Reinventing Communalim.

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Contents

Introduction

This paper explores the evolution of communalism from pre-historic times to the present day. The term 'communalism' as it is here used is not to be conflated with 'communism' which is typically defined as a system in which state governments own the means of production. By chance some events to do with communism and emancipated Russian serf villages in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries proves relevant to the topics of parts II and III, and this should make clear the direction which the Russian state was headed [communism] was very different from peoples natural propensity towards communalism.

In what follows the main parts (Part I – Part V) are based on research and I've endeavored to make them as objective as I can manage without having a formal background in history (my formal background is in physics and mathematics). In the 'discussion' section which follows each 'Part –' I will give my own analysis/ thoughts on the subject.

Part I first describes some evolutionary theories on the development of human tribal instincts and cooperative mechanisms. The advent of private property, the downfall of matrilineal societies, and the consequent development of patriarchies in ancient times (¯1000–3000 years ago) are then expounded upon. The last section describes feminist movements in America during the nineteenth century with an aim to once again highlight the connection between female empowerment and communalism.

Part II details the evolution of private life in Europe during the middle ages. Events to do with barrack housing in Russia during the early twentieth century are also touched upon.

Part III examines the role of communalism in present day society through sports and entertainment, with the evolution and present state of the sport of boxing being used as a particular example.

Part IV analyzes the relation between communalsim and the organizational principles of labor. Specifically, this section explores various ways in which the household can be related to the division of labor. A brief discussion of how land and labor are considered to be 'fictitious commodities' helps set the stage for understanding how conceptions of what work is or of land ownership might vary across time and geography or how distinctions between 'producer' vs. 'consumer' might make little sense. A case study of the Merina kingdom of Madagascar gives some insight to the relation between home and labor practices. A case study of some events to do with emancipated Russian serf villages in the late nineteenth century is presented in order to demonstrate how a shift in work practices can require (or cause) a corresponding shift in culture. In the case of the intensely traditional and quasi-communal peasant villages of Russia, adopting more productive methods of farming resulted in an increase in household division (*razdel*) and a shift towards a more progressive rather than traditional culture. The evolution of modern professional society is then examined in order to suggest a parallel which exists between the trend towards increasingly specialized or reductionist work and the much more general [and longer] trend of compartmentalizing things/ people which tends to characterize the domestication process.

Part V offers a couple of brief physical [as in physics] arguments. The first is a crude model based on entropy, the aim of which is to characterize the concept of equilibrium (not equality) within a com-

munal society. The second will challenge the old adage of 'pick yourself up by your own bootstraps' – a saying which is reflective of a hyper-individualized culture.

The author's note will relate the topics discussed to the present-day issue of homelessness (or as I prefer for reasons which should become clear; 'houselessness').

Because of extremely broad nature of the subject(s) covered, and because my formal background is not in history or anthropology, this remains a continuous work in progress.

*Note: my use of the term 'communal society' is used extensively. As will be argued throughout this paper, it is a thing distinctly lacking in modern society, and so at some point the reader may wonder if it is simply an idealization in my own mind. For an understanding of my own experience with communalism as well as what first got me interested in the subject the reader is invited to see the authors note.

Part I: Evolution of Communalism & Feminist Movements

Some Theories on the Tribal Instinct and Domestication

In *The Domestication of the Human Species* (1989) Anthropologist Peter Wilson[1] argued that the development of privacy between groups (not just individuals) was one of the most significant shifts in human history, yet that it has largely been overlooked by anthropologists. One interesting point he makes relates to the development of homo sapiens eyes and facial features; the human eye is unique among mammals in that it is capable of discerning minute details such as expressive facial features at short distances. In conjunction with the fact that humans are a highly cooperative [eusocial] species which for a long time [and still] relied on body language as a means of communicating with one another, a reasonable inference Wilson makes is that prehistoric humans developed highly expressive and detailed facial features as a means of allowing them to communicate with fellow group members. Wilson then argues that this would not – could not – have have been the case had the act of physically separating themselves from others played a significant role in the evolution of homo sapiens who must have lived openly exposed to one another without physical partitions (e.g. tents/ walls) of any kind. One look at Gorillas or Chimpanzees makes this argument obvious as constructing partition walls or inhabiting structures which divide them from one another is not a regular part of their behavior. Of course homo sapiens deviated from other apes in our evolution millions of years ago, and so there is admittedly a lot of unwritten history to how we evolved since that time.

A seemingly popular albeit unsubstantiated assumption has been that humans began to manipulate their environment as a result of becoming more intelligent than apes, but from an evolutionary standpoint – an argument any ecologist may appreciate – it is equally plausible that the habit of manipulating the environment itself caused a shift in intellectual development.

Evolutionary biologists Edward Wilson has argued that it was the development of campsites which caused homo sapiens to become intelligent in that campsites led to the original social agreement of babysitting; one person stays at home while the others go out to hunt. What ensued was an increasingly complex evolution of cooperation via social contract, and this resulted in humans becoming socially analytical creatures whose brains rapidly grew in size. At the same time, however 'advanced' our societies become, the tribal instinct, Wilson asserts, is indelibly buried in us as a result of having undergone tens or even hundreds of millions of years spent evolving through group selection[2].

Under what circumstances and for what reasons humans first began partitioning themselves is a subject that is worthy of further study and speculation. For example, it may have been some disease, predator, or ecological shift which caused the ancestors of modern humans to leave the protective canopy of the rain forest (~ three million years ago) in favor of the plains, and that this required they learn to construct shelters or [in the initial stages] inhabit caves. In either case, it was at this point homo sapiens brain began to triple in size until around 400,000 years ago at which point it began to decrease in size (by about 10% compared to today) for some unknown reason.

One alternative (or compliment?) to Edward Wilsons theory that it was the development of camp-sites which catalyzed the evolution homo sapiens mental capacities and cooperative mechanisms is that it may have been wolves who helped teach humans how to cooperate in more advanced forms. A brief discussion on domestication and animalism is offered in part II.

Another popular hypothesis among Anthropologists is that it was the need to domesticate animals which first gave incentive for humans to domesticate themselves, but this only a hypothesis; it may have instead been the case that some other impetus gave rise to domestication among humans. In either case, humans made the transition from a nomadic hunter-gatherer species to a sedentary (stationary) existence based on farming, and this required the development of permanent if not private homes. Yet it is questionable whether *all* humans adopted the practice willingly. As noted by Anthropologists Jarod Diamond,

> "The question "why farm?" strikes most of us modern humans as silly. Of course it is better to grow wheat and cows than to forage for roots and snails. But in reality, that perspective is flawed by hindsight. Food production could not possibly have arisen through a conscious decision, because the world's first farmers had around them no model of farming to observe, hence they could not have known that there was a goal of domestication to strive for, and could not have guessed the consequences that domestication would bring for them. If they had actually foreseen the consequences, they would surely have outlawed the first steps towards domestication, because the archaeological and ethnographic record throughout the world shows that the transition from hunting and gathering to farming eventually resulted in more work, lower adult stature, worse nutritional condition and heavier disease burdens. The only peoples who could make a conscious choice about becoming farmers were hunter–gatherers living adjacent to the first farming communities, and they generally disliked what they saw and rejected farming, for the good reasons just mentioned and others..."

> —Jared Diamond, *'Evolution, consequences and future of plant and animal domestication'*

As argued by Ian Hodder in *The Domestication of Europe* one feasible alternative to the hypothesis that it was the want/ need to domesticate animals which originally caused humans to domesticate themselves is that the advent of the private dwelling could be used as a means of controlling others. In the approximate time from of $5000 - 3400 b.c.$ humans in Northern Europe lived in long and linearly constructed communal houses which Hodder refers to as the *domus*. Hodder speculates about how the compartmentalization of the domus and its eventual conversion to individual/ familial private dwellings resulted from the need or want to control fellow humans. Though Hodders arguments are difficult for non-anthropologists to digest, I think it fair to summarize the theme of the book as follows; to control humans one must control the space they inhabit. Hodder relates how much of the way archaeological symbolism within the domus evolved in ways which are reflective of a power struggle between male vs. female, which for reasons we will soon begin to appreciate he roughly equates to domestication (male) vs. the wild (female). In his own words, "Put simply it seemed possible to argue that the process of domestication – the control of the wild – is a metaphor and mechanism for the control of society".

Northern Europe being as cold as it is, it would be presumptuous to extrapolate an overly general theory of how domiciles evolved throughout the world based on the domus. In other parts of the world it was perhaps not necessary for people to share the same domicile as the the collective pooling

of body heat would not be of much concern. Then again, individual privacy being a foreign notion, the absence of incentive to divide would likely be of greater relevance than any plausible incentive to share what space which might have been constructed. In either case, in warmer regions there still is the plain fact that much space was in most cases probably still shared *outside* of the tent, and so, in terms of the amount of space which is shared between individuals, there is a notable evolution of domiciles from communal to individual (or familial).

The advent of the private home must have had profound effects on our ancient ancestors.

Peter Wilson correlates the development of private property to the rise of witchcraft; with privacy in effect, he argues, people probably lost their ability to monitor the social contract with the means which they were evolved to (direct observation of body language). Misfortune, social deceit, and inequalities arise – none of which people can fully explain the how or why of, but instinctively they know things don't add up; it should not be *this* hard just to survive, and there is supposed to be much more to life than mere survival! Ergo, they must have been tricked by 'magic'. In present times there are tribes in Africa which believe that misfortune arises as a result of being bewitched by others. Among economists it is well accepted that what we refer to as capital or money ultimately boils down to this; what gives these things their value is ultimately a social relation rather than an objective or tangible thing which can easily be described. The ancient world dealt in social benefits, the modern in economic benefits. The conversion of one into the other is sufficiently difficult to understand that contriving fiction might in fact be the closest and easiest way to describe the phenomena of economic fortune or misfortune.

Modern courts nevertheless do recognize to some extent the true nature of capital in that they often grant a stay at home spouse half of the the total assets of their partner, and this is an implicit acknowledgment of the original social agreement among homo sapiens; one person stays at home to take care of the young while the other forages for food. But even in the case when there is no young to be raised, courts implicitly acknowledge that a working spouse derives a great deal of *social* benefit from their stay at home partner, and this is a thing which can help them achieve economic success by providing them emotional stability, affecting how they are perceived by others, and/ or by having someone to care to their health and well-being while they are preoccupied with matters of work.

The struggle to understand and to express the unnatural effects of domestication manifest in numerous ways as well.

In French philosopher René Girard's 'scapegoat theory' it is asserted that a fundamental mechanism by which humans cooperate – what allows societies to form in the first place – is that they collectively agree to blame their problems on some individual person or thing. Many researchers seem to accept the notion that humans cannot function together without in some way translating their experiences into some sort of fiction.

