

Homework 1

1a)  $m \cdot n$

1b) Each company  $c$  can make a pair with each applicant  $a$ , i.e.  $n$  companies can pair with  $m$  applicants. So, there are  $m \cdot n$  combinations of pairs.

2)

Exercise 1)

A perfect matching  $\mathbf{M}$  has every member  $c$  of  $\mathbf{C}$  and every member  $a$  of  $\mathbf{A}$  appearing in exactly one pair  $\mathbf{M}$ . There are  $n!$  perfect matchings because:  $a_1$  has  $n$  options of  $c$  to pair with,  $a_2$  has  $(n-1)$  options of  $c$  to pair with, ... until  $a_n$  has 1 option of  $c$  to pair with. Therefore there are  $n \cdot (n-1) \cdot (n-2) \cdot \dots \cdot 1$  perfect matchings, i.e.  $n!$  perfect matchings.

Exercise 2)

$$\mathbf{C} = \{c_1, c_2, c_3\}, \quad \mathbf{A} = \{a_1, a_2, a_3\}$$

Preference list for companies:

$$c_1 = [a_1, a_2, a_3] \quad c_2 = [a_2, a_3, a_1] \quad c_3 = [a_3, a_2, a_1]$$

Preference list for applicants

$$a_1 = [c_1, c_2, c_3] \quad a_2 = [c_2, c_3, c_1] \quad a_3 = [c_3, c_2, c_1]$$

Perfect matchings:

- 1)  $c_1a_1 \quad c_2a_2 \quad c_3a_3$
- 2)  $c_1a_1 \quad c_2a_3 \quad c_3a_2$
- 3)  $c_1a_2 \quad c_2a_3 \quad c_3a_1$
- 4)  $c_1a_2 \quad c_2a_1 \quad c_3a_3$
- 5)  $c_1a_3 \quad c_2a_1 \quad c_3a_2$
- 6)  $c_1a_3 \quad c_2a_2 \quad c_3a_1$

Stable matching:

$$c_1a_1 \quad c_2a_2 \quad c_3a_3$$

### Exercise 3)

Let  $M_1 = (c', a)$  which is a matching. There are 2 two options. If  $a$  prefers  $c'$  to  $c$ , so after an iteration,  $M_2 = M_1$ , so  $M_2$  is also a matching. Otherwise, if  $a$  prefers  $c$  to  $c'$ ,  $(c', a)$  is removed and  $(c, a)$  is added as part of the iteration.  $M_2$  is still a matching because the definition of a matching is still met where each member of  $\mathbf{C}$  and each member of  $\mathbf{A}$  appears in at most one pair in  $M_2$  since  $c'$  is removed from the set.

### Exercise 4)

The algorithm iterates so that every company offers an internship to every applicant. The final iteration will form a pair between the last  $c$  and the remaining  $a$ . The algorithm works by creating a perfect matching  $M$ , i.e. no companies and applications are free.

### Exercise 5)

Let the number of companies be  $n$  and the number of applicants be  $m$ . The input size would be  $n + m + 2mn$ .

3)

### Exercise 1)

```
For every element e (t1,..., tn),  
    If element equals 'exchange', 'escape', 'data', or 'stream',  
        Display word  
    endif  
endFor
```

Input size is  $n$ .

### Exercise 2)

The algorithm produces a sorted array because it appends the smaller element out of the two elements pointed by the two pointers in  $A$  and  $B$  onto the output array until one of the lists become empty. When one of the lists become empty, the rest of the other array is appended onto the output array. Since the algorithm compares the two elements and only outputs the smaller value until the next iteration, the output array is sorted.

### Exercise 3)

To correctly analyse the running time of an algorithm, we must look at the worst-case scenario. The worst case scenario for the Euclidean algorithm is when the inputs are two adjacent Fibonacci numbers. This is proven by Lamé's Theorem: "the Euclidean algorithm requires  $n$  steps when  $a = f_{n+2}$  and  $b = f_{n+1}$ ." Let  $T(a,b)$  be the number of steps, i.e. the time taken in the Euclidean algorithm, where  $a \geq b$ . When  $a = f_{10} = 55$  and  $b = f_9 = 34$ ,  $T(55,34) = 8$  steps. The iterations are:

$$55 = 34 * 1 + 21$$

$$34 = 21 * 1 + 13$$

$$21 = 13 * 1 + 8$$

$$13 = 8 * 1 + 5$$

$$8 = 5 * 1 + 3$$

$$5 = 3 * 1 + 2$$

$$3 = 2 * 1 + 1$$

$$2 = 1 * 2,$$

i.e. 8 steps.

### 4)

It is possible for all applicants to be unlucky if all the company's first choice of applicant has that company as their worst ranked company in their preference list.

For example, (3 applicants 3 companies):

Preference list for companies:

$$c_1 = [a_1, a_3, a_2] \quad c_2 = [a_2, a_1, a_3] \quad c_3 = [a_3, a_2, a_1]$$

Preference list for applicants:

$$a_1 = [c_3, c_2, c_1] \quad a_2 = [c_1, c_3, c_2] \quad a_3 = [c_2, c_1, c_3]$$

After three iterations, the stable matching is  $[c_1a_1 \quad c_2a_2 \quad c_3a_3]$ , and since there are no more free companies or applicants the algorithm ends. At this stage, the three applicants are all unlucky because the companies that they are matched with are respectively the worst ranked company in the applicant's preference list.

### 5)

True, the pair  $(c, x)$  belongs to  $M$ . If  $c$  ranks  $x$  highest and vice versa,  $x$  will always end up with  $c$ . If  $c$  makes  $x$  an internship offer,  $x$  will accept, and no other company can change the internship pair that  $x$  belongs to. If  $c'$  already has an internship pair with  $x$ ,  $x$  will leave that pair and pair up with  $c$ .