

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG DOMAINS

- The domains with more constraints are also less understood
- Software is in math domain
 - Amazon negative quantity bug
- The domain specific constraints have to be encoded or considered in the software

5

CHALLENGE

- Impossible to list the constraints explicitly
- How to effectively communicate with domain experts?

6

“THE EXPERT”

Our company has a new strategic initiative to increase market penetration, maximise brand loyalty, and enhance intangible assets.

0:00 / 7:34

7

ANGRY, RIGHT?

- People look stupid in the video because the constraints in their field are known to everyone
- What if we change the subject to medical?
- We will all experience some of the roles in this video at some time...

8



CS 233

SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION FOR MEDICAL CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

智能医疗仪器软件的设计与验证

9



MEDICAL DEVICES

FDA Definition:

An instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including a component part, or accessory which is: recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States Pharmacopoeia, or any supplement to them, intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals, and which does not achieve any of its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of any of its primary intended purposes.

10



MEDICAL DEVICE CLASSIFICATIONS




- Classified according to its risk
 - Class 1: present minimal potential harm to the user
 - i.e. Elastic bandages, dental floss
 - Class 2: more complex with higher risk
 - i.e. pregnancy testing kits and powered wheelchairs
 - Class 3: present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury to the patient
 - i.e. replacement heart valves, implantable pacemakers

11




MEDICAL CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS



12



 **CHALLENGES FOR MEDICAL CPS**



- Variability
 - Everyone is different
 - Infeasible to consider all possible situations during development

- Low observability
 - Less invasiveness
 - More ambiguities

13






CS 233
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 **SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS**



- Requirements
 - i.e. the vehicle should not crash with any other objects

- Specifications
 - i.e. when the vehicle detects an object on its path, apply brake

- Implementation




15

 **PHYSIOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS**







- Does the device always deliver therapy when needed?
- Does the device always not deliver therapy when unnecessary?
- Behavior Coverage
- Physiological Context

16



*Let the models catch the bugs
before the patients do*

20





PHASE 2: DEVELOP PACEMAKER SOFTWARE MODELS

- Learn the general principles of pacemaker algorithms
- Develop pacemaker models using existing pacemaker specifications
 - Extra credit: creative improvements on existing specifications
- Simulate the pacemaker model with heart models

25



MID-TERM EXAM

26



PHASE 3: MODEL-BASED SOFTWARE VALIDATION

- Model-based testing of pacemaker algorithm
- Model checking of pacemaker model
 - How to use the heart models to cover all possible heart conditions that a pacemaker may encounter?
 - How to interpret the counter-examples?
 - Valid vs. invalid
 - Appropriate vs. inappropriate
- How to maintain traceability from model to code?

27



PHASE 4: MEDICAL DEVICE CERTIFICATION

- Why do we need certification?
- What is considered as sufficient evidence?
- How to organize evidence into a convincing argument?

28

 **FINAL PRESENTATION & REPORT**



- I will serve as medical expert and regulator
- You need to demonstrate that your pacemaker algorithm is safe and effective
- In ENGLISH!

29

 **WHAT YOU WILL LEARN DURING THIS COURSE**



- State of the art software development and validation
- Experience the whole software life cycle
- Limitations of different techniques



- Modeling methodologies
- Validation techniques
- Effective communication

30

 **WHAT ARE REAL-WORLD PROBLEMS?**



- There are no perfect solutions!
 - There are trade-offs
 - Game among stakeholders
 - There are legacy solutions
 - Improve on existing solutions rather than starting from scratch

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 **SYSTEM ENGINEERING**



- 1 million settlers on mars



Elon Musk

	Founded	Status	Valuation or market cap	Industry
SPACEX	2002	Private	\$25B	Aerospace
TESLA	2003	Public	\$49B	Electric vehicles
NEURALINK	2016	Private	\$47M	Neurotechnology
THE BORING COMPANY	2016	Private	Unknown	Tunnel infrastructure

 PitchBook

32



SPACEX

- Reduce the transportation cost per person from 10 billion dollars to 200 thousands dollars (1/50,000)
 - Recycle the rockets
 - Fuel the spaceship in orbit
 - Produce fuel on mars

33



35



LOGISTICS

- Homework: 4*10%
- Midterm: 20%
- Final Presentation: 40%
- Office hour: TBD



35



THE POWER OF INTER-DISCIPLINARY

- If you want something extraordinary, you have two paths:
 1. Become the best at one specific thing.
 2. Become very good (top 25%) at two or more things.



Scott Adams



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READING MATERIAL

- Electrical activities of the heart (35 pg)

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LECTURE 2: CARDIAC ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY

1



ANNOUNCEMENT

- Piazza:
<https://piazza.com/shanghaitech.edu.cn/fall2019/cs233>
- Office hour
– Wed 5pm-6pm, 2-302A, starting next week.
- TA: Guangyao Chen
– Office hour: Fri 5pm-6pm, 1B-101, starting next week.
– chengy2@shanghaitech.edu.cn

2



TERMINOLOGIES



For our interest in medical device software in this text, let us focus on the first sentence. The FDA is responsible for “assuring the safety, efficacy, and security” of medical devices. To expand slightly on this, the FDA’s responsibility is to assure:

- **Efficacy:** The device is effective in achieving the claims that are made for its intended and expected use;
- **Safety:** The device does not expose the patient, user, or other bystanders to undue risk from its use;
- **Security:** The device has been designed to protect patients, users, and bystanders from both unintentional and malicious misuse of the device.

3



WHAT DO WE WANT THE DEVICE TO ACHIEVE?

- Let’s define $V(H)$ as the quantification of how good the heart condition H is.
- We want to achieve: for all heart conditions H :

$$V(H + \text{device}) \geq V(H)$$
 - Efficacy: For “intended use”, improve the heart condition as intended
 - Safety: For other heart conditions, don’t make it worse!
- In this lecture, we want to identify the function $V()$

4

HEART ANATOMY

- 4 heart chambers

Right Atria

Left Atria

Ventricles

FROM DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

- Different level of abstractions
- Serve different purposes

(a) Anatomy

(b) Blood Flow

(c) Electrophysiology

(d) Electro-mechanical

6

TISSUE TYPES

- Pacemaker Tissue
 - Periodically self depolarizes
- Muscle Tissue (Myocardium)
 - Triggered depolarization
 - By nearby tissue
 - By external voltage

Ion Conductances

mV

SA Node

Ion Conductances

mV

7

REFRACTORY PERIODS

Heart tissue

(a) Activation $\rightarrow V_{out}$

Refractory

(b) Time

Rest t0 ERP t1 RRP t2 Rest t3

(c1) ERP

(c2) RRP

(c3) Rest

- ERP: Effective Refractory Period
- RRP: Relative Refractory Period
- A cell needs to “recover” before it can be depolarized again
- A cell can be partially depolarized
 - Shortened ERP
 - Increased conduction delay

2

CONDUCTION OF ELECTRICAL SIGNALS

- Cells are connected via gap junctions etc
- Once the current exceed the activation threshold, the cell is activated

Activation Threshold

9

UNI-DIRECTIONAL BLOCKS

A wave front propagates into the wide end of an asymmetric pathway

10

ELECTRICAL CONDUCTION SYSTEM OF THE HEART

- Muscles have slow conduction velocity
- AV node has very long delay
- Purkinje fibers has fast conduction velocity to ensure simultaneous ventricular muscle contractions

SA Node
Atrial Muscle (~0.5 m/sec)
AV Node (~0.05 m/sec)
Bundle of His (~2 m/sec)
Left & Right Bundle Branches (~2 m/sec)
Purkinje Fibers (~4 m/sec)
RV
LA
LV
Ventricular Muscle (~0.5 m/sec)

11

OTHER PACEMAKER TISSUE

- In normal heart, electrical signal generation is dominated by the SA node
- Other tissue is depolarized by signals from the SA node before they self-depolarize
- There are exceptions


Cardiac Pacing Cells
SA NODE (60-100 bpm)
RIGHT ATRIUM
AV NODE (40-60 bpm)
LEFT ATRIUM
COMMON BUNDLE OF HIS
PURKINJE FIBERS (20-40 bpm)
RIGHT VENTRICLE
LEFT VENTRICLE
LEFT AND RIGHT BUNDLE BRANCHES

12




IMPULSE FORMATION

- Natural pacemaker: Periodically generates electrical impulses to initialize heart beats




DELAY AT AV NODE

- Delay at AV node which allows the ventricles to fill fully




ATRIAL CONTRACTION

- An impulse first triggers muscle contractions in the atria, pushing blood into the ventricles




VENTRICULAR CONTRACTION

- Strong muscle contractions pump blood out of the heart






NORMAL SINUS RHYTHM



- Electrical activities originate from the SA node
- The heart rate is around 60-100bpm, which is sufficient during resting



17



KEY PHYSIOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS

- Ventricular rate
 - In order to satisfy the minimum blood/oxygen demand
- Synchrony
 - Maintain efficient blood flow
 - A-V synchrony
 - V-V synchrony
 - Local synchrony

18



CARDIAC ARRHYTHMIA




- Bradycardia
 - Inadequate heart rate
 - Symptom: Dizziness, faint
 - Pacemakers are designed to treat Bradycardia
- Tachycardia
 - Excessive heart rate
 - Symptom: Palpitation, shortness of breath, chest pain
 - Pacemaker should not further increase the heart rate

19



BRADYCARDIA

- Slow generation
 - Slow atrial and ventricular rate
- Delayed conduction
 - Affecting synchrony
- Blocked conduction
 - Missed ventricular contractions



20



MECHANISMS FOR TACHYCARDIA



- Focal
 - Some tissue other than the SA node generates fast electrical events
- Reentry
 - Self-sustained electrical activations circling within an electrical circuit



21




SVT: ATRIAL FLUTTER



22





VT: CASE 1







23



VT: CASE 2




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
MECHANISM: REENTRY TACHYCARDIA

- Retrograde conduction through fast pathway creating echo beat



MECHANISM: REENTRY TACHYCARDIA

- Reentry induced and maintain high atrial and ventricle rate





REENTRY MECHANISM: DIFFERENCE IN REFRACTORY PERIOD



31




REENTRY INDUCTION IN SLOW MOTION



 **FIBRILLATION**




- Reentry without anatomical pathways
- The location of the “circuit” can change over time



33

 **FIBRILLATION IN ANOTHER DOMAIN**

IMAGERY COURTESY: CIMSS/SSEC
29 JUL 2005 - 11:12 AM - 01:15 UTC

34

 **FIBRILLATION**



- Multiple moving centers



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 **TACHYCARDIA**




- SupraVentricular Tachycardia (SVT)
 - Fast electrical signals originate from above the ventricles
 - Not fatal, but may develop into more serious conditions
- Ventricular Tachycardia
 - Fast electrical signals originate from the ventricles
 - Fatal, can cause death in minutes

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 **VENTRICULAR TACHYCARDIA**




Ventricular Tachycardia
Regularly irregular



→


Ventricular Fibrillation
Irregularly irregular




→ Death

37


 **WHY SVT IS NOT FATAL?**



 **WHY SVT IS NOT FATAL?**




 **WHY SVT IS NOT FATAL?**







WHY SVT IS NOT FATAL?




WHY SVT IS NOT FATAL?



WHY SVT IS NOT FATAL?




WHY SVT IS NOT FATAL?






WHY SVT IS NOT FATAL?



WHY SVT IS NOT FATAL?



WHY SVT IS NOT FATAL?



