

Lab 9-1

Analyze the malware found in the file Lab09-01.exe using OllyDbg and IDA Pro to answer the following questions. This malware was initially analyzed in the Chapter 3 labs using basic static and dynamic analysis techniques.

Questions:

1. How can you get this malware to install itself?

Run strings command to identify possible command line arguments. Ex: -cc, -re, -in

This may indicate a dependency on certain command line arguments being present in the binary

-in stands for install, therefore this is likely what is needed in the command line.

```
004028CC push lab09-01.40C114      "60"
004028D1 push lab09-01.40C110      "80"
004028D6 push lab09-01.40C0E8      "http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com"
004028DB push lab09-01.40C0E4      "ups"
004029E1 mov edi,lab09-01.40C134    "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\\"
00402A3E mov edi,lab09-01.40C12C    ".exe"
00402B48 push lab09-01.40C170      "-in"
00402BD3 push lab09-01.40C16C      "-re"
00402C58 push lab09-01.40C168      "-c"
00402CE5 push lab09-01.40C164      "-cc"
00402D58 push lab09-01.40C14C      "k:%s h:%s p:%s per:%s\n"
00403381 push lab09-01.408180      "COMSPEC"
004033CC push lab09-01.40817C      "/"
004033FB mov eax,lab09-01.408170    "command.com"
00403402 mov eax,lab09-01.40C0CC    "cmd.exe"
```

The first line the program stops at after initially running f9, is the main function.

Manually scroll down to look for where the main function is first being called. [402AF0]

By setting a breakpoint on this function call and hitting f9, the program then runs up until this point.

Step into this function call, and the first line that is hit is the prologue.

From the prologue, go down to the first cmp instruction [ebp +8]

F7 to run the compare function, which hits the JNE instruction. These values are equal. It doesn't jump.


Continue stepping through the function and it eventually exits/deletes itself.

2. What are the command-line options for this program? What is the password requirement?

This malware deletes/terminates after running because there are no arguments added. This is an anti-reversing effort made by the author of the malware. By default, if the program is ran without any command line arguments, the program deletes itself.

NOTE: Adding a "-in" to the command line allows the program to run longer

However, the program is still looking for more arguments.



Here, the program is running a open service manager command, which may be an install taking place.

Assembly code snippet from OllyDbg:

```

004026CC FF15 00804000 call dword ptr ds:[<&OpenSCManagerA>]
004026D2 8985 FCFBFFFF mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-404],eax
004026D8 83BD FCFBFFFF cmp dword ptr ss:[ebp-404],0
004026DF 75 0A jne lab09-01.4026EB
004026E1 B8 01000000 mov eax,1
004026E6 E9 0A020000 jmp lab09-01.4026F5
004026EB 68 FF010F00 push F01FF
004026F0 50 mov eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp+8]
004026F3 50 push eax
004026F4 8B8D FCFBFFFF mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-404]
004026FA 51 push ecx
004026FB FF15 04804000 call dword ptr ds:[<&OpenServiceA>]
00402701 8985 F8EBFFFF mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-1408],eax
00402707 83BD F8EBFFFF cmp dword ptr ss:[ebp-1408],0
0040270E 74 6D jle lab09-01.40277D
00402710 6A 00 push 0
00402712 6A 00 push 0
00402714 6A 00 push 0
00402716 6A 00 push 0
00402718 6A 00 push 0
0040271A 6A 00 push 0
0040271C 8D95 FCF7FFFF lea edx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-804]
00402722 52 push edx
00402723 6A FF push FFFFFFFF
00402725 6A 02 push 2
00402727 50 push FFFFFFFF
00402729 8B85 F8EBFFFF mov eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-1408]

```

Register Window (FPU hidden):

EAX	01920854	"-in"
EBX	003A0000	
ECX	01920AC8	&"C:\Users\wv867\Downloads\Practic"
EDX	01920854	"-in"
EBP	0014FF40	"3+@"
ESI	00403896	<lab09-01.EntryPoint>
EDI	00403896	<lab09-01.EntryPoint>
EIP	00402510	lab09-01.00402510

STATUS: 00000302
 ZF 0 PF 0 AF 0
 OF 0 SF 0 DF 0
 CF 0 TF 1 IF 1
 LastError: 00000000 (ERROR_SUCCESS)
 LastStatus: C0150008 (STATUS_SXS_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
 GS 0000 FS 0038
 ES 0023 DS 0023

Default (stdcall) 5 Unlocked

1: [esp+4] 01920854 "-in"
 2: [esp+8] 00591E60
 3: [esp+C] 76EF36D6 ntdll.76EF36D6
 4: [esp+10] 74F83C78 "CtfImmGetCompatibleKeyboardLayout"

.text:004026CC lab09-01.exe:\$26CC #26CC

3.How can you use OllyDbg to permanently patch this malware, so that it doesn't require the special command-line password?

