terror among the general population, group of people or over a person for political purposes, regardless of political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other reasons based on which ones are justified".[4]

In the definition of the American Federal Bureau (Federal Bureau of Investigation - FBI), terrorism is defined as an unlawful use of force or violence against a person or property to intimidate or force the government, the civilian population or some of its segments in the implementation of political or social objectives.[5]In early 1975, the Law Enforcement Assistant Administration established the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.This Committee issued five documents. One of them is entitled Disorders and Terrorism. This is one of many significant attempts at classification of the numerous definitions of terrorism. This document lists two equally accepted classifications. According to the first classification: Terrorism is divided into civil unrest, political terrorism, non-political terrorism, fake terrorism, limited political terrorism and official or state terrorism.According to another classification, terrorism can be: national-separatist, religious fundamentalist, new religious and social-revolutionary.[6] The first classification has its own theoretical outcome to the basis of classical political theory and the other in the "practical results of terrorism".

Terrorism cannot be precisely defined because of the different interests of the countries, as well as the elements that comprise it. Terrorism is an illegal use of force or violence against people and their property, to intimidate or threaten the government, the civilian population or part of the population to achieve political or social goals - the definition of terrorism of the Federal Bureau for Investigation.

In Chapter 22 of the US Code of the US State Department, Section 2656, the same occurrence is seen as a premeditated politically motivated violence made against non-combat targets, which is carried out by sub-national groups or secret agents, usually intended to influence public opinion. The Department of Defense of the United States has a different opinion. Terrorism is defined as an unlawful use of force - or the threat to use force - or violence against individuals or property because of intimidation of the government and community, often to achieve political, religious or ideological purposes. Three vital services have different definitions of terrorism. Each sees terrorism specifically from its own point of action, so the world has no single, generally accepted definition.

One of the leading international lawyers, Elagab[7] thinks that it difficult to find an objective definition of terrorism because:

1. Terrorism has different forms – although usually it is equal to political subversion, occasionally it is used by governments and it is used as a tool of organized crime;

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[3] Terrorism in asymmetric conflict: ideological and structural aspects, By Ekaterina Stepanova, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press US, 2008.

[4] International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, 15 December 1997.

[5] Cited as: The Terrorism Research Center, 2002.

[6] Hudson, Rex A. *Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why*: The 1999 Government Report on Profiling Terrorists, Federal Research Division, The Lyons Press, 2002.

[7] According to Krieken, van P. (2002), p. 32

2. The criterion for definition of terrorism is generally subjective, because it is essentially based on political debates;

3. Challenged with a wide scale of motives depending on the time and the prevalence of political ideology.

In order to perceive terrorism as a global threat and to organize suppression of terrorism (which includes all kinds of fighting terrorism – anti terrorism) and the forms of organized crime with ideological (political) goals, it is necessary to explore and define the term terrorism and all its manifestations, organization and associated logistics, goals, consequences, motives and motivation of the members of the terrorist organizations.

The term and the definition of terrorism as a negative social phenomenon with unforeseeable global consequences has not been specifically processed and fixed yet. Terrorism as a global problem is in constant expansion and transformation - shifting from one type to another, so that it takes continuous monitoring and identification of new opportunities and mechanisms for successful and efficient fight against and countering terrorism. The term terrorism often has different meanings or authors use the same term with different explanations.[8] In literature one can find many different definitions that often do not respond to the essence of the problem of the emergence of terrorism. There are only few attempts for a complete theoretical definition of terrorism, encompassing its causes, characteristics and the laws of the development of this concept.

Terrorism (lat. Terror - intense fear, horror; French - Terrere - sowing fear) is a method of deliberate and systematic use of violence in order to develop the fear in people and government representatives for personal political or other ideological goals. The exposure of citizens to danger creates a sense of insecurity, weakness, powerlessness, anxiety and distrust of the national government, which is obliged to provide peace and security.

These are the goals of terrorists: in action of violence against innocent people, to attract the attention of the domestic and world public and to intimidate or win, for accomplishing the interests and objectives that they proclaim, making the public to put pressure on the country to meet the demands of the terrorists. Terrorism endangers the safety of citizens, states and international regions; it may lead to the establishment of emergency and restriction of freedoms and rights of citizens; disruption of diplomatic relations etc. In order to better understand when and why terrorism occurs, it is necessary to start from the term terror.

Comparison: terror and state terror.

As a social phenomenon, terrorism (Latin: terror - intense fear, horror; French: terrere - sowing fear) is a method of systematic and planned use of violence in order to cause fear in people and government representatives for personal, political and other ideological goals.

Generally, we can say that terrorism represents a deliberate and often organized and systematic use of violence and intimidation to create or exploit the atmosphere of fear among the citizens and the stakeholders of power to proclaim certain ideological, often political values, goals and interests and force the state government to meet the demands of the terrorists. The objectives of the terrorists may be legitimate, but terrorism as a mean to achieve these objectives is illegal and morally unacceptable (Mijalković, 2009: 242).

The term terror (from the French word "terreur" - sowing fear), in political terms means an action of violence that is undertaken for political purposes aiming to intimidate and break

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[8] The word terrorism in modern meaning used after the collapse of the great Duke of the French Revolution, Robespierre in 1794.

the resistance towards those who perform it. Terror means fear, horror and rule by intimidation, political violence. In ordinary life, very often there is confusion between the terms terror and terrorism. The frequent interference of these terms is probably due to some of their common traits. It means that the two terms are causing fear, which is their most important weapon. In fact, terror represents tightly organized government which turns fear into an essential part of the daily activities of the broadest layers of citizens.

Prof. V. Dimitrijevic' said that terror begins "when the application of violence is not previously prescribed punishment for a predetermined illegal behavior, and when the violence in the form of punishment represents deterring of potential offenders and does not apply to anyone.

Terrorism has no such scale and systematic character, which is inherent to terror. Terrorism has less coverage, it is directed toward an individual or a narrower circle of people and is characterized by the following "achieve major political effects with minimal goals."

Terrorism usually has small groups and individuals who choose the "victim" and thus they draw attention to their goals.

Terrorism contains groups, associations that are weaker in military power in an illegal system. State terror represents terror of the institutions in a country that does not respect human rights. It appeared in fascist countries, Germany and Italy.

In a broader sense, terrorism is an attack on the life and body of individuals or small groups of people to achieve a political change. If the aim of this attack is to divert the political decision maker, exclusively and primarily held responsible for a certain political course or style, it is a political murder. These acts of violence are often not spectacular and are often portrayed as non-violent death. If the direct victim of the attack is politically less important or unimportant, it is terrorism in the narrow sense of the word, which is intended to cause fear in the general governing group and population, to draw attention to the presence of the forces on whose behalf the terrorists act, to encourage their potential allies and alone or with other means to achieve their goals (Mijalkovik Sasha, Keserovikj Dragomir, 2010).

It is a complex form of organized, individual and institutional political violence marked by frightening physical and psychological methods of political struggle, which is usually in times of political and economic crises and rarely in circumstances of achieved economic and political stability of a community; it systematically wants to achieve big goals. As a type of individual, non-institutional and illegitimate violence, terrorism is always turned against certain institutions of a state. If terrorism is a form of disguised state violence (and when is formally-legal), there is no legal basis in the relevant legal and ethical codes of the international community (Mijalkovik Sasha, Keserovikj Dragomir, 2010).

Terrorism differs from terror and guerrillas. Terror is political violence directed "top to bottom" and terrorism is violence directed "bottom-up": the ruling majority leans to terror through the state, or those that have the state apparatus in their hands so as to maintain their power for a longer period of time to achieve their interests and fight their opponents. Terrorism inclines towards those who are weak in terms of power, to extort some concessions. Terror is the systematic use of violence which creates a general feeling of insecurity among the population and collective awareness that anyone can become a victim of the regime, and the person who creates the terror remains unpunished. It usually consists of relentless persecution of political opponents or respectable people and cruel suppression of the slightest signs of dissent or critique. It is a binding method of

governance. Terrorism and terror are kinds of violence, ideological and politically motivated and they produce the desired fear (Mijalkovik Sasha., Keserovikj Dragomir., 2010)

3. FEATURES OF MODERN TERRORISM

We can state the following dominant characteristics of the crime of terrorism: (Mijalkovik Sasha., Keserovikj Dragomir., 2010)

- *The multicausality* nature, or as agents appear more subjective - objective factors;

-multidimensionality in manifestations of terrorism;

-*Use of violence, physical* (use of force, firearms weapons, explosives, poisons, radioactive materials, etc.), and often various forms of mental manipulation and indoctrination (of the public and the victims of kidnapping who after the "moment of brainwashing" join the terrorist organizations, which should be distinguished from the so-called "Stockholm syndrome");

-*Diversity of the victims*, those who are involved in the political and ideological problems (measures - selected victims) and those who donot have any connection (innocent citizens as depersonalization of the country - the so-called depersonalized victims);

-*The effect of surprise*, even when the terrorist attack is expected, the choice of target, time and place and method of attack surprise the state, the local and international public, which creates uncertainty, insecurity, panic and fear that any person can be a potential victim;

-*Ideological and political motivation* (due to the exercise of certain political, religious, racial, social and / or other purposes that would eventually become a political problem);

- Conveying certain messages by proclaiming the specific goals and interests and warning of consequences in case of a failure. They mobilize the public, create doubt and reaffirm the impaired dignity of certain social groups. The "turnout" to the message is larger if it is "an important figure" - a politician, businessman, officer in an international organization, furthermore, if the act is committed in a location of great importance - an embassy, premises of a government or international organization, means for water transportation or aircraft in international traffic, if the terrorist act is so spectacular etc.

-*Symbolism* - the attack on indirect victimc (civilians as a "symbol") symbolizes an attack on the real target of political violence (the state). Moreover, the victims are seen as "good" in situations of kidnapping when negotiations are ongoing with the state "object of exchange" (for political concessions, for money or vehicle, for release of political prisoners - the so-called terrorist liberators, for revenge - so-called revenge terrorists for attracting more publicity, etc.);

-*Expected effects and reaction* ("mental aggression" followed by panic, fear and other psychological effects, power, domestic and international public media reaction that "publicize and promote" them, the reaction of the state which condemns them, meets their demands or leads an uncompromising policy, the reaction of the citizens who condemn or support the state leadership, reaction of other states and international entities etc.).

- *Systematically* - targeted, planned and organized action;

-*immorality and illegality*;

-*economy* (with modest means to massive victims, major material damage and response of the public);

-variation of the object of attack (there is no object that cannot be the target of a terrorist attack);

-complexity of the problem, which is a consequence of the aforementioned features, as well as the complexity of the mechanisms for its prevention and suppression.

In the theory of security studies, the benchmarks of modern terrorism (which differentiate it from the traditional one), include: globality (borders are not barriers for terrorism); lethality (changing tactics of each pursued harassment of the public with impressive cruel shares to a new tactic of killing as many people); significantly greater coordination of terrorists and a larger scale of violence; the classic boundaries between terrorism and the declaration of war between countries are diminished; use of the most developed technology and focus on the destruction of the most developed technology that threatens the sacred tradition of the terrorists; organized and carried by transnational networks of conspiracy; its fanatical actions carried out by extremists who are eager to cause greater destruction by applying methods of suicide, not open to negotiation and compromise, and greater hatred of the target.[9] (Mijalkovik Sasha., Keserovikj Dragomir., 2010).

It should be underlined that the characteristics of modern terrorism have changed and it is different from the terrorism of the last century: the number of terrorist organizations and individuals – terrorists is larger; there are more often terrorist acts with deadly outcomes; the casualties are becoming greater, as well as the material damages; the goals are more radical, as the decay of a state or destruction of a whole society (ethnic, religious, racial, social ...) groups; the efforts of the terrorist organizations are greater to come up with weapons of mass destruction, and the growing fear of their use is justified; more terrorist actions have international dimensions; terrorist acts are organized in a more sophisticated manner and they are spectacular; the terrorist organizations have a growing number of members; terrorism and organized crime are increasingly paired together; terrorist acts are targeting civilians, etc. (Mijalkovik Sasha., Keserovikj Dragomir., 2010)

Today, transnational or postmodern terrorism, is enriched with new forms of manifestation in extreme radical religious Islamic fundamentalism in particular, on the threshold of the third millennium, taking on a global character and turning into the greatest threat to world security. Therefore, many authors have called it global terrorism (Bajagić, 2007).

Its essential features are: global spreading of certain terrorist organizations and networks and their expressed mobility, global effects of the terrorist attacks that tend to use weapons of mass destruction. It should be noted that the terrorist attacks in the security practice are often a combination of some of these "clean" forms of terrorism. Hence, the question is: what type of terrorism is expected in the future? It is expected the terrorist attacks to be performed mostly by individuals or small groups armed with automatic weapons, due to their high prevalence and availability. The use of small bombs is also real, both conventional (military) and so-called improvised. The next higher level of terrorist threats is coming from professionally trained groups equipped with conventional arms, which use "auto-bombs" (passenger cars or trucks filled with conventional explosives), projectiles ground-to-air (type Stinger) and thermal and infrared guided to missiles to

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[9] Indicated by: Mijalkovik Sasha., Keserovikj Dragomir., Basic safety, Faculty of Safety and Protection, Banja Luka, 2010, p. 185 and indicated by Keagly Charles.; Vitkof, J. R .: Ibid, p. 632; see - Luneev, V. Q .: Trends and terrorizma ugolovno-pravovaя borьba with them, Gosudarstvo and Law, Science, Moscow, 6/2002, p. 35-39.

attack civilian and military aircraft, mortars and rockets and other weapons. The third level of danger comes from highly trained groups equipped with weapons of mass destruction that would use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons (Mijalkovik Sasha., Keserovikj Dragomir., 2010).

Depending on the terrorist strategies, the state will take a stand on "hard" or "soft" anti-terrorist actions or applying a strategy of reconciliation (making certain concessions to terrorists in exchange for the cancellation or interruption of terrorist activities), a negotiating strategy (directly or indirectly negotiating with terrorists, which does not necessarily result in making concessions) or a strategy of intransigence (solving problematic situations by refusing the demands of the terrorists or no negotiations). The last of these strategies is known as the military-police, anti-terrorist strategy (arrest the terrorists and release and protect the victims, mostly hostages, applying coercive means - Strategy of release), while the strategy of revenge against terrorists is her variant, is applied when terrorists commit acts of violence, and often "fled from justice" (so-called strategy of revenge). Preventive strategies are primarily based on intelligence activities, and often a so-called preventive wars.[10] (Mijalkovik Sasha., Keserovikj Dragomir., 2010)

Generally, they can be subsumed into two types of opposing terrorism, as follows: anti-terrorism, which is a system of (defensive - preventive and repressive) measures, actions and procedures undertaken by the state to protect people and property of terrorism on its own territory and in counterterrorism, which covers the application of offensive measures aimed at deterrence, prevention and repression of modern terrorism in and outside the territory of the country.[11]

4. CONCLUSION

Prevention of terrorism is essentially a multidisciplinary, intergovernmental and long-term project that aims to help in achieving the broader goals of democracy, good governance, safety and economic prosperity. In opposition to this phenomenon, which often accompanies organized crime and corruption, it is necessary to develop a preventive dimension, in addition to the repressive one. In modern international relations, which are characterized by intense process of globalization, the traditional concepts of security and defense have become obsolete.

The changing circumstances have imposed the necessity for a new approach to security and protection against terrorism, as well as the overall defense of the state, where national, regional and global security are intertwined. As a global problem and a threat, "modern terrorism" is characterized by a high degree of organization, conspiracy, extreme inhumanity and cruelty, globalism, abuse of the most modern scientific-technical and technological achievements, as well as abuse of religious feelings and religious affiliation, vast financial power acquired through money laundering and manipulations with support of financial institutions and multinational companies in many countries. In the above context, terrorism, as a criminal phenomenon, cannot be understood outside the framework of the overall criminal events and the whole social and political relationships which overburden modern society and the globalization trends. As a destructive way of dealing

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[10] Indicated by: Mijalkovik Sasha., Keserovikj Dragomir., Basic safety, Faculty of Safety and Protection, Banja Luka, 2010, p. 193 and indicated by: Klarin, M.: Ibid, str. 73
[11] Indicated by: Mijalkovik Sasha., Keserovikj Dragomir., Basic safety, Faculty of Safety and Protection, Banja Luka, 2010, p. 193 and indicated by: Kotovchevski, M.; Bozinovska, S.: English-Macedonian Dictionary of Intelligence Terminology, Faculty of Philosophy Studies, Skopje, 2007, p. 11

with social and political conflicts, and despite its extreme cruelty and inhumanity, terrorism has its supporters and the support of the politically extreme population that approves of violence to achieve political goals. In this context, the international community has adopted a series of international treaties binding on all states to cooperate and fight against modern terrorism through their bodies and authorities.

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SECURITY ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS TO THE AIRPORTS AS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

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ABSTRACT

The main subject of this paper is the analysis of the security aspects of terrorist attacks at airports, which are part of the critical infrastructure.

At the beginning, the security measures implemented at airports will be presented, as well as the risks that they confront, taking into account that as part of the critical national infrastructure they are a tempting target for terrorists to commit armed attacks.

This paper will discuss the current security issues within the airport infrastructure, as well as the safety management risks that exist in the protection of passengers, personnel, aircraft and land side and air side areas.

Special analysis will be made on two individual cases – the recent terrorist attacks at the airports in Brussels and Istanbul. The analysis is intended to specify the ways of carrying out the attacks in order to identify the common omissions that were made within the safety and security system at airports.

Keywords: terrorist attacks, analysis, airport, critical infrastructure, terminal

1. Introduction

The bombing of Istanbul and Brussels Airport in 2016 are reminders that the threat to aviation has not waned. Public areas where there are large quantities of unchecked luggage around many people have proven to be vulnerable targets of terrorism. When many people gather, or stand in line, they become an attractive target for a terrorist attack. Airports, as a result, have repeatedly fallen within the sights of terrorists targeting [1]. That is why they are called critical infrastructure of the country.

According to data from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), there are currently over 100,000 daily flights carrying 10 million travellers. Preliminary figures released on the 2nd of January 2017 indicated that the total number of passengers carried on scheduled services reached 3.7 billion in 2016, a 6.0 per cent increase over last year. Over half of the world's tourists who travel across international borders each year were transported by air. Air transport carries some 35 per cent of world trade by value.The worldwide air transport network will double its volume of flights and passengers by 2030" which makes the protection of civil aviation from "acts of unlawful interference" one of ICAO's highest priorities.

A counter terrorism expert Dr. Clarke Jones [2] says that international airports have become a popular target for terrorist attacks but no amount of security will ever make them terror proof. Moreover, he stated that terrorists now had a "far greater intent to attack airports because of their symbolism as an international hub with lots of international travellers". According to him, attacks carried out in airports pose a maximum threat to lives and have a significant impact on the economy and downturn in tourism. Terrorists want to send a shiver down the spine of the population and through to the government.

Security analyst and terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins in 2011 [3] wrote: "Attacks on airports give terrorists the symbolic value they seek and guarantee the attention of the international news media. They also create alarm locally. Besides the panic they generate, these attacks force tourists and business executives to re-evaluate their local plans".

Secretary General of ICAO [4] said that the deadly suicide bombings in 2016 at airports in Brussels and Istanbul are a tragic reminder of the enormous challenges faced in security public areas, the inseparability of aviation security and national security and of the significant socio-economic consequences of terrorism.

While the implementation of the current aviation security standards is steadily improving both globally and regionally, there is a list of threats that need urgent attention. They include small weapons carried by passengers, homemade bombs concealed in baggage and cargo, shoulder-fired ground-to-air missiles, security on the ground, cyber security, drones and insider threats.

Responding to increasing attacks on airports and aircraft, the U.N. Security Council on the 22nd of September 2016 unanimously approved its first-ever Resolution 2309 (2016) on aviation security and safety to address extremist threats to civil aviation and urge beefed-up security[5].

It called for stepped up screening and security checks at airports worldwide to "detect and deter terrorist attacks". It also called on all countries to tighten security at airport buildings, share information about possible threats and provide advance passenger lists so governments are aware of their transit or attempted entry. The Resolution expresses the Council's concern "that terrorist groups continue to view civil aviation as an attractive target, with the aim of causing substantial loss of life, economic damage" and air links between countries.

The threat of terrorism at airports is at high level, persistent and ever-evolving today. Bombers have continued to identify different targets of opportunity within the airport environment. Thus, security measures must also adapt in step to protect the whole aviation system, terminals (both land and air zones) and reduce the likelihood of a high consequence event.

We can never guarantee security at airports, as Philip Baum stated (the author of the book Violence in the Skies: a history of hijacking and bombing, Summersdale, 2016) [6]. As it is often said the only airport which is 100 per cent secure is one which is 100 per cent closed. But we can – indeed must – start to put ourselves in the shoes of the terrorist and develop strategies which mitigate our vulnerabilities. It is no easy job. This is especially true in older, city-based airports where one has limited opportunity to screen vehicles and their passengers, within the perimeter of the airport.

In the continued cat and mouse game of terrorism security, officials are challenged to stay one step ahead of terrorists.

2. Terrorist attacks on airports in the world

Terrorist attacks on airports have steadily increased over the last few years. However, they are not a new phenomenon [7], but go back to the early 1970s. Terrorists remain obsessed with attacking aviation targets. Increased security has made it more difficult to hijack or sabotage airliners, but the public portions of airports, check-in counters and baggage pickup areas are open public spaces. Russia Today, one day after Istanbul airport bombings, made a list of 6 deadliest airport terror attacks of the 21st century [8].For the purposes of this paper, the authors expanded this list with older terrorist attacks on airports. Here, that list of airports that have been attacked by terrorists will be given in a table where the attacks will be sorted out by a chronological order.

Table 1. Review of terrorist attacks on airports in the world

Date	Airport	Terrorists	*Modus Operandi*	Casualties	
				Deaths	**Injured**
26.07.2016	Mogadishu, Somalia	1	Suicide attacker detonated two car bombs.	13	
28.06.2016	Istanbul, Turkey	3	Suicide bombers opened fire before detonating their explosive devices at the arrivals terminal.	42	238
12.06.2016	Shanghai, China	/	An explosion at a check-in-area carried out using home-made explosive device contained in an empty beer bottle.	/	4
22.03.2016	Brussels, Belgium	2	The departure hall was rocked by two explosions carried out by suicide bombers.	14	>200
07.032016	Beledweyne, Somalia	/	A laptop bomb explodes in a piece of luggage.	/	6
28.12.2015	Kabul, Afghanistan	/	A suicide car bomb attack near the eastern military entrance.	1	13
08.12.2015	Kandahar, Afghanistan	/	Taliban militants took control of a school near the airport buildings. The gunmen then proceeded to target the joint Afghan-NATO military base at the airport.	50+	35
17.08.2015	Kabul,	1	A suicide car bomber struck the front gate of the airport.	/	/

	Afghanistan				
21.03.2015	New Orleans, USA	1	A machete-wielding man carrying a bag loaded with Molotov cocktails attacks TSA officers.	/	1
03.02.2015	Cairo, Egypt	/	Two explosives: one bomb in the arrival hall, another near a police patrol location in the airport parking lot.	/	/
08.06.2014	Karachi, Pakistan	/	Taliban group disguised as security guards launched grenades and opened fire and caused at least three blasts.	26	18
11.12.2013	Kabul, Afghanistan	/	Car bomb explodes near a gate used by NATO troops in the northern section of Kabul airport.	/	/
20.07.2013	Beijing, China	1	Partly paralyzed man explodes a bomb.	/	1
18.07.2012	Burgas, Bulgaria	1	Suicide bomber caused explosion on a bus carrying Israeli tourists at the airport.	7	35
27.02.2012	Jalalabad, Afghanistan	1	Suicide car bomber struck at the gates.	9	/
24.01.2011	Moscow, Russia	1	A suicide bomber targeted the international departure hall.	37	170
17.09.2009	Mogadishu, Somalia	/	Twin suicide bombings rocked the airport. The attackers managed to get into the airport by using two stolen UN cars.	21	40
30.06.2007	Glasgow, United Kingdom	2	Terrorists rammed a Jeep Cherokee, loaded with propane canisters, into the glass doors and caused blasts.	1	5
30.12.2006	Madrid, Spain	/	A van bomb exploded in the parking area.	2	52
24.07.2001	Colombo, Sri Lanka	14	14 terrorists attack military aircrafts. Later, they attacked the airport, blowing up and damaging several civilian	21	12

			aircraft.		
27.12.1985	Rome, Italy Vienna, Austria	/	Two simultaneous attacks took place in Rome and Vienna. The twin attacks were carried by Palestine terror group Abu Nidal Organisation.	19	138
23.06.1985	Tokyo, Japan	1	A piece of luggage exploded.	6	/
20.04.1984	London, United Kingdom	/	The bomb, which was in an unclaimed suitcase, exploded in a baggage area.	/	23
07.08.1982	Ankara, Turkey	2	Terrorists exploded a bomb in the middle of the crowded check-in area, and then opened fire with sub-machine guns on passport-control officers and passengers.	9	72
29.12.1975	New York, USA	/	A bomb exploded in the baggage reclaim area of the airport central terminal.	11	75
30.05.1972	Tel Aviv, Israel	/	Members of the Japanese Red Army fired indiscriminately at airport staff and passengers and lobbed hand grenades at those disembarking from another aircraft.	26	80

Source: authors' research

Researchers from Fraunhofer EMI [9] have conducted risk analyses of terrorist attacks on airports. For that project, a database was established covering terroristic attacks on airports worldwide in the years of 1968 to 2007. The event analysis based on this database has indicated a significant threat for European airports. If all attacks are taken into account, there were about five attacks on airports per year within the observed period of time. In ten percent of the attacks, at least ten people were killed and 40 people injured. Most attacks were committed by means of explosives and directed at parking spaces (covered car parks, parking lots etc.), at terminal buildings or the interior of a building.

3. Airport screening procedures and security measures

According to aviation expert Stephen Wright [10], airports and aircraft are very valuable, high-cost objects, which makes them attractive targets for terrorists. But they are also vulnerable because of the large volumes of people passing through at almost all times.

It can be difficult to screen people inside airports because of the sheer number of people in the area at any time.

There are various security activities taking place before passengers check in at airports. The vast majority of the travelling public are not aware of these. This can include screening vehicles before they arrive at car parks. Plain clothes, armed police officers dressed as travelling members of the public also circulate in the airport. Regional and national intelligence is also applied by airport staff.

All departing passengers pass through a series of security procedures before embarking their plane. One such procedure is a short, scripted interview when security personnel must make decisions about passenger risk by looking for behavioural indicators of deception [11]. These are referred to as "suspicious signs": signs of nervousness, aggression and an unusual interest in security procedures, for example. However, this approach has never been empirically validated and its continued use is criticised for being based on outdated, unreliable perceptions of how people behave when being deceptive.

As in the case with past incidents, the Brussels and Istanbul attacks will renew calls to extend the existing security screening to the front door of the terminals. But screening passengers before they board airplanes and protecting airport terminals are two very different tasks. Passenger screening is designed to keep weapons and explosives off airplanes. Screeners are unarmed and cannot engage shooters. That is the role of airport police.

Security checkpoints [12] at entrances are intended to keep gunmen and bombers out of the terminal. They would have to be extended to the baggage pickup areas, since these also have been targets of terrorist attacks. In response to an increasing terrorist threat, security screening had been set up at the entrance to Istanbul's international terminal in an attempt to prevent attackers from deeply penetrating the terminal. But checkpoints create bottlenecks and queues of people waiting to get through them, who then become an easy target. In one sense, Istanbul's security measures worked and the shooting at the front door allowed passengers inside to flee — while they could not prevent casualties, worse casualties might have occurred if the terrorists had been able to slip unnoticed into the busy terminal.

According to Philip Baum [13], most terrorist actions are preceded by a scoping exercise in which the group visits the target to effect surveillance and determine the best course of action. Challenging a person with negative intent at that stage of their planning could well dissuade them from pursing their mission.

More importantly, if a behavioural detection officer is to challenge an individual on the day of execution of their plot, one does not need a crowd of people standing around at the same location waiting to be screened.

Behavioural detection is only part of the solution. The deployment of canine units to identify the presence of explosives on people as they approach terminals and visibly armed units ready to engage offer a far greater deterrent than any traditional checkpoint.

Some security experts have since suggested restricting non-travelling relatives from terminals, and introducing face-recognition technology and heavily armed guards at airport entrances across the globe.

Centre for Aviation analyst David Bentley told that there has to be more security as you enter the airport, otherwise these types of attacks are going to increase.

In a 2004 study [14], RAND presented near-term options for improving security at Los Angeles International Airport based upon one fact that consistently emerged from the analysis: *it is not the size of the bomb that matters most; it is where it is detonated*. All of

the most dangerous terrorist attacks involve placement of a bomb in close proximity to a vulnerable crowd of people. The authors proposed two valid ways to reduce this vulnerability: Move the possible bomb detonation away from the people or move the people away from the possible bomb detonation. The study also identified an easy way to make people a less attractive target – improve ticketing and security operations so that crowds of people are not waiting in line.

Reducing the size of the lines and speeding people into the secure area of the airport helps security officials separate cleared from uncleared travellers. By quickly decluttering crowded areas, security can more easily detect suspicious activity.

The Australian Federal Police has officers present in all international airports across the country. Security measures at these airports are multi-layered and may involve armed mobile, canine and foot patrols, static guarding, as well as specialist response armed capability.

In the UK, the government has issued guidelines for the design of new airport terminals to survive terrorist acts including glass that stays within its frame after a blast and even ensuring pot plants cannot be used to hide explosives.

At London's Heathrow new terminals have been built with a 30m gap between the road and airport building to minimise the impact of car bombs.

Yet, at many Australian airports cars can drive straight up to the front door.

Some airports in Asia and Israel's Tel Aviv do mandatory security checks away from terminal buildings and do not allow family members of travellers into the airport to farewell or greet loved ones.

Anybody who has ever visited Istanbul will be able to attest to the traffic which surrounds Ataturk Airport, making effective inspection of all vehicles nigh on impossible. In London, stopping every car as it approaches Heathrow would result in tailbacks east into Central London and westwards down the M4 to Wales!

There has been much criticism of the new airports which have been built in Asia – in the likes of Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Hong Kong – as they have been constructed a long way from their city centres.

However, their more remote locations have enabled the screening of vehicles at considerable distances from the terminal buildings with broad highways facilitating the construction of toll-booth style checkpoints where behavioural analysis officers can be based.

That is, in effect, exactly what happens in Tel Aviv, the one airport which, time and again, demonstrates that the best service it can afford its users is security.

There are always measures that can be taken to improve safety and security. New technologies in sensor development would allow for early detection of devices prior to entering buildings. Effectively, this would identify who is carrying banned objects before they even check in. The appropriate response could then be co-ordinated before significant damage is done.

Security analyst Bart Brands [15] has devised a method called A.A.E.A. which can be used as a policy for mass transit hubs such as airports, calling on visitors to identify threats and reduce their risk of being a victim of a terrorist attack. A.A.E.A stands for Awareness, Avoidance, Evasion and Attack.

Awareness:Check your surroundings; Check for exits and 'hard' structures that can provide shelter; Check details of suspicious people, 'map' their physical attributes and behaviour;

Avoidance: Avoid large groups of people in higher risk environments; Avoid waiting in long lines. Lined up in a queue, you are vulnerable. Wait at some distance in order to minimize time spent waiting in line; Make sure you stay 'mobile'. Don't get stuck in groups that limit your freedom of movement;

Evasion:Try to avoid freezing (train and visualise); Move away from the chaos; Act in a calm, controlled and deliberate manner; Apply step one, Awareness;

Attack: Only use as a last resort; Attack with conviction; Train!

4. Analysis of the terrorist attack on the airport in Brussels

On 22.03.2016, around 8 pm two explosions went off at Zaventem airport in Brussels. At least 13 people were killed and more than 35 were wounded. The explosions took place in the hall of the departure hall, i.e. the part of the airport where the passengers surrender their luggage and where they receive their boarding passes. Both explosions occurred at the "American Airlines" flight terminal. The eyewitnesses claimed that before the detonation they heard shots and people shouting in Arabic. At the terminal several homemade bombs were found. Later another explosion took place at the metro station Malebek and Schumann, near the headquarters of the European institutions, which killed 15 and wounded 55 people.

The terrorist group Islamic State took the responsibility for these attacks. The announcement of the group was published by the news agency AMAC, which is associated with Isis. The announcement stated that the fighters of the Islamic State hatched a series of bomb attacks with explosives belts fastened and the goal was the airport and the central station of the subway. The attacks were carried out because of Belgium's participation in the attacks of the international coalition against targets of the Islamic state.

Later, according to the conclusions of the widespread report intended for the media, which was prepared by the Belgian Parliamentary Commission following the investigation, it was determined that the emergency services had no plan of action and the communication between them "totally failed". Zaventem's plans about the reactions were mainly in a case of a plane crash. Among the instructions there was no component related to terrorism and no such instruction was part of the training intended for the airport paramedics and firefighters. There was a problem with the mobile network as well. As a result of the burden, the mobile network became unusable and the doctors literally had to improvise. During the investigation it was determined that the airport had only one trained dog that detects bombs and explosives.

The rapporteurs insist on immediate update of the plan ensuring inclusion of activities in case of an emergency, which is not related to a plane crash.

By admitting that the crisis plans were written 10 years ago and are outdated, in May the Belgian authorities decided to prepare a "national plan of action in emergency hostage or terrorist attack."

This Committee was to analyze the work of the law enforcement and intelligence activities applied, who were accused of failing to follow the kamikaze, some of whom were involved in the attacks in Paris and others were well known members of the criminal underworld in Brussels.

The EU carries out around 35 safety inspections at European airports each year. The restricted report [16], dated April 28, 2015, details shortcomings in the security supervision in the Brussels Airport section that travellers enter once they have cleared security checks and around the planes themselves. The suicide bombers blew themselves

up in the departure area of Belgium's main international airport, part of the facility that was not covered in the EU report.

Three persons were identified as direct perpetrators of the attacks. Two of them, the brothers Khalid and Brahim El Bakraoui blew themselves up. While one of them, Ibrahim al Bakraoui, detonated the explosives on him at the airport and the other, Khalid el Bakraoui at the metro station. The third of them, Nadzim Lacharaoui, renounced his intention to trigger the explosives he was wearing. He had placed the explosives at the airport and left. After an intensive search for Laachraoui, he was arrested in the suburb of Anderlecht in Brussels. The search for him began after he was spotted in the company of two other suspects on the footage from the security cameras.

The brothers Khalid and Brahim El Bakraoui were previously known to the police, but were not accused or suspected of acts of terrorism. One of them, Khalid, under a false identity rented an apartment on "Rue de DRI" street in the neighborhood of Forest in Brussels where five days before the attacks one of the most secular terrorists, Salah Abdeslam was arrested by the security services in Belgium as a direct participant in the simultaneous terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 that killed 137 people. Beside Abdeslam, five of his accomplices were arrested in hiding and the brothers El Bakraoui were part of the group around him that had managed to escape the security authorities in the shootings and arrests in Forest.

5. Analysis of the terrorist attack on the airport in Istanbul

Three months after the attack on the airport in Brussels, on 28.06.2016 there was a terrorist attack on Kemal Ataturk Airport in Istanbul. The three attackers arrived at the airport around 10 pm by taxi. One of them first fired an assault rifle in the area at the entrance of the international terminal, after which the three of them blew themselves up by explosives tied on them in the area where the passengers are arriving a floor below. The first bomber blew himself up at the entrance of the terminal of the international arrival, the second blew himself up after he entered the arrival hall and the third in terminal arrival, after being shot by a police officer. All were dressed in black and wore no masks. 36 people died and 150 were injured. It is the deadliest of the four terrorist attacks in Istanbul earlier this year for which jihadists and a Kurdish militant organization are responsible.

The airport Kemal Ataturk was the eleventh busiest airport in the world in 2015 and the third busiest in Europe, after Heathrow and De Gaulle. It is located at 24 kilometers from Istanbul. In 2015, 62 million passengers passed through the airport. There are two main passenger terminals: Terminal 1 which is older and smaller intended for domestic flights and Terminal 2, which is newer and bigger, intended for international flights. Security checks on vehicles are made at the entrance and X-ray inspections are made at the entrance of the airport.

The terrorists in the airport attack demonstrated an alarming ability to stay one step ahead of the measures taken to stop them - agility in the planning, which could be a new and serious threat to the security services and airports throughout Europe and the USA. The attack on the airport in Istanbul showed sophistication at a level of the special powers.

Although most experts agree that the massacre in Istanbul has the seal of Isis, yet, the sophistication of the attack execution surprised.

It was conducted in a way that suggests advanced intelligence, careful study of the purpose and cold-blooded execution, which is normally the practice of the Western special forces.

There were three phases. It started with an attack at the parking lot near the terminal for international arrivals. The aim was to draw the security personnel away from the terminal.

The attackers apparently knew that the security of the terminal had recently been strengthened in response to the attack in Brussels, where the suicide took advantage of the fact that, as at many airports, there is no security at the check counters.

In Istanbul all who enter the terminal for arrivals have to pass scanning checks at the entrance. The distraction at the parking lot achieved its goal - getting the police and the security personnel away from the first line of defense – after which a lot of them were injured in the taxi zone.

That was the place where the second attack was conducted, causing heavy losses. The explosive force of the attack broke the doors and the security which allowed the third striker to enter inside the building. As we saw on the footage of the security cameras, the attacker, wearing a suicide vest, was shot down by a police officer. The footage showed that the officer was killed in an attempt to stop the attacker to detonate the suicide belt – an act of supreme courage.

Although the Turks moved the security perimeter out to reinforce what is called defense of the terrestrial areas (unlike air areas where the gates and planes are), the body that advises European airports, Airports Council International (ACI) Europe was incredibly careless after the attack in Brussels.

They said: "The possible adoption of additional security measures, such as checks on persons and goods entering the airport ground areas can be disruptive and cause new security vulnerabilities". They added that it would lead to a "moving target" instead of securing it. They also said - outlining their greatest concern that such changes will cost money.

In Europe (excluding Germany) the airport authorities are financing their own safety. In the United States, of course, the Department for Transport Security, TSA is responsible for the security at all airports as part of Homeland Security.

The strengthening of the perimeter in the terrestrial zone raises the question of how far outside can it go. If we want the attackers to be successfully intercepted before they reach the terminal buildings, that means new checkpoints and scans at the access roads, which, in turn, would create a kind of bottlenecks which are tempting targets.

6. Conclusion

Dr. Clarke Jones [17] said major airports were "soft targets" for terrorists because they were able to carry out attacks "in the entry halls rather than behind security".They do not go through security, it is in the entry halls rather than behind security aspect, where the families hang out, a place with a large group of people and time to cause maximum impact, it is a soft target, an easy target.The airport in Istanbul is a classic example. It is a place where it is busy with lots of people and has the potential to disrupt economy, flow of people, international travels and tourism. It has a large impact on everything.

In the aftermath of the deadly Istanbul Atatürk Airport terror attacks, striking similarities [18] were observed in the ways the attacks were carried out in Brussels and Istanbul, both major European cities.

The explosions on March 22 at Brussels airport and the city subway center were carried out by three Daesh terrorists (Daesh refers to the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)). The attack in Istanbul airport on June 28 was also carried out by three terrorists and initial findings signal that the Daesh terror group is responsible.

In Brussels, the two of the three terrorists attacked the airport, while another one caused the explosion at a metro station in the city. Similarly, two of the terrorists attacked the Istanbul airport terminals, while the third one carried out an explosion at the airpor parking lot.

The attackers at Brussels airport opened fire on civilians, prior to the self-explosion, which was also done in Istanbul's attacks.

Meanwhile, in both Brussels and Istanbul, the attackers used a taxi as a means of transportation to arrive at the airport.

The main common characteristics of the terrorist attacks on Brussels and Istanbul airports is that they are suicide terrorist attacks. Suicide terrorism is a particular form of terrorism in which the goal is killing as many people and inflicting heavy damage.

The following behaviors and appearance of suspicious persons can be considered as indicators of a suicide terrorist:

- looks nervous or does not respond (with a blunt view) or is effusive;
- smells unusualy due to washing with water with aromatic herbs or flowers to smell better when they go to heaven;
- shows vigorous actions (to get to the desired goal struggling through crowds or entering the restricted area);
- devotedly prays (until the blast), the person praying deep down, giving an impression they are whispering to someone;
- moves away when they see police officers or officers who check the luggage;
- raises his hands up (optimal spraying) and so on.

After the terrorists enter the airport, it is too late to stop the attack even if it can not be obstructed.

The most successful last line of defense is intelligence that detects and prevents attacks before being conducted.

The fight against suicide terrorism is mainly based on intelligence. This type of activity requires the use of human, technical and operational measures to neutralize the suicide bombing in its preparatory stage.

The passenger flights remain the most efficient target of ISIS. This year it seems that their attention is increasingly turning to attacking airports as an easier option than aircraft. This creates enormous short-term results in publicity and terror and long-term economic damage to tourism and freedom of movement.

Although suicide terrorism is not a new phenomenon it will remain as a permanent feature of terrorism in the following years and decades.

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TERRORISM AND THE ROLE OF LAW IN FIGHTING TERRORISM – EXPERIENCES OF THE JUDICIARY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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ABSTRACT

The first part of this paper explainsthe notion and etiology of terrorism, providing possible meanings of the notion of terrorism, albeit with a note that in theory there is no uniform and generally accepted definition of this extremely destructive phenomenon, which represents one of the biggest security challenges today's world is facing on the global level.

It also notes the issue of possible human rights violations in relation to state's repressive responses as a mode of prevention and suppression of this modern age plague, on both internal and international levels.

Founding terrorist organizations, financing terrorism, recruiting and training people to carry out terrorist acts, all require a harmonization of the legal provisions in the countries and international organizations with the international legal instruments, in order to be able to successfully access facilitated international cooperation aimed at preventing terrorism and violent extremism. Naturally, a harmonization of legal provisions includes uniformization of prescribed sanctions in order to avoid a situation where perpetrators of terrorist acts enjoy the benefits ensuing from different legal frameworks of prescribed sanctions in the national legislations for the criminal offense of terrorism and the related offenses. This paper also presents a codification framework on the internal level, by which terrorism is criminalized as a criminal offense, with the aim of protecting social values guaranteed by constitutional and conventional provisions on the rights and freedoms of the man and the citizen, and applicable legal provisions adopted by the BiH legislative authorities. The paper also provides a review of the jurisprudence of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina which has repeatedly dealt with the criminal offense of terrorism.

My final considerations include a position according to which the prevention of the criminal offense of terrorism, and the related forms of violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism, besides repressive measures, also require a number of other measures which will, if not completely eliminate the danger of such or similar criminal offenses, at least control the danger by reducing it to a minimum.

This is especially so bearing in mind that the etiology of the genesis of this global crime is rather complex – from racial, religious, ethnic and class intolerance, old and new anarchism, separatist tendencies and persecutions, to objective causes found in the internal affairs of particular countries, which lead to crises, often as a result of external pressures (political, economic, technological and similar factors), as a consequence of the process of globalization and the establishment of a "new world order," generated by unacceptable living conditions and failed ambitions of various social groups.[1] One should add to this list

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[1] However, it should be noted that the more recent studies of the etiology of contemporary terrorism (e.g. the study conducted by the Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael from The Hague, titled

the existence of the so-called state terrorism in the context of international terrorism. All the foregoing, in terms of preventing the consequences of terrorism, requires an effort to make the measures to prevent and suppress terrorism complex and numerous.

Further, in examining the connection between organized crime and terrorism as current and omnipresent phenomena of our time, with their devastating effect on society, at the very first glance one may detect several common features: first, those are complex phenomena that are, etiologically, accompanied by multiple socio-cultural and other causes. Second, the aggravating reasons for suppressing these deeply pathological phenomena include the absence of their unique and generally accepted definitions, with the existing ones mostly remaining on a descriptive level.

Key words: terrorism, violent radicalism, factors, repression, social relations, religious and external influences, human rights, organized crimes.

1. INTRODUCTION

The roots of terrorism go back to the ancient past, for terror was the oppression carried out by those in power over those under them, and a response to that terror was terrorism as a fight against the state and everything it personifies (Kalinić, 2003.: 11).[2] It is also true that terrorism is a product of contemporary world, especially that of the second half of the 20th century.[3] In parallel with the development and progress of mankind in terms of technical and technological breakthroughs, especially with the development of information society,[4] terrorism as a form of organized crime developed quickly, constantly changing its form, substance, types of organization, mode of operation and level of technical equipment. In that context, terrorism has had numerous forms of manifestation, so we now refer to conventional/non-conventional, ecological and suicidal terrorism. There are also subgroups within these forms of terrorism. Thus the conventional/non-conventional terrorism is classified into overt and covert; ecological terrorism is divided into nuclear, biological and chemical; we also have suicidal attacks carried out by terrorist organizations. All these forms of terrorism aim at causing mass killing of innocent population, mostly civilians, and huge material damage. In the commission of a terrorist attack the perpetrator does not attack a specific victim because the victim has certain

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Jihadi terrorists in Europe, their characteristics and circumstances in which they jihad: an exploratory study, Bakker, 2007) indicate that traditional explanations of its growth caused by the factors such as poverty, trauma, rage, madness or ignorance are superseded by the key role of social networks in the transformation of socially isolated individuals, turning them into fanatic mujahedeens. U: Prodan, Tonči, *Protivteroristička politika Evropske unije,* UDK: 323.28(4-67 EU), Accepted on: 12 Dec. 2009.

[2] Jurišić, Jelena, Šapit, Marko, *Uticaj terorizma na ulogu i djelovanje medija,* Politička misao, Vol. XLII, (2005), No. 4, pp.115-128.

[3] It is worth noting that the attempts to establish an international criminal court date back to the period between the two world wars, sparked by the assassination of Yugoslav King Aleksandar Karađorđević in Marseille in 1934. Under the auspices of the League of Nations, a Convention against Terrorism was adopted in 1937, which envisioned the establishment of such a court. However, the Convention never really took effect, so the idea fell through. V. Jovašević, Dragan, *Međunarodno krivično pravosuđe – između prava, pravde, pomirenja i prava žrtava,* UDK: 341.4;2-484 Biblid. 0025-8555, 63(2011) Vol. LXIII, No. 4, str. 536-566, Original scientific paper, November 2011

[4] Unlike classical terrorism, contemporary terrorism is unthinkable without the role of the media (Cyganov, 2004: 23), for in roughly 95% of the cases the organizers of terrorist actions address the media to assume responsibility for such actions. Also, terrorism has been gaining a new form of manifestation in the form of "information terrorism" with a common characteristic of manipulating certain individual and collective psyche. V. Jurišić J., Šapit M. *Uticaj terorizm...*op. cit., p. 118.

values in broadest terms, he attacks at random. For a terrorist, the victim is an anonymous and expendable means to achieve certain goals. In the words of the renowned French jurist M. Delmas-Marty, one of the most recognizable characteristics of terrorism is "victim depersonalization."[5] However, one must previously ask a question as to what is really meant by terrorism.

As an introduction, suffice it to say that terrorism represents a mode of fighting carried out by individuals, political and religious groups and organizations against the existing state and political systems based on the application of organized violence: assassinations, killing of representatives of states and international organizations, ruling classes, attacks on social goods, sabotages and others that constitute an obstacle to the development of mankind and contemporary world, increasingly seen as a global society.

Terrorism is a global security phenomenon characterized by extreme violence wherever it appears; it as a rule does not remain isolated in a certain area but has a tendency of spreading out and easily transfers to other areas.[6] This has been especially visible over the recent years with the expansion of the so-called religious terrorism. For that reason, in the modern world, terrorism undermines both internal and international security, which by itself requires a coordinated and uniform action as a response within the chain of all security subjects on national and international levels, including the judiciary itself. A press release of the EU Foreign Affairs Council says "For the first time, there was a real awareness that we need to work together to fight a common threat (terrorism)."[7] Unfortunately, for the reasons of sensitivity to issues encroaching upon the domain of their sovereignty, security services of European countries are not always ready to exchange information pertaining to potential perpetrators of terrorist acts.

On the other hand, an issue arises as to how to make sure that the repressive response from the state and/or international community aimed at safeguarding social and civil values is balanced so as not to cause irreparable damage to the civil society and not to create massive human rights violation on the wave of growing islamophobia, xenophobia and racism. Ultimately, the EU position, expressed through its regulations, starts from the principle that fight against terrorism through the measures taken by its member countries must not bring into question the basic human rights and freedoms of individuals and associations,[8] therefore the very foundations the entire European democratic and legal order rests on.

As an illustration of the duality of the link with terrorism, as a pragmatic case we point to France, which has without a doubt suffered most serious terrorist attacks committed by radical Islam followers. In that plight, France was unfortunately meanwhile

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[5] A.Cassese, International Criminal Law, Dossier, Belgrade, 2005., p. 144. U: M.Delmas-Marty, „Les crimes internationaux, peuvent-ils contribuer au dèbat entre universalisme et relativisme des valeurs?", Crimes internationaux, na 57.

[6] Whenever the word terrorism is mentioned, one immediately thinks of the attack on the U.S.A. on 9/11/2001, the WTC highrise in New York, and on Pentagon, when a total of 3,033 people were killed. Before that, we had the destruction of residential skyscrapers in Moscow in 1999, and attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. In a series of tragic events that followed, notable was a terrorist attack on a Moscow theater in 2002, a three-day hostage crisis in Beslan in September 2004, blowing up railroad tracks at a Madrid station on 11 October 2002, bomb attack in Istanbul in 2003-2004, terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, and before that the military interventions of the anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and the most recent one, in Syria.

[7] UE, Conseil Affaires étrangères, 3364ᵉ session, Doc Presse 5411/15, p. 3.

[8] See news article Iten, Jean-Louis, Le contrôle par la Cour europénne des droits de l'Homme des mesures de lutte contre le terrorisme, l?après Charlie.., op. cit.

joined by Belgium, which was hit by a terrorist attack of 22 March 2016 with dozens of slain victims (according to preliminary reports 34 people were killed and 200 wounded).

Following the terrorist attack in Paris on 13 November 2015 in which 130 people were killed and hundreds wounded, at the proposal of former Prime Minister Manuel Valls, the French President immediately declared a state of emergency, which the Parliament almost unanimously extended for three months. Faced with a threat of repeated terrorist attacks, that was one of the first measures whereby France introduced a special regime at the time of crisis.[9] However, as time went by ever more frequent appeals were heard in the public, backed by data concerning the use of excessive force, for the official Paris to drop the amendments on the extended emergency measures that were intended to be made to the French Constitution.[10]

Unfortunately, these terrorist attacks did not stop, because now attacks happened in Nice, Istanbul and Germany, which caused terrible repercussions. Nowadays, the world is confronted with dramatic changes in the political and security fields, which dynamics again opens new questions and threats, which need to be answered so as to make the world more secure.

2. THE NOTION OF TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL SOURCES PROSCRIBING TERRORIST ACTS

In the contemporary social sciences we still do not have a general consensus regarding the definition of terrorism, although, as was already mentioned, this is not a new social phenomenon. Terrorism, taken in a doctrinarian sense, implies the use of means and methods aimed at spreading fear and insecurity among the public by a systematic use of violence, so in that regard its basic elements would include: politically motivated intentions, high level of organization, consequences of terrorist attacks, the means used to achieve them, exceptional cruelty and ruthlessness, variety of targets and methods, etc. The gist of many of the mentioned definition of terrorism, which we now do not have enough time or space to elaborate on,[11] could boil down to the method of criminal activity that characterizes terror (Lat. *terror* – horror) and violence for the purpose of achieving a certain goal.

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[9] Over the past two months, ever since a state of emergency was declared in France, a total of 3,242 searches without court warrants were carried out, 400 people were arrested, while another 400 were detained at their homes, whereas judicial investigation was launched against only four of all those persons for possible links with terrorist actions. See Article *Vanredno stanje razorilo život stotinama porodica,* „Politika", Belgrade, 5 February 2016. Reacting to the request made by the Human Rights League (la Ligue des droits de l'Homme) not to extend the state of emergency, on 27 January the State Council (Le Conseil d'Etat) declared it refused to suspend the proclaimed state of emergency, with the explanation that the existing imminent danger of terrorist threat and risk of assassination have not been removed yet, and that as such they justify the existence of the state of emergency. See http://la-croix.com/France/Securite/Le-Conseil-d-Etat-refuse-de-suspendre-l.etat-d...3/7/2016

[10] V. N°3381 Assemblée Nationale, Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 quatorzième législature, *Projet de loi constitutionenelle* de protection de la Nation, présenté au nom de M. François HOLLANDE, Président de la République, par M. Manuel VALLS, Premier ministre, et par Mme Christiane TAUBIRA, garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice, Source: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/projets/pl.3381,asp 2/5/2016.

[11] Dutch scholars Alex P. Schmidt and Albert J. Jongman have performed a quantitative analysis of 109 definitions of terrorism and came to a conclusion that each of them has 22 elements with the following percentage share: 1) use of force or violence – 83.5 %, 2) political character – 65%, 3) causing fear or terror – 51%, threat – 47%, 5) psychological effect and reaction – 41.5 %, etc.. See Gaćinović, Radoslav, *Savremeni terorizam,* Grafomark, Belgrade, 1998.

In the political sense, terrorism means systematic and organized violence against a passive subject with the aim of keeping the subject in a state of political submission, in order to create public distrust in the existing public order and government or to force them into political concessions.[12]

We should make a distinction between terrorism and radicalization, which will not pose a social threat unless it is linked to other illegal actions, such as fomenting hatred, as the offense is legally defined in line with international human rights law. This certainly is not the case with the notion of terrorist radicalization viewed as a dynamic process in which a person is brought into a situation to have to embrace terrorist violence as a possible, and even justifiable, course of action. This requires an effective action of the criminal justice system while complying with the human rights and rule of law standards, applied against those who instigate and try to win over others for terrorism.[13]

The *Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism CETS No. 196*[14] adopted in Warsaw on 16 May 2005 (entered into force on 1 June 2007) aims at strengthening the progress of its members countries in preventing terrorism by setting two modes for achieving that objective. The first one, by establishing as criminal offences certain acts that may lead to the commission of terrorist offences, namely: public provocation, recruitment and training. The other mode consists of strengthening the preventive measures both internally and internationally through the modification of existing extradition and mutual assistance arrangements. In adopting the implementing legislation by each member country, it is important to regulate the issues contained in the provisions set forth in Articles 5 through 7 of the Convention – public provocation, recruitment and training.[15]

The Treaty on the European Union signed in Maastricht on 2 February 1992, which entered into force on 1 November 1993, established common external and security policy. As of that date, at the international scene the United Europe started voicing its official positions on the issues such as armed conflicts, human rights and alike, issues related to fundamental principles and common values that constitute the very foundations of the EU, but has since also faced the problem of internal and international terrorism. It should be noted here that no unified European concept of fight against terrorism has been created in the EU, although over the past couple of years the Union issued a number of regulations and multiple acts concerning its fight against terrorism.

The Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 2002/475/JHA, of 13 June 2002, amended in 2008 (*Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on Combating Terrorism*), and the aforementioned Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism are the pillars of the standardization of prevention in relation to the threat of terrorism on which the member States will rely in their respective legislative work.

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[12] Martucci, Francesco, *L'action de l'Union européenne en matière de lutte contre le terorisme,* L'après Charlie.., op. cit.

[13] See Court of BiH, Case No. S1 2 K 017968 15 K, BiH Prosecutor v. *Husein Bosnić*, Trial Judgment (5 November 2015). The Trial Judgment found the accused guilty of the criminal offense of Encouraging Terrorist Activities in Public under Article 202a of the CC BiH, as read with the criminal offense of Recruitment for Terrorist Activities under Article 202b of the CC BiH and Organising a Terrorist Group under Article 202d(2) of the CC BiH, and sentenced him to seven years of imprisonment.

[14] European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism entered into force on 4 August 1978. The BiH Presidency made a decision on its ratification on 16 July 2003. The Convention was published in the Official Gazette of BiH, International Treaties, No. 12/2003.

[15] Kozarić, Dragana, *Suzbijanje terorizma i krivični zakonik Njemačke*, Strani pravni život 2/2012, p. 59.

In the EU legal system, the legal definition of terrorism has been determined by the two legal acts adopted following the attack launched on 11 September 2011. Specifically, in exercising its normative powers, the Council of Europe has determined the meaning of a terrorist offense,[16] provided a single definition for the entire EU territory, and thereupon provided for the manner of identification of persons indicated as terrorists.[17]

In terms of substantive law, the acts of terrorism mean intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may cause serious damage to a state or international organization, which comports with a criminal offense provided for in the internal law when it is committed with a view to: (i) seriously intimidate a population, or (ii) unduly compel a government or an international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or (iii) seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political structures, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.

An act of terrorism is, in its subjective element, defined as an intentional act undertaken with the purpose of achieving a certain goal.

The list (catalogue) of the very criminal-law acts, means and tools by which the planned goals are being achieved by perpetrators of the acts of terrorism, includes the following acts:

a) *Attacks upon person's life, which may cause death;*
b) *Serious attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;*
c) *Taking of hostages;*
d) *Causing a great damage to facility of government or public facility, an infrastructure facility, including information systems, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic damages;*
e) *Kidnapping of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;*
f) *Manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives, nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into and development of biological and chemical weapons;*
g) *Releasing dangerous substances, or causing fire, explosions or floods the effect of which is to endanger human life;*
h) *Interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power and any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life.*

With regard to personalization of the acts of terrorism, the EU law (*position commune*, acr. PESC), which defines the common external and security policy, provides for its application to (1) persons, groups and entities involved in the acts of terrorism contained in the list attached in Annex to the legal act   (Article 1(1); (2) Article 2(3) of the Directive (CE) ⁿ2580/2001 provides for the specific restrictive measures directed against persons, groups or entities entered on the list contained in Annex of common positions that is subject to modifications in accordance with the procedure stipulated at the adoption of the common positions. It should be noted that the EU Court of Justice (the European Court) is authorized to control, and even annul the documents adopted by the Union, which relate to entering on the list of individuals or organizations, particularly when violations of their

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[16] Position commune 2001/931/PESC du Conseil, du 27 décembre 2011, *relative à l´application de mesures spécifiques en vue de luter contre le terrorisme, JOCE* L 344, 18 décembre 2001.p.93
[17] Décision-cadre 2002/475/JAI du Conseil du 13 juin 2002, *relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme,* JOCE L 164, 22 juin 2002, p. 3.

fundamental rights are in question. Specifically, if we start from the premise that terrorism is a denial of democracy and of human rights, we will draw the conclusion that combating terrorism and the protection of human rights are the goals which mutually strengthen each other.[18]

3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMBATING TERRORISM AND CASE LAW OF THE STATE COURT OF BiH

Pursuant to Article 13(1) of the Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, within its criminal jurisdiction, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Court of BiH) has jurisdiction over the criminal offenses defined in the Criminal Code and other laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Article 13(2)(a) of the same Code provides that the Court has further jurisdiction over the criminal offenses prescribed in the Laws of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska and Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina when such criminal offenses: endanger the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, *national security* or international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. An act of terrorism certainly falls under the jurisdiction *ratione materiae* of this Court which applies the CC BiH.

Chapter XVII of the CC BiH[19] involves a group of criminal offenses against humanity and the values protected under international law, including the criminal offense of terrorism. If we have noticed that there is no unique definition of the crime at issue, no wonder that, due to the "chameleon-like character"[20] of terrorism (to use the term borrowed from D. Roberts), there are theoreticians who have held that terrorism, as international crime, would under certain conditions be classified as a crime against humanity, although objections are promptly raised along this line that, in that case, it would be an overly extensive interpretation of crimes against humanity.[21] A terrorist organization can hardly be identified with a state as the subject of international public law. Also, when it comes to justification of classifying terrorism and terrorism-related criminal offenses under the referenced Chapter of the CC BiH, the question is to what extent these criminal offenses may amount to violations of international (humanitarian) law considering that they are not undertaken by governmental subjects and do not fall within war activities (ISIL is an exemption). The foregoing points to the conclusion that an act of terrorism would not be a separate international criminal offense, but rather a criminal offense which qualifies in the group of conventional criminal offenses.

Considering that terrorism is prohibited under customary international law, it will also exist in cases where its effects are not limited to only one state, but reach beyond the state borders. Accordingly, any state, including BiH, is entitled to prosecute any perpetrator of the acts of terrorism found in its respective territory.

Article 201(1) of the CC BiH provides for the basic form of the offense: *Whoever perpetrates a terrorist act with the aim of seriously intimidating a population or unduly compelling the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities, government of another state or*

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[18] *Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach*, OSCE, Vienna, March 2014.

[19] The Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 3/03,32/03,37/03,54/04,61/04,30/05,53/06,55/06,32/07,8/10, 47/14,22/15,40/15).

[20] Casseze, A. quote, p. 144. U: Roberts, A. "Can we Define Terrorism?", 14 Oxford Today (2002), p. 18.

[21] Dragana Kolarić, quote, p. 58. U: Casseze, A: The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 4(2006), Oxford University Press, p. 938. Also, see, Casseze, A., quote, p.147.

international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or with the aim of seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of another state or international organization, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not less than five years.

Paragraph (5) of the same Article explains that a terrorist act means one of the acts which, given its nature or its context, may cause serious damage to a state or international organization. It is apparent from the foregoing that, in relation to the acts covered by the definition of a terrorist act, the CC BiH has more or less identically adopted the normative solutions pertaining to the Council of Europe Common Position taken in 2001.

In addition, the CC BiH addresses not merely the spheres of determining the essential elements of criminal offense of terrorism and prescribing its basic and qualified types, but rather standardizes the offense as exceptionally dangerous for the social values, both national and universal ones, as well as complex in its numerous negative aspects, by extending and supplementing it with the related incriminations contained in Article 202 (Funding of Terrorist Activities),[22] 202a. (Encouraging Terrorist Activities in Public), 202b. (Recruitment for Terrorist Activities), 202c. (Training to Perform Terrorist Activity), and 201d. (Organizing a Terrorist Group).

In prescribing the criminal offense of terrorism in Article 201 of the CC BiH and in specifying its forms, the national legislator does not directly refer to the aforementioned international documents pertaining to the suppression of terrorism, but rather determines its individual forms by their acts of commission, or by their results in certain cases. In addition to referring to a number of forms of an act of terrorism, the legislator anticipates additional requirements for each form individually which pertain to the significance of the act of commission from the aspect of the effects it may cause for the state or international organizations.

