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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2021 (expected)

Dissertation Committee: Raymond Fisman, Martin Fiszbein and Dilip Mookherjee

B.Sc., Mathematics and Economics (*First Class Honor*), Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong PRC, China, 2015

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Applied Microeconomics, Development Economics, Political Economy

WORKING PAPERS

“Readers vs Owner? What Drives U.S. Media Attention on China during the Sino-US Trade Conflict”, September 2020 (Job Market Paper)

“Checks and Balances: Media criticism in China”, September 2020

WORK IN PROGRESS

“The Value of International Allies” (joint with Giovanna Marcolongo)

“State Ownership and R&D Efficiency: Evidence from Chinese Public Firms” (joint with Yang Ming)

“Image of Countries: A Cross-National Comparison of Media Coverage during the Covid-19 Pandemic” (joint with Taosong Deng)

“Spillover Effects of Anti-Corruption Campaign in China” (joint with Xiangyu Feng)

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Dean’s List, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2013-2015

WORK EXPERIENCE

Co-organizer, Reporter and Editor, Boston University Alumni Association of China & Xtecher, 2017

Internship Analyst, BGI Group & UCLA & HKUST, 2013

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Fellow (Lab Instructor), Econometrics Analysis II, Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2020

Teaching Fellow (Lab Instructor), Intermediate Microeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2018

Teaching Fellow, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2018

Teaching Fellow, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2017

LANGUAGES

English (fluent), Mandarin (native), Cantonese (working knowledge)

COMPUTER SKILLS: R, Stata, Python, Matlab

CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS: China/F1

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Readers vs Owner? What Drives U.S. Media Attention on China during the Sino-US Trade Conflict (Job Market Paper)

In the past two years, the Sino-US relation has been through a volatile period due to trade conflicts. At the same time, there is extensive heterogeneity in the coverage on China by the U.S. media, both in terms of intensity and topics. What drives media attention on China as the U.S.'s diplomatic relation with her changes? In this paper, I use President Donald Trump's tweets as indicators of diplomatic relation changes, and I use the coverage by local daily newspapers to separate the effects from the demand (the readers') side and the supply (the owner's) side. I find that on average, a local newspaper's coverage on human rights and ideological issues of China responds to the President's tweets, and the response is driven by its owner's political leaning. The more democratic-leaning (republican-leaning) its owner is, the more a paper covers human rights and ideological issues when Sino-US relationship gets better (worse). On the other hand, such pattern is barely true for the coverage on the trade conflict itself. In contrast, the average political preference of newspapers' readers has little consistent effect. My study sheds light on the potential concerns of media independence in the United States when it comes to coverage on foreign countries.

Checks and Balances: Media Criticism in China

I study how political competition among provincial officials affects media criticism in China. I collect news reports by local mouthpiece outlets that criticize the provincial governments from 2004 to 2017. By exploiting the randomness of the pairing of the provincial governor and secretary, I prove that higher competition induces more criticism. I find that if a pair is assigned such that their promotion periods overlap, then during the overlapped period it is more likely to observe critical reports. I construct a model to illustrate how competition can be generated by promotion pressure. Intuitively, when both officials go through promotion examination, the economic signal from each individual cannot be observed separately, and media coverage serves as an additional signal to reveal their types.