- The AV node can block some very fast electrical events
- The ventricles still maintain coordinated contractions

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THE V(H) FUNCTION



- Roughly
 - NSR > SVT ~= Bradycardia > VT > VF

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 **DIAGNOSING ARRHYTHMIA**


- Electrocardiogram (ECG) (EKG)
- Electrophysiological (EP) Testing



49


 **ELECTROCARDIOGRAM (ECG)**

- 12-lead ECG monitors how electrical activities in the heart map to different vectors
- The most commonly used ECG signal is Lead II



50


 **HOW LOCAL ELECTRICAL ACTIVITIES MAP TO ECG SIGNAL**



51

 **DIAGNOSING COMMON ARRHYTHMIA USING ECG**

- Cannot tell exactly where the anomalies like reentry circuits are



52

ELECTROGRAM (EGM)

- Approaching and departing of electrical waves
- Unipolar EGM are subjected to far-field noise
- Bi-polar EGM can
 - Cancel far-field noise to a large degree
 - Determine the direction of the activation wave

53

EGM MORPHOLOGY WITH DIFFERENT CATHETER POSE

54

ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL (EP) TESTING

Ablation Panel

ELECTROGRAM (EGM) SIGNALS

CS
HRA
HIS
RVA


I
II
III
aVR
aVL
aVF
V1
V2
V3
V4
V5
V6
aVF

14





ELECTROGRAM ANNOTATION

- Event type & origin
- Delays between events




BASELINE NSR ELECTROGRAM ANNOTATION




DIAGNOSING ARRHYTHMIA

- Electrocardiogram (ECG) (EKG)
 - Global view of the electrical activities
 - Difficult to map to local anomalies (Inverse problem)
- Electrophysiological (EP) Testing
 - Monitors local electrical activities
 - The number of locations that can be monitored at the same time is limited

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ABLATION: TREATING TACHYCARDIA



60

ABALATION: TREATING TACHYCARDIA

This will fail as the ablation catheter is at a part of the circuit which is irrelevant

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ELECTROGRAM (EGM) SIGNALS

- Pacemaker leads sense voltage changes corresponding to electrical activities

Pacemaker

ATRIAL SENSING (AS)

- Generate sensed event when signal above threshold

Pacemaker

VENTRICULAR SENSE (VS)

- Same for ventricular channel

Pacemaker

V-A DEADLINE & ATRIAL PACING (AP)

• Pace atrium when no AS within deadline (track ventricular event)

A-V DEADLINE AND VENTRICULAR PACING (VP)

• Pace ventricle if no VS happen within deadline (track atrial event)

MAINTAIN MINIMUM HEART RATE

• Maximum interval between two ventricular events ($\max(V-A) + \max(A-V)$)

NEXT LECTURE

- How to collect more information via EP study?
- What is a good model for an application?

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READING MATERIAL



- R2: EP Study Basics
- R3: Mathematical modeling (by Mette Sofie Olufsen)
- For heart simulations and tutorials you can check:
 - <http://www.visibleep.com>





LECTURE 3: EP TESTING AND MODELING BASICS

1



WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THIS EGM?



HOW TO GET NEW INFORMATION?

- Passive observations provide us very little information
- What if we would like to know
 - The ERP of certain tissue
 - Are there additional pathways?
 - Where electrical events can be blocked along a pathway

3



REFRACTORY PERIODS




- ERP: Effective Refractory Period
- RRP: Relative Refractory Period
- A cell needs to “recover” before it can be depolarized again
- A cell can be partially depolarized
 - Shortened ERP
 - Increased conduction delay

The logo of ShanghaiTech University is a circular seal. The outer ring contains the university's name in Chinese characters: 上海科技大学. The inner circle features a stylized building or tower design, with the year 2013 at the bottom.

WENCKEBACH AV BLOCK


- A: Each pacing event provides the same information
 - B: AV_ERP+RRP>350ms
 - AV_ERP<350



The logo of ShanghaiTech University is a circular emblem. It features a central figure resembling a stylized 'T' or a ladder, with vertical bars extending upwards and horizontal bars connecting them. The entire emblem is enclosed within a circular border. The border contains the university's name in both Chinese characters (上海科技大学) and English (SHANGHAI TECH UNIVERSITY) in a stylized font.

WENCKEBACH AV BLOCK (SIMULATION

- Gradually increased conduction delay and ERP result in blocked A-V conduction



EXTRASTIMULI

- Stabilize the heart to a known state
 - A sequence of pacing stimuli with long cycle length (S1)
 - Faster than intrinsic heart rate, but shorter than most ERP+RRP
 - A quick pacing stimulus with short cycle length (S2)








7

The logo of ShanghaiTech University is a circular seal. The outer ring contains the university's name in Chinese, "上海科技大学", and English, "SHANGHAI TECH UNIVERSITY". Inside the ring is a stylized torch or cross symbol.

EXTRASTIMULI FROM HRA

- Gradually decrease the cycle length of S2
 - A: $\text{AV_ERP} + \text{RRP} >= 475$
 - B: $\text{AV_ERP} < 340$
 - C: $\text{AV_ERP} < 280, \text{SA_ERP} + \text{RRP} > 190$
 - D: $190 < \text{AV_ERP} < 280, \text{SA_ERP} + \text{RRP} > 190$
 - E: $\text{SA_ERP} > 160$







MODELING CARDIAC ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY



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WHY DO WE NEED MODELS?



- Prediction
 - We know the low-level mechanisms but we want to understand how they affect higher-level behaviors
 - Use simulation instead of testing on the real system
- Explain the data
 - Make assumptions and use our knowledge to explain mechanisms that we don't understand
- Classification
 - i.e. definitions, machine learning algorithms

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WHAT ARE MODELS?



- A system: (S, I, T, O)
 - S : States $s_1, s_2 \dots s_n$
 - I : Inputs (could be \emptyset)
 - T : Transitions $S \times I \times S$
 - O : Observations $f(S_o), S_o \subseteq S$
- Model of the system (S^m, I^m, T^m)
 - S^m : Abstraction/interpolation of S
 - Much fewer state variables
 - I^m : abstraction of I (could be \emptyset)
 - T^m : Transitions $S^m \times I^m \times S^m$


15



ABSTRACTION – REMOVAL OF STATE VARIABLES



- States (s_x, s_y, s_z) are abstracted to (s_y^{m1}, s_z^{m1})
 - $(s_x, s_y, s_z) \rightarrow (s_y^{m1}, s_z^{m1})$
- Loss of information




Chernin Entertainment

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ABSTRACTION: APPROXIMATION OF STATE VARIABLE VALUES



- Irrational numbers
 - $\pi \approx 3.1415$
 - $\sqrt{2} \approx 1.414$
- Approximation is another way of abstraction




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INTERPOLATION: EXTRACTING INTERPRETABLE INFORMATION




- Locational information \rightarrow topological information
- $S^m = f(S_p), S_p \subseteq S$



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MORE INTERPOLATION: LONDON MTR



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WHAT IS CONSIDERED AS A “GOOD” MODEL?



- Accuracy
 - All models are wrong!
 - Error accumulates over time
 - Initial condition of the model cannot be determined due to limited observability
- Generality
 - The capability to explain not only training data, but also testing data
- Identifiability
 - Model parameters can be identified from data
- Interpretability
 - S^m are meaningful and interpretable by human

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
NEWTON VS. EINSTEIN



- Newtonian physics is suitable for macro level objects at low speed
- $$L = L_0 \sqrt{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}$$
- A model can only be “good” within the context of its designated application
- The definition of “goodness” is changing over time

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MODELING METHODOLOGIES




- Bottom-up modeling
 - “White-box” model
 - Using first principles
 - Pros:
 - Interpretable
 - Convincing
 - Cons:
 - State space explosion
 - Difficult to be general
 - Low identifiability
- Data driven models (i.e. Neural networks)
 - “Black-box” model
 - From observable data
 - Pros:
 - No need to know domain knowledge
 - Cons:
 - Large and uninterpretable S^m
 - Depends highly on the quality and quantity of data

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IMPLANTABLE PACEMAKER



- Maximum interval between two ventricular events ($\max(V-A) + \max(A-V)$)



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PHYSIOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS



- Does the device always deliver therapy when needed?
- Does the device always not deliver therapy when unnecessary?
- Behavior Coverage (Generality)
- Physiological Context (Interpretability)

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EXISTING HEART MODELS

- Researchers created heart models from different perspectives
- Only electrophysiological model is suitable for pacemaker evaluation

(a) Anatomy (b) Blood Flow (c) Electrophysiology (d) Electro-mechanical

Whole heart modeling

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WHOLE HEART ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL MODEL

- Too complex with unnecessary details
- Infeasible to identify parameters from data

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ELECTROGRAM (EGM)





- Fixed locations
- Bi-polar EGM
 - Cancel far-field noise to a large degree
 - Lose local action potential information





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


STATE EQUIVALENCE

- From the pacemaker perspective, a reentry circuit is equivalent to a node firing electrical events at high frequency

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- HOW GOOD IS OUR MODEL?**
-
- Accuracy
 - Condition-level accuracy vs. patient-level accuracy
 - Generality
 - Can be used for modeling a large number of arrhythmia
 - Identifiability
 - Compatible with existing EP testing techniques
 - Classification
 - Capable of distinguishing different arrhythmia
- 40



READING MATERIAL



- R4: Pacemaker introduction
- <https://matlabacademy.mathworks.com/>

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HW 1 OUT

- Due on Mon Sep 30th, at the end of the day
- Please use Matlab R2019a or higher

10/27/2019

1



HOMEWORK POLICY

- Homework should be done individually!!!
- Submit on Blackboard
- Deadline: 23:59 of specified date. (okay if submitted within 15min after)
- Late Policy: Late homework submission will receive penalties.
 - Homework submitted 72hr after the deadline will get 0 pt.
 - Every 24hr after the deadline, the grade will have a 20% penalty.
 - i.e. if you gained 8/10 points in a homework, with 1 day late submission you will only gain 6.4/10 points.
- Late pass:
 - Each student is given a "Late pass" which can be used ONCE on a homework submission. The late pass extends ONE homework deadline for 24hr, but remember you will still receive penalties if you miss the Extended deadline.

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LECTURE 6: RISK MANAGEMENT

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3



WHAT IS RISK MANAGEMENT?

- There are undesired situations that we don't want to be in
 - i.e. an order was missed and the customer was not happy
- What can lead to those undesired situations?
- Can we avoid these undesired situations?
- If not, can we reduce potential damage?


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4



TERMINOLOGIES

- Harm/impact: Loss when running the system in certain situations
 - Financial/time loss
 - Life/health loss
- Hazard: A potential source of harm
- Hazardous situation: circumstance in which people or property are exposed to one or more hazard(s).
- Risk: Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm



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TYPES OF RISKS

- **Efficacy risk:** The system fails to do what it was intended to do
- **Safety risk:** People & properties may be harmed under normal use of the system
- **Security risk:** The system is prone to unintentional and malicious misuse which can cause harm


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EXAMPLE: INFUSION PUMP

- Deliver drug with programmed dosage
- Hazard: Pump won't stop
- Hazardous situation: over-delivery of drug
- Sequence of events:
 1. Unexpected user programming sequence
 2. Corrupted limit value
 3. Pump runs beyond programmed limit
- Harm:
 1. Discomfort
 2. Tissue/organ damage
 3. Death



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EXAMPLE: PILOTING AN AIRCRAFT

- Hazard: Pilot fatigue
- Hazardous situation: aircraft control lost/delayed
- Sequence of events:
 1. Pilot did not sleep well last night
 2. Pilot forgot to lower the landing gear before landing
 3. Aircraft landed without landing gear down
- Harm:
 1. Aircraft severely damaged
 2. Crash



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
 **RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS**



1. Risk analysis
 - Analyze the frequency and severity of harms
2. Risk evaluation
 - Determine what is acceptable risk
3. Risk control
 - How to prevent hazard and/or reduce harm?
4. Residual risk acceptability
 - Are there new risks introduced by control measures?

