

ElGamal公钥密码体制简介

熊虎 电子科技大学



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ElGamal公钥加密体制原理

Diffie-Hellman密钥协商



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A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms

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Abstract - A new signature scheme is proposed, together with an implementation of the Diffie-Hellman key distribution scheme that achieves a public key cryptosystem. The security of both systems relies on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over finite fields.

I. Introduction

N 1976, Diffie and Hellman [3] introduced the concept of public key cryptography. Since then, several attempts factors, then computing discrete logarithms is easy (see [8]). have been made to find practical public key systems (see, for example, [6], [7], [9]) depending on the difficulty of where $0 \le m \le p-1$. First A chooses a number k unisolving some problems. For example, the Rives-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) system [9] depends on the difficulty of secret x₄ in the key distribution scheme. Then A computes factoring large integers. This paper presents systems that the "key" rely on the difficulty of computing logarithms over finite fields.

Section II shows a way to implement the public key distribution scheme introduced by Diffie and Hellman [3] to encrypt and decrypt messages. The security of this (c_1, c_2) , where system is equivalent to that of the distribution scheme. Section III introduces a new digital signature scheme that depends on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over finite fields. It is not yet proved that breaking the system is equivalent to computing discrete logarithms. Section IV develops some attacks on the signature scheme, none of which seems to break it. Section V gives some properties of the system. Section VI contains a conclusion and some remarks.

Hence both A and B are able to compute K_{AB} . But, for an intruder, computing K_{AB} appears to be difficult. It is not yet proved that breaking the system is equivalent to computing discrete logarithms. For more details refer to [3].

In any of the cryptographic systems based on discrete logarithms, p must be chosen such that p-1 has at least one large prime factor. If p-1 has only small prime

Now suppose that A wants to send B a message m, formly between 0 and p-1. Note that k will serve as the

$$K \equiv y_B^k \mod p$$
, (1)

where $y_p \equiv \alpha^{x_p} \mod p$ is either in a public file or is sent by B. The encrypted message (or ciphertext) is then the pair

$$c_1 = \alpha^k \mod p$$
 $c_2 = Km \mod p$ (2)

and K is computed in (1).

Note that the size of the ciphertext is double the size of the message. Also note that the multiplication operation in (2) can be replaced by any other invertible operation such as addition mod p:

The decryption operation splits into two parts. The first step is recovering K, which is easy for B since $K \equiv (\alpha^k)^{x_B}$ and we is known to D only. The second stan



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密钥生成:

p, 一个较大素数 g, Z_p^* 中的生成元 $\alpha \in Z_{p-1}, \beta = g^{\alpha} \mod p$ p, g, β 为公钥; α 为私钥

加密:

随机生成一个秘密数 k , $k \in \mathbb{Z}_{p-1}$ 。 E(x,k) = (r,s) ,其中 $r = g^k mod p$ $s = x\beta^k mod p$

解密: $D(r,s) = s(r^{\alpha})^{-1} mod \ p = xg^{\alpha k}g^{-\alpha k} mod \ p = xg^{\alpha k}g^{-\alpha k}$



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
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数字签名体制介绍



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ElGamal - 签名



密钥生成:与加密相同.

签名:

随机产生,密钥
$$k \in \mathbb{Z}_{p-1}^*$$
。
$$S(m,k) = (r,s), \quad \sharp + p$$

$$r = g^k mod \ p$$

$$s = (m-ra)k^{-1} mod(p-1)$$
 即 $(m=ra+sk)$

验证:

是否
$$\beta^r r^s \equiv g^m \pmod{p}$$
 ?

$$\beta^r r^s = g^{ar} g^{k(m-ra)k^{-1}} = g^{ar+(m-ra)} = g^m mod \ p$$



ElGamal - 签名



安全:

只有知道 α 可以签名的人,才能被 β 所证实。 从 β 求解 α ,或从r,m,p 求解s 为离散对数。 伪造的其他方式?未知。 相同的K不能重复使用。

变化:

许多变体,通过改变"签名方程",

$$m = ra + sk$$

例如, DSA的方式:

$$m = -ra + sk$$

验证:
$$\beta^r g^m \equiv r^s \pmod{p}$$
?($\equiv g^{m+ra}$)



Schnorr 签名



q|(p-1)为素数,而且, $g \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ 阶为q。

Schnorr 群: 在 Z_P^* 中,由g产生的子群,素数阶为q。

$$\langle g \rangle = \{1, g, g^2, \cdots, g^{q-1}\}$$

事实: q 可以比p短得多(例如:160 vs 1024比特),DLP在< g > 中的硬度保持不变。



Schnorr 签名



密钥生成:素数p,素数q|(p-1),而且 $g \in Z_p^*$,阶为q。哈希**FNC** $H:\{0,1\}^* \to Z_q$

密钥: $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ 是私钥; $\beta = (g^a mod p)$ 是公钥.

签字:(r,s) 其中

$$v = g^k mod \ p$$

$$r = H(M||V)$$

$$s = (k - ra) mod \ q$$

验证:

$$v' = g^s \beta^r mod \ p$$

$$r = H(M||v')?$$

优点:尺寸和复杂度降低



数字签名算法(DSA)



国家安全局设立美国政府的安全标准。

基于ElGamal & Schnorr:

无专利(ElGamal)

不能用来加密

异议:

ElGamal没有像RSA一样分析

较慢的验证

行业已经投资了RSA

闭门设计