You can patch the binary by changing the 0x402510 address in memory to always return true. The assembly instruction is MOV EAX, 0x1; RETN.

Assembly code snippet from OllyDbg:

```

00402515 8B7D 08 mov edi,dword ptr ss:[ebp+8]
00402518 83C9 FF or ecx,FFFFFFFF
0040251B 33C0 xor eax,eax
0040251D F2:AE repne scasb
0040251F 7D11 not ecx
00402521 83C1 FF add ecx,FFFFFFFF
00402524 83F9 04 cmp ecx,4
00402527 74 04 jle lab09-01.40252D
00402529 33C0 xor eax,eax
0040252B EB 73 jmp lab09-01.4025A0
0040252D 8B45 08 mov eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp+8]
00402530 8A08 mov cl,byte ptr ds:[eax]
00402532 8B4D FC mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-4],cl
00402535 0FB555 FC movsx ecx,byte ptr ss:[ebp-4]
00402539 83FA 61 cmp edx,61
0040253C 74 04 jle lab09-01.402542
0040253E 33C0 xor eax,eax
00402540 EB 5E jmp lab09-01.4025A0
00402542 8B45 08 mov eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp+8]
00402545 8A48 01 mov cl,byte ptr ds:[eax+1]
00402548 8B4D FC mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-4],cl
0040254B 8B55 08 mov edx,dword ptr ss:[ebp+8]
0040254E 8A45 FC mov al,byte ptr ss:[ebp-4]
00402551 2A02 sub al,byte ptr ds:[edx]
00402553 8B45 FC mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-4],al
00402556 0FB54D FC movsx ecx,byte ptr ss:[ebp-4]
0040255A 83F9 01 cmp ecx,1

```

Register Window (FPU hidden):

EAX	00000000	
EBX	00248000	
ECX	FFFFFFFF	
EDX	019D0BAC	"abcd"
EBP	0014FF40	"3+@"
ESI	00403896	<lab09-01.EntryPoint>
EDI	00000003	
EIP	0040251D	lab09-01.0040251D

STATUS: 00010246
 ZF 1 PF 1 AE 0
 OF 0 SF 0 DF 0
 CF 0 TF 0 IF 1
 LastError: 00000000 (ERROR_SUCCESS)
 LastStatus: C0150008 (STATUS_SXS_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
 GS 0000 FS 0038
 ES 0023 DS 0023


Default (stdcall) 5 Unlocked

1: [esp+4] 019D0BAC "abcd"
 2: [esp+8] 0046D710
 3: [esp+C] 771A36D6 ntdll.771A36D6
 4: [esp+10] 76B53C78 "CtfImmGetCompatibleKeyboardLayout"

.text:0040251D lab09-01.exe:\$251D #251D


4.What are the host-based indicators of this malware?

The malware creates the registry key HKLM\Software\Microsoft\XPS\Configuration



5. What are the different actions this malware can be instructed to take via the network?

SLEEP, UPLOAD, DOWNLOAD, CMD, or NOTHING.



6. Are there any useful network-based signatures for this malware?

<http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/>

Lab 9-2

Analyze the malware found in the file Lab09-02.exe using OllyDbg to answer the following questions.

Questions

1. What strings do you see statically in the binary?

Below is the CMD sting. It appears statically in the binary.




2. What happens when you run this binary?

It terminates almost immediately.

3. How can you get this sample to run its malicious payload?


Change the name of the file to ocl.exe



The screenshot shows the assembly window of OllyDbg. The instruction list on the left includes several `mov byte ptr [ebp-1A4], 0` and `mov byte ptr [ebp-1A0], 6F` instructions. The register window on the right shows the status of various registers: `OF 0 SF 0 DF 0`, `CF 0 TF 0 IF 1`, `LastError 00000000 (ERROR_SUCCESS)`, `LastStatus C0000008 (STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE)`, `GS 0000 FS 003B`, and `ES 0023 DS 0023`. The status bar at the bottom indicates the current instruction is `Default (stdcall)`.

4. What is happening at 0x00401133?


A string is being built on the stack.



The screenshot shows the assembly window of OllyDbg with the instruction list. The instruction at address 0x00401133 is `mov byte ptr [ebp-1A0], 31`. The register window on the right shows the status of various registers: `EAX 00880DA0 &"ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\\Program`, `EBX 00321000`, `ECX 001D47C0`, `EDX 001D0000`, `EBP 0014FF40`, `ESP 0014FC34 <&EntryPoint>`, `ESI 00401577 <lab09-02.EntryPoint>`, and `EIP 00401133 lab09-02.00401133`.

