



Computer Security

PKCS #1

Hyounghick Kim

Department of Software

College of Software

Sungkyunkwan University

PKCS #1 v1.5

- Standard issued by RSA labs in 1993
- Idea: Add random padding
 - To encrypt m , choose random r
 - $C = [(r || m)^e \bmod N]$
- Issues:
 - No proof of CPA-security (unless m is very short)
 - Chosen-plaintext attacks are known if r is too short
 - Chosen-ciphertext attacks are known


PKCS #1 v2.0

- Optimal asymmetric encryption padding (OAEP) applied to message first
- This padding introduces redundancy, so that not every $c \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ is a valid ciphertext
 - Need to check for proper format upon decryption
 - Return error if not properly formatted
- RSA-OAEP can be proven CCA-secure under the RSA assumption, if G and H are modeled as random oracles

OAEP

- By Bellare & Rogaway, 1994; in RFC 2437

$$C = [(x|y)^e \bmod N]$$



OAEP looks like a kind of Feistel network.

RSA-OAEP operations

- Encryption with the plaintext m

1. $x \leftarrow m \parallel 0^{k_1} \oplus G(r)$

2. $y \leftarrow H(x) \oplus r$

3. $C = [(x \parallel y)^e \bmod N]$

- Decryption with the ciphertext c

1. $x \parallel y \leftarrow c^d \bmod N$ satisfying $|x| = n - k_0$, $|y| = k_0$

2. $u \leftarrow y \oplus H(x)$; $v \leftarrow x \oplus G(u)$ // $u = r$

3. Output m if $v = m \parallel 0^{k_1}$, else reject.

Questions?

