Cryptography Meets Algorithms (15893) Lecture Notes

Lecture 7: Preprocessing PIR Lower Bounds

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In this lecture, we will prove a lower bound about the client space and server computation tradeoff for preprocessing PIR schemes. We will borrow techniques for proving time-space tradeoff from the complexity theory literature.

Specifically, we consider a 1-server preprocessing PIR scheme with the following syntax:

- Preprocessing algorithm. Suppose there is a (possibly randomized and unbounded) preprocessing function denoted Prep: $\{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^S$ that takes in an *n*-bit database DB $\in \{0,1\}^n$ as input, and outputs an S-bit hint string denoted h.
- A single query. The client and the server perform a (possibly randomized) query protocol. The client takes in h and some index $i \in [n]$ as input, and the server takes the database $\mathsf{DB} \in \{0,1\}^n$ as input. To answer the query, the server is allowed to read at most T locations of the database.

In other words, we do not place any restriction on the amount of work performed during preprocessing. The only constraints are that at the end of the preprocessing: 1) the client is allowed to store only the hint h; and 2) the server is allowed to store only the original database DB and no extra information.

We assume perfect correctness, i.e., for any $\mathsf{DB} \in \{0,1\}^n$, any query $i \in [n]$, correctness holds with probability 1. Let $\mathsf{view}_S(\mathsf{DB},i)$ denote the server's view during the query phase when we run the PIR scheme (i.e., preprocessing followed by the query protocol) over inputs DB and i. For security, we require that for any $\mathsf{DB} \in \{0,1\}^n$, any $i,j \in [n]$, $\mathsf{view}_S(\mathsf{DB},i) \approx \mathsf{view}_S(\mathsf{DB},j)$ where \approx means computational indistinguishability.

For such a preprocessing PIR scheme, we will prove a tradeoff between S and T as stated in the following theorem:

Theorem 1 (Time space tradeoff for preprocessing PIR [CGK20]). Given a 1-server preprocessing PIR, let S be the client space, and let T be the server computation per query. Then, $(S+1)(T+1) \ge N$. [elaine: TODO: edit the theorem based on what we can prove later]

Again, note that the lower bound holds even when we allow the preprocessing to be unbounded, even when there is only a single query after the preprocessing, and even when the query phase may have arbitrarily many rounds of interaction.

Piano. Recall that in an earlier lecture, we covered Piano [ZPSZ23], a preprocessing 1-server PIR scheme. It uses the client-specific preprocessing model, meaning that each client has a subscription phase with the server, during which it will perform preprocessing. Piano enjoys the following performance bounds:

- Client space: $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$ where $\widetilde{O}(\cdot)$ hides a(n arbitrarily small) superlogarithmic function.
- Communication per query: $O(\sqrt{n})$
- Server computation per query: $O(\sqrt{n})$

We can see that Piano achieves optimal client space and server computation tradeoff (up to polylogarithmic factors) in light of Theorem 1.

Before proving Theorem 1, we first prove a time-space tradeoff for a classical problem called the Yao's box problem [Yao90], and we shall see why Yao's box problem is closely related to preprocessing PIR.

1 Yao's Box Problem

We have a server with N boxes, each covering a bit. Note that this is not a PIR scheme, because it does not provide any privacy guarantees.

Preprocessing Phase Client and server can open all bits, and run arbitrary and unbounded computations. However, we have a constraint that at the end of the preprocessing, client can only store S bits of information.

Query Client wants to know the i-th bit. We allow the client and server to have unbounded communication and work. We have a constraint that the server can open at most T boxes and it cannot open box i.

Upper Bound

- 1. Divide the N boxes into \sqrt{N} segments.
- 2. Preprocessing Phase: Have the client store the parity of each segment.
- 3. Query Phase (i): Server opens every box in i's segment except i and sends the parity back to the client. As the client knows the parity of each segment, it can easily reconstruct the value of bit i.

Here,
$$S = \sqrt{N}$$
 and $T = \sqrt{N} - 1$

Lower Bound

Theorem 2.
$$S(T+1) \geq N$$

Proof. We will be using an encoding type argument. Consider the following experiment.