The characteristics common to all terrorist attacks ensue from the incriminations of terrorism set forth in Article 201 of the CC BiH, including the following:
- Threat to life, body or property;
- Attempt to intentionally undermine the democratic authority, particularly the attempt to exert influence on the policy and law creators, and non-selective approach to targets with a view to cause fear and terror among the population.

In view of the foregoing, an overall evaluation may be that, by prescribing the criminal offenses relating to terrorism, Bosnia and Herzegovina has met its international obligations and expectations pertaining to the field of legislation and undertaking anti-terrorism measures with a view to suppressing the evil of terrorism which the modern world faces today.

In its case law to date, the Court of BiH (the State Court of BiH) has had a number of cases in which a total of 15 persons were convicted of terrorism[23] under its final Verdicts. In our view, it is noteworthy to cite the saying of one these judicators in the decision on sentence:

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[22] The footing for this incrimination is the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1999. The BiH Presidency passed the decision ratifying this Convention on 26 March 2003. The Convention was published in the "Official Gazette of BiH", International Treaties, No. 3/2003.
[23] Court of BiH, case No. X-KŽ-06/190 against the accused *Mirsad Begtašević et al.*; case No. S1 2 K 003342 12 Kž against the accused *Rijad Rustempašić et al.*; case No. S1 2 K 002596 14 Kžk against the accused *Haris Čaušević*; case No. S1 2 K 007723 13 Kžk against the accused *Jašarević Mevlid.*

The case No. X-KŽ-06/190, against the accused *Mirsad Begtaševićet al*. for the criminal offense of Terrorism under Article 201 etc. of the CC BiH, the Panel of the Appellate Division, Verdict (of 21 May 2007.)[24]

In the first case conducted before the State Court of BiH against the persons charged with terrorism, the Appellate Panel handed down a verdict granting, in part, the appeals filed by the defense attorneys for the accused individuals and modified the Trial Verdict of 10 January 2007 in its sentencing part. Thus, for the committed criminal offense of Terrorism under Article 201(1) as read with paragraph 4(f) of the CC BiH, in connection with Article 29 of the same Code, the accused *Mirsad Begtašević* received a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 8 (eight) years, and for the criminal offense of Obstructing an Official Person in Execution of Official Activity under Article 358(1) of the Criminal Code of the Federation of BiH (CC FBiH), as read with Article 26(1) of the CC B&H, the prison sentence for a term of 6 (six) months, whereupon the Court imposed on him, for the referenced criminal offenses, a compound sentence of imprisonment for a term of 8 (eight) years and 4 (four) months. Pursuant to Article 56 of the CC of BiH, the time the Accused spent in custody, running from 19 October 2005 through 5 April 2007 was credited towards the sentence imposed; the accused *Abdulkadir Cesur* received, for the criminal offense of Terrorism under Article 201(1) as read with paragraph 4(f) of the CC BiH, in connection with Article 29 of the same Code, a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 6 (six) years, and for the criminal offense Obstructing an Official Person in Execution of Official Activity under Article 358(1) of the CC FBiH, as read with Article 26(1) of the CC BiH a prison sentence for a term of 6 (six) months, wherefore the Court, applying Article 53 of the CC BiH, imposed on him a compound prison sentence for a term of 6 (six) years and 4 (four) months, towards which the time the accused Cesur spent in custody, running from 19 October 2005 through *5 April* 2007, was credited pursuant to Article 56 of the same Code; the accused *Bajro Ikanović* received, for the criminal offense of Terrorism under Article 201(1) as read with paragraph 4(f) of the CC BiH, a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 4 (four) years, towards which the time the accused Ikanović spent in custody, running from 18 November 2005 through 5 April 2007, was credited pursuant to Article 56 of the same Code; the accused *Senad Hasanović* received, for the criminal offense of Illicit Possession of Weapons and Explosive Substances under Article 371(2), as read with paragraph 1 of the CC FBiH, with the application of Articles 39, 42 and 48 of the CC B&H, a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 6 (six) months, to which the time Hasanović spent in custody, running from 24 November 2005 through 22 December 2005, was credited pursuant to Article 56 of the CC B&H.

4. COMBATTING TERRORISM THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

In addition to the challenges of terrorism with which they are faced, in searching for the response to such challenges by applying ant-terrorism measures, the European countries at the same time face the problem of how to preserve in this combat the human rights and freedoms, the democratic order, the legal basis of the modern states system and of the democratic societies. This is so because terrorism is indeed a severe criminal offense but it should not be correlated with national, religious or ethnic affiliation. Any action to

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[24]*The "Večernje novosti" newspaper, 25 March 2016, referring to the SIPA's source (State Investigation and Protection Agency BiH) published the news pursuant to which Bajro Ikanović, one of the BiH's most radical and most wanted citizens, who had joined the terrorist organization Islam State (ISIL), was killed in Iraq.*

the contrary would mean denial of one's own democratic rules and the legal frameworks, which are the cornerstones of the modern Europe states and legal systems. This would mean playing into the hands of terrorist organizations such as the so called Islamic State (ISIL) and others.

The shocks caused by the Paris attacks (in January and November 2015) were followed by numerous discussions in the public arena throughout the European states relating to the ways and means of combating this evil, without bringing into question, at the same time, the democratic and civilization values defined and guaranteed under the legal frameworks which stand as the basis of the modern Europe societies. The general position taken along this line was that the state's response through the application of legal instruments to terrorist threats and attacks fed by the Islamic integrism, which may easily pass beyond national boundaries, should not bring into question the cosmopolitan ideal which allows distinctions among the peculiar identities in the very core of the national states, and among the states as well, and particularly should not violate the fundamental principles of liberalism and human rights.

Terrorist acts are criminal offenses, and are therefore subject to rigorous measures introduced by the criminal justice system. However, it should also be noted that human rights standards are being applied regardless of whether a certain incident is deemed as an act of terrorism in relation to any other severe criminal offense from the domain of general crime.[25]

Faced with this task, participants in a session, organized in relation to combating terrorist threats, focused their critical considerations on two crucial questions: 1) how to respond to religious terrorism in layman's terms (which will not be xenophobic at the same time)[26]?, and 2) how to reconcile the fight against terrorism with the respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms? Starting points in searching the answers to the first question posed by the responsible authorities from the politics and the media, were the issue of mental reasons of the Islamic world and the reasons for which the Muslim community in France has, essentially, not been integrated in the Republic. However, there are still difficulties in responding to the ambivalent question of how to avoid a situation where an amalgam between Muslims and the radical Islam personified in the religious terrorism is being created.[27]

For the sake of protection of the values guaranteed under the ECHR, Article 15 of the Convention (Derogation in time of emergency), enabled the Council of Europe member States to unilaterally derogate from certain obligations under this Convention to the extent required by certain exigencies of the situation, which some member States have already done in the context of combating terrorism, as we have seen in the example of France.

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[25] *Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach*, OSCE, Vienna, March 2014, p.31.

[26] In combating these negative appearances to which no society is immune, the European Commission has adopted a number of recommendations against racism and intolerance, including:

• ECRI General policy Recommendation no. 8 on combating racism while fighting terrorism (2004)

• ECRI General policy Recommendation no. 11 on combating racism and racial discrimination in policing (2007)

[27] V. Laurence Dubin, *La lutte cintre le terrorisme et la pratotection des libertés et droits fondamentaux après Charli,* U: L'après Charlie. Quelles réponses juridiques? Contributions présentées dans le cadre de la journée des Rencontres du 20 mars 1015, à l'Université de Paris 8.

In a number of its cases, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has dealt with the issues of derogation in relation to the guarantees provided under the Convention.[28]

The conclusion transpiring from the contents of the ECHR's decisions pertaining to this issue may be that, in combating terrorism, the criminal judiciary of the CoE member State must act in compliance with the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms of citizens.

5.   FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the field of phenomenology, terrorism as a specific form of organized crime is active through various forms of violence to achieve its political goals by causing fear from violence, wherein the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism is becoming increasingly present. The publicity given by the media to cruel executions and suicidal terrorism (suicide bombers), as a special form of fight by organized crack-brained and fanatic terrorist groups, their training and skills, sophistication, flexibility and changeable forms and contents of the activities aimed at achieving political goals, require energetic and strong response but in the manner excluding the strengthening of racism, xenophobia and the denial of human rights and freedoms. This is so because such acting would mean the denial of the civilizational and democratic bases of the majority of states of the modern world and achieving exactly the goals pursued by terrorist groups.

In an attempt to reconcile these issues, or to strike a balance between the application of the principle of proportionality between threats and effectuation of terrorist acts, on the one end, and the aspect of combating terrorism by the states and the international community, on the other hand, a possible response might be found in Lord Gardin's following words: "*Where freedoms conflict, the State has a duty to protect those in need of protection.*"[29]

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[28] See, *Aksoy* v. Turkey 18 December 1996.;   *A.et al v.* United Kingdom (application no. 3455/05),19 January 2009 (Grand Chamber): *Ocalan* v. Turkey 18 March 2014;*Daoudi* v. France, 4 December 2009; *El-Masri* v.Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 13 December 2012 (Grand Chamber); *McCann et al.* v. United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, and other judgemnts.U: *Terrorism and the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, OKO War Crimes Reporter, No. 17, 2015., p. 28-41.
[29] Prof. Radoslav Dr Gaćinović, quote.

METHODS, TRENDS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES IN FINANCING OF TERRORISM IN EUROPE

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SUMMARY

"We must live as though peace will last for a hundred years, and be ready as though war will start tomorrow." After Istanbul, Ankara, Paris and Brussels, Europe cannot live calmly that it will be safe, at least until tomorrow. Europe is facing a "new normal" of more threats and disruption to major events as security fears remain high in the months ahead.

At the beginning, we will be more critical and our message should contribute to waking up the indifferent attitude among European leaders towards the issue of terrorist threats. Now is the time, more than ever, to be united. Now is the time to create an unbreakable network to be able to minimize the threat of terrorist attacks. The EU is facing challenges such as immigrant and economic crises. It is a fact. Yet, that does not give an exclusive right to the states to ignore security. It must be carried out as a parallel process as development of economy and development of the state.

This paper does not explore the root causes of the threat of terrorism in the EU, particularly the development of terrorism based on misinterpretation of religion – inspired terrorism or Religiously Inspired Terrorism based on the EUROPOL categorization. The paper will be a kind of recommendation for the states. The recommendation needs to be implemented in order to build a public-private partnership, which we consider to be a key element and play a key role in building the strategy for successful minimizing of the threat of this kind of terrorism.

To get to that point, we need to know the internal structure of the terrorist organization, in this case the network structure composed of multiple cells that are independent of each other in all segments, even in the decisions to carry out terrorist attacks. The situation is further complicated because the cells are very small groups that are composed of several people, generally 10 to maximum 15 people. The main focus of these groups is the final stage, for example, the execution of a terrorist attack. Why? – First, these groups are usually composed of individuals who already have an existing residence, work and other benefits from the state. They are domestic citizens, not imported. They live, work, socialize and play with us and among us. Second is the finance - source of funds. Many of them, before committing attacks, have regular employment

from which they generate stable income. Additionally, they had access to credits, loans, credit cards and they still do. On the other hand, these activities do not cause suspicion. With that, the process of identifying these groups is complicated.

The role of the public-private partnership which means cooperation between the private sector and law enforcement is of great importance in the early detection of suspicious persons or transactions that deviate from the daily operations. Although we can say that the police cannot stop every attack by a lone wolf who decided to die and blow him/herself up with a home-made explosive, they must prevent attacks that require more planning and serious logistics, as the previous attacks in Europe.

The public-private partnership must set up an "ambush". They will await the smallest mistakes of the terrorists in order to reveal their identity and purpose. We always need luck, but they need it only once.

Keywords: *public-private partnership, exchange of information, suspicious client/s, suspicious transaction/s.*

1. INTRODUCING – UNDERSTANDING OF TERRORIST REQUIREMENTS FOR FUNDS

Based on their purposes, terrorist organizations vary widely. Seen historically, they can be ranging from large, which look like states, to small, decentralized and self-directed networks. Europe is faced with new challenges. The recent terrorist attacks that occurred on European soil only confirm these challenges. Norway, Germany, Belgium, Holland, France and Turkey were direct eyewitnesses. The terrorist attacks which were committed in these countries showed the new face of terrorism. Some of the attacks were committed by lone wolves and some of them were committed by small groups of terrorists led by the ideology of a particular terrorist organization. Nevertheless, the ways how these individuals were financed gives a completely different dimension to the problem.

The development of terrorism depends on the funds which are a key element for the maintenance and development of terrorism. Money is a prerequisite for all terrorist activity and is often described as the "lifeblood" of the terrorist and terrorist organizations (Chadha, 2015). Without them, the body could not survive, and the terrorists will not be able to realize their goal. Financing of terrorism requires not just funds for terrorist attacks specifically, but also to cover broader organizational costs for developing and maintaining a terrorist organization. With that, they will create an enabling environment necessary to sustain their activities.

The direct costs of terrorist attacks have been very low compared to the damage that they can cause. Maintaining a terrorist network or a specific cell requires a lot of funds which would be stable and long term. The funds are necessary for creating and maintaining an organizational infrastructure, recruitment, maintaining a domestic and international infrastructure of organizational support, propaganda, training, communications, planning and procurement between terrorist attacks. Identifying and disrupting the flows of funds will degrade the capability of the terrorist groups over time, limiting their ability to launch attacks, increasing their operational costs and injecting risk and uncertainty into their operations(FATF, 2008).

The financial support of terrorist organizations has a domestic and international character and requires establishment of a network of relevant institutions at national and

international level which have a common interest for cooperation and sharing of information in order to neutralize or minimize and prevent the risk of terrorism.

2. TERRORIST FINANCING *MODUS OPERANDI*

According to Europol, terrorism in Europe is divided into five different groups. According to an ideology, there are religiously inspired terrorism or mostly known as jihadist terrorism, ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism, left-wing and anarchist terrorism, right – wing terrorism and single – issue terrorism. These terrorist groups use different ways and methods to finance their activities. To understand the types of financing, we need to know the main goals of these groups, their structures, areas of activity and types of attacks. The abovementioned terrorist groups have different goals. In order to realize their goals, they need a different value of funds. For example, the goal of single-issue terrorism is different from religiously inspired terrorism. In order to accomplish his goal, a lone wolf would need a small amount of money to organize and carry out the attack. On the other hand, we have inspired religious terrorism represented by notorious terrorist groups such as the Islamic State or Al-Qaida. Their goal is to create a caliphate. In order to accomplish their goal, they need funds for recruiting soldiers, propaganda, training, food, equipment and resources to control territory, weapons for all soldiers etc. Hence, all that requires a stable and long term source of funds.

However, the terrorist groups in Europe are all different. Some of them are comprised of loosely connected transnational webs of autonomous cells. Others are formed based on family or friendship connections or they are formed around social circles. Solo terrorists in Europe are growing. These persons emerge for idiosyncratic personal and ideological reasons. Arid Uka in Frankfurt, Andres Breivik in Norway or Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly in Sweden are just several examples. After them, we have the solo terrorists in Nice, Zurich, Ankara, Istanbul, Munich, etc. Larger terrorist groups exist embedded within lager communities where they emerge from time to time to prepare or carry out an attack against the state or local enemies. Almost all these terrorist groups which exist in Europe have significant transnational linkages with dynamic flows of arms, money and ideas.

In Europe, the situation with financing is different from other regions where terrorist groups exist. Here, the terrorist activities do not require substantial funding and are often generated through a combination of legal and illicit sources.

Generally, terrorist organizations and cells raise funds in many different ways. The most commonly income sources of funds are illegal activities, legal activities, state sponsorship and public support (Biersteker & Eckert, 2008)(Freeman, Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology, 2011).

According to data, 57% of the jihadist cells in Europe raised money from legal activities such as: salaries, credits, loans, family support, personal assets and business. This fundraising is an advantage for them because it is more secure and does not attract attention and suspicion. These self – financing and legal income sources have become harder to detect and prevent by law enforcement agencies. From the other side, jihadi terrorist attacks in Western Europe have generally been cheaper than in other regions. For example, three quarters of the plots estimated to cost less than 10,000.00 EUR. The negative side of the legal activities is that they require various forms of documentation. With that, the involved person reveals their identity (Biersteker & Eckert, 2008)(Passas, 21-38). But from a terrorist perspective, fundraising through illicit sources has several advantages because it can provide money very quickly and yield very high profits. These

activities allow them to operate away from the eyes of regulators and record keepers. Also, there are not cases in which the cells are financed by state support. This is so because the international community has mechanisms to take action against any country that sponsors terrorism. The second most used income source of funds is illegal sources, such as theft and robbery and illicit trade. This financing type through illegal sources has several advantages. Money is raised very quickly. Crime always brings high profits. These activities allow terrorists to operate away from the eyes of law enforcement. However, on the other hand, these illegal activities entail a risk, especially for those members who become more interested in making money than fighting for terrorism ideology.

Small cells have fewer members to train and equip for attack. For that, they need less money, and can more easily raise it without external or internal support. They are more likely to be self – financed. Compared with cells that receive external support or raise money from other sources, self-financed attacks are generally cheaper and less complicated. Conducting simple attacks that require involving of fewer people presents fewer opportunities for errors and decreases the risk of detection. On the other hand, financing cells with external support and illicit sources requires involving many people, complicated schemes and activities, which can increase suspicion and risk of detection. The "Doctor cell" is an example which shows that self-financing is hard and sometimes impossible to detect. This cell was composed of three members. All of them were doctors in different UK hospitals (Stv News, 2012)(The Guardian, 2008). Their salaries were an important source of income. In addition, their savings and loans contributed to financing their activities, including an attack. These methods are nearly impossible to identify as related to terrorism or other crime and none of their financial activities were inherently suspicious. Cell financial activities, such as relying on legal income sources, raising the money locally, using cash, having low expenses, avoiding large cash withdrawals and formal bank transfer between themselves, buying the bomb materials in various stores in different cities did not rise red flags in the banks or between the law enforcement agencies (Oftedal, 2015). Very similar to these activities is the Strasburg Cell. In 2000, while plotting a bomb at a Christmas marketplace, they divided their purchases and bought small amounts of chemicals in less than 50 different pharmacies in Germany (The Guardian, 2002).

"Lone" wolf Taimour Abdulawahab al-Abdaly died in a suicide-bomb attack in Stockholm on December 2010, after he detonated his explosive devices(Ranstorp, 2011). He used a variety of sources to finance his activities before the attack. While living in the UK, Taimour financed through Centrala studiestodsnamnden (CSN) – a Swedish study loan scheme. Through this, he received SEK 745,000 for his studies in the UK. After his graduation, Taimour managed to forge university documents pretending to study medical science, which enabled him to claim SEK 450,000 fraudulently(DN, 2013). Another source is the external sources. Before the attack, he received a bank transfer in the amount of 5,000 GBP from Nesserdine Menni from Scotland who was arrested and convicted for financing of a terrorist act(Sakerhetspolisen, 2014).

The pattern of "lone" wolf Anders Behring Breivik shows different pathways for fundraising and concealment of the funds. In the previous period, he established a number of legal entities. He had not been a successful businessman. Some of the businesses were closed, but he never gave up. In 2009, he established a company called GEOFARM, which was reconstituted as A GEOFARM. This company was the shelter for purchasing the materials for preparation of the explosives. Given the fact that he made a bomb which was based on ammonium nitrate, he bought a fertilizer through the company GEOFARM.

According to the characteristics, the fertilizer has a large concentration of ammonium nitrate and combined with explosives it has devastating effects. In addition, he applied to nine different financial institutions for different credit cards totaling NOK 235,000, which he did not use until April 2011. Several months after, several police and military uniforms, badges, weapons and ammunitions were purchased from different retails in different countries (NOU, 2012). These activities were not deemed any suspicion and the Norwegian Police reported that they would not be able to detect Braivik following his activities(NOU, 2012).

Another example is the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) that used both illegal and legal sources for funds. The PIRA illicit financial sources are coming from fuel smuggling, smuggling of livestock, grain, cattle and pigs, income tax frauds involving the use of false tax exemption certificates, counterfeiting currency, extortion, video and audio piracy, car theft, fundraising from the sale of contraband cigarettes, rackets, etc. One of the best known and widely reported illegal sources of funds comes from armed robbery. Additionally, PIRA finances their activity from legal sources which include funds from salaries and membership fees, collected from their members and supporters (Oftedal, 2015). Examples for that are the support group NORAID (the Northern Aid Committee) in the US, then the support group FOSF (Friends of Sinn Fein), voluntary private donations collected from local pubs and clubs (Horgan & Taylor, 1999). Additionally, they created "mini empire" of legitimately – owned businesses. These businesses have included private firms in the security sector. Here, the whole operation has become more sophisticated and gentlemanly. Any new company or business to an area controlled by PIRA will be guarded by their security company. These new and legitimate sources of funds have become very popular among the terrorists in Northern Ireland. Today, they have more than sixty security companies (Adams, 1987). Then, the "black" taxi cabs (with annual income of about US$ 1m) (Anderson, 1994), hackney cab services, construction firms, a lot of shops, restaurants and pubs in the US and Ireland and courier services and social clubs.

They use multiple methods for moving funds from sources to the final beneficiary and these are usually either through cash couriers, informal transfer system, formal banking, fast money transfer system and high value commodities. The detection of these methods and money flows is extremely difficult. There is a spectrum of methods and flows extending from legitimate sources (e.g. own businesses, salaries, loans, credits, family supports, donations) to illegal activities (drug trafficking, counterfeit goods, financial fraud).

The identification of suspicious clients and suspicious transactions in the financial sector (especially in the banks and fast money transfer agencies) should be focused on the prevention policy. The main task of all involved institutions should be implementation of a procedure for identification and analysis of risk customers before they establish a business relationship and during the business relationship.

3. A VARIETY OF FUNDSRAISING FOR PKK – FROM LEGAL SOURCES TO STATE SUPPORT

The PKK terrorist organization is a Marxist-Leninist and an ethnic-separatist organization which Turkey has been fighting against for nearly forty years. Even though the organisation was somewhat weakened after the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, today it continues its attacks actively. A terrorist organization needs serious and long-term financial support to continue its activities for so many years. If an organization does not have financial support, it cannot even conduct its attacks. Furthermore, for the

maintenance of a terrorist organization, they also need other kinds of support such as sheltering, logistics, health etc. In short, all terrorist organizations need financial resources to be able to continue their existence. PKK, like other terrorist organizations, provides financing from legal and illegal sources.

The PKK's main sources of financing have changed after the Öcalan arrest, from state support to other illegal financial sources. Many different studies have indicated that the most important source of income of the PKK is drug trafficking. (Altunok & Denizer, 2009) (Jonsson, 2008) (Özdemir & Pekgözlü). Because of Turkey's geographical position, as a bridge between the "Golden Crescent[1]" and Europe, PKK has used this advantage from the beginning of the organisation. According to the UN World Drug Report 2016, in 2014 Turkey was reported to have conducted the second largest heroin seizure of 16 percent of the global heroin seizures after Iran. With respect to synthetic cannabinoids, 5.4 tons of synthetic cannabinoids were seized in 2014 mainly from Cyprus and Turkey, compared with 1.2 tons in 2013.

Furthermore, the same report shows that opiate trafficking on the Balkan route suggests that the majority of the opiates leaving Afghanistan over the period 2009-2012 were smuggled on the Balkan route (through Iran and Turkey via South-Eastern Europe to Western and Central Europe) (UNODC, 2016).

In addition to these data, according to Turkey's Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu's speech on 23 January 2017, one of the most important funding sources of the PKK terrorist organization was drug trafficking and that the PKK earned nearly $ 1.5 billion annually from drug trafficking (Akgün, 2017). On the other hand, according to a report published by the Police Department in 2013, it was seen that the PKK terrorist organization provided significant funding from drugs and was active at every stage of drug trade. In the same report, it was mentioned that due to its strategic location, Turkey has become a scene of intense drug trafficking between Asia, Europe, Africa and the Americas. A significant portion of the drug trafficked in Turkey is used for financing the PKK and other terrorist organizations. In summary, by this report, the PKK

- Receives a commission from drug traffickers,
- Controls hemp cultivation in Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia part of Turkey,
- Coordinates drug trafficking,
- Coordinates drug distribution in Europe, and
- Launders the money that comes from drug trafficking (KOM, 2014).

On the other hand, according to an interview with Osman Öcalan, who is the brother of Abdullah Öcalan, the annual income of PKK was $ 50 million. He said that

> "…revenues are coming from aid campaigns in Europe, donations from the people, taxes from companies and businessmen, factories and markets in Syria and Rojava, and customs at the border with Kurdish region," and also stated that PKK did not do any drug trafficking, "The Kurds who are drug traffickers in Russia and Armenia are a source of income in their own right. We are getting taxes on the spot….." (Öcalan, 2015).

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[1]Golden Crescent is the geographical area consisting of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, where most of the drugs in the global market are produced.

The PKK claims that they did not do drug trafficking, however Özkan (2016, p.6) explains the reasons of this claim by two ways; "first, if the PKK is seen as a drug dealer it may lose its support in Europe and second, if its engagement in drug dealing is visible, it may lead its members to use drugs, thus degenerating the relations within the organization". Nevertheless, it is obvious that the PKK has relations in all the levels of drug trafficking and it was accepted by the international community including the U.S. government. (Özkan, 2016).

In addition to drug trafficking, migrant smuggling and human trafficking, fuel, arms and other smuggling activities can be listed as other financial sources provided by the PKK. Turkey is the transit country for migrating to Europe from the Middle East and Asia due to its geographical position, but the process that started with the Afghanistan and Iraq intervention continued with the political instabilities, increasing thus the mobility of migrants in the region. The PKK utilizes human trafficking to such an extent that it is the PKK's second most profitable illegal activity after drug trafficking. According to one of the big newspapers of Turkey "Sabah", after the Syrian civil war, PKK has earned an income between 3 and 6 thousand dollars per person. Considering that approximately 300 thousand people migrated to Europe by the help of PKK in 2015, it is evident that the PKK has acquired a large income in this way (Sabah, 2015). Since the PKK has already existed on the borders of Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia, even if the PKK does not smuggle drugs, weapons or migrants, it has established a taxation system in the region, defined as "custom" and has begun to earn income from this. In other words, the PKK says to the illegal organized criminal groups that "you will be taxed if you want to smuggle in our territory" and the organisation acquires income in this way.

The PKK does not only use this taxation system in smuggling activities. At the same time, PKK collect taxes forcibly or intentionally from the Kurdish people who live in both Turkish territory and also in Europe. In fact, this is not taxation, but total extortion; however, the PKK calls it taxation in order to present themselves as innocent in the eyes of the Kurdish people. On the other hand, it is well known that the PKK has legal and illegal commercial activities both in Turkey and Europe. These can be listed as media and publications and commercial and cultural organizations. Money laundering, so-called taxation, and donations are the major extortion mechanisms used by the PKK through the legal identity of these business and cultural organizations in Europe (Özdemir & Pekgözlü). For example, according to the estimation of the security units, the terrorist organization derives 65 percent of its financial resources from its activities in Germany. The German internal intelligence organization BfV forecasted the amount of money the PKK collects in Germany in 2015 alone to be 13 million Euros. It is known that the activities of the PKK in Germany are managed by four regional managers responsible for 31 areas established throughout the country. Additionally, the newspaper Yeni Özgür Politika, known for its proximity to the PKK, continues to broadcast from Neu-Isenburg, near Frankfurt (Haber Perspektif, 2016). The above are just a small portion of the PKK's financial resources. When we consider the activities of the forty-year period, it is possible to find these kinds of examples in all sources (newspapers, books, articles). Another factor that needs to be considered here is that the activities of the organization are not limited only to the territory of Turkey. This shows that the PKK is providing external support as well to every terrorist organization.

It has been known that the PKK terrorist organization has received continuous and regular support from other states, especially from the neighbouring states of Turkey for many years. The fact that Abdullah Ocalan was kidnapped from the city of Damascus in

Syria and arrested by the Turkish military forces in the Embassy of Greece in Kenya clearly demonstrates the support of Greece and Syria. Greece also provides logistic support to the PKK in order to strengthen its position against Turkey in the international arena. "Lavrion Camp," is the first and well known PKK camp in Greece. The Lavrion camp is the oldest refugee camp in Greece, open for 60 years. The camp, which was opened for the refugees who fled the Soviet Union in the Cold War era, became the home of the PKK, who had escaped from Turkey's security forces since 1984. When Abdullah Ocalan was arrested, in his questioning process he confessed that the PKK militants had received military training and were provided with weapons at the Lavrion Camp in Greece (Kemal, 2016) (Hürriyet, 2010) (Köroğlu, 2012) (Milliyet, 2013). Syria is the leading supporter of PKK by providing shelter for PKK and Abdullah Ocalan until October 16, 1998 either in its capital, Damascus, or in Lebanon's Bekaa valley, under its physical control in that period. There are several reasons behind Syria's support of the PKK; first, the Southeast Anatolia Project of Turkey, which redirected the waters of the Euphrates river and second, the Turkish annexation of Hatay province in 1939, and lastly the historical grievances left over from the Ottoman rule (Mannes, 2004).

In addition to Greece and Syria, Iran and Iraq have been a direct support to PKK. PKK's main base, which is located on the Qandil Mountains and other main bases of operation and camps in the northern region of Iraq have always been a geographical safe haven for the PKK. Furthermore, Talabani and Barzani groups have given material and weapons support to the PKK. The PKK was supported both during the Iran-Iraq war and in the first Gulf war because of the fear that Turkey could occupy the Mosul-Kirkuk region. Also, Iran's support of international terrorism is a well-known and proven fact by the Western States. There were also several PKK camps in Iran until the end of 1990s; however, Iran had never allowed the Turkish armed forces pursue the PKK militants within its borders. The most important reason for Iran to support the PKK is that Turkey is involved in the region as an ally of the United States. In addition, the PKK has always carried out its policy in cooperation with Syria and Libya (Özcan, 1999). It is known that in addition to all these listed neighbouring states, Russia, the United States, and some Western European states have supported the PKK to serve their interests of the Middle East in a covert way, but this has not been proved yet (Gunter, 1991).

4. HOW DO TERRORISTS MOVE THE MONEY?

The best answer to the question: "How do terrorist raise and move funds?" is very simple: "Any way they can." The continuing efforts and techniques in response to the national and international measures, the difficult opportunistic nature of terrorist organizations, cells or lone wolves make it difficult to identify a most commonly used or favorite method of funds transmission. The need to transfer funds depends, among different factors, on how and where the money is raised. The abovementioned examples indicate that the most widely used methods for transmission of funds are: formal banking and fast money transfer system, false trade invoicing, high value commodities, *hawala* - informal transfer system and cash couriers. The transmission of funds is a crucial intermediary stage or step for a terrorist. According to Freeman and Ruehsen, they often raise money in places different from where they are located and different from where the attacks might take place (Freeman & Ruehsen, Terrorism Financing Methods: An Overview, 2013). However, some cases described in the previous paragraphs teach us that especially lone wolves and small cells in Europe raise money in the same place where they exist and where the terrorist attacks took place. We have the same situation in Iraq and

Syria. There, the terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and Levant - ISIS raises money on their controlled territory.

To be more effective, the terrorists move funds from its origins to the final beneficiary or to the operational areas where it is needed. In order to do that, they often use different or mixed methods. During the process of transmission, they must take into account the following attributes, such as: volume, risk, convenience, simplicity, costs and speed. The value of funds for the purposes of the terrorist organizations depends on many factors. For instance, if they need to move $1 million, the easiest way to do that is via bank transaction. This method is faster than the physical movement of cash. On the other hand, using this method will discover their identity. In contrast, moving cash physically is limited by its size and volume. To do that, they need a special container or a big truck or something else. Moreover, this physical transmission is not secure. The transporters might be captured. In some cases, the costs for physical transport are higher than the provision for bank transaction of fast money transfer. Related with this risk, they can choose the informal banking system, such as hawala, or use well-known intermediaries as "Money mules", who will move the money from its origin to the final destination on their behalf and for their purposes. Furthermore, the transmission of money depends on the physical location of the main origin or final beneficiary. For instance, it is very easy and convenient to move money in cash into or out of areas in Syria or Libya, then using formal banking.

CONCLUSION

To date, there is no evidence that terrorist organizations, cells, or lone wolves have used the cyber space to collect funds for their activities or Internet or telecommunication technologies, such as non-bank led mobile money services, PayPal-electronic payment system and virtual currencies for money transmission. However, these are the future challenges not only for Europe, but also for the entire world. The introduction and distribution of new products in the financial system presents an open field in which the perpetrators of crimes found a solution to commit illegal activities and abuse these products. Using the same methods, the terrorist organizations, members of cells or lone wolves can raise money for their activities. The most frequently committed crimes in cyber space are Internet fraud, harmful software, APT- Advanced Persistent Threat, payment card fraud and DDoS attacks on critical infrastructure. Some of these types of crime can be used to collect money. Others are used for attacks on the critical infrastructure, damage, data theft, etc. Which method of cyber-crime will be used depends on the type, size and purpose of the organization, cell or lone wolf. For instance, if they need a small amount of money to finance terrorist activities, they will choose to commit internet frauds, which include identity theft, harmful software (Malware), Phishing attack or social engineering. In contrast to these, prepaid card fraud or Advanced Persistent Threat are complex activities including money laundering schemes and require more people in that process, starting from planning to money withdrawal and transmission.

What are the advantages? – All of these activities can be committed from different regions. There is no direct or physical contact between the attackers and the victims. It allows identity protection of the attackers. Money can be transferred very quickly from one place to another. Additionally, the perpetrators always use intermediaries or so –called "Money mules" in the process. These people help the transmission of money. They can be part of the terrorist organizations or cells, or they are professionals who operate for a profit. All of these things additionally complicate the criminal investigations. For these

reasons, the response has to be joint, including a network of institutions at national and international level.

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HAWALA'S APPEAL IN TERRORISM FINANCING

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ABSTRACT

As an alternative value transfer system, Hawala has certain benefits, but also shortcomings when compared to the classical banking system. Hawala is effectively implemented as value transfer systems in many Asian and Pacific countries, which is demonstrated by the fact that the flow of money through it amounts to billions of dollars annually. Beside its negative effect on the macroeconomic area as potential adverse statistical, fiscal and balance-of-payments implications of such activities, there is one very specific positive characteristic inherent to Hawala which particularly stands out - the relationship of trust among the participants who most frequently belong to the same ethnic group. The reason why Hawala can be misused for money laundering and terrorism financing is because it is impossible to fully control and regulate such a system, there is no written record of carried out transactions and it is very efficient for moving large amounts of money quickly and secretly. Even though the control of such a system can be described as "catching smoke", its significance and efficiency in money laundering and terrorism financing cannot be ignored, which is why appropriate prevention measures need to be implemented.

Key words: *Hawala, money laundering, terrorism, anonymity, transfer*

FOREWORD

In its beginnings, informal value transfer systems operated with the main goal of establishing an alternative banking system as the regular one was non-existent in parts of some countries' territories. In the 10th century, Chinese traders developed a system called Fei ch'ien (known as "flying money") in order to facilitate the transfer of their earnings from tea and silk trade in Northern China when coming back home to the south. However, there are theories that the system developed due to the lack of trust in banks, political turmoil and persecution of Chinese minorities (Kochan, 2005).

Informal value transfer systems were established in the distant past, but their modern forms, appearing in the 16th century, are the following: Hawala (Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan), Hundi (India), Fei ch'ien (China), Phoe Kuan (Thailand) and Black Market Peso Exchange (South America). Hawala is the best known informal value transfer system. It is a system based on honour, ethnic ties, and, in the case of collections of bad debts, stunning violence (Richards, 1999). Participants use trust and codes to

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authorize each other to release funds, without having corresponding fund transfers between themselves. Due to the negative connotations regarding the intent to circumvent the banking system, Hawala and Fei ch'ien are considered to be the first methodological attempts of money laundering.

Even though Hawala can be found in developed and non-developed parts of the world, there are very few substantial differences in the way it works, so it can be universally defined as the transfer of money and value from one place to another, or as money transfer without its physical movement (Passas, 2005). Theoreticians often define it as a pre-modern financial transfer system via reliable informal networks (Brantly, 2014) or in other words, banking without records. Illegality is not necessarily its characteristic, as it is most frequently applied out of necessity in politically unstable times, due to an inadequate payment system or absence of a banking system. System benefits include efficacy, safety, cost-effectiveness of money transfer and avoidance of paying significant exchange rate differences, while its detected shortcomings include the fact that it is suitable for avoiding border control and enabling tax evasion, with the effect of the absence of written evidence of conducted transactions.

When pointing out Hawala characteristics, the fact that it survived to this day demonstrates the value of secrecy. Its attractiveness is manifold as its benefits directly annul the fear of a money launderer about disclosure and legal consequences, and terrorist financier's fears about the possibility that the mission can be disrupted (Turner, 2011). The specified benefits speak of Hawala's attractiveness, evidenced by its presence in more than 20 Asian and Pacific countries, while it is estimated that there are between 500 and 2,000 hawaladars in Afghanistan (according to Bolta (2010) fund movement direction covers Kabul, Peshawar, Dubai and London). Total transfers via Hawala are estimated at several billion dollars a year. Estimates for 2011 (Ratha, 2012) show that money transferred through alternative value transfer systems amounted to 483 billion dollars, 351 billion dollars of which is distributed in developing countries (according to Richardson (2011) 80% of start-up capital for small-sized entrepreneurs in Somalia was distributed via Hawala).

Hawala is the most distributed in Asia (transactions worth about seven billion dollars are yearly conducted via Hawala in Pakistan) and the Middle East, while transfers to India amount to 100 billion dollars a year (Ballard). Such a money transfer system is attractive to minority ethnic communities in many countries (immigrants from Sri Lanka to Canada financed the Tamil Tigers in that way) and to ethnic Muslim immigrant colonies in Europe, North America and parts of the oil-rich Middle East (Ballard, 2012). In accordance with statistical data for 2005, we can conclude that the three largest alternative value transfer system users are China, India and Mexico with a third of the total number of transactions (Gupta, 2007), while among 25 countries with the largest alternative system turnover are Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. It is interesting to note its presence in Australia, Germany, and Hong Kong which stand out as jurisdictions with large immigrant populations that have long-standing regulations that apply to Hawala and other money transfer businesses.[2]

It should be pointed out that Hawala, in the framework of legal business operations, has an important influence in many developing countries, even though the

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[2] Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, A Report to the Congress in Accordance with Section 359 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, USA, pp. 42, 2002.

possibilities for illegal operation of such a value transfer system are indisputable. In that regard, the goal of this paper is to point out the benefits and shortcomings of the Hawala system operation, with particular emphasis on cases when it was used for terrorism financing. The influence of the socio-economic and cultural surroundings in countries in which Hawala is used should not be ignored as they play an important role in the degree of its sustainability.

BEGINNING OF THE HAWALA LEGAL REGULATION

The very process of Hawala as an informal system of money transfer includes cash being deposited to a hawaladar, who in return issues a code (according to Mathers (2004) in ancient times this was a piece of paper with a picture of an animal) or some other identification mark. The hawaladar gives an order (by phone, fax or e-mail) to another hawaladar in the destination country to pay the same amount to the person for whom the money is intended and sends the hawaladar the code. The person who sends the money contacts the person for whom the money is intended and gives this person the code to be presented to the hawaladar in the second person's country. If the codes prove to match, the hawaladar pays off the intended funds. In short, the Hawala process refers to two separate processes: sending/receiving client money and settling the balance among hawaladars or intermediaries involved in the settlement process.

The above specified money transport method is the classical Hawala. In addition to the classical Hawala, there is also the modern system where money which is the subject of transfer is combined with income from legal business operations (e.g. grocery stores, restaurants, corporations, etc.). In addition to the alternative system, this way also enables the use of bank and other financial institution services and in the end, it is hard to detect the actual source of the funds.

Apart from being a form of an informal value transfer system, it also represents a type of a service-oriented business. In fact, Hawala is not prohibited in the U.S. if the business operations are conducted in accordance with the United States laws and reported to the Financial Intelligence Unit (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network). Equally, the Hawala business has to be in accordance with the Bank Secrecy Act provisions pertaining to the application of measures for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. The Patriot Act, in section 359, provides a broader definition of a financial institution which covers systems such as Hawala. In the beginnings of its legal regulation, Hawala was recognised as an alternative remittance system. Encouraged by the detected vulnerability regarding money laundering prevention, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network issued a special report in 1998.[3] However, it was not until after the attacks of September 11, 2001 that the USA and the EU implemented some more serious measures for the control system to be taken to a higher level, implying the implementation of measures to establish the identity of the sender and the recipient of funds through Hawala (Comras, 2007).

The same issue was covered by the Financial Action Task Force (hereinafter: the FATF) which, in Recommendation 14, stresses out the obligation to implement measures for their licensing, registration and monitoring through an effective control system and to analyse money laundering and terrorist financing prevention measure implementation in

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[3] Hawala and Underground Terrorist Financing Mechanisms, hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance, U.S. Government Printing Office, USA, pp. 2, 2002.

the sector.[4] As a result of thorough terrorism financing analyses, the FATF concludes that the frequency of Hawala use is based on the availability and practicality of money transfer among operative cells. According to Parkman (2012), the benefits that make Hawala so attractive are availability (due to geographical location or inability to use a banking system), cultural connection (certain areas such as the Middle East or Asia have historic ties with the Hawala system), personal contacts (it is often connected to members of the same ethnic group), as well as the speed and anonymity (lack of a written record).

VARIABILITY OF HAWALA MAIN CHARACTERISTICS

After the attacks of 11September, 2001 the controls of the formal banking and non-banking financial sectors were intensified which is why terrorists increasingly resorted to alternative value transfer systems (such as Hawala) or physical transfer of money, precious stones or gold. Despite its general legitimacy, Hawala as an alternative value transfer system is characterised by its poor legal regulation, enabling anonymous transfer of money across state borders with the intent of terrorist financing.

On the other hand, Hawala can be studied in the light of its basic application: as a legal transfer of money and export/import, while illegal or mixed application can be detected in the form of investments, payments of services abroad, overpayment of export and payment of fictitious exports, tax evasion, transfer of money that has illegal origins (cigarette smuggling, human and drug trafficking) and terrorism financing (Passas, 2005). Tax evasion potentially includes a combination of legal and illegal use of such a system since it is possible to place money with illegal origin in order to conceal its actual source, even though the money source can be legal.

PROFITABILITY ISSUE AND ACCOUNT RECONCILIATION OBLIGATION

The modern Hawala alternative remittance system is more complex than its classical form due to the advantages offered by modern technology. This is why its full implementation is impossible without a written record when it comes to settling balances within the scope of clearing houses in leading European, Middle East and Asian trading centres (Howell, 2006). Settling a balance between hawaladars is necessary since every transaction creates a debt or a positive balance, that is, credit. In the simplest forms of Hawala, especially in its original form, as well as in cases when both parties are members of the same ethnic group or relatives, the settlement is very simple. It is conducted through a courier who physically transfers the money to the hawaladar with a positive balance.

Modern times enable hawaladars to open accounts in large financial centres through which they settle the balance, that is, reconcile accounts. The biggest number of accounts was opened in Dubai, but many accounts have also been opened in larger financial centres, such as London or New York in order to lower the settlement costs and ensure easier currency exchange (the advantage of holding funds in stable currencies such as euro, pound or dollar). The balance between hawaladars is not always settled directly - other people acting as intermediaries for a certain commission are also often involved. Settlement through intermediaries is sometimes financially more affordable and faster, which reduces the financial risk. Most frequently, intermediaries are only involved in the settlement process and not in the Hawala system money transfer. In addition to the legal settlement via bank accounts, hawaladars also use intermediary accounts, fictitious ("shell"

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[4] International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, The FATF Recommendations, FATF, Paris, 2012.

and "front") companies and multiple transactions designed to make the process of money laundering more complex in case of money transfer through several countries.

Hawaladars can earn their profit from exchange rate differences by "renting out" money (the extra balance), by calculating a fixed fee or a fee displayed as a percentage of the transaction, by financing legal or illegal trade, etc. (Passas, 2005). It should be noted that hawaladars often do not calculate the money transfer fee in transaction in which senders are close acquaintances or relatives, or if they are extremely poor or the transaction amount is small. For the purpose of the settlement, various financial derivatives and securities such as checks, money orders and bearer securities are used, although the money laundering and terrorist financing prevention system generally focuses on the increased attention regarding the use of bearer securities (Directive (EU) 2015/849).

THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF HAWALA WITH REGARD TO MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCING PREVENTION MEASURES

Even though Hawala's main characteristics are confidentiality of information and lack of written records, making it suitable for money laundering, theoreticians do not have a unified attitude regarding its necessarily negative status as an alternative remittance system. However, most agree on its negative effect on the macroeconomic area when it comes to potential adverse statistical, fiscal and balance-of-payments implications of such activities (Reuter, Truman, 2004). Even with that point of view in mind, it is hard to expect the implementation of complex requests for licensing, transparency, reporting on suspicious transactions and keeping of client data as that would mean the loss of one of Hawala's most important characteristics - provision of low-cost financial services.

Apart from the mentioned legal transactions which can be a part of Hawala, numerous cases in which such an alternative money transfer system served to directly support terrorist financing have been recorded. The terrorism issue is specific because it does not request significant funds to achieve some of its objectives. However, when looking at terrorism as a global phenomenon, it needs to be financed and financing is achieved with funds from legal and illegal sources.

One example of Hawala being used for the benefit of terrorists is the case of the investigation of a well-known Indian politician's murder in which it was found that drug trade earnings were transferred in order to buy weapons which were subsequently used to perform the terrorist act. Also, funds for buying explosives and paying bombers to perform terrorist acts (1993) in India's major cities were transferred via hawaladars in the United Kingdom, Dubai and India (Jost, Sandhu, 2000). Furthermore, Hawala bankers in London have been connected to terrorists in the Punjab and Kashmir regions of India, and Fei ch'ien bankers in Hong Kong and San Francisco have been linked to heroin traffickers (Richards, 1999).

In addition to the formal banking system, terrorists also use informal banking systems, such as informal value transfer systems, charitable organizations and legitimate businesses. Even hawaladars who provided their services to Al-Qaeda relied on the banking system in the money transfer process (Beare, 2007). Hawala was found to be one of the Al-Qaeda financing sources, even though their financing sources vary and range from contributions (such as Zakat[5]), government sponsorship and legitimate business to

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[5] Charitable giving, known as Zakat, is one of the five pillars of Islamic faith and it is also functions as a form of income tax, educational assistance, foreign aid and political influence. Roth, J. & Greenburg, D. & Wille, S., National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, USA, pp. 24-25, 2004.

crime (Madinger, 2006). The informal value transfer system was used in financial transactions among Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah and Kashmir rebels. After the arrival of the coalition forces, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban transferred the amount of 10 million dollars from Afghanistan to Pakistan via a courier. After that, the money was transferred from Pakistan to Dubai using the Hawala system (Farah, 2002). Reaping the benefits of the banking secret, Al-Qaeda transferred funds through financial systems of Liechtenstein and the Bahamas.

A case of using Hawala for transferring funds acquired from Al-Zawahiri's call for donations for terrorism was also recorded. The collected funds were transferred from Peshawar using Hawala to militants in Pakistan's Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (Solomon, 2008). Also, between March and May of 2008, Indian terrorist al-Hooti transferred 2,500 dollars for terrorist purposes to terrorist Tadiyantavide Nasir through a hawaladar in Kerala (Swami, 2009). A similar *modus operandi* was recorded in the activities of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, which used Hawala for money transfers in Iraq and Syria (Ranstorp, 2016). One of the reasons for using Hawala is that many Syrian and Iraqi people do not have bank accounts and bank branches in the territories won by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant have lost access to the international financial system.[6]

Hawala is used by the terrorists in Europe as well. Even though Spain has regulated the Hawala system by requesting its registration, keeping business books and carrying out deep client analysis, in 2015 a case was recorded which provided evidence about a secrete hawaladar network. Funds intended for paying salaries to Spanish jihadists in Syria were transferred via around 300 hawaladars. They operated from secret, anonymous Hawala stations, which can be placed in the modern Hawala category because value transfer services were performed from butcher shops, grocery stores and call centres (Ranstorp, 2016).

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the effect of alternative remittance systems on the money laundering process and their connection with terrorist financing should not be observed in isolation due to the specific historical and political background of the countries where they are dominant (Thompson, 2007). The specified positive and negative characteristics cannot serve as justification for their misuse, supporting the thesis about the need to strengthen legislation and potentiate the effectiveness of the money laundering prevention implementation, which particularly applies to terrorism financing. Whether the proposed measures will be successful depends on the level of implementation of licensing and registration measures, efficient implementation of due diligence measures, records keeping and suspicious transaction reporting, in accordance with the international standards regulating the specified area and particularly in accordance with Directive 2015/849.

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[6] Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), FATF, Paris, pp. 28, 2015.

CONCLUSION

Hawala is an alternative system which does not merely signify transfer of cash, but transfer of value as well. Hawala's frequent use can be attributed to its swift and cost-effective transactions, reliability, anonymity and distribution in places of interest, particularly Asia. Its main benefits are greater speed, efficiency and affordable cost of service provision when compared to the banking system or any other money remitting service. Poor national economic policy and financial development, political turmoil and an imperfect security and control system support the development and frequency of use of such an informal value transfer system.

Apart from the specified advantages, the need to regulate the alternative remittance system is obvious not only in the area of transfer of money from heroin and cocaine trade or gold smuggling, but also in the area of influence on tax evasion, capital flight, distortion of trade statistics and data regarding money flows in general. At the same time, Hawala is a current topic in the area of money laundering and terrorism financing which is why pronounced efforts to implement preventive measures have been made in the framework of international standards, particularly through emphasising the obligation for licensing and implementation of an efficient control system which would control its operation, in order to both protect the hawaladars' interests and to combat illegal activities in the area.

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OLD AND NEW THREATS. MORAL PANIC AND THE SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION CRISIS. POLISH CASE STUDY

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INTRODUCTION

People have always migrated and changed their place of life in order to find a better and safer place to live. The reasons and consequences of migration are complex and complicated; they determinate abandonment of the up-to-present social order, losing one's roots, necessity of functioning in a new, sometimes totally different environment. A characteristic feature of the present times is people's increased mobility which has two faces. The central figures of globalization, which generates the phenomenon of relocation, are a cosmopolitan or a citizen of the world, as well as an emigrant. While the first one is a beneficiary of the globalization process, the other one is its victim [17] (p.285). Mass migration is not a new occurrence, and in terms of the number of people coming to the EU, it resembles those from previous years [7] (pp.91-112).

The European migration crisis is an ambiguous and multidimensional term. In fact, several crises are overlapping. First of all, it a crisis in terms of demography and it is caused by increased mobility towards the countries of the European Union. It is also a refugee crisis connected with the international legal status of the people who engage in increased movement in the Mediterranean Sea region, especially those from North Africa and the Middle East. It is also a crisis of the EU asylum policy, both in a legal and institutional dimension, proving divergence of positions of the member countries, as well as a humanitarian crisis. It particularly concerns the illegal camps, for example in the Northern France (the co called jungle near Calais), as well as some in other countries like Greece, Italy or Hungary.

It must be noted that the crises concern the European countries in many aspects and on different levels which results in different responses to this situation.

The aim of this study is to analyze the perception of migrants in Poland, where they are strongly associated with followers of the Islam. An attempt has been made to answer the question of the reasons for the negative attitude towards strangers. It is important to mention the role of media in the public discussion on shaping a hostile attitude towards potential immigrants, which in turn, should be connected with the increasing popularity of movements and groups that refer to the national discourse tinged with populism. It seems that in case of Poland, an important issue is not the number of migrants, but the dislike for strangers visible also in other European countries, which is also connected with the demands for sealing borders and separation from the strangers coming from different cultures. Due to the media message, this intensified migration movement is considered as the main drive of change in the cultural order of Europe.

MEDIATISATION OF THE CRISIS

Nowadays people learn about the world through the media which convey the vision of reality to the mass audience. The environment of the life of an individual located in a global, sometimes virtual reality, causes a situation when the individual is not able to follow the events personally and in order to learn about the world, it is necessary to rely on pictures and words provided by the mass media, both traditional and electronic ones. The role of media significantly rises in a period of a crisis, uncertainty or social anxiety. A special dependence of the society on the media occurs. They become the main source of information which shapes the idea about the surrounding reality. Selecting information, it is media that decide about the content that will arise in the consciousness of the mass audience. It might seem that the digital media of the 21st century would avoid gatekeepers, but the mass of information must be filtered [3] (pp. 7-34). In this way, some events become important for the public opinion, because the media – but also the audience who is a gatekeeper of the internet media – get back to them, focusing the attention of the audience on incidents and create an atmosphere of danger. Other events, although they would objectively influence the society, are left unsaid [9] (p.37).

Moreover, medial rhetoric inscribes migration into the issue of failure of the project of multiculturalism which concerns some West European countries. An immigrant, especially from beyond the circle of the Western civilization, becomes a synonym of a terrorist whose aim is to invade the European continent and destroy the Western culture along with its values, while his preferred life style is unacceptable for the dominant society due to a substantial cultural distance [11]. A symbolic immigrant takes the form of a young man, a Muslim with a mobile phone, whose real reason for migration is the dream of comfortable life, a good job and benefits of the social security system offered by the Western countries. According to the research of Eurobarometer, European citizens consider the migration crisis as the second challenge, after unemployment, that has to be faced by the European Union [8] (p.11).

Media play the go-between role in creating mass prejudices. This situation got stronger after September 11, 2001, when the WTC towers in New York came down as a result of an attack by Muslim extremists. As Vincent Geisser, the author of the *New Islamophobia*, justly says, the media's image of Islam is strongly affected by emotions. Journalists of the mass media do not even create an antimuslim attitude, but they repeat stereotypes about this religion and its followers, making use of "an amateur erudition [6] (p.30)". In the age of a flood of news and an access to many means of mass media, a message must get through to the average recipient and draw their attention. The choice of the topic and means of transmission is dictated by audience ratings which undoubtedly affects the substance of the information.

CULTURAL HOMOGENEOUSNESS OF POLAND

Such a situation concerns also the Polish nation which is the subject of this analysis. Poland, located in Central-Eastern Europe, is one of the most culturally homogeneous European countries. According to the National Census of 2011, foreigners are 0.2% of the 38 million population. As many as 91.6% of the respondents declared their homogeneous Polish national identity, while only 2.17% hold Polish and simultaneously another national or ethnic identity. Those who declare solely non-Polish national or ethnic identity are 1.46% of the population [14].

At the same time, Poles overestimate 50 times the number of Muslims living in Poland. The research carried out by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation [27], clearly shows that

although Muslims are 0.1% of the population, in the opinion of Poles, there are too many Muslims and they are too visible in public space. Few Poles know a Muslim personally and their contacts are incidental, usually during holidays spent abroad [20] (p.14).

Poland has a great historic experience with emigration as for centuries Poles have been leaving their homeland due to ideological, politic and economic reasons. However, Poland has relatively less experience in accepting strangers. It is rather a transit, and not a receiving country, even though in the 90s of the 20th century more than 80 000 refugees from the war-engulfed Chechnya were accepted and most of them were Muslims [13].

The attitude of Poles towards strangers, especially those culturally different, results from various reasons connected with personal experience, opinions on world diversity, as well as political views, age or education. Dorota Hall and Anna Mikulska-Jolles, authors of *Prejudices, Fear or Ignorance? Young Poles about reasons for their dislike to accept refugees* from 2016, indicate that since the 90s of the 20th century, the attitude of Poles to strangers has changed several times, from dislike, through stable time of acceptance of refugees, until dramatic fall when the European Union started the debate on acceptance and relocation of refugees among the European countries [10]. The lowest level of acceptance for refugees was noted in 1997 when more than half of the Polish respondents asked by Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) demanded sending back strangers to their countries of origin [16]. The period thereafter, until 2015, noted a positive attitude towards receiving the people persecuted due to their political views or public activity. Between May and December 2015, CBOS noted a decrease of the percentage of Poles ready to accept people escaping from the territories engulfed by military conflicts, who asked for asylum, or forced migrants. In May, the acceptance for temporary or permanent stay was declared by 72% of respondents, while 21% were against. In December, the same year, already a half of the Poles held a view that strangers should not be accepted, while in February 2016 it was 57% [22]. The decrease of support for accepting migrants came along with the medial exploitation of the issue of relocating refugees in the EU countries, an electoral campaign to the Polish government (October 25, 2015) during which the topic of the migration crisis became political, and also in November 2015 there were terrorist attacks in France [1] (p.16).

The researchers were surprised by the result showing that after May 2015, the majority of the people reluctant to accept refugees and migrants, were young people between 18 and 34 years of age, although in the previous surveys the old people, the less educated and the disadvantaged declared dislike for immigrants. Among the fears connected with the presence of strangers, they indicated an increased threat of crime, new illnesses, loss of Polish culture (40% of answers proving this concern), but also the question of loyalty of the newcomers towards the receiving country (fear expressed by 76%-81% of the respondents). The surveys were carried out in the countries of the Visegrad Group in 2015 by CBOS [21], and although they showed that Poles are less worried about the migrants than Hungarians, Czech and Slovaks, still it is a considerably big group.

On the other hand, the research on the web content carried out between October 14-21, 2015, by CBOS in collaboration with Newspoint, proved that only 6% of Internet users spoke positively about the refugees and declared willingness to help regardless of their ethnic origin and faith. The analysis concerned 8000 Polish web portals and around 13 million posts from the social media. A straight majority of them (81%) were messages against receiving strangers in Poland. According to them, the main reason was the religion glorifying violence and hate, terrorist attacks committed by Muslims, as well as problems

connected with integration of culturally different migrants (raise of crime, social tensions) and a threat to the stability of social systems. As the authors, Hall and Mikulska-Jolles, mark, the respondents and web users under 34, do not view strangers as victims of war and crime, but as a source of potential threat to their own security, connected with the category of being a Muslim [10]. It might seem that young people participating in the global culture by Internet, would be more open to difference and acceptance of people from outside their culture. Meanwhile the youth using the web, do not reach for other sources of information than websites and social media, but they use such that are in accordance with their own outlook on life [5] (p.365). Therefore, the web as a communication channel and medium is highly responsible for strengthening the negative attitude towards Islam and immigrants, as well as for creating the image of a cruel religion and emphasizing the threat of religiously motivated extremism and crime. A seeming anonymity on the web additionally enables the so called "hate", insults and offensive opinions, as well as propagation of stereotypes and dubious information.

ISLAMOPHOBIA

The presence of Muslims in Europe is almost as long as the history of Islam. The first known notes about the stay of Arabs in Sicily come from the 7th century. Islam was considered a religion strange to the European continent and its expansion started along with the arrival of emigrants to Europe looking for jobs, inhabitants of previous colonies and after World War I, and also students from different parts of the world. They came not only from the Arabic countries, although a cliché based on the assumption that Islam is homogeneous, as well as is the group of its followers, is still present in the media message. We deal here with Arabization of Islam and identification of Islam with terrorism. The media warn about the danger connected with the functioning of Muslims in Europe, the conflictual character of this religion and the aggression of its followers who want to impose their system of values by force. Such imagination of Islam creates many stereotypes which in turn influence the growth of anxiety concerning the level of threat for public safety generated by the followers of Islam. A report of the British organization Runnyemede Trust from 1997 emphasizes islamophobia as "unreasonable hostility towards Islam and practical consequences of this hostility in the form of unjust discrimination of Muslim individuals and community, as well as their exclusion from political and social life [12]." Therefore, it is a category which does not refer directly to the race factor, but religion, culture and ethnicity are considered the source of discrimination of a certain group. It is cultural racism which evolves constantly taking new forms, as for example theories which present the differences between cultures as invincible and cultures as fundamentally contradictory to each other [12], or referring to the belief that there are permanent and irremovable differences between groups of people, including those of race or ethnic character. However, the differences do not imply a lack of equivalence. As a counterbalance to the concept of multiculturalism, ethnopluralism assumes that different groups should not coexist in one space, but independently from each other [18] (p.103). The blade of this ideology is aimed against incoming people from African and Asian countries as if their arrival implied higher danger of terrorist attacks and rising level of crime, and if the newcomers became a burden for the social system, using state benefits and support. Their presence on the job market would imply difficulty with employment for native Europeans. Such anxiety is confirmed by the research done by the Pew Research Centre in 10 countries of Europe [25].

A risky assumption can be made that this kind of view on Islam and Muslims dominates the public discourse and even that content of islamophobic tinge is getting trivialized. Muslims are particularly exposed to stigmatization, discrimination and exclusion. The justification of xenophobic attitude with a terrorist danger is only a clever rhetorical figure. Surely the risk of terrorist attacks increases along with the number of Muslims, however not every follower of this religion is a camouflaged fundamentalist who wants to violently crack down Western civilization. However, a collective responsibility is applied to Muslims and it does not concern only immigrants. The wave of antimuslim attitude affects both followers of Islam who have lived in Europe for centuries, like Polish Tatars and also many foreigners who are far from an image of a stereotypical Pole. The increase of anti-immigration feeling and race-, ethnic- or religion-based hate crime is confirmed by the Police data, indicating that in 2016 as many as 30% of all proceedings concerned cases motivated by racist and xenophobic reasons [26]. A report made by the Team for Observation of Public Debate of "Kultura Liberalna" ordered by the Office of the Ombudsman at the beginning of 2017 is reconstructing a debate on Islam and Muslims which is taking place in the Polish print media and which affects the social atmosphere around the migration crisis.

METAPHORES OF MORAL PANIC

It is important here to ask about the reasons for the negative attitude towards immigrants identified as followers of Islam. Does it result from a real threat from Muslims or maybe it has hallmarks of emotional hyperbolisation of fears, known in sociology as moral panic? A current analysis indicates that in the case of Poland, we can speak about islamophobia without Muslims, a platonic one or even an imaginary one as the number of Muslims living in Poland can be estimated as 10 000, including representatives of the Tatar ethnic minority, converted citizens and foreigners living in the country [14].