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 **RISK ANALYSIS**



- Hazard: Pump won't stop
- Hazardous situation: over delivery of drug
- Sequence of events:
 1. Unexpected user programming sequence
 2. Corrupted limit value
 3. Pump runs beyond programmed limit
- Harm:

1. Discomfort	Minor	2. Tissue/organ damage
3. Death	Major	Catastrophic

$$P_{\text{death}} = P_{e1} \times P_{e2} \times P_{e3} \times P_{h3}$$

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
 **RISK ANALYSIS METHODS**



- Expert opinion
 - Solicitation of views from those deemed to be most knowledgeable
- Data diving
 - Use of data to assess impact and frequency over a specified time period as a proxy for likelihood
- Stochastic
 - Have some prior knowledge
 - Application of statistical models (e.g., Monte Carlo simulation) that capture the essentials of the underlying behavior
- Cultural
 - Reliance on the inherent subjective assessment of both the nature of events and their likelihood and impact
- Often used in combinations

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 **EXAMPLE**



- Pilot self evaluation
 - Expert opinion
- Considering both the frequency and harm of potential risks

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SMALL & RARE HAZARDS CAN LEAD TO FATAL HARM

• Eastern Airlines Flight 401, 1972

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

```

graph TD
    A["Pilot drops landing gear"] --> B["Landing gear not down"]
    A --> C["'Landing gear down' light bulb blew"]
    C --> D["'Landing gear down' light off"]
    D --> E["Flight engineer went down to visually check landing gear"]
    E --> F["Pilot set autopilot on"]
    F --> G["Pilot started fixing the bulb"]
    G --> H["Pilot incidentally touched the steering column"]
    H --> I["Autopilot half off"]
    I --> J["Aircraft started to gradually descend"]
    J --> K["Terrain detection warning on flight engineer's table on"]
    K --> L["Flight engineer went down to visually check landing gear"]
    L --> M["Aircraft crashed"]
  
```

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RISK ACCEPTABILITY

- Acceptable
- Unacceptable
- ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable)

Probability	Frequent	Probable	Occasional	Remote	Negligible
Catastrophic	IN	IN	IN	H	M
Critical	IN	IN	H	M	L
Serious	H	H	M	L	T
Minor	M	M	L	T	T
Negligible	L	T	T	T	T

LEGEND: T = Tolerable, L = Low, M = Medium, H = High, IN = Intolerable

Probability	Description	Severity	Consequence
Frequent	Not expected, will occur several times (Frequency per year > 1)	Catastrophic	Greater than 6 month slip in schedule, greater than 10% cost overrun, greater than 10% reduction in product functionality
Probable	Occurs repeatedly or as can be expected (Frequency per year = 10 ⁻¹)	Critical	Less than 1 month slip in schedule, less than 10% cost overrun, less than 10% reduction in product functionality
Occasional	Could occur some time (Frequency per year = 10 ⁻² - 10 ⁻³)	Serious	Less than 1 month slip in schedule, less than 3% cost overrun, less than 3% reduction in product functionality
Remote	Unlikely, but could occur (Frequency per year = 10 ⁻⁴ - 10 ⁻⁵)	Minor	Less than 1 month slip in schedule, less than 2% cost overrun, less than 2% reduction in product functionality
Incredible	So unlikely that probability is close to zero (Frequency per year < 10 ⁻⁵)	Negligible	Negligible impact or no impact

Table 2-1 Sample Risk Matrix

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ACTIONS TOWARDS DIFFERENT RISKS

- Accept
 - Appropriate for low risk exposure. No specific action will be undertaken to mitigate or manage the risk. Instead a contingency plan will be developed to tackle the eventuality that the risk may be realized
- Reduce
 - Appropriate for medium negative risk. Actions will be undertaken to reduce either the impact or the likelihood of occurrence of the event
- Share/transfer
 - Appropriate for low frequency high impact positive risk where the efforts to manage the risk alone may not be warranted owing to the relative unlikelihood of it occurring. Measures will be undertaken (with others) to share the risks and rewards
- Avoid
 - Appropriate for high negative risk. The activities that give rise to the risk will not be undertaken

Impact

Share

Avoid

Reduce

Accept

Likelihood

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HOW TO DRAW THE LINE - ATTITUDE TOWARDS RISKS





- **Risk-averse:**
 - Preference of secure payoffs, common sense and facts over theories. Propensity to over-react to threats and under-react to opportunities.
- **Risk-seeking:**
 - Preference towards speculation and unafraid to take action. Propensity to underestimate threats and overestimate opportunities.
- **Risk-tolerance:**
 - Indifference towards uncertainty that lends itself to reactive rather than proactive measures. Propensity to fail to appreciate importance of threats and opportunities alike.
- **Risk-neutral:**
 - Impartial attitude towards risk and act in the interests of significant benefits. Propensity to focus on the longer term.

*Murray-Webster and Hillson (2008)

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UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE INDEX (UAI)

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
RISK CONTROL



- The activity in which decisions are made and measures implemented in which risks are reduced to, or maintained within specified levels
- Risk Control Measures (RCM)

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RISK CONTROL MEASURES (RCM)



1. Preventive measures
 - i.e. a cover on emergency stop button
2. Corrective measures
 - i.e. watchdog
3. Mitigating measures
 - i.e. fuse
4. Informational control
 - i.e. warning, personnel training

	Reduce probability	Reduce severity
Preventive	Yes	No
Corrective	Possibly	Possibly
Mitigating	No	Yes
Informational	Yes	No

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RESIDUAL RISK EVALUATION



- Whether the benefit of further measures outweigh the overall residual risk
- Treat remaining risk as new risk and see whether it's acceptable
- Principle: ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable)

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RCM EXAMPLE



- Mostly preventive


Hazards	Pre Mitigation			Post mitigation		
	Unlikely	Frequent	Catastrophic	Unlikely	Frequent	Catastrophic
Poor visibility (smoke)	Occasional	Frequent	Catastrophic	Occasional	Frequent	Catastrophic
Wake turbulence and speed differential (SEATs)	Occasional	Frequent	Critical	Occasional	Frequent	Critical
Weather (turbulence/wind/thunderstorms)	Occasional	Frequent	Critical	Occasional	Frequent	Critical
Fuel management	Occasional	Frequent	Critical	Occasional	Frequent	Critical
Density altitude	Occasional	Frequent	Catastrophic	Occasional	Frequent	Critical
Poor engine performance (single/twin, turbin/recip.)	Occasional	Frequent	Catastrophic	Occasional	Frequent	Critical

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PRIORITIZE RISKS



1. Avoid Collision
2. Driving on shoulder prohibited
3. Avoid hard brakes



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BALANCING AMONG RISKS



- Sometimes, mitigating Risk 1 will make Risk 2 more likely
- Uber Autonomous Vehicle Accident



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UBER AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE ACCIDENT

```

graph TD
    A[Sensor data has noise] --> B[Noise recognized by the vehicle as impenetrable objects]
    B --> C[Vehicle has no accessible path to move forward]
    C --> D[Delay]
    C --> E[Unable to move]
    F[Sensor detects pedestrian] --> G[Pedestrian recognized by the vehicle as noise]
    G --> H[Vehicle hit the pedestrian]
    H --> I[Pedestrian dead]
    J[Mitigation] --> K[Increase detection threshold]
    
```

• High frequency * serious harm
 • Low frequency * catastrophic harm
 • False-positive vs. false-negative
 – Always balance between the two

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ETHIOPIAN AIRLINE CRASH

• Flight ET302 from Addis Ababa for Nairobi
 • Crashed on March 10, 2019
 • Crashed 6 mins after takeoff
 • All 157 people on board died
 • Boeing 737-Max 8

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SIMILAR CRASH

• Lion Air JT610 Oct 29, 2018
 • Crashed 12 mins after takeoff
 • All 189 people on board died

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BOEING 737 MAX 8/9

• The Max's engines were bigger and mounted farther forward on its wings
 • A configuration that could push the nose upward toward a stall in certain circumstances.

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
MANEUVERING CHARACTERISTICS AUGMENTATION SYSTEM (MCAS)



- MCAS to automatically push the nose down to prevent stalling
- Two sensors mounted at the head of the aircraft
- MCAS activates if just one of two sensors says the nose is too high.

How the MCAS system works

The Boeing 737 Max has a computer controlled stability system



737 Max
737-800
The Boeing 737 Max has larger engines than earlier models

Source: Boeing, The Air Current


29

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BOEING'S "SOLUTION"



- Provided instructions to the pilots on how to turn off MCAS




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ETHNIC CONSIDERATIONS WHEN BALANCING RISKS



- Choices have to be made
- Invaluable things have to be priced
- For medical applications: Institutional Review Board (IRB)



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RISK MANAGEMENT VS. FINDING BUGS VS. VALIDATION



- Risk analysis
 - Finding flaws in design that may cause harm
- Finding bugs
 - Discrepancies when converting design into implementation
 - Verification
- Validation
 - Evaluate whether the design meets the requirements of customers

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 **WHEN TO DO RISK MANAGEMENT?**



- Short answer: always
- Parallel with software development
- Identify & control & document & review new risks as development goes


Software Development → Risk Management →

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 **IDENTIFY SEQUENCES OF EVENTS THAT CAN LEAD TO HAZARDOUS SITUATIONS**



- Hazardous situations are relatively easy to identify
- What are the sequences of events that can lead to the hazardous situation?
- What's the frequency of hazardous situations?



Sequence of events
Hazardous situations
Harm

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 **NEXT LECTURE**



- History of Pacemakers
- Reading Material: R4: Pacemaker Step-by-step

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LECTURE 5: PACEMAKER ALGORITHM

1

BRADYCARDIA

- Ventricular rate slower than 60bpm
 - Slow generation
 - Slow atrial and ventricular rate
 - Delayed conduction
 - Affecting synchrony
 - Blocked conduction
 - Missed ventricular contractions

2

PACEMAKER ARCHITECTURE

- We focus on the logic part

3

LEAD FIXATIONS

- Ensure stable contact with cardiac tissue

4

PACEMAKER PACING


- Electrical current triggers tissue depolarization

According to Ohm's law :

$$R = \frac{V}{I}$$

comprises :

- * lead resistance
- * tissue impedance




A. F. Hilleman

5


UNIPOLAR VS. BIPOLAR PACING

UNIPOLAR PACING



Large pacemaker stimulus on analog ECG recording

BIPOLAR PACING



Small pacemaker stimulus on analog ECG recording

A. F. Hilleman

6


PACEMAKER MODES

Category	I		II		III	
	Chambers Paced	Chambers Sensed	Chambers Sensed	Response To Sensing	Chambers Paced	Chambers Sensed
Letters	O – None A – Atrium V – Ventricle D – Dual	O – None A – Atrium V – Ventricle D - Dual	O – None A – Atrium V – Ventricle D - Dual	T – Triggered I – Inhibited D – Tracked	O – None	O – None

- VVI: Sense and pace in the ventricle only, inhibit pacing when sensed
- DDD: Sense and pace in both chambers, pace according to events in another chamber (tracked)

THE HISTORY OF PACEMAKERS

- VOO pacemaker**
 - No sensing, pace in the ventricle with preset rate
- Pace on T wave may cause Ventricular Fibrillation




8

INTRODUCING SENSING

THE SENSING FUNCTION

LEVEL DETECTOR, FILTER, AMPLIFIER

Discriminates signals by their frequency content (or slew rate)

9

SENSING FILTER

Unfiltered ventricular electrogram

BAND-PASS FILTER

IN OUT

Filtered ventricular electrogram transmitted to the sensing amplifier

10

LIMITATIONS OF PACEMAKER SENSING

- Our goal: Identify heart chamber contractions
- Our assumption: Sensed atrial events reflect physiological need
- Reality: We only know that at a particular time, whether the sensed voltage at the lead is larger than the sensing threshold
 - We don't know whether an event corresponds to chamber contraction
 - Noise
 - We don't know where the signal is coming from
 - From the SA node?
 - From a reentry circuit?

