Reviewer #3:

-Thank you very much for taking the time to provide such a detailed review, with these constructive suggestions. We have responded to all the comments with 1) changes to the paper and 2) clarifications. We hope that the revised paper matches to your expectation and is sufficient for publication.

It should be mentioned the difference of the expressive power between SACM and GSN. Authors just explained the transformation from SACM to GSN. I wonder that there are elements of SACM that are not be expressed in GSN.

-This is very accurate observation. For clarification, we have added a discussion in Section 2.3, to list the features included in SACM but not in GSN/CAE. Together with it, we added corresponding references to works that motivate these features.

Section 4 and 5 contains similar statements and diagrams. Authors should omit the redundant parts and briefly describe the main point

-Thank you very much, we have removed the redundant parts and kept the description of the elements minimal.

Although Section 7 introduced a tool named ACME, there was no evaluation of the tool. It is necessary to discuss the effectiveness of the tool.

It is meaningless to write what a tool can do.

-ACME is currently a work-in-progress. What we want to show in this section is what can be achieved with model-based assurance cases. For example, with model-based assurance cases, interoperability from GSN/CAE to SACM is enabled; automated validation to check the well-formedness of assurance cases, etc.

-ACME is the first step towards an integrated environment for model-based assurance cases with SACM, whilst providing backward-compatibility with existing approaches (GSN/CAE). We only briefly mention the tool, it would be another paper to discuss in detail ACME.

In conclusion, authors mentioned that SACM provides means of system assurance for Cyber-Physical Systems and IoT. However, there is no evidence of the claim in the paper. Especially, it should be clearly discussed on the meta model elements on SACM for runtime system assurance.

-We have changed Section 2.4 to briefly explain why model-based assurance cases are the key to assure Open Adaptive Systems (including Cyber-Physical Systems) at runtime.

We feel that detailed discussion on runtime assurance cases for Open Adaptive Systems would fit into another paper, therefore removed the references to CPS and IoT in the paper.