
Barriers to the
implementation of
k-anonymity and
related microdata
anonymization techniques
in a realworld application

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Abstract

ToDo: Abstract

1 Introduction

Nowadays data is a key factor in nearly every domain. It is comparable to the gold rush of the 19th. century [9]. Furthermore, storage space and network ability increasingly become affordable [11]. This is leading to the situation that the created and stored data is often not only useful to the original data holder, but to other researchers. Also, some data is only useful if its get shared with other data and get together analyzed. But those data may contain some personal or sensitive information. Such that the data should only get releases if the privacy is protected [7].

Table 1. Basic example

SSN	Age	Postcode	Problem
680-90-2665	25	4568	procrastination
008-07-4179	34	4567	stress
391-05-7998	48	4569	stomach cancer
078-36-3853	39	4568	obesity
411-71-9290	42	4561	stomach ulcers
527-59-1948	27	4568	stress

Data like in table 1 have to get anonymized before it gets released. A very common technique archive this goal is the so-called k-anonymity, which will prevent the possibility that information about the individual gets leaked. This paper will show the barriers to implementing k-anonymity. In Section 1 explains the mandatory basic to understand k-anonymity and its purpose. Section 2 will discuss the underlying barriers of k-anonymity. In Section 3 we will explain, possible attacks which also have to be considered as barriers for k-anonymity. Section 4 will show multiple algorithms to implement k-anonymity. A summary of the whole paper will be in the last section

2 Basics

In the following subsections basics will be explained.

Microdata: First of all, those data is containing records of information about individuals. The upside versus the more known summary or aggregate data is, that microdata is naturally flexible. Everyone who has this data can perform own statistics from that data [1].

Identifier: They are attributes which can identify the record owner explicitly without any other attribute. For example the full name (first name and last name), telephone number, social security number, and more [4].

Quasi-identifier: Even though explicit identifier got removed from published data (to anonymize the data). Attributes which non-explicitly identify the record owner are left. But if they get combined with other non-explicit attributes or other tables, they can reidentify the record owner. In such a case those combination of attributes are called quasi-identifier. For example Gender, Age, Postcode, weight and height [3]. Such process is shown in figure (the quasi-identifier would be the ZIP, birth date and sex) 1.




Fig. 1. Quasi-identifiers

Sensitive data: Data which is useful for example researchers but are too private and should not be known publicly nor be accessible for outsiders. This is the data which the record owner do not want to get linked to.[8].

Background-knowledge: Because its unknown what the attackers knows, we have to assume additionally to that he have access to table, the attackers knows that the table is generalized (to guarantee k-anonymity). Furthermore, the attacks is aware of the domain of the attributes.

Instance-level background knowledge: The adversary knows about specific details about his target. For example Alice (the adversary) knows that Bob do not suffer from a disease, because he does not show the symptoms. In this case Alice may can conclude what Bob is really suffers from.

Demographic background knowledge: The Adversary knows more general fact, for example $P(t[\text{condition}] = \text{cancer} \mid t[\text{Age}] \geq 40)$. With this information the attacker may use it to interference about records [8]

K-Anonymity: The goal of making a k-anonymized table, is to have at least (k-1) tuples of each identical tuple taking the corresponding quasi-identifiers into account [11, 7]. For example the 2-anonymized version of the table 1 in the introduction section would be the following table:

Table 2. Basic example 2-anonymized

SSN	Age	Postcode	Problem
*	2*	456*	stress
*	3*	456*	stress
*	4*	456*	stomach cancer
*	3*	456*	obesity
*	4*	456*	stomach ulcers
*	2*	456*	stress

Disclosure: There are two kinds, **identity disclosure** if this is happening an individual gets linked to a particular record. Because of that **attribute disclosure** may happens, this is if new information about an individual gets reveled. For example, Bob gets linked to his record in 2, because of some attack (see Section 3.3). The adversary learns that he is suffering from stress [11].

Equivalence class: Is a set of all tuples with the identical quasi-identifiers of a table [7].

Global recoding/domain generalisation: This generalization technique is very common, if a attribute value get generalized then all occourences of that value gets replaced by the generalized one [11, 10, 7, 6].

Local recoding: This coding strategies works differently from the above described one. Local recording generalizes attribute values in cells. Because of that

this strategies doesn't over generalize the table and the data distortion is significantly lower [7].

3 Underlying Barriers

In the following section, we will show the basic and most challenging barriers to the implementation of k-Anonymity. First, we will show the barrier which appears if you k-anonymize the data, the so-called **distortion** of data, in some papers it also mentioned as data loss.

