

Thank you Sponsors









About Fabian Bader






Cyber Security, Identity, Microsoft SIEM & XDR @ glueck=kanja

From

Hamburg, Germany

My Blog

cloudbrothers.info



Certifications

Microsoft MVP

Hobbies

Concerts, KQL, User Groups

Contact

Socials (BlueSky, Mastodon, Twitter)



Passkeys in Entra ID: Myth or reality







Thank you



Evolution of Authentication at Microsoft

2000 Active Directory -> Kerberos + Smartcards

2003 SecurID standardized

1961 2000

2011 MSO-DS

2012
Microsoft acquires
Phone Factor

2013 Azure AD GA

2011

2015

Windows Hello

2016

Microsoft Authenticator

2017

Phone sign-in

2015

2019 FIDO2 Support

2022

WHfB Cloud Kerberos Trust

2023

Native CBA in Entra ID TAP and FIDO2 in iOS

2019

2024

Passkey Support

- Entra ID
- Authenticator

FIDO2 on Android

GA @ Ignite 2024!

2024



Passwords PWless

Certificates


Phone-/Token based MFA

Passkeys!




What is a passkey

- A passkey is a FIDO2/WebAuthn Discoverable Credential
- "Discoverable Credential" means you don't have to enter your username
- Password-less
- Phishing resistant
- Based on cryptographic public and private keys






Synced vs. Device-bound passkeys



- Passkeys are synced by default
- Private key is sent to your provider
- Restore security is based on the account recovery mechanism of the provider
- Hard to track or secure for enterprises
- Backup to vendor or third-party passkey provider



Synced vs. Device-bound passkeys




- Native cross vendor sync is not yet possible
- Workarounds
 - Cross-Device Authentication
 - Third-party passkey provider
- The future
 - Credential Exchange Protocol (CXP)



Synced vs. Device-bound passkeys

- The private key cannot leave the device
- FIDO2 security keys are devicebound passkeys
- Microsoft Authenticator creates a device-bound passkey
- Recovery = New Setup





Microsofts current implementation
















Auth Funnel - Thanks @merill














Authentication Methods available

Authentication Methods allowed for the user Configured through Authentication Policies

Authentication methods registered by the user

Authentication methods the user must use Configured through authentication strengths






Authentication Methods allowed for the userConfigured through Authentication Policies

Define which Passkeys can be registered by your users






Quick Tipp








Authentication methods registered by the user





Authentication methods the user must use Configured through authentication strengths

Define which Passkeys can be used in specific situations



Auth Funnel - Thanks @merill














Authentication Methods available


Authentication Methods allowed for the user Configured through Authentication Policies


Authentication methods registered by the user


Authentication methods the user must use Configured through authentication strengths






































User experience Reality 14:25 TO




















What's happening here




- 530003
 Your device is required to be managed to access this resource.
- 50097
 Device authentication required











User experience Reality 18:34




User experience Reality 18:35 to






- Create a second, Conditional Access Policies for device compliance and approved apps
- Set target resources to only selectable apps
- Assign it to a specific "Passkey Onboarding" group
- Exclude this group from the regular Conditional Access Policies
- Use an access package with self service to add users to the "Passkeys Onboarding" group for one or two days.
 - Optional: Let the helpdesk delegate the access package for users in scope of your onboarding campaign




























































Cross Device

- Requires Bluetooth on both devices for proximity check
- Requires internet access
 - https://cable.ua5v.com (Android)
 - https://cable.auth.com (Apple)



FIDO:/08852177264574630425662919689802380521379 19748878851599699467519287713887017934854010709 2342336636303159168738737767290060661159865120 837177011010667266107096654083332



Passkey "support" matrix

	Management	Conditional Access	ВТ	Method	Attestation	Result
*	MAM	Compliant device: All resources		Same-Device	Yes/No	i
	MAM	Compliant device: All resources	*	Cross-Device	Yes	\odot
≥ €	MAM	Compliant device: All resources	*	Cross-Device	No	\odot
A	All	Approved apps: All resources		Same-Device	Yes/No	i
	MAM	Approved apps: All resources	*	Cross-Device	Yes	\odot
≥ €	MAM	Approved apps: All resources	*	Cross-Device	No	\odot
≥	Work Profile/MDM	Compliant device: All resources		Same-Device	Yes/No	\odot
É	All	n/a	*	Cross-Device	Yes	i

1. Credential key pair generated Attestion? AAGUID?

2. Sign public with attestation private key





Passkeys in Entra ID: Myth or reality

Passkeys are reality

• There are hurdles, a lot of hurdles


- Update to the latest OS version
 - On Android also update the Play Service
 Settings → About phone → Android version → Google play system update
 - On Android 14 the device vendor third party passkeys are optional
 - Not supported by e.g. Motorola, Fairphone, Oppo, Oneplus, Sony*

^{*}List based on forums entries and responses to social media outreach.



Android - How to check

adb shell pm has-feature android.software.credentials





- Use temporary access pass for passkey enrollment
- Use same device registration whenever if possible
- Windows Windows Hello for Business + Cloud Kerberos Trust
- Enable attestation to verify the passkey provider
- Allow phone sign-in as a backup
- Restrict security info registration to phishing resistant methods
- Enforce phishing resistance using Authentication Strength
- Every passkey is better than no passkey



But what about the recent Yubikey flaws?




Figure A.3: YubiKey 5C - Second Opening

In both cases however, the device needs to be re-packaged if the adversary wants to give it back to legitimate user without him noticing. We did not study further this issue.

Session Feedback









Thank you