- 1. Run preprocessing
- 2. Define an empty set called known = {}. In each step i, the client finds the smallest $q_i \notin \text{known}$, queries q_i .

With this step, known \iff known $\cup \{q_i\} \cup$ all boxes opened during query

3. If known $\neq [N]$, break. Otherwise, repeat step 2 again.

Let the "client's hint" denote whatever information that the client stores after the preprocessing phase. The hint is at most S bits long.

Define the encoding enc for this process as follows:

enc = client's hint + all "newly opened" boxes in all queries

We write "newly opened" because we do not want to include values that have already been recorded in the encoding.

By Shannon's theorem, we will show that $|enc| \geq N$.

Let $t_1, t_2, \dots t_k$ be the number of newly opened boxes at each step $i \in [k]$.

Note here that we have the power of **plus one**; if I open t boxes, I end up learning t + 1 new bits. This is because I also learn the value of the query without opening its box.

Thus, the known set increments with the following pattern.

- We newly open t_1 boxes: known increments by $t_1 + 1$
- We newly open t_2 boxes: known increments by $t_2 + 1$
- and so on...

Thus, we have that $\sum_{i=1}^{k} (t_i + 1) \ge N$. Let $t = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} t_i}{k}$. Note that t is the average number of boxes opened on each iteration so it must be upper bounded by T, the maximum number of boxes that can be opened in an iteration. Since we repeat the steps until known = [N], we have that

$$\sum_{i=1}^{k} (t_i + 1) \ge N \implies (t+1)k \ge N \implies k \ge \frac{N}{t+1}$$
 (1)

The encoding size is $S + \sum_{i=1}^{k} t_k = S + tk$. By Shannon's we have that $S + tk \ge N$. By (1), we have that

$$S + tk \ge N$$

$$\implies S + t \frac{N}{t+1} \ge N$$

$$\implies S(t+1) \ge N$$

$$\implies S(T+1) \ge N$$
(Simplification)
$$\implies S(T+1) \ge N$$
(As $t \le T$)

2 PIR Lower Bound

Using our knowledge of Yao's Box Problem, let's know try to prove the PIR lower bound.

Theorem 3. Suppose we have a 1 server prepossessing PIR with perfect correctness and negl(n) privacy loss with client space S and server computation T per query. Then,

$$(S+1)(T+1) \ge N \quad [CGK20]$$

This lower bound holds even for computationally private schemes. It holds even for a single query, regardless of bandwidth, server space, even when preprocessing can be unbounded. However, we have a restriction that the server stores the original database and nothing else. That is, it does not store any encoding of the database.

For the proof, we will show that a solution to the PIR problem can be used to construct an algorithm to solve a probabilistic version of Yao's Box Problem.

Probabilistic Yao's Box Problem Suppose we have a working PIR scheme. Now, we will construct a solution to probabilistic Yao's Box Problem as follows:

- Client's Hint: PIR's hint
- Query for $i \in [N]$: Run PIR for query i. If server looks at $\mathsf{DB}[i]$, then output "error".

We want to show the following. Given that PIRExpt: $i \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} [N]$, PIR preprocessing, PIR query on i,

$$p = \mathbb{P}[\text{PIRExpt opens } i] \leq \frac{T}{N} + \mathsf{negl}(N)$$

That is, we want to show that if we run a PIR query with the a random index i, the probability we open that index is small.

For a fixed i, define the following probability $p_i = \mathbb{P}[PIR \text{ on } i \text{ looks at } i]$. Then,

$$p = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i} p^{i}$$

Assume for the sake of contradiction that $p > \frac{T}{N} + \mu$, where μ is non-negligible.