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INTRODUCING OF SENSING

- VVI pacemaker
 - Sense and pace in the ventricle, inhibit pacing when event sensed
 - Lower Rate Interval (LRI): minimum interval between two consecutive ventricular events
- Pacemaker Syndrome
 - Atrial and ventricular contractions are too close to each other
 - No A-V synchrony

A LRI V LRI V LRI V

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NOISE THAT MAY AFFECT DETECTION OF REAL HEART BEAT



- ERP: there should be no new activations
- Ventricular Refractory Period (VRP)
 - Ignore voltage above threshold (no sensed events)

FUNCTIONS OF THE PACEMAKER VENTRICULAR REFRACTORY PERIOD

PACEMAKER VENTRICULAR REFRACTORY PERIOD AND ITS SENSING OF :

- its own stimulus
- the paced QRS complex
- T wave
- (excessive) afterpotential
• the combination of T wave and afterpotential

INTRODUCING THE ATRIAL LEAD



- DDD pacemaker
 - Sense and pace both atria and ventricles
 - Track: The timing of atrial event depends on the ventricular event, and vice versa
 - Lower Rate Interval (LRI): The minimum ventricular rate
 - Atrial Escape Interval (AEI): the minimum delay between a ventricular event and an atrial event
 - Atrial-Ventricular Interval (AVI): the minimum delay between an atrial event and a ventricular event
 - Upper Rate Interval (URI): The maximum paced ventricular rate

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VENTRICULAR SENSE (VS)



- Same for ventricular channel

V-A DEADLINE AND ATRIAL PACING (AP)



- Pace atrium when no AS within deadline (track ventricular event)

A-V DEADLINE AND VENTRICULAR PACING (VP)

- Pace ventricle if no VS happen within deadline (track atrial event)

V-V DEADLINE





- Maximum interval between two ventricular events ($\max(V-A) + \max(A-V)$)

MINIMUM VENTRICULAR PACING INTERVAL

- Upper Rate Limit (scheduled early VP (dashed) is delayed)

NOISE FILTERING

- Ventricular Refractory Period (VRP)
- Atrial Refractory Period (ARP)?
 - AVI period is also ARP
- Cross-talk between atrial channel and the ventricular channel
 - Ventricular events are strong enough to be sensed in the atrial channel
 - Post-Ventricular Atrial Refractory Period (PVARP): Inhibit atrial sensing after a ventricular event





PACEMAKER MEDIATED TACHYCARDIA (PMT)


- Normal heart rate -> tachycardia with pacemaker
- SVT -> VT with pacemaker
- Atrial Tachycardia Response (ATR)
- Endless-Loop Tachycardia (ELT)

25




ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE: OPEN-LOOP

- Atrial Tachycardia: Abnormally fast atrial rate




ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE: OPEN-LOOP

- AV node enters Refractory period



ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE: OPEN-LOOP

- Another early atrial contraction



ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE: OPEN-LOOP

• Blocked by AV node during refractory

Medical Systems

ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE: OPEN-LOOP

• Third atrial contraction

Medical Systems

ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE: OPEN-LOOP

• Blocked by AV node again

Medical Systems

ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE: OPEN-LOOP

• AV node refractory finished

Medical Systems

ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE: OPEN-LOOP

• 3:1 A-V conduction

Medical Systems

ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE: OPEN-LOOP

• Normal Ventricular rate in contrast to fast atrial rate

Medical Systems

ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE: CLOSED-LOOP

• Inappropriately increase ventricular rate

Pacemaker

Medical Systems

ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE: CLOSED-LOOP

• Mimic refractory property of heart tissue

Pacemaker

AV node Refractory

Medical Systems

ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE: CLOSED-LOOP

- Some of the fast atrial events are filtered

Pacemaker
AV node Refractory
Medical Systems

ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE: CLOSED-LOOP

- VP when AV node in Refractory
- AV node function **bypassed**

Pacemaker
AV node Refractory
Medical Systems

ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE: CLOSED-LOOP

- Ventricular rate at Upper Rate Limit
- Turns SVT into VT

Pacemaker
Medical Systems

ATRIAL TACHYCARDIA RESPONSE (ATR) TERMINATION ALGORITHM

- Detection of SVT
- Switch to single chamber pacing mode to detach A-V synchrony
- Switch back to dual chamber mode after AVT terminates

ATR: SVT DETECTION



- Pre-duration:
 - A timer measures the time between atrial events in and out of Refractory Period (AS, AR)
 - A counter +1 if the timer value is shorter than sensing threshold and -1 otherwise
 - When the counter value reaches 8, start Duration

```

graph LR
    A[SVT Detection] --> B[Pre-duration]
    B --> C[Duration]
    C --> D[Fallback mode]
    D --> E[Dual chamber mode]
    E --> F[SVT ends]
  
```

The diagram shows a sequence of states: SVT, followed by a duration period, then Fallback mode, and finally Dual chamber mode, leading to the termination of SVT.

ATR: SVT DETECTION



- Duration:
 - The duration confirms the detection of SVT
 - If after Duration the counter value is still positive, the pacemaker switch to Fallback mode
 - If the counter value reaches 0 during Duration, the algorithm will exit Duration and reset the counter

```

graph LR
    A[SVT Detection] --> B[Pre-duration]
    B --> C[Duration]
    C --> D[Fallback mode]
    D --> E[Dual chamber mode]
    E --> F[SVT ends]
  
```

The diagram shows a sequence of states: SVT, followed by a duration period, then Fallback mode, and finally Dual chamber mode, leading to the termination of SVT.

ATR: FALBACK MODE



- Fallback mode:
 - Single chamber mode which only sense and pace in the ventricle
 - Detach ventricular rate from fast atrial rate
 - At any time the counter reaches 0, the pacemaker assume the termination of SVT and switch back to dual chamber mode

```


graph LR
    A[SVT Detection] --> B[Pre-duration]
    B --> C[Duration]
    C --> D[Fallback mode]
    D --> E[Dual chamber mode]
    E --> F[SVT ends]
  
```

The diagram shows a sequence of states: SVT, followed by a duration period, then Fallback mode, and finally Dual chamber mode, leading to the termination of SVT.





ENDLESS LOOP TACHYCARDIA (ELT)



- Open-loop Behavior (ODO pacemaker)
 - Random heart event (rare) trigger retrograde conduction




The diagram illustrates the mechanism of Endless Loop Tachycardia (ELT). It shows a pacemaker (ALTRUA 20) connected to a heart. Retrograde conduction is depicted as arrows traveling from the ventricles up to the atria. The timeline below shows the sequence of events: Atrial (A), Ventricular (V), Pace, PVC (Premature Ventricular Contraction), and another V. The text "Retrograde conduction" points to the atrial capture following a PVC.



ELT DETECTION & TERMINATION



- V-A conduction delay is mostly fixed
- Monitor VP-AS interval when the ventricular rate is at Upper Rate Limit
- If 16 consecutive intervals are similar, extend PVARP to 500ms for one time



WHAT WENT WRONG DURING PMT?



- Ventricular rate no longer reflect and satisfy physiological need
- DDD pacemaker introduced a virtual pathway between atria and ventricles
- Atrial Tachycardia Response
 - The pacemaker cannot distinguish atrial events from the SA node and the ones from atrial tachycardia
- Endless Loop Tachycardia (ELT)
 - The pacemaker cannot distinguish atrial events from the SA node and the ones from retrograde V-A conductions


50

PRIORITIZED PHYSIOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS



1. Maintain appropriate ventricular rate
2. Maintain A-V synchrony
3. Encourage intrinsic electrical generation/conduction

- We can sacrifice a low priority requirement if only by doing so we can achieve a higher priority requirement



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ARE THE TERMINATION ALGORITHMS CORRECT?



- We will find out in the following lectures/homeworks.

52


OTHER FUN PACEMAKER FUNCTIONS



• Rate-adaptive pacemaker (DDDR)
 – Adapt pacing rate according to perceived physiological need
 • Accelerometer
 • Respiratory rate


• Pacemaker with 3 leads
 – Cardiac Resynchronization Therapy (CRT) Devices
 – Treat and prevent heart failure

• Leadless pacemaker




53

VENTRICULAR SAFETY PACING




54

WEIRD PACEMAKER MALFUNCTIONS



55

HICUPS CAUSED BY PACEMAKER




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


OBSOLETE: REED SWITCH

NORMAL REED SWITCH
OPEN CONTACT WITHOUT MAGNETIC FIELD



NORMAL REED SWITCH
CLOSED CONTACT WITH MAGNETIC FIELD



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READING MATERIALS



- <http://www.uppaal.org/>
- Uppaal 4.0 : Small Tutorial*

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LECTURE 6: MODEL CHECKING

1



- 
- ### ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
- Dynamic Analysis (runtime)
 - Execute the system, possibly multiple times with different inputs
 - Check if every execution meets the desired requirement
 - Static Analysis (design time)
 - Analyze the source code or the model for possible bugs
 - Trade-offs
 - Dynamic analysis is incomplete, but accurate (checks real system, and bugs discovered are real bugs)
 - Static analysis can catch design bugs early !
 - Many static analysis techniques are not scalable (solution: analyze approximate versions, can lead to false warnings)

 **VERIFICATION METHODS**



- Simulation
 - Simulate the model, possibly multiple times with different inputs
 - Easy to implement, scalable, but no correctness guarantees
- Proof based
 - Construct a proof that system satisfies the invariant
 - Requires manual effort (partial automation possible)
- State-space analysis (Model checking)
 - Algorithm explores “all” reachable states to check invariants
 - Not scalable, but current tools can analyze many real-world designs (relies on many interesting theoretical advances)

 **DIFFERENT REQUIREMENTS**




- Safety
 - A system always stays within “good’ states (i.e. a nothing bad ever happens)
 - Leader election: it is never the case that two nodes consider them to be leaders
 - Collision avoidance: Distance between two cars is always greater than some minimum threshold
- Liveness
 - System eventually attains its goal
 - Leader election: Each node eventually makes a decision
 - Cruise controller: Actual speed eventually equals desired speed
 - A car will always eventually reach its destination

6

 **MODEL CHECKING**



- A domain D representing the state space of a model
- The reachable state space M for the model
- Define a subset of the state space as property φ
- Explore the whole reachable state space of a model for property violations
- Widely used in semi-conductor industries for verifying chip design



7

 **PLATO VS. DIOGENES**



- The definition of “human”

φ All living creatures D

Counter – example



Plato

M

Featherless Biped



Diogenes

Here's Plato's human!!!!

8

CHALLENGE



- State space explosion
 - Not every model can be model checked!!
 - i.e. Real-number (continuous) state space
 - Complex dynamics between states
- Solution
 - Simple yet expressive formalisms
 - Symbolic states/executions
 - Model abstraction/approximation

9

SIMPLE LIGHT CONTROL



Diagram of a simple light control state machine:

```

graph LR
    Off((Off)) -- Press --> Light((Light))
    Light -- Press --> Bright((Bright))
    Bright -- Press --> Off
  
```

WANT: if press is issued twice quickly then the light will get brighter; otherwise the light is turned off.