The concept of moral panic concerns an extreme reaction of the society to "states, events, persons or group of people that start to be defined as a threat to social values and interests; its character is being stylized by media, preachers and politicians [23] (p.922)". Some persons or groups are considered a threat to the believed social values and to the existing social order. An important thing here is the spiral effect created by the media who catch the subject and transform it in a sensational and exaggerated way. Then comes the hysterical reaction of society, while the media support the spiral by exposing incidents and exaggerating non-significant events so that they match the current trend. A social movement is organized around the problem which allegedly defends the endangered values, then "moral experts" join in, politicians, opinion-forming centers, and finally reports and analyses are published. Finally, a panic disproportionate to the event loses its power or leads to social changes [24] (p.14). A characteristic of moral panic is the high degree of social concern of behavior of a group of category of people along with the raising feeling of hostility towards a group or categories identified with a threat to values [24]. As Cohen states, moral panic "allows to steer the public opinion in an irrational direction". Moral panic can be provoked both by politicians of the governing or opposition parties, as well as by other non-governmental organizations, churches etc. An interest of the public opinion can be intentionally aimed at "the social enemy" in order to draw the society's attention away from other, real problems. Moral panic can be compared to a contemporary witch-hunt. In the case of Polish media, a witch has been made of a community of followers of Islam, although the Polish press writing vastly about Islam does

not deal with the Muslims living in Poland, as the analysis done by the Observatorium of Public Debate of "Kultura Liberalna" proved.

Four journals („Fakt", „Gazeta Wyborcza", „Rzeczpospolita"), four weekly opinion magazines („Do Rzeczy", „Newsweek", „Polityka", „wSieci") and four portals (NaTemat.pl, „Dziennik Opinii", Niezalezna.pl, Fronda.pl) analyzed on their pages issues that were not present in Poland: mass migration to Europe, problems with integration of Muslim migrants and their descendants and also terrorist attacks. A division of ideological dyad has been noted: right-wing and conservative media presented Islam in a bad light, operating with negative associations and stereotypes, while the left-wing and central ones presented more balanced opinions. The right-wing press (among others portals „Fronda" and „Niezależna" and weekly magazines „Do Rzeczy" and „wSieci") in the researched period (September 2015 – September 2016) described current events with notional clichés and returning semantic metaphors which included:

- A metaphor of a wave or invasion of refugees and immigrants coming from the countries where Muslims are the majority, as well as a related metaphor of a hybrid war or a war led with alternative methods – by means of terrorism or "sexual" and "social" jihad;
- A metaphor of so called multiculturalism which is supposed to play an important role in describing the current social and political situation of many Western European countries and to be a threat to Polish sovereignty, Christian values and the tradition of Polish culture;
- A metaphor of "hotbed of jihad", i.e. districts inhabited by immigrants, considered a source of recruitment of future terrorists;
- A metaphor of a clash between the Western and Islamic civilizations, the critical point of which is the migration crisis in 2015-2016;
- A metaphor of a suicide of the elites or even a suicide of Europe being unable to face the above mentioned issues [15] (p.14).

It is worth emphasizing the significance of the choice of words used for describing the increased migration to Europe. The newcomers are defined as a wave, flood, inflow, mass, horde etc. which leads to dehumanization and adiaphorization of immigrants [2]. Terms like Islam, Muslims or followers of Islam in the above mentioned research were mostly connected with the subject of refugees from the Middle East and a terrorist threat in Europe.

The visions meet a favorable response as the main group of respondents of this message is a group named precariat. They are people without stable employment who perform jobs below their education level, who do not have a guaranteed social security system, earn little and have no perspectives for professional development. In a situation of lack of stability and security, as well as with the feeling that political elites do not represent the marginalized social groups, it is important to develop the dissatisfied groups by organizations who offer the feeling of membership, such as nationalistic, xenophobic and anti-immigration groups[19]. Such group needs an enemy who could be blamed for one's misery. An enemy protects against the discomfort of consciousness of one's imperfection and responsibility for failure. Precariat is also a group most prone to media panic.

CONCLUSION

Migrations are an important factor that transforms the social and cultural order, highlights existing divisions and can lead to antagonization of societies in terms of ethnic and religious sense of belonging. It concerns also countries culturally homogeneous such as Poland, where the media discourse about Islam has had an exogenous character dictated by events happening outside the borders of the country.

In the media and public space, the politicians and activists who identify themselves with nationalistic ideology are becoming more visible and for them the category of being different means a threat to European values. Immigrants embody all fears of the Europeans uncertain about their identity, dealing with lack of stability and safety. European governments are not able to manage the needs of their citizens who view strong authoritarian leaders, who offer simple solutions like raising a wall or deportations [2], as a remedy to fear. A situation called a migration crisis is changing Europe's political landscape, admitting to the mainstream a sharp political, anti-immigration rhetoric that plays on economic uncertainty and cultural antagonisms. Social tensions connected with the end of the land of prosperity, previously hidden under the surface, find their way in the shape of extreme reactions to a threat generated by newcomers. A figure of a migrant is a collective scapegoat that embodies and symbolizes the evil, it is an object of projection of the collective fear and is a peculiar folk devil [4]. Giving a hallmark of a moral panic to something does not mean that the problem does not exist and is just media news, but rather that the scale of the situation and the danger generated by it have been exaggerated in the collective awareness in order to create an atmosphere of fear. It is not the scale of migration that brings most anxiety, but the direction from where the migrants are coming, as well as the fact that they represent most often the Arabic and Muslim civilization, follow another religion and have different customs. Even if many Europeans insist on the cultural purity of Europe, still the numbers and facts indicate the increasingly multicultural character of the Old Continent. Forecasts do not imply that the percentage of the coming people will decrease. It is an effect of the megatrends of the present times such as processes of globalization, aging of native Europeans and needs of the economy of European countries. Some processes cannot be stopped.

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MIGRATION AND TERRORISM - THE PROBLEM AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

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ABSTRACT

In the early decades of this century, we have witnessed a sudden increase in the number of hot spots, and thus the migration, transnational crime and terrorism. What is most worrying is the fact that the migrant-wave increases international terrorism. The wave of such attacks, which in Western Europe started with the massacre in Paris on 13 November 2015, does not stop, and France and Belgium have already singled out as centers of terrorist activities.

The current migrant crisis and the crisis of terrorism in Western Europe are not separate, but related processes, the consequences of which may be severe and far-reaching. There is no doubt that the movement of migrants affects the national security of the countries whose territory they cross, or remain into, so it is not surprising that the issue of transnational migration has become one of the most important security issues in the EU. Searching for solutions that can contribute to overcoming the problems brought about by the migrant crisis and its associated terrorism, it is necessary, first of all, not to succumb to the prejudices that every migrant is a potential terrorist. However, it is also necessary not to lose sight of the fact that among the migrants there are also terrorists. In conditions of globalization, these problems are in any case beyond national boundaries and therefore they must be addressed not only at national, but also at the international and even global level.

Key words: international migration, transnational crime, terrorism, security, EU law.

1. Introduction

For centuries, Europe has meant a world surrounded by the Mediterranean and our sea, Mare Nostrum, as the Romans called and included North Africa. In the early years of the V century, in the period of St. Augustine, who lived in Algeria, North Africa was the center of Christianity. However, Islam was advancing rapidly during the VII and VIII century and practically extinguished Christianity in North Africa, dividing the Mediterranean region into two halves with the civilization "Middle Sea" as a hard boundary, but it was no more a unifying factor. Since then, the Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset noted, "all European history can be presented as a great movement of the nation to the north."

After the collapse of the Roman Empire, migrants from the north, Germans (Goths, Vandals, Franks, Lombardi) slowly forged the foundations of the Western civilization, to be upgraded with the classic heritage of Greece and Rome only a few centuries later. Many

historians believe that this development of the European system of values occurred precisely because of the division of the Mediterranean world. If Islam had not divided the world, the Christian system of values might have had a different development.

Islam did not influence the development of Europe only geographically. A united Europe in this sense is not the achievement of today. Europe is the arrival of Islam on its borders and it unites the crusades based on religion and opposition to Islam. The identity of Europe, in other words, is built on the sense of superiority over the Arab world, especially after Napoleon's conquest of the Middle East.

Islam is now trying to undo what had been done before. Terrorism and migration unite the Mediterranean region, including North Africa and the Levant with Europe. The significant migration that existed before (Slavs, Magyars) has contributed to the creation of a European System, because shortly after their arrival they received Christianity and contributed to the building of the system along with the others. During the Cold War, a large number of Algerians immigrated to France, Turks and Kurds have moved to Germany or have not assimilated, representing the beginning of migration, which is still ongoing. Migrations have occurred throughout human history, beginning with the movements of the first human groups from their origins in East Africa to their current location in the world.

The time is now for Christianity to return to itself or perhaps go some other way after which Europe will no longer be the same.

2. MIGRATION

If we look at the definition of migration, we will see that the notion of human migration is the movement of people from one place (in the world) to another for the purpose of taking up permanent or semi-permanent residence, usually across a political boundary.[1] People either can choose to move ("voluntary migration") or be forced to move ("involuntary migration"). Migration occurs at a variety of scales: intercontinental (between continents), intracontinental (between countries on a given continent) and interregional (within countries).

If we take a look at the types of migration, we can define several types: Internal Migration, External Migration, Emigration (Leaving one country to move to another), Immigration (Moving into a new country) and Population Transfer, Impelled Migration (also called "reluctant" or "imposed" migration), Step Migration and Chain Migration.

For us it is extremely important to understand the true impact of emigration and immigration. The newest migration process is based, as all other variations, on push and pull factors. Push Factors are the reasons for emigrating (leaving a place) because of a difficulty (such as a food shortage, war, flood, etc.), and pull Factors are the reasons for immigrating (moving into a place) because of something desirable (such as a better climate, better food supply, freedom, etc.). If the push factors are decreasing, the pull factors are decreasing too. For instance, if we focus our efforts on creating better living conditions and the Development of peace, less people will leave their homes.

This relationship is clear and simple. But, .. there is always but.. If the reasons are not completely honest, that secret moment will be decisive in the change of migration. For example, if there is a hidden agenda to finance migrants so that they settle in some area (Western Europe, for example) and when the number of people moving is crucial for a

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[1] An example of "semi-permanent residence" would be the seasonal movements of migrant farm laborers.

cultural and religious tectonic change in that area, then migration occurs regardless of the push factor. Then we can talk about Terrorism.

3. TERRORISM

The last decade of the twentieth century was marked by radical changes and a variety in the types of global security environment. During this decade, the deep changes have already started to decisively determine the economic, social, political and security configuration of the world community. The first consequences of these changes have largely begun to appear. Among other things, a changed and expanded list of security challenges, risks and threats, along with changes in their nature, content, forms and range. A new threat to the stakeholders of individual, regional and global security has emerged on the scene. The number of the new - individual, joint and / or collective - actors trying to achieve and preserve security has grown too.

The period since the end of the Cold War has led to the evolution of a new structure of international relations, which is itself largely "unconventional".
Today, the main threats to international peace and stability are quite different than during the Cold War and they mainly consist of those elements that were considered in the previous era of international relations as "conventional", although alternative security threats. These threats are "conventional" based only on the criterion of weapons, but as they are also alternative, it is difficult to respond to them using the classic military methods. In the period of the Cold War, the weapons were almost the only criterion to distinguish the nature of the security threats, hence the classical war could either be conventional (if waged by conventional weapons, without the use of weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear) or nuclear.

Today, the distinction between classical and alternative models of conflict and security threats are more broadly based on multiple criteria, including the type of actors (state or various non-state actors), the territorial dimension (internal or external conflict), the legal nature of the conflict (the classic war between two sovereign states on the one hand, informal groups or war against the state, on the other side of the same spectrum). Therefore, the modern picture of concepts of security and insecurity is incomparably richer and more layered than the one that existed in practice, but also largely in theory during the Cold War era in international relations. You do not need to be reminded that the period of the Cold War had largely determined the theoretical thinking about security.

According to the list of priorities periodically formulated by large international organizations, primarily the UN and the EU, we can see that today's clashes in which at least one party is not a state but an organized group within sovereign formed and recognized borders are the dominant threats to security. In other words, the growing international integration through the increase of multilateralism in solving international issues (and thereby reducing the probability of an outbreak of traditional wars between sovereign states) has increased proportionally the probability of alternative administration conflicts as the most common security threat. Such ethnic conflicts, internal disturbances, terrorist movements and related security threats existed during the Cold War period as well, but they were overshadowed by the threat of a global, yet crucial, bilateral, all destroying superpower confrontation. With the withdrawal of these threats, the attention of theoreticians and security practitioners focused on other conflicts, and at the same time, the volume of these alternative conflicts increased, because some of them were under control thanks to the global balance of interests of the superpowers.

Historically, it has been found that most forms of terrorism emerged in the developed democratic states in the twentieth century, whether from the extreme left wing, extreme right-wing terrorist organizations, or ethno-nationalist groups. The relationship between democracy and terrorism is extremely complex and it would be a simplistic conclusion that the development of democracy in the Islamic world has led to a reduction or disappearance of terrorism. Moreover, history proves that in the past there was more terrorist activity in Arab democracies than in those countries with other types of government. Terrorism does not occur solely in poverty, but it is necessary to emphasize its danger in many developing countries because poverty enables easier connections between terrorism and organized crime, due to the poorly developed administration exposed to more corruption and some large areas cannot be permanently monitored by the central authorities and some areas are difficult or impossible to access.

In conditions when the population becomes frustrated and dissatisfied with the government's inability to help them with a number of existential problems, people can easily turn against a sovereign state and accept more or less organized groups. It causes fragmentation, taking various forms, and one of them is the wave of lawlessness - terrorism. In addition, these conditions contribute to the emergence of disgruntled extremist ideologies, such as those that fit the radical and intolerant fundamentalist religious groups, which challenge the social bliss, harmony and which are often in the context of struggling to take up terrorist activities[2]. Violence only encourages further violence and the terrorism of the powerless and the poor cannot be eradicated by the new world "long war" (War without End).[3] The ethically acceptable choice of fighting terrorism is to select only morally licit means. This raises the question of acceptable ethical criteria for selection of morally permissible means. We cannot avoid the use of force and power in circumstances of fight against terrorism, but we must not forget that power without justice leads to violence and tyranny and there is no justice without power, e*x injuria jus non oritur* (justice is not based on injustice). By addressing terrorism, it is possible to change a policy that is not contrary to the true democratic values, to convince and encourage the condemnation of extremist interpretations of religion, receive and encourage global ethos, regardless of their racial, ethnic, cultural and religious identity by encouraging dialogue between the conflicting parties and overcoming poverty.[4]

4. TERRORISM AND MIGRATION

Immigration and terrorism are Europeans' two main concerns, far ahead of the economic situation and unemployment, according to a new survey by the European Commission.

More than 31,000 people in 34 European countries and regions were interviewed for the spring 2016 Eurobarometer.[5] The majority of people in five nations state that refugees will be an economic burden and will take away jobs and social benefits. In Hungary, Italy, Poland and Greece, the majority of respondents say they have an

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[2] See: Daniele Archibugi, *Terrorism and Cosmopolitanism*, Rome, 2001, pp. 5–7.

[3] The doctrine of "long war" is a term of the Bush administration in 2006, also the title of the book: Michael T. Klare*, War without End*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1972.

[4] Mina Zirojević, *Terorizam – međunarodni pogled*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2015.

[5] http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2130

unfavorable opinion of the Muslims. At least a quarter of every nation has the same belief. (Please see figures 1 and 2 for further explanation.)

The great migration flow from the Middle East and Africa to Europe started in 2011, having especially intensified since 2014 and reaching an unprecedented scale in 2015 until recently, greatly exceeding the projected numbers of migrants for 2015. The growth rate of migration is generally on a world scale far greater than expected. Just two years ago, it was assumed that the total number of migrants in the world in 2015 will reach a maximum figure of 237 million, which is a serious growth rate compared to 1990, when the total number of migrants in the world amounted to "only" 154 million.[6] Still, even the most pessimistic predictions have proved to be insufficient because the number of migrants, especially to Europe and North America, is in a continuous enormous increase.

In an effort to curb and control the enormous influx of migrants to the EU countries, many of its members, due to the lack of a general and binding set, began to engage in solitary state measures in this field that often not only fail to achieve the desired effect, but also contribute to changing the image of the democratic status of these countries and highlight the numerous discrepancies between the proclaimed principles and regulations of the Union and the anti migration practice.

Figure 1. Do Europeans fear diversity?

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[6] UN, *Key trends in international migration*, Expert Group Meeting on The Post-2015 Era: Implication for the Global Research Agenda on Population Development, New York, 10 April 2015.

Many Europeans concerned with security, economic repercussions of refugee crisis

■ Top choice

	Refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism in our country	Refugees are a burden on our country because they take our jobs and social benefits	Refugees in our country are more to blame for crime than other groups
Hungary	76%	82%	43%
Poland	71	75	26
Netherlands	61	44	--
Germany	61	31	35
Italy	60	65	47
Sweden	57	32	46
Greece	55	72	30
UK	52	46	28
France	46	53	24
Spain	40	40	13
MEDIAN	59	50	30

Note: Netherlands excluded on question about crime (Q51b) due to administrative error.

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q51a-c.

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Figure 2. The same person in military and civilian service. [7]

[7] http://www.vestinet.rs/tema-dana/zele-osvetu-preko-4-000-militanata-uslo-u-evropu-kao-izbeglice. 14/11/2016.

5. CONCLUSION

By analyzing the content and using statistical methods, the paper attempted to determine all serious political and other types of anomalies that have been emerged in many countries of the European Union as a result of migration. There is also an apparent delayed reaction of the institutions of the Union to the challenges that migration has brought about, which is also visible in their attempt to solve the problem of migration mainly with money, which has now proved to be insufficient. There is no doubt that there are numerous dimensions of migration, which they have converted into a growing security challenge. Furthermore, the potential positive economic effects of migration discussed so far are not visible, despite the fact that it is easily possible to determine the benefits of such effects.

Migration is a security challenge for Serbia, not only in terms of increasing the threat of terrorism, but also because of the risk of regional conflicts. The greatest anomaly would be that the poorest countries of Europe, including Serbia, which, because of their relative economic underdevelopment and the high number of unemployed have no economic or any other interests in maintaining a number of migrants on their soil or bearing the costs of transit migration, bear the greatest burden of migration, as is the case now.

In terms of determining the duration of the actual migration, as well as the probability of being repeated in the near future, it can be concluded on the basis of the recent structure of the focal points of demographic explosion and the wars in the Middle East and Africa, and on the basis of the analysis of the reasons for migration and science-based assessment of their probable mass and intensity, that the population explosion in the Middle East and Africa in its further rapid rise is a potential for conflict in the Middle East Africa which is still very high. There is a small chance of calming the existing crisis focus as there is a high degree of probability that a new one will be opened in the near future and not just because of oil and religious extremism, but also because of shortages of other resources such as water, all of which implies the emergence of new and growing migratory waves due to the high population growth in the war areas and the possibilities of social engineering in the field of migration. The destination of these new, as well as the current migration waves, will continue to be the developed countries of Europe. The reason is the limitations of maritime and continental Europe with Africa and immense length of the Middle East, the wealth and social orderliness of Europe, as well as the fact that the indigenous population of Europe decreases rapidly. The increase in population in 2014, although the natural population growth was only 14.5%, is due to the influx of migrants of over 85%. The magnetism of Europe for migrants from the far Middle East and Africa is proven with the fact that every tenth migrant to the OECD countries is from China and one in four from India.[8]

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[8] OECD (2015), International Migration Outlook 2015, OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 11.

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THE MIGRANT CRISIS AND THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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ABSTRACT

The paper presents an overview of the challenges facing the Schengen system within the Area of freedom, security and justice in the European Union under the pressure of the migrant crisis and terrorist attacks. The idea of free movement in the European Union has been under strong pressure due to the migrant crisis and the necessity to strengthen the fight against terrorism. Therefore, the Union has introduced measures to follow the movement not only of persons entering Europe, but also the movement of persons within the Union.

The increase in the number of refugees in Europe has created a new challenge for the Schengen area of the EU. Looking for a suitable solution to the crisis, EU Member States have begun to restore border controls and have raised the issue to reform the Schengen system. As main reasons for the movement of migrants are considered the war in Syria and the political and economic instability in countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan, whose citizens moved to Europe. The countries of Western Europe, such as Germany, France and Austria were most affected by the wave of refugees, but no less affected are the Scandinavian countries, such as Denmark and Sweden. The Republc of Macedonia was part of the Balkan route of migrants and part of the humanitarrian corridor that funneled asylum seekers from Greece to Germany which was closed in March, 2016.

The migrant crisis raised the issue of whether it is possible to establish a temporary and limited lifting of the Schengen agreement to establish border control in terms of the flow of migrants in the EU. The paper presents an overview of the legal framework for action of the Member states of the European Union and gives proposals and suggestions of reforms that are necessary for the European Union in the area of the Schengen system.

> "The challenge to the European project today is existential. The refugee crisis has brought that to light. What was unimaginable before now becomes imaginable, namely the disintegration of the European project"
> *Frans Timmermans, European Commission First Vice President*
> *At the Friends of Europe's annual State of Europe debate*
> *(October 22, 2015)*

INTRODUCTION

The 'Area of freedom, security and justice' (AFSJ) is one of the most striking examples of just how far beyond the pure economic integration of the EU has been developed after the Amsterdam Treaty. The third pillar of the Treaty framework has been introduced as Justice and Home Affairs with the Maastricht Treaty and later the Treaty of Amsterdam has presented more supranational approach to some covered matters, such as immigration, asylum and judicial cooperation in civil matters, having cross order implications in the field of courts' jurisdiction and recognition and judgment enforcement. The cooperation predating the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 'has developed in various stages, evolved at variable speeds and has blended intergovernmental and integrationist elements in a unique way [1].'

Today, the Area of freedom, security and justice is based on the key principle of the internal market of the European Union for many years: an area without internal frontiers. As Article 3(2) TEU states: "The Union shall offer it citizens and area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime", which precedes the objectives of an internal market and economic and monetary Union.

Therefore, the common policies and regulations mainly refer to external border regulation and limitation of third country immigration because once the persons enter the Union (regardless if they are EU citizens or not), their free movement is guaranteed as one of the key elements of the internal market. Besides the fact that the free movement of people and the absence of internal borders are one of the cornerstones of the AFSJ, the security and justice components might include repressive measures over the movement of citizens. The 'right to security', especially of law abiding persons (both citizens and third-country nationals), is a fundamental right and can result in restrictions on the liberty of persons who pose a threat to security [2]. Such Treaties are perceived to have been aggravated or augmented by the abolishment of internal border controls, the Europeanisation and internationalization of organized crime, and the influx of immigrants and asylum-seekers, including illegal immigrants into the Member States of the Union, and Article 67(3) TFEU thus sets the objective of promoting a 'high level of security'[3].

An alternative approach to migration governance would have to reflect critically on the concepts, legal initiatives and policies that have characterised the last thirty years of Member State cooperation in this area and to rethink, and reframe, the area of freedom, security and justice. Reframing the area of freedom, security and justice requires, among other things, the de-legitimation of the present law-enforcement approach and the de-securitisation of migration, that is, its removal from the conceptual realm of security and sovereignty and its designation as a 'normal' issue to be dealt with through political processes [4]. This approach is an alternative way to reduce the prevailing definition of migration as a threat and/or a problem.

But when the basic objective of abolishing internal border controls in the Schengen area for the benefit of all the persons travelling within that area, regardless of their nationality, transforms into a threat of mass migrant influx, the Union has to face a new challenge. The technical possibility for the Member States to temporarily reintroduce internal border controls becomes a reality not only invoked in relation to security considerations by high-profile political meetings or sport events, but also regarding the movement of migrants from the war in Syria. The Schengen area becomes the main focus

of policy makers and the discussions regarding the need to reinforce border controls, create a set of new measures or reforms, if necessary, to overcome the migrant crisis, have been set highly on their agenda.

Schengen- factor for the integration of the European Union?

The Schengen Agreement came into force in 1995, and along with the Convention for its implementation, was formally codified in the law of the European Union with the Schengen Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty.

The Schengen Area is comprised of 26 countries that have agreed to allow free movement of their citizens within this area as a single country. Of the 26 countries bound by the Schengen agreement, 22 are part of the EU [5] and the other 4 are part of the EFTA (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland). This agreement provides the abolition of passports or any other type of border control within the internal borders of the EU Schengen zone, which guarantees free movement and open borders as key features of the European integration that are complementary to the single market of the Union. Moreover, the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement regulates the issue of standardization of the conditions of entry and residence, as well as issuing of visas for the territory of the Schengen zone. In that sense, this Convention regulates the issues of police and judicial cooperation and asylum for the countries in the Schengen zone. Also, the Schengen Agreement and the Convention allowed for enhanced control of the external border, closer cooperation between the judiciary and the police and well regulated visa policy. The Schengen system has been integrated into the legal and institutional framework of the European Union since 1999.

According to the Treaties of the Union, the issues concerning the Schengen area are subject to parliamentary and judicial control and as part of the *acquis*, they need to be adopted by the member states of the European Union.

According to Jorg Monar, the creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) has affected three key aspects. First, AFSJ touches upon essential functions and prerogatives of the modern nation-state. "Providing citizens with internal security, controlling external borders and access to national territory and administering justice have since the gradual emergence of the modern nation-state in the seventeenth to eighteenth century and its theoretical underpinning in the writings of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau all belonged to the basic justification and legitimacy of the existence of the state." Second, the AFSJ touches upon a number of very sensitive political issues. "The fight against crime and illegal immigration, ensuring that asylum systems are both fair and protected against abuse, and facilitating access to justice are issues which matter for European citizens". Third, the AFSJ has by now not only become a fundamental integration and treaty objective, [6] but also one of the major areas of 'growth' of EU action [7].

The migration crisis-challenge for the Schengen area

In recent years, the proper functioning of the Schengen area of free movement and its benefits to European citizens and the European economy has been under strong pressure due to the migrant crisis. Additionally, the need to strengthen the fight against terrorism has led several Member States to resort to reintroducing temporary internal border controls and to follow the movement not only of those entering Europe, but also the movement of persons within the Union [8].

The increase in the number of refugees in Europe has created a new challenge for the Schengen area of the EU, whereby part of border controls, albeit partially, were restored and the member states faced with increasing numbers of asylum seekers [9]. As main reasons for the movement of migrants are considered the war in Syria and the political and economic instability in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, whose citizens moved to Europe. Most affected by the wave of refugees were the countries in Western Europe, such as Germany, France and Austria, but no less affected are Scandinavian countries, such as Denmark and Sweden.

The migrant crisis has raised the question whether it is possible to establish a temporary and limited suspension of the Schengen agreement in order for the European Union to restore border controls for the flow of migrants. The legal framework allows termination of the Schengen Agreement, but this step is the least politically desirable because it would result with undermining the legal foundations of the community in times when "A stronger Union" is needed. Hence, Member States have decided to introduce permanent border controls, which, to some extent, has limited the application of the Schengen Agreement because open internal borders are considered as a key aspect of cross-border trade in the EU.

An article in the Financial Times points out: "If the Schengen accord finally buckles under the weight of Europe's migration and security crises, the world's biggest border-busting experiment will probably end as it began: with a long traffic jam [10] ". However, these gloomy predictions about the future of the Schengen zone may not happen, but they warn us that it is necessary to reform the legal framework of the Schengen agreement so as it becomes more responsive to the new challenges.

Historically, the Schengen *acquis* can be considered as a successful chapter, but also as a failure in the history of the European Union. The most visible results can be found in the good functioning of the Schengen area, which is based on removal of all border controls for EU citizens when they travel in some of the Member States of the Union. On the other hand, this important feature of the so-called European identity has come under pressure to criticism that not all member states have joined the Schengen area in good faith.

As professor Ester Herlin-Karnell [11] pointed out, Schengen is about more than just freedom from passports, queues and traffic jams. It has functioned as a means of regular exchange of information between Member States in order to counter terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the most widely used information-sharing instrument today. Competent national authorities can use it to check alerts on wanted or missing persons and objects, both inside the Union and at the external border. The SIS was upgraded in early 2015 to improve information exchange on terrorist suspects and to reinforce the efforts of Member States to invalidate the travel documents of persons suspected of wanting to join terrorist groups outside the EU.

Therefore, the *acquis* of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is considered as one of the fastest growing areas in the European Union that necessarily must respond to modern security challenges. The flow of migrants and the threat of terrorist attacks opened the discussion about the reforms that are necessary for the European Union.

What reforms are needed for the Schengen system?

The Policy of open borders of the European Union resulted in serious threats. The string of terrorist attacks in Europe initiated the necessity to review the model of functioning of the Schengen area. The attacks by the Islamic State in November 2015 in Paris resulted in 130 deaths. It was thought that the killers had easily slipped into Paris from Belgium and that some had entered the European Union with crowds of migrants via Greece. The number of Syrian refugees, which exceeded a million, further increased the pressure on the Schengen agreement for an urgent rethink in 2015. The attack on the Christmas bazaar in Germany in December 2016, which resulted with twelve killed people, has reopened the debate on how terrorists enter the territories of the Western European countries without being detected and without being able to prevent their attacks. All these factors influenced the political elite of the European Union to take the necessary steps to reform the Schengen area. Schengen is often criticized by nationalists and Eurosceptics who say it is an open door for migrants, criminals and terrorists in particular.

In December 2015, this issue was opened by the European Commission, which adopted an important set of measures to manage the EU's external borders and protect the Schengen area without internal borders [12]. The proposals will help to manage migration more effectively, improve the internal security in the EU and safeguard the principle of free movement of persons. The Commission proposes to amend the Schengen Border Code in order to introduce, at the external borders of the EU, systematic checks against relevant databases for all people entering or exiting the Schengen area. In return, a uniform European travel document will facilitate effective return of illegally staying third country nationals. Practically, it means that most of the travelers who are not from the EU countries will be checked in police databases at the external borders of the Union. The change is that this rule will also apply to citizens of the European Union, which was not a case before. In addition, the non-EU citizens who have Schengen visas are not normally checked by the competent authorities when traveling within the Schengen area. These checks by the police applied more frequently after the terorist attacks in Paris in 2015.

These steps for introduction of security measures and temporary reintroduction of border controls in some Member States of the Schengen have raised the question as to whether such restrictions may affect the common market, free movement of persons and European integration in general. In this context, few more issues were highlited, such as the threat of limiting free movement of labor, reduced number of tourist trips and a decline in revenues from tourism, the stagnation of foreign direct investment and foreign capital.

On the other hand, the strengthening of security measures and border controls raised the issue of reforms in the Schengen area. In 2011, the former president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, stressed that in order to avoid giving rise to the arguments of populists and extremists, the best way to avoid putting the Schengen at risk was to reinforce its governance and clarify some aspects of its operation. "We know that it is now fashionable in some quarters to be extremist or populist or even to wave sometimes the flags of xenophobia. This is not what we are going to do [13] ".

At the beginning of 2016, seven of the twenty-six countries of the Schengen zone temporarily imposed border controls again. In February 2016, the Council adopted a recommendation on addressing serious deficiencies identified during an evaluation of Greece's application of the Schengen *acquis* in the area of external border management. The recommendation proposes to Greece remedial action to address these deficiencies. Where, after three months from the adoption of the Council recommendation, serious deficiencies persist and the measures taken have not proved sufficient, the Commission

may trigger the application of the procedure provided for in Article 26 of the Schengen Borders Code, under threat of suspension of the Schengen by two years.

As outlined in the document of the European Parliament [14], from a legal standpoint, any temporary border control falling outside the scope of Articles 23-26 of the SBC (as a last resort, in case of a foreseeable or unforeseeable event that poses a serious threat to public policy or internal security, or when a Member State is not able to control the Schengen area's external borders), is illegal and would be subject to infringement proceedings. Schengen Borders Code explicitly states that migration flows per se cannot be used as a reason to impose border controls. A longer-term reintroduction of temporary border controls or a temporary suspension would require amendment of the Schengen Borders Code or the Treaties.

On 7 February 2017, the Council adopted an implementing decision setting out a recommendation to prolong temporary internal border controls in exceptional circumstances. Starting from 11 February 2017, when the previous decision expires, Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway should prolong proportionate temporary border controls for a maximum period of three months. Before prolonging such controls, those member states concerned should exchange views with the relevant member states to ensure that internal border controls are carried out only where it is considered necessary and proportionate. They should also ensure that internal border controls are only carried out as a last resort when other alternative measures cannot achieve the same effect. Border controls should be targeted and limited in scope, frequency, location and time, to what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat and to safeguard public policy and internal security resulting from the continued risk of secondary movements of irregular migrants. The member states that carry out these controls should review each week whether they are still necessary and adjust them to the level of the threat, phasing them out wherever appropriate. They should report to the Commission and the Council every month [15]. Before the Balkan route was closed by the Member States of the European Union in March 2016, following the decision of Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia to accept no more refugees without valid passports and visas, and according to the decision to implement a new regime in the Schengen area, a debate was opened on one of the key issues posed by the refugee crisis: does the Schengen need reforms?

Member states were concerned that closing the borders can pose a new danger: closing internal borders may simply cause a redirection of migrant flows to new routes, rather than a reduction of entries. In fact, in May 2016, just two months after the Balkan route was closed, Macedonia prevented entry of 11,800 migrants in an illegal attempt to enter the Macedonian-Greek border, in order to continue to some of the western European countries.

The debate on reforms of the Schengen area has first opened the dilemma of whether the non-application of the Schengen rules and re-imposing border controls is a suitable response to the refugee influx in the European Union. Notably, Article 3 of the Schengen Borders Code stipulates that asylum-seekers are expressly exempted from the Schengen rules on unauthorized entry across the borders, and on the other hand the EU Asylum Procedures Directive requires Member States to process asylum applications made at the borders, which reflects the collision of the legal norms in the EU legislation.

Another way to affect the level of security of the European Union caused by massive migrants influx is a reform of the Dublin system, rather than reform of the Schengen system. The Dublin Regulation establishes the Member State responsible for the examination of the asylum application [16]. Every single asylum application lodged within

EU territory needs to be examined - each EU country must be able to determine if and when it is responsible for handling an asylum claim. The objective of the Dublin Regulation is to ensure quick access to asylum procedures and the examination of an application on the merits by a single, clearly determined Member State.

In this regard, the EU Court of Justice has made it clear that in applying the Dublin System (which aims to ensure that one Member State is responsible for the examination of an asylum application, to prevent multiple asylum claims), a Member State cannot assume that the asylum seeker's fundamental rights will be respected in another Member State [17].

This leads towards a conclusion that strengthening of the common asylum system in the EU and better-coordinated management of the external borders of the European Union would be a more appropriate response to the migrant crisis, than non-application of the Schengen rules.

Reforms towards enhanced cooperation and information exchange between Member States of the Union might be undertaken in another area- the Prum Treaty for cross-border cooperation [18]. It provides an opportunity for automatic comparison of data such as DNA, fingerprints, vehicle registration data, which are crucial in the fight against crime in the process of gathering evidence and prosecuting the perpetrators. This framework applies only to a very small number of Member States that meet the legal and technical conditions for its implementation [19], although it may give very good results in fighting organized crime and terrorism.

CONCLUSIONS

The benefits of the Schengen system began to receive the same dimensions as its abuses, so the reforms that will not jeopardize the rights of citizens guaranteed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, but will penalize the perpetrators of crimes, ensuring freedom, security and justice, have become necessary.

Schengen is one of the most significant achievements of the European Union which provides police and judicial cooperation on issues like terrorism or organized crime, facilitating trade within the Union and free movement of goods and services of immense value [20]. Abolition of or limitations on the Schengen might bring a loss of these benefits acquired through many years of common building of the EU.

The Schengen system is facing numerous legal and economic challenges under the pressure of mass migration movements and the threat of terrorism. They affect the relativization of its success, although it is one of the greatest achievements of European integration. Despite the strong pressure, the EU heads remain strongly committed to the concept of "EU without borders" and its benefits, and retention of the principle of free movement and stronger Schengen aimed at enhanced economic cooperation. They also strongly believe in collective security achieved through cross-border cooperation.

In these circumstances, the Union faces a new challenge today, i.e. how to restore the full functionality of the Schengen after lifting the temporary border controls. The threat of refugee crisis and terrorist attacks raises the level of caution and security in the Member States and creates fear of the idea of completely free border zones, a principle which is grounded in the idea of free movement in the European Union. In this case, when the level of distrust in restoring the full functionality of the security system of the EU is high, a comprehensive debate of the EU leadership is necessary and it should lead towards new reforms of the Schengen system.

One of the biggest threats of today, terrorism, allies with open borders and the free

movement of persons, goods and services. Open market of the European Union means open borders for cooperation, but also a challenge for the authorities to reform the Schengen system towards early warning and detection, instead of lifting the Schengen regulations and reintroducing border controls. The best solution towards which the Union should focus is a sophisticated intelligence system that would detect the criminal activities of potential perpetrators.

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CRISIS AND SOCIAL SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

Crisis and crisis events have become commonplace in modern society and therefore the paper is dedicated to their analysis. In the first part of the paper, the relation between crisis and security will be analyzed through the origins and roots of the crisis and then entrapment crisis of social conflicts and interests will be presented. The second part of the paper analyzes the influence of modern crisis trends on security and comes to the conclusion that modern crisis is a complex phenomenon that affects the social security and requires the involvement of all capacities to solve them.

Keywords: crisis, social security, conflicts, interests.

1. INTRODUCTION

Does the disturbance of the secure environment of an individual generate, for man as an individual or for the social entity, requests for engagement of exceptional powers and means in order to protect the aspirations and needs? The answer is certainly yes. Accomplishing man's basic needs is the principal condition for his existence. The disturbance of the possibility to accomplish those needs produces a situation that diverges from the "normal" one. A new situation, in which man has to spend time and resources, change the circumstances in which he lives and works in order to return to the regular situation, is considered a crisis. The essence of crisis is that the normal process in a certain social system is disturbed. The new situation appears in multiple forms and modes.

2. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE CRISIS CONCEPT AND SECURITY

The phenomenon of crisis, regarding human security, has become the topic of research for many scientists. Researchers of different kinds have established the whole spectrum of factors that can cause disturbances in the fulfillment of person's needs or functioning of society. That multitude of factors can be classified by different system levels. Although the reasons for crisis are different from one case to another, we can divide them into external and internal ones. [Adomeit, H. 1982] The majority of crisis researchers share the opinion that modern crises cannot be explained by citing several easily recognizable factors. Catastrophe sociologists abandoned "god's will" as a model for explaining catastrophe, but have not come up with other acceptable explanations. When it comes to crisis, a similar type of explanation – human error and motives of "crazy" mind – gave way to approaches that fit better in the context and processes of modern crisis. The

research of crisis causes has become a multidisciplinary activity that paves the way to a multidimensional approach that enables analyzing the origins of each crisis and its implications on society security. The empirical and theoretical challenge is to apply the perspectives of security needs and requirements on a dynamic crisis process that takes the system from one temporary state to another. This process can have a form of permanent escalation, shifting from one level to another and accumulating significant negative capacity, threatening in character.

The majority of crises originate from a combination of individual errors, organizational oversights and environmental influences. Since different crises follow different critical trajectories, crisis researchers need a methodology that would enable a reconstruction and comparison of each crisis process. A "new" theoretical perspective is necessary – developing a study field for complexity and a revived interest in the evolutional perspectives that connect different factors functioning at different analysis levels. Such analysis can help us understand the combination of human error, organizational pathology and environmental imperatives into processes that cause a disturbance of the system, but it does not explain why and where only certain tensions, problems and worsening conditions are defined by the term crisis or catastrophe. We need to understand how the escalating crisis process is entwined with the political processes and the processes of social deduction. [Beck, U. 1992]

For understanding this process, the findings from the research of political defeats and failures are useful. They show that labels like "fiasco" and "disaster" are a product of the social interaction between the key players in the political and social arena. The media play a key, controversial and hardly definable role in this process. In it, for some, catastrophe is a golden opportunity and a chance for others.

2.1.   The concept and origin of crisis

A crisis is a personal, national or international situation where there is a threat to the priority values, interests or goals. Such definition undoubtedly implies a direction and a form of a negative activity of situations at different levels to human secure environment. Therefore, a crisis is a specific condition of changed circumstances where human individual and social existential needs are seriously disturbed. Nevertheless, a crisis should not be explicitly taken as a negative stream, for at the same time it can be a very serious chance. [Kesetovic, Z., Kekovic, Z. 2009]

The word *crisis* is nowadays probably one of most used words in everyday language of politicians, journalists and in social conversation. It is also used to describe a personal, i.e. private situation, but more often to describe a state of the society as a whole, or of certain organizations and systems within. Still, despite its frequent use, the term crisis has no clear and unambiguous meaning, but there are many, often quite different, interpretations. [Almond, G.A., Flanagan, S., Mundt, R. 1973] From an etymological point of view, the word crisis comes from the Greek language. In ancient Greece, the word crisis (κριςις) meant "verdict" or "decision". In Mandarin, the symbol for crisis contains characters with meanings "danger" and "opportunity" and therefore it is interpreted as both good and bad. [Kesetovic, Z., Kekovic, Z. 2009]

In general, the term crisis is applied to any sudden interruption of the continual development. More specifically, it denotes a situation that marks a turn from some positive development towards a negative one, i.e. the climax of a dangerous development. Crisis denotes "a special state in the development of some occurrence; a twist in comparison to the former direction". The study of crisis is important for practical mastering of crises, and

on the other hand, it is very interesting as the basis for developing crisis theories and implications on security. Defining crisis shows that in different times theoreticians developed different views of it. They consider that important elements are the *surprise* and the element of *time limitation* to act upon it, and that both these elements depend on the characteristics of each particular case. They are both obstacles to decision making. Some experts add to them the element of *insecurity* in a crisis situation. All that affects those who fight crises, i.e. who return the system into secure environment.

There are several different definitions when it comes to the concept of crisis. The crisis is a real situation or a general provocative event, unlike an accident that is concrete and direct in character. Accident is a factual situation that occurs due to objective circumstances. Such a situation can easily cause a crisis that is echoed in the social public or that induces certain public opinions. When the origin of the crisis is determined, it forms a specific situation that requires specific actions, specific people to master the crisis and causes specific opinions.

Modern definition of crisis was given by the theoretician Paul t' Hart stating that "crisis is an unpleasant event that challenges and tempts the decision makers to act under conditions of threat, limited time and unreadiness." Crisis occurs when everyday public life is disturbed either by external factors, unprovoked cumulative consequences of the process of organizing and leading a society, or by intentional acting of special groups that want to achieve their goal by discernable evil.

The London school determines crisis as a real incident that affects human security, the environment, the products or reputation of an organization. Such an incident usually causes a hostile reaction of the media. In accordance with such determination, crisis is perceived as circumstances that endanger the life, security or even the survival of the individual, the organization or society. What is important for a crisis is the time pressure which means that managers have to make decisions urgently and overcome the stress of all crisis participants.

Crises are transition stages, when the normal modes of functioning do not apply any more. Crisis is "serious threat to basic structures or fundamental values and norms of the social system that, in conditions of time, pressure and very insecure conditions, requires making of critical decisions." [Rosenthal, U., Charles, M.T., P.'t Hart 2002] An important advantage of this definition is that it can be applied to all kinds of disturbances (ecology threats, IT breakdowns, economic crises, internal state conflicts, jail rebels, regional wars and natural disasters). Crises can be determined as unplanned and unwanted processes whose duration is limited, that can be partly affected and that can end in different manners.

In order to align the different perspectives, the term "crisis" is usually used as a "wildcard", as a concept that covers all types of negative events. On even larger scale, the term crisis is applied to situations that are unwanted, unexpected and almost unimaginable, that cause widespread disbelief and insecurity. [Rosenthal, U., Charles, M.T., P. 't Hart 2002] Such a definition of crisis contains three key components: threat, uncertainty and urgency.

Crises occur when the essential values or systems supporting the existential needs are exposed to a certain threat. If we consider the widespread and rooted values, such as safety and security, social care, health, justice, etc. that become insecure or even pointless due to the negative effect of an oncoming disaster, it is clear they have a very negative effect on both individuals and society. The dependence of secure life on the listed values is directly proportional to the scale of the crisis and vice versa.

Such approach explains why an oncoming natural disaster causes a deep sense of crisis, such as a death threat, material destruction, hunger, loss of loved ones. Therefore, it is obvious that it includes a disturbance of the deeply rooted values of safety and security.

Crisis	Negative aspects	Positive aspects
General organizational plan	Perturbation, disorder	Balanced capabilities for research, restoration of social structure
Action plan	Inertia, paralysis, source of confusion	Research of adaptation to new, more efficient actions
Plan of relations between protagonists	Conflict, rivalry	Cooperation, alliance, coalition
Behavioral plan – behavior caused by a stress	Tensions leading to imprudent moves	Cause of stress, search for clearer solutions
Value plan	Banality, routine	Prevention, challenging solidarity
Learning related plan	Quick approaching to norms	Experimenting

Figure 3: Aspects of crisis effects

Source: Lalonde, C.: In Search of Archetypes in Crisis Management, Journal Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 12, 2004, p.775

The perception of threats in a crisis is inevitably coupled by a high degree of uncertainty. [Flin, R. 1996] Uncertainty is related to the nature and sources, but also to the potential consequences of a threat. It generates many questions: what happened, why it happened, how bad it is, what is the right course of action, etc. There is no doubt that crises create a feeling of urgency. That statement is justified and is related to the effects of a crisis. The fact is that during a crisis, the existential needs of man are endangered and that imposes an urgent need to apply some measures that will either prevent or soften such intention.

Beside the mentioned characteristics, it is necessary to pay attention to another two important characteristics. The first one is applicable to all types of disturbances of the secure environment (ecological threats, problems related to information technologies, economic disasters, intranational conflicts, regional wars, factory explosions and natural disasters) (Fig. 3). This characteristic alone is requiring a multidisciplinary approach in understanding the crisis. The second definition focuses the protagonists' attention to decision making: crises imply both an opportunity and a necessity to make critical decisions.

Although the proposed definition is most acceptable in relative terms, it is not faultless either. For, understood in this manner, crisis is in a certain way constructed by the elite. Those who have the authority and power, decide if certain process or event means progress or disturbance of normality. This definition is burdened by the return to normality and everyday order. That poses the question if such an approach is justifiable from the point of view of some individual. As the system consists of individuals, and if certain level of authority determines the moment of beginning and end of the crisis, the events outside the formal framework questionable, i.e. the elimination of negative effects formed outside the formal framework.

This crisis definition does not solve the issue of subjectivity and that makes the integration of the theoretical perspectives difficult. Judging by this definition, we can

consider a situation as a crisis only if the participants of the event in question perceive that situation as a crisis (so called Thomas' theorem). This subjective understanding of crisis makes it impossible to demarcate precisely the beginning and the end of the crisis, since different participants perceive the same situation as a crisis at different points in time. If we say that individuals or groups have to perceive a certain situation as a crisis (threat, urgency, insecurity) that automatically means that we have missed some events or processes that many of us would term as crisis just because the competent people did not recognize that situation as a crisis. As long as the competent people who are in charge of taking adequate measures remain unaware of the situation, the analyst cannot define a certain situation as a crisis. Therefore, it might be useful to search for more objective definitions of crisis.

The conceptualization of crisis as a period of discontinuity that is marked by a breaking point in a linear process that follows the routine pattern is based on classic ways of research in sociology and political sciences. In that kind of definitions, crisis is regarded as a disturbance of normality. It is problematic from the position of modern researchers in social sciences, for it reminds to a structural-functional analysis. Nevertheless, this type of definition helps in overcoming the shortcomings of the "decision making" definition of crisis.

The generic definition of crisis requires a process approach. Crisis has no clear beginning. The consequences of the crisis are felt in the future, the crisis can pick up substantially after, according to an assumption or a decision, it has ended.

2.2.   Conditionality of crisis by social conflicts and interests

The disturbance of social, political or economic order is as old as life. Human needs, both individual and social, are growing with time and with the level of development. In the initial stage of development of man as an individual, the needs were much simpler than after the first groups and societies were formed. Man fulfills his needs entirely in society, so the influence of a social crisis is equally significant as that of an individual crisis. In the domain of social crises, the role of the people in power is very important, both individually and as organized groups (parties, associations). The fact that crises are not bad luck or god's punishment implies that the reasons for crises are real events everywhere around people and that the disturbance caused in the social systems cannot be prevented. [Bovens, M., tHart, P. 1996] This is exactly where the focus is turned on those in power, those who are mandated to protect the "ordinary" man from all adversities. Therefore, they are the ones to determine the beginning of the crisis, its end, the forces and means to fight the crisis, the required finances and the manner of that fight. Linear deliberation suggesting that big events must have big consequences enabled a different approach and understanding of crisis, highlighting ever more complex consequences.

The central topic or issue in society is forming, protection and development of fundamental and generally accepted values. The needs of the society in achieving this goal are materialized in social interests. Having in mind the very complex and uncertain development of man and society, each society is very careful when defining its own interests. The projection of the defined interests into national interests creates the pinnacle of measures taken to protect society's identity. Still, one of the roots of social phenomena complexity is the sole definition of national interests. In other words, if a society or a state defines its interests without respecting or partially respecting the interests of its environment, conditions are created for possible conflicts. Conflicts are as old as man and

society. They are a form of social reactions whose manifestation can be very specific and different, such as: war, fighting, friendship, animosity, alliance, etc. [Kovac, M., Stojkovic, D. 2009] Conflicts have changed through history, irrespective of the knowledge of their participants, i.e. their objectivization occurred only after a certain time distance (Figure 4). [Kovac, M., Stojkovic, D. 2009] Either openly or in a hidden manner, conflicts generate certain consequences that affect values of human society. Materialization is a consequence, either immediate or with time delay, in compliance with "the one who writes history". Multicausality, mutliconsequentiality and multidimensionality of fighting create a fertile ground for generating different kinds of crises. In that sense, crises are the result of multiple and multidimensional causes that, together, bring about threats with a devastating potential. Such conception tends to oppose practice, for it opposes the traditional logic of "trigger and cause" that makes the background of an event. The prevailing belief is that a certain set of factors causes a crisis. Once the causes are determined, it is the right situation to differentiate internal and external factors. Still, it is more obvious and precise to say that some intensive processes undermine the capability of the social system to fight against disturbances. The essence is that the cause of the crisis can come out of any reason, but the cause of the crisis is actually the incapability of the system to overpower the disturbances. The logical question is whether modern systems are becoming more and more susceptible to breaks. The answer to that question is twofold. On the one side, it implies an increased resistance of the society by developing modern technologies, i.e. improved equipment of the society to handle routine errors. On the other side, it implies a decreased resistance of the society systems, materialized in the appearance of disturbances that cause certain negative effects on everyone (for instance, power outage).

No.	Type of crisis (conflict)	Year
1	Iraq-Iran war	September 22, 1980
2	Falklands war	June 02-14, 1982
3	Grenada invasion	October 25 – December 15, 1983
4	Panama invasion	December 20, 1989 – Dec. 31, 1990
5	Iraqi forces invade Kuwait	August 02, 1990
6	Desert storm	January 17, 1991
7	Ten-days war in Slovenia	June 25, 1991
8	Terrorist attack on World Trade Center in New York	September 11, 1991
9	Bombing of FR Yugoslavia	March 24 – June 10, 1999
10	War against terrorism in Afghanistan	October 07, 2001
11	Aggression on Iraq and start of bombing	March 19, 2003
12	American forces enter Baghdad	April 09, 2003

Figure 4: Account of conflicts and crises worldwide
Source: Karovic,S., Komazec, N.: Krize i krizni menadzment, Novi glasnik, 04/2009

The quality of complex systems that initiate progress is in the core of most, if not all, technological crises. As social-technical systems become more complex and more connected to the subsystems, their susceptibility to disturbances grows at an exponential rate. Suddenly there is also the danger from multiplication of interactions, both horizontal and vertical, due to the close connectivity of one system with others.

A separate segment of social life, relevant to the susceptibility to disturbances of the social systems, is globalization, a process connecting world markets and financial systems forming unitary systems of global culture and security. The process and principles of globalization erase all limits and increase susceptibility to disturbances, due to the enlarged technical technological expansion, fast communications and the development of global awareness, resulting in neglect of the local problems.

Non-linear dynamics and complexity of social activities complicate crisis detection. The complexity of modern systems makes their understanding more intricate and labeling the multitude of factors and activities they include becomes more difficult. The increased weakness of the systems is more difficult to recognize and inefficient attempts to overcome small disorders keep piling. In this way, a system instigates a hidden crisis. [Rijpma, J.A. 1989] The roots of a crisis can be distant (geographically), but it can be intensified quickly through global networks, switching from one system to another, increasing the destructive potential, but also increasing the chances for progress.

3. INFLUENCE OF MODERN CRISIS TRENDS ON SECURITY

Classic crisis was a destructing event that caused death, serious injuries or material damage. It was a clearly defined event, with a clear beginning and end, cause of destruction and victims. Such events still happen and still cause damage and insecurity. However, the causes of such events are nowadays much more understandable. Classic crises have become routine crises that fall inside the boundaries of acceptable risk for modern society. They are in the region of controllable crises, judging by the known characteristics of the causes of the initial events.

Prominent theoretician Ulrich Beck characterized modern society as a society of risks in which obsessive fear of endangered security dominates over the threat of destruction. That is why modern crisis is very different from the events that were commonly studied as crisis. Modern crisis has *endemic* characteristics, which implies that modern crisis is a logical correlate of more and more complex systems that cannot cope with the security requests due to technological, financial or political reasons. Modern crisis is in its nature *complex*: it comprises new combinations of known crises that point in the direction of solutions that turn out to be actually sources of escalation. Moreover, modern crises have the tendency of *self-eternalization*; the process turns into a vicious circle that feeds on insecurity and uncertainty regarding causes and causal chains. There is no turning back to normal since future crises will again appear in changed forms. Modern crisis is also the result of the perception of values in society and the manner in which threats are perceived. Furthermore, it is the logical consequence of dominant trends that have shaped and are still shaping modern society.

Modern theories include several phenomena that better define the influence of crisis on society security and these are: transnationalization, media society, decline of state authority and technological development.

Transnationalization

Until the last years of the 20th century, security was linked exclusively to the state. The national framework was the central arena and the boundary for protection of the national interests. Negative events, those caused by human, but also natural factors, showed the porosity of such approach and directed the security view towards regional and global level. The effects of the negative events did not affect values just within national borders, but in a much wider area (for instance Chernobyl, Fukushima, diseases, draughts).

Crises do not recognize borders of national states and do not stop there. Crises are increasingly defined at regional and transnational levels.

The global range of calamities is ever more present: two world wars, economic regression worldwide, nuclear accidents and actual ecological trends require a global view. The sources of problems can still be local or national, but the direct and long-term consequences of disasters and crises are spreading over countries and continents. The majority of large disasters and crises in the last decade already point out the significance of this transnational dimension. Crises can spill over from local region to the international arena, but more than ever before they have to be a part or a manifestation of problems that are global by their nature. The most persuasive examples are the ecological trends (depletion of the ozone layer, global warming, acid rains) that spread and, according to some experts, are endangering the very survival of the planet, requiring thus, international action and investment of huge funds in long-term projects. At the same time, the global nature of the problem generates significant insecurity. Those negative consequences that were heretofore limited to national borders, as endangering of the environment and economic stagnation, are ever more influencing the political and social situation in neighboring countries. Mass migration and tides of refugees, lack of food and resources, increased number of war destructions, cyber criminal, etc. are examples that confirm the seriousness of the current situation in near and far future.

Media Society

A consequence of a crisis is the breakdown of the symbolic framework that legitimizes the order in which people realize their secure environment. The elements of security of normal life disappear, only a chaotic state of what remains arises. Crises cause multiple levels of uncertainty, from personal to collective. At the personal level, affected persons face cognitive undeniable information that things have turned to worse. [t Hart, P., Rosenthal, U., Kouzmin, A. 2008] At the social level, this cognitive conflict is reflected on the activities of numerous groups and organizations that define the situation in various ways, offering differing claims about causes, functioning and further development of the situation. The same problems are characteristic for the international level too. To a significant extent, the cognitive problems increase or decrease depending on the steps taken by the actual government. The authorities build their credibility on the results of acting in crisis situations. The ideas for resolving a crisis situation, which do not have to match the expert views, need, in general, to reach the people affected by the accident. The ideas are mainly communicated through the media reports. Credibility does not lead automatically to a successful communication in crisis. The reason for this is that there are many actors in the arena, who transmit the information from various angles and interests. The context in which information is created is mainly developed within the triangle: political actors, mass media, and citizens. Before the expansion of information and communications technology, information was transmitted slowly and most often than not it would not reach far, losing thus by that time its importance. That means that information about accidents and crises did not even reach the people who were realistically at risk.

A particular place is reserved for the crisis perception of decision makers. As Thomas theorem states "If men define situations as crises, they will be crises in their consequences", from which it can be seen that the onset of a crisis or an accident depends on the perception of the decision makers. When citizens or authorities define or declare a difficult situation as a crisis or a disaster, it can have a decisive impact on the further flow of events. To call the situation a crisis can induce overreactions and excessive vigilance,

starting with collective stress all the way to key decision making by the authorities in charge. On the other hand, it may trigger collective energy and activation of the rules for emergency mode and the norms necessary for efficient crisis and disaster management. These problems are largely dependent on the media. Sometimes the signal for a crisis situation can be given on time, however if it is not timely transmitted where necessary, it will not have any effect.

The media have become one of the key powers that influence the world of crisis management. The media connect the spot at which the crisis has been created, with the rest of the world, transmitting warning signals, reports on consequences, connecting people, etc. [Nye,J. 2000] The media are inclined to intensively cover two types of events. First, they are interested in ominous perspective and current enactment of mega disasters with a large number of potential or actual casualties and the size of the physical damage. The reason for that is, current and gigantic information will bring publicity. Second, the media show particular interest in typically subjective types of crises characterized by madness, panic and collective stress that can weaken the normative structure of society.

Technological development

Sudden and ever more rapid development of information and communications technology, satellite communications and internet have induced a dramatic change in human perception of temporal and spatial limitations. This technological development has impacted the traits of crises as well. Technology has become so complex that users often do not understand how it works, which makes detection and correction of errors in their operations more difficult. The successful design of technological systems requires tight coupling of their elements, which increases probability for chain reaction. [Living with risk, 2009] The development of the immanently high risk technologies also impacts the potential scope of the crisis. The increasing dependence on computer systems makes our social and economic systems ever more vulnerable to the threats of hackers and cyber terrorists. A completely new dimension of high risk technologies focuses our attention towards the field of medicine technology and genetic manipulation. The consequences of this development may be seen only in several generations, but their impact can be irreparable. Such development can benefit from the growing divergence between mega-science and knowledge or understanding of those who bring political decisions.

Technological development has not contributed only to the prosperity of the world and the individual. The other side of technological development is related to the accumulation of known and unknown destructive potential in the environment. The progress can best be observed in the development of information and communications technology systems, which have reduced vast physical distances to time dimensions measured by seconds and minutes. [Blummer, J.G., Gurevitch, M. 1995] Robotization and automatization of technological processes have led to a sudden increase of production, primarily of materials that do not have short term of decomposition, which further leads to accumulation of waste and endangering of the environment. Increased energy needs have led to the building and development of nuclear power plants, which can be very vulnerable and the source of threat on the global level, as it was seen in Fukushima in 2011.

The impact analysis of technological revolution convincingly corroborates the statement that all countries with access to information and other technologies have an advance over those who do not have such access. Technological superiority results in strategic superiority. [Stojanovic, S. 2009] Through technological innovation, more and more individuals and organizations express their freedom and initiative, as well as new

forms of power. This particularly refers to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as in the example of various terrorist organizations, but also of countries that uncontrollably produce these weapons. Information revolution reflects the prosperity in the future, but also the potential for the increase number of conflicts, as triggering events for crises and security breaches.

Attrition of State Power

In predominantly neoliberal countries, the role of the state has been diminished during the last decades. Traditional prerogatives of civil authorities during crises give way to a less clear and unquestionable definition of the tasks that public authorities need to perform in order to prevent, prepare for and face crises. This political and administrative trend has implications on the causes, characteristics and consequences of the crisis.

Tendencies of austerity and restrictive behavior in a crisis should be added to the declining role of the public authorities. As a result of a performance crisis, large budget overruns and decline of legitimacy in the eyes of the public, new governments in the "West" were elected that stated New Public Management as their credo. [Blummer, J.G., Gurevitch, M. 1995] As one of the tools for "doing more with less", the focus was put on reduction of expenses and reevaluation of priorities. The second tool was the improvement of public management. In the atmosphere of austerity and reforms, the measures for prevention and reduction of potential crises received less attention than the already existing problem (and which could be identified as endemic crisis of public management). Decline of resources affects staffing, activities of maintenance, repairs, rehearsals and practice, planning, and prejudges many factors whose interaction may be the cause of a crisis. Taking into account that the benefits stemming from crisis management activities are much more difficult to quantify than expenses, it is possible that such activities are underestimated, which can further lead to a decrease of funds for this purpose. [Kesetovic, Z., Kekovic, Z. 2009]

In many instances, organizations do not manage to transform vast quantity of data into useful information. The reason can be found in the collective negligence, ignorance or rivalry. A significant element represents an increase in the number of participants that enter the crisis arena: private companies complement the traditional, but declining role of the state. In other words, the responsibility for the crisis has become divided between public and private actors. Public security has become increasingly dependent on private security companies. In many instances, private companies are the only ones that have the potential to resolve the problem, unlike the public ones, which are limited with legal frameworks or the slowness of administration in decision making. [Blummer, J.G., Gurevitch, M. 1995] Crises in large organizations have become almost an exclusive domain of security managers. Past years have shown that government actors may be a significant cause of public and private crises.

When the crisis strikes, the public turns to the public authorities expecting a decisive action, instant relief and long-term leadership. Public authorities then find themselves between limited possibilities to provide an effective crisis management and an increased readiness of the part of public to scrutinize government actions and blame it when they think it is needed. During crisis, critical attitudes towards government and its activities are quickly transformed into a decline of legitimacy. The loss of support does not refer only to what the public authorities have done during the crisis, but it also reduces the ambitions of the public authorities related to future crisis prevention. The role of the public in the crisis arena becomes the part of the vicious circle, whose boundaries are abolished by the media which further facilitate the fueling or extinguishing of the problem.