Let $p_{ji} = \mathbb{P}[PIR \text{ on } j \text{ opens } i]$. Since our scheme is private, the different indices should be computationally indistinguishable. Thus, this probability should be equally distributed. As a result,

$$p_{ii} = \mathbb{P}[\text{PIR on } j \text{ opens } i] \ge p_i - \mathsf{negl}(N)$$

$$\begin{split} E[\text{server work for PIR on } j] &\geq \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_{ji} \\ &\geq \sum_{i=1}^{N} (p_i - \mathsf{negl}(N)) \\ &= Np - \mathsf{negl}(N) \\ &\geq T + \mu N - \mathsf{negl}(N) \end{split} \tag{By def. of } p) \\ &\geq T + \mu N - \mathsf{negl}(N) \tag{As } p > \frac{T}{N} + \mu) \end{split}$$

Thus, we have a contradiction because the expected number of locations the server needs to look at is strictly greater than T. Thus, we have shown that

$$\mathbb{P}[\text{PIRExpt opens } i] \leq \frac{T}{N} + \mathsf{negl}(N)$$

Shifting our focus back to Yao's Box problem with probabilistic correctness on random index, the probabilistic correctness is

$$\mathbb{P}[i \xleftarrow{\$} \text{correct for } i] \geq 1 - \frac{T}{N} - \mathsf{negl}(N)$$

Encoding Argument Randomness comes from two parts: the preprocessing part (the client's hint), and the query part. With this in mind, we will be using an augmented version of the encoding type argument in 1.

Consider the following experiment.

- 1. Run preprocessing, and choose a "reasonably good hint." Initially, let the encoding be just the hint. We will add to this encoding as we go forward.
- 2. Define an empty set called $known = \{\}$
- 3. In each step i, find the smallest $q_i \notin \mathsf{known}$.
 - If \exists online coins such that query q_i will give the correct answer, choose the lexicographically smallest coin. Execute query.

known
$$\iff \bigcup \{q_i\} \cup \{\text{all newly opened}\}\$$

Add "newly opened" to encoding.

- Else add q_i -th bit to the encoding.
- 4. Repeat until known = [N].

A hint is bad for $i \in [N]$ if $\mathbb{P}[\text{query } i \text{ correct}|\text{hint}] = 0$. That is, there does not exist an online coin such that the query is correct.

Claim 4. \exists hint that's bad for at most T+1 location.

Proof. If all hints are bad for more than T+1 locations, then

$$\mathbb{P}[i \in [N], \text{correct on } i] < 1 - \frac{T+1}{N}$$

We have a contradiction, because it disagrees with our probabilistic correctness result above.

Finally, we can reason about the encoding length.

Suppose the worst case where the hint is bad for exactly T+1 locations. Let b_{bad} be the encoding of the "newly opened" boxes in the bad queries, and b_{good} be the encoding of the "newly opened boxes in the good queries.

- $|b_{\mathsf{bad}}| = T + 1$, as each bad iteration adds one bit, and we have T + 1 iterations.
- To find $|\mathbf{b}_{good}|$, we repeat the argument from 1. Let $t_1, t_2, \dots t_k$ be the number of newly opened boxes at each good step $i \in [k]$.

By the "plus one" argument, we have that $\sum_{i=1}^{k} (t_i + 1) \ge N - (T+1)$. We subtract T+1 here because those indices have been handled by the bad iterations.

Let $t = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} t_i}{k}$. Then as before, we have $k \ge \frac{N}{t+1}$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{k} (t_i + 1) \ge N - (T+1)$$

$$\implies tk + k \ge N - T - 1$$

$$\implies k \ge \frac{N - T - 1}{t + 1}$$

Thus,
$$|\mathsf{b}_{\mathsf{good}}| = tk \ge t \frac{N-T-1}{t+1}$$

With the information above, we can mek the following conclusion.

$$\begin{split} |\mathsf{enc}| &= S + |\mathsf{b}_{\mathsf{good}}| + |\mathsf{b}_{\mathsf{bad}}| \geq N \\ &\implies S + t \frac{N - T - 1}{t + 1} + T + 1 \geq N \\ &\implies S(t + 1) + T + 1 \geq N \\ &\implies (S + 1)(T + 1) \geq N \end{split} \tag{By simplification}$$

References

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