The Rise of Property and Patriarchy

Have you ever read the bible and wondered why so many pages of the old testament were dedicated to reciting lines of lineage? e.g. 'Abraham was the son of [someone], who was the son of [someone else],

who was the son of...., etc.'. The concept of lineage we will see is inextricably tied to inheritance, and the [inferred] biblical version of inheritance is one of direct descent, which is to say that Abraham (or equally likely, whoever opted to write down his story sometime later) was representative of a culture in which a child inherited their names from their father instead of their mother. More relevant to the points I wish to pursue here is that in such a culture property is also transmitted directly from the father to his offspring. Such a culture is commonly referred to as a *patrilineal* society. Note however, that a patrilineal society does not necessarily imply a patriarchal one in which males have possessive and authoritative control over women and children. We should also note that many chapters of the bible reflect the cultural values of a certain time and of a limited geographic region. As it turns out, patrilineal societies were not the norm in many parts of the world until relatively modern times. Arab culture for example, while often stereotyped as being particularly restrictive of women, were composed of matrilineal societies until around the time of the prophet Muhammad[38].

A *matrilineal society* is one in which children are named according to their mothers. Moreover, entire tribes may name themselves according to female descent. While a true example of a matriarchal society society is difficult to find, matrilineal societies were widely prevalent in many parts of the world prior to being overtaken by what we today consider to be normal; taking the last names of our father; the passing of property onto our offspring; monogamy, private property, and the nuclear family all being foundational principles of organization; systems of government which deal with us as members of a geographically defined territory rather than as members of a socially defined group; and what will be argued throughout this paper to be a compartmentalized form of community being normalized.

Matrilineal societies typically being communal to some extent or another (or it may be more appropriate to say that communal societies tended to be matrilineal), polygamy was often the case in matrilineal societies. So too was it typically the case that property was inherited according the tribe[1] rather than by paternal descent, i.e. a fathers possessions might not be inherited by his son, but as a member of his mothers tribe the son would inherit whatever was the tribal custom for him to receive. In a polygamous setting a man might not even know who his son was in the first place, or if he does he may nevertheless identify all his brother and sisters children as his own, and these children [cousins] in turn identify as brothers and sisters; a woman might refer to her sisters husband as her own; individuals typically refer to one another according to relation rather than by name; etc. Neither were notions of private (*individual*) property (of land in particular) well defined or recognized as they are today.

All of this together gave men little incentive to be possessive of women or children in the first place. Without any reliable system by which a man might ensure his accumulated property gets passed to his offspring, there would be less incentive for him to fixate himself on the accumulation of property. Add to this the fact that notions of private property or the divisions of labor which such a thing leads to (e.g. 'owner' vs. 'laborer' or 'producer' vs. 'consumer') were not well defined in the first place and it likely had the effect that a mans social status and mating privileges were much less tied to his ability to accumulate property as they are today.

Communalism being a central – we might even say causal – aspect of matrilineal societies, for men there naturally arose a sense of intense brotherhood which satiated his tribal instinct, and this

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[1]I use the term loosely here. The more appropriate word may be *gens* – see ref. [39].

further enabled him to avoid becoming overly dependent on or controlling of what family he himself managed to create. The need to acquire and maintain property being much less of a burden on men, one might speculate that men probably enjoyed in some ways more freedom than they do today.

Such a state of communalism might be characterized by what anthropologists refer to as *confluent love*; love which transcends the individual sexual drive. Sigmund Freud held that the drive to belong to a group had many of the same characteristics of the individual sexual drive (or 'libido')[2]. When describing how *Dinka* people of Sudan – even hostile enemies – tended to amalgamate for the ritualistic killing and eating of animals David Graeber notes that, "for Dinka, such moments of communal harmony are as close as one can come to direct experience of God."[40].

It would then take a fairly powerful impetus to make people willingly give up their sense of communalism. As is the natural course of most all major social and political transitions among humans, in all likelihood accepting any transition away from it probably happened over the course of centuries and was not adopted willingly by all. In his seminal work *Ancient Society* Lewis Henry Morgan identifies the impetus to make the transition away from a communal matrilineal society into a nuclear-family based patriarchial society as being the want to ensure the transmission of property onto direct descendants. According to Morgan, "The growth of property and the desire for its transmission to children was, in reality, the moving power which brought in monogamy to insure legitimate heirs,…"

Legitimizing the notion of private property, its accumulation, and its transmission onto direct descendants ultimately required that communalism be usurped by the advent of the nuclear family, and in turn that polygamy be replaced by monogamy. This all had the effect of confining the woman and her influence to the private home – a thing which gave rise to patriarchy. Using the term *gens* as a loose equivalent of a large and socially (not territoriality) defined tribe, Morgan identifies Greece as the most notable epicenter of this transition,

> "Elsewhere Attention has been called to the fact, that when descent was changed from the female line to the male, it operated injuriously upon the position and rights of the wife and mother….Before the change, the members of her own gens [~ tribe], in all probability, predominated in the household, which gave full force to the maternal bond, and made the woman rather more than the man the centre of the family. After the change she stood alone in the household of her husband, isolated from her gentile kindred. It must have weakened the influence of the maternal bond; and have operated powerfully to lower her position and arrest her progress in the social scale. Among the prosperous classes, her condition of enforced seclusion,…
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> From first to last among the Greeks there was a principle of egotism or studied selfishness at work among the males, tending to lessen the appreciation of woman, scarcely found among savages. It reveals itself in their plan of domestic life, which in the higher ranks secluded the wife to enforce an exclusive cohabitation, without admitting the reciprocal obligation on the part of her husband… the plan of domestic life among the civilized Greeks was, in reality, a system of female confinement and restraint. …"
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> —Lewis Henry Morgan, *'Ancient Society'*

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[2]unfortunately I cannot recall what book or paper it was I read this in

Closing Thoughts

The development of some sort of reciprocal social obligation is prerequisite to the formation of both the familial and tribal group. In both cases the expectation that offspring will be cared for in some way or another is one foundational expectation. And there is, to some degree or another at least, also the expectation that grown individuals will be cared for if and when they cannot support themselves.

There are many forms of communalism which do not place such extreme expectations on individuals. There are however, always *some* set of expectations involved. The complete lack of expectations would be the antithesis of communalism by most any reasonable definition – war and violence which is performed against the will of another. Without reciprocal expectations of any kind the resulting group would be akin to an amalgamation of sociopaths who have no want or need to empathize with one another, to share in one anothers struggle, or even to respect the will of one another for that matter. Violent sports are not an exception as they too have expectations such as that you fight a person is willing and is of close to equal weight, that you do so at a designated time and place, and abide by certain rules.

Normative expectations are expectations which serve the purpose of reinforcing a social or cultural norm, which is in contrast to expectations which are solely intended to serve the health and well-being of individuals, animals, or the environment. As far as objective normative expectations (i.e. expectations which we can physically observe and describe) go, among the most fundamental normative expectations is if, when, and where an individual may sleep[3]. As the development of communalism is being considered from prehistoric times when our ape ancestors slept openly exposed to one another and likely found a degree of safety in this (as opposed to finding it via the construction of walls), this will be one normative expectation which is of particular interest. Later it will be argued that it (sleeping openly exposed to others) is a generator of trust between individuals, and that this in turn makes it a generator of social capital and kinship.

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[3]one could argue that this actually serves a health and safety purpose, and there a number of cases in which this would be true. Yet there are also a number of cases when stipulations against sleeping in certain places or at certain times clearly serves much more of a cultural purpose. This point will be pursued further in the authors note.

Part II:
Modern History of Communal Living

Nineteenth Century Boarding Homes & Feminist Movements in America

"What we do need, however, is a WORLD OF OUR OWN, a place in the universe for ourselves,..."

—Melusina Fay Peirce, *'Cooperative Housekeeping'*

"The isolated household is wasteful in economy, is untrue to the human heart, and is not the design of God, and therefore it must disappear"

— Commentator in the Fourierist journal, 1844, as quoted in The Grand Domestic Revolution[3]

"The difficult point is this: to devise or outline a social and industrial system in which a large number of individuals cooperate harmoniously, and yet have every individual free to do what he believes to be right, provided he infringes not upon the equal rights of any other person. No man here on earth thus far has been able to outline such a system."

—Henry Olerich, *'The Story of The World A Thousand Years Hence'*

In Herman Melville's classical novel *Moby Dick* the main character Ishmael is a merchant sailor and whaler with a fetish for the forbidden and who had developed a habit of finding refuge out at sea, "Whenever it is a damp, drizzly November in my soul; whenever I find myself involuntarily pausing before coffin ware-houses...and especially whenever my hypos get such an upper hand of me, that it requires a strong moral principle to prevent me from deliberately stepping into the street, and methodically knocking people's hats off – then, I account it high time to get to sea as soon I can." The novel opens with Ishmael checking into the 'Spouter Inn' – a boardinghouse that appears to cater mostly to sailors. Struck by the " boggy, soggy, squitchy picture truly, enough to drive a nervous man distracted, a pile of clubs and spears laced with human hair, and floor-boards that reminded him of a worn-out ship" Ishmael proceeds past a group of men in the common area who are all huddled around the table examining 'skirmshander' (ivory carvings) to ask the landlord for lodgings, to which the landlord replies in the affirmative – that is, if Ishmael is willing to sleep in the same bed as another man; a harpooner peddling embalmed human heads no less[4].

Upon consideration Ishmael convinces the landlord to allow him to sleep on a bench downstairs near the entry, but he quickly finds a strong and cool breeze to make the idea of sleep a hopeless one. Still unsure just how serious the Innkeeper was about the story of the harpooner 'peddling heads', and cognizant that he might be giving into his own prejudice, he resigns himself to the idea of sleeping next to a stranger who he had yet to meet. Later that night, Queequeg (the Harpooner who peddles heads) comes into the room while Ishmael is laying down on the bed, under the covers,

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[4]Cannibalistic Indian tribes of South American for example were reported by colonial explorers led by Ferdinand Magellan to have displayed a number of human heads outside their large (~ 160 person) communal homes. Two of Magellan's crew members were cannibalized for their naive trust of the savages. See *Nomads & Empire builders* by Carleton Beals

and in a dark corner from which he spies on Queequeg who was as of yet oblivious to Ishmael's presence. Ishmael, though not usually prone to fear, after observing the exotic 'purple-yellow' hue of the Harpooners skin, a face and body covered in square patterned tattoos, a vicious tomahawk, and a shamanic nightly prayer-like ritual to a strange hunch-backed black carving (what Ishmael refers to as 'the little negro') which the Harpooner has placed above the fireplace, Ishmael is struck with fear; "Ignorance is the parent of fear, and being completely nonplussed and confounded about the stranger, I confess I was now as much afraid of him as if it was the devil himself who had broken into my room."

Still oblivious to Ishmaels presence, the harpooner places the tomahawk in his mouth and leaps into bed thereby startling Ishmael enough to give away his presence. "Speak-e! tell-ee me who-ee be, or dam-me, I kill ee!" Queequeg demands of Ishmael who in turn calls out to the Innkeeper. Very quickly the Inkeeper intervenes and introduces the two, and conveys Ishmaels wish that the Queequeg put out his tobacco pipe. Queequeg immediately obliges and politely motions for Ishmael to take back his side of the bed under the assurance that he intended no harm. Ismael suddenly overcomes his first impressions; "I stood looking at him a moment. For all his tattooing he was on the whole a clean, comely looking cannibal. What's all this fuss I have been making about, thought I to myself – the man's a human being just as I am: he has just as much reason to fear me, as I have to be afraid of him. Better sleep with a sober cannibal than a drunken Christian." Ishmael awakes the next morning to find Queequeg's arm wrapped around him, and before long he is taken aback by the nobility of his spirit. Queequeg, as it turns out, would later end up saving Ishmael's life.