Highly qualified services for data collection represent a particular problem in contemporary societies, i.e. environment related data being integrated into a coherent and useable story. It is a two-way problem. The first part of the problem is the agreement on the interpretation of the information. People of different profiles and on different functions, interpret the information in different ways, so that the decision making bodies are inefficient in bringing about consensus. Many social organizations lack the capacity to make the right assessment, or the general framework that specifies weaknesses and prescribes the method for their recognition, which more often than not, serves for politicization. The second part of the problem is the inexistence of mechanisms within the government that would enable and facilitate rapid recognition of the danger. [Kesetovic, Z., Kekovic, Z. 2009]

Therefore, the problem that influences negatively the efficiency of the state apparatus is the impossibility of identification and rapid recognition of endangering signals, due to the organizational model, the existence of various sub-models and interests, the data often extremely dispersed among various organizations.

4. CONCLUSION

The aforementioned conditions show us that contemporary society is in a particular state of uncertainty and instability called a crisis. However, the size of the crisis and even the acceptation that crisis exists, depends on the authorities in charge, i.e. their perception of an imminent threat to the fundamental values of society that requires an immediate response to the uncertainty and insecurity, but also of the interest that some event is perceived as a crisis. Crisis events represent a serious challenge for the authorities, as well as a serious security problem for the individual and the society. Citizens rightly expect that the society will protect them and provide them with safe environment in which they can fulfill their own needs. However, the very conditions that provide prosperity and progress represent the main crisis initiators. Due to the high number of dangerous events the representatives of the society, as well as societies in general, become more sensitive to disorders of even a modest endangering capacity.

The vicious circle in which crisis generates progress and vice versa is the main trait of contemporary society.

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EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: CHALLENGES AND REQUIREMENTS ACCORDING TO THE SENDAI FRAMEWORK

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INTRODUCTION

Emergency management and disaster resilience in urban areas around the world, regarding the causes and consequences of emergencies and disasters, obviously represent a challenge to the human ability for rethinking how to deal and manage them. The communities in different parts of the world face the same problems due to the fact that the emergency management capacities and the level of implementation of disaster resilience measures are guided and dependant on local budgets and the policy (strategies and guidelines) of local officials. The general trends indicated an intention to place the focus in the next period on investments in human capital and infrastructure for building the local emergency and disaster management resources, and making more efficient plans and procedures as to how these capacities can be deployed (Blanksby, 2013; Platt, 2015; Kapucu, Hawkins, and Rivera, 2013; Hsueh-Sheng and Hsin-Ying, 2013; Coppola, 2006, pp.185-190; and Angjelkovic, 2001). Involving all public institutions and non-state actors as relevant local stakeholders, as well their commitment, goodwill, knowledge, experience and resources are emphasized as a requirement. Although there is a serious step forward in the urban areas; there is still a lot of work to be done in the upcoming period. Apart from the national and local disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies, there is a general will for following the international trends in this area toward adoption of international documents (conventions, decision, terminology, guidelines etc.) as an appropriate way for a holistic and worldwide approach.

Following the experiences of the UN's Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) - addressed to the period 2005-2015, the UN upgraded it within the Sendai Framework as a successor instrument for building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters in the forthcoming – 2015-2030. The Sendai Framework is a non-obligatory instrument providing a new global approach to disaster risk management policy and operations. Starting from the lessons learnt arising from the HFA, practical issues and barriers for the framework implementation, the UN policy makers invested a lot of energy and time, especially in the part devoted to the development, implementation and promotion of the normative frameworks, standards and plans for disaster risk reduction at the local level. They concluded that it had had little impact on the local scale. Therefore, the Sendai Framework, even as a voluntary and non-binding agreement, besides the role of the State, as primary, in term of reducing the disaster risk, focuses its implementation on sharing the state's role with other stakeholders including the local government, the private sector and other stakeholders.

1. SENDAI FRAMEWORK VS. HYOGO FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION

Analyzing the content of the Sendai Framework, some provisions within framework's priorities focus on the role and importance of the local emergency management capacities. The Sendai Framework within its implementation period is attempting to achieve better effects than HFA, using the lessons learnt and new enrolments within the international community.

The Sendai Framework, as a predecessor of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), follows the HFA's concept and gives empirical data correlated to disaster risk reduction, losses and structure of the affected demography. The Framework builds its own, but also takes into consideration the facts collected in the Hyogo Framework's implementation period. As it is stated into the (par.4 of the) Sendai Framework, it should be taken into account that "over the same 10 year time frame, however, disasters have continued to exact a heavy toll and, as a result, the well-being and safety of persons, communities and countries as a whole have been affected. Over 700 thousand people have lost their lives, over 1.4 million have been injured and approximately 23 million have been made homeless as a result of disasters. Overall, more than 1.5 billion people have been affected by disasters in various ways, with women, children and people in vulnerable situations disproportionately affected. The total economic loss was more than $1.3 trillion (UNISDR, 2015)".

The Sendai Framework was created as an outcome or custom-made agreement deriving from the 3rd UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR) held in Sendai, Japan on 14-18 March 2015. "The Sendai Conference has been a major political and technical [opportunity] for local governments worldwide to strengthen their role and capacities in prevention and reduction of disaster risk," United Cities and Local Governments, a global network, said. "The Sendai Framework recognizes for the first time the crucial role that local authorities play in disaster risk reduction." (As quoted in Biron, 2015). Comparing both frameworks, in addition to their emphasis of the local dimension, the creation of the Sendai Framework mainly comes from the questioning of the efficiency and approaches of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015). Both Frameworks highlight the importance of interagency and international cooperation, involving the wide range of stakeholders affected by the strategies and an inclusive approach to DRR. From an operational standpoint, as most important for practitioners (i.e. emergency management capacities), HFA is more focused on a "proactive approach," while the Sendai Framework is focused more on a "people centered approach." Paralleling with HFA, the Sendai Framework recognizes man-made hazards, biological hazards and increases the scope of action in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. It represents an advanced change in the policy approach at the global level replacing disaster management with disaster risk management. The objective is to prevent new and reduce the existing disaster risks, through an "all stakeholders and hazards" (all-of-society and all-hazards) risk approach across diversity of areas dealing with economic, social, and environmental policy areas, mainly concentrated on measures to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience. By multiplying the scope of actions and objectives, the Sendai Framework underlines the need for increased (local and national) interagency partnership with government institutions dealing with health and man-made hazards and consistent respect of knowledge sharing by updating the hazard databases and integrating these additional hazards in the risk assessment methods.

The Sendai Framework focuses on disaster risks, while the HFA focuses on disaster losses. In addition, the Sendai Framework focuses more on "the how" while the

HFA focus more on "the what"... The Sendai Framework followed the HFA guidance, where about a quarter to about half of the priorities for action are similar. The Sendai Framework puts more emphasis on the means for implementation as compared to the HFA, with some priorities for action having entirely new sections on regional and global actions elaborated in the Sendai Framework... Both Frameworks highlight the importance of embedding DRR into sustainable development. Both focus on a multi-stakeholder and inclusive approach to DRR, although the HFA focused a lot more on a "proactive approach," while the Sendai Framework focused more on a "people centered approach." Both focus on multiple levels of DRR work, from local to international (Velasquez, 2015). Starting from those key differences and similarities, the Sendai Framework contains several clear points dedicated to the local level priorities and activities.

The Sendai Framework puts attention on monitoring its implementation at the local level. It is conceptualized as a very specific issue, taking again the roots from the HFA. The main feature of the new national and local monitoring revolves around the updated national and local strategies and plans on DRR. These are called on to have targets and indicators, with varying time periods and covering the three sub-components of the goal of the Framework - reduce existing risks, prevent future growth of risks and build resilience. States are called upon to report on the status of these strategies and plan publicly and to promote debates on their implementation status. UNISDR is asked to update the HFA monitor, which will likely be updated in the interim period while the new set of indicators are developed through the work of the inter-governmental working group established by the GA. Finally, the national and local plan implementation will be reviewed in sub-regional, regional and Global Platform on DRR (Velasquez, 2015).

2. SIGNIFICANCE, CHALLENGES AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE SENDAI FRAMEWORK CONTENT FOR THE LOCAL LEVEL STAKEHOLDERS

As Sendai Framework accentuates the implantation and contribution of the local community and its authorities, credit is given to the local capacities. Therefore, an impact was made on the draft document in view of tailoring the document according to the local capacities, needs and challenges. "Cities are the first level of governance dealing with disaster risk reduction," the position that the document stated was agreed upon by a body known as the Local Authorities Major Group. "Central governments must develop strategies together with local governments in order to build their capacities. This can only be done if [the] decentralization process in all countries is strengthened to give the necessary power and competences to local authorities." (As quoted in Biron, 2015). Determining the global targets of the Sendai Framework, only one of seven - the global target e – covers challenges with local issues and it is quantitative and qualitative in the same time and should be partially measured by indicators. This target is dedicated to substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020.

The Sendai Framework goals stress the role of four priorities at the local level addressing the increase in the number of local strategies and the involvement of the coordination mechanisms. The priorities are as follows: 1) Understanding disaster risk; 2) Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk; 3) Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience; and 4) Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to "Build Back Better" in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Also, the guiding principles identify the value and role of the local level dedicated to the concept and implementation of the Sendai Framework. The analysis and correlation of those priorities

and principles was recently done by two authors (Culleton, 2015; Velasquez, 2015). It determinates suitably the roles of the local stakeholders.

The 1st *priority* includes the call for application of risk information in all dimensions, the call for collaboration of people at the local level, fostering partnership with the scientific, technological, academia and private sector in terms of sharing good practices and the call for supporting global and regional campaigns for public awareness and education. The Sendai Framework calls for national strategies for public education and awareness raising. The Sendai Framework also calls for an update to the DRR terminology. This priority corresponds with the action at local (and national) level dedicated to (g) Build the knowledge of government officials at all levels, civil society, communities and volunteers, as well as the private sector, through sharing experiences, lessons learned, good practices and training and education on disaster risk reduction, including the use of the existing training education mechanisms and peer learning, dedicated to capacity building within the community with providing education and information. Also, in terms of empowering the community with tools and platforms, the guiding principle (f) While the enabling, guiding and coordinating role of national and federal State Governments remains essential, it is necessary to empower local authorities and local communities to reduce disaster risk, including through resources, incentives and decision making responsibilities, as appropriate; addresses on two actions at local (and national) level: (c) Develop, update periodically and disseminate, as appropriate, location and disaster risk information, including risk maps, to decision makers, the general public and communities at risk of a disaster in an appropriate format by using, as applicable, geospatial information technology; and (f) Promote real-time access to reliable data, make use of space and in situ information, including geographic information systems (GIS), and use information and communications technology innovations to enhance measurement tools and data collection, analysis and dissemination.

The Sendai Framework includes within its 2nd *priority* calls for assessment and publicly reported progress on national and local DRR plans and promotion of debates on the plans. It calls on Governments to adopt and implement strategies and plans with targets, indicators and time frames, with the three elements of the goal. The Sendai Framework focuses on the assignment of roles and responsibilities to communities. The Sendai Framework promotes local platforms on DRR in addition to National Platforms. It calls for appointment of national focal points. The guiding principle (d) Disaster risk reduction requires an all of society engagement and partnership emphasizing the holistic approach (of whole community through partnership). This principle corresponds with the definition of the 2nd priority at the local (and national) level - (h) Empower local authorities, as appropriate, through regulatory and financial means, to work and coordinate with civil society, communities and indigenous peoples and migrants in disaster risk management at the local level. In that term, the role of non-state local actors (their commitment, goodwill, knowledge, experience and resources) plays an important role within the institutionally organized emergency management system. This holistic approach means huge and rational involvement of the civil society, volunteers, organized voluntary work organizations and community based organizations to participate, in collaboration with public institutions. Their roles, as stakeholders, mainly correspond with the task and duties for development and implementation of normative frameworks, standards and plans for disaster risk reduction; engage in the implementation of local plans and strategies: contribute to and support public awareness, a culture of prevention and education on disaster risk; and advocate for resilient communities and an inclusive, all-of-society

disaster risk management which strengthens the synergies across groups as appropriate. This relationship makes clear that knowledge sharing is the most important issue in DRR cooperation, as well as it emphasis of the need for public debate, multi-stakeholder involvement and democratization of the concepts of the DRR strategies.

The *4th priority* is focused on critical infrastructure safety, public awareness and stockpiling for relief, capacity of workforce and volunteers on response, business continuity management, response and recovery exercises and evacuation drills, cooperation by stakeholders for reconstruction, and guidance on reconstruction and fostering learning from past practices. It also added focus on relocation of public facilities outside of the risk range, building capacities of the local authorities for evacuation and development of laws to support international cooperation and relief and recovery procedures. This priority, in terms of the capacity for building within the community by providing education and information, corresponds with two actions at the local (and national) level: (f) Train the existing workforce and voluntary workers in disaster response and strengthen technical and logistical capacities to ensure better response in emergencies...; and (d) …stimulate a culture of prevention and strong community involvement in sustained public education campaigns…

The issues of voluntarism, as a very important part of citizens' involvement in the emergency management system, although it is highlighted, goes beyond the Sendai framework. The guiding principle (d) … special attention should be paid to the improvement of organized voluntary work of citizens, treats the cooperation through volunteer groups within two different priorities:

- Priority 1, defined with actions at the local (and national) level: (o) Enhance collaboration among people at the local level to disseminate risk information through the involvement of community based organizations and non-governmental organizations.
- Priority 2, defined with actions at the local (and national) level: (h) Empower local authorities, as appropriate, through regulatory and financial means to work and coordinate with civil society, communities and indigenous peoples and migrants in disaster risk management at the local level;

The development of the voluntarism at the local level depends much more on the system, structuring and organization of the society, history and tradition in terms of organizing the civil protection and crisis management (emergency) systems. Sometimes the development of voluntarism may depend on the political will and seriousness of the local authorities relevant for the implementation of the institutional reforms. Raising the level of voluntarism very often cannot be achieved by incorporating provisions in the legislation, especially in countries that have serious problems with the implementation of legal provisions.

2.1 EU dimension

In order to provide more clear guidelines regarding the understanding, value and implementation of the Sendai Framework at **EU level** (by member states and communities), and following the EU principles and the UN concept of the Sendai Framework, in the middle of 2016 the EU adopted "Action Plan on the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030: A disaster risk-informed approach for all EU policies". This approach confirms the position and perspective of the EU, perceiving the Sendai Framework as an opportunity to develop a disaster risk-informed approach for all EU policies.

The 2nd priority is strongly linked to a number of existing EU actions on civil protection (such as risk management planning, capability assessment, peer reviews) and on humanitarian aid (local and community coordination, capacity building). There are also linkages with environmental management and cross border cooperation, including through cohesion and development policies… The 4th priority addresses issues covered by the civil protection policy (such as early warning, training, exercises, sharing response capacities, host nation support and the European Medical Corps), humanitarian aid (EU Aid Volunteers, early action and local responses), environmental protection and development policies (EC, 2016). The Sendai Framework provides an opportunity to adapt EU policies to the EU's interests and purposes, its states and communities, using the current and future EU crisis management instruments as part of the national security policies and the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) conceptualization.

<p align="center">***</p>

Some supporting UN actions help the implementation of the Sendai Framework, its priorities, guiding principles and targets. It largely aids the document's dissemination and better understanding by the emergency community at the local level. In order to intensify the interagency and international cooperation at all levels in DRR matters, the UN, as the leading party in DRR's area worldwide, solved the recognized need of policy makers and practitioners. Therefore, in 2009 - in the middle of HFA implementation, the UN produced the handbook of DRR terminology (UNISDR 2009). Meanwhile, there is an ongoing attempt (started in 2016) for redefining and upgrading of the preliminary terminology. In addition to this more precise UN terminology, the rest of the terminology is defined within UN documents. The definition[1] of hazard within HFA (UNISDR, 2005) is a good example how terminology started to develop and keeps its continuity as part of its successor - the Sendai Framework.

3. UNDERSTANDING AND PERSPECTIVE OF THE SENDAI FRAMEWORK BY THE PRACTITIONERS

Explaining the implications of a broader scope of hazards in the Sendai Framework, Velasquez gives two perspectives. From a disaster risk management perspective, this would mean increased collaboration with government institutions dealing with health and man-made hazards. From a risk understanding perspective, this would mean an update of hazard databases and an integration of these additional hazards in the calculation of risks (Velasquez, 2015). The practitioners understand much better the so called "operative perspective" of their work. In the Sendai Framework's case, it is addressed in the way how to transform actions defined within each of its four priorities, targets and priorities, into (institutional) standard operative procedures and protocols.

In general, the practitioners understand less and believe more that the Sendai Framework mostly refers to the activities aimed to cope with climate change, as well as that it belongs more to the field of environment, rather than security, i.e. crisis management, protection and rescue. Most of them do not know that we have a cross-sectoral approach in this case.

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[1] A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation. Hazards can include latent conditions that may represent future threats and can have different origins: natural (geological, hydro-meteorological and biological) or induced by human processes (environmental degradation and technological hazards).

Thus, the role and importance of institutional capacity, their development and sustainability is largely relativized.

On the other side, climate is perhaps the paramount new disaster-related concern — one that is faced by poor countries and urban areas in particular, and thus one that has massive potential to influence development gains… Urban areas today are facing most significant losses. Some 80 percent of the world's largest cities are considered vulnerable to severe damage from earthquakes and 60 percent from tsunamis… The impact of a changing climate, meanwhile, has yet to be fully understood (Biron, 2015). Therefore, within local DRR strategies and plans, especially within prevention and mitigation measures, the local policy makers are mainly focused on taking investment (hard) measures, where more relevant is the expertise provided by the environmental, health and civil engineering experts, rather than the expertise in soft measures (as training is) provided by security and public safety specialists.

CONCLUSION

As the Sendai Framework has been adopted recently, it should be subject of critique or evaluation, as it happened with the comprehensive independent evaluations of the Hyogo Framework carried out at the local level (in 2009 and 2011). This is a very important issue, as it is well known that most of the UN processes use "top-down" approaches. It is not the best way to hear the voices of the practitioners of the local emergency management structure.

The concept of the Sendai Framework does not allow an absolute measurability of the seven global targets by indicators - keeping in mind that only the first three are qualitative and the rest of them are quantitative and qualitative at the same time. Only one of them is dominantly addressed to the local level.

Most of the countries and local communities, especially those that are not part of the developed world, have severe challenges to understand the importance and to implement the Sendai Framework targets at the local level. Also, most of them do not consider the Sendai Framework as a cross-sectoral document which emphasizes the need for institutional growth, large citizens' involvement and an increase of the range of cooperation on all levels.

In general, the Sendai Framework opens an opportunity for understanding disaster risk and measures and how to manage them, with clear guidelines for all involved parties. In the upcoming period, beside the problem of understanding the document content, the local emergency capacities will challenge how to transform the Sendai Framework into relevant and concrete actions (tasks and measures) that should be taken in all phases of crisis management.

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HOUSEHOLD SUPPLIES FOR NATURAL DISASTERS: FACTORS OF INFLUENCE ON THE POSSESSION OF SUPPLIES

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Purpose – The paper presents the results of the quantitative research of the impact of certain factors on household possession of supplies necessary for the survival of the consequences of natural disasters.

Design/methodology/approach – Quantitative research was conducted by using a survey strategy in households with the use of a multi-stage random sample. The first step, which was related to the primary sampling units, included selection of parts of the community for conducting research. The second step, which was related to research cores, included selection of streets or parts of streets at the level of primary sampling units, and finally a selection of households for surveying 2500 citizens in 19 local communities.

Findings – It was found that only 24.6% of the respondents have supplies, while 61.5% have no supplies for surviving natural disasters. On the other hand, 37.2% of the respondents possess supplies of food for 4 days, while only 12% have supplies of food for 1 day. It was found that 17.6% of the respondents have a transistor radio, 40% a flashlight, 40.6% a shovel, 25.8% a hack, 33.6% hoe and spade, and 13.2% a fire extinguisher. The results of the inferential statistical analyses show that there is a statistically significant influence of gender, education, marital status, parenthood, employment, income level, level of religiosity, completed military service on having supplies to survive the consequences of natural disasters. On the other hand, there was no influence of previous experiences on having supplies.

Originality/value – research results allow the design of strategies aimed at raising the level of preparedness of households for natural disasters with regard to their supplies.

Keywords – security, natural disasters, disaster supplies, factors of impact, Serbia.

INTRODUCTION

Mitigation of effects of natural disasters is possible only through improving the level of preparedness of communities and citizens (Cvetković, 2015, 2016c, 2016d; Cvetković & Andrejević, 2016; Cvetković, Dragićević, et al., 2015; Cvetković, Gаćić, & Petrović, 2015). Preparedness for disasters is generally defined by the American Red Cross in terms of five key steps that need to be taken at the individual level, the household level and the community level: development and testing plans for protection and rescue; ensuring supplies of food and water in households; training; volunteering and blood donation(Cross, 2006).Disaster preparedness experts broadly agree that citizen

preparedness requires households to have an emergency plan, to stockpile supplies such as water and prescription medications, and to stay informed of community plans (Uscher-Pines et al., 2012). Starting from the consequences of natural disasters, an essential precondition for the survival of people is to have a stock of food, water and other necessities. In the study of the preparedness of the citizens of the United States, 57% of the population own stocks in their home, 34% in cars and 45% in office at workplace (FEMA, 2009). When it comes to men, according to the results of the existing research, they more often focus on supplies that are needed to survive natural disasters(Able & Nelson, 1990), including technical means of protection of the household from upcoming natural disasters. Research in the USA (FEMA, 2009: 8) indicates that the supplies most frequently mentioned included a supply of packaged food (74%) and bottled water (71%), with many fewer individuals mentioning other essential supplies such as a flashlight (42%), a first aid kit (39%) or a portable radio (20%). Less than half of the respondents (44%) reported updating their supplies once a year, while 3 percent reported never updating their supplies. When asked directly, 71 percent of the respondents reported having copies of important financial documents in a safe place, yet only 1 percent specifically mentioned the documents unaided as part of their household disaster supplies.

LITERARY REVIEW

Becker et. al. (2012) found that the reason for undertaking sustained preparedness was that people desired to keep their supplies fresh and/or in working order in case they had to use them. They found that people wanted to ensure they had safe drinking water and food, and this desire for safety encouraged people to replenish these items as part of sustained preparedness. Light (2016) emphasizes that the lack of essential items such as food, water and medication reduces the length of time that people could stay at home and increases the urgency with which the government and other agencies would need to deliver supplies. Page et al. (2008) found that 48% people had gathered 4 or more relevant supplies in case of emergency. They found that close to half (43.7%) of the respondents did not possess a battery radio at either time point, while 32.2% did not have toiletries, sanitary supplies, and medications gathered at home. Kapucu (2008) found that 8 percent of all respondents have a disaster supplies kit that contains enough food, water, and medication for a family to shelter in a place for three days. Besides that, he found that the most common emergency items in the respondent households were smoke detectors and a fire extinguisher, while the least common items were storm shutters, a fire sprinkler system, and a carbon monoxide detector. Eisenman et al. (2006) found that 28.0% of the respondents purchased or maintained additional emergency supplies of food, water, or clothing and 35.0% responded "yes" to either developing an emergency plan or maintaining emergency supplies. Mori et al., (2007) highlighted the need for continued medication supplies for the chronically ill during and after a disaster. Bether et al., (2011) found that vulnerable populations were generally less likely to have household preparedness items, but more likely to have medication supplies than their counterparts. Miceli et al., (2008) found that the behavior that is more likely to be adopted by respondents is ''Keep a working flashlight and a battery operated radio in a convenient location'' (77%).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Quantitative research was conducted by using a strategy of surveying households with the use of a multi-stage random sample. The first step, which is related to the primary sampling units, included selection of parts of the community for conducting the research. This process was accompanied by a creation of a map and determination of the percentage share of each such segment in the total sample. The second step, which was related to research cores, included selection of certain streets or parts of streets at the level of the primary sampling units. Each core of the research was determined as a path with specified start and end points of movement. The next step included a selection of households for conducting the research. The number of households covered by the sample was determined in relation to their total number in the municipality. The final step was related to the procedure for the selection of respondents within the predefined household. The selection of respondents was conducted following the procedure of the next birthdays of the adult members of the household. The process of interviewing in municipalities was performed three days during the week (including weekends) at different times of the day. The study covered a total of 2,500 citizens (face to face - a personal interview) in the following local communities Obrenovac (178), Šabac (140), Kruševac (180), Kragujevac (191), Sremska Mitrovica (174), Priboj (122), Batočina (80), Svilajnac (115), Lapovo (39), Paraćin (147), Smederevska Palanka (205), Sečanj (97), Loznica (149), Bajina Bašta (50), Smederevo (145), Novi Sad (150), Kraljevo (141), Rekovac (50) and Užice (147). The presented methodological framework is a part of a wider study conducted on preparedness of citizens to respond to a natural disaster (Cvetković, 2016a, 2016b; Cvetković, 2015). The analysis of the sample structure indicates that the sample includes more women (50.2%) than men (49.8%). The largest portion of surveyed people, 41.3%, have completed secondary education. There is the smallest number of people with master 2.9% and doctoral studies 0.4%. In the sample, the married make 54.6%, widows/widowers 3%, singles 18.8%, the engaged 2.7% and respondents in a relationship make 16.9%. Statistical analysis of collected data was performed in the statistical program for social sciences (*Statistical Package for the Social Sciences*). h2 test for independent sampl, and one-way analysis of variance were used to test the connection between subjective and objective knowledge and security culture of behavior regarding the epidemics.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The impossibility of leaving home, destroyed critical infrastructure, contaminated foods at supermarkets and pharmacies or gas stations with no usable fuel condition the preparation of supplies. When talking about supplies for natural disasters, we primarily refer to food, water, certain medications, fuel, etc. Based on the survey results, only 24.6% of the respondents noted that they maintain supplies for natural disasters caused by floods. On the other hand, a large percentage of respondents does not maintain supplies (61.9%) (Figure 1). The possession of supplies is an important indicator of the current preparedness of the citizens to respond to such situations. In the survey of preparedness of US citizens for natural disasters, 57% of the citizens maintain supplies in their homes, 34% in vehicles and 45% in the office at the workplace (FEMA, 2009).

Figure 1. Percentage distribution of the possession of supplies

Of the total of 1502 respondents who answered the question "What do you maintain as food supplies", 37.2% said they have supplies of food for four days, while only 12% of citizens have supplies of food for one day (Figure 2). The results of the research conducted in the US indicate that 74% of the respondents have food supplies, 71% water supplies, 42% a flashlight, 20% a radio-transistor, 2% cash, 1% copies of important documents (FEMA, 2009). Tomio et al (Tomio et al., 2014) in the research results indicate that 27% of the respondents have supplies of food and water. Horney et al (Horney et al, 2008) suggest that 207 households (82%) out of 251 included in the study stated that they are very responsible in taking care of the possession of supplies of food and water. However, only 109 households (44%) have supplies of food and water for three days.

Figure 2. Percentage distribution of the duration of supplies

The results indicate that 17.6% of the respondents have a transistor radio, 40% a flashlight, 40.6% a shovel, 25.8% a hack, 33.6% hoe and spade and 13.2% a fire extinguisher (Figure 1). The results of the research in the United States in 2009 indicate that 42% of the citizens have a flashlight, 20% a transistor radio, 11% other medicaments, 2% cash, 1% financial documents. Baker (Baker, 2011) in the paper indicates that more than 80% of the citizens of Florida have a flashlight, non-perishable food and a transistor radio. In a study conducted in Italy, Miceli et al (Miceli et al., 2008) indicate in the research results that 77% of the respondents keep a flashlight and a radio transistor in an easily accessible and

open place, 59% have a list of phone numbers of the most important services, 28% keep essential items in safe places protected against floods, 20% own supply of water and food.

Figure 3. Percentage distribution of the possession of specific supplies

Chi-square test results show that there is a statistically significant influence of gender (p = 0.002) on the possession of supplies for natural disasters (Table 1). A higher percentage of male respondents have supplies for natural disasters compared to women.

In addition to gender, the findings indicate a statistically significant influence of education (p = 0.005) on the possession of supplies for natural disasters. The results were as follows: 25.6% of the respondents with primary education maintain supplies, 21.3% of the respondents with secondary three-year education, 26.1% of the respondents with secondary four-year education, 20.3% of the respondents with higher education, 24.7% of the respondents with a university degree and 38.7% of therespondents with post-graduate studies. The respondents with postgraduate studies have supplies for natural disasters in the highest percentage as opposed to the respondents with higher education (Table 1).

Marital status is statistically significantly associated (p = 0.000) with the possession of supplies for natural disasters. Of the total number of respondents, 25.3% of the respondents who are single keep supplies for natural disasters, 26.6% of the respondents who are in a relationship, 34.3% of the engaged, 24.6% of the married, 27.8% of the divorced and 24.3% of the widows/widowers. Based on the results, the respondents who are engaged have supplies in the highest percentage, while widows/widowers have supplies in the lowest percentage (Table 1).

When it comes to parenthood (p = 0.000), the findings indicate a statistically significant correlation between parenthood and the possession of supplies for natural disasters. Of the total number of respondents, 24.7% of the parents keep supplies as opposed to 26.6% of those who are not parents. Hence, in a slightly higher percentage, the respondents who are not parents have supplies for natural disasters compared to those who are parents (Table 1).

The possession of supplies for natural disasters is statistically significantly influenced by the status of employment of the citizens (p = 0.015). Survey results indicate that

employed citizens (25.7%) have supplies for natural disasters in a higher percentage compared to the unemployed citizens (23.5%) (Table 1).

In addition to the employment status, the possession of supplies for natural disasters is statistically significantly influenced by the income level (p = 0.008). The respondents with income above RSD 76.000 have supplies for natural disasters in the highest percentage (36%), then up to 25.000 (27.2%), 50.000 (23.1%) and finally, up to RSD 75.000 (22.9%) (Table 1).

The level of religiosity also statistically significantly (p = 0.000) affects the possession of supplies for natural disasters. Believers in certain sense have supplies in the highest percentage (35.3%), followed by those who are believers in the absolute sense (25.9%) and those who are neither believers nor non-believers (23.8%), non-believers in the absolute sense (26.3%) and non-believers in certain sense (9.9%) (Table 1). On the other hand, previous experience does not statistically significantly affect the possession of supplies for natural disasters. However, the results of the descriptive statistical analysis indicate that 22.5% of the citizens who have previous experience and 25.6% of citizens who have no previous experience keep supplies for natural disasters (Table 1). Finally, it was found that military conscription is statistically significantly associated (p = 0.003) with the possession of supplies for natural disasters. The respondents who have completed their military conscription service have supplies in a higher percentage (27.7%) compared to those who have not completed their conscription (24.3%) (Table 1).

Table 1. The influence of independent variables on the possession of supplies for natural disasters

		Keeping supplies	Not keeping supplies	Results of statistical analyses
Gender	Male	27.4	72.6	$X^2 = 7.22$ df – 2 Sig. – .002* V – 0.055
	Female	23.5	76.5	
Education	Elementary	25.6	74.4	$X^2 = -28.18$ df – 6 Sig. – .005* V – 0.355
	Secondary (3 years)	21.3	78.7	
	Secondary (4 years	26.1	73.9	
	Higher	20.3	79.7	
	University	24.7	75.3	
	Postgraduate	38.7	61.3	
Marital status	Single	25.3	74.7	$X^2 = -48.82$ df – 6 Sig. – .000* V – 0.355
	In a relationship	26.6	73.4	
	Engaged	34.3	65.7	
	Married	24.6	75.4	
	Divorced	27.8	72.2	
	Widow/widower	24.3	75.7	
Parenthood	Parent	24.7	75.3	$X^2 = -19.43$ df – 2 Sig. – .000* V – 0.09
	Non-parent	26.6	73.4	
Employment	Employed	25.7	74.3	$X^2 = -8.37$ df – 2 Sig. – .015* V – 0.060
	Unemployed	23.5	76.5	
Income level	Up to 25.000	27.2	72.8	$X^2 = -17.51$ df – 6 Sig. – .008* V – 0.08
	Up to 50.000	23.1	76.9	
	Up to 75.000	22.9	77.1	
	Above 76.000	36	64	
Level of religiosity	Non-believer in absolute sense	26.3	73.7	$X^2 = -62.26$ df – 8 Sig. – .000* V – 0.164
	Non-believer in certain sense	9.9	90.1	
	Neither believer nor non-believer	23.8	76.2	
	Believer in certain sense	35.3	64.7	
	Believer in absolute sense	25.9	74.1	
Previous experience	Yes	22.5	77,5	$X^2 = -3.15$ df – 2 Sig. – .206 V – 0.037
	No	25.6	74.4	
Military conscription service	Completed	27.7	72.3	$X^2 = -11.96$ df – 2 Sig. – .003* V – 0.075
	Not completed	24.3	75.7	

When it comes to the possession of specific supplies to survive the consequences of natural disasters, there is no statistically significant difference between men and women in regard to the possession of fire extinguishers (p = 0.648) and a flashlight (p = 0.17). Of all respondents, 14.3% of men and 13.4% of women have a fire extinguisher. 41% of men and 37.3% of women have flashlights. On the other hand, there is a statistically significant correlation between gender and the possession of a transistor radio (p = 0.03). Also, men have a transistor radio in a higher percentage (19.5%) than women (15%) (Table 2).

Education is statistically significantly associated with the possession of transistor radios (p = 0.001), flashlights (p = 0.004) and fire extinguishers (p = 0.000). The people who have completed post graduate studies have a transistor radio in the highest percentage (34.1%), then the citizens with three-year secondary education (22.3%), elementary education (21.9%), university degree (19%), higher education (15.6%) and four-year secondary education (12.8%). Also, the people who completed post graduate studies have a flashlight in the highest percentage (60%), followed by those with a three-year secondary school (46.9%), university degree (37.2%), higher education (36.2%), four-year secondary school (35%) and elementary education (32.4%). Finally, the citizens who have completed post graduate studies have fire extinguishers in the highest percentage (43.2%), then the citizens with a university degree (17.1%), three-year secondary education (16.8%), higher education (12.7 %), four-year secondary school (10.6%) and with elementary education (5.7%) (Table 1).

On the other hand, the marital status is statistically significantly associated with the possession of transistor radios (p = 0.004), but it is not associated with keeping a flashlight (p = 0.069) and a fire extinguisher (p = 0.243). The divorced people have a transistor radio in the highest percentage (34.1%), then the people who are single (20.2%), married (17.1%), in a relationship (15.6%), widows/widower (5.6%) and lastly the engaged (5.4%). When it comes to possession of a flashlight, the results of the descriptive statistical analysis are as follows: single (40.2%), in a relationship (39.5%), engaged (37.2%), married (37.1%), divorced (60.5%), widow/widower (48.7%). The distribution of the possession of a fire extinguisher according to the marital status is as follows: single (13.7%), in a relationship (11.5%), engaged (21.6%), married (14%), divorced (24.2%), widow/widower (8.3%) (Table 2).

The status of parenthood is not statistically significantly associated with the possession of a transistor radio (p = 0.909), a flashlight (p = 0.308) and a fire extinguisher (p = 0.243). The results of the descriptive statistical analysis indicate that 17.2% of the parents have a transistor radio and 17.5% of the citizens who are not parents. 39% of the citizens who are parents possess a flashlight and 39.4% of the citizens who are not parents. Finally, 14.8% of the citizens who are parents have a fire extinguisher and 12.7% of the citizens who are not parents (Table 2).

The employment status is statistically significantly associated only to the possession of a fire extinguisher (p = 0.000), while it is not associated with the possession of a transistor radio (p = 0.141) and a flashlight (p = 0.672). The results indicate that the employed have a fire extinguisher in a higher percentage (16.9%) compared to the unemployed (7.1%). The distribution of the possession of transistor radios is as follows: the employed (16%), the unemployed (19.3%). 13% of the employed and 14% of the unemployed respondents have flashlights (Table 1).

The Income level is statistically significantly associated with the possession ofa transistor radio (p = 0.000), a flashlight (p = 0.020) and a fire extinguisher. The respondents with an income level over RSD 76.000 have a transistor radio in the highest

percentage (33.3%), then the respondents with an income up to RSD 50.000, up to RSD 25.000 (15.9%), and lastly, up to RSD 75.000 (11.5%). The respondents with an income over RSD 76.000 have flashlight in the highest percentage (50.5%), then up to RSD 75.000 (43.8%), up to RSD 50.000 (37.2%), and lastly, with an income up to RSD 25.000 (36.1%). The citizens with an income over RSD 76.000 have a fire extinguisher in the highest percentage (27.3%), then up to 75.000 (15.9%), up to RSD 50.000 (14.3%), and lastly, up to RSD 25.000 (11. 3%) (Table 2).

Additionally, the level of religiosity is statistically significantly associated with the possession of a transistor radio (p = 0.005), a flashlight (p = 0.007) and a fire extinguisher (p = 0.028). The citizens who characterize themselves as neither believers nor non-believers have a transistor radio in the highest percentage (19.7%) compared to the citizens who are believers in the absolute sense (2.3%). On the other hand, the believers in certain sense have a flashlight in the highest percentage (41.8%) in relation to the citizens who are non-believers in certain sense (24.2%). And finally, it was found that the citizens who are neither believers nor non-believers have fire extinguishers in the highest percentage (15.9%) in relation to the citizens who are not believers in the absolute sense (2.6%) (Table 2).

The completed military conscription service is statistically significantly associated only to the possession of fire extinguishers (p = 0.000), whereas there is no such correlation with the possession of a transistor radio (p = 0.386) and a flashlight (p = 0.131). The citizens who completed their military conscription service have a fire extinguisher in the highest percentage (48.2%) in relation to the citizens who have not completed their conscription (32.4%). 18% of the respondents who have completed their military conscription service have a transistor radio and 16.1% with no conscription. On the other hand, 41% of the respondents who have completed military conscription service have a flashlight and 36.7% who those without a conscription (Table 2).

Table 2. The influence of independent variables on the possession of specific supplies for natural disaster

		Radio-transistor	Statistic	Flashlight	Statistic	Fire fighting apparatus	Statistic
Gender	Male	Yes – 19.5 No – 80.5	$X^2 = 4.35$ df – 2 Sig. – .037* V – 0.05	Yes – 41 No – 49	$X^2 = 1.83$ df – 1 Sig. – .17 V – 0.05	Yes – 14,3 No – 85.7	$X^2 =$ 0.208 df – 1 Sig. – 0.648
	Female	Yes – 15 No – 85		Yes – 37.3 No – 62.7		Yes – 13.4 No – 86.6	
Education	Elementary	Yes – 21,9 No – 78.1	$X^2 = 22,49$ df – 4 Sig. – ,001* V – 0,135	Yes – 32.4 No – 67.6	$X^2 =$ 18,96 df – 6 Sig. –	Yes – 5.7 No – 94.3	$X^2 =$ 39.06 df – 6 Sig. –
	Secondary (3 year)	Yes – 22.3 No –		Yes – 46.9 No – 43.1		Yes – 16.8 No – 83.2	

		77.7			,004* V – 0,122		.000* V – 0.182
	Secondary (4 year)	Yes – 12.8 No – 77.2		Yes – 36.2 No – 43.8		Yes – 10.6 No – 89.4	
	Higher	Yes – 15.6 No – 74.4		Yes – 36.2 No – 63.8		Yes – 12.7 No – 87.3	
	University	Yes – 19 No – 81		Yes – 37.2 No – 62.8		Yes – 17.1 No – 82.9	
	Postgraduate	Yes – 34.1 No – 65.9		Yes – 60 No – 40		Yes – 43.2 No – 46.8	
Marital status	Single	Yes – 20.2 No – 79.8	$X^2 = 17.10$ df – 5 Sig. – .004* V – 0.135	Yes – 40.2 No – 59.8	$X^2 = 10,22$ df – 5 Sig. – ,069	Yes – 13.7 No – 66.3	$X^2 = 6.71$ df – 5 Sig. – .243
	In a relationship	Yes – 15.6 No – 74.4		Yes – 39.5 No – 60.5		Yes – 11.5 No – 88.5	
	Engaged	Yes – 5.4 No – 94.6		Yes – 37.2 No – 62.8		Yes – 21.6 No – 88.4	
	Married	Yes – 17.1 No – 72.9		Yes – 37.1 No – 62.9		Yes – 14 No – 86	
	Divorced	Yes – 34.1 No – 65.9		Yes – 60.5 No – 39.5		Yes – 24.2 No – 75.8	
	Widow /widower	Yes – 5.6 No – 94.4		Yes – 48.7 No – 51.3		Yes – 8.3 No – 91.7	
Parent hood	Parent	Yes – 17.2 No – 82.8	$X^2 = 0.013$ df – 1 Sig. – .909	Yes – 39 No – 61	$X^2 = 1.03$ df – 1 Sig. – .308	Yes – 14.8 No – 85.2	$X^2 = 1.38$ df – 1 Sig. – .239
	Non-parent	Yes – 17.5 No – 82.5		Yes – 39.4 No – 60.6		Yes – 12,7 No – 87,3	
Employment	Employed	Yes – 16 No – 84	$X^2 = 2.16$ df – 1 Sig. – .141	Yes – 13 No – 87	$X^2 = 0.18$ df – 1 Sig. – .672	Yes – 16,9 No – 73,1	$X^2 = 22,68$ df – 1 Sig. – .000
	Unemployed	Yes – 19.3 No –		Yes – 14 No – 86		Yes – 7.1 No – 92.9	

		80.7				
Income level	Up to 25.000	Yes – 15.9 No – 84.1	$X^2 = 24.06$ df – 3 Sig. – .000 V – 0.14	Yes – 36.1 No – 63.9	$X^2 = 9.84$ df – 3 Sig. – .020 V – 0.09	Yes – 11,3 No – 88.7	$X^2 = 14.82$ df – 3 Sig. – .002 V – 0.116
	Up to 50.000	Yes – 18.1 No – 81.9		Yes – 37.2 No – 62.8		Yes – 14.3 No – 85.7	
	Up to 75.000	Yes – 11.5 No – 88.5		Yes – 43.8 No – 56.2		Yes – 15.9 No – 84.1	
	Above 76.000	Yes – 33,3 No – 66,7		Yes – 50.5 No – 49.5		Yes – 27.3 No – 72.7	
Level of religiosity	Non-believer in absolute sense	Yes – 2.3 No – 97.7	$X^2 = 14,89$ df – 4 Sig. – ,005 V – 0,111	Yes – 24.4 No – 75.6	$X^2 = 14,19$ df – 4 Sig. – .007 V – 0.107	Yes – 2.6 No – 97.4	$X^2 = 10.85$ df – 4 Sig. – .028* V – 0.097
	Non-believer in certain sense	Yes – 11.2 No – 88.8		Yes – 24.2 No – 75.8		Yes – 5.9 No – 94.1	
	Neither believer nor non-believer	Yes – 19.7 No – 80.3		Yes – 40.6 No – 59.4		Yes – 15,9 No – 84.1	
	Believer in certain sense	Yes – 17.9 No – 82.1		Yes – 41.8 No – 58.2		Yes – 14.9 No – 85.1	
	Believer in absolute sense	Yes – 10.8 No – 89.2		Yes – 39.4 No – 60.6		Yes – 12.4 No – 87.6	
Previous experience	Yes	Yes – 22.6 No – 77.4	$X^2 = 6.50$ df – 1 Sig. –. 011 V – 0.075	Yes – 47.3 No – 52.7	$X^2 = 10.91$ df – 1 Sig. – .001 V – 0.09	Yes – 18 No – 82	$X^2 = 5.52$ df – 1 Sig. – .019 V – 0.07
	No	Yes – 15.8 No – 84.2		Yes – 36.2 No – 63.8		Yes – 12.1 No – 87.9	
Militar	Completed	Yes – 18 No – 82	$X^2 = .753$ df – 1	Yes – 41 No – 59	$X^2 = 2.2$ df – 1	Yes – 48.2 No – 51.8	$X^2 = 29.99$

y conscription service	Not completed	Yes – 16.1 No – 83.9	Sig. – .386 V – 0.026	Yes – 36.7 No – 63.3	Sig. – .131 V – 0.04	Yes – 32.4 No –67.6	df – 1 Sig. – .000 V – 0.000

CONCLUSION

In the quantitative research covering enough households for natural disasters, we have come to diverse conclusions. Of the total number of respondents, only 24.6% have supplies, which is a serious security problem. In addition, 17.6% of the respondents have a transistor radio, 40% a flashlight, 40.6% a shovel, 25.8% a hack, 33.6% hoe and spade and 13.2% a fire extinguisher. In addition, 37.2% of the respondents have food supplies for four days, while only 12% of the citizens have food supplies for one day.

The possession of supplies to survive the consequences of natural disasters is significantly influenced by gender, education level, marital status, parental status, employment, income level and level of religiosity. There is no a statistically significant influence of previous experience on the possession of supplies. In a higher percentage, supplies for natural disasters are owned by men, citizens who have completed post graduate studies, respondents who are engaged, respondents who are not parents, employees, respondents with income over RSD 76.000, believers in certain sense. On the other hand, in a smaller percentage, supplies for natural disasters are owned by female respondents, who are widows/widowers, parents, unemployed respondents, respondents with incomes up to RSD 75.000 and higher education, non-believers in certain sense.

The possession of a transistor radio is statistically significantly influenced by gender, education level, marital status, parental status, income level and level of religiosity. On the other hand, employment has no influence. The possession of a flashlight is statistically significantly influenced by the level of education, parental status, income level and level of religiosity, while it is not influenced by gender, marital status and employment. On the other hand, the level of education, parental status, employment, income level and level of religiosity significantly affect the possession of a fire extinguisher, while it is not affected by gender and marital status. Men have a transistor radio in a higher percentage compared to women. Divorced people have a transistor radio in the highest percentage, while the engaged have it in the lowest percentage. The respondents who completed post graduate studies have a transistor radio, a flashlight and a fire extinguisher in the highest percentage. The citizens who have completed their post graduate studies have fire extinguishers in the highest percentage, while the respondents with elementary school have these in the smallest percentage.

Recommendations for improvement of the possession of supplies:

Starting from the concluding remarks, it is necessary to conceive a strategy, programs and campaigns aimed at improving citizens' preparedness for natural disasters in the context of compiling supplies necessary for survival of the consequences. As part of those activities, it is necessary to focus on the female population, citizens who are widows/widowers, parents, the unemployed, those with income up to RSD 75.000, with a degree in higher education and those citizens who are non-believers in certain sense.

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NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ON THE BALKAN PENINSULA AS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

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ABSTRACT

Natural disasters represent a further increased threat to the safety of humanity. In the early 21st century, an increased number of natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, etc.) have been noticed, as well as an increase of their destructiveness: on the nature, increased losses of human lives, material and non-material damage. Despite the technological development of humankind, it s very difficult for societies to handle the threats. It seems that many of these appearances cannot even be predicted, but the consequences can be influenced by other mechanisms in a way to reduce the damages to the lowest level.

Nuclear installations like nuclear power plants, research reactors, processing factories and other components of the nuclear fuel cycle are amongst the most critical infrastructures not only because of their importance, but also because of the potential consequences in case of incidents that include nuclear and radioactive materials. Threats include natural disasters such as earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, tsunamis, as well as structure deficiencies, human mistakes, terrorist attacks, etc.

The safety of the nuclear power plants is the most important segment because it should prevent radiological contamination of the environment and the population. From that point, the nuclear power plants in the Balkans represent a critical infrastructure of strategic importance to the countries.

Due to the above stated, the nuclear power plants on the Balkan Peninsula as a critical infrastructure with huge importance and possible consequences that would appear in case of any incident, will be specifically elaborated in this work.

Keywords: *reactor, isotope, nuclear reaction, nuclear fuel*

1. INTRODUCTION

Establishing the critical infrastructure can differ between countries. The term itself, "Critical infrastructure", is used to describe infrastructure, systems and means that are of key importance for the country's society, economy and national security. A key segment of the critical infrastructure is the nuclear sector i.e. the nuclear power plants, the reactors, various sources that are a result of the technological process, radioactive waste etc. Globally, the nuclear power plants currently supply 12 % of the world's electricity.

With the new energy policies, the construction of safe and clean nuclear power plants is becoming a reality. The problems arise in the countries that are willing to invest in nuclear energy and they are related to nuclear catastrophes and radioactive waste management.

The effect of nuclear catastrophes is the subject of many researches, while their beginnings are somewhat connected to the release of the first commercial nuclear reactor in 1954. According to available data and literature, starting from 2014, there have been over 100 serious incidents during the nuclear energy production [1]. It should not be forgotten that the production and management of nuclear waste represents the greatest challenge for many countries.

In South East Europe, nuclear energy originates since the communist days. The Balkan countries that possess nuclear power plants, as well as the nearby countries, are not safe from the threats from either human or natural sources. Human mistakes, natural disasters and cyber-attacks are the greatest challenges that the nuclear sector is faced with. Accordingly, the state institutions are responsible for preparing the country for such threats and the possible consequences of the aforementioned.

From that aspect, this work has the goal to give a brief review of the establishment, the work and the safety concepts, as well as the dangers that can be expected from a possible nuclear accident.

2. SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Since the very beginning of the nuclear energy development, people have been conscious of the dangers of nuclear power plants and the release of radioactive matter. Just like in any other industry, the probability of such an event should be as low as possible. Since the introduction of nuclear power plants, three major incidents have occurred. Those accidents happened in more than 16.000 cumulative reactor years in a total of 32 countries. All experiences indicate that nuclear energy is a safe way of producing electricity, but the consequences of a possible catastrophe are not excluded.

Nuclear safety includes activities for preventing nuclear and radioactive accidents or for limiting their consequences. It is related to the nuclear power plants, as well as all remaining nuclear facilities, the transport of nuclear matter and the usage and storage of nuclear matter for medicinal, industrial or war purposes.

A nuclear accident is defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or to the facility" [2]. Such examples include deathly effects to individuals, release of radioactivity into the environment or melting of the reactor. An example of a nuclear accident is when the reactor is partially or fully damaged and a significant amount of radioactivity is released into the atmosphere. It is important to note that the commercial reactors cannot explode like a nuclear bomb because the fuel is enriched with 5% and for such an explosion a greater fuel infusion is necessary.

In 1957 the United Nations (UN) set up the IAEA, which acts as a global auditor of nuclear safety. It prescribes the steps toward greater safety and reports even minor incidents. Every country with a nuclear power plant is subject to inspection by the UN. According to the new regulations, the consequences from melting of the core reactor in a potential accident will remain well within the reactor and there would not be a need for evacuation of the local population. On a global scale, IAEA and the European Union (EU) have established a regulation for an early evacuation alarm in a case of a radioactive accident, through which all EU countries can be alerted, as well as all the countries that would not be struck by the accident.

For reaching optimal safety, nuclear plants in the Western world have adopted the approach "Defense in Depth" with numerous systems for increasing safety [3,4]. The approach covers the accident prevention and decreasing of their effects i.e. if something is

not functioning well or goes out of control there is a system that will prevent or contain the damage. If that system fails, there is another system to do the work. The key aspects can be named as follows: prevention, observation and following, action (consequence prevention). That system is the following:

- High quality design and reactor construction;
- Failure prevention equipment;
- Human mistakes and problem developing mistakes;
- Complete observation and regular testing for discovering mistakes connected to the equipment or operators;
- Different damage control systems for the fuel and radiation prevention;
- Securing the limitation of a heavy fuel damage or different problems within the power plant.

The nuclear reactor facilities are designed so that earthquakes and outside influences cannot compromise the safety of the nuclear reactor. It is estimated that throughout the world 20 % of the nuclear reactors function in areas with increased seismic activity. IAEA has a manual and instructions for safety against seismic-related risks, as well as other outside influences.

Additionally, the life span of nuclear reactors needs to be taken into consideration because with time, some components deteriorate, corrode or degrade to a low level of efficiency. The steam generators are very expensive and some are changed every 30 years when the reactor is capable of expanding its life span. Another occurring problem is the process of aging of the instruments and system controls. Acknowledging all these aspects, huge investments are necessary for constant maintenance and increased safety [5].

According to literature, the probability of a nuclear accident is 10^{-5}, i.e. one exploited reactor, the probability for a serious nuclear accident is once every 100.000 years, if there are two reactors then it is once every 50.000 years. Currently, there are 450 reactors worldwide, which means the probability for an accident is once every 200 years. A team from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) from the USA predicts that a minimum of four nuclear accidents will occur, considering the growth between the years of 2005 and 2055 [6]. To date, there have been five serious accidents (melting of the reactor's core) in the world since 1970 (one at the Three Mile Island in 1979, one in Chernobyl in 1986 and three in Fukushima in 2011). That corresponds with the commencement of work of the second generation of nuclear reactors. It implies that a serious nuclear accident happens every eight years on average [7].

3. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE BALKANS
3.1. Krško Nuclear Power Plant - Slovenia

The construction of the nuclear power plant began on 30 March 1975 and it was put in commercial use on 1 January i 1983. The nuclear power plant is located on the left side of the river Sava. The Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia get 50 % each of the produced electricity as co-owners. It is the first "Western" nuclear power plant built by a former socialist country [8].

The power plant uses a pressure-infused water reactor (PWR) and it is the second generation of 696 MW capacity. It uses enriched Uranium as fuel (4.3 % uranium-235) and the water is used as a moderator. The pressurized water reactor is found in the majority of Western nuclear power plants. With 291 units around the world, this type of reactor is the

most commonly used with 64 % worldwide, from the second generation of reactors beginning in the 1970s [9].

Annually, it produces 5.371 GWh of electricity on average or it meets 38 % of the electricity needs of Slovenia and 16 % of the needs of Croatia.

Concerning the safety of the plant, numerous defects have been registered, such as: in March 2011 the power plant shut down automatically citing an interruption of electricity transfer outside the plant as a reason. On 4 June 2008, because of a cooling fluids leakage, the atomic fuels were damaged. The inspection discovered that one of the valves got loosened and it was swiftly replaced removing all dangers to the people and the environment.

Concerning the radioactive waste and radiation, the plant itself is under the average worldwide levels or at 2.44 mSv. It is a fact that during the work of the plant, a waste gas is formed composed of instable deteriorating gases that are released into the atmosphere in favorable weather conditions, fluid radioactive waste that is below the radioactivity limit and is released into the river Sava and solid radioactive waste which is compressed and stored in special containers that are kept near the plant.

Globally and locally, nuclear energy represents the only industrial sector that takes full responsibility of the radioactive waste management and creates conditions for its safe storage.

The non-hazardous functioning of the Krško plant represents the highest priority. The plant safety is of key importance and it is achieved in each segment of the work.

According to the original plan, the Krško plant was designed for 30-40 years of work and it would have to stop its work somewhere around 2023, but in 2014 a decision was made to extend the life span of the plant until the year of 2043 [10].

3.2.   Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant – Romania

The nuclear power plant of Cernavoda was projected in the 1980s, and the reactor, Cernavoda-1 was put to commercial use on 2 December 1996. The second reactor, Cernavoda-2, was put to use on 7 August 2007. The plant is built at the very end of the tributary to the river of Danube and it is the only power plant of its kind in Romania.

The plant uses a pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR/CANDU) of the second generation and Romania is the only country in Europe with such a reactor. CANDU reactors can use different types of fuel. The reactors use natural uranium with just 0.7 % uranium-235 and heavy water (D_2O) with high purity as a moderator and cooling fluid. The heavy water represents a better moderator than regular water, but the method is significantly more expensive. The reactors Chernavoda-1 and Chernavoda-2 have 650 MW of power each.

Annually, the plant averages produce of over 10.000 GWh and covers 17 % of the electricity needs of Romania.

Concerning the safety of the plant, there have been numerous defects, such as: on 8 April 2009, the reactor Chernavoda-2 was closed down due to defects that led to closure of the electro energetic system. On 30 May 2009, the reactor Chernavoda-1 was shut down because of fissures in the water pipes. At the same time, the reactor Chernavoda-2 was also shut down because at the time the plant was not producing electricity. On 16 January 2010, Chernavoda-1 was shut down because of a steam leakage from the system [11].

In 2014, Romania upgraded its national strategy for nuclear safety and security, adopted by the government in order to establish the national legislation. Romania

recognizes the leading role of the IAEA and fully supports the nuclear program and approves the international support for increasing nuclear safety.

3.3. Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant – Bulgaria

- The nuclear plant of Kozloduy has been put to commercial use on 4 September 1974. The plant is built on the river Danube and is the first nuclear plant in Bulgaria and in South-East Europe as well. The plant has six blocks with a total capacity of 3760 MW. Since the beginning of 2007, only two functioning blocks have remained, Kozloduy-5 and Kozloduy-6 and the remaining four blocks have been shut down after the country's accession to the European Union.

- The plant uses Russian VVER-1000 reactor which corresponds with the Western pressurized water reactor (PWR). It uses enriched uranium-235 (3.6% - 4.5%) as fuel and regular water as moderator. The reactors Kozloduy-5 and Kozloduy-6 have 963 MW of power each. Annually, the plant averages produce of over 15.000 GWh and covers 31 % of the electricity needs of Bulgaria.

- Concerning the safety, the plant is yet to register an event higher than second degree according to the International Nuclear Events Scale (INES) (anomalies and incidents, but not accidents). In the last 10 years, there have been a total 338 events in the Kozloduy plant from which 333 were rated at 0 level, 4 were level 1 and 1 was level 2. Every event was subject to detailed analysis and corrective measures were implemented. After the Fukushima accident, stress tests were implemented and a national plan of action was put in place. The plan includes 63 measures with the purpose of increasing the resistance of the Kozloduy plant against outside events identical to the ones that caused the Fukushima accident. The full implementation of the measures is scheduled to be fulfilled by 2017.

- The safety of the Kozloduy plant has been made top priority and after the inspections during the recent years, the plant has received high marks and international recognition. As a member of the EU and the IAEA, Bulgaria meets the requirements according to the EU directives, as well as the EU and IAEA regulations pertaining to the implementation of the necessary measures for prevention of nuclear or radiological accidents. Bulgaria has ratified a Convention for assistance in the case of a nuclear accident and radiation emergency situation. In the vicinity of the plant, there is a company for processing, conditioning and storage of low and medium radioactive waste meeting the highest ecological requirements of the Kyoto Protocol. The plant has an automatic information system for measuring gamma rays within a radius of 3 km of the location. Because of the high standards from a safety aspect, the gamma rays in the region do not exceed the limitations. A national warehouse for radioactive waste is under construction and companies from Germany, France and Spain have been selected to do the project. The first part of it has been scheduled for 2021. It is expected to fulfill 40 years of exploitation.

- After the preliminary analysis and assessment, based on the completed modernizations of the plant, it is expected that the two blocks can be exploited for additional 30 years from the projected deadline [12].

4. NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND EFFECTS
4.1. The Nuclear Accident of the Three Mile Island

The nuclear power plant was based in Pennsylvania, USA. The type of reactor at the Three Mile Island plant was a pressurized water reactor (PWR). It is very similar to the Russian VVER reactor, which is used in the Kozloduy plant in the Republic of Bulgaria. The similarities of the two reactors consist in the usage of water as the main transmitter of heat, with which the fluid state is maintained under high pressure.

The accident at the reactor 2 happened on 28 March 1979, when the reactor was working with 97 % of its potential. A huge amount of the water in the primary cooler had drained, leaving only the heat of the core. As a result, the core went through serious damages.

The operators were unable to diagnose and respond accordingly to the automatic shutdown of the reactor. The lack of equipment in the control room was cited as the main cause for the accident, as well as the inadequate training for emergency interventions.

The accident caused unrest in the local area of the reactor, as people were concerned about increased radiation, mainly about the possibility of cancer development. After the accident, a huge amount of individual studies were made which evaluated the health effects to the people and the environment. The latest was a 13-year old study conducted on 32.000 people. None indicated any negative effects, such as cancer, to be somehow connected to the incident [13]. The only detected effect was the psychological stress during and shortly after the accident. The total losses of the accident are estimated to be around $1.86 billion.

4.2. The Chernobyl Nuclear Accident

One of the worst nuclear accidents ever is the one in Chernobyl that occurred on 26 April 1986 in Ukraine. The reactor type in the Chernobyl plant is one with a high power channel-type reactor (RBMK). The reactor used graphite as a moderator and had no protective building.

The accident occurred after a series of actions from the operators, including turning the automatic control mechanisms on and off. By the time the operator was on his way to shut down the reactor, it was in a highly unstable state. The control panels design led to a power overload as the panels were installed into the reactor. The collision between the heated fuel from the reactor and the cooling water led to fragmentation of the fuel followed by an increased creation of steam and added pressure. The intensive creation of steam spread along the entire core creating a powerful explosion and the release of fission products into the atmosphere. The graphite had initiated a series of fires, thus creating the main reason for the radiation in the middle. All in all, there were 14 EBq (14×10^{18} Bq) of radioactivity. That led to serious socio-economic disorders among the population of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia.

In the accident, 213 people were immediately hospitalized and 31 of them died. One study was published in 2005, predicting that there will be 4.000 additional death cases caused by cancer directly connected with the accident for those who were directly exposed to the radiation. At that time, the accident cost the USSR $18 billion.

The radioactive isotopes from the Chernobyl plant are known as Cesium-137, Iodine-131 and Strontium-90. These isotopes have negative effects on people's health and in the case of the iodine, it has a tendency to accumulate in the thyroid gland. Immediately after the accident, the main concern was the radioactive iodine which has a half-life of 8 days. Today, the concerns are about the radioactivity of strontium-90 and cesium-137 that

have a half-life of 30 years. The highest levels of radiation were found on the surface of the earth where plants, insects and mushrooms had absorbed the cesium-137, thus intruding the food chain. The main diseases that began to appear after the accident were: thyroid gland cancer, leukemia, other types of cancers, cataract, cardio-vascular diseases, psychological effects etc.

The IAEA projects for reviewing each concrete type of Soviet reactors have made the operators and the Western engineers to work together and focus on the increasing the safety. The Chernobyl accident was a one of a kind event and the only one where a commercial nuclear plant was the cause of death by radiation [14].

4.3. The Fukushima Nuclear Accident

The great earthquake in Japan with a magnitude of 9.0 degrees according to Richter happened on 11 March 2011. It caused significant damage in the region and it also was the cause for a giant tsunami that inflicted an even greater damage. The reactors in Fukushima Daiichi lost power nearly one hour after the earthquake when the whole power plant was flooded by the 15 m tsunami. The three aggregates lost their capability to maintain the proper cooling of the reactor and the water circulating functions. The emergency response center at the site was not able to fight off the radioactive contamination.

The earthquake itself had not made a single damage to the reactors. The type of reactor was a boiling water reactor (BWR). In such reactors, the steam is generated in the core aiming towards the turbine.