SIMPLE LIGHT CONTROL



Diagram of a simple light control state machine with clock constraints:

```

graph LR
    Off((Off)) -- Press --> Light((Light))
    Light -- "Press x:=0" --> Light
    Light -- "Press x<=1" --> Bright((Bright))
    Bright -- "x>1 Press" --> Off
  
```

Solution: Add a real-valued clock x





Adding continuous variables to state machines

TIMED AUTOMATA



Diagram of a timed automata with two states n and m :

- Clocks:** x, y
- Guard:** Boolean combination of comparisons with Integer/rational bounds
- Reset:** Action performed on clocks
- Action used for synchronization:** a
- State:** $(\text{location}, x=v, y=u)$ where v, u are in \mathbb{R}
- Transitions:**
 - $(n, x=2.4, y=3.1415) \xrightarrow{a} (m, x=0, y=3.1415)$
 - $(n, x=2.4, y=3.1415) \xrightarrow{\text{wait}(1.1)} (n, x=3.5, y=4.2415)$



MODEL CHECKING: FORWARD REACHABILITY



- Given a timed automata and a property φ
- $R := \emptyset$
- Repeat
 - If R intersects $\neg\varphi$, report "yes"
 - Else if R contains $\text{Post}(R)$, report "no"
 - Else $R := R \cup \text{Post}(R)$

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REACHABILITY FOR TIMED AUTOMATA



$\xrightarrow{} l_0 \xrightarrow{x \geq 2} l_1$ gives rise to the infinite transition system:

...

...

...


...

SYMBOLIC STATES/EXECUTIONS







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FINITE PARTITIONING




Goal: To partition state-space into finitely many equivalence classes so that equivalent states exhibit similar behaviors





COUNTER-EXAMPLE-GUIDED ABSTRACTION AND REFINEMENT (CEGAR)

- Obtain initial abstraction
- 1. Model checking
- 2. Property satisfied \rightarrow no bugs
- 3. Property unsatisfied \rightarrow counter-examples
- 4. Check whether the CE is spurious
- 5. If not, bug found
- 6. If yes, refine the model and start from 1 again




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


COMPUTATIONAL TREE LOGIC (CTL)

- CTL is a logic used to express properties for model checking
- CTL is useful because there is an efficient technique to check it
- A temporal logic is a logic which can express aspects of time
- CTL makes statements about the computational tree of a state machine



Traffic light FSM




Computational tree for FSM




TEMPORAL COMPUTATIONAL TREE LOGIC (TCTL) PROPERTIES

- **A[] p** "Always globally p"
- For each (all) execution path p holds for all the states of the path




PROPERTIES

- **A<> p** "Always eventually p"
- For each (all) execution path p holds for at least one state of the path




PROPERTIES

- $\mathbf{E}[\cdot] p$ “Exists globally p” meaning there is an execution path in which p holds for all the states of the path



PROPERTIES


- $E\varphi p$ “Exists eventually p ” meaning there is an execution path in which p eventually (in some state of the path) holds





MONITORS

- Sometimes we need assistance to express our requirements
 - The minimum ventricular rate should be 60bpm
 - The maximum interval between two ventricular events (VS,VP) should be no larger than 1000ms
 - A[] (PM.TwoV imply PM.t<=1000)



3

PHYSIOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS

- Does the device always deliver therapy when needed?
 - Does the device always not deliver therapy when unnecessary?
 - Behavior Coverage (Generality)
 - Physiological Context (Interpretability)

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 **MODELING TIMING DELAYS WITH UPPAAL**

- Reset the clock when VS occurs
- Send AP when clock reaches AEI

Specification

Timed Automaton

33

 **WHAT SHOULD WE COVER FOR PACEMAKER?**



- Heart conditions
- Individual variabilities
- Noise
- How to use finite number of heart models to cover infinite number of heart conditions?

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 **CAPTURE PHYSIOLOGICAL VARIABILITY WITH OVER-APPROXIMATION**



- Properties satisfied by M are also satisfied by P1, P2
- Behaviors not exist in P1, P2 may also be physiologically-valid
- Is this a valid counter-example?
- Need a framework to provide context for counter-examples

Counter-example





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



 **OBSERVABLE BEHAVIORAL SPACE OF A PACEMAKER**



- Atrial channel: Boolean
- Ventricular channel: Boolean
- Time: Real number
- The combination of the factors above

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**PHYSIOLOGICAL ABSTRACTION RULES:
SIMPLIFY**

- R6: Simplify the model to increase non-determinism for more behavior coverage

Diagram illustrating abstraction rules:

Left: A complex state transition diagram showing multiple parallel paths between states like 'Act.path.1' and 'Act.path.2'. Transitions are labeled with conditions such as 'toFront_max', 'Act.path.1', 'Act.path.2', etc.

Middle: A simplified version of the diagram where some transitions and states are removed, resulting in a smaller state space.

Right: A simplified state transition diagram with fewer states and transitions compared to the original.

Annotations below the diagrams:

- "Will ignore activations at specific time"
- "May ignore activations at any time"

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**PHYSIOLOGICAL ABSTRACTION RULES:
COMBINE**

- R4: Combine models of different heart conditions for more behavior coverage

Diagram illustrating abstraction rules:

Left: Three separate state transition diagrams labeled "Trest in $[a_1, b_1]$ ", "Trest in $[a_2, b_2]$ ", and "Trest in $[a_3, b_3]$ ". Each diagram shows a sequence of states connected by arrows.

Middle: An abstracted view where the three separate diagrams are combined into a single large shaded area labeled "Trest in $[\min a_i, \max b_i]$ ". An arrow labeled "Abstraction rule" points from the separate diagrams to the combined one.

Right: A timeline diagram showing a sequence of events labeled "Trest" occurring over time.

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PHYSIOLOGICAL ABSTRACTION RULES

- R7: Use self-depolarization to replace conducted depolarization

Diagram illustrating abstraction rules:

Left: A diagram showing a single heart cell with a single activation path.

Right: A diagram showing multiple heart cells, each with its own activation path, representing self-depolarization.

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INITIAL HEART MODELS





Diagram illustrating initial heart models:





Left: A large oval labeled "Observable Behavior Space" containing several small circles representing initial heart models.

Right: A vertical list of heart conditions, each represented by a small icon:

- Normal Sinus Rhythm
- Bradycardia
- AV Block
- Bundle Branch Block
- Sinus Tachycardia
- Atrial Flutter
- AVNRT
- Atrial Fibrillation
- Premature Ventricular Contractions
- Ventricular Tachycardia
- Ventricular Fibrillation

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UPPAAL TUTORIAL

Partially referenced Prof. Insup Lee's course at UPenn

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1



UPPAAL??!!

- Model checking tool for Timed-automata
- Developed by Uppsala University and Aalborg University
- **SWE**den + **DEN**mark = **SWEDEN**
– REJECTED
- **swe****DEN** + **den****MARK** = **DENMARK**
– REJECTED
- **UPP**sala + **AAL**borg = **UPPAAL**
– ACCEPTED

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2



UPPAAL TOOL PARTS

- Graphical user interface (GUI)
 - Used for modeling, simulation, and verification. Uses the verification server for simulation and verification.
- Verification server
 - Used for simulation and verification. In simulation, it is used to compute successor states.
- A command line tool
 - A stand-alone verifier, appropriate for e.g. batch verifications.


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3



UPPAAL GUI: EDITOR

- Global declarations
 - Accessible to all system processes
- Templates
 - Can be parameterized
- Declarations for templates
 - Only accessible locally
- System declarations
 - Declare processes and system composition



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UPPAAL GUI: SIMULATOR

The screenshot shows the UPPAAL Simulator window. On the left, a tree view lists transitions: Train(0), Train(1) > Gate, App(0); Train(1) > Gate, App(1); Train(2) > Gate, App(2); Train(3) > Gate, App(3). Below it is a list of variables: (Safe, Safe, Safe, Safe, Safe, Safe, Doc). A central panel displays a state transition graph with nodes labeled Train(0) through Train(5) and a 'Gate' node. Edges represent transitions like 'Train(0) > Train(1)' and 'App(0)'. A sequence diagram at the bottom shows events like 'Safe', 'Stop', and 'Doc' occurring over time. Callouts point to the 'Current locations of each process' (top right) and 'Current value of variables & clocks' (bottom left).

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UPPAAL GUI: VERIFIER

The screenshot shows the UPPAAL Verifier window. A sidebar lists validation properties: 'E0: Gate.doc', 'E0: Train(0).Cross', 'E0: Train(1).Cross', 'E0: Train(0).Cross and Train(1).Stop', and 'E0: Train(0).Cross and Train(1).Stop'. The main area has tabs for 'Overview', 'Diagnostic Trace' (set to 'None'), 'Search Order' (set to 'Extrapolation'), and 'State Space Representation' (set to 'Hash table size'). A 'Query' text input field contains: 'All forall i : 18 to forall i : 18 to Train(i).Cross ==> Train(i).Cross'. Callouts point to 'Turn on diagnostic trace to view counter-examples in the simulator' (top left) and 'Sequence diagram' (bottom right).

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UPPAAL SYNTAX

This slide is a blank white page with the UPPAAL Syntax logo in the top left corner.

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UPPAAL SYNTAX

The screenshot shows the UPPAAL Syntax slide. It contains a bulleted list of syntax elements:

- Global declarations
 - Clocks:
 - clock x1,...xn;
 - Data variables
 - int n1,...; integer with default domain
 - Int[l,u] n1,...; integer with domain defined by [l,u]
 - Int n1[m],...; array with elements n1[0] to n1[m-1]
- Channels
 - Chan a, ... ;
 - Urgent chan b ... ;
 - Broadcast chan c ... ;
- Constants
 - Const int c1=n1;

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UPPAAL SYNTAX (CONT.)

- Template
 - Names should be unique
 - Channel declaration has a "&" in front

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UPPAAL SYNTAX (CONT.)

- System declaration

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UPPAAL SYNTAX: LOCATIONS

- Initial Location

 - Only one per template

- Urgent Location
- Committed Location
- Invariant
 - Conditions that need to be satisfied when in state

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UPPAAL SYNTAX: EDGES

- Select
 - Defines multiple parameterized transitions
- Guard
 - Condition under which the edge is enabled
- Sync
 - $a!$ for sending message
 - $a?$ for receiving message
- Update
 - Actions taken during the transition

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UPPAAL SEMANTICS



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URGENT LOCATION



- No time pass in an urgent location
- The two automata is equivalent
- Save a clock thus reduce state space

```

graph LR
    I1((I1)) -- "a?" --> I2((I2))
    I2 -- "x=0" --> I3((I3))
    I2 -- "x>=0" --> I3
    I4((I4)) -- "a?" --> I5((I5))
    I5 -- "b!" --> I6((I6))
    I5 -- "x<=0" --> I6
  
```

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COMMITTED LOCATION



- Urgent location still allows interleaving
 - $I7 \rightarrow I8$ can happen before $I5 \rightarrow I6$, although no time has passed
- Committed states are stronger than urgent locations
- If multiple committed states reached at the same time, the transitions will interleave
- Reduce interleaving thus reduce complexity

```

graph LR
    I4((I4)) -- "i==0" --> I5((I5))
    I5 -- "i=1" --> I6((I6))
    I4 -- "i==0" --> I7((I7))
    I7 -- "i=1" --> I8((I8))
    I5 -- "C" --> I6
  
```

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URGENT CHANNELS



- Urgent channel definition
 - Urgent chan $a;$
- $a!$ sent as soon as location a and c are reached
- No clock guard is allowed on the transitions with urgent channel components

```

graph LR
    a((a)) -- "a!" --> b((b))
    c((c)) -- "a?" --> d((d))
  
```

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BROADCAST CHANNELS



- Synchronize multiple processes
- If receiving channel $a?$ is enabled, the transition must be taken
- Can send without any receivers ready

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NON-DETERMINISM



- Transitions with guard evaluates true are only enabled
- Used to model variabilities of system environment
- Location a does not have an invariant, thus can stay forever
 - $- x \in [0,1]$: location a
 - $- x \in (1,2]$: location a or b
 - $- x \in (2, \infty]$: location a or b or c

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WANT TO DO SOMETHING AT A PARTICULAR TIME?