Herman Melville wrote Moby Dick after having spent a number of years being a sailor himself. *Moby Dick* having been published in the year 1851, even though the encounter just described was likely more exotic than the average one, it probably gives a somewhat realistic depiction of boarding homes in the 1800's.

What is a boarding home? Probably the most accurate description we could give it is that it's a place where boarders stayed. Boarding homes varied widely in their structure and specific operation, but in general they were temporary, and in some cases semi-permanent dwellings which usually fell somewhere between a motel and and a hostel. Often people had private rooms, but not always. And even when privacy was granted it might be by way of nothing more than a suspended sheet dividing a room into two. Boarders might be day-to-day or month-to-month tenants. In some cases people lived in boarding homes for decades – especially widows and those who lacked immediate family. As noted in *The Boardinghouse in Nineteenth-Century America* by Wendy Gamber, "Yet the thousands of Americans who lived not in "homes" but in boardinghouses suggest just how uncommon and, at times, just how unwelcome, domestic retirement really was. The history of boarding reveals a middle class - and to some extent a working class - for whom privacy remained important but that was far from private in our sense of the word."[12]

At the beginning of the nineteenth century it has been estimated that about 5% of Americans resided in urban centers, but this began to change rapidly with the onset of the 'transportation revolution' which began around the year 1815. Prior to the $1830's$ the majority of Americans abided by a 'household economy' in which a family might be largely isolated from the outside world; people consumed what they produced and the household formed its own self-contained economy. As industrialization picked apart the household economy and induced large numbers of farmers to relocate to cities, with immigrants flooding into America, and by the fact that America was still a new

country which had yet to be fully settled, America was to a large extent a nation composed of transients throughout much of the nineteenth century – a thing which proved conducive to the rise of boardinghouses.

But Were boardinghouses homes? The notion of what constituted a home in urban America was not yet well defined. According to Gamber, somewhere between $1/3$ to $1/2$ of New York's population in the $1830's$ either were themselves boarders or were taking in boarders. Increasingly throughout the nineteenth century there arose a stigma against transient boarding life, one which was perpetuated by advocates of the 'Victorian' domestic life that was characterized by the 'virtue' of the private home. Such advocates were nothing less than hostile towards boarding life and often honed in on the bad while ignoring the good[12] when it came to boardinghomes. Some people seemed bitter to the fact that their experience led them to believe they couldn't fit into the boarding-life – as though it were some kind of underground world which, despite their brief and casual efforts, did not immediately extend to them a sense of belonging. Such people were often members of the affluent 'bourgeois' class who held a high degree of influence or outright owned newspapers which would caste boarding life and its inhabitants in a degrading light.

And boarding homes granted them much ammunition as they were prone to sanitation issues, they required tenants abide by their schedule if they wish to be fed (a subject of complaint by many boarders), and they at times attracted con-artists who might steal other boarders belongings. Yet as noted by Gamber, overall the fact that people left themselves exposed to such things says that this must not have been a very common experience[12].

Running boarding homes was no easy affair. Boarders expected a meal to come with their rent, and the preparation of a meal in those days was a much more laborious thing than it is in today's world with all of our modern appliances and prepackaged ingredients. Those running boarding homes could not conduct background checks and at times had trouble collecting payment. The issue of housekeeping in boarding homes raised questions of surprising social and economic depth, namely, whose job is it? Is it the boarders job to clean their own and common areas, or is such a thing included in the rent?

House-hold labor in fact had become a significant issue even outside of the boardinghouse – for women in particular.

The breakdown of the household economy brought with it a redefinition of roles for women who now found themselves subject to severely underpaid wage-labor, harsh working conditions, and long hours. According to Melusina Fay Peirce, industrialization had the effect of transforming women from producers into consumers; whereas a woman in the year 1800 might spend much of her day tending gardens and farm animals in addition to various household chores, by 1870 many women were engaged in purely house-bound and family related tasks. But was this work? Wage labor was still a relatively new concept in America in the late $1800's$, and while house-servants (not necessarily actual slaves) were indeed paid a meager wage, many women did not even get this much as 'work' was increasingly conceived as a thing which was done *outside* of ones personal home.

The fact that work is a thing which is and needs to be consciously defined (and on occasion redefined) is a thing which is often taken for granted, but this was not so for women of the late nineteenth century. Peirce, along with a number of other reformers such as Marie Stevens Howland, Ellen Swallow Richards, and Charlotte Perkins Gilman fought to improve the social and economic

positions for women*3*.

Peirce, having observed that "There is already a continual feminine yearning for common action which manifests itself in the sewing circles, fairs, and festivals so frequent among them;..." advocated for communal and cooperative kitchens, or as Peirce often referred to her proposals; 'cooperative house-keeping' on the grounds that she also called for co-opting sewing and laundry services – basically any household tasks which could be communalized (not communized!) without compromising the idea of a maintaining private homes. So there the feminist movement advocated for alternative forms of communalism – forms which fell short of out right living communally as in boardinghomes, but which nevertheless sought to restore communalism to work practices.

To Peirce, cooperative housekeeping was more than a means to improve the labor conditions of women – it was a means of transforming society itself. By separating cooking, sewing, and laundry from the private home cooperative housekeeping would significantly reduce the amount of work which needed to be done in it, and therefore would, "... almost entirely blot out from our domestic life the SERVANT ELEMENT!". Cooperative sewing rooms, Pierce believed, would not only allow women to bypass much of retail trade by providing both the material and the social outlet which fuels much of consumerism, but making clothing purchases on a cooperative scale would enhance the market power of women by placing as intermediaries between the manufacturers and the consumers certain knowledgeable women who were privy to the actual value of goods. In addition, such 'cultivated ladies' would empower women to shape the very trends of fashions rather than responding to them,

> "...cultivated ladies,... shall make the attiring of their fellow-women their special vocation. One or two such costume-artists in every cooperative sewing-room, would in the end effect an entire revolution in the whole idea of fashion; for within certain limits every woman would have a fashion of her own. Such distressing anomalies as blond hair smoothed and pomatumed as it was twenty years ago, and dark hair curled and frizzed as it is now, with a thousand others, equally melancholy, would disappear, and every assemblage of women, instead of presenting a monotony at once bizarre and wearisome, would present the variety and beauty that now is only attempted at a fancy ball"

> —Melusina Fay Peirce, *'Cooperative Housekkeping'*

in addition to reducing the cost of food and clothing Peirce's cooperative's would have a similar effect on charity giving, "...women have most need of large illumination on the subject of charity and reform. Our generosity is now so thoughtless and unsystematic, our sympathy so shallow, sentimental, and even silly, that it is to be feared much of it is no better than thrown away. But cooperative housekeeping could change all this by organization in every society a charitable department, and giving it in charge to that woman of the association (and there is always one in every circle) who takes more interest in the poor, and knows more about them, than any other"[4]

Pierce's cooperatives were to be consumer cooperatives which were somewhat in contrast to cooperative run retail-stores, of which Peirce thought contradicted themselves; division of labor required self-interest, and this inevitably would reduce cooperation in running a retail store to a mere business transaction (e.g. a doctor is too busy to act as a carpenter, but may 'cooperatively' pitch in on the cost). But Peirce had more in mind than to create joint-partnerships and corporations; she wanted to change the culture of consumption, unhealthiness, and isolation – especially for women at the time who were virtually housebound as, for example, they were not allowed to go to restaurants[11].

In Pierce's view, "'Society!' In this country there is none. Boys and girls meet together, dance and flirt until they are married, and that is all there is of it."

Communilizing basic house-hold functions would restore women to the place of guardians of the health and well-being of the community,

> "She will keep a strict eye on everything that goes out of the kitchen and clothing- house, to see that nothing injurious to health, either in food or clothing, be ignorantly adopted by the community,... all this melancholy physical deficiency that haunts society and makes home unhappy, exists because we do not know how to live physically; ...
>
> ...In cooperation, however, neither sickness nor health would make any difference in the clock-like workings of the great domestic machine. The sisters would be trained not only in nursing, but in family management and the care of children, so that in case no relative of a sick mother could be called upon, her little ones would still be attended to. And I really think one angelic office of the cooperative kitchen would be the preparation of food for the sick. "

> —Melusina Fay Peirce, *'Cooperative Housekkeping'*

Finally, the cooperation of women, Peirce believed, would ameliorate problems in education in a somewhat natural fashion,

> " Finally, when all the women who crave, and who are worthy of, a liberal education have received it, teaching will not, as now, be limited to those who are obliged to follow it for a living whether they have capacity for it or not. Cooperative housekeeping would develop the principle of 'natural selection' in this as in so many other feminine avocations. The woman who had the talent for it would undertake it, whether married or single, rich or poor, since, if she could teach better than she could superintend cooking or sewing, her fellow-housekeepers would find it for their highest interests even to entreat her to instruct their children. And what a great thing it would be for the manners and ambition of the young, could they feel their teachers were always the social equals and honoured friends of their parents! The present disadvantage of the profession in this respect is immense. "

> —Melusina Fay Peirce, *'Cooperative Housekkeping'*

Charlotte Perkins Gilman was another active feminist at the time, and her thinking was somewhat in line with Peirces'. She wrote a number of books that gave an insightful voice to the plight of women at the time. For example, with regard to women's reluctance to speak up for themselves she claimed, "It is not that women are really smaller-minded, weaker-minded, more timid and vacillating; but that whosoever, man or woman, lives always in a small, dark place, is always guarded, protected, directed and restrained, will become inevitably narrowed and weakened by it. The woman is narrowed by the home and the man is narrowed by the woman."[3]. Gilman however, put forward less of an actionable plan than did Pierce, which for women of the time was just as well as Pierce herself acknowledged that communalizing essential services on a large-scale was extremely forward and hopeful thinking as it would require a somewhat dramatic shift in culture – one that would have been in direct opposition to the power of patriarchy which relied on a division between house and work, and to the power of industry which relied on people being trained to think, act, and behave like good consumers as the domestic life trained them to be.

Peirce's efforts came to an end at the hands of the 'Council of Gentlemen' – a male professional society, the approval of which she relied upon to finance her projects. Such professional societies would seek to sabotage feminist reform in other ways, such as discouraging their own wives from joining, educating a professional class of women who would prove to be enthusiastic about collaborating with them in their schemes, and gaining control of other large-scale kitchens emerging at the time such as those associated with colleges, hotels, prisons, and hospitals[3].

Industrial capitalists at the time had a vested interest in weaning people onto the private home life and bending them to the needs of industry. Henry Ford, for example, in implementing his '$5 day' program which sought to shorten worker hours and improve wages under the belief that it would enhance productivity, and at the same time he established a sociology department which would monitor workers lifestyle and behaviors outside of work, ensuring that workers were, "legally married to their partners, 'properly' support their families, maintain good 'home conditions,' demonstrate thrift and sobriety, and be efficient at their jobs". S.S. Marquis, head of the Sociology department wrote in 1915, "as we adapt the machinery in the shop to turning out the kind of automobile we have in mind, so we have constructed our educational system with a view to producing the human product in mind[13].