3.1 Distortion of data as Barrier

A basic underlying barrier of k-anonymity is, how to measure if a implementation has been successful or leads to a satisfying result. This can be measured by a simple calculation. The **modification rate** is representing the fraction of cells which got modified within the attribute set of the quasi-identifier [7].

Table 3. a: original table, b: example for local recording, c: example for domain generalization

a			b			c		
Gender	Birthday	Problem	Gender	Birthday	Problem	Gender	Birthday	Problem
male	13.08.1962	stress	male	13.08.1962	stress	*	196*	stress
male	28.10.1967	obesity	male	28.10.1967	obesity	*	196*	obesity
male	20.01.1977	stress	*	197*	stress	*	197*	stress
female	15.09.1973	obesity	*	197*	obesity	*	197*	obesity
female	15.03.1985	stress	female	15.03.1985	stress	*	198*	stress
female	28.05.1986	obesity	female	28.05.1986	obesity	*	198*	obesity

Example: for table 3b, the modification rate is 33,33% (4 out of 12 quasi-identifier got changed) for table 3c: its is 100% (12 out of 12 quasi-identifier got changed). Like this simple example shows the modification rate calculation is a unsatisfying procedure. Because of that the **weighted hierarchical distance** got introduced by Li, Wong, Fu and Pei. To calculate the **weighted hierarchical distance** of a cell, which got generalized from level p to level q, following formula is used [7].

$$WHD(p, q) = \frac{\sum_{j=q+1}^p \omega_{j,j-1}}{\sum_{j=2}^h \omega_{j,j-1}} [7]$$

Let the hierarchy of birth date be {D/M/Y, M/Y, Y, 10Y, C/T/G/P, *}. Where D/M/Y would be day.month.year, 10Y a 10 years interval and C/T/G/R for Child/Teen/Grownup/Pensioner.

Example with uniformed weight $w_{j,j-1} = 1$ **where** $2 \leq j \leq h$ [7]: For the above example Birthday gets generalized from D/M/Y to 10Y, which corresponds into $WHD_{Birthday}(6, 3) = \frac{3}{5} = 0.6$. For the Gender generalization it would be $WHD_{gender}(2, 1) = \frac{1}{1} = 1$. Which means for generalize 5 cells of age from D/M/Y to 10Y one will have the same data distortion as if 3 cells of gender gets generalized from Male/Female to *. This calculation shows a much better way to address the distortion of data than the **modification rate** but it does not take how near a generalization is to the root (which would be *).

Example with height weight: $w_{j,j-1} = 1/(j-1)^\beta$ **where** $2 \leq j \leq h$ **and** $\beta = \mathbb{R} \geq 1$ [7]: β would be chosen by the user. For example $\beta = 1$. For $WHD_{Birthday}(6, 3) = \frac{0.33+0.25+0.20}{1+0.5+0.33+0.25+0.20} \sim 0.3431$. For $WHD_{gender}(2, 1) = \frac{1}{1} = 1$. The distortion of nearly 3 changed cell of birthday from D/M/Y to 10Y have the same amount as if one cell of gender, from Female/Male to *, gets generalized.

Conclusion Because research need the information out of the tables, like of the examples. Its very important that as less as necessary information gets lost during the anonymization process. To show the importance of this an additionally example, consider a table with survivor of a **idiom disaster beyond all expectations**. Researchers trying to find out the long-time effects of this disaster. Thats why the want to find out if victims get more likely to life a long and happy life if the live far away or close to the disasters location. If the data gets to much generalized by location its maybe useless for researchers to work with.

3.2 Attacks as Barrier

Furthermore, also attacks have to be considered as barriers to the implementation because if the implementation ignores the weaknesses which the attacks use, k-anonymity will be useless. It is absolutely necessary that an attacker, under no circumstances, can learn about whatsoever target if he is studying the published database. Not even if the attacker has background knowledge from any other sources [2]. Unfortunately like Dwork showed 2006 that such safety is impossible because of the impossibility to predict what the attacker may know. Therefore its important and necessary that the implementation takes possible attacks into account and implement countermeasures, but because attacks are not the main part of this paper it will be only a short introduction.

Homogeneity attack As an example, let Alice be the adversary and let be Bob her target. They are neighbors, someday Bob get transported with an ambulance to a hospital. Assume the hospital published the table 4, where all current patients with them Nationality, Age, ZIP, and Problem are listed, but this table got 4-anonymized before release. Alice knows that Bob is a 31 old, American who lives in ZIP Code 02239. She can conclude that either he is entry 3, 5,6, or 11.