- The transition will take place when $x==5$



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DEADLOCK



- No enabled transitions
- Common deadlock scenarios
 - Cannot enter a state
 - State invariant about to expire and no enabled transition available
 - Committed state does not have enabled outgoing transition




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


COMPUTATIONAL TREE LOGIC (CTL)

- CTL is a logic used to express properties for model checking
- CTL is useful because there is an efficient technique to check it
- A temporal logic is a logic which can express aspects of time
- CTL makes statements about the computational tree of a state machine



Traffic light FSM



Computational tree for FSM


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21



TEMPORAL COMPUTATIONAL TREE LOGIC (TCTL) PROPERTIES

- $\mathbf{A}[\cdot] p$ "Always globally p"
- For each (all) execution path p holds for all the states of the path




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22



PROPERTIES

- $\mathbf{A}\lhd p$ "Always eventually p"
- For each (all) execution path p holds for at least one state of the path




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PROPERTIES

- $\mathbf{E}[\cdot] p$ "Exists globally p" meaning there is an execution path in which p holds for all the states of the path



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PROPERTIES

- $E<>p$ “Exists eventually p” meaning there is an execution path in which p eventually (in some state of the path) holds

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UPPAAL TCTL PROPERTIES

- $A[]p, A<>p, E<>p, E[]p, p-->p'(p imply p')$
- p can be
 - Location of a process: a.l
 - Data guard
 - Clock guard
 - p and p'
 - p or p'
 - Not p
 - p imply p'

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MONITORS

- Sometimes we need assistance to express our requirements
- The maximum interval between two ventricular events (Vin,VP) should be no larger than 1000ms
- $A[] (PM.TwoV \text{ imply } PM.t \leq 1000)$

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EXAMPLE: MUTUAL EXCLUSION PROTOCOL

- Only one component can access the critical section (cs) which represents resource
- Use global variable id to communicate with each other
- If there are two components at critical section together, their id must be the same
 - $A[] \text{ forall } (i:id_t) \text{ forall } (j:id_t) P(i).cs \&& P(j).cs \text{ imply } i == j$

// Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol.

```
typedef int[1..6] id_t;
int id;

clock x;
const int k = 2;
```

名前: p パラメータ: const id_t pid

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


EXAMPLE: TRAIN-GATE

- Each train has an id
- Each train can approach the gate at any time
- Approaching takes 10-20 sec
- The gate controller can stop a train within 10 sec after its approaching, otherwise the train will cross
- After receive a GO signal, the train will start within 7-15 sec
- Crossing takes 3-5 sec

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EXAMPLE: TRAIN-GATE (CONT.)

- Gate controller maintains a queue
- If queue empty and a train approaches, gate stay occupied
- If the gate is occupied and a train approaches, stop the last one in queue
- If the train at the front of the queue leaves, remove it from the queue
- If the gate is free and there are trains in queue, let the front one go

```


// Remove the front element of the queue
void dequeue()
{
    int i = 0;
    len -= 1;
    while (i < len)
    {
        list[i] = list[i + 1];
        i++;
    }
    list[i] = 0;
}

// Put an element at the end of the queue
void enqueue(id_t element)
{
    list[len++] = element;
}

// Returns the front element of the queue
id_t front()
{
    return list[0];
}

// Returns the last element of the queue
id_t tail()
{
    return list[len - 1];
}

```



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EXAMPLE: TRAIN-GATE (CONT.)

- E<> Train(0).Cross
 - Train 0 can eventually cross
- E<> Train(0).Cross and Train(1).Stop
 - Train 0 can be crossing bridge while Train 1 is waiting to cross
- E<> Train(0).Cross and (forall (i:id-t) i != 0 imply Train(i).Stop)
 - Train 0 can cross bridge while the other trains are waiting to cross
- A[] Gate.list[N] == 0
 - There can never be N elements in the queue
- A[] forall (i:id-t) forall (j:id-t) Train(i).Cross && Train(j).Cross imply i == j
 - There is never more than one train crossing the bridge
- Train(1).Appr -> Train(1).Cross
 - Whenever a train approaches the bridge, it will eventually cross
- A[] not deadlock
 - The system is deadlock-free

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HW 2 OUT

- Due 10/18 at the end of the day

10/27/2019

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HW 1 REVIEW

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1



GRADING CRITERIA

- 10 pts total
- 1-3: 1pt each
 - Need to plot the result
- 4: 2pts
- 5: 5pts
 - 5.1, 5.2: 1pt each
 - Identify correct pathway: 0.2
 - Answer contains relative conduction speed or signal cancellation: 0.8
 - 5.3: 3pts
 - Logic: 2pts
 - Rate: 1pt

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2



COMMON PROBLEMS



- Unlink Library

When you try to modify a copied component, Simulink might protest and ask whether you want to “unlink” the component from the library. Do that.

- AV block problem

Use blocks `Node`, and `Path` to create a model which has a fast atrial rate, but such that the AV node is blocking 1 out of every 2 atrial beats, thus keeping a 2:1 ratio between atria and ventricles.

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SUBMISSION FORMAT



- Please submit .zip file with name: HWx_YourName.zip

Submission

A .zip file containing the following files:

- NPNAntegradeOnly.slx
- Bradycardia.slx
- Tachycardia.slx
- AVblock.slx
- Reentry.slx

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MECHANISM: REENTRY TACHYCARDIA

- Equivalent to the fast pathway alone

Diagram: A circular diagram representing the heart's atria. Two arrows labeled "slow" and "fast" point towards the center. A small gray box labeled "Conflict" points to the area where the two pathways meet. Below the diagram, the text "Normal Sinus Rhythm" is written.

MECHANISM: REENTRY TACHYCARDIA

- Premature activation blocked in the fast pathway

Diagram: A circular diagram representing the heart's atria. A large gray shaded region covers the right side of the circle, labeled "1 ERP". An arrow points from a small gray box labeled "Blocked" to the boundary of the shaded region.

MECHANISM: REENTRY TACHYCARDIA





- Retrograde conduction through fast pathway creating echo beat

Diagram: A circular diagram representing the heart's atria. A small gray box labeled "Finished refractory" points to a specific area within the atria. An arrow points from the text "Retrograde conduction through fast pathway creating echo beat" to the diagram.

MECHANISM: REENTRY TACHYCARDIA

- Reentry induced and maintain high atrial and ventricle rate

Diagram: A circular diagram representing the heart's atria. Three arrows point in a clockwise direction around the interior of the circle. A small gray box labeled "Loop continuously" points to the direction of the arrows.





EXAMPLE: TRAIN-GATE (CONT.)


- E<> Train(0).Cross
 - Train 0 can eventually cross
- E<> Train(0).Cross and Train(1).Stop
 - Train 0 can be crossing bridge while Train 1 is waiting to cross
- E<> Train(0).Cross and (forall (i:id-t) i != 0 imply Train(i).Stop)
 - Train 0 can cross bridge while the other trains are waiting to cross
- A[] Gate.list[N] == 0
 - There can never be N elements in the queue
- A[] forall (i:id-t) forall (j:id-t) Train(i).Cross && Train(j).Cross imply i == j
 - There is never more than one train crossing the bridge
- Train(1).Appr -> Train(1).Cross
 - Whenever a train approaches the bridge, it will eventually cross
- A[] not deadlock
 - The system is deadlock-free

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VVI EXAMPLE




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IDENTIFY SEQUENCES OF EVENTS THAT CAN LEAD TO HAZARDOUS SITUATIONS

- Hazardous situations are relatively easy to identify
- What are the sequences of events that can lead to the hazardous situation?
- What's the frequency of hazardous situations?



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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS



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SO FAR WE ONLY ANSWERED YES/NO QUESTIONS

- There is need for quantitative verification
 - Quantify uncertainty
 - How often does bad events happen?
 - Quantify performance
 - What's the minimum battery consumption?
- There are tools available to evaluate
 - Probability
 - Cost/reward

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UPPAAL SMC

- Statistical Model Checking (SMC)
 - Non-exhaustive evaluation of the model's state space
 - Through statistical simulations within certain time bound
- Statistical Timed Automata
 - Resolve non-determinism with stochastic behaviors
 - Based on Monte Carlo Simulation

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MONTE CARLO SIMULATION



Suppose you timed 20 athletes running the 100-yard dash and tallied the information into the four time intervals below.

You then count the tallies and make a frequency distribution.

Then convert the frequencies into percentages.

Finally, use the percentages to develop the random number intervals.


Seconds	Tallies	Frequency	%	RN Intervals
0-5.99		4	20	01-20
6-6.99		10	50	21-70
7-7.99		4	20	71-90
8 or more		2	10	91-100

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MONTE CARLO SIMULATION: NBA DRAFT



- 14 ping pong balls numbered 1 through 14 are placed in a drum.
 - $C_{14}^4 = 1,001$
- Prior to the Lottery, 1,000 combinations are assigned to the Lottery teams based on their order of finish during the regular season.
 - The worst team has 250 combinations (25% chance for No.1 pick)
- 4 balls are drawn from the drum with a combination
- The team that has been assigned that combination will receive the number one pick.
- The four balls are placed back in the drum and the process is repeated to determine the number two and three picks.



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UPPAAL SMC: NEW SYNTAX

- Probabilistic transition
 - Resolves nondeterminism
 - i.e. $\frac{1}{4}$ chance going up, $\frac{3}{4}$ chance going down
- Rate of Exponential
 - “How eager you want to exit the state”

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UPPAAL SMC: SEMANTICS

- The time it takes to reach END
- Uniform distribution
 - Transition out at time 2 and time 3 are equal
- Probabilistic transition
- Exponential distribution

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UPPAAL SMC NEW QUERIES

- Simulation
 - simulate $N [\leq \text{bound}] \{ E_1, \dots, E_k \}$
- Probability Estimation
 - $\Pr[\text{bound}](<\!> \psi)$
- Hypothesis Testing
 - $\Pr[\text{bound}](\psi) \geq p_0$
- Probability Comparison
 - $\Pr[\text{bound1}](\psi_1) \geq \Pr[\text{bound2}](\psi_2)$
- Expected min/max for certain expression
 - $E[\text{bound}; N](\min/\max: \text{expr})$

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EXAMPLE: STOCHASTIC TRAIN-GATE

- Train with larger id is more eager to start the approach
- simulate $1 [\leq 300] \{ \text{Train}(0).\text{Cross}, \text{Train}(5).\text{Cross}, \text{Gate}.len \}$
- $\Pr[\leq 300](<\!> \text{Gate}.len < 3)$


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STOCHASTIC PARAMETERS



- δ, α, β : hypothesis testing
- ε : uncertainty for the output
– The smaller the range, the more simulations needed
- u_0, u_1 : for probability comparison



Message
(100 runs) Pz(> ...)= 0.9997321292377999
with confidence 0.95.


OK

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UPPAAL CORA: COST OPTIMAL REACHABILITY ANALYSIS




- Linearly priced timed automata (LPTA)
- Add cost/reward to each location
- Calculates the path with minimum cost
- Can be used to model power consumption, etc



E earliest landing time
T target (cruise) landing time
L latest landing time
e early cost rate
I late cost rate
d late penalty

```
Parameters: const int E, const int T, const int L, const int e, const int I, const int d, const int type
```



time <= T
time >= E
land[type]!
time == T
time <= L & cost == I
done

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CONTROLLER SYNTHESIS




- Synthesize a controller that satisfy the requirement
- Two player game: Controller vs. Environment
- Return the winning strategy for controller

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



TOY EXAMPLE



R1: No collision
R2: No driving on shoulder
R3: No hard braking



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REFERENCE



- Download
 - www.uppaal.org
- Tutorials
 - On the same webpage
 - Recommended:
 - UPPAAL 4.0: Small Tutorial.
 - Uppaal SMC Tutorial

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LECTURE 9: TRACEABILITY & STATEFLOW


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WHAT IS TRACEABILITY?