Dolores Hayden summarizes the efforts which were made by industry to the ends of indoctrinating women so that the newly emerging feminist movements would turn in a direction which favored industry at the time,

> "Advertising and marketing firms spent one billion dollars to promote private domestic life and mass consumption in 1920; their annual volume had risen over 1,000 since 1890, and continued to rise throughout the 1920's. Stuart Ewen has shown how cleverly advertising copywriters interwove the rhetoric of women's liberation with arguments for domestic consumption: vacuum cleaners gave women new life, toasters made them "free." Advertisers' blandishments were complemented by the introduction of consumer credit systems to encourage housewives to buy... [Citing a report from the Chamber of Commerce in Muncie, Indiana in the 1920's] "The first responsibility of an American to his country is no longer that of a citizen, but of a consumer. Consumption is necessity. "
>
> —Dolores Hayden, *'The Grand Domestic Revolution'*

Quietly shoved underneath the rug, the idea of communalized kitchens took a back-seat to restaurant culture which began to open itself up to women in the early part of the twentieth century. Flirtatious waitresses who endured sexual harassment were depicted as 'modern girls'. Unionized male waiters exploited this as an opportunity to 'save them' by attempting to exclude them from the profession. Overcoming conflicts such as this became the new agenda of progressive age feminists who responded by opening restaurants as part of a social mission to solidify their right to participate in the market. Meanwhile, Organizations such as the National Standowners Association which aimed to "make war on temporary ugly shacks" ensured the emerging restaurant culture was centered around the ideals of family life[11].

Rather than seeking to transform society entirely by shifting the culture itself into what might be considered a quasi-matriarchal society, the newly emerging wave of progressive feminists had been inculcated with the idea of equating progress to simply attaining equal rights with men and standing standing along-side of them within the progressive hegemony.

"By the 1970's...feminists and anti feminists had more in common than they realized. Both feminists and anti feminists accepted the spatial design of the isolated home, which required an inordinate amount of human time and energy to sustain, as an inevitable part of domestic life.

...The issue of household space and its design was almost totally ignored. They would have been taken aback to hear their houses described as perfect symbols of Victorian rather than modern womanhood, requiring a paradoxical combination of self-sacrifice and economic consumption. They would have been surprised to learn that earlier generations of feminists would have described these same houses as enemy outposts in the domestic revolution. "

—Dolores Hayden, *'The Grand Domestic Revolution'*

Boardinghouses more or less met with a similar fate. The very concept of a boardinghouse undermined consumer society as it blurred the line between what was the market and what was the home. Being heavily promoted by industrial capitalists and others who resented or for some reason feared the culture generated by boardinghouses, the home was depicted as a means of refuge from the market; a safe-space which the market could not reach. The private apartment, or apartment hotel was proposed as a middle ground. Initially, many people had a tough time calling such places a home*12*. On one hand, apartments didn't grant the comfort, the dignity, or the room to establish a family that private homes did, and on the other they did not offer the flexibility or the social interaction that boarding homes did. Over time such objections met the fate which many reasonable arguments sadly do; a quite death.

The establishment of the supremacy of the private home and apartment life came at the expense of any community space which was free of being subjected to commodity fetishism. Increasingly, consumers were subjected to a life we call normal today; one in which individuals, in an effort to satiate their basic human social needs, are often compelled to contrive a reason to pay money for something they don't actually need – something which might in fact, actually harm their health – just to escape the house and see other human beings, i.e. human relations have themselves have been transformed into a commodity.

The irony in all of this is that by essentially bullying those who might, for a period of time, choose to live otherwise into a life of inhabiting 'safe-spaces' which are insulated from the market, the collective whole of citizens leverage within both consumer and job markets is deteriorated as a monopoly is then created by domestic life. Without little to no alternatives, people have less leverage from the effects which a domestic consumerist culture creates.

Europe: Privacy in the Middle Ages

"...everywhere its [the spread of feudalism] effect was gradually to abolish the distinction between those of the poor who had once been considered free men and the rest...This was only natural, since the notion of freedom had been kept alive in the village assemblies, where it was known that so-and-so was entitled to sit while someone else was excluded because he belonged from birth to another man, or that a woman could "legally prove" that she was not the private property of the man who claimed to be her master. When these once-public assemblies became indistinguishable from the domestic tribunals in which the master punished the misbehavior of his slaves, the notion of freedom evaporated. "

—Georges Duby, *'A History of Private Life'*

Lacking any central government since the downfall of Rome, 'barbaric' German tribes embarked on conquest throughout Europe in the early middle ages (AD 500 –1000) but were eventually tamed toward the onset of the upper middle ages, in part as a result of the spread of Christianity but also as a result of the civilizing effect of property,

"...because Germans lacked an effective agriculture, they lacked a sense of property which could reinforce and moderate the sense of self. The tribesman's passions were violent but unfocused; he alternated between periods of lethargy and melancholy and moments of uncontrolled warrior action which roused him, says Gibbon, to "a more lively sense of his existence." For this Angst the only remedy was property. Had the German possessed land of his own to till, productive labor would have cured his physical and psychic lethargy. The sense of honor - of an exposed and vulnerable personal identity - which Gibbon tells us was all that the tribesman understood of liberty, would have been transformed into a sense of law and a capacity for military discipline by an awareness of responsibility for his material possessions and for the relations with others which possession involved. "

—J.G. A. Pocock, *'Virtue, Commerce, and History'*

By the middle ages (A. D 1000 – 1250) Europe had become a very dangerous place to roam about freely. In the eleventh century it was to some a sign of a loss in a persons senility for them to wonder outside the walls of a given town alone where a lone wanderer ran the risk of being robbed or abducted and turned into a slave. A semblance of government began to arise as nobles began to consolidate both land and power by offering peasants protection in exchange for their submission to a state [or contract] of serfdom which tied the peasant to the land of the noble and obligated them to perform labor duties. But serfdom also became widespread because nobles were able to clear and settle land faster than the peasants who began to see colonization as a means of obtaining their own freedoms. Tied to the land and preoccupied with agricultural tasks to serve the noble, the peasant became segregated from military service which was reserved for the knights of the noble house, consequently, over the course of centuries to come the peasant became relatively un-warlike and passive[7].

While in the beginning serfdom may have been perceived as a contract which relied on a peasants willingness to continue in it, in reality serfdom often became hereditary and forced. In some cases serfdom was somewhat comparable to slavery in that serfs were tied to the land and punished at the noble lords whim. Thomas Picketty describes one particularly brutal case in which a French peasant

worker who had displeased his lord by refusing to perform his labor duties had his limbs removed and shipped to his family by the noble he was indentured to. But such psychotic acts were not the norm. In truth, in addition to being disputed among researchers, the conditions of serfdom varied widely and warrant a case-by-case examination. The case of Russian was on average probably the most consistently harsh case of serfdom.

The social lives of medieval peasants were a curious thing in themselves that is hard to compare to today's culture, and so it is also difficult to say just how difficult or how enjoyable life was for the peasant. Suffering is ultimately a matter of how one *feels* about what they are experiencing, and this is a subjective thing. To one peasant, being tied to the the nobles estate [or manor] might be abject misery; the antithesis of freedom, while to another it might be a constant reminder of security. The nobles might be viewed as a sort of schizophrenic lot, humane – amicable even – at times to peasant serfs and tyrannical in other times.

Two distinctive features of medieval European cities were their lack of public space outside of the private estate and the prevalence of enclosures which either surrounded individual homes or the nuclear villages. The development of sturdier homes, castles (or donjons), and densely populated villages and eventually urban centers which were surrounded by a protective barrier were all reflective of the social conditions of the time which required people to insulated themselves from the outside world for defensive reasons. The word 'neighbor' originally implied those who actually lived together, but as villages began to form and previously disbursed house-holds began to amalgamate into a 'nuclear' village, and with the introduction of the three field system the term came to reflect those who live nearby and which require a degree of cooperation[7].

As a means to control peasants, lords limited the ability of peasants to divide their holdings such that only one sibling inherited whatever holdings which the family occupied. This gave rise to classism within the family, with those deprived of inheritance often taking the side of the poorest peasants in disputes involving the common areas (unclaimed areas of land which could be used for farming or pasture). Compared to the children of nobles who were sent off to the cold embrace of monasteries to receive their education, peasants had a comparably warm and nurturing relation with their mothers in their early days. However, it was common that serfdom entailed offspring which resulted from breeding between different nobles territories had to in some way be split between the two estates[8].

In some countries such as France there wasn't any term to reflect the modern idea of a hereditary family, rather the 'familia' was composed of all inhabitants of the noble lords estate. Within the nobles estate a number of servants lived in a communal albeit hierarchical setting,

"The newly married couple lived in a crowded turmoil that would offend a present-day recipient of relief. Few nobles possessed more than two or three rooms, and these swarmed with family and retainers. Even the English king was known to hold royal court in his bedroom, with his queen sitting on the bed for lack of other retreat. All ate together in the hall. Waifs lived under the stairs, and at dinner stood in "beggar's row," disputing their pittance with the dogs. Children slept with their parents or with the servants on the floor of the hall. Privacy is one of the greatest of modern inventions"

—Morris Bishop, *'The Middle Ages'*

While life in the high middle ages certainly had its drawbacks, there was in some ways a much higher degree of social capitol enjoyed than today. Visiting person on his or her deathbed for example, was not only more of a feasible thing than today where we have a tendency to segregate as much as possible daily experience from experiences of pain and suffering, but participating in an end of life celebration for the person in their final days or caring for the sick might be an obligatory thing. Threats of outsiders aside, within the village natural community defense mechanism took root. Charles de la Roncee're describes one example in which a woman calls out in the middle of the night and within a matter of seconds a number of people were beside her ready to act on the false alarm. Communal bathhouses in Paris and Zurich operated well into the $1500's$. Little effort was made by individuals to hide or segregate themselves; on the contrary, bathes would often be placed in front of buildings with minimal barriers between the bathe and passerby's and women, men, and adolescents would all bathe together. Culture in much of Europe during the upper middle ages was such that a person might be considered suspect if they were overly independent.

Archaeological evidence is lacking for the exact structure of homes outside of the nobles estate, but as early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries evidence is found of housing codes being put in place. Being as both the power of the noble and church were tentative, this primarily served the purpose of limiting the power and influence which any given household could amalgamate. As the church became a legitimate power which was on par with nobles clerics became increasingly concerned with the influences which people had on one another in shared spaces – even the ways in which family members influenced one another in their private homes[7].