Furthermore, all of these entry have the same Problem, Cancer. Alice can conclude Bob is suffering from Cancer even if the table the table got 4-anonymized [11, 8]. To counter such attacker **diversity** is needed [8]. Such method is the so-called l-diversity which will not discuss further in this paper.

Table 4. Homogeneity attack

	Nationality	Age	ZIP	Problem		Nationality	Age	ZIP	Problem
1	American	42	02135	Viral Infect	*		≥ 40	021**	Viral Infect
2	Japanese	41	02133	Hearth disease	*		≥ 40	021**	Hearth disease
3	Germany	38	02238	Hearth disease	*		3*	0223*	Cancer
4	Japanese	29	02139	Fever	*		≤ 30	021**	Fever
5	Indina	37	02232	Viral Infection	*		3*	0223*	Cancer
6	Native-american	34	02236	Cancer	*		3*	0223*	Cancer
7	Russia	53	02138	Viral Infection	*		≥ 40	021**	Viral Infection
8	China	23	02139	Cancer	*		≤ 30	021**	Cancer
9	American	23	02141	Short of breath	*		≤ 30	021**	Short of breath
10	Indian	46	02139	Viral Infection	*		≥ 40	021**	Viral Infection
11	American	31	02239	Vomiting	*		3*	0223*	Cancer
12	American	28	02130	Viral Infection	*		≤ 30	021**	Viral Infection

Background knowledge attack This attack uses the demographic background knowledge, which got explained in the basics, of an adversary. Assume Alice have a college, which gets also to the same hospital. This college is 32 years old, Japanese and has the ZIP 93607. Everyone with the same quasi-identifiers (Age = 3* and ZIP = 936**) have cancer or a heart disease. Because she knows that Japanese have a very low risk of a heart disease she concludes her college has cancer [8].

Table 5. Background Knowledge Attack

	ZIP	Code	Age	Disease		ZIP	Code	Age	Disease
1	93677		29	Liver Disease		936**		≤ 30	Liver Disease
2	93602		22	Liver Disease		936**		≤ 30	Liver Disease
3	93909		52	Cancer		9390*		≥ 40	Cancer
4	93906		47	Flu		9390*		≥ 40	Flu
5	93673		36	Heart Disease		936**		3*	Heart Disease
6	93607		32	Cancer		936**		3*	Cancer

Unsorted matching attack against k-anonymity This attack is based on the very common strategy to release two tables separately. For example, assume a two column weight table (a). This table gets separated into two tables (b, c). Table b will contain Age completely generalized but ZIP ungeneralized, table c will have Age ungeneralized but Zip Generalized. The adversary just will merge both tables and will get the table (a), and get access to sensitive information. This weakness can be fixed via random sorting. [11].

Table 6. My caption

a		b		c	
Age	ZIP	Age	ZIP	Age	ZIP
42	91058	*	91058	42	91050
44	91058	*	91058	44	91050
50	27785	*	27785	50	27780
52	27785	*	27785	52	27780
20	32105	*	32105	20	32100
21	32105	*	32105	21	32100
31	67676	*	67676	31	67670
32	67676	*	67676	32	67670

Conclusion After showing possible attacks on k-anonymity it should be clear that before implementation an application with k-anonymity, these attacks should be tested and the application should be secure against any possible attack.

3.3 NP Hard

Todo: why non polynomial problem?

4 Algorithm

This section will show some algorithms which goals is to archive k-anonymity through generalization.

4.1 The KACA Algorithm

This algorithm idea is to archive k-anonymity by clustering attribute hierarchical structures. The algorithm choose a random equivalent class, which is smaller than k. The next step is to form a larger equivalent class by merging the chosen one with the closest equivalent class. Which is resulting in a larger combined equivalent class. Through repeating this process the final result is that each

equivalent class consists of at least k tuples [7].

Algorithm 1: K-Anonymization by Clustering in Attribute hierarchies (KACA) [7]

```

1 form equivalence classes from the data set
2 while there exists an equivalence class of size  $< k$  do
3   | randomly choose an equivalence class  $C$  of size  $k$ 
4   | evaluate the pairwise distance of  $C$  and all other equivalence classes
5   | find the equivalence class  $C'$  with the smallest distance to  $C$ 
6   | generalise the equivalence classes  $C$  and  $C'$ 
7 end
```

This algorithm has a runtime of $O(n \log n + |E|^2)$. Li, Wong, Fu, and Pei have shown that their KACA-Algorithm is resulting in a 5.57 times smaller amount of distortion as the well known Incognito algorithm. The reason is lying in the technique which Incognito is using. Its a global recoding algorithm, which is resulting in a over-generalized table [7].