Concerning the radioactivity of the air, as well as the water leakage of Fukushima, the main radionuclide was a vaporizing iodine-131 and cesium-137. When it contacts the earth it instantly contaminates the land and can enter and disrupt the food chain. The release of radioactive water into the sea resulted in the emergence of contaminated sea food. In 2014, the Institute for Environment and Radioactivity at the Fukushima University published that the total amount of released cesium-137 amounts to 20.5 PBq with 17 PBq being released in the air. In the air, 17 PBq combined with iodine-131 gives a total of 813 PBq (Iodine-131 equivalent).

The accident resulted in the evacuation of 300.000 people from the local area, 15.884 deaths caused by the earthquake and the tsunami, and as of August 2013, there were over 1.600 deaths connected with the evacuation [15].

Nuclear accidents like the ones in Chernobyl and Fukushima cause huge economic damages, losing the nuclear capacities that supply a large amount of the electricity of the country, location cleaning expenses, cleaning expenses for the radioactive pollution of the environment, compensations to people etc. Also the nuclear accidents influence other critical infrastructures.

What is common for all accidents is the role of the human factor. Lack of projecting, building, release, operating, material choice, technology etc. are just some of the areas where the human factor is responsible. The lacks of the human factor are mainly connected to corporate level decisions, country level decisions and coordination. After each nuclear accident, there is a stop in growth. Afterwards, the safety characteristics are measured and valuable lessons are learned. After the Three Mile Island accident, the human factor entered in the focus of emergency situations in order to minimize its role. After Chernobyl, work groups started developing and implementing the term "safety culture". After the Fukushima accident, much more attention has been paid on the natural factors.

CONCLUSION

The safety challenges in the nuclear sector which the Balkan countries are facing are no different from the ones faced by other countries. In order to have effective safety of the critical infrastructure, the countries need to have an effective strategy which has centralized planning and decentralized execution, enforced not only on actual threats in the present, but on long-term plans for regional collective safety as well. The threats and weaknesses of the nuclear power plants can be reduced or completely eliminated with appropriate plans, learning from the mistakes of others and experiences. The following safety measures are highly recommended:

- Evaluation of the critical omissions from cyber -physical attacks;
- Plans to eliminate important shortages;
- Development of alarm plans;
- Quick response to attacks or accidents;
- Inclusion of the private sector in the security;
- Upgrade of the cooperation between countries and adoption of standards.

From the completed researches we can conclude that nuclear energy can solve the energy problems of a given country in the long term, but it can also cause both local and global issues. There is willingness among the Balkan countries to build new nuclear power plants and to upgrade and expand the existing ones.

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ANALYTICAL APPROACH ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper has to do with a clear reflection of the indications whether the Iranian side has deviated from its peaceful nuclear program.

To achieve this goal the true motive of Iran to possess nukes - nuclear weapons should be explored. An analytical method of interpreting the contradiction between the international legal acts and Iran's motives and political background will be used to understand completely the current nuclear status of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It will discuss the serious concessions by Iran which neglects to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter IAEA) on a regular and periodical basis regarding the enrichment with sensitive uranium and reprocessing of its activities. The enriched uranium can be used for peaceful purposes or for nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the paper will discuss the Iranian official statements which declare that its nuclear program has only peaceful purposes and that it has less than 5% enriched uranium (this amount may be sufficient only for civilian nuclear fuel power plants). On the other side, the Board of Governors of the IAEA, had reported to the United Nations Security Council Iranian activities of noncompliance with the Safeguards Agreement (signed between the IAEA and Iran).

This study identifies the main factors of nuclear proliferation, the legal gaps regarding the international legal framework of nuclear security and other influencing political factors.

***Keywords:** Iran nuclear program, IAEA, International legal acts*

1. Introduction

Since 2003, the Security Council has adopted Resolutions by imposing sanctions, which have required from Iran to suspend its enrichment nuclear activities, while Iran on the other hand has rejected the sanctions declaring them as "illegal" measures imposed by the West and influenced by the state of Israel. This paper indirectly explains and analyzes the lack of international authority to adjudicate the violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as one of the main acts of international law governing nuclear safety. Moreover, by analyzing the P5+1 and the Iranian effort to reach a final agreement, it presents the current status of nuclear weapons.

2. Status of the Iranian nuclear program

Iran's nuclear facilities are defined and described in the most important comprehensive agreement on Iran's nuclear program, the JCPA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). (Iran, 2015)

According to this agreement, Iran allows activities in a nuclear reactor, built by Russia, which will provide fuel for the reactor until 2021. The negotiations were mostly focused on the enrichment program and heavy water reactor, because of the huge potential to produce nuclear weapons material. (Kenneth Katzman, 2015)

According to the IAEA report, date 14 November 2013, Iran has halted generally expanding its enrichment programs and heavy water reactor, after the beginning of the negotiations by signing the JPA. (IAEA, 2013)

It should be noted that Iran has three plants for gas centrifuge enrichment (the fuel enrichment plant at Natanz, the pilot plant fuel enrichment and the fuel enrichment plant at Fordow). These gas centrifuges are used for enriching uranium with a diluted hexafluoride uranium gas at high speed to increase the concentration of the isotope uranium 235. Such centrifuges can produce enriched uranium to reduce (Leu-Low Enrichment Uranium), which can be used for fuel in reactors of nuclear power or research reactors and weapons that use uranium-scale enrichment to high (HEU –High Enrichment Uranium). The problem is that, if LEU is used in nuclear reactors, it usually contains less than 5% uranium-235; a research reactor fuel can be made to use 20% uranium-235; HEU, which is typically used for nuclear weapons, contains approximately 90% uranium-235. Based on the Teheran official statement, Iran is enriching uranium for use as fuel in nuclear reactors and in nuclear research reactors (Kenneth Katzman, 2015).

2.1 Fuel enrichment plant in Natanz -this commercial building could eventually hold more than 47,000 centrifuges. Former Vice President Gholamreza Aghazadeh, who headed the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran until July 2009, explained that Iran's goal is to install all the centrifuges by 2015. So, Iran began enriching uranium after mid April 2007. It has produced low enriched uranium hexafluoride, which can be estimated in total of 6.876 kilograms, which contains up to 5% uranium-235. This amount of LEU, if it is enriched further, could theoretically produce enough HEU (high enrichment uranium) for at least five nuclear weapons (Ker, 2012). Those who support the negotiations with Iran conclude that such an Iranian effort to enrich this LEU is very likely to be detected by the IAEA inspections. In this facility, individual centrifuges are linked together in a cascade; each cascade is in a commercial building containing 164 or 174 centrifuges. According to the report of the Director General of the IAEA, Amano, by 21 August 2012, Iran fueled hexafluoride uranium to 54 cascades (9.156 centrifuges) centrifuges of the first generation (IR-1) and installed another cascade. Tehran also installed an additional IR-1 centrifuge in this facility (Ker, 2012, p. 16).

2.2 Enrichment Pilot Plant of Fuel in Natanz- Since 2010, Iran had used IR-1 centrifuges in the facility to produce LEU containing approximately 20% uranium-235, until it was stopped under the JPA. LEU enriched production up to a level of 20%, has caused concern for many countries because such production requires about 90% of the effort needed to produce weapons-grade -HEU, which as noted, contains about 90% uranium-235. Iran is testing other models in the centrifuges in these buildings under IAEA supervision, but such work is monitored by the IAEA and the JPA provisions limit these tests (Simon Henderson, 2015, p. 10).

2.3. Fuel Enrichment Plant in Fordow- Iran used IR-1 centrifuges in the facility to produce LEU containing 20% uranium-235 until JPA entered into force. Iran has installed around 2700 first-generation centrifuges, 700 of which have enriched uranium. According to the inventory of enriched uranium, when JPA was signed, Iran had sufficient quantities of hexafluoride uranium containing up to 5% uranium-235, which, if enriched further, will produce enough HEU for some nuclear weapons. The total amount of Iranian LEU containing 20% uranium-235, if it were in the form of hexafluoride uranium and enriched further, would be sufficient for nuclear weapons. Since the signing of the JPA, however, Iran has converted such material for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran (called the Tehran Research Reactor), or to prepare it for this purpose. Tehran facility of uranium conversion is not set up to fuel the reactor retranslated in the uranium hexafluoride (Kenneth Katzman, 2015, pp. 2-4).

It is so, but concerns have been raised by Western countires and Israel about suspisious hidden activities of Iran in Fordow. According to a memo made by AIPAC, the IAEA declared that Iran has completed the first installation of centrifuges to enrich uranium in order to hide it in Fordow. It is for completely operational purposes, since these centrifuges can produce quadruple quantity in Fordow and dramatically reduce the time needed to produce weapons. With its current centrifuges, Iran has increased its deposit amount of 20 percent enriched uranium to nearly 50 percent in the last three months. 20 percent enrichment level represents 80 percent of the work needed to produce material for the core of a nuclear weapon (Committte, 2012).

2.4. ARAK-reactor in Iran has built a heavy water reactor in Arak-moderate, which, according to Tehran intends to produce radioisotope for medical use and replace the Iranian research reactor. The construction of this reactor started in 2004 and it was planned to head up operations in 2014. JPA further limits the development of this facility. The production of heavy water plant requires a special production which Iran possesses. Before the JPA agreement, Tehran informed the IAEA that it had been producing heavy water reactor sufficient commission. This reactor is a proliferation concern because nucleare heavy water reactors produce spent fuel containing plutonium, which is more suitable for nuclear weapons than the plutonium produced by light to moderate water reactors. However, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel (a procedure called "reprocessing."). Iran has always maintained that stance and stated that it is not going to engage in reprocessing (Kenneth Katzman, 2015, pp. 2-4).

What is very important is that no one from outside knows for certain if Iran has decided to produce nuclear weapons, although there should be no doubt, given Iran's actions, which will be elaborated and analyzed below, that Iran is in search of hidden capabilities for creation of nuclear weapons. Although the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) said that it has found no conclusive evidence about a military nuclear program, Western intelligence agencies continue to prioritize the actions suspectying that Iran is producing nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is continuously introducing research questions, with respect to which they still do not have the right to be informed about the Iranian nuclear program. The questions include at least ten indicators of Iranian military involvement in nuclear and other military purposes. Together these provide strong indication that, at least until 2003, there existed a coordinated military connection to a nuclear weapons program for exploration purposes (Cronin, 2008, p. 24).

President Ahmadinejad launched the issue as one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the state of the international legal framework on nuclear safety with exactly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It seems that he used this excuse wishing to cover the violations legitimately documented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the concerns of visible security in connection with Iran's nuclear program. In a speech in the nuclear facility in Natanz in April 2007, Ahmadinejad stated: "The great Iranian nation will not allow you to balk its way of progress with some force. ... We will continue to reach the top." The President further suggested that all those who were against the Iranian projects should reconsider their positions. What also crystallizes the nuclear status of this state is the series of missiles, which continues to grow; the limited accuracy of its long range missiles, Shahab 3 is expanded. This makes Iran a potential candidate with nuclear weapons rather than with conventional weapons (Cronin, 2008, p. 25).

The aforementioned creates an ambigious picture that Iran is building a nuclear weapon. It can be interpreted in various political contexts depending on the political situation.

3. Indication of a nuclear program diversion

The construction of a thermal research reactor with heavy water in Arak, 200 kilometers southwest of Tehran, which may be the source of plutonium (another fuel for nuclear weapons) has also raised questions and concerns of the experts for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Although Iran has pledged more transparency in its nuclear program and has repeatedly confirmed the nature of its program for peaceful purposes, the IAEA on the other side has expressed concern by the replies of Iran on several aspects in the field of nuclear safety that fall under its jurisdiction. Among the main concerns raised was the refusal of Iran to allow inspectors to visit this agency at Parchin after signing the agreement in July 2014 and other actions undertaken by the leader for visiting this facility. On September 21, 2015, the Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Yukiya Amano informed the Board of Governors that the day before he had visited a suspected site within the Parchin military complex in Iran (a few days before the visit of Director General Amano, as envisaged in the draft informal agreement with Iran), under the guidance of IAEA inspectors and that 'but not their physical presence, have taken environmental samples from a suspected place"; Amano said in a public statement that the approach in this section is important to "clarify issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program. The building has been the site suspected of tests, including nuclear weapons activities supposed to have taken place several years before. Iran denied IAEA access to this particular part of the northern military complex since the first visit had been made by the IAEA in 2011 (Allbright, 2015) to a country with significant military restrictions south of Tehran which was allegedly the site of experiments years ago, in the testing of nuclear weapons. The experts for WMD proliferation have different opinions among themselves in terms of the duration necessary for the construction of nuclear weapons by Iran. However, the majority agree that the greatest challenge is that Iran is enriching uranium to the sufficient level to build nuclear weapons, unnoticed by the IAEA inspectors. Meanwhile, the Institute for Science and International Security, a group of non-proliferation monitors in Washington said that Iran's centrifuges could theoretically produce enough uranium for a bomb by mid 2014 (Gladstone, 2013).

Although it remains unclear whether Tehran will take the final decision to build nuclear weapons, it has developed a wide range of technologies, including uranium

enrichment, filling and distribution systems, which can be set in a nuclear state in a relatively short time. Iran has enriched uranium to use in a machine called gas centrifuge, which has high speed to increase the concentration or percentage and degrade the uranium isotopes. Doubts about Iran's capabilities to produce nuclear weapons increase even more, knowing that in the mid-1980s, Iran obtained the technology (centrifuges gas) through a network of nuclear smuggling, led by a Pakistani ex-official nuclear Abdul Qadeer Khan. The scientists also provided similar assistance to Libya and North Korea. Also in late 2012, Iran created an underground station for industrial uranium enrichment, which is called Natanz by installing nearly 10,400. Of these 10,400 around 9150 are presently used, thus achieving the purpose of enrichment of 3.5 percent enriched uranium (LEU), which is generally used in nuclear reactors. Until November 2012, Iran had produced a total of 7,600 kilograms of depleted uranium, enough to be used in several nuclear weapons production. Since November 2012, Iran has produced about 137 kilograms of enriched material, nearly 20 percent in Natanz. Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, leaving this issue on its political decision if the country chooses to do so (Tom Z. Collina, 2013). This is confirmed by statements of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran - Mohhamad Jarif Zarif, who declared at a conference organized by the Foreign Corrospodent Club of Japan that "Iran possesses the technology, scientific knowledge (know how) scientists, workshops and can produce nuclear weapons, but does not want to do such a thing (Zarif, 2014)".

All this information with respect to the technical advancements influence the formulation of our judgment that Iran is technically capable of producing enough enriched uranium to produce more than one nuclear weapon, if it decides to do such a thing. Iran has also given a program for development of ballistic missiles, which it repeatedly produces. It is suspected by the international community for carrying out research and developing nuclear missile heads, making the country the largest arsenal of various missiles in the region. A wide range of reports indicate that the development of missiles in Iran now includes a mix of rigid and liquid-fuel, medium-range operations, ballistic missiles (MRBMs) named and ranking as Ghadr-110 (2,000 -3.000 km), Shahab-3 (2,100 km) (Iran), Fajr-3 (2500 km) Ashour (2,000-2,500 km) and Sejjil (2,000-2,500 km). For more controversy, they can also include development systems, such as the intermediate-range ballistic missile (ICBMs) as Shahab 5 or Toqyān 1 (3000-5000 km) and Shahab-6 or Toqyān 2) (3000-5000 km. (Cordesman, Iran's Rocket and Missile Forces, 2014).

Even official estimates say the US ballistic missile program of Iran has been focusing on increasing the sophistication of the medium radius of action of 1,000 to 3,000 kilometers, creating sufficient abilities to hit targets in Israel, Turkey and the Persian Gulf. A key aspect of Iran's efforts to increase the sophistication of its missile program is to develop missile technology with rigid fuel (Tom Z. Collina, 2013, p. 3).

The ability of Iran to refine uranium, the fuel for peaceful nuclear energy and weapons, has increased significantly, according to the latest inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Prior to the JPA, in February 2012 Iran multiplied roughly, more than 1,000 advanced centrifuges at its main nuclear unit in the central city of Natanz. It also equipped a secret underground facility known as Fordo, near the holy city of Qom, with 3,000 centrifuges of the older model (Cordesman, 2011, pp. 42-43).

According to reports by IAEA, before the conclusion of the JPA, Iran had accumulated 185.8 kg, or about £ 410, uranium enriched to about 20 percent, which is considered very close to the material for production of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, experts have different views in terms of the amount of 20 percent of uranium and whether

it is necessary for Iran to make a bomb. But Israel stated that it will consider Iran with nuclear weapons as an existential threat and warned that it should not exceed 240 kilograms, or £ 529.

4. **CONCLUSION**

Iran has stated that its nuclear program has only peaceful purposes and that it has enriched uranium less than 5%, which makes this amount sufficient only for civilian power plants nuclear fuel. The IAEA Board of Governors, on the other hand, reported to the United Nations Security Council about Iran's action contrary to the Safeguards Agreement (signed between the IAEA and Iran). The Security Council adopted a Resolution imposing sanctions on Iran to suspend its enrichment and nuclear activities, while Iran rejected the sanctions as "illegal" measures imposed by the West and influenced by Israel. But what makes the status of the nuclear program in Natanz more confusing is that Iran had previously enriched 6,000centrifuges without giving any further explanation in detail. IAEA has not confirmed this publicly for a long time.This creates an ambiguity of the effort aiming to increase Iran's political advantages in the international system.

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DESIGNING SECURITY SYSTEMS AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN TECHNOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

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ABSTRACT

Security is crucial to the normal and efficient functioning of the modern industrial capacities. It could be compromised by external threats, such as terrorist activities, but also by internal threats, facing potential sabotages, thefts of confidential company information, various criminal activities, technological accidents and other uncontrolled events leading to damages and losses. Therefore, security design is the most crucial element for the survival of any industry or company. Security architecture, as an essential element of infrastructure, should be planned and implemented, aiming to provide a proactive, technologically advanced secure environment. Taking into consideration that the scenarios for potential threats are inconsistent and ever changing, in ensuring a modern security system, it is critical to provide its continual revision, evolution and upgrade. Security level evaluations include a thorough research into security, safety and efficacy of the pre-designed measures for threat response, assessments of the security resources at disposal, evaluation of the efficacy of the planned security measures and activities, security of the communications and confidential information, analyses of the existing risks and threats, as well as an assessment of the new risks and threats to the industrial capacities, etc. Therefore, designing a security system in the industrial production facilities is a continual process that provides protection against all risks and threats that endanger not only objects, technology and production, but also the human resources involved in that production.

Key words: threats, risks, security system, technological security, providing security

Introduction

Security of technological and industrial processes and production is a broad term since it encompasses the prevention and protection against many risks and threats which are or are not specific to the technological processes, but certainly result in material and/or human losses and injuries. It could refer to the security of the facility and technology against intruders within an industrial facility; of the subjects responsible of finances and corporate matters by preventing thefts or leaking of secret company information; of the departments of work or environmental protection; of the sectors of computer security management and risks related to intellectual or computer data; etc. All security risks in the technological processes include a likelihood of unwanted events or situations, resulting in a less than favorable outcome. However, this paper will treat mainly the risks of terrorist attacks, especially likely to occur in facilities that use or produce expensive or sensitive technology, or chemical and biochemical materials that could endanger the overall internal security of the industrial facility. Designing a security system and its implementation

should contribute to reducing the likelihood of occurrence of these risks, as well as to the protection of the facilities, technology and people within the industrial facility in case an attack occurs.

Risk assessment and management in regard to terrorist attacks in industrial facilities

Terrorism is an expression of the ways of using violence, intimidation, threats and spreading fear, aiming to manipulate the behavior of people, to achieve goals – political, societal, economic, religious, ethnical, ideological, or personal, in an illegal way. Although terrorism encompasses a plethora of criminal activities, what is most obvious is the use or the threat of violence and destruction, aiming to spread insecurity and fear. The goals of these attacks are many and terrorist activities are equally directed towards people and material, technological, financial and other elements of the infrastructure and the social and economic life of the communities. However, one of the newer trends in terrorist attacks are the large, leading and successful production or trading companies that are the symbol of exploitation of the poor to many terrorist organizations and thus, an attractive goal to strike. This is also proven by the great number of attacks on industrial companies across the world. In 1998, there were 17 attacks on successful American companies in other countries and in 2003 the number rose to 40 (Top Security Threats and Management: Issues Facing Corporate America, 2003 Survey of Fortune 1000 Companies). It is important to stress that sometimes an attack on a company is actually an indirect attack of the country whose symbol the company is.

Terrorist attacks are widespread in industrial facilities that dispose of sensitive and expensive materials and technology, or produce and use dangerous materials (chemical, flammable materials, explosives, nuclear materials, etc). These attacks are deliberate, premeditated, planned, and aim not only to destroy the facility and the valuables in it, but also to deliberately cause an industrial catastrophe and damage people and estate. Factories that own massive quantities of dangerous liquids, chemicals, flammable or explosive materials are especially liable to attacks, since they pose a risk to public health and security in the long run. A nuclear weapons attack or an attack of a nuclear plant is less likely, but in case it does occur, it would be disastrous, which leads to increased fear of such attacks, and therefore there are many efforts to prevent such an attack. The risk of using biological and chemical agents in terrorist attacks is more likely, but the attacks on facilities of food and chemical industries pose a real risk to the security of these companies, but also of the people and the immediate and farther environment.

The use or threats of use of explosive devices in terrorist attacks are increasingly more common and more likely future scenarios for terrorist attacks on industrial facilities. Although nearly 98% of the threats have been proven false, the fact that it is impossible to prove if an explosive device is real or false until the last second imposes the need to plan a response to such situations, since the company has to protect its estate and staff from the dangers a potential explosion might bring. The lack of a plan to react to the threats will always cause panic since there will always be a possibility that the threat is real. The plans for emergency situations include appointing a person in charge of dealing with the crisis and delegating tasks, as well as appointing a control center for communication with all parts of the industrial facility and the security forces. However, the staff included in the threat response has to be well trained and ready for their tasks and duties.

Conducting a risk evaluation of terrorist attacks on industrial processes and managing those risks are two distinct actions. The evaluation includes possible scenarios for attacks,

while the management process includes a preparation of action plans, evaluation of the measures and activities that are to be undertaken according to the plans, and defining the activities and objectives, aiming to minimize loss and damage in case a terrorist attack does occur. Therefore, the plans could be considered proactive (based on the risk evaluation), active (based on security revisions) and reactive (based on the incident analysis).

The process of managing the risks of terrorist attacks on technological processes includes an evaluation of the likelihood of such risks, identification of the materials that are in danger, an evaluation of the costs incurred both by the realization of the risk and by the measures aiming to reduce or eliminate the risk. Each risk is developed and analyzed in a set of scenarios, the costs for each scenario are calculated, as well as the costs for reducing or eliminating the likelihood of that risk. The scope of the risk is defined on the basis of the materials in danger (data, inventory, production, and almost everything of value), their vulnerability, as well as the threats that might degrade or destroy them. For instance, in a scenario including a terrorist attack with an explosive device, the vulnerability might be the fact that the main reactor could be damaged, leading to an explosion that would destroy the factory, and the materials under danger of destruction would be the reactor, the inventory, the data and the facility. This attack would lead to a loss of millions. However, with proper and careful planning and engineering controls, the materials could be separated to decrease their vulnerability. What needs to be stressed out is that sometimes the prevention measures are not taken seriously and are marginalized. The approach to the prevention will depend on the likelihood of the undesired event. The terrorist attack risk evaluation of the technological processes (chemical, oil, or electromechanical processes, as well as power plants) is a complex process that demands a thorough and comprehensive analysis of all possible ways to fail, the likelihood of failure, and the potential repercussions. Many industries use "what if" analysis and techniques in the HAZOP – analyses that enable them to detect all potential risks (including terrorist attacks) and their scenarios. However, regardless of which techniques are to be used in the risk evaluation, they need to be conducted by a risk evaluation team that is comprised by well-trained professionals from many areas (managers, administrators, technical engineers, business advisors, security managers, etc.) (Russel and Arlow, 2015:164).

Designing a security system against terrorist attacks in industrial facilities

Designing a security system is the most significant element in the prevention of terrorist attacks in an industrial facility. The implementation of the system needs to provide a proactive, technologically safe environment, which means that it should be planned in a way that corresponds to the likelihood of the risk of a terrorist attack and take into consideration all aspects of the security of that given industrial facility. The likelihood of a terrorist attack could be evaluated based on the analysis of terrorist groups that have already been conducted, as well as on the political situation. The power and capabilities of terrorist groups needs to be analyzed separately through the use of security information and previous analyses of the group's movements and activities in the previous period. National and regional security services could supply the information on the history of the terrorist groups and their past attacks, which would serve as the basis for further analysis of their intentions towards certain companies or countries. In the terrorist attack risk evaluation, information about the political attitudes of terrorist groups towards countries can also be used. If the company is a symbol of a country towards which there is an expression of violence by a terrorist group, or which is a professed nemesis of that group,

the degree of likelihood is greater and it can be classified as a key national subject of highest level protection. Therefore, in designing the security system of that company, complete and efficient prevention measures must be put in place, including all aspects of facility, technology, production and staff protection.

The most significant aspects that need to be taken into consideration are border barriers, vehicle control, entrance roads and control stations, infrastructure improvement, electronic security systems, external sensors, access control, staff evaluation, visitors identification, locks and keys controls, as well as control over the work and efficiency of the company security forces. The border barriers, i.e. external borders of the industrial facility, need to be reinforced by fences, wire fences, high sidewalks (20 cm at least), reinforced pillars at 1.2 meters distance, sliding gates, etc. Vehicle barriers are placed at each exit and entrance point to provide controlled vehicle movement, and in case of a violent entry to stop or prolong their penetration. In order to control the speed of the vehicles through the facility, signs are placed next to the entrance roads and the high sidewalks are designed to disable the crossing from one lane to another. Entrance control stations need to be placed next to the entrance points. They need to be active 24 hours a day, well-lit, with external motion detector sensors and announce timely any entrances, be reinforced and explosion-resistant, have first class communication systems, as well as signalization placed on the auxiliary systems for potential danger detection, at a minimum of 30 meters from the control station. Furthermore, the facilities themselves should be designed to be able to withstand a minimum of 2.3 kilopascals of pressure from a potential explosion, even though explosion pressure is much greater. Therefore, industrial facilities are built with armoured walls and concrete, and have small, narrow windows with explosion-resistant glass (Russel and Arlow, 2015: 154-157). All these measures of protection are preventive measures that reduce the vulnerability of a physical attack and are directed towards disabling an assailant to access the facility. Although it is much more difficult to stop an assailant from actually enforcing the violent intention, the aim is to gain as much time as possible to evaluate the situation and undertake adequate security response measures.

The lighting system is one of the most significant security elements, since it has the capacity to improve every other technology and planned security effort. The lighting security system needs to be connected to a separate Energy source in case of an energy cut and dispose of a system of independent lights in case of multiple simultaneous defects. It is of utmost importance that the areas beside the main fence, the control points, and the parking lot be well-lit and that the facilities are painted in bright and clean colors to improve visibility. In case of an emergency, the existing lighting should be amplified. The electronic system (cameras, sensors, alarms, etc) enables warnings against an unauthorized entry in the industrial complex, which is why it needs to be secure, accurate, and based on the latest technology.

Access control is another significant aspect of security in an industrial facility. The areas in which access is controlled are divided by the significance they bear on the industry:
- controlled areas – the area is controlled, but movement in it is unlimited;
- restricted areas – movement is limited, and visitors must be accompanied by a staff member to move in them;
- access denied – including control points and objects for strengthening the security and they are in the focus of security interest (Russel and Arlow, 2015: 159).

History shows that the majority of unauthorized entries into industrial facilities or complexes, especially those conducted by vehicles and explosive devices, occurred through secured entrances, which points to the fact that the intruders were in cohort with the employees. To eliminate such possibilities, background check must be conducted on all employees and medical checks to determine the potential employees' medical and psychological state could also be conducted. In controlled areas, staff identification is done with ID cards and if there are more than 30 employees in one shift, they need to wear special uniforms and ID cards with their personal information and the areas which they are authorized to enter. In restricted areas and areas with denied access, special electronic passes ought to be used to detect anyone who enters and exits a certain area.

The control and identification of external persons and goods entering an industrial complex also reduces the possibility of unauthorized entrance. To establish control, special written rules and regulations must be in place and the security personnel need to adhere to them strictly. When hiring security personnel, there must be a strict set of criteria, assessing potential external attack risks. It is important that they are professionals, well-trained for preventive measures, as well as for responding to a terrorist or other attack.

The security protection plans recommend measures for internal monitoring of the industrial facilities, access control, emergency acivities coordination and management of any crisis. A diligent implementation of the security procedures will lead to a decrease of the risk of disasters caused by internal physical attacks of industrial facilities, which not only endanger the lives and safety of the staff and pose a danger to the facility, but also might pose a national security risk.

Conclusion

Terrorist attacks are mainly external security risks affecting the technological and industrial facilities. They present a marked risk to the industries that own or produce sensitive and expensive technology, or dangerous flammable, chemical, nuclear, or explosive materials, since a physical attack alone could cause an industrial disaster with great material and human losses. In the prevention of terrorist attacks in industrial facilities, what is especially significant is designing a security system, adequate to the estimated level of likelihood of a terrorist attack risk. The system should include all aspects of the protection of the industrial facilities, staff, technology, and production and enable the most efficient readiness for dealing with a potential terrorist attack before it occurs, thus lessening the damage and continuing with the processes even after it occurs. It must be stressed that the security system in an industrial facility or complex will never provide a one-hundred percent protection against all risks and threats of the security of people and property, especially those deemed to have a higher risk of occurrence. The system needs to be flexible, as well as the staff design, implementation, and management, adapting it to the new conditions and threats.

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THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR SUSTAINTABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

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ABSTRACT

The consideration of issues relating to various aspects of energy security is in the focus of interest of the key factors in the long-term strategies for sustainable development of modern states. The achievement of the objectives of sustainable development requires integration of social, economic and environmental dimensions and development of a new energy strategy relying on alternative energy sources. In this paper, the technique of content analysis of secondary documents of relevant international institutions within their jurisdiction is used to collect, analyze and publish data on the current global energy situation and the greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, the subject of the work relates to the analysis of the role of nuclear energy in achieving an ambitious seventh goal of sustainable development, regardingthe access to affordable, reliable and sustainable energy for all roles of nuclear energy and its share in the global fight against climate change. The aim of the paper is to present the potential contribution of energy production to the development challenges of sustainable development. The comprehensive reassessment of the relevant domestic and foreign scientific papers relating to these issues came to the conclusion that nuclear energy contributes to decarbonisation of global economy, especially of the security of the energy sector.

Keywords:*security, nuclear energy, energy security, sustainable development*

1. INTRODUCTION

Various aspects of energy security are in the focus of the planning stages of the long-term strategies for sustainable development of modern countries. The IEA prediction indicates that the world energy demand will increase by 30% until 2040. The increased energy demand requires new actions for sustainable development [1]. Alternative energy sources must be developed using new technologies in order to decrease the greenhouse gas emissions. The new energy sources require considering the social, economic and environmental aspects before their commercial use. The most important goal in the future energy mix must be directed toward energy availability and security and fighting climate changes. With the industrialization, the national economies have become highly dependent on energy security as availability of resources with affordable prices [2]. In order to fulfill the energy requirements, countries develop different national strategies and include concepts of sustainable development. Nuclear energy is considered as an alternative source

of energy that can compete with the high oil prices and decrease energy dependency of certain countries [3]. On the other side, nuclear energy has slow development because of the high capital costs, the negative public perception and the radioactive waste disposal. Although the capital costs are high, the operating costs are less sensitive to fuel price changes than the coal or gas power plants [4]. The main goal of this article is to indicate the possible contribution of nuclear energy toward fulfilling sustainable development goals.

2. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

In the report of the World Commission of Environment and Development, named as Our Common Future, sustainable development is defined as a development which satisfies the needs of the current generation with a possibility for the next generations to satisfy their needs (energy requirements) [5]. Bruntlands Commission confirms the necessity for further economy growth in the developing countries, if it is sustainable. Half a decade after the Bruntlands Commission at the European Union Environmental Conference held 1992 in Rio, a Declaration was adopted with 27 goals of sustainable development. All nations are recommended to develop national strategies in order to fulfill the sustainable development goals. After that, the concept of sustainable development has been studied in all disciplines, analyzed in thousands of books and articles and has become part of the historical and theoretical paradigms. Beside its supporters, the concept has received criticism from the very beginning, most of the critics pointing out that the terms "sustainability" and "development" are contradictory [6,7] and that there is an ideological manipulation with these terms. Giddens emphasizes that sustainability considers continuity and balance, while development considers dynamics and changes. Ecologists are interested in sustainability, governments and companies are interested in development, considering their GDP [8]. Albeit the great criticism and the fact that the concept of sustainable development does not consider the legal obligations and that every nation makes its decisions, the concept is still present. Established on the principles of the European Union Environmental Conference in Rio and the Millennium goals, the sustainable development concept was enhanced on 25 September 2015 at the Sustainable Development Summit. In order to find a common solution for many social and environmental issues, the United Nations member states adopted the Program for Sustainable Development covering the period until 2030. The Program consists of 16 Sustainable Development Goals – SDG, which cover the main challenges of today and they are therefore called Global Goals. The Sustainable Development Goals present an upgrade and expansion of 8 Millennium goals which the UN member states tried to fulfill until 2015. Energy is considered as a key factor in fulfilling the Millennium goals in the future [9]. For that reason, energy is considered through the prism of the sustainable development concept and the main concerns are directed toward energy supply, energy availability, economical and environmental acceptance. During the development of the national strategies, the countries make a decision for various energy sources including fossil fuels oil, gas, coal, renewable energy sources, including solar, wind, hydroenergy, biomass, nuclear sources etc. Due to the limited world oil reserves, many countries invest in the development of alternative sources of energy, depending on their economy, knowledge and the existence of renewable sources in their territories.

## 3. EXPONENTIAL GROWTH OF HUMAN POPULATION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON ENERGY RECOURCES

Over the past century, the availability of modern fossil fuel has significantly changed the lives of millions of people. In mid-2015, world population reached 7.3 billion people, which is an average of one billion for every 20 years [10]. World population by region is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. World population by region [10].

Region	Population (million)	The percentage of the world population
Asia	4400	60
Africa	1200	16
Europe	738	10
South America and the Caribbean	634	9
North America	358	5

China and India are countries with over a billion inhabitants (18% of the world population) and are among the ten countries with growing economies and a great demand for energy, mostly fossil fuels [11]. The global oil consumption is increasing by 1.4% annually and it is predicted that oil consumption in 2030 will be 30% higher, which is equivalent to 120 million barrels per day. The consumption of natural gas will be increasingly higher from year to year and it is expected to be 30% higher than today. The industrialized countries increase their energy consumption and the highest consumption is expected from countries with growing economies led by China and India [12].

World total energy demand from 1973 to 2014 is presented in Figure 1 [13].


1. World includes international aviation and international marine bunkers.
2. In these graphs, peat and oil shale are aggregated with coal.
3. Includes geothermal, solar, wind, heat, etc.

Figure 1. Global energy demand from 1973 to 2014

From 1971 to 2014, the global demand for fossil fuels (oil, coal, natural gas) was increasing.

The global energy supply from 1973 to 2014 is presented in Figure 2 [13].

1. Asia excludes China and OECD countries of Asia.
2. Includes international aviation and international marine bunkers.

Figure 2. Global energy supply from 1973 to 2014

Global electricity generation by fuels from 1971 to 2014 is presented in Figure 3.

1. Excludes electricity generation from pumped storage.
2. Includes geothermal, solar, wind, heat, etc.
3. In these graphs, peat and oil shale are aggregated with coal.

Figure 3. Global electricity generation by fuels from 1973 to 2014

Any significant change of the three main drives, demand, supply and environmental impact, causes changes on the energy transition on a global level. According to the report from the World Economic Forum, two factors that influence global energy are industry and the government. The industry must continue to develop and supply new energy reserves in a safe, reliable and environmentally friendly way. The government has a responsibility to provide a stable energy development, opening the door to international markets, competitive trade and cooperation between nations [14].

4. NUCLEAR ENERGY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The first nuclear plant for electricity production was started on 26 June 1954 in Obninsk (USSR). Today, there are more than 450 nuclear plants around the world [15]. The commercial application of nuclear energy started in 1966. Before 1977, nuclear energy had slow development. After two energy crises, the nuclear energy developed rapidly until 2011 when the accident in the Fukushima reactor took place [16]. During a meeting of the Commission on Sustainable Development at the UN Environmental Conference, there was a controversial debate on nuclear energy. Some countries considered nuclear energy as a main part of their national energy strategies and others rejected this statement. Nuclear energy was connected with many issues including nuclear safety, nuclear fuels, disposing of radioactive waste and decommission of nuclear plants. In the adopted document, CSD-9, the decision of building nuclear plants was left to the countries [17]. In 2002, during the Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, nuclear energy was recognized as an advanced technology for energy efficiency. The three dimensions of nuclear energy in sustainable development defined by the Johannesburg Declaration are economic, social and environmental as presented in Figure 4.


Figure 4. Three dimensions of nuclear energy in sustainable development [15].

4.1. Economy dimension of nuclear power

The economic dimension considered in this article is related to the uranium resources and costs of building, operating and decommission of nuclear plants. Uranium extraction is the first step in the nuclear fuel cycle. Currently, uranium is extracted from phosphates. The primary resources of uranium are uraninite (88.1%), coffinite (70.4%) and brannerite (59.8%). Secondary minerals are autunite, carnotite and uranophane (around 50%). Deposits of uranium are also sandstones, quartz, lignite, shale and breccia. Uranium is extracted by open pit mining (Namibia, Niger, Australia), underground mining (Canada, Russia) or chemical treatments (Kazakhstan) [18]. Currently, the annual consumption of uranium is around 65 000 tons. The annual world production of uranium from 2006-2013 is presented in Figure 5.


Figure 5. Annual world production of uranium from 2006-2013 [18]

Uranium is one of the fuels that can be used in nuclear plants. Thorium is an alternative to uranium and is present in the Earth four times more than uranium.
Like most of the renewable energy sources, nuclear plants have high capital investments. The instability of the uranium price does not play a critical role, as fossil fuel plants, because every country can store significant quantities of uranium. Other energy fuels can also be stored, but uranium has significant advantages, because its price is lower, storing is easy and there is no danger of degradation like with coals [19].
The costs of nuclear plants can be divided in four components [15]:
- Capital or construction costs (during planning, preparation and building of a plant)
- Operative costs (safety, security)
- Fuel costs
- Final costs (disposal of radioactive waste and decommission of plants).

Even if nuclear energy proves as an economy efficient option for electricity generation, the financing of a nuclear plant requires significant investment. With the average construction time from 5-7 years and a price from 3.5-5.5 billion dollars, the capital investment can be high for most of the countries. Investments are often presented with the indicator which assumes that a nuclear power plant can be built over night, neglecting the construction

costs. The costs for a nuclear plant vary from 1800-6600 $/kW - with the average price around 4500 $/kW [20]. The operational costs are just a small portion of the total costs; the largest share goes for the construction costs. The uranium price has a very small influence on the total costs (7-10%), which contributes to stability. If the uranium price is increased ten times, the total cost will be increased by 18-36%. Additionally, in power plants with natural gas, the fuel price takes 70% of the total costs, the doubling of the gas price will increase the total costs by 80% [15].

The costs for nuclear plants are one of the most important factors and require cooperation between countries and international corporations by applying an international regulative and using the public in the decision making process.

4.2. Social dimension of nuclear power

According to the social dimension, everyone has a legitimate right to inform and influence the decision making for environmental protection purposes. Public attitudes can have a strong impact on planning, energy requirements, especially on the risk associated requirements. The memories from the nuclear disasters in Chernobyl and Fukushima still have a negative contribution to the risk perception of nuclear plants, despite the large scientific researches about mortality prevention using nuclear energy [21]. Public perception of nuclear power is the key factor for considering nuclear energy [22]. The negative attitude is connected with radioactivity, nuclear disasters, even with nuclear wars. The populations that support nuclear energy give an advantage to energy safety and security. The public support for different energy sources is presented in Table 2 [23].

Energy source	Public support
Solar	97
Wind	93
Hydro	91
Natural gas	80
Coal	48
Nuclear	38

According to the international surveys in 20 countries with more than 10 000 peoples, two thirds of the people support the construction of nuclear power plants in their countries [24]. Public support for nuclear energy in the European Union has increased from 37% to 44%, while the percentage of opponents has decreased from 55% to 45%. From the Three Mile Island disaster, nuclear security is taken to the high level during the design, construction and licensing, which is reflected in the system complexity and construction time. As a result, the competitiveness of nuclear plants has lowered. In addition, the public perception of nuclear dissasters has resulted in a lack of investments [25].

The renewable energy plants can be potentially affected by volcanic eruptions, erosion, floods and winds. The highest mortality level is caused by the coal source (especially in China), while hydro and nuclear energy are related to the lowest mortality level. The remaining renewable energy sources also have a low mortality rate and impact on human health [26]. According to Kharecha & Hansen, nuclear energy has prevented 1.84 millions of deaths and 64 Gt of greenhouse gas emission. Their projections show that nuclear energy can save from 420 000 to 7,04 million of lives and from 80 to 240 Gt CO2 emission [21].

A survey conducted in 1996 investigated the relationship between trust and risk perception, within and across four European countries (Sweden, Spain, the United Kingdom and France). Trust was a significant predictor of perceived risk within the countries, but the strength of the relationship varied from weak (Spain and France) to moderate (the United Kingdom and Sweden). General trust was also a significant source of variation in the perceived risk among the countries, but much of the variation in the perceived risk remained unexplained [27]. Public attitudes towards nuclear power in the UK have historically been deeply divided, but as the concerns about climate changes and energy security have exerted an increasing influence on the British energy policy, nuclear power has been reframed as a low-carbon technology [28].

4.3. Environmental dimension of nuclear power

In addition to the economic and social dimension, the environmental dimension of nuclear power plays a critical role throughout the design, construction and operation of the nuclear plant. The largest impact on the environment is related to the radioactive isotopes and their release in the environment, as well as their negative impact on the environment. However, because of its high capacities, nuclear power is recognized as a great potential for reducing the fossil fuel consumption in the global energy mix [29].

Nuclear power plants release small quantities of fine dust and gases (SOx, NOx), which cannot create acid rains or damage the ozone layer. Generally, small quantities of carbon components are produced through all processes [30]. From 1970 to 2012, nuclear energy and other low carbon technologies had prevented more than 157Gt of CO_2, for the same quantity of energy obtained from fossil fuels (coal, oil or gas). In the fifth report of the intergovernmental panel on climate changes (IPCC), Working Group III has confirmed the potential of nuclear energy in the global decarbonization of economy and the energy sector. According to the scenarios, an increase of nuclear energy is predicted from 383 GW in 2015 to 930 GW in 2050 [15].

The advantages of nuclear energy will disappear if the radioactive isotopes leave the reactor in uncontrolled conditions. All nuclear accidents have a strong influence on the risk and the strategies of nuclear energy. After the accident in the Westinghouse Test Reactor (USA, 1960), Idaho Falls SL-1 (USA, 1961), Detroit Edison Fermi (USA 1966), Three Mile Island (USA, 1979), Chernobyl (USSR, 1986), and Fukushima (Japan, 2011), many questions were raised, including the economic, social and environmental strategies of nuclear power [31]. Waste disposal, defined in SDG 12 is based on responsible consumption and production of fuel for energy use. Energy density plays an important role in the evaluation of fuel extraction, transport and quantity of the generated waste which is disposed in the environment. The densities of fuels are as follows:

-1 kg coal = 8.2 кWh;
-1 m3 gas = 1.1 kg coal = 9.0 кWh;
-1 kg oil = 1.4 kg coal = 12.0 кWh;
-1 kg uranium = 2.7 millions kg coal = 50 000 кWh. [15].

Currently, there is 8-10 billions of waste generated on a global level (without mining and extraction waste). Around 400 Mt is dangerous waste and less than 0.5 Mt is radioactive waste. Around 2-3% of the radioactive waste is a high level waste and requires special treatment due to radio toxicity and the long decay time. The remaining 97-98% is low and middle level of radio toxicity waste. Non radioactive waste is also generated in the nuclear power plants and that kind of waste requires proper treatment and storage. If that waste is

treated and stored in the proper way, there is no impact on the environment and human health [15].

5. CONCLUSION

By analyzing the relevant documents of international institutions and scientific articles, a conclusion is derived that nuclear energy is mainly accepted as an alternative to fossil fuels. Scientific analyses confirm that nuclear energy has important environmental advantages, compared to fossil fuels, mostly because of the decarbonization of economies. In normal conditions, the nuclear power plant does not release almost any toxic gases and it can be used as a support in fighting against climate changes.

Small quantities of gas are released in controlled conditions and they cannot have any negative effect on the environment. Despite the possibility of nuclear energy to stop further climate changes and air pollution, there is a misunderstanding related to nuclear accidents and radioactive waste. According to available data, it is noted that the popularity of nuclear energy has decreased after the nuclear accident in Fukushima in 2011.

In addition to the security risks and potential nuclear accidents, the negative public attitude is connected with environmental pollution and radioactive waste management. Waste generation is a key factor of sustainability which is related to using resources and proper waste management in order to prevent any consequences to people and the environment.

A future problem of nuclear energy is related to the economic dimension of sustainable development and financing of nuclear plants. The main point is the high initial investment, as well as the long period of investment and construction. If energy future is based on nuclear energy, the construction price must be significantly lower without any changes on safety and security.

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EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF THE PROTECTION AND RESCUE FORCES IN CRISIS CONDITIONS

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ABSTRACT

The protection and rescue forces are engaged for dealing with crises caused by natural and other disasters in the Republic of Macedonia. For successful dealing with a crisis, it is necessary to have an effective and efficient leadership and command. The members of the Headquarters and the command protection and rescue units have that responsibility.

The development of their capabilities and skills for making effective decisions and the delegation of appropriate tasks to the teams and the unit members for effective implementation of the decisions are key to the successful leadership of the actions for protection and rescue of people and material goods in times of a crisis.

The subject of this paper is the research of the leadership function through a field survey conducted with the protection and rescue forces on our territory during the actions for protection and rescue of people and material goods in the floods of Skopje region in August 2016.

Keywords: leadership, forces, crisis, flood.

1. INTRODUCTION

Protection and rescue forces (PR) management is a complex activity made up of several consecutive steps. PR forces management during a crisis, in addition to management, includes commanding the units in PR actions on the field affected by a natural disaster or other accidents. Management and command of protection and rescue actions during a crisis include: order of engagement of PR forces, determining the tasks and responsibilities of the management structures of the PR forces and dealing with the specifics of the actions. In addition to the theoretical knowledge, exercise activities and experience in PR actions are essential for effective and efficient PR forces management.

The paper provides a theoretical overview of management as a complex managerial function, a normative review of PR forces management and commanding in the Republic of Macedonia and experiential knowledge through a research conducted with the members of the PR forces in the Republic of Macedonia for PR action management and crisis specific management through the development of the Case Study of the flood in Skopje region in 2016. The acquired knowledge is the basis for making recommendations aimed at increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of PR forces management in future crises caused by natural disasters and other accidents.

2. MANAGEMENT AS A MANAGEMENT FUNCTION

Management in the broadest sense is a set of several managerial functions, processes or steps such as: decision making, delegation of authority, leadership, communication, motivation, coordination, etc. Decision making is a process by which managers respond to the opportunities and threats faced by analyzing the options and make a decision with specific objectives and action directives. (Gareth and Jennifer, 2010: 253) Delegation of authority requires clear assignment of the task, the ability to communicate the expectations and a capability to monitor the task after being delegated. (Dimitrovski, 2008: 192) Leadership is the process of inspiring others to work hard to carry out important tasks (Shermarhorn, 2013: 312) Communication is the process of sending and receiving symbols with a prescribed meaning. (Shermarhorn, 2013: 415) Motivation refers to the forces that come either from ourselves or our environment and generate an enthusiasm and persistence in looking for a particular course of action. (Daft, 2011:522) Coordination is a process of integrating the goals and activities or functions of the special units, organizations or systems in order to efficiently and effectively achieve the objectives. (Solunchevski & Ramadani, 2011:137).

Management is often teamwork. The team is a small group of people with complementary skills working together to achieve common goals, counting themselves jointly responsible for the results of the performance. Teamwork is a process in which people work together to achieve certain goals. (Griffin, 2010: 345)

3. MANAGEMENT IN THE PROTECTION AND RESCUE SYSTEM

Protection and rescue management will be reviewed from two aspects: *first*, protection and rescue system (PRS) management broadly reflecting the overall process of PRS business entities and employees and *secondly*, management and command of the protection and rescue actions during natural disasters and other accidents.

3.1. Management of the protection and rescue system elements

The elements of the PRS include the state bodies, state administration bodies, public enterprises, companies, public services, NGOs and citizens. (Law, 93/2012)

The Parliament is governed by the President of Parliament. The Parliament adopts a Protection and Rescue Strategy and a budget for protection and rescue. The Parliament passes a decision for declaring a state of emergency when major natural disasters and epidemics occur and manages the emergency situation. (Constitution, 51/1991)

The Government is headed by the Prime Minister of the Government. The Government adopts an assessment of the threats to the population and the territory of natural disasters and other accidents, a protection and rescue action plan; adopts decisions related to establishing protection and rescue forces and providing material supplies. The Government decides on declaring a crisis during natural and other disasters and manages the crisis situation. (Law, 29/2005)

Ministers   or   directors   appointed   by   the   Government   manage   the public administration bodies. The public administration bodies implement and manage measures to prevent the occurrence of and eliminate the consequences of natural disasters and other accidents in the areas within their scope of jurisdiction.

The public enterprises, public institutions and agencies are managed by directors or managers appointed by the Government or by the Government ministers. They manage

the protection and rescue activities of their employees and their property in case of natural disasters and other accidents.

Directors appointed by the Government bodies manage the companies. They manage the protection and rescue activities of their employees and their property in case of natural disasters and other accidents.

Responsible institutions within the PRS are the Protection and Rescue Directorate (PRD) at the and regional national level and the local self government (LSG) at the local level. PRD manages and coordinates the PRS activities. The PRD is managed by a director appointed by the Government. In his absence, the directorate is managed by a deputy director, also appointed by the Government. The regional and local PR departments are managed by heads appointed by the Director. (Law, 93/2012). LSG manages and coordinates the PRS activities locally. The LSG is managed by a Mayor elected by direct vote of the citizens and a Council composed of a varying number of councilors, depending on the population of the LSG, also elected directly by the citizens. Administrative officers within any of the LSG sectors or departments manage the protection and rescue activities. (Law, 5/2002)

3.2. Management and command of the protection and rescue forces

The management and command of the PR forces involves planning of activities directed towards achieving the goals and objectives of organizing and preparing the civil protection forces in the country. Command is a function of unity of management and it is applied during the execution of tasks for eliminating the consequences for the civil protection headquarters at all levels, the civil protection commands and unit commanders. (Solunchevski, 2005: 220) This definition is relevant today despite the transformation of the notion of civil protection (CP) into protection and rescue (PR), and the CP forces into PR forces.

PRD and LSG form the PR forces. PR staffs manage the PR forces and they are under the command of PR unit commanders. The PR forces comprise personnel from the state administration bodies, public enterprises, companies and public services.

In the event of a natural disaster and other accidents, the state administration bodies, public enterprises, companies and public services are engaged by providing their available forces and means for protection and rescue of people and material goods in the affected area. The appropriate engagement of the available forces and means in actions for dealing with natural disasters and other accidents leads to a better protection and rescue of the population and goods.

The hierarchical responsibility in managing and commanding the protection and rescue forces goes top-down in the following order:

The Protection and Rescue HQ Commander is responsible to the Government and the Commanders of the regional protection and rescue HQs (RPRH) are responsible to the PRD Director or the PRH Commander. The unit commanders and heads of teams report to the PRHC.

The Commanders of the local protection and rescue headquarters – the municipal protection and rescue headquarters (MPRH) and the local PR staffs are responsible to the body that has established them and the unit commanders report to the commander of the local protection and rescue staffs.

The field units are managed by commanders who also command the relevant units in the territory in which they are engaged in actions for protection and rescue of the population and goods from natural disasters and other accidents. (Decree, 18/2006)

In protection and rescue actions involving NGOs participation, the protection and rescue HQs have the managing role under the command of their heads of teams and departments.

All forces engaged in the field are coordinated pursuant to the orders of the Head of action.

4. MANAGEMENT AND COMMAND OF PROTECTION AND RESCUE ACTIONS DURING A CRISIS

4.1. Phases in disaster management caused by natural disasters and other accidents

Disaster management in case of a natural disaster and other accidentsthat lead to a crisis situation or a state of emergency is a complex process of managing the overall situation. The whole management process includes the following stages:

Mitigation- an activity to be undertaken to eliminate or reduce the blows of expected accidents. This activity may include continuous changes and preventive measures for the purpose of protection and rescue from a specific hazard.

Preparations - a set of activities undertaken in accordance with the development of the operational capabilities to enhance an effective response in case of an accident.

Response – actions which include protection and rescue of the lives of people and goods throughout the event.

Recovery - activities to restore the vital facilities to achieve minimum standards for the maintenance of the life of the population, to improve the infrastructure systems for normal functioning and thus bring the state in the regions affected by the crisis or the emergency back to normal.(Taylor, C. & Erik, V. 2006: 96)

4.2. Order for engagement of the forces and management and command of the protection and rescue forces in a crisis situation

In a crisis caused by natural disasters and other accidents, the PR forces are engaged in actions to protect and rescue the population and goods. The entity that is the first to arrive in the field manages the activities for protection and rescue of the population and goods at the beginning of the action. If two entities arrive in the field at the same time, the one that is hierarchically at the higher level takes over the management.

According to previous experiences, the forces of the owner are the first to arrive and the actions are managed by the staff of local protection and rescue forces of the owner of the affected area where the action is taking place and the heads of the mobile teams or the unit commanders have the direct command.

If a territorial fire-fighting unit (TFU) is engaged in the action in the field, it falls under the management and command of the TFU commander.

Once the citizens and the municipal protection and rescue forces are engaged, the action is managed by the MPRH under the command of the PR unit commanders.

If the natural disaster or another accident exceeds the territory of the municipality or if the forces engaged on the field are not sufficient, the state PR forces for the respective region are engaged. In that case, the direct management on the ground is exercised by the RPRH and the indirect by the GPRH. If state forces from several regions are engaged, they are managed directly by the RPRH that will be appointed by the GPRH.

When all possibilities for engagement of the state PR forces are exhausted, the Steering Committee submits a request to the Government for engagement of Army forces and resources. The Government considers the proposal and submits it to the President of

the Republic of Macedonia. The President makes a decision on the engagement of Army forces and resources.

The engagement of the Army forces and resources is a very sensitive issue. For these reasons, there is specific instruction which Army forces and resources can be engaged in dealing with natural disasters and other accidents. (Guideline, 2006)

If all previously engaged forces are not sufficient to eliminate the consequences of the natural disaster or other large scale accidents, the Government may request the assistance of international protection and rescue forces of the collective security and defense systems. Border assistance may also be sought and the LSG unit, which is on the border with the neighboring state if it is estimated that the border PR forces of the neighboring state could help in the crisis.

4.3. Tasks and responsibilities of the management structures of the protection and rescue forces, necessary for effective and efficient management and command of the protection and rescue actions

Each member of the PR headquarters has appropriate tasks that contribute to the performance of the tasks of the HQ in general. The tasks of the staff members depend on the staff type and duties.

The HQ Commander is responsible for the overall organization, competence and protection and rescue activities in the implementation of the protection and rescue actions. The Commander manages the work of the PR staff and actions. With respect to the management activities, he/she cooperates with other subjects of interest for protection and rescue. He/she uses full, shortened and direct methods of decision making. The chief of staff is responsible for the operation of the staff. The COS monitors the situation and takes timely measures depending on the development of the situation. The COS examines the proposals of other staff members and makdes a draft decision to be submitted to the Commander. The chief takes other protection and rescue measures and actions in the field in accordance with his/her duties and tasks entrusted by the Commander of the staff. The Staff members are responsible for making a timely and proper assessment of the threats to the region, proposing to engage the respective PR units. The COS assistants also execute other tasks which arise from their duties in the HQ and tasks that will be entrusted by the Commander and the COS.

The unit Commanders are responsible for the timely and quality execution of the orders received from their superiors by ensuring the execution of the specific tasks and activities of each member of the unit in the protection and rescue actions. The heads of the quick response teams are responsible for swift and professional action in an urgent situation in order to efficiently and effectively rescue vulnerable population and goods.

4.4. Important characteristics in the management and command of protection and rescue forces in protection and rescue actions

The effective and efficient management of the PR staff in protection and rescue actions have a crucial impact on the course and outcome of the action for protection and rescue of people and material goods.

Managing and commanding the protection and rescue actions is a complex activity, especially given the fact that the existing PR forces management and command system built through training and exercises differs significantly in a newly emerged real terms situation.

The existing management and command system in such situations is expected to be disturbed to a greater or lesser extent. The disorder may be manifested as an impracticable application of the developed documents, interruptions in the system links, absence of certain members of the staff and the managerial staff of the forces, failure to present the physical and mental constraints resulting from the new situation to a part of the management structure, etc. All these and many other characteristics lead to disruption of the management and command system in protection and rescue actions.

In order to minimize all these weaknesses that will objectively occur during the protection and rescue actions, the staffs should be trained to ensure the success of these processes that includes management, collection, processing and presentation of data on the situation; assessment of the situation; decision-making; issuance of tasks and delegation of authority; monitoring the situation and reporting. (Guideline, 19/2006)

This requires the PR forces to be well trained, to participate in numerous prominent and diverse exercises, in particular by participating in joint exercises for PR of population and goods during natural disasters and other accidents, as the most complex form of exercise. Are the PR forces of the Republic of Macedonia capable for effective and efficient management of protection and rescue actions in crisis in what way?

5. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY RESULTS

5.1 Results from the survey conducted with the members of the protection and rescue forces

In the second half of 2016, a survey was conducted to explore the PRS managerial functions through a number of statements and questions. It encompassed the PR forces. The survey covered 440 respondents on the territory, divided into three samples: staff members, unit commanders of the PR forces, i.e. the heads of quick response teams and other members of the PR forces. The first dominantly manage, the second command and the third perform specific tasks in the actions. The research in this paper presents a summary of the answers to the statements and questions as shown in the tables. The steps in the management process: decision-making, delegation of authority, leadership, communication, motivation, coordination, etc., are presented integrated in the tables below.

The statement includes six answers, namely: 1 disagree, 2 partly agree, 3 agree, 4 significantly agree, 5 completely agree, 0 - no participation. The tables below are represented horizontally by numbers.

Table 1 Degree of success in managing and commanding the protection and rescue actions

Forces PR	Statements												Total	
	1	%	2	%	3	%	4	%	5	%	0	%	No.	%
Staff members	0	.0	15	15.9	20	21.3	31	33.0	28	29.8	0	.0	94	21.4
Leaders and commanders	0	.0	26	24.5	15	14.2	25	23.6	40	37.7	0	.0	106	24.1
Other members	2	.1	64	26.6	65	27.1	46	19.2	24	1.0	39	1.6	240	54.5
Total	2	.0	105	23.8	100	22.7	102	23.2	92	20.9	39	8.8	440	100

The statements indicate that 100, or 22.7% of the respondents agree, 102 or 23.2% significantly agree and 92 or 20.9% agree completely, as opposed to 2 or .05% who disagree and 105 or 23.8% who partially agree. The statements on the management and command of the PR actions indicate a positive attitude by a high number of respondents, 294 or 66.8%. However, the number of 107 or 33.2% who have a positive attitude is an understatement. The respondents in the categories consider as most successful the management and members of the command staffs, while the agents are cpnsidered as the least successful. Out of all respondents, 39 or 8.8% did not answer or did not participate in the actions.

Table 2 Weaknesses in management and commanding the actions for protection and rescue

Forces PR	Answers										Total	
	1	%	2	%	3	%	4	%	5	%	No.	%
Staff members	37	39.4	27	28.7	17	18.1	13	13.8	0	.0	94	21.4
Leaders and commanders	31	29.2	19	17.9	8	7.5	48	45.4	0	.0	106	24.1
Other Members	72	30.0	28	11.6	11	4.6	90	37.5	39	16.3	240	54.5
Total	140	31.8	74	16.8	36	8.2	151	34.3	39	8.9	440	100

The major weaknesses that the respondents detected within the PR actions are as follows: 1. Making a bad and untimely management decision was stated by 140 respondents or 31.8%; 2. Absence of effective communication among the participants 74 or 16.8%; 3. No knowledge about the tasks of the participants, stated by 36% or 8.2; and 4. An insufficient number of participants in the actions stated by 151 respondents or 34.3%. 39 or 8.9% of the respondents gave other answers or did not answer specifically. By categories, the staff members state as a weakness "Making bad and untimely decisions,"

while the leaders, commanders of PR units and other members state the following weakness in the PR actions "Insufficient number of participants in the actions."

5.2 Findings obtained from the developed "Case Study - Flood in Skopje region in August 2016 "

The detected weaknesses relating to the management and command of the PR forces from the conducted research largely coincide with the weaknesses in the actions of the PR forces in the flood in Skopje region, examined in the "Case Study" presented on 13 pages. In the following section of the paper, a part of the case study is presented. Although according to the information provided by the LSG and PRS: "The City of Skopje established a crisis headquarters and promptly deployed its units on the ground and the PRS teams responded quickly and the state PR forces responded on time", yet the number of casualties and material damage points to a number of weaknesses in the management of the PR forces that are perceived by the subjects. Some of them are presented below:
- The Government of the Republic of Macedonia provided the entire equipment from all regions of the state to the PRS on the third day of the flood;
- The President of the Republic of Macedonia criticized the competent institutions of the systems for crisis management, protection and rescue because of their
  disproportionate reaction to the floods in Skopje and handing over the burden to the Army;
- The experts stated: "We have a system. But that system is obviously just a piece of paper and the situation in the field has shown a serious lack of coordination and all the elements that make up its overall security aspect. The Hydrometeorological Service, the Protection and Rescue Directorate and the Crisis Management Centre did not organize any coordinated actions, nor established a permanent contact";
- The citizens stated: "The storm could not be prevented, but the huge number of casualties could have been prevented. The storm can not serve as an excuse for the failure of the institutions that are paid from public money for prevention and management in such situations, as the Protection and Rescue Directorate and the Crisis Management Center.