As trade and commerce developed between towns later in the fourteenth through the sixteenth century, and as famines and plagues weakened the ability of nobles to offer peasants protection, nobles lost influence while centralized governments [monarchies] germinated. As serfdom was steadily abolished labor duties of serfs were converted into wage labor and the defining lines between serf and free peasant began to blur[8, 9]. As emancipated serfs were drawn to urban centers the church influenced urban architecture while guilds lobbied monarchs for privileges which would allow them to enforce a strict division of labor[10]. Division of space and labor gave rise to division of most all human activities; there was now a designated place for work; a place for justice; a place for prayer; a place for teaching; etc. "Thus, at the very end of the Middle Ages, an ideal of urban space took shape. That ideal was not without parallels to the authorities' vision of the ideal society: more hierarchy, more segregation, stricter regimentation, and closer monitoring of individual behavior"[7]. The church encouraged a philosophy of individual responsibility for ones salvation, the Lateran council going so far as to make penance an individual and compulsory thing in the year 1215 – a time prior to which penance had been a rare and public event. In a highly fragmented and dense urban envi-

ronment, social life turned towards the one remaining communal space left to the town; the street. Of course in those days the streets were primarily occupied by pedestrians, and this was a thing which facilitated a truly 'street culture'[7].

America adopted a similar urban design as it industrialized throughout the nineteenth century, but when modern vehicles came to dominate the road it failed to compensate for this by introducing any alternative form of truly communal space. Instead it was left to capitalism to relegate human social relations to the realm of privately owned establishments where entrance was only gained at a price along with a set of normative expectations such as abiding by definite time limits and limiting ones behavior to a few well-defined activities such as shopping or eating. In effect, human social needs were chopped up and relegated to the realm of commodity fetishism.

One notable exception to the claim that streets were the last remaining communal space in Europe were restaurants which, in stark contrast to their modern equivalents, were often characterized by large round communal tables in which villagers and even strangers would find themselves eating together[8, 11].

Animalism

> "The domestication of animals and the introduction of cattle-breeding seems everywhere to have brought to an end the strict and unadulterated totemism of primaival days."
>
> —Sigmund Freud

The Bear

The acculturation of the church extended beyond private housing. As we've seen the domestication of animals is inextricable from the domestication of humans, and so we ought to anticipate that there be parallels between cultural shifts towards domestication within human societies and the views towards/ treatment of wildlife and animals. Being as Europe was to a large extent the epicenter of domestic existence in its present form, naturally it will be the focus of much to follow. Native Americans also present a convenient case-study as this form of domestic existence was entirely new to them up until a relatively recent date.

Returning to the nomadic and wild Germanic barbarian tribes which conquered much of Europe in the early middle ages, the bear was idolized among them for its fearlessness, its willingness to fight to the death, and for its passionate sex drive. Bear cults were common amongst these tribes who would wear bearskins into battle – a thing which fed into the the well-known *berserker* rage in which a warrior was purported to take on super-human levels of prowess, courage, and stamina. So too did these tribes make use of bear costumes in communal congregations in which dancers/ warriors would achieve a trance like state for which it was believed that an individual could – if only for a few moments – actually become a bear. This is comparable to the buffalo dance among Native Americans which Roger Welch describes; "It is impossible once the dance begins to know who the heavily costumed and masked dancers are, nor does anybody guess. The [people] understand that the dancers are now buffalo...no longer their relatives, friends and neighbors once they put on their Buffalo Dance regalia and begin to dance. In the matrix of the costumes, prayers, music and ritual

those who were human beings earlier in the evening....are now buffalo"[5]

Bear cults of course posed an intolerable threat to the Christian church. Beginning with Charlemagne who organized a number of campaigns to massacre bears in the late eighth century these bear cults became a target for proponents of Christianity who sought to eliminate not just bears but the pagan cult beliefs which they gave rise to. Satan was until then still a vaguely described figure, but throughout the middle ages Satan came to be associated with animals such as the bear or monkey; the more it resembled and mimicked man the more it was labeled as an abomination[50]. According to Adam Douglas, "Monsters were no longer a cause of mild amusement or curiosity; they had become signs of disorder and sinfulness. As religious controversy began tearing at the fabric of medieval Europe, the tendency to stigmatize the monster as heretic, begun with the dog-headed Jews and Muslims...the categorization and separation of man from animals was still a matter of infinite weight for thinkers from the Renaissance onward"[52].

Romans too held great respect for the bear, and festivals which celebrated the bear were widely spread throughout western Europe prior to the fourteenth century. While repeated public testimonies of a god who was infinitely more powerful than animals – who was the very creator of them no less – did much to make European peasants question their animalistic belief systems, reverence for the bear was so deeply ingrained that this was not enough to uproot the cult of bear. A strategy which was adopted to this ends was to overlay festival dates revolving around the bear with Christian celebrations. For example Nov. 11th had been a festival day which celebrated the bear going into hibernation, and this naturally overlapped with transitions in human affairs such as outside activities coming to an end. Today however, Nov. 11th is known as St. Martins day – a theme which holds little connection to wildlife and which has no clear relevance to the average persons experience of transitioning from outdoor to indoor weather. On that note it is strange to consider how few if any of the holidays the average person celebrates today has any obvious connection to their daily or seasonal experience.

The bear came to be presented as stupid in comparison to other animals, clumsy, gluttonous in its eating habits, disregarding of its surroundings, and a slave to its wild sexual impulses. To finish the beast off it was eventually reduced to a circus animal where it was trained to perform tricks. Though the church typically frowned upon games which associated humans with animals, they made an exception in the case of bear-handlers[50].

The Wolf

Though the wolf did not threaten to emulate humans in the individual sense, as a pack creature it naturally posed what was perhaps the greatest threat to the notion of individual salvation; communalism[6].

Raymond Pierotti argues that humans may have – probably did – learn a number of cooperative skills from wolves. It is of course well known that dogs were mans best friend well before humans converted to agricultural practices. But wolves? Aside from dispelling a number of subjective distinctions between the two species, Peirotti demonstrates that wolves and humans do in fact willingly cooperate with one another, and this challenges the assumption that we had to forcibly domesticate them in order for them to evolve into dogs in the first place.

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[5]Roger Welch (1992) as quoted in [49].
[6]This is my own inference. None of the books I've read have made this assertion.

Pierotti makes a couple of interesting observation on the differences between Indo-European belief systems and those of Native Americans. The first is in line with what has already been established; that western belief systems strove to distinguish humans from animals. According to Pierotti, "...in Indigenous belief systems, creators are typically nonhuman entities embodied as a species of animal recognized as important to the local ecological community...What is important about his distinction is that Western monotheistic religions all work to separate humans from the rest of nature...nonhuman species are considered to be the originators of cultural traditions and perhaps of modern human beings themselves." A second point Pierroti makes concerns the the idea of a trickster; a self-interested and cunning albeit overall neutral figure whose schemes inadvertently give rise to changes in social values as they redefine what is possible. "It is interesting that Indigenous Americans assign the trickster role to non-humans. In contrast, tricksters in European traditions tend to be gods, such as Hermes or Loki...To accept that your world is largely the work of a trickster is "to know and accept it on its own terms"... It's not perfect, but given the being who created it, how could it be?...This shows an acceptance of nature and a corresponding belief that the way the world works does not need to be massively changed or "engineered" to make it a better place to live..."

To Native Americans wolves were creators while coyotes were tricksters. While Indo-Europeans carried with them their fear of predatory wolves and superstitions of menacing werewolves (a thing which likely did not jive with native shamans wearing wolf costumes), Native Americans of course held a great deal of respect for wolves. The discrepancy between the two clashing systems can be further understood by a paradigm shift in Christian iconography during the high middle ages; "...while missionaries attempting to convert the northern heathen found it useful to portray Christ as a great hero capable of defeating the old gods of strength like Thor in open combat. But from about the twelfth century a noticeable growth in the cult of Christ as lamb or infant took place, with a concomitant increase in devotion to the Virgin who nurtured the infant."[52] Paralleling this shift in the depiction of Christ, Christians began to fancy themselves as sheep. Regardless of whether the pack behavior of wolves was consciously perceived as a threat to the changes which proponents of Christianity sought to establish[7], being the natural predator of the lamb proved grounds for the wolf's consequent demonization. And there was also the very real threat which wolves posed to actual livestock. Accordingly, during the middle ages the wolf became demonized through the advent of the werewolf; a nocturnal and malevolent shape shifting predator born of pure evil. Ironically, it can be said that wolves only became nocturnal hunters in the first place due to being threatened by humans, but in more remote areas it is found they usually prefer to hunt in the daylight[49].

Fairies

Fairies cannot rightfully be said to be animals, and their relevance to domestication is questionable. It nevertheless is interesting to note that the beliefs surrounding these mythical beings in Europe during the middle ages somewhat parallels the trajectory of werewolves. Ancient Celtic folklore held that fairies were neither inherently good nor bad (tricksters might be the more appropriate classification), but in the middle ages, like the wolf, fairies became a scapegoat for inexplicable malignancies or misfortunes and a source of fearful and dark superstition among people. If a child was kidnapped or went missing it was believed fairies came to take the child. Even more common was to suspect that a child was a 'changeling' implying that the child had been 'swapped out' by a fairy who had overtaken the child's body. This provided an explanation for things people could not

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[7]again, this is my own speculation.

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fully grasp or cope with such as a contriving neighbor who might have swapped a baby at birth or a mental illness or deformity of the child which did not manifest until later in life – any abrupt change within a child might illicit suspicion that they'd been overtaken by a faerie[51].

In contrast to the depiction of fairies today; $2-6$ inch in size, beautifully clad, flawless elf-like facial features, and with butterfly wings, prior to being 'Disneyfied' throughout the progressive era fairies were more commonly described as being closer to two feet in size and with dry, leathery, or yellowish skin, and sometimes outright disfigured in their appearance. Fairies were seen by European peasants as things to be feared. Similar to the tradition of leaving cookies and milk out for Santa Claus for Christmas, peasant would leave treats in a house before moving in to test whether it had been inhabited by fairies. If the treats were eaten the next day, they'd not move into it. Children suspected of being changelings would be abused and mistreated in hopes the fairy who had overtaken the child's body would return the stolen child. Suspected changelings – even babies – were tossed into hot coals, tied upside down, kicked down a hill, or left exposed in the cold for days – things which in some cases resulted in the child's death[51].

Naturally a belief in fairies also posed a threat to Christian beliefs. According to Richard Sugg,

> "Fairies were omniscient and omnipresent. They were also omnipotent – at least to those who believed the could 'cut of off half the human race' or destroy the world itself. This, and much more, was what the ordinary Christians of fairyland really believed. They believed so fervently in fairies that at times they would, like Abraham, be ready to sacrifice their own children for this belief. There is good reason to think that, if these people could have written down their beliefs, the result would have been very drastic indeed. Simply, it would have torn official Christian history to shreds. "

–Richard Sugg, *'Fairies: A Dangerous History'*

Communal Living in Russia; From Emancipation to the 20th Century

> "If the American dream is pursued in the individual family house, the Soviet dream can only be fulfilled in the communal house. "
> —Svetlama Boym, *'Soviet Everyday Culture: An Oxymoron?'*

During the 1920's barracks became a popular form of housing in some industrialized Russian cities such as Moscow. This have resulted from the Bolshevik's social organizational agenda to deconstruct the nuclear family, industrialization efforts, to remedy a simple lack of housing, or some combination of all of these. Strangely, any overly detailed ethnographic information on these places in Russia during the 1920's seems to have been selectively omitted from Russia's history[45, 27, 28].