- We would like to make sure that
 - All requirements are implemented
 - All implementations are necessary
- Trace artifacts
 - Requirements, models, code, etc.
- Trace link
 - Association between two trace artifacts
 - Type: Refinement, Abstraction, Implementation, etc.
- Trace granularity: component level, statement level, etc.
- Trace quality: completeness, correctness, etc.



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TRACEABILITY ACTIVITIES

• Trace Creation

- Establish *trace link* between a *source artifact* and a *target artifact*

• Trace Validation

- Between requirements and model: Model checking
- Between concept model and implementation model: Model translation
- Between model and code: Conformance testing

• Trace Maintenance

- Update trace when modification happened

Source artifact Target artifact

Trace link
Primary trace link direction
Reverse trace link direction


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TRACEABILITY MATRIX

- Try to avoid orphan nodes



		Design Elements				
		1	2	3	4	n
Requirements	1	x				x
	2					
	3		x			
	n			Trace	x	

No requirement trace (potential gold plating)

Unimplemented requirement

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
 **WHY DO WE NEED TO ENSURE TRACEABILITY?**

- Software life cycle involves more than one person
- They need to be on the same page
 - Why we are developing this software?
- People tend to focus on their job at hand, and forget why they are doing it.

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
 **CHALLENGE**

- Impossible to list the constraints explicitly
- How to effectively communicate with domain experts?




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 **SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS**




- Requirements
 - i.e. the vehicle should not crash with any other objects
- Specifications
 - i.e. when the vehicle detects an object on its path, apply brake
- Implementation

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SIMULINK & STATEFLOW



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SIMULINK & STATEFLOW




- A graphical modeling/programming language
- Developed by Mathworks
 - Highly integrated with Matlab
- Has a full model-based design toolchain
- Widely adapted by system/software developers
- Rich expressiveness

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MODEL EXPLORER




- Define and configure input/output, event/message, va

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STATE HIERARCHY




- Object oriented modeling
 - /Car_done
 - /Car_done.Car_made
 - /Car_done.Car_shipped
 - /Car_done.Car_made.Parts_assembled
 - /Car_done.Car_made.Painted


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 STATE COMPOSITIONS



- “OR”/exclusive composition
- “AND”/parallel composition



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 EMBEDDED FUNCTIONS



- Matlab function
- Simulink function
- Truthtable
- Graphical function




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 FUNCTION AVAILABILITY



- Only available to states at the same level




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 STATE ACTIONS



- entry: (en:) entry actions
 - Action occurs on a time step when the state becomes active.
- during: (du:) during actions
 - Action occurs on a time step when the state is already active and the chart does not transition out of the state.
- exit: (ex:) exit actions
 - Action occurs on a time step when the chart transitions out of the state.
- on event_name: on event_name actions
- on message_name: on message_name actions



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REDUCE REDUNDANCY

```

en:          en, du, ex: fcn1();
fcn1();      en: fcn2();

fcn2();      du: fcn1();

du: fcn1();  ex: fcn1();
ex: fcn1();
  
```

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TRANSITION

- event_or_message[condition]{condition_action}/transition_action
- Condition
 - Boolean expression that specifies that a transition path is valid if the expression is true; part of a transition label
- Condition actions
 - Executes after the condition for the transition is evaluated as true, but before the transition to the destination is determined to be valid
- Transition actions
 - Executes after the transition to the destination is determined to be valid


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DEFAULT TRANSITIONS

- State A is active. Event E_one occurs and awakens the chart
- State A exit actions (exitA()) execute and complete.
- State A is marked inactive.
- The transition action, A, is executed and completed.
- State B is marked active.
- State B entry actions (entB()) execute and complete.
- State B detects a valid default transition to state B.B1.
- State B.B1 is marked active.
- State B.B1 entry actions (entB1()) execute and complete.
- The chart goes back to sleep.




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EXECUTION ORDER

- Transition 1 from StateA is marked for evaluation.
- Transition 1 from StateA has a condition.
- The condition is true.
- The destination of transition 1 from StateA is not a state.
- The junction does have outgoing transitions.
- Transition 1 from the junction is marked for evaluation.
- Transition 1 from the junction has a condition.
- The condition is false.
- Transition 2 from the junction is marked for evaluation.
- Transition 2 from the junction does not have a condition.
- The destination of transition 2 from the junction is a state (StateD).
- StateD is marked for entry, and StateA is marked for exit.




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CONDITION ACTION BEHAVIOR

- E_one happened when state A is active. C_one and C_two are false
- A valid transition segment from state A to a connective junction is detected.
- The condition action A_one is immediately executed and completed. State A is still active.
- No complete transitions is valid.
- State A during actions (durA()) execute and complete.
- State A remains active.
- The chart goes back to sleep.




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
CONDITION AND TRANSITION ACTION BEHAVIOR

- E_one happened and awaked the chart.
- The condition C_one is true. The condition action A_one is immediately executed.
- State A is still active.
- State A exit actions (ExitA()) execute and complete.
- State A is marked inactive.
- The transition action A_two is executed.
- State B is marked active.
- State B entry actions (entB()) execute.
- The chart goes back to sleep.



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
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FLOW CHART

- No time consumption during execution
- Can be used for graphical function definition





```

if u > 0
  y = 1;
else
  y = 0;
end
  
```



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 **IN() OPERATOR EXAMPLE (CONT.)**

No match In(P,Q,R) will do Wrong match In(B,P,Q,R) will do Multiple match Use enclosure to ensure local match





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 **DETCT DATA CHANGE**




- **hasChanged(u)**
 - Detects changes in data value from the beginning of the last time step to the beginning of the current time step.
- **hasChangedFrom(u,v)**
 - Detects changes in data value from a specified value at the beginning of the last time step to a different value at the beginning of the current time step.
- **hasChangedTo(u,v)**
 - Detects changes in data value to a specified value at the beginning of the current time step from a different value at the beginning of the last time step.

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 **TEMPORAL LOGIC**

- E is the base event and n is a positive integer
- **after(n,E)**
 - Returns true if n units of simulation time have elapsed since activation of the associated state.
- **before(n,E)**
 - Returns true if fewer than n units of simulation time have elapsed since activation of the associated state.
- **every(n,E)**
 - Returns true every n units of simulation time since activation of the associated state.
- **temporalCount(sec)**
 - Counts and returns the number of specified simulation time (sec) that have elapsed since activation of the associated state.




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 **COUNTER VS. TEMPORAL LOGIC**




- Simulation time, not real world time

Assuming a step time of t seconds these charts are equivalent



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
 **BROADCAST LOCAL EVENTS TO SYNCHRONIZE PARALLEL STATES**



- send(event_name,state_name)
- event_name is broadcast to its owning state (state_name) and any offspring of that state in the hierarchy.
- The receiving state must be active during the event broadcast.
- An action in one chart cannot broadcast events to states in another chart.

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 **BROADCASTING EVENTS TO PARALLEL STATES**




- Parallel substates A.A1.A1a and A.A2.A2a are active. Event E_one occurs and awakens the chart

In condition action
In transition action
In state action

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 **IMPLICIT EVENTS**







- change(data_name) or chg(data_name)
 - generates a local event when writing a value to the variable data_name
 - Data_name has to be at chart level or lower
- enter(state_name) or en(state_name)
 - generates a local event when the specified state_name is entered
- exit(state_name) or ex(state_name)
 - generates a local event when the specified state_name is exited
- Tick/wakeup
 - generates a local event when the chart of the action being evaluated awakens

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 **EXAMPLE**



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MATLAB CODE

```
% Parameters
Param.TTRI_def=1000;
Param.TVRP_def=100;

% States and initialization %%% T1
States.TIRI_cur=Param.TIRI_def;
States.TVRP_cur=Param.TVRP_def;
States.Cur_stateVRP='VRP_on';
States.VS_up=0;
States.VS=0;
States.Cur_stateLRI='LRI_off'; %%% T2
States.VP_internal=0;

% Default input
Ain=0;
Vin=0;

% Output
VP=0; %% T1

% Global Clock
t=0;
data=[];
% Running the Pacemaker
while t<2500
    t=t+1;
    % Your pacemaker function here:
    [States,VP]=HW3_ZhihaoJiang_FM(Ain,Vin,States,Param);
end
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```