5. What arguments are being passed to subroutine 0x00401089?

The string "1qaz2wsx3edc"



The screenshot shows the assembly window of OllyDbg with the instruction list. The instruction at address 0x00401133 is `mov byte ptr [ebp-1A0], 31`. The register window on the right shows the status of various registers: `EAX 00880DA0 &"ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\\Program`, `EBX 00321000`, `ECX 001D47C0`, `EDX 001D0000`, `EBP 0014FF40`, `ESP 0014FC34 <&EntryPoint>`, `ESI 00401577 <lab09-02.EntryPoint>`, and `EIP 00401133 lab09-02.00401133`.

6. What domain name does this malware use?

Practicalmalwareanalysis.com

7. What encoding routine is being used to obfuscate the domain name?

The malware will XOR the encoded DNS name with the string 1qaz2wsx3edc to decode the domain name.

8. What is the significance of the CreateProcessA call at 0x0040106E?

The CreateProcessA is called with cmd as an argument, this will create a reverse shell by tying the command shell to the socket.

Lab 9-3

Analyze the malware found in the file Lab09-03.exe using OllyDbg and IDA Pro. This malware loads three included DLLs (DLL1.dll, DLL2.dll, and DLL3.dll) that are all built to request the same memory load location. Therefore, when viewing these DLLs in OllyDbg versus IDA Pro, code may appear at different memory locations. The purpose of this

lab is to make you comfortable with finding the correct location of code within IDA Pro when you are looking at code in OllyDbg.

Questions

1. What DLLs are imported by Lab09-03.exe?

The import table contains kernel32.dll, NetAPI32.dll, DLL1.dll, and DLL2.dll.

The malware dynamically loads user32.dll and DLL3.dll.

Base	Module	Party	Path
00020000	d112.dll	User	C:\Users\wv867\Downloads\PracticalMalwareAnalysis-Labs
00400000	lab09-03.exe	User	C:\Users\wv867\Downloads\PracticalMalwareAnalysis-Labs
10000000	d111.dll	User	C:\Users\wv867\Downloads\PracticalMalwareAnalysis-Labs
6AD40000	netapi32.dll	System	C:\Windows\System32\netapi32.dll
6E2A0000	shedcli.dll	System	C:\Windows\System32\shedcli.dll
742C0000	kernelbase.dll	System	C:\Windows\System32\kernelbase.dll
74620000	ucrtbase.dll	System	C:\Windows\System32\ucrtbase.dll
74820000	msvcrt.dll	System	C:\Windows\System32\msvcrt.dll
76610000	kernel32.dll	System	C:\Windows\System32\kernel32.dll
769E0000	rpcrt4.dll	System	C:\Windows\System32\rpcrt4.dll
77170000	ntdll.dll	System	C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll

2.What is the base address requested by DLL1.dll, DLL2.dll, and DLL3.dll?

Requested base address = 10000000. The compiler will select a default address for all DLL's when they are selected

004D6000	000FA000	Reserved (004D0000)	PRV	---	---	---
005D0000	000C5000	\Device\Harddiskvolume2\Windows\	MAP	-R---	---	---
006A0000	000FD000	Reserved	PRV	---	---	---
0079D000	00003000	Thread 1808 Stack	PRV	-RW-G	---	---
007A0000	000FD000	Reserved	PRV	---	---	---
0089D000	00003000	Thread 1A0F Stack	PRV	-RW-G	---	---
10000000	00001000	d111.dll	IMG	-R---	ERWC-	---
10001000	00006000	".text"	IMG	ER---	ERWC-	---
10007000	00001000	".rdata"	IMG	-R---	ERWC-	---
10008000	00005000	".data"	IMG	-RWC-	ERWC-	---
1000D000	00001000	".reloc"	IMG	-R---	ERWC-	---

3.When you use OllyDbg to debug Lab09-03.exe, what is the assigned based address for: DLL1.dll, DLL2.dll, and DLL3.dll?

Since DLL1 has a preferred load address of 10000000, DLL2 and DLL3 were relocated to the following:

Address	Size	Info	Content	Type	Protection	Initial
00010000	00010000	d112.dll		MAP	-RW--	-RW--
00020000	00001000		Executable code	IMG	-R---	ERWC-
00021000	00006000	".text"	Read-only initialized data	IMG	ER---	ERWC-
00027000	00001000	".rdata"	Initialized data	IMG	-R---	ERWC-
00028000	00005000	".data"	Base relocations	IMG	-RWC-	ERWC-
0002D000	00001000	".reloc"		MAP	-R---	-R---
00030000	00019000			PRV	---	---
00050000	000FC000	Reserved				

4.When Lab09-03.exe calls an import function from DLL1.dll, what does this import function do?