"Soviet historiography, describing the process of creating the industrial cities of the first Soviet five-year plans of new buildings, very sparingly talked about the barracks – buildings for living together 80-120 same-sex workers in the same room (and often opposite-sex families). In the historiography of Soviet architecture is almost completely absent an explanation of why the barracks were the most common type of dwelling, as well as information about how they were the main repository of public functions: dining room, post office, club, office, hospital, kindergarten, school and so on. "

<div style="text-align: right">Author unknown, as cited by Mark Meerovich and Elena Bulgakova</div>

What we do know is that the introduction of barracks caused a sort of cultural tug-a-war between attempts at the communal life and its domestic surroundings. The term 'Domestic trash' was widely used to describe private property owners in Russia in the progressive era. On their part, proponents of the domestic life mocked communal residents with jokes such as that residence shared a 'hundred-meter blanket' or by insinuating that they shared one anothers wives[45, 28].

Aside from some interesting accounts of prisons in which prisoners lived contentedly and willingly in a communal and almost autonomous fashion, to my knowledge Barrack housing was not introduced on any large scale in Russia until the early $1900's$. Prior to this recently (1861) emancipated serf villages, while composed of intensely traditional people who identified with their local village and its ways, were not communal – least not in the sense that different families actually lived together (although it *was* common for members of a family to sleep in the same room together). But through open and regular village assemblies in which the whole public engaged for both political and celebratory purposes, through farming systems which allotted farmers land that surrounded the village instead of the private home and which caused their tilled lands to intersect [a thing which required farmers work in tandem with one another], and by maintaining common lands available as a last resort for those most in need as most European villages did in past times, a strong sense of community nevertheless existed in these villages.

It is therefore, difficult to say how the idea of barrack housing came about as a proper accounting of it was seemingly removed from the record. Either this or it was simply never recorded in the first place. But we do know barrack housing primarily existed in cities, and this was a time in which rural village workers were migrating to urban centers to take advantage of emerging work opportunities. Being as rural peasants were accustomed to the traditional and quasi-communal culture of the rural village, it is plausible that villagers who relocated to cities were open to barracks not just because they were an economical way of getting by, but also because they were communal, and furthermore because communal places tend to become a refuge for traditional cultures to grow in the midst of a progressive city. The tug-a-war between tradition and progressive habits/ ways of life was a significant theme of the time, and this is a thing which will be discussed more in part IV.

In either case, to my knowledge, there is no record of anyone being *forced* into barrack housing prior to the initialization of Joseph Stalin's [first] 'five-year' plan in 1929 in which workers were forced into massive communes reaching populations of $5,000$. For *this* we have fairly detailed historic recording of. Ironically, this notion of a 'commune' as it came to be referred to was not communal in the sense that no actual living space beyond the kitchen was shared between families, rather it was their work tools, disposable property, and lands which were to be held in common. And this is I posit is what has given the form of socialism which emerged in Russia a degree of hypocrisy as

when people live separately they will inevitably come to see themselves as separate and distinct – to some degree or another even opposed in interests – to those who live next to them. When this is the case, forcing such people to share land and disposable property is sort of an outside-in approach which is doomed to contradict itself. In short, when people live separately, they act separately, and any attempt to cause them do otherwise necessarily will require authoritative force. As we know by now, this has bad outcomes.

The difference between sharing living space and sharing disposable property is unfortunately easily overlooked. It has had the effect that communism [state ownership of land and productive resources] has become conflated with communalism – a thing which existed most naturally for millions of years prior to any communist government.

The communist government of Russia from the time of Joseph Stalin onward (at least until the dissolution of the soviet union) switched from a truly communalist ideology to being a proponent of the nuclear family remaining a foundational unit of organization. Though the massive communes which Joseph Stalin initiated soon came to an end as the forced collectivization of agriculture backfired and the famine which resulted tragically caused millions of deaths, the state government would for decades – until the 1990's – continue to falsely equivocate and reduce communalism to the 'communal' apartment.

The case of Nowa Huta in the early $1970's$ which experienced a brief revival of barrack housing may shed some light on why socialist regimes were wary of truly communal living arrangements.

> "With so many workers toiling and living together, norms and networks of resistance spread inside and outside the plant, as Nowa Huta became one of the most militant centers of opposition to the government....
>
> By the account of Solidarity unionists, Nowa Huta workers came to have a shared pride in working in the plant not because of its role in creating a socialist Poland but because of its role in fighting it. As Goodyear, GM, Ford, GE, and other American corporations had learned decades earlier, large assemblages of workers who work together can turn the largest, most important factories from models of efficiency into weapons of labor power. "

> —Joshua B. Freeman, *'A History of The Factory and The Making of The Modern World'*

Of course Now Huta observed a number of degenerate habits in the populace as well, at least in the beginning stages; alcoholism, brawling, sexual abuse, etc. But how much of this can be attributed to factors other than just the barracks is unclear as there were a number of social and economic factors which were unique to Russia and particularly Nowa Huta at the time, e.g. lack of employment and entertainment (boredom), or the fact that people came there in the first place under adverse conditions.

The implementation of barracks alone is neither an inherently empowering or dis-empowering thing. Were it so, then today's Foxconn factory workers in China who live in dormitories would probably be in a position that is worthy of envy, but they are not; Foxconn exerts a large degree of control over workers. It is worth noting however, that Foxconn goes to great lengths to keep workers separate from friends and family[29]. All this is to say that Barracks are a useful tool, but their specific effects remain understudied.

The history of communal living in Russia and elsewhere lends proof to the fact that not everyone is cut out for family and domestic life. Numerous accounts tell a similar story; that the life centered around private property is not a sustainable one, and it can be a boring one[28]. Yet it is also true that many people resented being *forced* into communal living. And so the history of communal living in Russia is tainted, not only be an eerie omission of barrack housing from the history books, but also by the fact that the meaning of communal has been conflated with communism, and that the implementation of 'communal' living arrangements was at times forced onto citizens. Nevertheless, it is strange to consider that in what has at times been an over-controlling communist country experiments were [at least briefly] had in which people had the opportunity to pursue communal living, while in supposedly free nations like the U.S. a history of experimenting with communal living is comparatively lacking, and the opportunity to pursue a communal life-style was never so much as recognized as a freedom to be granted in the first place.

As the saying goes, history is written by the winners. Life in barracks is often associated with a state misery and hardship or of state/ military control. The problem to objectively studying the idea of barrack housing is in part that barracks are used for social housing only in times of upheaval and societal stress, so the 'misery of the barrack' becomes inseparable from the misery of the situation. The other potential complication is that communal living situations tend to create a cultural-tug-a-war with the surrounding domestic culture, and representatives of the two opposing ways of life may actually seek to false witness against and sabotage one another. In the end, if the case of Russia is to judge by, history will seemingly be written by the winners.

Closing Thoughts

> "Monks' cells were allocated in individual houses. According to the statutes of the order, the Carthusian "must take diligent and due care not to create reasons to leave his cell apart from the regular and common observances; rather, he should regard his cell as being as necessary to his salvation and his life as water is to fish or the sheepfold to sheep. The more he stays in his cell, the more he will like it… "
>
> —Philippe Contamine, *'Peasant Hearth to Papal Palace: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries'*

As the above quotation seems to imply, humans are creatures of habit and inertia; we know what we have observed our whole life, and unless or until we observe something else this will be 'normal' to us. Yet there is something very abnormal about domestic society, and we are justified in calling as such because it runs contrary to our biological hard wiring – it makes us feel abnormal.

As we have seen in part I the notion of inheritance has played a profound role in the evolution of society, causing humans to shift from matrilineal societies that were more communal in their habits to domestic societies which base themselves on the sanctity of the private home and nuclear family. But inheritance can take many forms beyond simply passing private and tangible forms of property onto children. Though assuring that inheritance of tangible forms of property were passed onto direct descendants may have played a decisive role in the conversion, the conversion nevertheless has also had the effect of narrowing the transmission of *habits*.

All of my work ethic I got from observing my mother put her nose to the grind-stone day in and day out. Though she never taught me much with her words, from her I learned not to think twice about chasing my goals and to be so persistent I could not stop myself if I tried; putting one foot in front of the other; some days it is all I feel I know how to do. I think of where she got it from. Probably her mother in Italy. Stalky, tough as nails, the sole authority of her hundred and twenty year old house – decapitating chickens with her own two hands on every special occasion. In turn I wonder where did she got it from?

Whereas it was likely once true in the communal society that 'it takes an entire village to raise a child' and children had the equitable benefit of being influenced by a wide variety of individuals rather than by whoever happened to give birth to them, in the domestic setting this is not the case; for better or worse, children are disproportionately influenced by their parents, and often it can be said they lack positive role-models if and when they did not have the fortune of being born to one. This seems to me the grossest form of inequity in opportunity, and a society which attempts to remedy it by handing out scholarships instead of restoring a true sense of communalism then calling *this* an attempt at restoring some sense of equilibrium can be compared to pouring salt on the wound.

This is also true of information inheritance. Considering the adage 'information is power' and that we are living in what is increasingly an 'information economy', the ways in which we transmit the sorts of knowledge which are not found in books yet have the capacity to influence our life choices (e.g. advice/ sharing of life experiences so that children have something to learn from) are likely to be increasingly sources of inequity (or, as I prefer to say, a barrier to equilibrium – see part V).

For a man, though he might not occupy the position of authority and prestige as he would in a patrilineal society, one trade off to a matrilineal society is enhanced brotherhood and a sense of freedom. It is however, somewhat disheartening to think that, in comparison with feminist movements of past times which aimed to restructure the whole of society to suit the needs of women by restoring communalism (a thing which had benefits for all of society), modern feminism, despite proclaiming itself to be a movement of boldness, has seemingly settled on the notion of simply advancing women to the position of being breadwinners of the nuclear household. This does not seem to aim for changing the prevailing domestic system so much it simply aims to swap out who is in what position within its framework. At the risk of sounding anti-feminist, this poses a fundamental challenge to the nuclear family as, unlike men, women are the reproductive unit and so there is little incentive for them to take care of a man; rightfully so, it is natural for a woman to see herself as the very purpose of resources.

Now, I of course cannot speak for women, but I don't think its a common sentiment for young girls growing up to dream of the day they can afford to take care of a man.

And there is the fact that nature seems to have engineered us to form complimentary units in which sexes play different roles. What makes humans somewhat unique is we have the capacity to redefine gender roles over time, but if there is a prolonged period of time and place in which men and women played the *same* role I am unaware of it. This is to suggest that, prior to modern feminism, we still abided by the tribal laws of nature in the sense that we sought to form complementary social/ tribal/ familial units; we worked together instead of competed against one another. But modern feminism does not just aim to redefine the role of a women; it posits that a woman can essentially fill the role of a man – in all ways but sexual, she can essentially *be* a man. In turn, it is probably

no surprise that we now have men changing their gender identity to that of a woman.