4.2 The OLA Algorithm

The OLA Algorithm works in 3 Steps that will now be explained.

1. For every generalization, strategy builds a binary search to find all k -anonymous nodes in the different strategies.
2. For every generalization strategy that includes k -anonymous nodes save the one with the least Information loss in the hole generalization strategy, this is referred to a local option k -anonymous solution.
3. Now compare the local optimum solutions to respect of the information loss. The one with the lowest Information loss of all local optimum solutions is the global optimum solution.

The most time-consuming operation is finding the all the K -anonymous notes with and compares them to each other with respect to their information loss. To get a better performance at the Programm step 1) the OLA algorithm works with Predictive Tagging that boost the process. This Tagging take advantage of 2 Theorems of the generalization Lattice. That every k -anonymous note in the same generalization lattice on high n . All notes above n and in the same generalization strategy are also k -anonymous. So the algorithm only has to find the first k -anonymous note in the strategy and tag all above as k -anonymous.

4.3 Cloaking Algorithm

Moving object data poses new challenges to a traditional database, data mining, and privacy-preserving technologies due to its unique characteristics: it is time-dependent, location-dependent, and is generated in large volumes of high-dimensional stream data. The following algorithm shows an example of privacy

production. The Cloaking Algorithm tries to produce Anonymity on location-based data for users of Location Based Services (LBS). The Cloaking Algorithm is installed on a location protection broker on a trusted server and anonymize messages which will afterward send the LBS. K-anonymity prevents such a privacy breach by ensuring that each individual record can only be released if there are at least $k - 1$ other (distinct) individuals whose associated records are indistinguishable from the former in terms of their quasi-identifier values. There are two possible attacks to get the identity of a sender of a message. At the Restricted Space Identification, the attacker A observes that message M is sent from location L afterward he gets the background knowledge that L belongs to someone specific. For example, if Mr. Bob the owner of a flat sends a message and the attacker observes this message. He can re-link the identity of Bob. Another Attack is Observation Identification. If A has observed the current location L of subject S and sends a message M from L then A learns that S has sent M. To prevent this leaking of information the cloaking algorithm works with Spatial Cloaking and Temporal Cloaking. Spatial Cloaking's goal is to increase the location of m in such a way that there are more messages in it. So that there is not only one message at a time in an area. Temporal Cloaking extends the sending time until more messages are in one area.

5 Summary

Like we saw in section OLA algorithm there are possibilities of choosing between different information loss metrics which all compute different values to the same k-anonymous node. So the implementer has to choose which one fits the most in his data. Different Metrics have pros and cons and have to be compared. Another problem with Information loss is that you can measure the information loss on your dataset but what would be more interesting is the information loss compared to upcoming data mining tool or machine learning application. The information loss metrics can't know which information is important for the upcoming data mining step. suppression can also harm the quality of the data and should be chosen wisely. The production of k-anonymity is NP-Hard which results in a difficult implementation in real-time applications like the Cloaking - Algorithm had shown. This Complexity can result in problems of finding an optimal solution in real-world data sets and can make a practical implementation difficult. High Dimensional Data like transaction data with more than thousand of attributes are in practice not capable to produce k-anonymity for all attributes. The reason for that is the so-called Curse of High Dimensionality which produces a metric space which is too large to produce k-anonymity solutions for all attributes. A Possibility is so called, bounded background knowledge that some attributes can't be used as a quasi-identifier because the effort of getting background knowledge which can be linked to the attributes is estimated too high. Like shown in chapter Attacks as Barrier attacks against k-anonymity are a threat for the anonymity of the user and can result in identity disclosure. There are solutions regarding these kinds of attacks we proposed in this paper. L-Diversity

and T-Closeness will help them. The cloaking algorithm shows a good example of the connection between anonymity and usability. The anonymization of the data reduces the usability of location-based services. Which comes from the construction of the Spatial cloaking and Temporal cloaking boxes to have enough messages to constrain them and let them be k -anonymous. The Software gives the option that a user of the client can decide how much usability he wants to sacrifice to get anonymity. So the user is at least under the control of how much utility he wants to give up.

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