

point, they give the examples of causes like the one about milk, etc.<sup>231</sup>

- 9 From this point onwards we shall describe how Prakṛti and Puruṣa have similar and different essential properties (*dharma*).

Both are without beginning and both are without end; both both are permanent;<sup>232</sup> both are unsurpassed, both are without characteristics (*liṅga*) and both are omnipresent.<sup>233</sup>

But Prakṛti is single, unconscious, has three guṇas, is essentially a seed, is essentially creative and has the essential property of being in the middle.

The Puruṣas, meanwhile, are multiple and have consciousness. They do not have the guṇas, they are not essentially seeds, they are not essentially creative, and do not have the essential property of being in the middle.

- 10 Thus, on the assumption that an effect corresponds to its cause, all these particulars (*viśeṣa*), consisting of sattva rajas and tamas, come into being.

Some people argue that the Person actually consists of these particulars<sup>234</sup> because he is manifested by them and made out of them.<sup>235</sup>

231 I.e., the calf in the proximity of the cow causes the milk, in the same way that Prakṛti in the proximity of Puruṣa causes evolution. Ḍalhaṇa on 3.1.8 (Su 1938: 340) explained that the milk, even though it is unconscious (*ajñā*), comes forth (*pravartate*) (in the cow) for the purpose of nourishing a calf. Ḍalhaṇa also gave the example of a man's semen that is incognizant (*ajñā*) but is comes forth (*pravartate*) in the presence of erotic women, at a private party, for the purpose of the man's enjoyment. *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* 4.17 addressed the same issue with the simile of magnetism: the mind (*citta*) was likened to a piece of iron that is attracted by the magnet of sense objects (Āgāṣe and Āpaṭe 1904: 193, et passim).

232 This is an emended reading of the Nepalese witnesses, which both read अनित्यौ "impermanent." It is inconsistent and contextually incorrect to assert that Puruṣa is impermanent. The vulgate reads "permanent."

233 See discussion, p.88.

234 Ḍalhaṇa on 3.1.10 (Su 1938: 340) identifies these as the principles (*tattva*), beginning with महत्.

235 This opinion of "some people" represents a kind of materialist who thinks that the Person is also composed of prakṛti's components rather than being distinct and unitary. This is an outsider view as far as early Sāṅkhya is concerned.

On अञ्जन in the compound तदञ्जन "manifested by them," Kuiper (1953) noted the inadequacy of dictionary entries for derivatives of roots अञ्ज/अञ्ज, and described the root of the present word under no. 3 "show, manifest, mark, adorn, honour." See *ibid.*, §12, pp. 76–82.

- 11 In the Vedic tradition, however,<sup>236</sup>
- people with a wide perspective consider essential being (*sva-bhāva*), destiny, time, transformation (*pariṇāma*), the Lord, and chance (*yadṛcchā*) to be Prakṛti.<sup>237</sup>
- 12 One should teach that the elements (*bhūta*) that are **born from her** as specifically having her qualities.<sup>238</sup> From those, the entire group of living beings (*bhūtagrāma*) is generated, having their characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*).<sup>239</sup>
- 13–14 Its applicability (*upayoga*) is stated always with regard to medicine.<sup>240</sup> Therefore in therapeutics, no consideration is given beyond the elements. Because it is has been stated,
- [by saying ‘Puruṣa’] he has expressed that it originates from a collection of substances beginning with the elementss (*bhūta*).<sup>241</sup>

<sup>236</sup> The variant reading वैदिक, in witness N, probably would refer to the Vedic tradition, as it does generally in Sanskrit literature (MW: 1022). Witness H and the vulgate read वैद्यके “in the medical tradition.” The following statement listing different views about Prakṛti is not known elsewhere in medical literature, but is very close to the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* and *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 1.8, 9 (Karmarkar 1953: 3–4, 62).

<sup>237</sup> Ḍalhaṇa on 3.1.11 (Su 1938: 341–342) discussed whether these six entities were to be considered together or separately. Ḍalhaṇa seems to have accepted Jejjāṭa’s view that these are multiple philosophical views, but that physicians consider the ultimate cause to be Prakṛti. He also recorded Gayadāsa’s view that some thinkers believe that these causes cumulatively constitute Prakṛti. Cf. similar discussion in *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 1.1–2 (Olivelle 1998: 414–415).

<sup>238</sup> ततो “from her” refers to Prakṛti. Note that this phrase differs from the vulgate text, but was known and accepted by Gayadāsa.

<sup>239</sup> Ḍalhaṇa on 3.1.12 (Su 1938: 341) took “having their characteristics” as referring to the characteristics of the भूत “elements.”

<sup>240</sup> Ḍalhaṇa on 3.1.14 (Su 1938: 341–342) explained that “its” refers to discussion of the group of living beings, which starts with the five great elements (*mahābhūta*) (पञ्चमहा-भूतारब्ध).

<sup>241</sup> I.e., the “person” is the physical subject of medical science, deriving from the elements (*bhūta*), etc. The internal reference here is to *Suśrutasaṃhitā* 1.38 (Su 1938: 9). In this passage, the *Suśrutasaṃhitā* defined the human being (*puruṣa*) as a material creature made out of the five elements and the physical bodily parts and tissues.