For the 'pure-bred' males that remain, discussing the possibility that gender roles might actually be a positive thing, or [god-forbid] joking about them, has become so taboo it can cripple a persons employment. In this sense 'cancel culture' is eerily related to modern feminism. Another pernicious consequence of discussing gender roles having become taboo is that, by extension, it becomes taboo to question how things like feminism has affected the constructed merit system. Now, I do not aim to suggest that the merit system is not in need of changing with the times, however, what once made the US a successful country was the fact that it constructed one. People believed that if they worked hard their efforts would not be for nothing; there was a ladder to be climbed. Today however, increasingly there is the sense that there are just elevators. As it relates to feminism, one obvious way in which the introduction of women has potentially altered the merit system is that the more physical demanding a task is, the less merit is assigned to it. Admittedly however, this is also largely a consequence of technology.

As will be argued briefly in the authors note[8] men and women competing instead of working as a complementary unit has a demoralizing effect on a mans impetus to perform work, namely because women are much of the reason why men work in the first place.

Again, this was not to say that the merit system changing is an altogether bad or unnecessary thing. It is however, absolutely important that we have the capacity to consciously create a [new] merit system rather than being so checked by social taboos that we stand idly by while everything which once gave workers impetus to work hard and create an economically successful country is stripped out from under us and we are pulled back to an age of feudalism where inheritance trumps individual effort and merit, and in which no matter how hard one may work, no merit is given to their efforts.

Lastly, It is worth questioning whether it was the advent of the private home and nuclear family which gave rise to patriarchy, or vice-versa. Here it was argued that it was the former case, but this was by no means a rigorous case-study and conclusion. Admittedly, the case may well be more of 'which came first; the chicken or the egg?' type situation. To make this question more explicit; did the advent of the private home and nuclear family, both of which helped narrow the channels of inheritance, play causal roles in giving rise to patriarchy (i.e. patriarchy was some peripheral consequence of these things rather than the intended goal) or was it the case that the already established patriarchy demanded the advent of the private home and nuclear family as a means of narrowing the channels of inheritance once it decided this was necessary or desirable?

Successful movements tend to identify things which, once changed, cannot easily be unchanged. As with any organizational shift in society, the advancement of women is ultimately interdependent on other things, and in the long run advances might not hold unless other facets of society calibrate to the advancement of women in labor sectors. However popular the feminist movement is today, popularity fades. What will remain is the biological drive to reproduce, and the millennia old framework in which people must pursue this ends. What I am suggesting then, is that an advancement of women in the work place may (in the long run) remain a tentative and limited thing so long as the private household and nuclear family remain the dominant organizational forces in society.

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[8]these thoughts to do with feminism and its relation to labor issues are germinating in my mind after initially publishing this essay, so my thoughts on this may be a bit out of order and also scattered.

In part IV we'll see that our labor systems are intimately related to and reliant upon the private household and nuclear family.

Part III:
The Role of Communalism in Sports and Entertainment

Perhaps above all other significant evolutionary drivers, the tribal instinct suffers to manifest in today's concrete jungles. And it is scary how adept we prove at normalizing what is easily argued to be an unnatural state. Take sports as an example. Sports are among the foremost outlets of [a semblance of] tribalism which is capable of transcending the nuclear family today. There is something intoxicating about being a part of a crowd in which one may find their own sense of ego dissolving like salt in the ocean. We are inundated with one sports advertisement after another, all which essentially play to this instinct within us. We are sold on superstars, and they are legitimate heroes in the sense that they bring us together in the midst of a highly segmented domestic existence. Were we however, able to reach back in history and transport one of our ancient ancestors to the present day and invite them to a sporting event, they might firstly wonder how and why such a feeling of communal harmony came to be treated like a commodity for which we must stand in line only to pay an exorbitant price just to get small and transient taste of; why are the superheros we rely on to bring us together people we do not even know; why must we sit in some designated seat and behave in what seems to them an automated and stale fashion? Why do modern humans seem so bent on trying to map their inner experiences onto their outer achievements – to the point of sacrificing the inner experience itself?

Native Americans had their rough equivalent to the Indo-European style sporting events of today[9], but they did not have such a clear definition of winners vs. losers. In fact there was no clear line between participant and spectator; *everyone*, from the oldest lady to the youngest child was in some fashion a participant in the game[49].

Even in more recent times there have been notable transformations in our sporting events. In the progressive era for example, for sportsmen 'progress' held the implication of becoming more of a marketable and family friendly poster-boy than a representative of his community. For fans the progressive movement was equally transformative,

> "The 1920s are often recalled as a golden age of sport, but it was an age of mass consumption rather than mass participation. Some thought that this was a very bad thing. In their 1929 sociological case study of Middletown, the Lynds noted that modern leisure was now 'mainly spent sitting down'. 'A few play,' elaborated Stuart Chase, 'while the rest of us shout, clap hands . . . crush in our neighbours' hats, and get what thrill we may from passive rather than active participation. "

> —Kasia Boddy, *'Boxing: A Cultural History'*

Boxing makes a particularly good example of the transformation. Using the example of Philadel-

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[9]I label them as such out of respect for the fact that modern sporting events were largely shaped by the advent of the Olympics in Greece and later the concept of a sports club was developed in Europe, and this paralleled the evolution of guilds into professional society. In fact its curious to note that the notion of a half time or pre-game show in which teams march in unison while wearing their respective colors and waving their flag is remarkably similar to guild practices of the fourteenth century [see *The European Guilds: An Economic Analysis.* by Sheilagh Ogilvie[10].

phia aristocrat Robert Waln, Elliot J. Gorn describes the role that the introduction of boxing clubs served for the aristocratic class,

> "Prize fighting broke down class barriers, allowing a tavern keeper or a black man, Crib or Molineaux, to mingle with the aristocracy. Sparring, on the other hand, helped maintain social distinctions. "In all civilized societies," Waln reasoned, "an aristocracy must and will exist, either founded on letters, family or fortune." American demagogues who denied this truth unleashed the insolence of the lower orders. Sparring lessons, however, would help the upper class keep hack drivers, wood sawyers, carters, and draymen in their place: "Tobacco-smoke would not be puffed in the faces of our ladies at every corner, nor white silk stockings jostled into gutters, by every athletic and malicious porter. The aristocracy of fashion and gentility would be more clearly recognised, and the farce of relative republican equality cease to ornament every ragged vagabond with the same attributes as a gentleman."
>
> Clearly, men like Waln dreaded the masses and, equally clearly, they sensed that political and social power were eluding their grasp. The success of Fuller and other sparring masters was due at least in part to fears that the social transformation of American cities was subtly changing class relationships, that inferiors no longer respected their betters, and that gentlemen must learn to protect themselves against ruffians. The rise of boxing schools signaled new anxieties that a dangerous underclass now threatened social order "

—Elliot J. Gorn, *'The Manly Art'*

The notion of a club has parallels to the concept of guilds in medieval Europe. In fact the history of clubsmanship and its socializing/ professionalizing effects can largely be traced to Eighteenth century London. Tough guilds largely died off by the middle of the nineteenth century, through professional associations guilds were able to transmutate themselves into 'professional society' that we are familiar with today through fields of work, e.g. every time we see a person in a business suit we are beholding the notion of a gentleman which was largely honed in England, coincidentally right around the time that guilds were formally dying off. Simultaneous to this, the advent of sporting clubs were laying the foundation for the professionalization of sporting activities, and as the previous quote makes clear, they served a social organizational/ conditioning purpose.

Despite being classified as illegal soon after the turn of the twentieth century, the loosely organized and lively fights in New York became an almost nightly occurrence. These unsanctioned events were vilified by lawmakers who associated them with crime and degeneracy, but this had not always been the case; having been made illegal there was little chance for them to evolve in any other way. Nevertheless, boxing remained the most popular sport in America until the progressive era – arguably until the 1960's.

Today's boxing events are in distinct contrast.

For starters, at the competitive amateur level the organization *U.S.A. boxing* has a virtual monopoly on the sport. This is largely thanks to the fact they control access to the Olympics. Any fighter who participates in an alternative amateur boxing organization can and likely will be barred from this opportunity for life (a thing which helps explain why there are no alternative amateur boxing organizations). The advent of prize-fighting laws has served as another means to ensure the controlled organization of the sport. Together these things have allowed fights to become so rigorously system-

atized that it has made attending professional bouts akin to attending a movie theater. For amateur boxing events it has made them an almost boring occurrence; there is no communal or singular crowd so much as there is a congregation of separate groups (families or clubs). And I find it more than coincidental that, in contrast to the rugged and celebrated depiction of a boxer of past times who might fight to overcome dire poverty, chisel concrete all day before hammering away at the ad-hoc constructed bag in his back-yard in lieu of any gym to go to, or travel like a hobo just to scrounge up fights (e.g. Jack Dempsey) modern champions increasingly seem to be those who were indoctrinated into the sport from a young age, i.e. the systematization of the sport is seemingly having the effect of making champions an act of inheritance.

If nothing else it is probably reasonable to say that, for whatever reason, modern champions are more pliable to being managed than those of the past. It is curious to compare and contrast boxers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who were much less encumbered by professional management than fighters today are. John Sullivan – the last bare-knuckle heavyweight champion – went through numerous trainers, and in all cases one does get the impression that it was Sullivan who told his managers what was to be done.

Eerily reminiscent of scientific management or 'Taylorism' in which detailed studies of the precise movements and timing of workers movements were carried out in an effort to better manage them, it is normal in many boxing gyms today that a fighter be told precisely when and how to do this, or not to do that. Yet one often finds that the person telling them these things is no expert, and even if they were it can be said that no one can be an expert on someone elses body. In boxing this is important because though the fundamentals may be the same for everyone, *how* to make them work is a highly individualistic thing. Like any act of discovery in any science, this requires freedom of experimentation *in combination* with opportunity to put these experiments to the test. But by interjecting him or herself between the fighters autonomy in experimentation of and opportunity to test his or her ideas out through fighting, the notion of a professional manager has come to hold much more weight than it used to, and this has largely been facilitated by the advent of sporting clubs in conjunction with legislation which sought to make prize-fighting illegal. This in turn even makes the concept of 'drop-in sparring' infeasible as such a thing could potentially be categorized as prize-fighting. Ergo, if they wish to compete, fighters at some point or another will experience a strong impetus to join a club, submit to some form of management, and find a way to successfully navigate the social maze of quasi-tribal and territorial belonging which boxing clubs are so prone to.

Though it will certainly come at the cost of opportunity, from my own experience in amateur boxing, there is a great deal of mental empowerment and freedom which comes from training alone. Having fallen out with my first club I learned to train alone outdoors when I was in my early twenties. I'd always run different routes and train in different places. By shadow boxing with hand-weights and by striking the ground with my palms I learned to get a great work out in without the use of a bag so I'd train outdoors. I'd find old buildings or fields – places which had seemingly outgrown what people initially expected them to be; places with grimy and natural character. I'd do this in numerous cities up and down the west coast, and always it had a mentally empowering and rejuvenating effect on me. This is all in stark contrast to boxing gyms in which I'd often find myself running the same routes every day and going through the same exact routine, all in unison with others and under somebody elses dictation. In his autobiography legendary track star Jesse Owens professed, "I always loved running – it was something you could do by yourself and under your own power. You could go any

direction, fast or slow as you wanted, fighting the wind if you felt like it, seeking out new sights just on the strength of your own feet and courage of your lungs."