```
10/27/2019
```




IN THE LAST LECTURE...

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WHAT IS TRACEABILITY?

- We would like to make sure that
 - All requirements are implemented
 - All implementations are necessary
- Trace artifacts
 - Requirements, models, code, etc.
- Trace link
 - Association between two trace artifacts
 - Type: Refinement, Abstraction, Implementation, etc.
- Trace granularity: component level, statement level, etc.
- Trace quality: completeness, correctness, etc.



Requirement
Stop movie at request or at the end (no auto restart)
Start playing movie within 1 sec after selection

Structure
Display → Streamer
select(), play(), stop() → stream(), wait()

Behavior
select → play → stop
play → stop

Code
Test Suite → Testcases
Testcases → Code (represented by a circuit diagram)

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WHAT WE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT TRACEABILITY

- Traceability is not just traceability documentation
- Traceability is a requirement, just like safety and correctness
- Will be one of the most important judging criteria for final projects

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LECTURE 10: TESTING

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WHY?

- Validation: whether the system satisfy the requirement
 - Functional Testing
- Verification: whether the system conform with the specification
 - Conformance Testing

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WHO AND WHEN?


- Testing is performed by test engineers after the initial development
- Test design engineers may be different from test engineers
- The test engineers should be able to do it without participating the development process

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SOFTWARE CHARACTERISTICS

- Functional characteristics
- Non-functional characteristics
- Non-functional tests should be performed together with functional tests



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EARLY TESTING

- The cost of finding (and fixing) a defect
 - In the design phase is “1”.
 - In the coding phase, multiplied by “10”
 - During the test phase (system test or acceptance test), multiplied by “100”.
 - In production (by the customer or by a user), multiplied by “1,000”.

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INDEPENDENCE LEVEL

- Same person
- Pair programming
- Independent tester from the same team
- From the same company
- Third party

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TESTING MENTALITY

- A developer will try to find **one** solution to a particular problem, and will design the program based on the solution envisioned;
- A tester will try to identify **all** possible failures that might have been forgotten.
- A developer usually has two hats: the developer's and the tester's
- Our brain has a tendency to hide defects because it is looking for usual patterns.
- Need to have different perspectives

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TESTING IS NOT A DESTRUCTIVE ACTIVITY

- The defects were not introduced by testers, but developers
- It is not personal, it is just business
 - Point out defects should not look bad for developers
 - need good relational skills

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TEST CASES AND TEST SUITE

- Test a software using a set of carefully designed test cases:
 - The set of all test cases is called the test suite

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TEST CASES AND TEST SUITE



- A test case is a triplet [I,S,O]:
 - I is the data to be input to the system,
 - S is the state of the system at which the data is input,
 - O is the expected output from the system.

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DESIGN OF TEST CASES



- Exhaustive testing of any non-trivial system is impractical:
 - input data domain is extremely large.
- Design an optimal test suite:
 - of reasonable size
 - to uncover as many errors as possible.

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DESIGN OF TEST CASES



- If test cases are selected randomly:
 - Many test cases do not contribute to the significance of the test suite,
 - Do not detect errors not already detected by other test cases in the suite.
- The number of test cases in a randomly selected test suite:
 - Not an indication of the effectiveness of the testing.

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DESIGN OF TEST CASES



- Testing a system using a large number of randomly selected test cases:
 - does not mean that many errors in the system will be uncovered.
- Consider an example:
 - finding the maximum of two integers x and y.

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DESIGN OF TEST CASES

- If $(x>y)$ max = x;
else max = x;
- The code has a simple error:
- test suite $\{(x=3,y=2);(x=2,y=3)\}$ can detect the error,
- a larger test suite $\{(x=3,y=2);(x=4,y=3); (x=5,y=1)\}$ does not detect the error.

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INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

- ISO/IEC/IEEE 29119-4 Software and Systems Engineering – Software Testing – Part 4: Test Techniques
- Available on Blackboard

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TEST DESIGN (TD) PROCESS

- TD1: Identify feature set
- TD2: Derive test conditions
- TD3: Derive test coverage items
- TD4: Derive test cases
- TD5: Assemble test sets
- TD6: Derive test procedures

The process is shown as purely sequential, but in practice it may be carried out in parallel, with some activities being revisited. See ISO/IEC/IEEE 29119-2 for details.

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TEST DESIGN TECHNIQUES

- Specification-based Testing
 - Black-box Testing
- Structure-based Testing
 - White-box Testing
- Experience-based Testing

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SPECIFICATION-BASED TESTING

- Equivalence Partitioning
- State Transition Testing
- Scenario Testing



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EQUIVALENCE PARTITIONING

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EXAMPLE: EQUIVALENCE PARTITIONING

- Homework (HW) 25pt
- Exam 75pt
- Specification: A function *generate_grading*
 - $\text{HW+Exam} \geq 70 \rightarrow \text{'A'}$
 - $50 \leq \text{HW+Exam} < 70 \rightarrow \text{'B'}$
 - $30 \leq \text{HW+Exam} < 50 \rightarrow \text{'C'}$
 - $\text{HW+Exam} < 30 \rightarrow \text{'D'}$
 - Invalid inputs $\rightarrow \text{'FM'}$



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
STEP 1: IDENTIFY FEATURE SETS (TD1)

- FS1: *generate_grading* function

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 **STEP 2: DERIVE TEST CONDITIONS (TD2)**


- Input Partitions
 - Valid
 - TCOND1: $0 \leq \text{Exam} \leq 75$
 - TCOND2: $0 \leq \text{HW} \leq 25$
 - Invalid
 - TCOND3: $\text{Exam} < 0$
 - TCOND4: $\text{Exam} > 75$
 - TCOND5: $\text{HW} < 0$
 - TCOND6: $\text{HW} > 25$
 - TCOND7: non-integer Exam input
 - TCOND8: non-integer HW input



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 **STEP 2: DERIVE TEST CONDITIONS (TD2) (CONT)**


- Output Partitions
 - TCOND9: 'A' induced by $70 \leq \text{Total} \leq 100$
 - TCOND10: 'B' induced by $50 \leq \text{Total} < 70$
 - TCOND11: 'C' induced by $30 \leq \text{Total} < 50$
 - TCOND12: 'D' induced by $0 \leq \text{Total} < 30$
 - TCOND13: 'Fault Message' (FM) induced by $\text{Total} > 100$
 - TCOND14: 'Fault Message' (FM) induced by $\text{Total} < 0$
 - TCOND15: 'Fault Message' (FM) induced by non-integer inputs



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 **STEP 3: DERIVE TEST COVERAGE ITEMS (TD3)**

- Specify a test coverage item (TCOVER) for each test condition (TCOND)
 - TCOVER1: $0 \leq \text{Exam} \leq 75$ (for TCOND1)
 - TCOVER2: $0 \leq \text{HW} \leq 25$ (for TCOND2)
 - ...



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 **STEP 4: DERIVE TEST CASES (TD4)**

- Attempt to "hit" Test Coverage Items
 - One-to-One: One test case for EACH Test Coverage item
 - More test cases but more intuitive
 - Minimized: Each test case may exercise more than one Test Coverage Items
 - Less test cases



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**STEP 4: DERIVE TEST CASES (TD4)
ONE-TO-ONE**



- Test cases for input Exam
- Test cases for input HW
- Test cases for non-integer inputs
- Test cases for valid output

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**STEP 4: DERIVE TEST CASES (TD4)
ONE-TO-ONE**



Test cases for input Exam

Test Case	1	2	3
Input (Exam)	60	-10	93
Input (HW)	15	15	15
Total	75	5	108
Test Coverage Item	TCOVER1	TCOVER3	TCOVER4
Partition Tested	0<=Exam<=75	Exam<0	Exam>75
Expected Output	'A'	'FM'	'FM'

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**STEP 4: DERIVE TEST CASES (TD4)
MINIMIZED**



Test Case	1	2	3	4
Input (Exam)	60	50	35	19
Input (HW)	20	16	10	8
Total	80	66	45	27
Test Coverage Item	TCOVER1 TCOVER2 TCOVER9	TCOVER1 TCOVER2 TCOVER10	TCOVER1 TCOVER2 TCOVER11	TCOVER1 TCOVER2 TCOVER12
Partition Exam	0<=Exam<=75	0<=Exam<=75	0<=Exam<=75	0<=Exam<=75
Partition HW	0<=HW<=25	0<=HW<=25	0<=HW<=25	0<=HW<=25
Partition Total	70<=Total<=100	50<=Total<70	30<=Total<50	0<=Total<30
Expected Output	'A'	'B'	'C'	'D'

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STEP 5: ASSEMBLE TEST SETS (TD5)



- Arrange test cases sequences for efficient testing

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 **TEST COVERAGE MEASUREMENT**



- Coverage = $\left(\frac{N}{T} \times 100\right)\%$
 - N is the number of test coverage items covered by test cases
 - T is the number of identified test coverage items
- Coverage is only measured for a particular criteria
- Coverage criteria has strength

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STATE TRANSITION TESTING

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 **EXAMPLE: MANAGE DISPLAY**



- A function: manage_display_changes
- 4 inputs
 - Change Mode (CM)
 - Reset (R)
 - Time Set (TS)
 - Date Set (DS)

```

graph LR
    S1[DISPLAYING TIME S1] -- "reset (R)  
alter time (AT)" --> S3[CHANGING TIME S3]
    S3 -- "time set (TS)  
display time (T)" --> S1
    S1 -- "change mode (CM)  
display time (T)" --> S2[DISPLAYING DATE S2]
    S2 -- "change mode (CM)  
display date (D)" --> S1
    S3 -- "reset (R)  
alter date (AD)" --> S4[CHANGING DATE S4]
    S4 -- "date set (DS)  
display date (D)" --> S3
  
```



STEP 1: IDENTIFY FEATURE SETS (TD1)




- FS1: manage_display_changes

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STEP 2: DERIVE TEST CONDITIONS (TD2)

- The state model is the test condition



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STEP 3: DERIVE TEST COVERAGE ITEMS

- All states
 - Test cases should visit all states in the model
- Single transition (0-switch coverage)
 - Only valid transitions
- All transitions
 - Both valid and invalid transitions
- Multiple transitions (N-switch coverage)
 - Valid sequences of N+1 transitions in the state model

Table B.31 — State table for manage_display_changes

	CM	R	TS	DS
S1	S2/D	S3/AT	S1/-	S1/-
S2	S1/T	S4/AD	S2/-	S2/-
S3	S3/-	S3/-	S1/T	S3/-
S4	S4/-	S4/-	S4/-	S2/D

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STEP 3: DERIVE TEST COVERAGE ITEMS (TD3)

- TCOVER1: S1 to S2 with input CM (valid)
- TCOVER2: S1 to S3 with input R (valid)
- ...

Table B.31 — State table for manage_display_changes

	CM	R	TS	DS
S1	S2/D	S3/AT	S1/-	S1/-
S2	S1/T	S4/AD	S2/-	S2/-
S3	S3/-	S3/-	S1/T	S3/-
S4	S4/-	S4/-	S4/-	S2/D

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STEP 4: DERIVE VALID TEST CASES (TD4) 0-SWITCH TEST CASES

- 0-switch test cases
- Invalid test cases should not cause state changes

Table B.31 — State table for manage_display_changes

	CM	R	TS	DS
S1	S2/D	S3/AT	S1/-	S1/-
S2	S1/T	S4/AD	S2/-	S2/-
S3	S3/-	S3/-	S1/T	S3/-
S4	S4/-	S4/-	S4/-	S2/D

Table B.33 — 0-switch test cases for manage_display_changes

Test Case	1	2	3	4	5	6
Start State	S1	S1	S2	S2	S3	S4
Input	CM	R	CM	R	TS	DS
Expected Output	D	AT	T	AD	T	D
Finish State	S2	S3	S1	S4	S1	S2
Test Coverage Item	1	2	5	6	11	16

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STEP 4: DERIVE VALID TEST CASES (TD4)

1-SWITCH TEST CASES

- TCOVER 17: S1 to S2 to S1 with inputs CM and CM
- ...

Table B.35 — 1-switch test cases for manage_display_changes

Test Case	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
Start State	S1	S1	S1	S3	S3	S2	S2	S4	S4	S4
Input	CM	CM	R	TS	TS	CM	CM	R	DS	DS
Expected Output	D	D	AT	T	T	T	T	AD	D	D
Next State	S2	S2	S3	S1	S1	S1	S4	S2	S2	S2
Input	CM	R	TS	CM	R	CM	R	DS	CM	R
Expected Output	T	AD	T	D	AT	D	T	AD	T	AD
Finish State	S1	S4	S1	S2	S2	S3	S2	S1	S4	S4
Test Coverage Item	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26

Diagram illustrating state transitions for managing display changes. It shows four states: DISPLAYING TIME (S1), CHANGING TIME (S3), DISPLAYING DATE (S2), and CHANGING DATE (S4). Transitions are triggered by 'change mode' (CM) or 'reset' (R) inputs. Labels indicate 'display time (T)', 'display date (D)', and specific command types like 'time set' (TS), 'date set' (DS), etc.

STEP 5: ASSEMBLE TEST SETS

- TS1: 0 switch test cases - Test cases 1,2,3,4,5,6
- More efficient if rearranged to 5,1,4,6,3,2
 - The finish state of test case n is the start state of test case n+1

Table B.33 — 0-switch test cases for manage_display_changes

Test Case	1	2	3	4	5	6
Start State	S1	S1	S2	S2	S3	S4
Input	CM	R	CM	R	TS	DS
Expected Output	D	AT	T	AD	T	D
Finish State	S2	S3	S1	S4	S1	S2
Test Coverage Item	1	2	5	6	11	16

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THE PACEMAKER EXAMPLE

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VVI PACEMAKER

- Step 1: Identify Feature Sets (TD1)
 - The VVI_pacemaker function
- Step 2: Derive Test Conditions (TD2)
 - VVI_pacemaker model

Diagram of the VVI_pacemaker model. It consists of two main states: VRP (Ventricular Rate Generator) and LRI (Lead Rate Inhibition). The VRP state has transitions for 'VRP_up' (with conditions [VRP_up=0] and [VRP_up=1]), 'VRP_dn' (with conditions [VRP_dn=0] and [VRP_dn=1]), and 'VRP_st' (with condition [VRP_st=0]). The LRI state has transitions for 'LRI_up' (with condition [LRI_up=0]) and 'LRI_dn' (with condition [LRI_dn=1]). Both states have self-loops labeled 'VRP' and 'LRI' respectively. There are also transitions between the two states, such as 'VRP_dn' to 'LRI_up' and 'LRI_dn' to 'VRP_st'. Various internal variables like VP, VRP_out, VRP_in, LRI_out, LRI_in, and TLR_out are shown with their respective update logic.

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