CONCLUSION
The management of the protection and rescue forces in crisis situations is an organized and planned activity directed towards achieving the goals and tasks of organizing and preparing the protection and rescue forces in the Republic of Macedonia. The effective and efficient management of the protection and rescue forces in times of a crisis is a prerequisite for successful dealing with the crisis.

Managing and commanding the protection and rescue actions is predominantly successful, but certain weaknesses were highlighted. The biggest weaknesses include making untimely decisions or insufficient implementation of decisions because of the inadequate number of participants in the field. Non effective communication and coordination among participants, as well as lack of knowledge about the tasks of the participants on the field in the protection and rescue actions are also among the detected weaknesses of the management and command of the protection and rescue forces. These

weakness were registered in the actions for protection and rescue of the population and goods from the floods that struck Skopje region in 2016.

In order to overcome the detected weaknesses, it is necessary to ensure training, equipping and intensification of the exercise activities implemented as part of the training, with special emphasis on intensifying the number of joint exercises for protection and rescue from various types of natural disasters and other accidents in conditions that are as close as possible to the real situations. These exercises improve the way of making appropriate decisions, the delegation of authority and knowledge of tasks, the communication, coordination and motivation of the protection and rescue forces in protection and rescue actions in times of crisis.

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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER IN BUILDING SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

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Abstract
Design/methodology/approach
The paper attempts to address some issues concerning the systems and organizations in terms of theory, but at the same time it addresses the organizational structure of the executive power in the Republic, which is in charge of performing the security functions.

The basic theoretical elaboration of the paper refers to the Crisis Management Center (CMC) as a body of the State administration, but also as part of the Security system of the country in general.

The original value of the paper can be seen in the segment that tries to answer the question about what are the relevant security elements of the Crisis Management Center as its Legal competences and obligations, all this as a comprehensive approach towards determining its competences. The variable of Environmental security is also highlighted.

The paper uses a qualitative approach, primarily applying the dogmatic method, i.e. by analysing the content of the legal acts of the processes and the phenomena under the legal competence of the CMC.
Research limitations/implications:
The paper in its findings is limited to theoretical knowledge. The author has conducted research in other studies as well, but it is not presented in this paper. Basically, this paper does not offer new solutions, but rather analyzes the existing solutions, concluding what may be a problem, thus, making an excellent foundation for the construction of new models, and conducting appropriate research. In fact, these analyzes are actually variables that could be measurable within a given context.

Key words: Crises; Crisis Management Center; Security; Environment.

Introduction

Putting aside the semantic debate about the meaning of the concepts of a system and an Organization, in this part we would like to stress that in this paper we understand them as the same thing. The explanation that organizations have structures, modes of operation (procedure) and specific dynamics of their internal and the external relations, brings the two concepts even closer. (Лазаревски, и др., 2001, стр. 68-70) The organization is the visible part of the system or a part of it.

Systems (theoretically, in a Social Organizational sense) are a complex set of elements, entities, processes, that presuppose the existence of rules in the relevant entities, which further aim towards establishing, implementing, monitoring, evaluation and improvement of the processes, etc.

The Security systems of the countries in the world are facing numerous threats. These threats can have a different nature, can originate from different sources, they can

also variously manifest themselves in different ways and the bottom line is that they can have a different potential in causing harm. Generally speaking, the security systems in the world are tasked to deal with three (in the broadest sense of the term) groups of threats. The first group encompasses the traditional and conventional threats that appear in the form of organized violence aimed at jeopardizing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the States. The second group is responsible for preventing and dealing with the internal security threats (crime, which can occur nationally and internationally, furthermore, disturbance of the public order and peace, terrorism, illicit trafficking and smuggling, etc.). The third type is the subsystem that is mainly our object of interest and it refers to the prevention, addressing and management of: Natural and other disasters, Technological disasters (industrial, electrical, chemical, nuclear, telecommunications, information systems and other large systems), Epidemics and other infectious diseases and a larger scale Environmental degradation.

If we imagine that among other important elements the state is based on the following pillars: 1. Social regulation (regulatory activity that involves the highest sovereign authority in the political system of the country where it regulates the social relations); 2. Institutional architecture (political power required for the operationalization of its policies, while the first measure is intended to apply social regulation in people's everyday life, with the right to apply force based on monopolistic grounds). As we can see, the organizational aspect is particularly important because it represents an institutional structure of the administrative system of the country, among other state activities, also for achieving the function of providing Security.

Therefore, when we talk about security as an organization, we are looking for answers for the overall organization of the Government in accordance with the Constitutional order. It can be said with certainty that the position of these bodies are constitutionally based on interdependence, cooperation, complementarity and control in order to function as a System.

The political and Constitutional theory separates the political, the executive and the judicial parts of the System.

The personnel and institutional structure of the political part of the System in Macedonia in the broadest sense of the word is manifest at the level of the representative bodies, such as:

→ The Macedonian Parliament;
→ The Government of the Republic of Macedonia;
→ The Governing officials of the executive branch who are elected in accordance with political criteria by the Parliament and the Government (e.g. Ministers, State Secretaries, Heads of independent State Administration bodies and organs within these independent bodies);
⇒ In these cases, when specific and specialized education and work experience is required from the candidates[1], we cannot neglect the fact that the selection also has political elements that could be seen in the proceedings, the lack of a public announcement for the required position, and most importantly the fact that they are elected by the political majority or by the government which is its executive structure; of course they should follow the Government policy.

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[1] In most cases of the above mentioned, specific education is not required, especially with respect to the Ministers, their deputies, the Assistant Ministers.

→ The representatives of the local government, in particular the Mayor, the Council and the Management staff within the municipalities;

The Executive part of the personnel structure in the country comprises the employees of the following institutions:

→ **Ministries** (the Ministry of Interior and the Defence Ministry have particular competence in the area of security, but at the same time we cannot avoid the other ministries, especially in the context of the paradigm of multidimensional security, hence, for example, the Ministry of Finance also has a role within the organizations that provide security in terms of ensuring the safety of the financial transactions, the source of finances, anti-money laundering, financing of prohibited activities etc.). In terms of what is the interest of this paper, the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Economy and other ministries (of course especially the Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning) has a central role in Environmental protection and in ensuring the overall philosophy of Sustainable development;

→ **Other state administrative bodies** (the Intelligence Agency, the Protection and Rescue Directorate, the Crisis Management Center, the Protection of Classified Information Directorate, the Protection of Personal Data Directorate) which all have significant specialized roles in certain sectors of work (e.g. issuing certificates for access to classified information), but also a significant role in ensuring the synchronized operation of the system (e.g. the important coordinating role of the Crisis Management Center);

→ **The local government** (mayor, council, municipal administration). The process of decentralization encompasses almost all domains of social life (health, social welfare, environmental protection, fire protection, education, etc.), hence the security function of the operation is subject to decentralization (e.g. appointment of police stations Commanders of general competence by the municipal councils); the municipalities also have a key role in what is the narrow subject of interest in this paper, crisis management and protection and rescue, all in function of accomplishing Security.

The afore stated represents an extensive summary of what the institutional structure of the representative and executive power manifests (without getting into the details of competences of the institutions) and basically, when we talk about security, we talk about the above-mentioned authorities, more or less in regard to providing Security. In other words, a system with numerous subsystems for providing the Security in society.

In this text, the role of the Crisis Manegement Center in achieving these Security issues is of particular interest.

These issues, are quite modestly reviewed and analyzed by the basic assumptions of the Systems theory. One of the system parts is the Crisis Management Center.

Systems theory represents a new, higher level of positivism. Instead an empirically simplified approach, that most commonly associates two phenomena, the neopositivism - in the character of the systems theory, moves the axis of the research towards the whole system. And the system consists of a number of parts connected and mutually conditioned. In addition to their internal interaction, the parts affect each other, affect the whole system and vice versa (the system affects them). However, in the systems theory, neither the parts nor the whole (complete, total) are closed, but rather have space for communication, which has a decisive role in the information and their connection. (Мојаноски, 2012, стр. 47)

The applied Systems Theory regards the reasons and conditions for occurrence of accidents and disasters under the assumption that they can be in essence, simple systematic flaws which result in a disaster or an accident. Furthermore, these systems compromise the human, as well as the technical elements, with the assumption that the failure of any of these system parts could result in a crisis. These theoretitians also argue that the systemic flaws basically represent human or technical failures of the operation of the organizational systems. However, the human and technical factors are identified and relevant for the accomplishment of the fundamental objectives, which by all means must be able to function in mutual complementarity. In the book *Man made disasters,* Turner suggests a model for the failure of the systems. Separating it in 6 steps, Turner explains that it takes a period of "incubation" before a disaster occurs.

This theory has a significant importance for us, especially in regard with the risks and hazards associated with accidents that are under the complementary jurisdiction of the Ministry of Environment, the Crisis Management Center and the Protection and Rescue Directorate. A question arises whether there is room for concern about Systematic inconsistency that would result in undesirable consequences in Macedonia related to these institutions and their competence, as discussed above? This is open for discussion, but there are some empirical data indicating that the system is not functioning in its total capacity. We need to answer these questions as scientists. From the communications that have been monitored, systematic flaws have been detected between the CMC and PRD.

CRISIS MANEGEMENT CENTER

Crisis situations have been and we can justifiably expect that they will continue to represent conditions that we will be confronted with on a regular basis. Therefore, the State and the legal systems should and must be able to carry out their main activities in times of crises or other types of irregular situations, in addition to the regular (usually peaceful) situation. In this regard, this particularly applies to the State-organized system that handles security risks and threats of any nature.

A Crisis situation is such a situation that cannot be characterized under any of the following circumstances: 1) state of peace; 2) state of emergency; and 3) state of war. On the other hand, emergency and a state of war in the semantic sense of the word are defined as crisis situations.

Considering the challenges arising in relation to the engagement of the Macedonian Army in 2001 and the new forms of security risks and hazards, the solution for the existence of a crisis situation had been specified as a state (condition) when, for example, the President of the Republic, as Commander in Chief, can, upon prior request of the Steering Committee, allow the use of the Army in totality with all other security structures of the country. This produces a legal and organizational basis for engaging the total Security potentials of Macedonia in addressing issues related to international crime, terrorism, illicit trafficking and smuggling, a larger scale of violation of the public order, but also for protection and rescue and eliminating the consequences of natural and man-made disasters in cases of Environmental degradation to a higher extent.

With the adoption of the Law on Crisis Management - LCM ("Official Gazette" No. 29/05), the legal framework for establishing a security system was completed (or a security organization at the state level that is compatible with the NATO system and also organizationally corresponding to the strategic direction and policies promoted in the National Security and Defense Concept adopted in 2003);

In the LCM, there are parts related to the Environment and according to the established principle of CMC jurisdiction, the LCM establishes a crisis management system, including:

⇒ **Crisis Management System** consisting of state authorities (Assembly, President and Government), armed forces such as the Army of the Republic of Macedonia, the protection and rescue forces, the municipal authorities and the City of Skopje, as well as Public enterprises, public institutions and services and companies[2] which can participate in the prevention, early warning and crisis management. Additionally, the citizens, the civil society organizations and the Red Cross of Macedonia, the non-governmental and humanitarian organizations, the media and other entities that are not listed above, can participate in the prevention, early warning and disaster management, on a voluntary and contractual basis, pursuant to the law and the ratified international agreements regulating this matter;

⇒ To achieve the coordinating role that is essential for the functioning of this system (flow, information sharing, harmonization of activities, measures, providing interoperability at full capacity), the Law establishes the **Crisis Management Center** (CMC) which has a central role in the system for Crisis Management and takes care of prevention, early warning, management and overcoming the consequences of civilian accidents and disasters and provides timely, quality and realistic assessment of the threats of civil risks and dangers.

In addition to the coordinative role, no less important role of the Center is to provide complete organizational, administrative and professional support to the government bodies dealing with crisis management (the Steering Committee and the Assessment Group), as well as administrative and technical support to the CMC Headquarters, which represents both an operational and a professional body in charge of the operational activities for dealing with disasters occurring on the territory of a state and for removing damages and consequences. Furthermore, the CMC provides professional support to the Local Government Units through the offices of the CMC Regional Centers. Continuous international and intersectoral cooperation is also an obligation of the CMC. The development of analytical and research tools is a necessity in the pursuit of the objectives underlying the existence of the CMC (let us recall that crisis management, inter alia, should provide prediction, i.e. determine the degree of probability), as well as the establishment of the Single European emergency call - 112, further development and maintenance of the public warning and reporting system, cooperation with all international organizations, in particular with those that work in areas related to the nature of work of the CMC. Furthermore, the work of the CMC also includes the preparation and implementation of training events, exercises and other activities for the functioning of the system. (Стратешки план на Центарот за управување со кризи за период 2013-2015 година, 2012, стр. 4-6) Similar priorities of the Center are also considered in the Strategic Plan for the period 2014-2018.

Considering the arrangement of the Crisis Management system and the anticipated solutions, it appears that the CMC has at least two original positions and roles in the State public administration of the country. **First**, the existence of inter governing bodies, such

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[2] Decision of the Government adopted on 19.5.2009, specifying the companies that have special importance in times of a crisis.

as the Steering Committee and the Assessment Group; and **secondly,** planning job positions in the CMC systematisation for other bodies of the State administration that can become necessarily "functional" (Crisis Management Law, 2005, Article 27). In fact, in addition to being a founding law, it appears that the CMC as an independent state body, is also the founding law for two other formally constituted collegial bodies that have strategic importance, both in terms of their jurisdiction (competence) and in their composition. The Steering Committee and the Assessment Group have hierarchically superior jurisdiction with respect to the CMC, as well as to the other bodies of state administration, especially during a crisis situation, and the basis for their existence is stipulated in the founding LCM. With this solution, we are obligated to note that the Law on Crisis Management has acquired the meaning of a General Law in the legal system of the Republic of Macedonia, and in systematic terms it should be the "umbrella" of the other special laws that regulate matters related to the issues regulated by the LCM. Hereby it appears that the CMC enjoys a privileged role. Another specificity of the CMC is its organizational and professional part which is determined by bylaws for systematization of job positions, which provides posts for representatives from other bodies of state administration in case of a need - for example, an employee from the MEPP, Transport and Communications, Ministry of Interior, Defense, etc.

The Steering Committee, under Article 13 of the LCM, is the Government body for coordination and management of the Crisis Management System. It comprises the Ministers of Interior, Health, Transport and Communications, Defense, Foreign Affairs and the Head of the Assessment Group. Depending on the crisis situation, if required, the Steering Committee can also include other officials working in the state administration bodies. One representative of the Parliamentary Committee for Defense and Security and one representative from the Office of the President also participate in its work.

The Assessment Group (Articles 17 and 18) is a Government body that continuously assesses the risks and threats to the security of the state and proposes measures and activities for their prevention, early warning and managing a crisis situation. It comprises the Director of the Public Security Bureau, the Director of the Security and Counter-Intelligence Agency, the Directors and Deputy Directors of the Crisis Management Center and the Directorate for Protection and Rescue respectively, the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Army and the Head of the Security and Intelligence Service in the Defense Ministry. When necessary, other officials can also be invited to participate in the work of the CMC.

In support of the points of this paper also contributes the fact that the legislator and the National policies in general determine that the meaning of a threat to the Republic encompasses, inter alia, the existence of risks and threats to the goods and the environment, the health and life of people, animals and plants, property and other tangible goods to a larger extent, furthermore defining that: "Risks and hazards include natural and other disasters, technological disasters, epidemics, quarantine and other infectious diseases in people and animals and a larger scale environmental degradation." All these elements make the Environment an indivisible part of understanding Security.

Regarding the organization of the CMC, under the central level there are 7 departments and 2 independent units. These are: 1) Department for administrative support to the Director, Deputy Director and governmental bodies in the Crisis Management Center; 2) Department for legal and general affairs, inspection and media production; 3) Department for financial affairs; 4) Department for information technology, telecommunications and public warning support system and E - 112; 5) International

cooperation; 6) Department for operations and coordination; 7) Department for Analysis, assessment and strategic planning.

In terms of the regional organization, 35 centers have been established in the Republic of Macedonia according to the territorial principle: 34 regional Crisis Management Centers based in certain municipalities and one Crisis Management Center for the city of Skopje. Their task in the regions where they are located is to inform, monitor the situation, exchange data and information. Their function is limited to making suggestions for managing crisis situations and making threat assessment. Practically, these centers continue to execute the decisions made by the higher authorities, and Main headquarters is established at the national level and regional headquarters at the level of regional centers. The Main Headquarters is managed by the Director of the Center and it serves as the operational expert body that manages the activities of prevention and crisis management. Depending on the level of risks and hazards, proportionality of the reaction on a local, national or international level is required.

Graphic chart No. 1. Overview of the regional centers in their seats.

SECTORS:

Sector North: RCMC SKOPJE, RCMC Kisela Voda RCMC Gazi Baba, RCMC CENTER, RCMC KARPOS, RCMC CAIR	
NORTHWEST SECTOR: RCMC Tetovo, Gostivar RCMC	
Northeast SECTOR: RCMC Kumanovo RCMC RCMC Kratovo RCMC Kriva Palanka	
SECTOR CENTER: RCMC Veles, RCMC Kavadarci, Negotino RCMC	
EAST SECTOR: RCMC STIP, RCMC PROBISTIP, RCMC Kocani, RCMC Sveti Nikole RCMC VINICA, RCMC BEROVO, RCMC DELCEVO	
SECTOR southeast: RCMC Strumica, RCMC VALANDOVO, RCMC RADOVIS, RCMC GEVGELIJA	
Southwest SECTOR: RCMC OHRID, RCMC Debar, Kicevo RCMC, RCMC STRUGA	
SECTOR SOUTH: RCMC Bitola, RCMC Demir Hisar, Krusevo RCMC, RCMC Prilep, RCMC Resen, RCMC MAKEDONSKI Brod	

(Пет години Центар за управување со кризи, 2010, стр. 10)

From this distribution, we can conclude that the CMC used the division of statistical regions that was made by the State Statistical Office during 2007 - 2008 period. This approach of unification of the territorial division in the long run will bring numerous opportunities, particularly in data collection and in organizational sense. For example, the Internal Affairs sectors of the Public Security Bureau overlap with this jurisdiction.

It seems proper to indicate that the interpretation of certain authorities that the jurisdiction of the CMC is depleted in times of a declared crisis situation. Namely, according to Article 37 of the LCM for fulfilling the objectives of the functioning of the CMC (mentioned above) ...*"all participants in the crisis management system in accordance with the laws and regulations are obliged to provide continuous and mutual communication, coordination and cooperation for the collection of data and information, analysis, delivery and reporting of the risks and hazards that could endanger the security of the Republic... are obliged to continually communicate, deliver data and information and cooperate, and if necessary, as determined by LCM and other laws, coordinate their activities with the Center"*. For specifying what type of data are collected by the CMC, a *Decree on the type of data and information on the manner and procedure of submission to the Crisis Management Center has been adopted*[3] according to which: the Center analyzes and processes all the information that can be communicated in the form of data and information and which relate to the phenomena that can cause a crisis situation. These are the same risks and hazards that are defined in the National Security and Defense Concept of 2003, mentioned in the text previously.

Contrary to the claim that the CMC only operates during a declared crisis situation, the fact is that the CMC, according to the law, has jurisdiction over making *a single assessment of all threats to the security of the Republic of Macedonia ensuing from all risks and hazards*. Precisely here is the high "stone" the CMC stumbles upon in functioning with its full capacity. Namely, the traditional authorities of the Security activities and actions, the Interior and Defence Ministries, should in this case exchange information with the Center. And we suppose that it could be a problem.

The particular weakness that exists in the establishment of this system has a dual nature, first socio-political and second, Nomo technical[4]. We generally opened the first

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[3] Adopted on 23.1.2007 by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.
[4] Nomo technique is a legal technique that determines the rules for writing legal acts.

element in the previous paragraph and we will not discuss it further because there is a risk of speculating. However, the second element has a strong generic weakness. The point is that the Law On Crisis Management does not regulate in detail the issue of what information is subject to collection, analysis, processing, distribution, deletion and other operations in terms of their structural processing   an exhaustive list with precisely determined authorities for the type of information, to whom it is to be submitted, etc.

On the other hand, according to one of Nomo technical rules, bylaws cannot establish new rights and obligations. After all, it is the basic feature of the bylaw. It merely explains the Laws, but it does not regulate them, does not create a legal obligation proclaiming new rights and obligations. In the case of the delivering of information, it practically means that it cannot establish an obligation to the entities that participate in the crisis management system and in general in the security system of the country to submit their information for the preparation of the *security assessment of Macedonia of all risks and hazards*, which is one of the responsibilities of the CMC. Accordingly, the Decree for the type of data and information and the manner of their submission to the CMC, 2007[5] cannot really establish such an obligation and it is evident from the text of the Regulation. Namely, Article 2 of the regulation stipulates that the Center analyses and processes all the information **that can be communicated. Can** implies discretion of choice between two or more alternatives. According to the publicly available documents, this way cannot entirely extend the legal jurisdiction of the CMC and its performance of the legal obligation.

For this part of the jurisdiction of the CMC, the above stated *regulation for the methodology for the preparation of the assessment of all threats to the security of the Republic of Macedonia* adopted at the session of the Government on 25.1.2011 is of particular importance. The terms used in the regulation have considerable significance that transcends the usual regulatory phrases in their precision. Notably, these explanations have a real philosophical and theoretical, and therefore, scientific value. It is about defining the notions of risk, hazard, vulnerability, exposure, risk assessment, risk analysis, prevention, resilience and risk management.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CRISIS MENAGEMENT SYSTEM

The municipalities and the City of Skopje are an integral part of the crisis management system, i.e. they accomplish the system. The Municipality Council, similarly to the national council, adopts a local "*assessment of the threats to the municipality, the City of Skopje, from all risks and hazards*." Practically, this is a local strategic document which integrates the assessments of the competent authorities relating to the area of the municipality and in function of planned, timely, purposeful and coordinated decision-making towards determining guidelines and taking the necessary measures and activities of the entities of the Crisis Management System at the local level. By the end of May 2015, assessments of all risks and hazards (the General and the Special part) were adopted by 56 municipalities (there are 85 Local communities in total and the system operates for more than 10 years). The municipalities and the City of Skopje, in addition to the assessment that we stated in the part of the crisis management activities, also carry out the following:

⇒ Adopt a program for revitalization;
⇒ Implement the Government decisions.

It is also important to note that the protection and rescue forces participate in the elimination of the consequences in a *declared crisis situation*.

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[5] Adopted by the Government at a meeting held on 23.1.2001.

3. SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT

CMC is an institution that was formed as a result of a theoretical doctrine, which was later followed by a legal framework, as well as an Institutional follow- up.

This section will briefly recap the specifics of the CMC which we think have a distinctive meaning:

⇒ It is an authority that performs a unique assessment of all risks and hazards to the Republic of Macedonia;
  o Based on this same jurisdiction, the CMS is authorized to collect information from all the legal entities in the country, including all public authorities in order to be able to prepare the assessment;
⇒ It provides professional and administrative support to the Crisis Management System, comprising the Assessment Group and the Steering Committee;
⇒ CMC is the holder of the only alarm system in the country and a major center for the establishment of the single European emergency call - 112;
⇒ In the area of utilization its full capacity, the proclamation of a state of crisis or a "crisis situation" is of great importance. It is a condition which allows the use of the institutional mechanisms which raises the level of preparation for a coordinated response from the host institution in dealing with risks and hazards that may have a different source, i.e. they can be natural (heat waves, for example), but can also be caused by the human factor (international terrorism);

The crisis management system terminology is complementary and follows the doctrine of the National Security and Defense Concept of the Republic of Macedonia of 2003. From a security perspective, it is important for us present the concepts outlined in the following table.

Table. 1. Security elements of the crisis management system (content analysis)

TERM	EXPLANATION	SUBJECT OF PROTECTION/ENDANGERMENT
Endangerment of Macedonia	Risks and hazards ⇒ Natural and other hazards; ⇒ Technical and technological disaster; ⇒ Epidemics of quarantine and other infectious diseases in humans and animals; ⇒ Larger extent degradation and destruction of the Environment;	⇒ The Goods; ⇒ The Environment; ⇒ The Health and life of people, animal and plants; ⇒ The property and other material goods of a larger extent; ⇒ The stability; ⇒ The functioning of the State and its Legal order;
Risk		⇒ A combination of interdependent factors that affect a particular danger to evolve in an accident or a disaster;
Risk analysis	Part of the risk assessment process (and thus associated risk mapping) and includes:	⇒ Overview of the technical characteristics of hazards; ⇒ Analysis of exposure to vulnerability, including physical, social, health, economic and environmental dimensions (consequences); ⇒ Evaluation of the ability of prevailing and alternative coping capacities in terms of the likely scenarios for risks.
Risk management	A systematic process of using:	⇒ Legal mechanisms; ⇒ Organizational and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and concrete measures and activities for prevention and dealing with the negative impacts of hazards to evolve into a greater misfortune or a disaster.
Danger	⇒ Natural phenomena; ⇒ Technical and technological disaster:	⇒ Loss of life, injury or other impacts on health; ⇒ Property damage, loss of means of subsistence and services; ⇒ Socio-economic disturbances; ⇒ Environmental damage.
Crisis	⇒ Occurrence which threatened:	⇒ Fundamental values; ⇒ The permanent and vital interests and goals of the state; ⇒ Constitutional order and the security of the state;

The listed explanations from the table are taken from the LCM and the bylaws arising from it. As it can be seen, when the crisis management system sets out the

fundamental assumptions of its existence, the environment has a significant place in each of them. Consequently, the crisis management system has an exceptionally complicated task and its competence is exercised, figuratively speaking, in two dimensions:

The first is preventive and in security terms it is mainly expressed in the fact that the CMC prepares the Assessment about the Vulnerability of the Republic of Macedonia from all risks and hazards, and participates in the cross-sectoral bodies in order to maintain the system. This task that the CMC performs in all security conditions (peace, military, emergency, crisis situation) is basically complex. The basis for its successful accomplishment is the timely and high quality delivery of qualified data from the participants in the crisis management system. However, as discussed previously in the text, the wording of the text of the *Regulation on the submission of data by participants in the system* that they "can provide data" represents a substantial disadvantage. In this sense, this especially applies to the Environmental protection. The Steering Committee and the Assessmment Group play a key role in this part; namely, the CMC provides expert and administrative support; the assessment applies to all elements of the system. It is difficult to fail noticing that the CMC is also the main stakeholder of the *national platform for disaster risk reduction* which, by all characteristics also represents a preventative task.

The second, figuratively speaking, dimension of the CMC activity is related to a declared crisis situation, especially when the Main Headquarters is activated. Under these conditions, the Steering Committee and the Main Headquarters have significantly more resources at their disposal in order to deal with the given risks and hazards, especially those that are part of the crisis management system. In this part, there are some decisions that are inconsistent, particularly with regard to the compliance of the PRD and the CMC. Namely, the Legal solution indicates that: while the CMC director manages the Main Headquarters, the PRD remains a fully autonomous system. For example, in a situation when the Steering Committee or the Headquarters of the CMC decide to require the engagement of the PRD, this requirement **is a subject to decision** of the PRD Director. This solution could lead to serious challenges during a crisis situation. What if the PRD Director decides not to provide the needed help? In fact, he/she is supposed to sign the order, not to **decide**, terminology used by the LCM.

In the part of the crisis management system, we have analysed the risk assessment methodology concerning the environment, referred to as "environmental dimensions of risk assessment." These are the main *Environmental dimensions* in the system:

Table. 2. Environmental dimensions of risk assessment

Environmental dimensions of risk assessment	
Elements of risk Suggest an edit	⇒ Geographic position and size; ⇒ Relief features; ⇒ Forest and other vegetation coverage; ⇒ Basic characteristics of the land; ⇒ Climatic conditions; ⇒ Hydrographic network, type and quantity of atmospheric and other waters.
Separated elements that have relevance to the environmental elements of the risk assessment.	Natural resources (agricultural land, forests and forest lands, mineral resources and mines, water resources and water supply systems, energy sources and infrastructure, etc.).
	Population and organization of settlements (urbanization and settlement network, arranging settlements and rural areas, housing etc).
	Environment and natural resources.
Assessment of vulnerability and exposure of particular elements to risk.	

       The CMC with its numerous activities is part of the single security system of the country.

       It is also the main authority of the crisis management system. As of recently, it is an independent state administrative body which can spread its ideas of political power to other authorities by which it undoubtedly faces multitude of challengesin its regular functioning. Due to the large number of classified documents in the area of its responsibility, many of the issues could not be opened.

       The recognition of the Environmental dimensions of risks, as given in the table above, and also the possibility of declaring a state of crisis as a result of environmental degradation, or another disaster that basically makes an impact on the environment, such as floods, heat waves, energy crises etc., lead to the conclusion that the CMC represents a part of the Environmental protection system. Also the CMC has an extraordinary coordinating, analytical and predictive validity aimed at establishing a system for early warning and risk management, inter alia, for those involved in the endangering of the environment.

       Furthermore, the fact is that the CMC is the main authority of the National platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, which undoubtedly places it at the top of the coordination procces as an administrative body in charge of the facilitatation of the inter-departmental and inter-institutional cooperation between the institutions of the entire administrative apparatus for reduction of the risks and hazards.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The security is a field where transdisciplinary research of several scientific disciplines can and are being conducted. Psychology, Law, History, Economy, Sociology, Organizational sciences, International relations and other disciplines separately create scientific observations that have relevance in security. The link between Security and Risks is established and it can be visible or latent. Fortunately, the space for scientific research in this area is "unlimited." The risks today represent a part of modern society, or as Beck calls it "the Risk society". Within these general conditions the Environment will increasingly gain importance through the media. Thus, the Environment seen as a risk represents a social, political, ethical, legal and many other issues…As a result, people will increasingly change the perception of Security.

The National Security and Defense Concept of the Republic of Macedonia lists the political, economic, defense, internal security, social, environmental and "other" areas as "variable and measurable variables" in the creation and maintenance of security…,, there is no exclusiveness for protection, maintenance and construction of the Security environment and its condition... The state administration is obligated to cooperate towards meeting one of the fundamental objectives of societies and states and that is to provide security, i.e. absence of threats. The interdependent factors are based on estimates, measures and activities for protection, maintenance and promotion on political, economic, defense, internal security, social, environmental and "other" grounds.

Some short-term considerations for improvement of the opportunities for assessment and management of risks and hazards, especially in the context of the CMC jurisdiction in the preparation of a single Security Assessment of all risks and dangers could be enhanced by taking the following steps:

- First, establishing a legal obligation for the participants in the crisis management system for communication of information in view of the preparation of the assessment;
- Existence of a database and a data system;
- One analytical center to manage such a database;
- Analytical center to serve the most complex statistical operations, including predictive analysis based on mathematical models (quantitative research);
- The quantitative research must be parallel to the qualitative research;
- Dissemination of information to the policy makers;
- Making a strategy to stem the crisis and actively act contrary to its intentions;
- Eliminating the causes.

The crisis management system is not fully formed and it faces significant problems in terms of the exercise of its legal jurisdiction. The independence of the bodies involved in the network of the crisis management system (especially those who are members of the Assessment Group and the Steering Committee) put in question the transfer of knowledge and information to the CMC, so in that sense the CMC can not take the coordinating role for which it was established.

The unified Assessment of threats to the Security of the Republic of Macedonia from all risks and hazards developed by the CMC represents a significant argument in the context of the place of the CMC in the Security system of the Republic of Macedonia. However, the lack of a statutory obligation to submit the data to the CMC prevents developing a database that will result in the preparation of a realistic assessment of all risks and hazards.

During a declared crisis situation, the PRD remains completely independent in its powers creating an indetermination of activities, which will systematically result in malfunction of the system. In fact, the protection and rescue forces with their operational, material capacities and factual competence are crucial in the implementation of the field activities. Two commands could undoubtedly result in inefficiency.

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Reforms in the security system

THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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ABSTRACT

The security sector reforms are an exceptionally significant concept which focuses on the complete security sector transformation in order to establish a more balanced system of relations and an appropriate transformation of the security institutions. The basic premise is that an appropriatetransformation would meanbuilding security structures adequate for the real threats which the country faces, but also structures which would be under strict civilian and democratic control. The theoretical explication of this paper is focused, first of all, toward the designation of the need for reforms, and secondly, it is focused on the specific context of the reforms.

Key words:concept, reforms, reform challenges, security sector, reorganization.

1. About the reforms

The security sector reforms are a broadly accepted concept which refers to the improvement of the working methods and functioning of the security sector, respectively, and it includes a broad platform for implementation and concretization of certain tasks for improvement of the internal structure of the security sector. The fundaments of this concept are based on the principles of civilian control over the security institutions, which at its core means that it would make them more accountable and transparent in their work.[1]Hence, the purpose of the "security sector reform" is a transformation of the security institutions in order to play an efficient, legitimate and democratically accountable role in securing the external and internal security for its citizens. The transformation of the security sector demands numerous consultations and includes purposes, such as: strengthening the civilian control and oversight of the security sector; professionalization of the security forces; demilitarization and peace building and strengthening the rule of law.[2]

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[1] Bakreski O., Petrovski D., (eds), Reformite vo odbranata, Ministerstvo za odbrana na Republika Makedonija, Skopje, 2015, str.9.

[2] Towards a Better Practice Framework in Security Sector Reform, Broadening the debate, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', Occasional SSR Paper No. 1 August 2002, Clingendael – International Alert – Saferworld p 1.

It means that the security sector reforms are vital for global peace and security,[3]especially in the post- conflict states and nation building. In weak states, the construction and reconstruction of the security sector is a precondition for development, because any other reform – political, economic, or social – cannot be embedded without the accomplishment of an apposite level of security. Additionally, the assistance to the weak states during their recovery is critical for global security, because they may generate a chronic international problem; evoke regional instability which will result with humanitarian tragedy; or create training areas and operational bases for the terrorists; and succor international criminal organizations which smuggle narcotics, people, small arms, WMD and other illicit products and services. Finally, the competent and autochthon security sector is essential as an exit strategy for the expensive peace missions.[4]

In general, the notion security reforms is considered to have become actual in the late nineties of the past century, as a result of the need for democratization of the societies which emerged from the Soviet bloc, and of course, numerous countries from Southeastern Europe, and especially the Balkans in that period. It refers to the fact that these societies had undergone a complete transformation of almost every state institution, which was previously structured and administered in a socialist manner and in a totalitarian regime.[5]

Hence, the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Eastern bloc had altered this reality, but somewhere in 2002, this concept of security sector reform was for the first adopted with all its seriousness, and mentioned in the UNDP Human Development Report. Additionally, it should not be forgotten that the security sector reforms were a realistic necessity for the Western European countries as well, especially in the part of increased need for transformation of the security forces and revenues reduction.[6]

2. The specific context of the reforms

In practice, the security sector reforms vary significantly from the context of the specific reforms. There is a general agreement that there is no universal model of reforms and, in principle, every country that accepts reforms is a specific case, hence, arises from a different reform's context. Yet, for analytic purposes, a broad reform context could be extracted, which contents a row of arguments depending of the categorization criteria.

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[3]The security sector is defined as those state organizations which have the authorization to use or order the use of force, detention, arresting, protection of the country and its citizens, as well as those civilian structures responsible for management and oversight of the security sector. The definition, also, includes the military and paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies, police, border services, customs, the judicial system, the parliament, legal and administrative management and oversight organs (www.stabilitypact.org), respectively, the security sector could be divided in three pillars, which are: groups with a mandate to use instruments of violence - military, paramilitary and police forces; institutions with a managerial and oversight role of the security sector – civilian ministries, parliaments and non-governmental organizations; bodies responsible for guaranteeing the rule of law – judicial, penal system, human rights defenders, in those areas these bodies are especially weak, that role belongs to the international community.(Hendrickson, Dylan, A Review of the Security Sector Reform. London: The Conflict, Security and Development Group funded by DflD, Centre for Defence Studies at King's College London, September 1999, p. 29).

[4]Bakreski O., Konceptot na reformi na bezbednosniot sektor na Republika Makedonija, Godisen zbornik na Filozofski fakultet, br.68, 2015, str. 83-88.

[5] Pavliuk, O., Tsintsadze, I., K.: The Black Sea Region: Cooperation and Security Building, East-West Institute, 2004. p. 20.

[6] Wulf, H.: Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries Revisited,p.340 http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/wulf_handbookII.pdf(Visited on 10.12.2014).

Basically, three such broad security sector reform contexts could be differentiated and discussed and each of them reflects a different approach toward the reform:

1. The reforms are accepted by international development donors, as an instrument for efficiency and effectiveness improvement for development support.
2. The reforms became a tool for facilitation of the practical coordination and conceptual integration of the defense and security forces in post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond.[7]
3. The reforms gained the most practical relevance in the context of post-conflict reconstruction of the so-called "failed states" and countries which emerge from violent internal or inter-state conflicts, as evident from the wide spectrum of cases, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases, the peacekeepers and the development actors in the defense sector reforms are perceived as key to the success of the overall reconstruction engagements. The security sector reconstruction abounds with numerous specific supplements which differ from others within the framework of the defense sector reform.[8]

The basis for defense reform success is the holistic (inter-connected, comprehensive) approach to their dimensions and enabling conditions for improvement.[9] The political reform embedded in the security sector reforms signifies that the armed and security forces should be politically de-legitimated, in the direction in which they will not protect certain regimes or elites, yet democratically and institutionally, with legitimate institutions, the citizens and their rights would be protected, as well as the country's assets.[10]

3.Some aspects of security sector reforms in the Republic of Macedonia

Reforms are essential and indispensable for implementation because they promote good governance, assure that the sector is transformed and perceived as accountable, credible and legitimate by the society. The incomplete defense sector is unprepared for transparency, has a budget that cannot be revised by the legitimate institutions (a budget which in most cases is massive and inefficient), there is a lack of rule of law, it is a subject of political abuse and it is impecunious in professional standards.[11]

It means that the reforms and their transformation demand respect of the rule of law and respect of the democratic principles during the implementation process. Society, institutions and employees should be completely familiar and aware of the procedures and processes which will occur during the transformation of the security institutions within the country itself (public and private). It means that the security sector reforms should be precisely prepared, accepted by all of the involved parties and understood by the subjects

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[7] Bakreski O., Petrovski D., (eds), Reformite vo odbranata, Ministerstvo za odbrana na Republika Makedonija, Skopje, 2015, str.9.

[8] Ekengren, M., Simons, G.: The Politics of Security Sector Reform,Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011. p.25.

[9] Christensen, T., Lægreid, P.: The Whole-of Government Approach to Public Sector Reform, PAR, Volume 67, Issue 6. 2007.

[10] Ekengren, M., Simons, G.: The Politics of Security Sector Reform, Ashgate Publishing, 2011. p. 65https://books.google.mk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=_HEjrxWAihoC&oi=fnd&pg=PP5&dq=political+aspects+of +security+sector+reform (Visited on 29.03.2015).

[11] Bryden, A., Olonisakin, F.: Security sector transformation in Africa. Conceptualizing the Security Sector Transformation in Africa. Page 21. Lit Verlag. Dr. W. Hopf, Berlin, Germany, 2010, in Bakreski O., Petrovski D., (eds), Reformite vo odbranata, Ministerstvo za odbrana na Republika Makedonija, Skopje, 2015, str.9.-19.

that will be reformed, because incomplete reforms mean reversion of democratization and transparency and many opportunities for misuse of the platform.[12]

In the Republic of Macedonia, although certain steps in the security sector reforms have been made, yet the reforms remain one relatively new issue which opens up space for further improvements and perfections. Reforms should fit in a broader social framework, but at the same time, the political context should not be forgotten. It is considered that the security sector is still linked with the bad habits of party control in certain segments in the security sector. It creates problems in the adaptation which affects society and reflects in various ways. For the Republic of Macedonia, which does not have a vaulting democratic tradition, the main purpose of the reforms is establishing strong security structures, greater coordination of the security community and strengthening of the democratic control over the security sector.[13]

In general, there is a belief that there is no hope for some reform to succeed without getting entangled in few key problems. One of the biggest problems is tied with the organizational and functional elements which influence the volume and efficiency of the existing, modified security structures. This is especially important in order to strengthen the organizational structure and of course, the functionality of the security sector.

Another key issue is the decrease of the number of employees as a need for downsizing the number of personnel in parallel with the reduction of overused and obsolete equipment. The solution is conditionally seen through "superseding" certain numbers expressed in a numerical ratio of the employees and the projected organizational structure, but these activities still have to accomplish the needed balance through finding out a reasonable level of capacities which will simultaneously be a sufficient response for coping with the risks and threats to peace and security.

The next problem that conduces the difficulty to implement the reforms is the inexistence of a common dialogue between the civilian and the security sector. For a successful reform, it is necessary to establish an efficient communication between the civilian and the security sector, which could strengthen the trust between those two components and positively affect the dynamics of the reforms. The immediate communication and cooperation of these two sectors contributes to the intensification of the efforts for finding solutions which will be in function of the security sector.

As an initial analysis, the issue related to the legal vacuum regarding the coordination between the institutions, services and bodies which are engaged in internal security and security assessments of the country is imposed and it is evident that the weak side is the lack of more consistent and continuous communication and cooperation channels between the key actors in the security sector.[14]

This problem can be counterpoised by a control of the security sector. The establishment of an efficient control system of the security sector which is at the same time democratic and efficient, is one of the most difficult challenges which contemporary countries are facing.

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[12] Bakreski O., Petrovski D., (eds), Reformite vo odbranata, Ministerstvo za odbrana na Republika Makedonija, Skopje, 2015, str.9-27.

[13] Bakreski O., Konceptot na reformi na bezbednosniot sektor na Republika Makedonija, Godisen zbornik na Filozofski fakultet, br.68, 2015, str. 83-88.

[14] Biljana Vankovska, Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives, Volume II, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Genneva/Belgrade, 2003, pp.28-29.

The creation of a control system of the security sector will conduce to avoiding the abuse of the use of force, as well as to strengthening of the efficiency of every segment of the authority engaged in this process.[15] It means that the control is an integral part of the work of the security sector; every activity has to be controlled. One of the basic principles of functioning of the national security system in general, is its continuity and consistency, which is a fundamental reason for control as its process function. The purpose of the control of the security sector is two-sided in its essence. On the one hand, it ensures the lawfulness and purposefulness in the work. In the security sector it is achieved by directing the work in accordance with the legal regulation, by respecting certain procedures toward keeping the lawfulness, etc. On the other hand, with the security sector control, protection is enabled for the citizens and their organizations from illegal actions of certain segments of the security sector.[16]

Additionally, the issue how to enable a high degree of security culture is another huge problem. Security culture is an important assumption in order to anticipate what is the general culture in the country, and also, what is the culture of the individuals regarding issues of a security character. Security culture is conditioned by numerous factors, starting from family, through scientific institutions, to security institutions, etc., and it cannot be designated with some regulations; however, it has to be a result of the expression and effort for a proactive role of the individual – employed in the security institutions, for timely identification of the occurrences, stakeholders, reasons and consequences related to the condition in the security context. It means that only a proactive attitude toward this issue would result in the accumulation of a security- cultural capital which will enable the creation of positive prejudices for the security paradigm.

There is also the remaining problem related to the provision of political neutrality. The employees in the security sector should be apolitical, which means that they are committed to their work and professional execution of their duties. Basically, political neutrality will enable the members of the security structures to accomplish their duties in accordance with the law and not based on the wishes of a certain political party. It is a kind of guarantee that the members of the security structures will professionally perform their tasks and will be completely dedicated to their enforcement, which will mean a high degree of responsibility, which is actually one of the elements demanded by their profession.

Dilemmas also occur regarding the transparency of the security sector. The transparency of the security sector toward the citizens would mean that its work is open and its role is demystified. The transparency of the security sector would basically mean a sort of a certification that the work is in the citizens' interest and it is in the interest of preserving the fundamental values.

It means that one of the democratic benefits in a society is for the citizens to know and to be informed about the conditions in the security sector. With that, they will also have the opportunity to discuss the essential issues which are related to the activity of the security institutions.

The discussion on security sector transparency is especially significant. Nowadays it is considered that a society is democratic if there is space for a broader debate about the issues that have great social meaning and transparency could be achieved only through active civic participation in all spheres of interest which will signify divided responsibility

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[15] Bakreski O., Kontrola na bezbednosniot sektor, Filozofski fakultet i Autoprint, Skopje, 2012.

[16] Bakreski O., Kontrola na bezbednosniot sektor, Filozofski fakultet, Skopje, 2008, str. 47.

and also a possibility for policy creation and its implementation. Regarding the security sector, transparency is a complex concept and it is the only way to ignite public debate for security sector issues. It means that transparency is not a purpose in itself, rather it is the only way which enables the existence of public debate about all essential issues related to the work of the security sector and how the security goals have been achieved.

CONCLUSION

The security sector reforms are and will continue to be a politically sensitive area. In order to be successfully conducted, an overall engagement of all the subjects in the country is necessary. It means that there are no conditions for reforms without implementing a transparent reform plan, which will reflect the overall efforts of the policy-makers, administration, civil society and business community.

The reforms are not only intended for the defense and interior ministries, but also for numerous other ministries, agencies and establishments, as well as academic and educational institutions. With that, security sector transformation is carried out to respond in an adequate manner to all the challenges which the sector is facing.

Therefore, although the concept itself has some universal points which refer to the management of the country itself and broad aspects, the concrete domestic conditions still need to be adapted in order to make it functional and sustainable. Solely in that way, the resources of the internal budgets, as well as the funds from foreign donors could be completely utilized and appropriately allocated. This is especially important if the reform process in the security sector collides with inconsistencies; then, it could last for years, without being operative and effective in the long- term.

Hence, there is no dilemma that the security sector of the Republic of Macedonia needs to be transformed, in order to respond to the security threats of the country. In that context, alternations are necessary in all segments in order for the structural changes to reflect the overall efforts for change in the direction of enabling all preconditions for creation of an efficient security sector. That would mean complete utilization of the human resources, creation of an integrated security system, institutions prepared for maintaining the internal security. In order to achieve all of this, permanent education and training is necessary, as well as equipping of the forces, etc.

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SOURCES FOR INCREASING ACADEMIC MOTIVATION OF STUDENTS IN THE "NATIONAL SECURITY" SPECIALTY

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ABSTRACT

Academic motivation is defined as the common motivational state brought about and related with the training provided in a given specialty. The research was conducted within the period March – May 2016. 290 students took part in it, 60 of whom study "National Security" as their major course of study. The aim of the research is to bring to the forefront the significant personality traits and emotions that affect academic motivation. Three types of psychological tools have been applied adapted by Velichkov, Radoslavova and Petkov. The data have been processed with SPSS-21. The results show that personality traits and emotions do affect academic motivation. Significant correlations have been found between personality traits and academic motivation in cases of lowered self-esteem, spontaneous aggression, irritability and openness. The basic conclusions are that the combination of certain personality traits lowers academic motivation. It also turns out that the trend of establishing friendly terms raises academic motivation. Academic motivation stimulates the search of additional information on the studied subjects and is a crucial factor for the development of better specialists.

Keywords: academic motivation, personality traits, emotions

1. Introduction

One of the main issues to be solved in the management of any activity is connected with the determination of adequate motives that would push the subject of activity to provide resources and implement a certain set of actions and operations to implement the activity, preferably in optimal forms, because:

- Motives are an instigating organizing and controlling factor of human activity.
- Motivation reveals the mental content and regulation of the activity.
- Motivation is an internal mental determination of activity without which there is no activity. Each activity is internally and mentally motivated.
- Motivation mediates the external objective determination of human activity through the psychological or, as Rubinstein points out, motivation is realized through psyche determination.

"Motivation is the internal subjective evaluative attitude of a person to his/her activities, to the tasks they set themselves, to other people and to society."[1] Motivation refers to the internal periodically activated causes of behavior. Motivated behavior is purposeful, organized in a certain sequence and has a random nature, i.e. subject to conscious control. The motivational regulation of behavior is related to the implementation of several functions:

- *Inducement function.* The most important feature of motivation is the ability to incite and to energize behavior. The motivating factors act as inducement reasons, namely by this function;

- *Directing function.* Motivated behavior is oriented towards the mastery of certain subjects or a specified condition. Through motivation, of the whole diversity of external reality, only those objects which can satisfy the specific needs of the body are separated. They acquire a subjective significance and behavior is oriented towards them.
- *Organizing function.* Motivated behavior is not a messy set of motored acts, but has some organization and consistency.

Considering the motivation both as an internal reason and a justification for behavior, attention should be paid to the fact that to outside observers it is not always clear and possible to identify the actual reasons for performing an action, such as consent to participate in an activity, for example.

First of all, it is necessary to provide an even vague idea of motivation. Motivation is a central issue in the field of psychology as it is at the heart of biological, cognitive and social regulation. In the real world, motivation is highly valued because of its effects on the efficient functioning of people in different social environments.

Although in science motivation is often treated as a separate construct, even a superficial glance shows that people are driven to act by very different types of factors with high ranging experiences and consequences. People can be motivated because they appreciate the activity or because they are subjected to strong external coercion. They can be spurred to action because of sustained interest or a prize. They may behave as a result of a sense of personal commitment or for fear of being monitored. These contrasts between cases of intrinsic motivation against external pressures are obvious and well known. Whether behavior is motivated by their own interests and values, or by causes that are external to the self, it is very important, and at the same time represents a basic dimension in which people evaluate their behavior or the behavior of others.

Comparisons between people whose motivation is authentically intrinsic and those that are mainly externally controlled, usually indicate that the former as opposed to the latter, have more interest, excitement and confidence, which in turn is reflected in improved performance, perseverance and creativity, increased vitality, self-esteem [2] and general wellbeing [3]. This is so even when people have similar levels of perceived competence or self-efficacy of the activity. Because of the functional and experiential differences between self-motivation and external regulation, an important task of the theory of self-determination is to provide a differentiated approach to motivation by putting the question what kind of motivation is demonstrated at a certain point. In order to review the perceived forces that move people to act, the theory of self-determination identifies several different types of motivation, each of which has specific implications for learning, performance, personal experience and well-being.

The report considers two types of motivation, as both are related to academic activity, in determining the basic motive for applications in high school and one at a later stage in the development of the reasons for the acquisition of disciplines.

Intrinsic motivation. Perhaps no other phenomenon reflects the positive potential of human nature more than intrinsic motivation, the intrinsic tendency to seek the new and the challenge to expand and pursue opportunities to explore and learn. It is from birth that healthy children are active, inquisitive, curious and playful, even in the absence of special awards for such behaviors. The construct of intrinsic motivation describes this natural inclination towards assimilation, mastery, spontaneous interest and research, which are essential for cognitive and social development, as the main source of enjoyment and vitality throughout life. But despite the fact that people are generously granted with inner

motivational tendencies, it is clear that maintaining and increasing this innate predisposition requires supportive conditions and can be completely destroyed by various unsupportive ones. The theory of intrinsic motivation cited above does not relate to what causes motivation, but rather examines the conditions that support it against conditions that suppress and decrease it.

Theory argues that the first social contextual events (e.g. feedback, communication, rewards) that contribute to maintaining and enhancing the feeling of competence during the activity can increase intrinsic motivation for this activity. Therefore, the optimal challenges, effective feedback and lack of humiliating assessments do support intrinsic motivation. Several studies show that positive feedback on performance enhances intrinsic motivation, while the negative one decreases it.

The explanatory framework of the theory suggests that social environments can support or undermine intrinsic motivation through support or thwart of human inner psychological needs. The strong links between intrinsic motivation and satisfaction of the needs of autonomy and competence are clearly demonstrated and some works show that satisfying the need for connectivity can also be important. It is important to remember, however, that people will be intrinsically motivated only for activities they are intrinsically interested in, activities that tempt with their novelty, challenge or value. The principles of the theory are not applicable for activities that do not have these characteristics.

Self-regulation of extrinsic motivation. Although intrinsic motivation is a very important type of motivation, it is not the only type of motivation and not even the only type of self-determining motivation [3]. Indeed, much of what people do is not internally motivated, especially after early childhood, when the freedom to be internally motivated diminishes due to the social pressure to do activities that are not interesting and to accept new responsibilities.

The real issue in terms of behaviors that are not internally motivated is how individuals acquire the motivation to do so and how this motivation affects the perseverance, quality of behavior and wellbeing.

The term "extrinsic motivation" refers to the performance of any activity which aims to achieve a result and thus be distinguished from intrinsic motivation, which refers to doing an activity because of the inner satisfaction from it. Contrary to some authors who regard externally motivated behaviors as never autonomous, the self-determination theory argues that extrinsic motivation can vary widely in its relative autonomy [4]. For example, students who do their homework because they have personally adopted its relevance to their chosen careers are externally motivated as are those who do the work because they obey the control of their parents. Both examples include instrumentality rather than enjoyment of the activity itself, but the first case of extrinsic motivation requires personal approval, acceptance and a sense of choice, while the second involves obedience to external regulation. Both cases represent directed behavior [5], but vary in their relative autonomy. The first type is extrinsic motivation that is being sought by the socializing agents, regardless of the field of application.

In the theory of self-determination, Desi and Ryan bring to the fore a sub-theory called Theory of organismic integration to differentiate and present in detail the various forms of extrinsic motivation and contextual factors that help or hinder the internalization and integration of the regulation of these behaviors. "Studies of the interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation suggest that there are a number of options for their harmonious combination and transformation of socially significant activities into tools for self-development and expression of ourselves."[6] This further enriches the arsenal of the

manager with practices for impacting employees and in the case of academic motivation where teachers have the means to influence students.

When people internalize regulations and assimilate them into the Self, they experience greater autonomy in their operations. This process may occur in certain periods or at all times. The range of behaviors that can be assimilated into the Self grows over time with the growth of the cognitive capacity and the development of the Self. There is evidence that the overall regulatory style tends to become more and more internalized or self-regulated over time.

What has been stated above and the theoretically clarified opportunities for transition of the motivations of each other in the direction from the extrinsic to the intrinsic raise questions about the practical opportunities to catalyze the process, i.e. to support the integration of extrinsic motivation. This question stems from the fact that became evident as a result of the theoretical analysis that it is virtually impossible for all activities to be motivated intrinsically.

The above-said would be the perfect case for the functioning of the students in a particular specialty, who have accepted the values of their teachers, processed them cognitively and they have become their own, which will no longer need special effects to convince them of the necessity of learning of disciplines, but only social support from teachers and academic leadership in the process of training.

Again, research results support these arguments. For example, Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, and Leone (1994) have demonstrated in laboratory experiments that providing a meaningful rationale of some uninteresting behavior along with the support of autonomy and relatedness supports its internalization and integration. Controlling contexts contribute less to the overall internalization and internalization that occurs in these contexts tends to be only introjected [5].

Since the term autonomy is often used in this paper, it needs a terminological clarification. And it is that autonomy is often used as antagonistic to connectivity or a feeling of community. Moreover, in some theories it is equated with individualism and independence, but they suggest lower connectivity. In the theory of self-determination, autonomy represents not what it is to be independent, attached or selfish, but rather the sense of free will, which can accompany any action. Some recent studies have found a more positive relationship between autonomy and collectivist attitudes than between autonomy and individualistic attitudes. From this, it is clear that autonomy could not be equated with independence and individualism.

In light of the above considerations, the question arises how academic leadership should strengthen the relationship with the students and make it more attractive and desirable so as to ensure a fruitful collaboration in order to improve the learning outcomes. It is the self-determination theory that is directed to specific factors that promote, respectively demote human potential for growth, integration and prosperity and studies the processes and conditions that are conducive to the healthy development and effective functioning of the individual. It is this theory that gives adequate answers to the above question and is able to help optimize the educational activity. It is important in this process to suggest to learners that education in the university should be made the ultimate aim. Even if the choice of destination is made, the motivational process and motivational regulation of behavior do not end. The model of motivational regulation proposed by H. Hekhauzen suggests that people appreciate the actions to achieve the aims, the situation in which it should happen, the outcome and the consequences. The correlations between these

estimates produce a whole set of subjective expectations that are included in the regulation of behavior. The following figure illustrates the model:


Figure 1: A model of the motivational process

The expectations of the relationship between the action and the result direct the individual to the appropriate behavioral programs. The expectations of the relationship between the action and the situation show which behaviors are appropriate in the given circumstances, and the relationship between the situation and the result orient the individual whether this result is attainable in the given conditions, and the relationship between the situation and the consequences indicate the possible side effects, the relationship between the result and the consequences allows the behavior to be assessed in the broader context of a person's own activity.

All these expectations dynamically change over time and are included in the regulation of behavior at any point in a different way. People usually do not make detailed preliminary plans and outline only the general intentions. During the execution of motivated behavior, depending on the changes in the situation, they form new expectations and based on them adjust their current actions. This is an economic strategy to regulate their own behavior, but in most cases, the choice of one or another behavior is not fully recognized. Therefore, it is difficult to clarify the true reasons of their own behavior. This task is even more difficult for an outside observer and very rarely is he or she able to fully clarify the true motivational basis of behavior.

Clarifying the nature of emotions and their effects on the current behavior of the students and the traits of personality are an important and essential element in analyzing the problem. Occurring in different experiences, intensity and force, emotions reflect the personal importance and subjective assessment of situations which an individual encounters and these participate in the regulation of the vital activity. Emotions are included in the regulation of behavior due to their ability to interact with other regulatory processes and modify them in a specific way.

2. Methods

The applied psychological tools are developed by Bulgarian scientists – Velichkov, Radoslavova, Petkov [9, 10]. A questionnaire has been used to estimate the level of academic motivation. It provides the opportunity to study the intrinsic readiness of

university students to actively participate in the learning process. Academic motivation is a construct that describes the general motivational condition associated with training in a specialty. The overall positive motivational readiness is an indicator of the quality of teaching in a particular specialty, but also a predictor of academic success. Academic motivation stimulates the demand for more information on studied disciplines and is an essential factor in the development of university graduates. The estimates of the level of academic motivation are also important in the management of teaching and the planning and introduction of new forms of teaching.

A multidimensional personality questionnaire has been used in order to obtain a more complete picture of the personality of the respondents. Personality traits are measured in scales: neuroticism – anxiety can be caused by various factors, e.g. low self-esteem, insecurity, suspicion and individual internal conflicts unseen by the individual; spontaneous aggression – reveals an increased level of psychopathic and impulsive behavior, proneness to easy excitability; reduced self-esteem – depression, pessimism, higher values on this scale are not yet a basis for assessing clinical forms of depression, but can focus on additional studies with other methods; irritability – a tendency to react angrily and demonstrating instability, blaming external factors for the emerging difficulties, low resistance to stress, the use of physical force, easily subsiding angry moods ignored by individuals themselves; sociability – making friends, higher values on this scale indicate a need for communication, responsiveness; balance – measures the individual effects of the resistance to stress; stress impact presence makes people susceptible to developing sustainable stress reactions and related health complications; reactive aggression – high scale performance outlines striving to impose themselves at any cost consciously seeking conflict situations; shyness – higher values indicate social anxiety, uncertainty, numbness, inability to self-presentation; openness – low values in results indicate a proneness to secrecy, concealment of the true thoughts and feelings, and high values in results respectively indicate honesty and self-criticism; extroversion / introversion – respectively active and balanced, patient; emotional instability – high values in results characterize individuals who are trapped in their emotions with frequent mood swings; masculinity / femininity – characterize the degree of mastery of culturally conditioned patterns of behavior associated with gender roles.

"Emotional State Scale" is used to assess the emotional state and dynamics of emotions. Its psychometric characteristics justify its application in such studies. The method contains the following scales: a*ctivation* – measures the level of experienced vigor and emotional mobilization as those with high scores on the scale are filled with vitality and desire to work; de*activation* – measures the level of lethargy and emotional exhaustion; the i*ntrinsic* interest scale is designed to assess the experiences of infatuation, activity and interest; n*ervousness* – measures the emotional experiences of anxiety and inner tension: the data on this scale are indicative of having experienced mental stress; f*ear* – measures fearful experiences; u*ncertainty* – measures emotional experiences of insecurity and uncertainty caused by vagueness or lack of personal resources for action; d*epression* – the scale measures experiences of sadness, despair and other similar emotions of depressive nature; f*riendliness* – the scale measures the emotional attitude to sociability and openness towards others; l*oneliness* – measures emotional experiences associated with subjectively perceived social isolation; s*hyness* – includes emotional experiences associated with communication difficulties; h*ostility* – measures the degree of hostile and unfriendly attitude towards others.

The methods used include only scales that have demonstrated significant correlations with each other.

Aims, objectives and hypothesis of the research. The aim of this research is to find out whether and how psychological factors, such as personality traits and emotions, affect the nature and level of academic motivation and ultimately catalyze the success of students. The aim is achieved by solving several research objectives: to identify the traits of personality that affect motivation significantly; to assess the level of experienced emotions and the state of academic motivation of the students; to determine the set of emotions that affect the emotional status of the students; to investigate the relationship between traits of personality, emotional status of the students and their academic motivation. The main **hypothesis** of this research is that there is a link between a combination of emotions that build the emotional status of the individuals, as well as an outward constellation of personality traits and the degree and nature of the academic motivation of students.

3. Results

Individuals who have been studied. 240 people participated in the research. They are as follows: by gender: men – 121; 50.4 %; women – 119; 49.6 %; by specialty: 1 – 181; 75.4 %; 2 – 19; 7.9 %; 3 – 26 – 10.8 %; 4 – 14; 5.8 %; average age of the persons in the research: 31. Data has been processed with IBM SPSS Statistics 21.
Using a regression analysis, the impact of the personality traits, emotions and academic motivation in students were examined.


Figure 2: Interrelations of personality and emotions with academic motivation

As can be seen, some of the positive emotions such as activation, internal interests and affiliations, as well as insecurity, depression and loneliness show low to moderate correlations with motivation. The correlation coefficients are negative, meaning that the absence of depressive experiences, greater self-confidence, overcoming loneliness and lack of oppression generate a greater interest in the learning process and strengthen academic motivation.

The results show that personality traits affect academic motivation. Significant correlations between personality traits and academic motivation are detected in lowered

self-esteem, spontaneous aggressiveness, irritability, openness. The tendency to make friends only increases academic motivation and the rest of the features decrease it.

