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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston, MA, August 2021 (expected)

Dissertation Committee: Raymond Fisman, Martin Fiszbein and Dilip Mookherjee

B.Sc., Mathematics and Economics (*First Class Honor*), Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China, 2015

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Applied Microeconomics, Development Economics, Political Economy

WORKING PAPERS

“Readers vs Owner? What Drives Media Slant on China during the Sino-US Trade Conflict”, September 2020 (Job Market Paper)

“Checks and Balances: Media criticism in China”, September 2020

WORK IN PROGRESS

“The Value of International Allies” (joint with Giovanna Marcolongo)

“State Ownership and R&D Efficiency: Evidence from Chinese Public Firms” (joint with Yang Ming)

“Image of Countries: A Cross-National Comparison of Media Coverage during the Covid-19 Pandemic” (joint with Taosong Deng)

“Spillover Effects of Anti-Corruption Campaign in China” (joint with Xiangyu Feng)

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Dean’s List, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2013-2015

WORK EXPERIENCE

Co-organizer, Reporter and Editor, Boston University Alumni Association of China & Xtecher, 2017

Internship Analyst, BGI Group & UCLA & HKUST, 2013

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Fellow (Lab Instructor), Econometrics Analysis II, Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2020

Teaching Fellow (Lab Instructor), Intermediate Microeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2018

Teaching Fellow, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2018

Teaching Fellow, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2017

LANGUAGES

English (fluent), Mandarin (native), Cantonese (working knowledge)

COMPUTER SKILLS: R, Stata, Python, Matlab

CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS: China/F1

REFERENCES**Professor Raymond
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Readers vs Owner? What Drives U.S. Media Attention on China during the Sino-US Trade Conflict (Job Market Paper)

In this paper, I study how politics color the U.S. media's reporting on China using President Donald Trump's tweets as shocks to Sino-U.S. relations during the period of time of volatile relations over the past two years. By comparing coverage across local daily newspapers, I separate coverage motivated by readers' (i.e., demand) versus owners' (i.e., supply) interests. I find that coverage of human rights practices and political ideology in China respond to Trump's tweets on average, and that the responsiveness is driven by its owner's (rather than readers') political leaning. More Democratic-leaning owners cover human rights issues more when Trump tweets positive messages on China, relative to Republican-leaning owners, and vice versa. I observe no consistent effect of newspaper readers' political preference on post-tweet coverage of these issues. In contrast, I observe no such pattern for the coverage on the trade conflict itself, suggesting that the owners' effect on China's human rights and ideology coverage may not be driven by their opinions on China's trade practices, and is rather driven by alignment with President Trump.

Checks and Balances: Media Criticism in China

I study how political competition among provincial officials affects media criticism in China. I collect news reports by local mouthpiece outlets that criticize the provincial governments from 2004 to 2017. By exploiting the randomness of the pairing of the provincial governor and secretary, I prove that higher competition induces more criticism. I find that if a pair is assigned such that their promotion periods overlap, then during the overlapped period it is more likely to observe critical reports. I construct a model to illustrate how competition can be generated by promotion pressure. Intuitively, when both officials go through promotion examination, the economic signal from each individual cannot be observed separately, and media coverage serves as an additional signal to reveal their types.