DLL1Print is called, and it prints "DLL 1 mystery data," followed by the contents of a global variable.

CC	int3			OF 0 SF 0 DF 0
CC	int3			CF 0 TF 0 IF 1
55	push ebp	DLL1Print		LastError 00000000 (ERROR_SUCCESS)
8BEC	mov ebp,esp			LastStatus C0070032
A1 30800010	mov eax,dword ptr ds:[10008030]			GS 0000 FS 0038
50	push eax			ES 0023 DS 0023
68 34800010	push d111.10008034			
E8 05000000	call d111.10001038			
83C4 08	add esp,8			
5D	pop ebp			
Default (stdcall) 5 Unlocked				
1: [esp+4] 00B30000				
2: [esp+8] 00000000				
3: [esp+C] 00B305A0				
4: [esp+10] 00B30C60				
ebp=0014FF40				
.text:10001020 d111.dll:\$1020 #1020 <DLL1Print>				

5.When Lab09-03.exe calls WriteFile, what is the filename it writes to?

DLL2ReturnJ returns a filename of temp.txt

00021048	CC	int3	
0002104C	CC	int3	
0002104D	CC	int3	
0002104E	CC	int3	
0002104F	CC	int3	
00021050	55	push ebp	DLL2ReturnJ
00021051	8BEC	mov ebp,esp	
00021053	A1 78800200	mov eax,dword ptr ds:[28078]	eax:"ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\\Progr
00021058	5D	pop ebp	
00021059	C3	ret	
0002105A	53	push ebx	

6. When Lab09-03.exe creates a job using, where does it get the data for the second parameter?

The NetScheduleJobAdd

0040108A	68 10270000	push 2710	
0040108F	FF15 2C504000	call dword ptr ds:[<&Sleep>]	
00401095	33C0	xor eax,eax	eax:"ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\\Progr
00401097	8BE5	mov esp,ebp	
00401099	5D	pop ebp	
0040109A	C3	ret	
0040109B	CC	int3	
0040109C	FF25 88504000	jmp dword ptr ds:[&NetScheduleJobAdd]	JMP:&NetScheduleJobAdd
004010A2	55	push ebp	EntryPoint
004010A3	8BEC	mov ebp,esp	
004010A5	6A FF	push FFFFFFFF	
004010A7	68 C0504000	push lab09-03.4050C0	
004010AC	68 00104000	push lab09-03.4010D0	
004010B1	64:A1 00000000	mov eax,dword ptr [0]	eax:"ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\\Progr
004010B7	50	push eax	eax:"ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\\Progr
004010B8	64:8925 00000000	mov dword ptr [0],esp	

7. While running or debugging the program, you will see that it prints out three pieces of mystery data. What are the following: DLL 1 mystery data 1, DLL 2 mystery data 2, and DLL 3 mystery data 3?

DLL 1 mystery Data ⇒ current process identifier

CC	int3		
CC	int3		
CC	int3		
55	push ebp		DLL1Print
8BEC	mov ebp,esp		
A1 30800010	mov eax,dword ptr ds:[10008030]		eax:"ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\\ProgramData"
50	push eax		eax:"ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\\ProgramData"
68 34800010	push d111.10008034		10008034:"DLL 1 mystery data %d\n"
E8 05000000	call d111.10001038		
83C4 08	add esp,8		
5D	pop ebp		

DLL 2 Mystery Data ⇒ handle to open temp.txt

6A 00	push 0		
68 00000040	push 40000000		
68 30800200	push d112.28030		28030:"temp.txt"
FF15 00700200	call dword ptr ds:[&CreateFileA]		
A3 78800200	mov dword ptr ds:[28078],eax		eax:"ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\\ProgramData"
B0 01	mov al,1		
5D	pop ebp		
C2 0C00	ret C		
CC	int3		
CC	int3		
CC	int3		
CC	int3		
55	push ebp		DLL2Print
8BEC	mov ebp,esp		
A1 78800200	mov eax,dword ptr ds:[28078]		eax:"ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\\ProgramData"
50	push eax		eax:"ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\\ProgramData"
68 3C800200	push d112.2803C		2803C:"DLL 2 mystery data %d\n"
E8 17000000	call d112.2105A		
83C4 08	add esp,8		
5D	pop ebp		
C3	ret		
CC	int3		
CC	int3		
CC	int3		
CC	int3		

DLL 3 Mystery Data ⇒ location of memory for the string malwareanalysisbook.com