4. Discussion

The study showed that personality traits and emotional status of the individuals are key factors in the formation and operation of the academic motivation of students. It was found that individuals who are more sociable, with higher self-esteem and emotionally stable have higher levels of motivation. Emotionally unstable people with low self-esteem and high aggressiveness are less motivated. The conclusion is that the features that are in the negative part of the continuum affect negatively the motivational elements, lowering thus academic motivation and academic performance. The naturally positive and functioning features catalyze academic processes and help improve the performance of the students. The emotional status of students works in a similar way, as the set of positive emotions stimulate academic motivation, while others referred to in the analysis hinder it.

5. Conclusion

The results of the analysis of the obtained results confirm some of the theoretical assumptions. Although reviewed fragmentarily, these personal characteristics demonstrate more clearly and unequivocally the influence of personality on academic motivation. The level of self-assessment is subjective and depends on how high or low our aspirations are. The same success in one case will lead to low self-esteem, and in the other – to a high one. Maintaining low self-esteem has adverse effects on the planning of behavior because it indicates that the individual does not have enough resources for its successful implementation.

The participation of fractions of emotions in the construction of academic motivation is essential. At the same time, this issue reveals opportunities for academic leaders affect the emotions and maintain a favorable emotional status, influencing student motivation for more active involvement in the learning process and achieving higher academic results. In other words, the process is manageable, but it requires commitment and dedication to the student issues and maintaining a continuous positive emotional tone in the academic daily life.

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FACTORS FOR THE OPTIMUM FUNCTIONING OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN A MILITARY ENVIRONMENT [1]

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SUMMARY

When functioning in any environment, the individual falls under the impact of many factors. Some of them are consciously perceived and by manipulating them, it is possible to optimize the results of human behavior. Another part of the factors remain hidden even to the doers themselves. Albeit hidden, some of them are active participants in the regulatory aspects of behavior, while others are latent and are activated only under specific circumstances. The research has been carried out on a limited number of representatives of the command corps with certain command positions, which in itself is an objective criterion for the optimal functioning in a complex environment riddled with controversial and sometimes mutually exclusive requirements towards the individual and to their physical and mental stamina, and sometimes even to their inherent programs for self-defense and the need for safety. The methodology that has been used is a multi-measure personality questionnaire adapted to the Bulgarian conditions by Velichkov, Radoslavova and Petkov. Data have been processed with SPSS-21. The analysis outcomes present a limited study in its scope aiming to reveal the role of certain personality traits and emotional states, the constellation of which is capable of optimizing individual behavior. The conclusions lead to the belief that the discovery of the optimal combination of traits and emotional states capable of improving the function of the individual in extreme conditions is the way of finding a working model for the selection of suitable individuals for the realization of specific tasks, but also for planning and implementation of programs for deficit compensation when training personnel who are to carry out such activities.

Keywords: optimal functioning, personality, traits, emotions

1. Introduction

The assumption that different individuals react differently in identical situations is clearly demonstrated in several studies involving laboratory experiments on the impact of factors of the environment on the nature of the action [1] Moreover, it has been conclusively proven that even the same people apply different adaptive techniques in their being in different conditions. For example, in the study of the influence of the learning

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environment it was proved that some newly-arrived students respond better to visual auditorium stimuli than others [2] Snyder (1974) has found out that the higher self-monitors [2] are more experienced in modifying their behavior appropriately for their environment, based on the social requirements of the situation and low self-monitors situate their behavior based on internal factors, such as beliefs, experiences, etc. [3]. Ajzen, Timko and White (1982) have found out, that the intentions of the higher self-monitors more easily deviate under the influence of external factors than low self-monitors, whose intentions remain stable all the time [4].

All this shows that the differences in adaptive techniques are directly influenced not only by the differences in certain personality factors, but also by the configurations in which they are involved in each case. A configuration of personality factors can lead to behavior aimed at actively coping with the difficulties of the new environment, attempting to change the very environment or to self-modification to preserve the ego-identity and maintain the self-esteem. Another is the defensive behavior or seeking replacement behaviors associated with cognitive distortion of the perceptions of the environment in accordance with their own expectations.

Since this paper discusses the functioning of the individual in specific in his/her natural environment - the Armed Forces, discovering that constellation of personality factors which presuppose optimum adaptation to the environment and productive functioning in it makes the study particularly relevant and practically useful.

The Army environment affects servicemen in one way or another. Its specific character is as follows:

1. Experience gained before entering the military social experience, formed in a completely different environment, most often proves inadequate to the new conditions and this raises a number of specific difficulties.

2. The natural social contacts of the military in the course of carrying out their professional duties during most part of the day are relatively limited.

3. In the course of carrying out professional military duties, the problems that are solved and the goals that are pursued are fundamentally different from the civil ones. This by no means excludes the military from performing their duties by enlisting peaceful means as well, but the indisputable fact is that an inseparable functional feature of every and any military formation is to inflict maximum damage to the manpower and military equipment of the enemy, which is beyond any doubt associated with destruction and taking a human life. Naturally, this causes conflicts in the system of values of the personality.

4. There are, and are not but sufficiently, distinct patterns of military behavior, such as working with weapons, explosives and military equipment; action in specific weather conditions and in dangerous places; carrying out sentry duty, barracks duties, drill habits, etc. The focus should be on the specifics of the military behavioral patterns and the fact that they are involved in the regulation of behavior in almost always a more special, often stressful environment associated with a continuous threat to the life and health of the military servicemen.

5. There are difficulties for continuous verification of the results of the military work and the inability in this way to close the circle of set targets and the personal efforts made for their achievement and performance. The most reliable test is participation in hostilities, but this is the most undesirable option. There is no key factor for gaining a

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[2] "Self-monitoring" is a term indicating the ability to self-control the behavior in compliance with others' expectations.

sense of psychological well-being – the predictability of upcoming events resulting from personally made efforts. This prevents the possibility of timely correction of personal plans and discourages the individual.

6. The basic human needs are an object of frustration. There is sexual deprivation, as the satisfaction of the sexual needs usually involves a number of difficulties.

7. There is an information deficit. It is caused both by the lack of books and printed material and the detachment from periodical mass media. This also includes the monotony of everyday life, lack of entertainment and the occurrence of sensory saturation [5].

A possible direction of the searches in the analysis of this study is to outline the presence of several key factors in the personality structure that significantly influence the processes of adaptation and contribute to its optimum performance in ever changing conditions. Among these factors is the construct *social interest* introduced by Adler and designated as a preponderant orientation to the outside world, paying more attention to the events around us, and not to ourselves, a deep inner interest in everything that surrounds the personality and a proactive approach in coping with problems [6]. Several studies found out that people characterized by the presence of social interest, have a more realistic and constructive attitude to solving emerging problems, they demonstrate more empathy and also exhibit willingness to cooperate more often. These people are able to perceive things in life in all their richness and diversity, are able to give them meaning and value, but inevitably see the changing and ensuing difficulties as a challenge to their ability to cope and as an opportunity for development and self-improvement. Naturally, such people are expected to be more tolerant to changes and related surprises and seek no conflict when adapting to new conditions. Adler himself stresses that social interest is an absolute prerequisite for the adaptation of the individual, and indicates the strong sense of inferiority, insecurity and reduced self-esteem as major factors causing disadaptation. Moreover, Adler argues that social interest has a specific value in the implementation of the coping processes since the vital issues such as work, love, household, communication and friendship are key objectives whose achievement requires sufficient social interest.

Along with *social interest,* the psychological construct *courage* or also-called *endurance* could be used. Its introduction is an attempt to look at the mental prerequisites for increased flexibility and resilience of the individual, taking into account the participation of several personality variables. Their specific combination could presuppose the successful or unsuccessful adaptation. From this perspective, the psychological courage is seen as a mutually intertwined influence of three personal characteristics – readiness for personal commitment and involvement in the ongoing events, internal locus of control and perception of changes as a source of challenges and opportunities for self-development [7]. The constellation of the three characteristics favors the perception, assessment and successfully coping with situations created by critical life events.

The personal involvement in events and especially things occurring in the environment to which the personality adapts is a very important link in the puzzle called adaptation process. The willingness to engage is to take responsibility for the process and outcome among other things and this is already a certain degree of adaptation to the new conditions. Another indicator of psychological courage is the perception of a changing environment not as a source of threats to the self, but as a source of ongoing challenges, in the fight against which important human abilities are created, psyche is strengthened and personality grows. All this, combined with a reasonable and balanced look at one's own options for coping with situations is a content of *psychological courage*. Its presence is an excellent source of adaptive potential for the personality and a prerequisite for the

individual's coping with the requirements of the specific military environment. Psychological courage prevents the burnout of the body and reduces the process of a long and painful adjustment. Kobasa and Pussetti found out that the presence of psychological courage reduces morbidity. The style of coping with the individual's problems with high psychological courage, in addition to the confidence in their own strength and capabilities, also demonstrates personal effectiveness and their ability to use social and environment resources.

An important element of psychological courage is the locus of control. Describing this construct, Muzdibaev (1983) states that the subject to the control of human behavior can be the social environment and society as a whole through social norms and role functions attributed to the person in one situation or another. Often, however, the role of subject is played by the very individual. By drawing up a plan and making a decision on their own behavior, people weigh their options and assess whether the objectives are within their capabilities or they need to rely on the chance and benevolence of fate. Some people are considered to be masters of their destiny and they rely on their own powers and abilities, while others prefer to be left in the hands of fate and the responsibility for everything that happens is attributed to external forces. The same is applied in the mechanism of explaining past events. If, in most cases, the person takes responsibility for everything that happens in his/her life, explaining it with their behavior, character and abilities, this indicates internal (intrinsic) locus of control. If a person has a tendency to attribute the responsibility only to external factors, searching for the cause in other people, in the environment or fate, this indicates the presence of an external (extrinsic) control. In the opinion of Rotter (1966), author of the construct and its measurement method, internal and external locus of control is a resistant trait of the individual formed in the process of its socialization.

Radoslavova (1987) found out that the locus of control determines the differences in job satisfaction as a support of the sense of competence depending on the content of labor. These studies clearly support the idea to seek and account for the impact of this personality trait on its ability to adapt and optimally function in the environment [8].

Studies to search for other personality variables with a positive impact on the adaptive processes and the maintenance of a subjective psychological wellbeing show that there are sufficient grounds in the circle of personality factors to include such indicators as extroversion, sociability, emotional stability, level of anxiety and tension, lack of tendency to self-reproach, lack of loneliness and shyness in interpersonal relations. Depending on the specific army conditions, these factors may form configurations that facilitate the adaptive processes and increase the resistance to stress effects.

Extraversion and emotional stability are factors that belong to the so-called generalized traits [9, 10]. In some modern concepts, they are regarded as the basic properties of temperament.

Extroverts often act under the spur of the moment. Taking hasty decisions thoughtlessly, getting angry quickly and being prone to aggression. Overall, these feelings are not under firm control and such a person is not always a reliable personality. He/she loves gatherings and noisy companies. By contrast, introverts are quiet and closed, prone to self-monitoring and analysis. They prefer reading books to contacts with people and are prone to thinking over. They dislike exciting experiences and are able to control their feelings and rarely behave aggressively. They can concentrate on the same thing for a long time. Such people aspire order.

Emotionally unstable people are restless and anxious, often depressed and are more prone to depressive experiences. They are too emotional and impressionable. They often suffer from various psychosomatic disorders and have difficulty in adaptation and, therefore, have inadequate reactions. They are also prone to stress.

Emotionally stable individuals have higher thresholds of emotional excitement. Usually they are calm and balanced, have good self-control and do not succumb to anxiety. Generally, they have better opportunities for adaptation, especially in stress [11].

Regarding anxiety as psychological construct, Bakeev (1974) defines it as "a potential predisposition to react in emotional situations even under slight tension and threat. The psychological components included in the concept of anxiety ... have a stable and permanent nature and are manifested in different periods of life and in different situations" [12].

Heretofore, it has become clear that as a hindering adaptation to specific military environments, different personality structures can occur – peculiarities of self-esteem, dominant motivational trends, the enlisting of specific strategies for emotional regulation, etc. Therefore, it can definitely be said that the adaptation processes involving the individual cannot be uniquely derived from any feature of the psychic regulation.

Manifestations of hostility and aggression are also considered a risk factor, particularly in the development of coronary heart disease [7, 8]. It has also been found that acts of hostility and aggression are associated with emotional instability, introverted focus, proneness to anxiety in responding, difficulty in effectively processing information and orientation to the exertion of interpersonal control [11]. Therefore, aggression is associated with a common anti-adaptive organization of personality and leads to an increased risk of symptoms of mental instability. It can be a source of very serious interpersonal conflicts and determines violations of socio-psychic climate of the group with all the consequent complications that will secondarily affect the generation of anti-adaptive processes.

Self-esteem as one of the central regulatory structures of the personality also plays an important role in maintaining the emotional and mental status of the individual. Numerous studies reveal that high self-esteem is associated with a sense of self-confidence, emotional stability and better behavior.

Low self-esteem, on the other hand, is associated with depressive experiences, uncertainty, vulnerability and sensitivity. It is accompanied by a system of attitudes and behaviors that hinder the satisfactory social interaction and thus create conditions for the emergence of a sense of loneliness and isolation of individuals from around the world. As Horney states (1937) "Emotional isolation is a tough challenge for everyone, but combined with bias and uncertainty in itself, it becomes a disaster" [13].

Researchers have experimentally verified the self-assessment report that individuals with low self-esteem are particularly responsive to partners friendly to them and especially hostile to partners who reject them. More importantly, people with low self-esteem interpret the ambiguous social exchange more negatively than people with high self-esteem [14].

As stated, low self-esteem affects the social behavior of people. Zimbardo (1977) argues that "individuals with low self-esteem are more prone to passivity and suggestions and are less popular. These people are extremely sensitive to criticism, regarding it as a confirmation of their inferiority. It is also hard for them to appreciate compliments" [15].

The differences between individuals with high and low self-esteem give a reason to assume that self-esteem can be considered a factor for the increase or decrease in mental

stamina and catalyzing the adaptive capabilities of the individual at the clash with new and unknown conditions.

The outlined aspects of adaptation and optimal functioning are related with different configurations of the individual factors. Some of them can be effective when adapting to a certain environment, but they can be counter-effective in another. Due to this fact, it is only justified to state that the different aspects of psychic adaptation and optimal functioning should be explained by means of configurations from various individual factors.

2. Methods

In order to assess some of the traits listed above as suitable for the optimal functioning of the military in the specific environment of the army tried and tested psycho-diagnostic tools were used. The method for assessment of innovative behavior and propensity to original approach, adapted to Bulgarian conditions, is presented below; the Bulgarian version of Juian Rottery's methodology for assessing the locus of control; scales to assess the functional and dysfunctional impulsivity [16]. 97 officers from the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria were studied.

3. Results

The results of the analysis of the obtained data show that there is a constellation of eminent personality traits that are an excellent prerequisite for optimal functioning of individuals in the army environment (see Table 1).

Table 1. Psychometric indicators of measured personality traits.

Personal traits	Min	Max	M	SD
Neuroticism	0.00	11.00	3.40	2.65
Low self-esteem	0.00	13.00	2.47	2.66
Spontaneous aggressiveness	0.00	8.00	2.69	1.78
Reactive aggressiveness	0.00	8.00	3.43	1.82
Irritability	0.00	10.00	2.47	2.12
Friendliness	1.00	7.00	4.80	1.46
Loneliness	0.00	9.00	3.35	2.47
Openness	1.00	13.00	6.20	2.92
Balance	0.00	10.00	5.53	1.98
Psychopathic behavior	1.00	11.00	3.85	2.13
Thrill seeking	3.00	19.00	10.27	3.99
Functional impulsiveness	4.00	10.00	8.83	1.43
Dysfunctional impulsiveness	0.00	5.00	1.68	0.99

Control locus	0.00	7.00	1.97	1.87
Originality	33.00	38.00	35.50	3.54
Compliance	13.00	15.00	14.00	1.41
Creativity	25.00	29.00	27.00	2.83

It can be said that the respondents are a self-selected sample of established servants in the military profession with over 20 years of experience in the military. They have received an independent objective appraisal from their superiors in certain senior positions in the army structures. This means that the results of their work are accepted and highly appreciated. Perhaps there are others unaccounted for in the study of factors that have affected the professional performances of the surveyed soldiers, but the presence of these traits in the table and the level of expression are indicative of their key role in maintaining optimal forms of working in such an environment.

Traits manifest themselves so that they support rather than hinder the professional activities of the military. The surveyed individuals are emotionally stable (M = 3.40; SD = 2.65); with a high self-esteem (M = 2.47; SD = 2.66); low levels of spontaneous aggressiveness (M = 2.69; SD = 1.78) and reactive aggressiveness (M = 3.43; SD = 1.82); low level of irritability (M = 2.47; SD = 2.12); moderate friendliness (affiliation) (M = 4.80; SD = 1.46); low levels of loneliness (M = 3.35; SD = 2.47); moderately open (M = 6.20; SD = 2.92); moderately balanced (M = 5.53; SD = 1.98); a lack of psychic deviations in all their forms (M = 3.85; SD = 2.13); a moderate proneness to risky behavior (M = 10.27; SD = 3.99); functional impulsiveness (M = 8.83; SD = 1.43); dysfunctional impulsiveness (M = 1.68; SD = 0.99); internal locus of control (M = 1.97; SD = 1.87); a developed proneness to original solutions (M = 35.50; SD = 3.54); a readiness to meet the requirements within consensus (M = 14.00; SD = 1.41); an increased search for creative forms of solving problems (M = 27.00; SD = 2.83).

4. Discussion

The outlined configuration of manifestations of personality traits shows a stable, well-built personality participating fully in the regulation of the behavior of military members, as a result of which there is emotional comfort, low levels of negative emotions and great performances in the working place. The personality is able to flexibly respond to changes in the organizational environment and to quickly restore the positive emotional status of the military. The tendency towards risky behavior is under good cognitive control, behavior is deliberate, purposeful and responsible. The individual is able to act on impulse which is functionally effective. The personality is emotionally stable, with increased self-esteem, a better control of aggressive impulses. The individual is open in his/her contacts with the social partners and prone to innovative solutions. Actions are characterized by a large dose of creativity.

5. Conclusion

Individuals that function in the specific Army environment require skills and use mental and physical resources more than usual. They are highly adapted and also do well with their functional duties. As the survey indicated, they possess such a combination of congenital and acquired personality traits during the socialization process that this makes them suitable for operations in extreme situations created by their environment. Moreover, they routinely raise their qualification by making it compliant to the requirements of the environment and the daily performed tasks.

It turns out that the personality of the individual, the combination of skills, abilities and traits, subjected to the general regulatory mechanism, is key to the optimal functioning of the military. Therefore, besides the fact that the selection of people for the profession of a soldier should be based on reliable assessment of the personality traits, the traits should be consolidated and developed in the process of post-appointment education and training.

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THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES ENGAGED IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Under International Law, international organizations may be held responsible for internationally wrongful acts that can be attributed to them. According to the 2011 Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, "there is a breach of an international obligation when an act of that international organization is not in conformity with what is required of it or by that obligation, regardless of the origin or character of the obligation concerned". As to the issue of attribution, the Articles provide that "the conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization shall be considered an act of that organization under international law" meaning that the organization shall bear a responsibility for the conduct of its organs and agents. The concerns raise when international organizations employ private military and security companies (PMSCs) in peacekeeping operations and whether they can be held responsible for the conduct of PMSCs. The "effective control" must be applied in determining the responsibility of the concerned international organization or PMSCs. This paper does not analyze the legality or legitimacy of engaging PMSCs considering there are clear benefits to using PMSCs. And, according to some influential scholars, PMSCs are indirectly subject to International Law. However, the main ensuing problem is the status, rights and obligations of PMSC personnel, which are not very clear in conceptual terms. Therefore, since PMSCs are becoming more involved in peacekeeping operations they must be subjected to the international rules of responsibility for its conduct in times when the UN does not bear responsibility for its contractor. PMSCs have often violated the International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law with impunity. The existing international rules might not be sufficient to cover the conduct of the PMSC personnel, hence this paper, *inter alia*, suggests that a national and international regulatory framework could set forth the issue of responsibility.

Keywords: *Private Military and Security Companies, international responsibility, peacekeeping operations, international organizations, UN*

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades there has been a significant reliance by states on the services of private military and security companies in sustaining the war-fighting capabilities of national armed forces (Amstel/Liivoja 2017, 623). While the phenomenon of outsourcing in military context is quite new, the expansion of this market in the post-Cold war period has been intensive. In particular, the US use of private contractors in

recent conflicts has risen to such a degree that in Iraq and Afghanistan the number of contracted personnel deployed has been almost constantly higher than the troops deployed (Chesterman/Fisher 2009, 10).

Reliance on private contractors during armed conflicts is nothing new. They have played a role in wars past and present, from ancient times to the conflicts of our days (Singer 2008, 2). But their status and significance has changed and it is no longer considered as an ancillary aspect of military affairs (Singer 2008, 9). Today, PMSCs are considered in some quarters as an indispensable part of military undertakings. Since the end of the Cold War, the demand for PMSCs has increased to such an extent that today there is a lively PMSC industry offering an ever wider range of services, with some companies employing over 10,000 staff[i] (Singer 2008). In terms of the scale and scope of services they provide, PMSCs are a whole new phenomenon (The Montreux Document 2008, 3).

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are engaged by a variety of actors in times of both war and peace. They perform a plethora of tasks for states, international organizations, NGOs and multinationals. PMSCs' activities have ranged from offensive combat in the 1990s, to advice, training, armed security and logistics today. (Tonkin 2011, 52) According to Tonkin, the private military and security industry burst into the international spotlight in the mid-1990s when the South African firm Executive Outcomes (EO) based in London provided offensive combat services to the governments of Angola and Sierra Leone (Tonkin 2011, 14). They demonstrated impressive military capabilities and performed tasks of intervention that no other national contingent was willing to take, which led to the idea that the PMSCs could play a key role in providing help in other international or civil conflicts (UN Doc. E/CN4/1997/24 1997). The supporters of the industry suggested that PMSCs could undertake peacekeeping operations to assist the governments of developing countries (UN Doc. E/CN4/1997/24 1997). Even former UN Secretary-General Kofi Anann admitted that he had seriously considered engaging a private firm to assist with the 1994 Rwandan crisis (UN Doc.EC/50/SCINF.4 2000).

This situation raises a number of legal issues. There are still regulatory gaps in the national and international legal frameworks applicable to PMSCs and the lines of responsibility often remain unclear. Can the doctrine of responsibility of the International organizations for internationally wrongful acts, which is not stable itself, be applied on PMSCs? Can the relationship between the international organization (UN), the seconded state and the PMCS be treated according to the rules of International Humanitarian Law?

Nevertheless, it goes without saying that, especially in areas torn apart by armed conflicts, these corporations and their personnel can and sometimes do engage in different types of misconduct that may constitute violations of international law.

1. THE LEGAL STATUS OF PMSC PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

PMSCs are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.

Certain well-established rules of International Law apply to States and International Organizations in their relations with private military and security companies

(PMSCs) and their operation during armed conflict, in particular under the International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law.

Since there are significant differences between the IHL rules and peacekeeping rules with respect to the status of the peacekeepers, they lead to even greater ambiguity when PMSCs are used as peacekeepers. Generally speaking, PMSC personnel not directly participating in hostilities qualify as "civilians" (1949 Geneva Conventions). The status of PMSC personnel depends on the manner of their involvement in peacekeeping, that is, whether they are hired by a member State and seconded to the UN or instead hired directly by the UN. On the other hand, peacekeeping operations do not qualify as armed conflicts within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. Additionally, a peacekeeping mission is not a party to an armed conflict, therefore it cannot take direct participation in the hostilities. The common Article 2 to the four Geneva Conventions limits their applicability to "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more Contracting Parties". One of the most important principles of peacekeeping operations is that the use of force is prohibited except in cases of self-defense and defense of the mandate or, in some cases, defense of civilians. PMSCs are also restricted in the types of weapons they may carry. In peacekeeping, by contrast, a PMSC is seconded by a State to the UN, which means that the relevant relationship is between the seconding State and an international organization.

Although many believe that PMSCs are nothing more than modern "mercenaries", this view cannot be applied to PMSCs hired in UN peacekeeping operations. The criteria set forth in Article 47 of the Additional Protocol to the four Geneva Conventions (1949) do not relate to the PMSC personnel because mercenaries "take direct participate in the hostilities" and they are "not members of any armed forces of a Party to the conflict" (Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 1977). However, Art. 47 does not criminalize mercenaries, but merely removes them from the protection of the combatants' status (Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 1977, Art. 47). The PMSC personnel are not even volunteers, nor soldiers in national armed forces and they are not national soldiers. Nevertheless, despite the *de facto* and *de jure* differences, the UN has trouble separating the PMSCs from the mercenaries and strongly condemned their engagement in peacekeeping operations (Percy, 2010).

Some authors, such as Ostensen, argue that PMSCs play an essential role in peacekeeping missions and contribute to the Organization of the mission (Ostensen, 2011, p. 15). In May 2013, the UN employed 30 PMSCs (armed and unarmed personnel). They used unarmed security personnel in 11 peacekeeping operations and in one support mission (UNMIL, UNMISS, UNISFA, MONUSCO, UNOCI, MINUSMA, UNAMA, UNMIK, MINUSTAH, UNMOGIP) (Linti, 2014). For two missions (MINUSTAH and UNAMA), they engaged armed security personnel (UN Doc. A/69/338 2014). Although UN officials have never been too clear on their tasks or even recognition of their engagement, PMSCs are never used as front-line peacekeepers, but at the same time their use is not limited to the mere protection of UN personnel and premises (UN Doc. A/69/338 2014).

In order to determine the PMSC legal status in peacekeeping operations, it is necessary to explain how they can be engaged. Their involvement can be indirect, when they are contracted by the seconded state, or they can be directly engaged by the UN. For instance, during the 2004 UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, the State Department contracted with PAE Government Services Inc. and the Homeland Security Corporation to support and maintain the US Civilian Police contribution to that mission (Janaby, 2016, 120). In this context, can the PMSC personnel be regarded as "civilians" or as

"combatants" belonging to the national forces of the seconding state, which will ultimately affect their legal status? In this context, it must be noted that a State may second private companies to participate in peacekeeping operations if these companies are incorporated into its national armed forces, and subsequently they must fulfill a number of legal requirements, established and recognized by IHL (Janaby 2016 125). Furthermore, when PMSCs are directly engaged by the UN, they can be entrusted with the fulfillment of their mandate and act as peacekeepers, which has not been the case to date, or they can support the mission in various ways, most commonly by convoys, offering logistical support, disarmament and demining (Janaby 2010). If this is to happen in the future, the PMSC personnel hired by the UN to serve as peacekeepers would be classified as "civilians" until they participate directly in hostilities, in which case they would become "combatants". Therefore, the legal status of the PMSC personnel engaged in peacekeeping operations is established according to the rules of the International Humanitarian Law and peacekeeping rules, which seems to collide at certain points, especially when it comes to the determination of their legal status. At any rate, they have to comply with the IHL and IHRL rules in performing their tasks and assignments.

2. RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES OF THE PMSC PERSONNEL

2.1. The Role of the the Montreux Document in regulating the responsibility of the PMSCs

The first major multilateral attempt to address the perceived lack of regulation of the PMSCs was the Montreux Document, finalized in 2008, which aims to define and reaffirm the obligations of the states to ensure that PMSCs operating in armed conflicts comply with the IHL and human rights Law (the Montreux Document 2008). Initiated by the ICRC and the Swiss Government, the document outlines and reaffirms the existing legal obligations of the contracting states, territorial states and home states and identifies good practices to support the states in their national effort to implement the PMSCs regulations. Although the document is intended to apply in a war situation during an armed conflict, its good practices may inform behavior in other situations.

The Montreux document has been well received and, as of December 2015, 53 states and three International Organizations (EU, OSCE and NATO) have expressed their support for it. The Republic of Macedonia had additionally joined the Document on 3 February 2009. In December 2013, 'the Montreux+5' conference took place, which aimed to promote the Document among interested stakeholders and help ensure its effective implementation by participating States. A study issued at the occasion identified a number of challenges relating to the effective implementation of the legal obligations and good practices of the Document. In December 2014, the Montreux Document Forum was established as an intergovernmental forum aiming to strengthen the dialogue among the states and international organizations that are participating in the Document. The forum is a platform for states to exchange good practices on implementing the Montreux Document in national regulation and to support outreach and increase awareness for the document in different regions (the Montreux Document 2008).

Furthermore, the international Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, which is related to the Montreux Document, is also a Swiss initiative for enhanced regulation of the private security industry and it refers only to the private security companies and private security providers. It contains principles regarding the conduct of

the PMSC personnel and commitments regarding the management and governance of PMSCs (De Winter-Schmitt 2015, 259).

2.2. Responsibility of the State for the conduct of PMSC personnel (the principle of attribution) seconded in UN peacekeeping operations

It is clear that IHL rules are binding for the UN peacekeeping forces regardless of the fact that the UN does not have a similar system to that of the States to punish those who violate the IHL because such violations can still be prosecuted by the seconded states. The responsibility of the State to ensure respect for IHL under common Article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions remains even when the state seconds its forces to the UN. Subsequently, the members of a peacekeeping force, including PMSC personnel engaged by the seconded state, would be liable to prosecution by the courts, which has not been the case yet. Since PMCSs would be regarded as being members of the armed forces of the seconded state, there is no special legal regime for them and they must comply with IHL rules (Janaby 2016, 122). According to the Montreux Document, seconded (or contracting) States "have an obligation to ensure respect for IHL by the PMSCs they contract" and to "take measures to suppress violations of IHL committed by the personnel of PMSCs through appropriate means, such as military regulations, disciplinary or judicial sanctions, as appropriate" (the Montreux Document 2008, 11). In the context of an armed conflict, every person, including PMSC personnel, must comply with IHL and, having committed a serious violation of the IHL that entails individual criminal responsibility, may be prosecuted for war crimes (the Monterux Document 2008, 12). In this context, the document implies obligations for states to "investigate and prosecute relevant misconduct by PMSCs and their personnel. States must bring before their courts any private contractor suspected of having committed IHL and IIHRL violations and abuses, or extradite persons alleged to have committed such grave breaches" (the Monterux Document 2008). In order for these obligations to be realized, the states must first ensure they have the necessary legislation and means under national law (Calazans 2016, 94).

Another important issue provided in the Montreux Document is that it places shared responsibility of three types of States: the Contracting State (which hires the PMSCs), the Territorial State (on whose territory PMSCs operate) and the Home State (in which PMSCs are based). The categorization will determine the state's obligations and responsibilities according to the relationship established with the PMSC. This means that the territorial or home states do not necessarily have the same control and knowledge as the hiring state (Calazans 2016, 92). States also have other obligations arising from the document: the duty to provide effective remedies when the state fails to fulfill its obligations and the duty to investigate.

The responsibility of a state under international law arises where an act or omission is attributable to that state amounts to a breach of an obligation of that state under international law (Crawford 2005, 100). The conduct of private actors that contravenes international law does not generally implicate the state. A mere contractual relationship between a state and a PMSC would not, by itself, suffice as link of attribution. Therefore, according to H. Tonkin, a state could accrue responsibility for the conduct of PMSCs in two ways. First, where PMSCs, or their employees, become instrumentalities of a state, *their conduct can be directly attributed to the state*. And, second, where direct attribution is lacking, states have certain positive obligations to exercise control and influence over the private actors, including PMSCs, and can be responsible for a failure to conduct "due diligence"(Tonkin 2011, 56-70).

The conduct of a state organ is considered an act of that state (UN Doc. A/56/49 (Vol. I) 2001). A PMSC would constitute a state organ where it has this status under national law, for example, where it is formally incorporated into the armed forces of the state (UN Doc. A/56/49 (Vol. I) 2001). However, as noted earlier, such incorporation remains relatively uncommon. Alternatively, a PMSC could be regarded a d*e facto* state organ if it was in "complete dependence" on the state (ICJ Reports 43 2007, 392 and ICJ Reports 14 1986, 110). While an entire PMSC would be unlikely to satisfy this test, a group of PMSC employees in the context of a specific contract and in a particular conflict zone might.

2.3. *Responsibility of the UN for the conduct of PMSC engaged in peacekeeping operations*

Peacekeeping as one of the instruments developed by the UN to maintain and restore international peace and security, is defined as a mission involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflicts (Ostensen 2011). These operations are traditionally established under the Security Council's mandate in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Peacekeeping forces are a voluntary contribution of the UN member –States (UN Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet, 2015). At this point, it must be noted that the current UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement system is weak and does not fulfill its acclaimed purpose, partially because the member States are becoming more reluctant to send national troops to UN operations (UN Doc A/46/185 1991).

To date, the PMSCs have never been entrusted with the fulfillment of the mission (Janaby 2016 et Ostensen 2011). Although engaging the PMSCs might solve one of the major problems of peacekeeping today, there is a lack of member states that provide voluntary contribution. For example, the Western countries provide a very low number of troops.

The UN issued two important documents admitting that IHL is applicable to its operations: the first is the Secretary –General's Bulletin on Observance by UN Forces of IHL (UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13) and the second is the Report on the Panel on UN Peace Operations (UN Doc. A/55/305 2000). One of the recommendations in the documents is the "essential importance of the UN system adhering to and promoting international human rights instruments and standards and international humanitarian law in all aspects of its peace and security activities (Janaby 2016, 112). Once the obligations are set as legally binding for the peacekeepers, the question of its responsibility must be addressed.

As for the PMSCs used in peacekeeping operations, they may be regarded as an "agent" of the UN as they carry out their functions (UN Doc. A/66/10 88 2011). In the Commentary of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, it is said that the term agent does not refer only to officials, but also to other persons acting on behalf of the organization, in our case, the UN (UN Doc. A/66/10 88 2011). According to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, both the State and the UN share the responsibility to ensure that their peacekeeping forces respect the rules of IHL (Dormann et al. 2017). The UN troops have the legal duty to accept and comply with these rules. The responsibility of the UN may arise when the conduct can be attributed to them and when the principle of "effective control" must be applied. Nevertheless, international organizations, including the UN, bear the responsibility for internationally wrongful acts imputable to them, in same way as States (Gill et al. 2011).

3. CONCLUSION

The increased use of PMSC since the 1990s has drawn multiple objections and raised numerous concerns, both legal and otherwise. On the most general level, the outsourcing of certain governmental functions has been seen as undermining the role of the state, especially the state's monopoly of using violence. Overall, the critics were in direction of the general lack of transparency in the private security industry, the hiring state's lack of control over the PMSCs' activities, etc. But most of all, most vocally, they have been criticized for their questionable conduct and lack of transparency.

The use of PMSCs in peacekeeping operations is not prohibited, nor it contravenes any principle or fundamental rule of the international law, but their engagements must be regulated in legal terms. Although the use of PMSCs can be described as a necessary and effective tool in various mandates of peacekeeping, it does not exclude their obligation for respect of IHL and IHRL rules and principles.

In the absence of legal norms that will define the relationship between the international organizations and the PMSCs in a more restrictive manner, one must rely on the existing rules. The Montreux Document is a good starting basis for establishing legal implications for violations of IHL and IHRL rules by PMSCs. The fact that the Montreux Documents refers only to states, does not mean that the obligations do not apply to international organizations when hiring PMSCs or the UN when it is directly employing PMSCs in peacekeeping operations. Besides their different status in peacekeeping operations, the general respect for the IHL and IHRL rules remains. It is reiterated in the preface of the document that the "participating states will invite other states and international organizations to adopt these obligations and good practices appropriate for their operations".

At the end, it can be safely assumed that PMSCs are not a transitory and temporary phenomenon, but on the contrary, they will be used more frequently in the future. They will definitely become a permanent feature of the present-day and future conflicts. Therefore, instead of the rigorous stand of the UN officials, they should adopt a more realistic approach and work on defining the legal status of the PMSCs as well, setting the rules of responsibility in a concrete manner.

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PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF THE SECURITY SECTOR OF THE REPUBLC OF MACEDONIA AS A PRECONDITION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

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ABSTRACT

The efforts to establish a democratic legal order in the period immediately after the Republic of Macedonia gained its independence in the area of the security sector institutions were carried out with more or less pronounced difficulties. That, more than ever, imposed the need for establishment of parliamentary and other forms of democratic control and monitoring of the work of the security sector institutions, as these institutions are essentially considered as the most conservative and toughest structures of the social system, which repeatedly opposed the changes that were dictated by the new way of social order, in then still fragile democracy of the Macedonian state. This situation is slowly changing and the security sector reforms are implemented at a very slow pace and this has repeatedly been and still is one of the key points in the reports that the Republic of Macedonia receives with respect to our aspirations to join the big European family.

From today's perspective, however, the Republic of Macedonia has had good progress in the implementation of the commitment to democratic oversight and control of the actions of the security institutions and certainly, in terms of transparent operation of the security sector as a whole, but the fact is that the reforms are not completed yet.

Democratic order implies the need for an independent and democratic control of the security sector, which will be organized in a way chosen by modern democratic states. In that context, the legislature of the Republic of Macedonia, pursuant to its constitutional powers, examines the performance of the security sector institutions and thus establishes the basic legal principles and standards and respect for the basic human rights and freedoms. The completed process of legal and transparent operation of the security sector, in addition to the constitutional and legal regulatory framework for the implementation of parliamentary control and oversight of the work of security sector institutions, also requires strong political will, knowledge and skills. Considering the current political developments in the Republic of Macedonia when the Parliament operates with virtually no opposition, it seems superfluous to mention the political will, knowledge and skills for effective supervision of the security sector in conditions when to date, for six months the parliamentary committees have not been staffed.

In this paper, we will give a critical review of the functioning of the parliamentary committees in circumstances when their members from the opposition are absent and whether the parliamentary mechanisms for security sector control is only a democratic decor or effective mechanism aimed at protecting human rights and freedoms from possible abuses by the security sector institutions.

1. INTRODUCTION

In every democratically organized society like ours, a system of parliamentary democracy governs. Among other things, it involves the inviolable right of every citizen at democratically organized free and secret elections to cast their vote and thereby contribute to the election of their representatives in the legislature – the Parliament. These representatives, throughout the duration of their terms of office, have the opportunity, the right and the duty to represent the interests of the citizens. Elected MPs debate and make decisions on various issues of daily life. In this context, in democratic conditions the issues of security can be solved as well.

In Parliament, with dialogue and effective hearings, the deputies reach a compromise on a range of complex security issues that concern both individual and national and international security. Despite the fact that security issues are more associated with the executive branch and its agencies and the parliament is seen as a legislative body, it is necessary to achieve its real contribution, inter alia, as a body which exercises direct control over the executive branch, i.e. specifically over the security sector institutions. From today's perspective, however, the Republic of Macedonia has made good progress in the implementation of commitments for democratic oversight and control of the work of the security institutions and certainly in terms of transparency of the security sector as a whole, but the fact is that the reforms are not fully completed. Democratic order implies the need for an independent and democratic control of the security sector, which will be organized in ways that modern liberal democracies have chosen. In this regard, we make the following hypothesis: *The effective implementation of parliamentary mechanisms for security sector control affects the effectiveness and accountability of their operation.*

2. NOTION OF PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF THE SECURITY SECTOR

The Parliament in a democratic state is the highest representative and legislative body that represents the sovereignty of the people and is solely authorized to express the will of the people by adopting the Constitution and laws as the highest legal acts, as well as other political acts. The Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, called a unicameral Assembly, as a constituent and legislative representative body composed of 120 members, represents the central authority of parliamentary democracy in Macedonia. In this context, the Parliament or the MPs, using the vocabulary of democracy, are legitimate representatives of the general public that guarantee, both at party or at individual level, strengthening of the legitimacy of parliamentary decision-making, inter alia, on security issues.

Parliamentary control as an activity, process or phenomenon substantially vivifies the sense of responsibility and accountability (transparency) of the institutions of the executive branch. Its contents create the basic conditions for respect for human rights and freedoms, the rule of law and strengthening the citizens' trust in institutions.

The political purpose of parliamentary control means controlling the power of the executive branch and therefore minimizing any abuse of power, whereas the operational purpose relates to ensuring effective and efficient operation of the institutions of the executive power.

Parliamentary control over the operation of the institutions of the executive power, including the security institutions, depends on the power that the parliament has over the government.

In accordance with the constitutional and legal regulations in the country, the Assembly shall have the following legal instruments for supervision of the work of the government, including the security sector institutions:

- *Parliamentary questions* – the institute of parliamentary questions is an important mechanism for monitoring the work of the executive branch as a whole. According to Article 72 of the Constitution, Parliamentary question can be asked by a delegate and the manner and procedure for setting up a debate on a MP question are governed by the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. The sessions for MPs in the Assembly are transparent and the citizens can learn about their content on the parliamentary channel and thus the right questions and the corresponding answers can greatly affect the awareness of the voters about the capacity of the Government or other public functions (Kozarev, 2012). According to the MPs in the opposition, a great opportunity for direct political dialogue are the oral questions, since, as a rule, the oral questions must be answered immediately or exceptionally in writing within 20 days, all the more that they are not previously known, which creates an opportunity for the MPs in the opposition to confront directly the Prime Minister and the Government on key issues of national interest (Korunovska Avramovska, 2012).

- *Impeachment* - this mechanism is a qualified parliamentary question, which is submitted by at least five MPs and relates to the work of the executive power as a whole or of a member. "Each impeachment leads to a vote at the end of the debate by giving an assessment to the Parliament for the work of the Government or any of its members" (Shkaric 1995: 653). The method and procedure for submitting and debating on the interpellation shall be regulated in the Rules of Procedure (Article 45-51).

- *A trust vote* - a parliamentary mechanism that can be activated at the initiative of at least twenty deputies. Under Article 214 of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, the request for a trust vote for the Government shall be submitted in writing and must be explained and it can be submitted to the Prime Minister in writing or orally at the session of the Assembly. In terms of casting the trust vote, the Parliament convenes a meeting held on the third day of submitting the motion. Following the end of the debate on the confidence in the government, the MPs vote three days after the motion was submitted. This once again shows that virtually there is no equal position between the Parliament and the Government as if the trust vote does not pass in the Parliament, the Prime Minister must resign within 24 hours (Shkaric, 1995).

- *Parliamentary committees* – the legal basis for the establishment of parliamentary committees of inquiry as a mechanism for supervision and control over the Government and the institutions of the executive power is contained in the Constitution and Rules of Procedure of Parliament. In Article 76 of the Constitution, it is stipulated that the Assembly may set up survey committees for any domain or any matter of public interest, in practice this amounts to an opportunity for establishment of permanent and temporary (ad hoc) parliamentary committees tasked to review draft laws and other acts passed by the Assembly and

perform other duties prescribed by the Rules of Procedure of Parliament (Article 117-131).

3. **PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES FOR OVERSIGHT OF THE SECURITY SECTOR**

Parliamentary committees can be defined as small groups of parliamentarians who are joined on a temporary or permanent basis for extensive review of various matters within the scope of responsibilities of the concrete parliamentary committee; they are subsidiary bodies of the parliament which should provide better quality and more efficient work of the parliament as a whole (Petrov, 2010).

When we talk about parliamentary oversight of the security sector institutions in Macedonia, there are several parliamentary committees that, in one way or another, have certain control and / or appropriate obligations regarding the security sector in Macedonia in the broadest sense of the word:

- Committee for Defence and Security - which is authorized to monitor the armed forces and the police and act as the parent committee on matters related to their activity.
- Standing Inquiry Committee for protection of civil freedoms and rights - the only parliamentary body with investigative role, which is the focal point of the assembly where citizens can complain against violations.
- Committee for supervising the work of the Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency- responsible for supervising the work of the Intelligence Agency and the Security and Counterintelligence within the Ministry of Interior.
- Committee for oversight of the implementation of the special Intelligence measure interception of the communication by the Ministry of Interior, the financial police authorities, the customs authorities and the Ministry of Defence - a body which supervises the Ministry of Interior, financial police authorities, the customs authorities and the Ministry of Defence with respect to the legality of the measures for monitoring the communications of these two Ministries.
- Finance and Budget Committee - a body of the Assembly, which has the authority to review and approve the budgets of the security sector institutions through the usual process of budget drafting.
  The most qualified parliamentary committees that have direct supervision of the main components of the security sector in Macedonia are the Committee for Defence and Security and the Committee for supervising the work of the Security and Counter Intelligence Agency.

3.1 Committee for Defence and Security
  The Committee for Defence and Security in Parliament dates back to 1991 when it was established as a permanent body, with the original name of the Internal Policy and Nationwide Defence. "In 2002, by a decision of the Assembly a Committee for Defence and Security was established, as a specialized working body of the Parliament responsible for providing advice and recommendations to the plenary concerning laws or decisions pertaining to national defence and security of the citizens" (Kozarev, 2012:111).

In the scope of responsibilities of the Committee for Defence and Security of the Assembly include issues related to:

- protection of the order stipulated by the Constitution;
- performing control in the field of defence and security;
- defence of the country and civil defence;
- cooperation with the collective defence and security systems to which the country has acceded;
- integration of the country in the Euro-Atlantic organizations and the relations of the country with these organizations;
- protection of the life, personal security and property of the citizens guaranteed with the Constitution;
- production, sale, purchase, possession and carrying of weapons, parts of weapons and ammunition;
- protection of persons and property;
- citizenship;
- maintenance of the public order;
- public gatherings and performances;
- security of road, air, railway and lake transport;
- protection against natural disasters and epidemic diseases;
- registration of place of domicile and residence;
- border crossing and movement along borderlines;
- movement and stay of foreigners;
- identification and resolution of border incidents and other violations of the state borders;
- and other issues concerning the internal policy and defence (Muaremoska Abduli, 017:189).

The Committee for Defence and Security represents all political parties and it is comprised of representatives from all communities. Such heterogeneity in its composition aims at efficient functioning of the Committee in terms of effective debate, cooperation and understanding among its members, on the one hand, and cooperation with other parliamentary committees which in any way have an insight into the work of security sector institutions. Decisions are usually made by consensus, but they can also be outnumbered, it has 12 members and their deputies and one chairman. According to the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly and the Rules of Procedure of the Committee for Defence and Security, the Committee can request information and data from all agencies in the field of security and defence, as well as to invite scientists, professionals, public figures and representatives of other organizations, institutions and associations to its meetings, for presenting their opinions on projects and issues relating to defence and security. Such a practice was established in 2003-2004, when many scientific, professional and public figures were actively involved in the work on adopting laws and other projects (Dojchinovski, 2012).

3.2 Committee for Supervising the Work of the Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency

After Macedonia gained its independence in 1991, there was a need to create a system that would meet the needs of democracy to which the Macedonian nation aspired. To that aim, the necessity for creating a parliamentary body that will supervise the work of the Bureau for State Security raised. Hence, the Committee was established to supervise and control the work of the State Security Service. The State Security Service essentially reflected the intelligence community in the country until 1995, when the assassination of the President of Republic of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov seems to have been the motive for dividing the service. Reviewing the effectiveness of the secret services, a decision was made to divide the State Security Service into a Directorate for Security and Counter Intelligence [1] and an Intelligence Agency[2]. In this context, it is essential to mention the Sector-Office of Military Security and Intelligence which is also included within the intelligence community of the country. The Committee for Oversight of the State Security Service was renamed into the Committee for Supervising the Work of the Security and Intelligence[3] as a result of the renaming of the Office for State Security into Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence. However, the responsibilities remained unchanged until the formation of the Intelligence Agency, when a specific parliamentary body was renamed into a Committee for supervision and control of the Security and Counter-intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency. Since in 2002 the office became a directorate, the Committee took the name that is used until today - Committee for supervision and control of the Security and Counter-intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency.

The Committee has responsibility and specific duties in relation to the work of the Security and Counter-intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency and the legal matters of their work, as well as the protection of human rights and freedoms against their possible unjustified restriction by the Intelligence services. The specific duties of the Committee for supervision and control of the Security and Counter-intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency, according to the Rules of Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Committee are:

- respecting the rights and freedoms of the citizens, companies and other entities stipulated by the Constitution and the laws on the part of the Security and Counter-intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency;

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[1] As a body within the Ministry of Interior, the authority for the security and counterintelligence activity, taking into account the threats and dangers to security arising from inside. Its jurisdiction is regulated by the Law on Internal Affairs. By administration, it is headed by a Director, proposed by the Minister and appointed by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. The Director of the Security and Counter PRO report for their work to the Minister and the Government of the Republic of Macedonia

[2] Intelligence Agency is a fundamental institution in charge of intelligence understood as a process of collecting data and information necessary to protect the vital interests of the country from the dangers outside from other countries. The legal basis for its functioning stems from the Law on the Intelligence Agency. The head of the Agency is a director who is appointed and dismissed by the President. The Director of Intelligence reports to the President of the Republic for the Agency's operation and work, but the responsibility of the Director may be requested by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia

[3] Department - Office of Military Security and Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence. Its jurisdiction is regulated by the defence. The Sector is headed by Office chief, appointed and dismissed by the Minister of Defence. The Head of the Sector -Office reports to the Minister and the President of the Republic of Macedonia for their work.

- implementation and enforcement of legislation of the Security and Counter-intelligence Directorate in terms of misconduct, taking unauthorized activities, abuse and other adverse trends in its work, contrary to their rights established by law;
- methods and means used by the Security and Counter-intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency in terms of legislation and respect of the rights of citizens and other entities;
- material, personnel and technical facilities of the Security and Counter-intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency and
- other issues concerning the Security and Counter-intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency (Muaremoska Abduli, 2017: 194)

The Committee for supervision and control of Security and Counter-intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency consists of nine members (a president from the opposition and eight members) and eight deputies (members) that replace the regular members in case of absence. "The Committee does not have an advisory service or an independent budget and only one person is in charge of its bookkeeping. The Committee meetings are closed due to the specific character of the discussions during the exchanged classified information" (Bogoevski, 2012:16).

4. THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF THE SECURITY SECTOR IS A PREREQUISITE FOR EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE OPERATION OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE

If we take into account the fact that security is one of the vital values of human survival, it is understandable why society should strive toward its improvement and protection. The state should provide conditions for efficient and effective operation of the security sector institutions as actors in building the security of the citizens and the state. Precisely for this purpose, it is a legitimate opportunity to apply the powers that allow arbitrary treatment based on the nature of their work. Any possibility of arbitrariness entails the need for supervision, control and accountability by the institutions and bodies which are independent and impartial. In this context, the need of mechanisms for parliamentary control over the executive power is understandable. The parliament representatives who are the embodiment of the will of the citizens are best qualified to perform the control and supervision of the operations of the security sector institutions. They have a legal opportunity for direct insight into the actions of the security and defence institutions through the parliamentary committees formed for this purpose. The existence of such committees and their effective functioning is a prerequisite for efficient operation of the security sector institutions, but the question that arises is whether the parliamentary control is effectively implemented.

In practice there are many problems facing this control and supervision system and we will state some of them:
- The representatives fail to attend special training for oversight of the security and defence institutions resulting in lack of expertise;
- The way of arranging visits to security sector institutions (specifically referring to the visits that need to be made by the Chairman of the Committee for supervision and control of Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency);

- The submission of the reports to the parliamentary committees is almost always delayed and their review is more of a formality than a practice (Bogoevski, 2012:16);
- Difficulties in obtaining a certificate for working with classified data required for the representatives that are members of the committees;[4]
- Lack of a quorum of the committee, as a consequence of the representative's membership in several parliamentary committees (the committees for the control and supervision of the security sector have the smallest number of held meetings compared to the number of meetings held by other parliamentary committees);
- Lack of a separate committee budget that would allow engagement of experts in a particular field in order to support the control and oversight of the security sector, when necessary.

In this context, it is understandable why different scholars, experts and parliamentarians have different views on whether and how efficient the parliamentary control mechanisms are in the oversight of the work of the security sector. Therefore, according to Professor Bakreski, parliamentary control of the security sector in Macedonia amounts to a formal monitoring pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and the laws, but there is no objective, real and effective control. Macedonia has symbolic discussions on enhancing security, symbolic visits to the security and defence institutions and few recommendations from the parliamentary committees responsible for oversight of the security institutions (Bakreski, 2008). On the other hand, the chairman of the Committee for Defence and Security, Vladimir Gjorchev believes that parliamentary control works well and expects the process to develop further. Furthermore, he believes that the Parliament uses the mechanisms of civil control and the performance assessments vary depending on whether they come from the government or the opposition.

The essence of the existence of the parliamentary mechanisms to control the security sector is that it provides them with the concept of political responsibility established by the Constitution which is aimed at establishing a balance between the legislative, executive and judicial authority. The aim is to direct the citizens through their elected representatives to control and oversee the responsible authorities of the executive branch, in this case the security sector institutions. Therefore, one can say that the strengthening of such control contributes to greater efficiency, effectiveness and of course accountability of the security sector institutions. That leads to the achievement of the ultimate goal, strengthening of democracy and protection and improvement of the safety of the citizens and the state as one of the vital values of human survival.

5. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the afore-stated underlines the need for parliamentary control over the work of the security institutions sector. It entails an obligation on each system in democratic societies to find a legal way to control the power that is also legally granted to the institutions, the only ones that have a legitimate opportunity to apply special powers that can limit the compliance of human rights and freedoms in the procedures and manner prescribed by law in order to protect the security of the state and its citizens. Transparency

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[4] Before starting their work, the members of the Committee for supervising the work of the Security and Counter Intelligence Agency and the Committee for supervising the implementation of measures for monitoring the communications by the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence, must undergo a security check in order to gain permission to work with classified information.

and accountability in the operation of the security and defence institutions should be an imperative for a democratically organized society like ours, which justifies the need for proper parliamentary mechanisms that will monitor and control the work of the security sector institutions. The fact is that such a compromise is possible if we take into account that secrecy should actually be an exception in the operation of the security and defence institutions, as the commitments to democracy are directed towards transparency and accountability of the security sector institutions. Consequently, it is understandable why the inherent nature and dynamics of the security sector is a true challenge to effective parliamentary oversight.

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ROAD SAFETY PROTECTION SYSTEM IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

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ABSTRACT

The Road Safety Law adopted in 2009 has brought many novelties and provides some important system measures regarding road safety improvement in the Republic of Serbia. The most important one is a regulatory basis for establishing a sustainable road safety protection system and road safety management. Some solutions, such as the road safety financing system, is unique and progressive. After more than five years of implementation, some results have been achieved. Important institutions have been established, the jurisdiction has been determined and some important road safety measures have been applied. This work describes the road safety protection system in Serbia and some of the working results. Some solutions are highly recommendable to other countries.

Keywords: *Road Safety Management, Road Safety Protection System, Road Safety Law.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Road traffic safety is one of the most important issues in the road transport sector of any country. Every country has the responsibility to provide protection to its citizens and citizens are endangered in traffic more than in any other aspect of living. Road traffic safety is considered to be a human right, and it is supported by many international documents. For instance, the Tylösand Declaration [1] lays down the principal rights of citizens' road traffic safety. These rights serve to protect them from the loss of life and health caused by road traffic. In order to provide the necessary protection, states need to establish a road safety protection system. This system must be able to manage road safety, or in other words, to be able to plan and coordinate the activities of all stakeholders in order to prevent or cut down the number of road traffic accidents and consequences.

Traditionally, the police is considered to be the main and most important stakeholder of road traffic safety. However, considering that there is a large number of various underlying circumstances of road traffic accidents and a huge number of consequences, stakeholders need to be widely defined and coordinated.

Taking into account that the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention [2] emphasises that improving road safety performance requires a systematic and planned approach, it was recognized that establishing an effective road safety management system is the means by which countries can achieve this [3]. Bearing that in mind, and facing the outdated road traffic safety law in the Republic of Serbia during the first decade of the 21st century, the need to modernize the regulations and establishe a contemporary legal

framework for road traffic safety work was recognized. Serbia started to draft a new Road Safety Law to replace two valid laws: the Basic Road Safety Law (former Federal Yugoslav Republic Road Safety Law) and the Road Safety Law (former Republic of Serbia - as a Yugoslav member state, Road Safety Law).

The new Road Safety Law [4] was adopted on 29.05.2009 and started to be applied on 11.12.2009. This is a completely new Road Safety Law. The most important feature of this law is that it provides the basis for establishment of a sustainable road traffic safety protection system based on the road traffic safety management principles. It also provides a unique solution for sustainable road traffic safety financing based on road traffic safety law fines. This paper presents the elements of the road traffic safety protection system in the Republic of Serbia and some results after more than five years of implementation.

2. VIEW ON THE ROAD SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FRAMEWORK AT THE BEGINNING OF 2000

Managing road traffic safety means analysing and continuously monitoring the current state, professionally and realistically defining the desired state and designing and implementing measures in order to approach the desired state of road traffic safety. This is a continuous process which includes monitoring the effects and constant evaluation and improvement of the control measures [5]. In order to implement the management process, it is necessary to build a road safety management system that consists of three management system levels [6]: **institutional management functions** that produce **interventions**, which produce **results** (outcomes and outputs).

The institutional management functions should be focused on results. The results set the level of safety the country wishes to achieve expressed in terms of vision, goals, objectives and related targets. In order to achieve these results, it is necessary to provide: coordination; legislation; funding and resource allocation; promotion; monitoring and evaluation; research and development and knowledge transfer [6].

- **Coordination** refers to the harmonization of the interventions and the related institutional management functions to achieve results- focused- orientation;
- **Legislation** provides appropriate legal instruments which specify the institutions' jurisdictions, responsibilities and accountabilities, the interventions and related institutional management functions to achieve results –focused- orientation;
- **Funding and resource allocation provides** financing of interventions and related institutional management functions on a sustainable basis to achieve results- focused- orientation;
- **Promotion** provides support to deliver the interventions required to achieve results- focused- orientation;
- **Monitoring and evaluation** provides continuous measurement and evaluation of the interventions in terms of achieving the desired road safety outputs and outcomes (results).
- **Research and development and knowledge transfer** provides continuous creation, transfer and application of knowledge that contributes to the improved efficiency and effectiveness of the road safety management system to achieve results- focused- orientation.

Figure 1: The road safety management system [6]

Interventions comprise system-wide strategies and programmes of interventions to achieve targets. They include: planning, design and operation of the road network; entry and exit of vehicles and users into the road network; and the recovery and rehabilitation of crash victims. Interventions seek to manage risk exposure, prevent road accidents and reduce injury severity and their consequences. They are related to safety designs, standards and activities to secure compliance with these such as information, publicity, enforcement and incentive [6].

Results (in terms of expected results) are expressed as final goals and interim targets. Targets specify the desired safety performance and they are supposed to be achievable with cost-effective interventions.

This road safety management system framework has been taken into account in the Republic of Serbia when proposing the road safety law.

3. THE ROAD SAFETY PROTECTION SYSTEM IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Bearing in mind the framework for the establishment of traffic safety management, the Republic of Serbia has provided a solution in the Road Safety Law [4] which provides the necessary conditions to facilitate the road safety management. The following text presents the basis of the traffic safety protective system in the Republic of Serbia.

3.1 The establishment of institutions for traffic safety management

Article 8, paragraph 1, Chapter "III Foundations of Road Traffic Safety System" under chapter "1. Road Traffic Safety Coordination Body" of the Road Traffic Safety Law [4], prescribes the obligation of the Government to form a Body for Coordination of Road Traffic Safety (National Coordination Body), which is conceived as an inter-ministerial body, which includes the ministers responsible for: transport, internal affairs, health, labor,

justice, education and services. The aim of the establishment of this body is to initiate, monitor and coordinate the improvement of road traffic safety in the Republic of Serbia.

III BASICS OF THE TRAFFIC SAFETY SYSTEM
1. Road Safety Coordination Body
Article 8
"In order to achieve cooperation and harmonized activities aimed at improving road traffic safety, as well as initiation and monitoring of preventive and other activities in the field of road traffic safety, the Government forms a Road Traffic Safety Coordination Body (hereinafter referred to as National Coordination Body), as the coordinating body of the Government, which includes the ministers responsible for transport, internal affairs, health, labour, justice, education and trade and services.
The executive authorities of the territorial autonomy and local governments, municipal council or city council, may establish a Coordination Body (Commission, Council, etc.), to align the road traffic safety operations that are within the scope of the territorial autonomy or local government unit.
The organization and operation of the Coordination Body is more closely defined with an act of the Government or an executive authority and expert working groups are established in support of the coordination bodies."

This Coordinating body does not belong to any Ministry. It is established by the Government as an inter-ministerial body. It takes into account the fact that road safety is not a responsibility of one Ministry only: **road traffic safety is an economic, transport, health and social problem whose resolution directly involves the Ministries responsible for transport, home affairs, health, labor, justice, education and services**.

In addition to the National Coordination Body, the establishment of road traffic safety coordination bodies at the level of territorial autonomy and local self-government (Article 8, paragraph 2) is also provided. The establishment of these bodies is not defined as mandatory, but the competencies of territorial autonomy, municipalities and cities require the establishment of coordination and planning of measures and activities of road traffic safety improvement, and this can be achieved only by forming a coordination body.

The Law [4] also prescribes the formation of the Road Traffic Safety Agency (Chapter "III Foundations of the Road Traffic Safety System", under chapter "2. Road Traffic Safety Agency", Article 9), with the aim to implement a series of measures and activities within the road traffic safety protection system.

2. Road Safety Agency
Article 9
At the proposal of the Ministry responsible for transport, the Government establishes the Road Traffic Safety Agency, as a public agency (hereinafter: Agency).
The Agency:
1) analyzes, monitors and improves the road traffic safety system (development and use of unique database of relevance to road traffic safety),
2) works to improve the safety of drivers and other road users and vehicle safety,
3) carries out preventive and promotional activities in cooperation with the health promotion centers and/or the Public Health Institute that were established by the regulations concerning health protection and governs the road safety campaigns,
4) provides a database with technical characteristics of motor vehicles and trailers, which are relevant for the implementation of road safety regulations,
5) carries out the professional exam, organizes seminars to improve knowledge and perform knowledge check of lecturers in driver training,
6) organizes seminars to improve the knowledge and performs knowledge tests of driving instructors and professional drivers,
7) conducts professional examination for examiners, organizes seminars to improve the knowledge and performs knowledge tests of the driving test examiners,
8) organizes training and organizes and conducts professional exams for the drivers of the tourist train,
9) organizes training and organizes and conducts exams for tram drivers,
10) organizes training and organizes and performs knowledge tests for drivers with suspended driving license due to reckless driving,
11) conducts professional exams for vehicle technical inspection workers, organizes seminars to improve knowledge and performs knowledge tests for vehicle technical inspection workers,
12) issues permits (licenses) and certificates in accordance with this Law,
13) cooperates with regional and local road traffic safety bodies,
14) issues periodical analyzes and publications with information on traffic and road traffic accidents,
15) organizes and ensures publication of professional literature in the field of driver training,
16) carries out activities related to the implementation of the digital tachograph,
17) performs other tasks related to road safety improvement, prescribed by this Law and other regulations.
The Agency performs the activities referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article as delegated tasks.
To perform certain tasks relating to the organization of the activities referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, the Agency may engage a legal entity that is financially and professionally capable of performing these tasks.

A sustainable system for financing the Agency through fee for rendered services is also provided.

3.2 Establishing strategic road traffic safety management

The basics of strategic road traffic safety management at the national, provincial and local level is also provided by prescribing the obligation to adopt strategies and action plans:

- The National Road Safety Strategy (National Strategy) (Article 11) and the National Road Safety Plan (National Plan) (Article 12), to be adopted by the Government of the Republic of Serbia based on the proposal of the National Coordination Body (Articles 11 and 12);
- Road Safety Strategy and annual road safety plans of the territorial autonomy units, to be adopted by the Assembly of the territorial autonomy in accordance with the National Strategy and National Plan (Article 13);
- Road Safety Strategy and annual road safety plans of local governments to be adopted by the Assembly of the local self-governments in accordance with the National Strategy and National Plan (Article 13);

3. Road Safety Strategy

Article 11

The Government shall adopt the National Road Traffic Safety Strategy (hereinafter: National Strategy).

The National Strategy contains the most important characteristics of road traffic safety in their current state, long-term and short-term goals, guidelines, key areas and timetable for the adoption of an appropriate National Plan.

The National Coordination Body proposes the National Strategy for a period of at least five years, until the end of June in the final year of validity of the National Strategy.

Article 12

Based on the National Strategy and proposal from the National Coordination Body, the Government adopts the National Road Safety Plan (hereinafter: National Plan), for a period of at least one year.

The National Plan shall contain in particular: tasks, measures by priorities, responsible entities, deadlines and funding in key areas.

Article 13

The Assembly of the territorial autonomy units or local self-government, adopts a strategy and an annual road safety plan in accordance with the National Strategy and National Plan.

It also prescribes what should be the most important activities of this Strategy (the most important characteristics of the current state of road traffic safety, long-term and short-term goals, guidelines, key areas), the strategy within the referred period (at least 5 years) and the deadline to be adopted (until the end of June in the final year of validity of the Strategy) (Article 12).

These provisions were in line with the best practices in most developed countries at that time, especially with the experience of the European Union (EU), whose strategy (EU Road Safety Strategy) is particularly significant as it is considered that the introduction of successful strategic management of road traffic safety is one of the conditions for joining the EU and this implies the establishment of a legal basis for the

strategic management, the establishment of institutions and a protection system and adoption of appropriate national strategies.

In order to ensure successful implementation of the Strategy and achieving its goals, it is prescribed that the Government elaborates and specifies the Strategy and adopts the National Plan containing tasks by priority measures, responsible entities and deadlines for funding in key areas. The National Plan should ensure the achievement of objectives, and therefore it is necessary to be based on continuous monitoring of the Strategy implementation and actual capabilities.

Local governments are obliged to comply with the National Strategy and to adopt local strategies that are aligned with the National Strategy.

In order to fulfill one of the preconditions of the Strategic Road Safety Management, a legal obligation of constant monitoring of the road traffic safety state is also foreseen. In chapter "4. Monitoring of Road Traffic Safety", the obligation of the Government to submit a report on the road traffic safety state to the National Assembly, at least twice a year, is also prescribed, as well as obligations of the provincial and municipal / city governments to submit reports on the road traffic safety state to their assemblies at least twice a year.

These provisions should include the assemblies (State and local) to monitor the implementation of the strategic documents and activities of all road traffic safety stakeholders. This recognizes and emphasizes the fact that the responsibility for the road traffic safety state is on the side of the community leaders, on all levels of authorities: State, territorial autonomy and city/municipality. That way, the responsibility for road traffic safety in Serbia is in a very close connection with the political responsibility of the holders of political power. Given the fact that the holders of political power are, at the same time, the most important decision-makers, this should facilitate the adoption and implementation of important decisions for road traffic safety improvement.

3.3 Road traffic safety financing

Past experience has shown that the road traffic safety protection system does not work without allocated funds. Allocated funding is necessary to enable successful protection system operation, in accordance with the regulations and in accordance with the requirements of road traffic safety improvement.

The jurisdiction and funding of the Road Safety Agency provide planning and implementation of activities at the national level. For planning and implementing activities at the level of cities and municipalities, the Road Traffic Safety Law [4] provides special funding.

In addition to the funding from the budget (the budgets of local self-government, territorial autonomy and the Republic), it is determined that the most important sources are fines for violations of the Road Traffic Safety Law (Article 17) [4]. This is consistent with the contemporary approach, according to which "road traffic safety is financed by unsafe road users", because they are the major source of "unsafety" and there is a need to establish institutions and undertake a variety of measures and activities in road safety because of the "unsafe" road users. There is also a possibility to provide additional funding through various types of sponsorship (Article 17) (Figure 2). This is primarily related to insurance, technical inspections, companies etc.

5. Road safety financing
Article 17
Republic, territorial autonomy and local self-government units, within their rights and duties, provide funds to finance road safety improvement.
Sources of funds for traffic safety improvement are:
1) The budget of the Republic of Serbia, the budget of the territorial autonomy and the local self-government unit budget,
2) The collected fines for offenses under the road traffic safety regulations,
3) Contributions or gifts given to the Republic, the territorial autonomy or the local self-government unit,
4) other incomes.
Article 18
Funds from fines under Article 17 paragraph 2 item 2) of this Act, in the amount of 70% belong to the Republic budget and the amount of 30% belongs to the budget of the local self-government in whose territory the offense was committed. Out of the 70% of the funds belonging to the Republic budget, 75% is used for the Ministry of Interior. Out of the 30% of the funds belonging to the budget of the local self-government on whose territory the offense was committed, 50% is used for repairs of the road infrastructure of the local self-government unit on whose territory the offense was committed.
The funds referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be used for the purposes set forth in this paragraph or to finance the road traffic safety improvement.
Article 19
The funds referred to in Article 17 of this Law shall be used for:
1) the work of the Coordination Body,
2) improvement of traffic education,
3) preventive and promotional activities in the field of traffic safety,
4) scientific research in the field of traffic safety,
5) technical equipping of the traffic police units which enforce road traffic safety laws and direct traffic and other authorities competent for road traffic safety.
The funds referred to in Article 17 of this Law shall be used according to the program adopted by the Government, the executive body of the territorial autonomy or the executive body of the local self-government bodies, at a proposal of the Coordination Body.

The distribution of collected fines is prescribed in Article 18 (Figure 2) and their allocation in Article 19 (Figure 2) [4].

The law prescribes that 70% of the fines belong to Republic budget and 30% to the budget of the local self-government on whose territory the offense was committed. For the Ministry of Internal Affairs is allocated a total of 52.5% of the fines.

With regard to the local self-governments, 15% of fines is dedicated to repairs of the road infrastructure, but only in order to improve road safety. The remaining 15% is intended for improving road safety, for some significant tasks and activities, which are of greatest importance for the performance of the road safety protective system (Article 19): the work of the Coordination Body, improvement of traffic education, preventive and promotional activities, scientific research, technical equipping of traffic police units and other authorities competent for road traffic safety. The possibility to fund "other authorities competent for road traffic safety" provides for financing the local government authorities, which gives a stimulus to the establishment and strengthening of the capacity at the local level.

Figure 2: The road safety financing system in Serbia

4. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS

The Road Safety Agency was established in December 2009 and it commenced its operations on 1 September 2010. It is functional in most of the authorities and duties prescribed by the Law (a detailed description is beyond the scope of this paper).

The National Coordination Body has been established several times and it often was related to political changes after parliamentary elections. It was first established in the year of 2012. [7] and then again in early 2012. [8], with changes in the composition of mid-2014 [9]. The taks of the Coordination Body have been defined in the founding decision: *"The task of the Coordination Body is to initiate and monitor preventive and other activities in the field of road traffic safety, direct and coordinate activities aimed to reduce the number of accidents and their consequences and road safety improvement and propose the National Road Safety Strategy and the National Road Safety Plan."*

Achieving sustainable funding of road safety at the level of cities and municipalities is conditioned by the formation of functional local road traffic safety coordination bodies, although the Law does not impose the obligation to establish such bodies. The fines (in the amount of 30%) are directly flowing to the account of the cities and municipalities and should be consumed only if there is an investment program which was adopted upon proposal of the local coordination bodies, which means that the first condition to use the allocated funds is to establish a Coordination Body. According to a study [10], out of 161 towns and municipalities, at the beginning of 2015 there were 106 established local coordination bodies (around 66%), while at the beginning of 2016, 148 local coordination bodies were established (around 92%). Given that the period of application of the Law is 6 years, it can be concluded that building institutions at the level of towns and municipalities is progressing very slowly. However, the same survey revealed that an additional problem is the lack of proper supervision of the implementation of the funding provisions, as it was observed that there was a misuse of allocated money from fines. Some municipalities and cities were spending allocated money from fines even though they did not have established coordination bodies, had no program of investments

or had a program that was not in accordance with the Law (improper distribution per activity or having activities which were not related to a specified purpose). The research of the expenditures of 38% of the money for the period 2009 - 2012 [11] indicated that only 9.7% of the total money was used in accordance with the provisions of the Law, 25.7% was used inappropriately and 2.9% remained unspent. This suggests a significant deficiency in the road safety protective system.

Only after 5 years of legal obligations, the first Road Safety Strategy of the Republic of Serbia has been adopted and it covers the period from 2015 to 2020 [12]. The Strategy was adopted on 2 July 2015, and it prescribes that within six months an Action Plan shall be adopted, to " ... define concrete measures, stakeholders of activities, deadlines for implementation and the necessary funds."

On January 31, 2017, the Action Plan was not yet adopted.

3. CONCLUSION

The Road Traffic Safety Law, in force since December 2009, provides an opportunity for establishment of a combined model of strategic road traffic safety management in the Republic of Serbia. It prescribes activities at the national level, initiates, monitors, directs and coordinates the National Road Traffic Safety Coordination Body, while at the level of cities and municipalities, these activities should be conducted by local Road Traffic Safety Coordination Bodies. The National Road Traffic Safety Strategy and the annual National Road Traffic Safety Plan should be adopted by the Government on the proposal of the National Coordination Body, while the local strategies and annual road traffic safety plans should be adopted by the local Assemblies on the proposal of the local coordination bodies, but necessarily in accordance with the National Strategy and National Plan. The National Coordination Body is established by the Government, while the local bodies are established by local authorities. The National Coordination Body funding relies on the state budget and type of stakeholders funding (own sources for Road Traffic Safety Agency, budget for road authorities, part of the fines for violations of road traffic safety laws for the police, etc.). At the local level, funding relies primarily on the part of the fines for violations of road traffic safety laws.

The allocation of part of the fines for violations of the road traffic safety laws creates a sustainable source of funding for the key activities in road safety, which is one of the key conditions for the functioning of the Road Traffic Safety Protective System.

The described Road Safety Protection System in Serbia represents a possible solution for successful road traffic safety management, but only if there is strong political will to build institutions and support their activities. This support is lacking in Serbia and the potential for road traffic safety management has not been fully used since local coordination bodies have not been established in all local communities (cities and municipalities) or they have not yet become functional, the National Road Safety Strategy can not be applied without a National Road Safety Plan, there is no proper monitoring over the use of allocated resources for dedicated purposes and there is a large misuse of funds.

These remarks have pointed out the flaws in the system at both levels: national and local. They could be overcome primarily by political support, but also with more precise definition of the activities that belong to dedicated purposes and are financed by fines, ensuring efficient control over the use of these funds, conditioning the use of the allocated funds by adopting road safety strategies and road safety plans, by training professionals, etc.

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CONTRIBUTION OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR OF MONTENEGRO IN CONFRONTING THE NEW GENERATION OF SECURITY RISKS AND THREATS

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ABSTRACT

It is indisputable that the private security sector entities operate according to market rules and, at the same time, contribute to achieving the overall security system at the national level. In addition, dealing with a new generation of challenges and threats, and primarily with global terrorism, has marked a turning point towards transnational aspects of security in business. This situation is also characteristic of the Republic of Montenegro, as a country with a significant geostrategic position and developed tourist industry, which develops market democracy and aspires towards Euro-Atlantic integration. By consideration of these facts, many questions and issues related to the adequacy of the normative regulation and the effectiveness of the organization and functioning of the private security sector in Montenegro have arisen. It has become clear that even after the adoption of the new Law on Protection of Persons and Property in 2014, independently, private security industry is not able to adequately counter threats of transnational terrorism and other forms of modern challenges and threats, but there is no doubt that it represents a respectable force both in terms of prevention, as well as in the application of remedial measures to eliminate possible harmful consequences. Therefore, as the optimal solution in Montenegro, as well as in other countries in the region, public-private partnership as a pluralistic model has imposed itself, in which the public and private sectors are involved on a complementary basis in providing security as a basic social function.

Keywords: Private sector security, national security, the risks and threats of the new generation, the Law on Protection of Persons and Property, Montenegro

1. INTRODUCTION

Using the expanded meaning of national security as the domain from which all the other levels of security have derived in recent times, private security has emerged in theory.

Private security is linked to non-state entities within the national security, which perform certain tasks in the field of private security. Unlike state bodies competent for the tasks of security to engage in preventive and repressive plan in the field of protection of society and the state itself from any form of threat, here we talk about subjects who within the limits of their authority oppose various forms of threats to persons and property. Thus, they contribute to the efficient protection of the legal entities within which they act as their own internal-service or as standalone companies and agencies under the contractual obligations to perform tasks of security of persons and property. The relation of private security towards those involved in the national (state) security is most often directed towards public - internal security which is under the jurisdiction of the police authorities. Public safety, in theory, is generally classified into traditional public sector ("public

policing") and the private security sector ("private policing"). Private security sector is increasingly becoming a reality in contemporary society, taking an active role in achieving the internal security of the state. Its role is reflected in the maintenance of public order and crime prevention, which emphasizes that in practice there are other entities involved in addition to the police. While the police authorities are traditionally involved in the regulation and maintenance of the state system, other institutions, bodies and agencies also have specific tasks and responsibilities in maintaining social order and peace. Privatization in the field of security is apparently a generally accepted trend worldwide. The rising security needs, which increase the cost of the public security sector and thus burden the state budget, affect the switching part of the service to the sphere of private security sector as an addition to the state and national security. Comparing our practices and the practice of the developed countries in this field, we can conclude that the private security sector in these countries has attained higher levels of development. Many jobs are given to the exclusive jurisdiction of private security, such as security of persons and property, doorman services, technical protection, access control in facilities, movement control in buildings, protection of classified information and more.

In addition, it is evident that private security includes even some jobs that are in a certain way related to police matters, such as criminal investigations and investigations of the history of employees, the prison security service, the transportation of prisoners and alike. In Montenegro, the field of private security activities is mainly confined to the activities of security of persons and property. In recent years, in the context of private security, many companies and agencies that provide services of physical and technical protection of persons and property of legal entities and cash in transit services, fire protection and detective activity have been established. There is no doubt that the private security sector contributes to efficient protection of the vital value of the entire society, that there are appropriate forms of cooperation and that there is a process of transfering certain security tasks from the state to the private sector as a continuing increasing trend in Montenegro and the world.

2. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECURITY SECTORS

The extension of the field of security from traditional to non-traditional areas and actors affects the area of civil security, and as a result we see increasingly the presence of state (public) –non-state (private) partnership. In addition to the public security services, the private security sector provides services to an increasing number of private clients (Diagram 1). The private clients are ranging from airports to nuclear power plant, critical infrastructure facilities, major transport hubs, stations and areas of public transport, hospitals, national government institutions and others. The private security sector in such a situation is increasingly cooperating with the police and other public and private security entities for a wide range of security tasks. In addition, it should be noted with the growing number of cases, private security companies carry out their tasks without compromising the fundamental civil rights, but only as an extra pair of "eyes and ears" in the field of counter- terrorism and specific local, national and international criminal phenomena.

Diagram 1: The private security contracts in the European Union in 2011 (CoESS, 2014:10)

Global security issues, such as terrorism and organized crime, have influenced the interdependence of public and private sector security, in the way that it is impossible to separate the national from the autonomous content and the interests of safety and protection. Therefore, it is regarded as a partnership at the highest level of cooperation with respect to the treatment and full equality between the participants in order to achieve a common goal. The partnership represents a completely logical result of the cooperation with respect to the fact that no segment of security can be seen in isolation and independently in a unified national security system. For example, the cooperation between the police and the private security sector must be organized continuously since that is the model that could lead to significant results. There are different approaches to the notion of partnership. By resisting advocated partnerships, one perception is evident, inter alia, and that is the view that the private sector should play a supporting role in relation to the police and that it is necessary to be under a certain authority and under official control. According to quite the opposite opinion, an equal status of joint activities and professional relationship between these groups must be achieved. However, despite the different approach to the notion of the public and private sector, the existence of mutual cooperation and support of each side is inevitably essential in order to strengthen the joint forces and achieve the set goals. On the other hand, the public and private sectors have different characteristics that give them specificity (Table 1); however, it is unnecessary to potentiate their differences, because both sectors take responsibility for the authorization of the Security Affairs.

Public security sector	Private security sector
State budget funding	Own profit funding
Public interest	Private interest
Orientation to the threat	Orientation to ownership
Reducing crime rates	Loss reduction
All security services	Selective services

Table 1: Basic characteristics of the public and private security sectors (Kesić, 2009)

The cooperation of the entities is particularly important in the context of protection of buildings of exceptional (vital) importance because only such an approach can be expected to yield significant results in preventing terrorist activities. A particular important area of cooperation between the public and private sectors is the process of countering terrorist activities. The last series of terrorist acts in Western Europe has once again demonstrated the impotence of the public sector to resist this phenomenon alone, which is why its operational work is increasingly based on solid alliances and coordinated activities in which, inter alia, a special role has been given to the private security sector (Keković, 2004). A vital precondition for successful cooperation between these two sectors is the exchange of information and joint actions.

The benefits to be gained through joint action are numerous and range from strengthening mutual trust to significant intelligence integration (Bailey, 1989:524). In support of this is the fact that the Western countries particularly insist on the development and advancement of the concept of common security ("joint security"), which involves cooperation between the three levels of conventional and unconventional subjects of security. The first level consists of the national authorities and the police, the second level belongs to the private security services (i.e. security services, stewarding, detective agencies, etc.). The third and last level includes entities within the local community in which we include healthcare institutions, social services, public utilities and construction services. This concept implies adjustment to the current model of work of all subjects in order to achieve synchronized action necessary for safer community. In addition, but no less important is the rational distribution of resources resulting in lower costs and increased efficiency of all subjects. There is no doubt that the most effective partnership between the private and public security sectors is performed in conditions of complete and accurate normatively defined jurisdiction of both actors, with a clear delimitation of the areas of activity in which their cooperation and coordination is necessary. The establishment of such partnership is of great importance in the prevention of terrorism and shielding internal security, especially in securing and protecting critical infrastructure facilities.

3. PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The privatization of the security sector is not a new phenomenon and it has been the case throughout human history. The result of this process is that the areas of defense and national security gradually cease to be the exclusive jurisdiction of the state, where private military and security companies replace the governmental institutions to a large extent in the areas of exercise, training, security sector reform, operations, areas of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation and the like (Sajko & Mikac, 2009). If we consider the essential characteristics of private security demonstrated to date, the flexibility of the private sector can be noted in this area, bearing in mind that the actors in the security sector provide continuous and uninterrupted service and that they are able to respond to the different requirements of clients. Flexibility in the private security sector is manifested in different ways (the number of members who are engaged depending on the task, non-standard norms of working hours, and the ability to adapt to the needs of the clients at all times with the permanent goal of meeting their ever-changing and unpredictable demands. On the other hand, the competitiveness of the private security sector can be confirmed, which is primarily reflected in the fact that there is a constant and merciless mutual competition among the subjects in this sector. This should lead to the fact that contracts for the provision of security services are concluded by utilizing the best and cheapest deals. This, however, often leads to the appearance of unfair (unlawful) competition, amateur

work, illegal practices and other deviations, which threaten the reputation of the private security sector in the society and has a negative impact on its development. Finally, it can be stipulated that private security is still in a certain way undervalued, in the sense that private companies providing security and detective services contribute to creating a safer society and enjoyment of public and private freedoms and rights, and that this contribution is not always visible nor adequately valorized. In this regard, there is no doubt that ignorance and lack of recognition for the work performed by private security operators can have negative implications on the overall performance of the entire private security (Munar & Lorenzo,2004:263) . In addition, we should not forget that in reality the process of privatization of security functions is implemented in two parallel directions. On the one hand, it is the "privatization from above", where the state delegates some of its responsibilities to private operators. On the other hand, there is the "privatization from below", which is present in situations where the state for various reasons does not have sufficient capacity to ensure the safety of all citizens and businesses. This can trigger guerrilla actions, creation of secessionist or terrorist organizations and groups or organized criminal structures, which undermines the authority of the central government and calls into question the general personal and property safety, which is why numerous individuals, companies or social groups are brought in a situation to look towards the actors of the private security sector for protection. In addition, it should be noted that the phenomenon of pluralization of security is present both in the developed democratic countries, and in the post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies, and in weak and failed states (Caparini, 2006:263).

4. THE PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR IN MONTENEGRO

The expansion of private security and the security events that have encouraged its development has influenced, inter alia, the place that this sector has received in the strategic documents for national security. Such is the case with the National Security Strategy of Montenegro, where the private security sector is classified among the elements of the national security system (National Security Strategy of Montenegro). The private security sector in Montenegro is normatively regulated by the provisions of several laws; the most important is the Law on Protection of Persons and Property (Official Gazette of Montenegro no. 1/14). This law is a normative basis regulating the conditions and manner of conducting activities with respect to protected persons, property and natural resources (which are not within the exclusive competence of the national authorities), stakeholders of activities or conditions to be met by persons who directly perform tasks related to protection and their powers and duties while performing, wearing uniforms, organizing internal protection service, controlling and supervising the protection activities and subjects and more. The law stipulates that the private security sector in Montenegro offers the following services: protection of property against destruction, damage and theft; protection of natural resources, goods and the environment; maintaining order at public gatherings; protection of persons from threats to their life, physical and psychological integrity, privacy and individual rights, as well as other forms of threats to their security, as well as other services of importance to the delimitation of public and private partnerships. In addition, it is significant that a legal definition was introduced with regard to the conditions for performing protection activities, the definition of the activities that can be used by business organizations, other legal entities and entrepreneurs and the designated authorized entities that can perform such activities. In this manner, it regulates an important prerequisite for delimitation of the treatment between the public and private

sectors by creating a working model which specifies the limits of jurisdiction. Moreover, it has determined the extent and type of jobs that were handed over from one sector to another. Consent to perform/register activities of protection (for a period of up to five years at the longest), is issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, upon the request of the company, other legal entities and entrepreneurs who are obliged to submit an application to the administrative authority for policing. It is especially important that it has established criteria for determining the vital – mandatory protected buildings in Montenegro (critical infrastructure facilities in which there are things whose damage or possible destruction can have severe consequences to the life and health of people, objects of state administration and local government and publicly owned enterprises) (Official Gazette of Montenegro no. 1/14[)]

Country	Population number	Number of police officers	Number of private security officers	Ratio
Slovenia	2,000,000	7,500	4,500	0.60
Estonia	1,400,000	3,600	4,900	1.36
Cyprus	776,000	3,000	1,500	0.50
Luxembourg	462,000	1,573	2,200	1.40
Malta	397,000	1,800	700	0.39

Table 2: Basic data on individual countries, with the number of private security members (Button, 2007:111)

It is estimated that over 70 companies and entrepreneurs operate in Montenegro registered for carrying out activities of security of persons and property and 40 interior protection services, manned with more than 3,500 persons for such activities. Compared to other countries that have a similar population, it is evident that in Montenegro the private security business deals with a large number of individuals and there is a great interest in private sector services (Table 2). According to data from EU countries, there is one member of a private security company to 500 inhabitants on average (CoESS, 2004:1). However, we should not forget that the efficiency and quality of services provided by the private security sector contributes to the confidence among the service users, which inter alia, results in greater visibility of these services. In addition, the role and importance of the private security sector is increasingly being recognized in national laws, policies and security strategies.

Training and control of the members of the private security sector in Montenegro

Having in mind the importance of training of the members of the private security sector in Montenegro, there is is a special bylaw - Rulebook on the manner of training, program and manner of taking the professional exam for performing the duties of protection of personal property and goods in the arranged subject area (Official Gazette of Montenegro no. 7/06 and 53/11). It is anticipated that the program is implemented through 172 hours of instruction (119 practical and 53 theoretical), which include eight subject areas. The students who successfully complete their education, receive a certificate, a vocational qualification for the profession is acquired after checking the knowledge, skills and competences, which is conducted by a special commission appointed by the Ministry

of Interior on the basis of the professional qualifications. However, in reality the situation is quite different. According to estimates, more than 30% of private security is not trained to perform these tasks, which means that they work without authorization to carry out such activities. Compulsory education is one of the indicators that the state takes care of the quality of the staff. This is an important prerequisite for lawful, efficient, professional and ethical performance of the private security tasks. Training reduces the potential risk for eventual emergence of a legally sanctioned and illicit behavior, most frequently occurring in the application of repressive powers by members of private security, thus protecting not only the security personnel, but also customers from high damage claims that may arise in the event of any bodily injury and other various unjustified interventions. In addition, the data on the number of persons engaged in this activity and the fact that they are not adequately trained indicates a lack of adequate control effort in this area.

The inspection control in the field of private security is required for legal and practical reasons. From a legal point of control, supervision should provide lawful performance of the security and prevention of possible abuse, particularly in the field of human rights.

On the other hand, enterprises and entrepreneurs who are licensed to perform security services are not allowed to perform the tasks that are within the competence of the state bodies, as well as the use of operational methods and means that are legally authorized for the members of the police, national security agencies or governmental agencies. When it comes to practical considerations, their scope is fairly broad, but is primarily aimed at preventing unfair competition and a black market of security services and increasing work efficiency.

CONCLUSION

In modern conditions, private security services are spread over a wide area of security and protection of persons, property and business, transcending the volume and quality of elementary safety standards which the state guarantees to individuals and businesses. Although at first glance the privatization of security can be seen as an erosion of the sovereignty of state power because of the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence has always been a defining characteristic of the sovereignty of the state, but it is a simple look and a distorted image of reality. The result of the privatization of security represents a continuation of the formation of a network of security entities in which the power of the state and private actors is distributed on a new basis. In other words, the privatization of security has led to various processes, on the one hand, because of the inability of the state to guarantee a certain value according to the wishes and demands of citizens. On the other hand, there are some countries that leave certain tasks to the private sector without fear that they will lose the monopoly over them. The state decides when and which security services may be left to qualified private entrepreneurs. The relations between the private security sector and relevant government institutions can be viewed from two aspects: formal, qualifying law and other regulations (assessing the legality of the use of authority), and informal, which stems from the fact that the private security sector primarily applies the prevention element in establishing the security system, while the competent authorities, and especially the police, have the task of imposing security and preservation. In the previous operations of the sector of private security in Montenegro, as well as in the neighboring countries there are many problems that have originated from the legal, political and economic heritage, which affects, inter alia, the overall state of security in these countries.

The most important problems are the lack of appropriate standards and professional ethics in the work, inadequate training of the staff and insufficient material and technical equipment of the private security firms. Another significant problem in the countries that are in the process of joining the European Union, is the non-transparent connection of the subjects of private security with the state security structures.

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PROTOCOL AS A PRACTICAL TOOL IN DEFENSE DIPLOMACY

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ABSTRACT

This scientific paper focuses on protocol as a practical tool in defense diplomacy and on the relevance of its usage. The main thesis of this paper presents the official visits of foreign defense ministers to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia. The key argument in support of this paper's thesis is how to vividly explain the process of an official foreign defense minister's visit to our country as an operational tool in defense diplomacy.

The method used in processing the subject of this paper is practical analysis, a respective case study of a particular visit by a foreign defense minister in our country. The conclusions from this paper imply that the most important issues are the increase of bilateral cooperation between two countries and cooperation in the field of defense. It also includes additional interpretations or guidance for future development, innovations and solutions in protocol activities through a 360 degrees feedback, or the so called lessons learnt – assessing what had gone right and what had gone wrong, and as a consequence, gaining from the mistakes and avoiding them in each next visit of a foreign defense minister.

Key words: *military diplomacy, visit, reception, Macedonia, defense*

Introduction to protocol discipline

Protocol represents a science and one of the definitions for protocol is: *„Protocol is a series of rules that require good behavior in official life and in ceremonies that include whole governments and nations, as well as their representatives. It is a recognized system of international courtesy."* The topic of this paper is: *„ Organizing a visit from a foreign defense minister to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia."* Protocol, as described in the definition, implies *„Etiquette"* deriving from the French word *"étiquette"* which means *good behavior.* Another definition says: *„Protocol represents a set of rules that regulate the matters of etiquette, commendation and order of precedence in official ceremonies."* I would also like to cite one of the founders of our diplomatic protocol in former Yugoslavia, the author Trajkovski*: He explains that the official honors and ceremonies play a significant role in diplomatic protocol. In this issue I will also use the ARM Service Rulebook, February 1995, later in 2011 transformed in „The Rulebook for Military Protocol in the Army of the Republic of Macedonia," where Military Protocol is systematized. Military Protocol also involves military honors for diverse high heirs to the throne, heads of foreign states and defense ministers, who will be the subject of this paper."*

Organizing a successful official visit of a foreign defense minister to our Ministry requires a great and sacrificial work. To have an efficient and effective visit, the focus needs to be put on four managerial functions: *Planning* the visit of a foreign minister,

Organizing and teaming up for the visit, *Managing* during the time of the visit by a foreign minister to our country and, the fourth and last function, *Control by the chief of protocol* over the people who are directly involved in organizing and implementing the visit, for example: „Escort officers, bodyguards, police officers, doctors, nurses, drivers, waiters, hotel workers, curators, etc. In short, we can call this whole group: technical personnel. Hence, we divide the organization of the work into: **Specializing, Grouping and Deployment.**

According to one of the most famous authors in management Isaac Adzes, **„The organization in the long term should efficiently behave as a hand where each finger is not indispensable. In such an organization, team work needs to be carried out in a manner that everyone supports the other, yet nobody is indispensable."**

Organizing a planned official visit of a foreign minister requires a difficult and painstaking work. Everything needs to be planned and implemented and I will present the details in the further course of my project report on the subject Fundamentals of Management.

1. 1 Organizing a Visit From a Foreign Defense Minister to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia

There are several types of visits by a foreign minister to our country as follows:
1.2 Types of visits
- Working visits of defense ministers to our country;
- **Official visits of defense ministers to our country;**
- Informal visits of defense ministers to our country (visits to sporting events);

1.3 Official Visits of Defense Ministers to Our Country

Official visits of defense ministers to our country- *everything that is necessary to organize an official* visit by a foreign defense minister to our country.

Every visit of a foreign defense minister to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia is of a **working nature**. The invitation for a visit of a foreign defense minister is sent by the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia. A working visit of a foreign defense minister to the Ministry is organized based on an invitation, international and bilateral cooperation in the field of defense, a plan for training of officers and non-commissioned officers, international contracts and agreements for armament and military equipment and services, scientific and technical cooperation in the field of military technology and exchange of officers and civilians for vacation purposes.

Visits of foreign defense ministers to the Ministry cannot last more than three working days. There are exceptions when they have longer duration, but this only occurs with the approval of the Minister of Defense or if it is envisaged by an international agreement or treaty.

*The official visit*s of Defense Ministers are normally held on work days and not on weekends or national holidays. Military delegations on a ministerial level can include up to five persons. In situations when foreign visitors insist on a higher number of delegation members and a longer period for the visit, it can be allowed, depending on the interest; however, in such cases the expenses are covered by their side. Foreign defense ministers' visits are approved by our minister or a person authorized by him.

The Decision for a visit includes the goal and duration of the visit, the number of visitors and the institutions to be visited. It specifies the responsibilities of the professional, political, security and protocol segments of the visit and it determines the responsible authorities and the costs of the host.

The program and the appendage for recruiting people for the organization of the visit are prepared by the Section for Protocol within the Department for International Cooperation within the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia (hereinafter DIC) in collaboration with the responsible authority for the activity.

During an official visit, we can plan visits only to those units and institutions which, by Ordinance of the Minister of Defense, are open for visits by foreigners and those which are required to be visited due to extraordinary reasons, approved by the Minister of Defense.

The program for the visit must be short, meaningful and economic, without any contents unnecessary for the visit. The program cannot be altered or expanded without the approval of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia or a person authorized by the MOD, whereas the planning and the established protocol security – without the approval of the head of DIC or the Minister's Cabinet. The program of the visit needs to be printed in Macedonian Language and in the adequate foreign language, whereas for the working groups and individuals the foreign language is used when necessary, which is decided by the Chief of the Minister's Cabinet, on the proposal of the Chief of Protocol in the Department of International Cooperation in the MoD of the Republic of Macedonia.

DIC, in cooperation with the host, prepares a special program for the spouse of the foreign minister of defense. The spouse of the foreign minister of defense does not take part in the official talks and visits to the units and other state institutions, nor does she/he join the official luncheons which are organized in the units or state institutions (only in exceptional cases may she/he join official luncheons). The spouse program does not necessarily have to match the one of the delegation or the working group.

The spouse of the foreign minister of defense, depending on the reciprocity of two states, can reside in the Republic of Macedonia as a guest of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia or privately, as a guest of the relevant embassy.

The person in charge for organizing and carrying out the professional part of the visit is the responsible authority for the host duties, whereas the chief of protocol within the DIC is responsible for the security and the protocol part of the visit.

The responsible authority for the activity is to draft a proposal and submit it to the supervisor for approval, no later than 15 days before the visit, since the visit cannot be approved without an approved proposal.

Prior to the arrival of the guests, the responsible authority is to determine and negotiate the purpose and duration of the visit, the number of visitors, the expenses, which of the requested contents can be carried out in the Republic of Macedonia and what protocol honors they are entitled to during the visit, as well as to make sure these information is provided to the foreign guests prior to their arrival.

The responsible authority has to inform the Unit Commanders planned to be visited at least seven days before the visit.

The military unit or state institution to be visited by the foreign delegation is obliged, through its ordinance, to regulate all issues related to the organization of the visit and to take care of data confidentiality during the visit.

Additionally, it is obliged to either personally or through the DIC inform the foreign visitors about the restrictions they must adhere to during the visit.

Following the completion of the visit, the responsible authority prepares a report and submits it to the Minister within eight days.

During visits from a foreign defense minister to our Ministry, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia covers the expenses for hotel accommodation, transport, meals and gifts for the guests and the official escort.

The number of days for the visit, the responsible persons for the expenses and other details are determined before the arrival of the guest, through a written invitation and a program proposal for the visit or through other means.

The expenses for official visits of foreign ministers of defense need to be agreed and be borne by the Ministry of Defenses of the Republic of Macedonia solely on the basis of reciprocity of the two countries, according to the provisions of international agreements and interstate agreements and treaties.

The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia does not cover the cost of supplies of special aircraft and the cost for accommodation of pilots and expenses for foreign journalists accompanying the minister.

In negotiating the official and other visits of foreign ministers of defense, the responsible authority and DIC should inform the guest about the type of expenses covered by the Ministry of Defense and the expenses covered by the guest during the stay in the country.

As part of the preparations for the visit of a foreign minister of defense to our Ministry when the Ministry of Defense covers the costs, the Department for International Cooperation produces a calculation of costs and it is approved by the Chief of the Cabinet of the Minister of Defense who is responsible for the planned and rational spending of funds.

In the official reception during a visit by a foreign minister of defense to our Ministry, the Ministry organizes military honors according to: [1] ***The Regulation Service of ARM, February 1995.*** The military honor ceremonies usually include the presence of the Minister of Defense, the State Secretary, one of the state counselors or generals (and spouse if the guest's spouse is also present) and the Head of DIC. The delegation is accompanied by an officer or other person designated by the host, i.e. the Minister.

During the reception ceremony at the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia, the airports in Skopje and Ohrid, Skopje railway station and other specified locations, the foreign minister of defense visiting our Ministry is escorted throughout the visit and hence requires a certain number of escort officers, depending on the reciprocal obligations of both countries.

1.4. When the Minister of Defense of the Republic Macedonia is the Host

In cases when the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia is the host, the following actions need to be taken:

- The Host-Minister of Defense (and spouse, if the guest is accompanied by his/her spouse),
- State Secretary or one of the State Advisors from the MoD of the Republic of Macedonia,

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[1] Protocol Rule for Service in the Army of the Republic of Macedonia (1995), Skopje

- The Chief of General Staff of the ARM or one of the generals designated by him,
- Chief of Staff of the Minister's Cabinet,
- The Head of the Department for International Cooperation in the MoD of the Republic of Macedonia,
- The Military Attaché of the Republic of Macedonia from the country where the guest comes from,
- Other persons designated by the host, i.e. the Minister.

The persons in charge of the reception and seeing the guests off are designated by a proposal of the Head of the Department for International Cooperation in the MoD of the RM. These persons are lined up in a row during the reception and departure ceremonies according to the order of precedence, rank and position.

The necessary number of participants in the opening and closing discussions and expert consultations is determined by the host or the Minister, depending on the need and reciprocal obligations between the two countries.

The President of the Republic of Macedonia or the President of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, based on the reciprocity between the two states, receives a courtesy call by the minister of defense of the foreign country during the official visit to the Republic of Macedonia.

The reception ceremony for a foreign minister of defense to our minister of defense includes the following persons who attend the event: Chief of Staff, State Secretary, one of the state advisors, the responsible authority for the activity and the Head of Cabinet of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia.

Depending on the need, the reception may also be attended by the Ambassador and Defense Attaché of the country of the visitor and others designated by the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia.

Foreign guests, upon their request, can lay a wreath of fresh flowers on the grave of Gotse Delchev, at the "St. Saviour" Church in Skopje, and on this occasion only the foreign minister is allowed to write a note in the book of notes for visitors.

For providing movement and physical security for the delegations at standstill and in motion, personnel is engaged from the military police, the sixth sector of the Ministry of Interior for providing security to dignitaries and the Military Security and Intelligence Service of the MoD.

During the visits of a foreign minister of defense to our country, the responsible host authorities organize an official luncheon or dinner in the banquet hall of the Army restaurant or in any other national restaurant provided with a decision and approved by the Minister. The formal meal organized during the visit of a defense minister is attended, in addition to the guests, by Ambassador and the Military Attaché of the guest's country (the spouse of the Minister if the guest is accompanied by spouse) and officials from the MOD and ARM.

It is customary to exchange toasts during the official luncheon or dinner. They are normally held after the meal. Toasts can also be held at the beginning, if we reach such an agreement with the guest. The toasts can be previously translated and hand it out to the guests to avoid translation during the ceremony.

At official dinners, receptions and cocktails domestic beverages are usually served.

The type of attire is determined by the host, i.e. the responsible host authority, upon proposal of the Chief of Protocol in the Department for International Cooperation in the MoD of the RM, in line with regulations, customs and climate conditions. With respect to the attire of the spouses, the host's spouse is consulted.

At the formal luncheon or dinner there must be a sitting order at the table of the official delegation and name tags are set for the guests, and if required, for members of the technical staff. The layout of the table is made by the Head of Protocol from DIC, respectively (order of precedence) in accordance with the functions in the Ministry of Defense and the Army of the Republic of Macedonia and the armed forces of the foreign country (if the luncheon is attended by VIPs in order of precedence higher than MoD of the RM, then the sitting arrangement is in accordance with the order of precedence of the Republic of Macedonia). If the host - Minister of Defense has a reason for changing that order, then it should be promptly negotiated with the Head of Protocol in the DIC.

There must be a printed menu on the table and printed names of the guests for the ceremonial luncheon or dinner hosted by the Minister of Defense. The rest is marked as required.

During an official visit of a foreign minister of defense to our country, personal gifts are customarily exchanged between the two ministers at the end of the luncheon or at the end of the official talks between the two delegations. The gifts are provided in advance by the Head of Protocol in agreement with the Minister of Defense. The Head of Protocol takes care that the same gift is not given to the foreign defense minister for a second time.

The value of the gift should not exceed the amount of 100 Euros. If the gift exceeds the projected amount, it remains for the Ministry of Defense of the country where there guest is from.

The foreign minister of defense together with the delegation is accommodated in Government protocol buildings (egg. at the Vila Vineyards and St. Naum in Ohrid), or in first class hotels as stated in the Decision for the visit, approved in advance by the Minister of Defense.

The protocol buildings that are property of the Government of the Republic Macedonia can be used after prior approval by the Secretary General of the Government of the Republic Macedonia (egg. MPs Club in Skopje, etc). For part of the delegation accompanying the foreign defense minister in hotels, there are prearranged menus with a choice of two to three dishes at a predetermined price and a menu by the Head of Protocol of the DIC.

The ordinance also includes a small and prearranged consumption of foreign drinks, whereas the expenses for telephone calls and bar service are covered by the guests.

During a visit by a foreign minister of defense to our country, the Head of the Public Relations Section of the MoD of the RM, or the spokesperson is responsible for the public relations context – i.e. media communications, in agreement with the Minister of Defense or a person authorized by him.

The Section for Protocol within DCAOS (Department for Communications, Analytics and Operational Support) prepares a part of the protocol report for the visit of a foreign minister of defense, whereas the professional part of the report is prepared by the responsible authority for the activity and it is submitted to the Minister of Defense of the Republic Macedonia within eight days.

2. Military Honors for Foreign Guests

In this subheading I will focus on military protocol. The Army of the Republic of Macedonia has an Honors Battalion which deals exclusively with protocol matters, and I will take this occasion to stress only a few of them, as: ***The Protocol Rule for Service in the Army of Republic of Macedonia,*** i.e.:

3.1.4. Paying military honors to defense ministers of foreign states, chiefs of staffs of foreign Armed Forces, NATO commanders and heads of international organizations;

73) For the defense ministers and chiefs of staffs of foreign countries in official and working visits, the Ministry organizes a welcoming (departure) guard of honor upon arrival at the airport and during official visits and a formal reception ceremony in front of the MoD and General Staff.

The reception ceremony includes the participation of the honor unit with the Macedonian flag and a military band. The Honor Unit is consisted of 1 line with 20 guards and one officer, platoon commander, a flag-bearer and two companions - 3 officers and the commander of the Honor Unit, 1 officer. The honor guard is mustered in front of and in the building of the MOD and GS - 10 guard soldiers who are placed in pairs as follows: at the entrance stairs to the building, at the monument of General Mihailo Apostolski, at the platform for press statements in front of the MoD cabinet and the cabinet of the Chief of General Staff of the Republic of Macedonia.

Before the arrival of the delegation, with the appearance of the Minister or the Chief of Staff, the commander of the unit commands "READY!" and "SALUTE!" turning "TO THE LEFT - ROUND" and gives a report on the readiness of the unit.

Upon the receipt of the report, the Minister or the Chief of Staff heads the place for welcoming the guest, the commander turns and orders "TO THE LEFT - ROUND" commands "READY!" and "PARADE, REST!"

Upon arrival of the foreign delegation, the Minister or the Chief of Staff welcomes the guest coming out of the vehicle and the military band plays a march. The Commander of the Honor Unit commands an honorary salute "ON THE RIGHT". The guest and the host go up the stage and take their positions.

The military band plays the anthem of the guest country, and then of the host country.

The military band plays a march, the guest and the host step down from the stage and continue to review the formation. The honor unit commander gives the report and follows the guest while touring the honor unit to the end of the line. The guest salutes the flag with a head movement and salutes the unit walking to the end of the line. Finally, the Honor Unit commander salutes the officials with a sword and afterwards follows the introduction between the members of the Macedonian and the foreign delegations. Then the guest and the host enter the building of the MoD and GS of the Army;

74) During visits by NATO commanders and heads of international organizations, based on an ordinance by the Chief of Staff, the MoD and ARM organize a welcoming (departure) honor guard upon arrival at the airport and the honor guard is positioned in front of the building of the MoD and GS - 10 soldier guards, as regulated in paragraph 69;

75) During visits by deputy ministers of defense, deputy chiefs of staffs, lower levels NATO commanders and representatives of international organizations, based on an ordinance by the Chief of Staff, the MoD and ARM organize a welcoming (departure) honor guard upon arrival at the airport and the guard honor is positioned in front of the building of the MoD and GS - 10 soldier guards, as regulated in paragraph 69.

76) At handing over of credentials to the heads of foreign diplomatic missions in the Residence of the President of the Republic of Macedonia, the President office organizes military honors involving the honor guard. Upon their arrival and departure to and from the Residence of the President of the Republic of Macedonia, the honor unit performs a military honor guard alignment.[2]

Conclusion

As explained in the text above, the advantages of organizing a visit by a foreign minister of defense to our ministry are very significant. One of them is as follows: ***One of the most important things is increasing cooperation on bilateral relations between the two countries, cooperation in defense, and many other issues.***

As stated above in the introduction of my report, planning and organizing are among the most important management functions. If the trip is well planned and organized, half the work is already completed. However, despite the well-planned and organized visits, other problems always occur. The virtue and wit of the Chief of Protocol help to solve the problem immediately and avoid its effect on the prearranged protocol. Resolving problems that appear during the work need to be quickly identified, defined and a practical decision is to be made.

According to experience, to date it has been proven that the problems always come from the lower working structures (egg, bodyguards, drivers, waiters and others). The protocol level in our country is still on a stand-still position; although in the last ten years it has slowly moved upwards.

Another thing that must also be noted is that during a visit all things must be spotless, the protocol must be faultless, it must not make any mistakes and it must be efficient and effective. One of the activities which today's managers lack is motivating the protocol, i.e. increasing the motivating factor (e.g. praising the protocol service at the end of the work well done). In our reality, this occurs very rarely and if the work is done well, nobody notices that.

Additional interpretations or guidance on the further development of innovation in protocol is the 360 degrees given feedback or the so-called lessons learned: what was good and what was bad and making sure in each subsequent visit of foreign ministers not to repeat the same mistakes.

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APPLYING S.A.R.A. METHOD IN THE FIELD OF PRIVATE SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

Security risks and threats in the field of private security are important, considering the threats to facilities under the protection of private security. Access of persons to buildings under protection, prevention of crimes and misdemeanors in buildings under protection, armed robberies, money transfer, violence at sports events are just a few of the situations that the authorities need to manage.

In order to effectively prevent and combat these phenomena, there are numerous methods for analysis of security risks and threats that can be successfully applied in the field of private security. The authors of the paper address a specific current situation in the area, and by applying the S.A.R.A. method make an attempt to solve certain security conditions in the country, which are the responsibility of the private security agencies.

Keywords: risks, threats, S.A.R.A. method, etc.

1. INTRODUCTION

The S.A.R.A. method is used to establish an effective and long-term solution, determining the cause, the problem and the basic factors that need to be accurately identified. First, a decision is made on the application of the S.A.R.A. method, followed by the establishment of a working group with representatives of the interested parties. This group will be responsible for implementing the S.A.R.A. method. (Malish Sazdovska, 2014) The group is expected to develop original and innovative responses and thus send a strong message to the community that any problem can be solved by joint efforts of the interested parties.

The S.A.R.A. model is widely applicable to the problems faced by many municipalities and has produced excellent results in hundreds of communities across the United States. Through this method, cooperation is established and a systematic process of solving community issues and improving safety and quality of life is implemented.

2. CONCEPT AND STAGES OF THE S.A.R.A. METHOD

The S.A.R.A. model contains the following elements:

Scanning/research: The research involves identifying the recurring problems that concern the public and the police; however, the police cannot easily provide data for some of the problems. That is why the police-community relations are important, as well as the application of this method in solving safety related problems, (Mitrevska, 2012) i.e. community policing system. (Dzhukleski, 2004) After determining the problem, the survey includes verification that there is a problem, determining how often it occurs and how long it lasts and identifying the consequences of the problem. (Boba, 2010)

In the research, the team members are to describe the symptoms of the problem and present relevant information. Hereupon, the following questions should be answered:

- Identifying the problems that are of interest to the public and the police.
- Identifying the consequences of the problem for the community and the police.
- Giving priority to the problems.
- Developing goals.
- Confirming that there are problems.
- Determining how often the problem occurs and how long it lasts.
- Selecting problems for closer research.

Analysis: In the analysis phase, the group members collect data and information regarding the factors that influence the problem, creating the basis of identified trends or patterns that include the stakeholders.

Analysis - In the analysis phase, the group members gather data and information about the factors that influence the problem. On that basis, trends and models are identified, including the involved parties. This phase is the "heart" of the process of solving the problem according to the S.A.R.A. method. The information will have to be collected fundamentally from various sources. Data regarding a problem in the neighborhood is not collected only from the police. When all the parts of the problem are identified, a reaction or response that will be specifically tailored to the specific problem can be developed. We should ensure that the complete data analysis helps identify the real nature of the problem. We should make sure that we understand the problem from the perspective of the key interested parties in the community. (OBSE, 2004) In this process, the analyst analyses important information available to the police, but does not answer the question - why does the problem occur? The role of the analyst is important at this stage, because he/she proposes models and methods for assessing the effects of the response of the addressed problem or tries to identify new strategies. (Kekovic., Nikolic, 2004) Therefore, in the second phase an analysis is conducted by using the S.A.R.A. method. Thereof, the following questions need to be answered:

- Identifying and understanding the events and preceding conditions and supporting the problem;
- Identifying relevant data which need to be collected (Malish Sazdovska, 2013);
- Researching what is known about the problem;
- Identifying the advantages and limitations of the answer;
- Narrowing the scope of the problem;
- Identifying the various resources that can be helpful in developing an understanding of the problem, and
- Developing a working hypothesis as to why this problem occurs.

In order to accurately identify and analyze the problem, the issues should be grouped under two main features: the surrounding/environment where the problem has occurred and the type of behavior associated with it. The following settings can be defined for most general police problems:

- Residential - locations where people live. This includes houses, apartments and hotel rooms. They are often at fixed locations, except trailers.
- Recreational - places where people have fun, bars, nightclubs, restaurants, cinemas, playgrounds, parks and ships.

• Offices - places for office work where there is little communication between the staff and the public. The most common locations of this kind are the Government and enterprises and the access to these sites is often restricted.

• Retail - places to enter or take in turnover from customers, including cash transactions, such as, for example, banks and shops.

• Industrial - locations of processing goods. Cash transactions are not important activities in these areas and the public is rarely included. The examples include factories, warehouses, premises for stacking packages etc.

• Educational - places for learning or teaching, including playhouses, schools, universities, libraries, etc.

• State institutions - (places where citizens are directed when they have a certain problem) courts, prisons, police stations, hospitals and addiction centers.

• Public roads - roads that connect other environments. For examples: roads and highways, trails and bike paths and garage driveways.

• Transport - locations of mass movement of people. These include buses, bus stations, airplanes and airports, trains and train stations, ships and ports and line ships and ports.

• Open/transit - areas without permanent or regular use. They differ from parks because they are not used for recreation, although people use them for that purpose. These include abandoned properties and construction sites.

• Technological – "electronic" places where problems occur, such as Internet, internal networks, computer networks, etc. (Boba, 2010)

The second feature of the problem is the behavior, whereupon the following aspects are identified: the damage, the attempt and the relationship between the offender and the target. There are six types of behavior:

• Thefts – the perpetrator clearly differs from the victim and the victim faces the perpetrator's crime. The crimes of this kind are common and relate to thefts, child abuse and intrusions.

• Concessive - both parties are involved knowingly and willfully. This refers to some forms of transaction, such as drug sales, prostitution and selling stolen goods.

• Conflicts - this category includes violent acts involving rough people who already have some existing relationships. For example, some forms of domestic violence among adults fall under this category (domestic violence on children and elderly people is considered as a theft because the parties involved are not equal), etc.

• Unkindness – the offenders differ from the victims, the victims include a huge number of individuals and the damages are not grave. These include many riots that can be characterized as boring, horrid, loud or disturbing, but may include some serious damage to property or injuries. Loud parties are an example of this category. Thus, we raise the question - Does vandalism fit in this category, which, actually depends on the details. Thefts are one form of vandalism.

• Threatening – the offender and the victim are the same person, or the offender does not want to hurt the victim, as, for example, attempted suicide, overdose or a car accident.

• An abuse of the police - this category includes the unjustified requests to the police, for example, false crime reporting, repetitive calls for crimes that the citizens can solve by themselves. This is a category of the last shelter – when and the last harmful withholding of the behavior means and expanding of police resources when no other category fits. (Boba, 2010)

Despite these issues relating to community safety, there are other problems that require the engagement of security services and bodies applying the S.A.R.A. method in order to be solved.

The analysis phase involves an analysis of the data, thus developing assumptions as to why the problem occurs. It is followed by the collection of data for testing the assumptions and a statistical analysis is conducted to derive conclusions with respect to the immediate causes of the problem.

3. APPLYING THE S.A.R.A. METHOD IN THE FIELD OF PRIVATE SECURITY

This method can be applied to various security problems that correlate with private security in general and in the Republic of Macedonia. Namely, the entities responsible for private security need to solve specific security problems in the area in which they operate, related to the people and facilities they secure and the application of their responsibilities and powers in accordance with the legal regulations in the country.

Sport violence or on-field violence is a phenomenon known to these territories. As we sometimes say, today sports arenas are a place where spectators play violent games, using the places where sports spirit and joy should be in the focal point instead of national, or sometimes, religious disputes. "The moment when an individual connects the rules of standard communication with society is the moment when a deviant behavior begins." The reasons for such acts are numerous and of different nature. We will agree that the appearance of violence and misbehavior on sports fields is not a phenomenon of the new era. (Petrevski, 2015)

One of the serious problems that need to be analyzed in order to overcome on-field violence is the securing of sports events, especially those at high risk. The obligation of securing sports events arises from Article 1 of the Law on Prevention of Violence and Indecent Behavior at Sports Events. This law regulates issues related to violence and indecent behavior at sports events, measures for their prevention for the safety of spectators, competitors and other participants in sports events and the obligations of the organizers and the powers of the competent authorities to implement the measures.

If we analyze the Law on prevention of violence and indecent behaviour at sports fields in the country, it should be emphasized that the legal solution "borrows" and uses certain experiences from the legislation of other countries, primarily the legal decisions of neighbouring Serbia and Croatia. Macedonian stadiums today are places where national, ethnic or religious matches take place. In our country, the Law on prevention of violence and misbehavior at sports events was adopted by the authorities in 2004, but nine years later we still have the dilemma whether its amendments will decrease the risk of occurrence of violence at sports events and are those amendments a reflection of the real situation in the Republic of Macedonia? The section of recommendations related to the undertaking of social and educational measures for fans, is incorporated in the segment of the Macedonian law that prescribes the measures for preventing violence and misbehaviour at sporting events - preventive measures; in Article 6 whereof, the commitments of the organizer are correctly noted, as well as those of the sports club for this particular segment (communication with fans, regular meetings, coordination of the activities of the clubs, establishing a preventive action plan, etc.). (Petrevski, 2015)

It should be noted that there are numerous examples of violence at sports events in the Republic of Macedonia, sometimes escalating at the sports courts with serious consequences to human health, the fans, the police and private security agencies. There are

a number of cases when people use fireworks and other explosive materials, physical force and thus disturb the order of certain sports events that are taking place in the country.

The most serious incident that took place in the period 2008 -2013 was the one on 30 September 2012, during a football match between the clubs Vardar and Pelister in Skopje. Before the incidents that happened in the National Arena Philip II Macedon, a chain of incidents took place outside the arena before the start of the game. Namely, the guest fan group "Chkembari" should have been securely conducted by the police from the Railway station to the Arena, but once again the police officers made a non-coordinated action passing through an ethnic Albanian part of Skopje, exposing the fans as an open target and rocks were thrown on them. Many media gave reports on the incident and pointed their fingers to the fan groups, not even asking why the police demonstrated their reluctance and incompetence yet another time. (Stanojoska, 2014)

In view of overcoming such situations, the method of "Brainstorming" is applied in the training organized by the Chamber of the Republic of Macedonia for private security, to examine the situation, particularly the treatment of the members of the private security agencies and propose possible interventions (obezbeduvanje.org.mk).

The following weaknesses have been detected: problems with the legal basis for implementation of the competences for searching specific persons; profiling persons of security interest, their detection in a crowd and adequate treatment; cooperation and responsibilities of all entities involved in securing the event, as the police, private security agencies and public order services; training and an increased number of human resources; risk assessment of the competition; violence prevention; application of adequate measures for suppression of riots and others. Each of these weaknesses is a problem in itself, but it can be generally concluded that the securing of sports events is a serious task which poses a serious challenge to the competent entities. The competent authorities should address the above issues in order to ensure an effective conduct at sports courts, prevent violence and maintain public peace and order at matches.

The analysis phase is followed by a proposal of solutions relating to staff training; increased number of security personnel; enhanced cooperation of all relevant entities; legislative changes, etc. If these proposed solutions are applied, it is expected that this would reduce the occurrence of riots at sports events, improving thus the function of securing sports events and the cooperation among all relevant entities, the police agencies and the private security order services.

This analysis along with the proposed solutions can be presented in the table of the S.A.R.A. method as follows:

Table 1. Violence at sports events (Source: authors' analysis)

Scanning	Analysis	Response	Assessment
Increased violence at sports events	Application of the brainstorming method	- Legislative changes; - Staff training; - Increased number of security personnel; - Enhanced cooperation of all relevant entities; - Other measures.	Possible reduction of the occurrence of incidents.

The draft decisions are related to legislative changes regarding the prescribed powers of the individuals that inspect or search the fans entering the sports facilities, the possibility of confiscation of objects and whether and how this measure is in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Macedonia. Additionally, staff training is required in the future in order to gain knowledge and skills for acting when the peace and order are disturbed at sporting events, as well as training for profiling individuals that attract special attention upon their entry into the sports facilities. With respect to the cooperation of private security agencies with other authorities, the cooperation with the police and the public order service is being enhanced. It is also possible to apply other measures aiming at effectively preventing and combating violence at sports events and reducing thus the harmful consequences, both of human and material nature.

4. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN SECURING SPORTS COMPETITIONS

In terms of the security at sports courts, there are various situations when security is needed, especially during games that are at high risk, as well as events where there is a risk of terrorist attacks, which has unfortunately occurred in the past. Therefore, it is necessary to have an effective system of securing and coordinating all relevant entities.

The attention and institutional reaction of every organization which addresses these problems appeared shortly after the incident on Heysel Stadium, Belgium, on 28 May 1985. The question that has not yet been answered is whether it was a hooligans clash or a security omission. Few months later, the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehavior at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches. (Petrevski, Stanojoska, 2014)

During the Olympic Games in London in 2012, numerous entities in the organization of the games were involved, including private security. There is not a universal rule for hiring personnel, but there are certain basic principles that must be understood and executed effectively. The organizers should be able to determine the risks, challenges and requirements associated with the involvement of private security companies in future major events.

There are currently many key factors that the organizing committees need to address to prevent these types of problems and successfully deliver a safe event, inter alia:

-Addressing the standard phases of a major event and understanding what are the requirements for each phase;
- Establishing a compact and complete Security Committee free of politics and vested interests;
- The quality of the private security resources should be ensured at all costs;

- Another crucial aspect is the planning and execution of a Testing Programme. (Tarbitt, 2012)

The budget for the 2012 London Olympics was £9.3 billion that included an extra £271 million to boost security. The introduction of thousands of security personnel and the implementation of the latest surveillance technology transformed parts of the city into enclaves specifically designed to prevent and mitigate security risks. Massive sports events such as the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games create new spaces that are both highly controlled and surveyed by the government and private authorities. Policing them is no longer confined to applying physical force, but includes high-tech forms of surveillance and new 'crowd control' techniques. However, in some cases managing security checkpoints and implementing the most advanced surveillance technologies is not sufficient. The crowd itself must be managed in such a way that it does not cause interference with the event. The use of 'fan zones' is a prime example of this. (Cherry, 2014)

With respect to this, during the Winter Olympics in Sochi the following actions were taken: using a network of thousands of video cameras; filtering keywords in communication through a free internet network; detailed physical examination of the visitors (even the history of the visitors was checked); using special passes; the use of satellite navigation systems GPS / Glonass; surveillance for the games including drones, reconnaissance robots, sonar systems and high-speed patrol boats; a computer system called Sorm was upgraded and operational to monitor all Internet and communication traffic by Sochi residents, visiting competitors and spectators during the Olympics in hopes of intercepting any sensitive information that could help to avoid any potential disruptions; and application of many other measures. (www.stratfor.com).

In order to educate competent staff and professionals, there are certain institutions that conduct training through certified programs to establish standardized competencies among individuals holding leadership positions in the sports security industry and to ensure that the most current techniques, strategies and solutions are used to mitigate the safety and security risks inherent to sports spectator venues. This certification focuses on advancing sports safety and security industry by addressing the competency requirements of the current security professionals and the professionals in law enforcement, emergency management, government, public safety, human resources, event management, etc. (www.ncs4.com).

5. CONCLUSION

The S.A.R.A. method can greatly assist in defining the specific security problems and finding adequate solutions to solve them. The application of this method will strengthen the analytical capacities of the staff in the practical field work, providing them with another tool of broad police instrument that could reduce the criminogenic hot spots and the emergence of new security problems.

This method can be successfully used to address any security issues, including the prevention and eradication of violence at sports courts. Therefore, it is necessary to train persons involved in securing events, including the members of the public order service, police and security agencies in the Republic of Macedonia.

One of the key factors for improving the situation in this area is the involvement of sports federations and fan groups in the overall process of securing sports competitions to create conditions for realization of the goals.

It is also necessary to analyze the legislation and modify or adapt it to the existing conditions in the country, as well as harmonize it with the other positive legislations in this area.

For successful securing of sports competitions on the field, efficient cooperation among all relevant entities is required without favoring one or marginalizing the other.

These and all other open and unsolved issues should be analyzed in the next period so they can offer adequate solutions to reduce the events associated with on-field vandalism and violence.

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