The organization of the sport of boxing exemplifies how the want for individual freedom does not jive so well with the yearning for communalism within a domestic society. And there is hardly a limit to how seriously one could take the sociological study of boxing. One of the most influential texts in history – the *Bhaghavad Gita* – revolved around the simple question which was asked by a warrior named Arjuna who stood opposed to people he either loved, had no quarrel with, or in either case was lacking meaningful reason to go to war with. Arjuna then asked Krishna (the incarnated form of god) the simple question, "why fight?". From this seemingly simple question evolved one of the most influential philosophical discussions ever recorded.

Though there are definite limits to the comparison of war to the sport of boxing, there are parallels. As a soldier might join the military out of a want to experience a feeling of kinship with a large group (a thing which can be difficult to find in domestic society), so too might a boxer find his or herself punching others in the face as a means to find a sense of belonging and community. The primal yearning to be a part of a tribe when combined with a territorial system which inhibits tribalism from germinating in a natural fashion in turn allows for such a thing as the management and organization of fighters, and this in turn this allows for the evolution of both sporting events and wars so large in scale that they can encompass entire continents.

Closing Thoughts

Let us now consider a satirical analogy.

Imagine a large troop of apes who one day discover and adopt the habits of domestication and farming, and for the sake of satire and analogy assume the transition happens within the span of just a few years. Whereas members of the troop once spent most of the day casually lounging around one another and the social drive was constantly satisfied, now individuals largely find one another hidden behind their own four walls (respectively), and (with the exception of a few 'free-loaders' who rebel by inventing the practice of begging) each individual hustles from early morning until sometime in the evening as the difficulties of farming and trading life require. Whereas there once existed a natural mechanism for the alpha male to maintain social order by observing the troop and checking the actions of the most envious, opportunistic, deceptive, and antagonistic among the troop, now this natural mechanism is suddenly outdated – outlawed even. Moreover, individuals are claiming territory and resources for themselves; its no longer just a banana tree, its *my* banana tree, or it is *your* banana tree. New conceptions of 'mineness' – the idea that an individual can own the land and resources within it – gives rise to trade and commerce within the troop and, in conjunction with the fact that individuals are now separated, their yearning for tribalism at times reaching the point of desperation, this will inevitably give rise to the opportunity to monetize ape social interaction as it will excessive habits of consumption as individuals learn to accept that eating, buying, and drinking – consuming – are now the new preeminent means of connecting with one another. And it will give rise to addiction as people come to realize that smoking, drinking, ingesting chemical substances or indulging in synthetic forms of entertainment (lets pretend these apes invented television) are a means of forgetting about the tribal instinct altogether.

From the alpha males perspective, it is not just dis-empowering to him as an individual, but the degeneracy and unhealthiness of the new social dynamic is as alarming as it is heartbreaking and unsatisfying to him. His bills piling up, his labor exploited, his marriage having devolved to a stressed over-dependency on the emotional support of just one individual, frustrated, he begins to hit things as he used to do in the old days. One day he gets so mad he hits another ape – say it was a silverback his own size so that spectators are more interested than disproving of the act. Despite the act of conflict now being considered 'uncivil' or even illegal, it having been a while since the members of the troop have seen the big guy in action, everyone pauses in their daily hustle; they come out from behind their walls and circle around to observe what just happened. The audience feels an inexplicably primal satisfaction in the temporary return to the old communal ways. With everyone circled around him, things to the alpha male feel as they once were – his tribe in tact. If only for a moment, all feels as it should be to the big guy. So he just keeps on hitting people, albeit this time in whatever *legal* way he could think of. With the exception of a few transient moments, it can be said he's been unsuccessful at reverting things to how they once were. Instead he eventually finds the surrogate activity – what people are now calling 'sport' – has become the crutch of fighters like him and fans alike. Ironically, by providing this transient crutch the true underlying problem was allowed to grow unchecked as so long as people had a fight to watch they felt no urge to question why they were driven to such spectacles in the first place.

So it was the ancient sport of boxing was born. [end satire]

The transformation of boxing events has parallels with other entertainment events. My niece and I once attended a play called *The Magic Show* which was about a drunk and aspiring magician and his love quarrels. To open the show a man [an actor] gave a beautiful speech which detailed how audiences in the nineteenth century used to throw tomatoes onto the stage, shout, and *'boo!'* at the actors when disappointed them, or give a standing ovation and loud cheer when exited. Acting used to be more of an interactive thing he said, and that this was all in contrast to today's docile crowds who sit quietly, clap only when cued to, and would likely be asked to leave were they to interrupt or arrested should they dare throw a tomato on stage. As he explained all of this, he had been making numerous failed attempts to engage a stiffly obedient crowd – a thing which, in addition to making us hate ourselves for the wall-flowers we had become, also had the effect of leading one to believe it was going to be a disappointing show. Giving up his attempts to liven us up, he said, "How a society goes from that" [the active crowds of the nineteenth century] "to this" [gesturing to all of us wallflowers] he said, "is the real magic trick." He then asked that we silence our cellphones, emphasizing in all apparent seriousness that we'd be asked to leave if we failed at this.

Part IV:
Communalism and Labor

Though one has acted over the course of centuries while the other has acted over the course of millennia, there is nevertheless a parallel between the modern trend of compartmentalizing fields of work and the much longer and more general trend of compartmentalization which characterizes domestic society. In both cases it can be said the trend relies on at least one critical thing; dividing [or compartmentalizing] the community. Naturally, the development of the private home has played a critical role in this, and this sets the ecological stage in which labor is performed.

It ought to come as no surprise that systems of production and/ or service (i.e. labor systems) are intimately connected to *social* systems that are in turn largely influenced by the environment which gave rise to them. Whatever is produced must be consumed if it is to be worthy of the cost and effort of producing it in the first place. A service provided doesn't do much for the person offering it if no one is need of his or her service(s). When the environments through which people connect change it is natural that their habits of consumption, the services they are in need of, and the means through which they obtain both of these things will all change to some extent or another. We begin to see how and why, from a theoretical perspective, what is 'work' cannot be extrapolated from what is social. Private property – physical mediating institutions (e.g. private homes, clubs, restaurants, etc.) – plays the ecological role of mediator or even divisor between the two constructs; by dividing physical spheres of work from physical spheres of social activity the abstract notion that labor processes are in some way fundamentally distinct from social processes arises.

If and when the environment becomes monopolized by one distinct and uniform sort of construct, the illusion would be taken further into what Allen bloom has called the greatest form of tyranny[10]; to remove the perception that there is an outside; to make the individual believe that things have always been this way, and that they could not be any different. There is then strong incentive for the individual to conclude that problems which arise within the prevailing system are mainly problems stemming from the inability or unwillingness of individuals to conform to their environment (or the system which arose from it).

Of course, any ecological argument must begin with land.

The first section to follow will discuss how and why land and labor have been considered to be 'fictitious commodities', and this will help set the stage for understanding how notions of 'ownership', 'consumer', 'producer', etc. can vary across time and geography. Naturally the idea of land ownership also feeds into the concept of communalism as no sedentary (domestic) community/ tribe/ family can form without it.

The second section will discuss the subtle relation between monarchies/ matriarchies, the private home, and servile labor systems. The case of the Merina kingdom of Madagascar will be used as a case study which demonstrates how notions of differentiating between what is ritual vs. what is work or what is a producer vs. what is a consumer might vary or be entirely absent in a culture. Though not strictly related to the domestication *process* or the the general concept of communalism,

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[10]see Author's note section.

the case of the Merina kingdom *does* give some enlightening insights to the relation between the private home and the organizational principles of labor.

The third section discusses the case of Emancipated Russian serf villages. Here we will see that affecting a transformation of work practices can more than cause – it can require – a shift in culture. Newly emancipated Russian serfs being quasi-communal and intensely traditional in their culture and work practices, we will see how progressive work habits which were 'promoted' by the communist government in the name of improving peasants productive capacity in turn had the effect of undermining peasants sense of communalism, increasing household division (*razdel*), and luring peasants to cut ties with their traditional roots.

The final section will discuss labor trends observed in America throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which have tended towards reductionist forms work. Here it is argued that the aim of what has been referred to as 'professional society' is largely to achieve exclusivity (and also the management of human capital), and that increasingly specialized fields of work which are made possible by technology were used to achieve this ends (as opposed to them causing an exclusive outcome naturally). This trend trend towards ever more specialized and reductionist forms of labor is then argued to be but a recent manifestation and advancement of a much broader mechanism – one that has operated over the course of millennia. This mechanism is of course the compartmentalization of communalism which characterizes the domestication process.

Land and Labor: Fictitious Commodities

The concept of owning land itself is perhaps the heart and soul of the matter as communalism cannot grow without space which is truly shared in the sense that A) individuals have rights to access it with autonomy and B) to use it in ways which are relatively free of [externally imposed] normative expectations such as what activities they do or do not perform, what they wear, or how they behave.

'Commons' was a term which was prevalent in many cultures throughout history. It was a term which was used to refer to lands which were unclaimed yet open to be used by those who were in some need of them in terms of growing food, hunting game, or gathering resources (e.g. wood for a fire). Today the notion of commons has virtually been replaced by state owned lands and public parks – neither of which are available for the actual harvesting or growing of resources by those in need.

Of course, when we speak of 'community' what often comes to mind is not what activities we perform to sustain ourselves. and in modern society this is even more the case; 'community' often reflects congregational leisure or celebratory activities or some form of community service (work aimed at benefiting the surrounding community rather than the individual performing it).

In the 1940's Karl Polyani published what proved to be a seminal and bold thought; that both land and labor were a *fictitious commodities*; land in the sense that no one created it, and therefore no one could objectively justify putting a price on it, i.e. no matter how hard we may work, we could never justify the idea of 'earning' our right to own land itself. Understably, Polyani's means of characterizing the notion of land ownership is enlightening only to the modern mind. It likely can be said that for eons land was not seen as a thing which could be 'owned' by an individual as humans

were in many cases either A) communal in their treatment/ ownership of land and/or B) nomadic in their ways of living until the advent of agriculture just a few thousand years ago. But it was not until relatively recent times (just over a few centuries) that notions of private property really substantiated into immutable, financialized, and state sanctioned 'rights' as they are today.

How labor is a fictitious commodity is a question that can be approached from at least a few different directions.

Firstly, Polyani was careful to note that 'labor' is an extremely broad concept and so he settled on defining simply as 'human activity' – a definition which does not preclude how *social* motives/ activities are interwoven into constructing notions of work. 'Labor' is a very natural thing; one does whatever they must in order for themselves and their people to not just survive, but to thrive. As noted by Polyani, one cannot nor should they attempt to explain economy strictly in terms of what tangibles are necessary for the survival of individuals or groups. Were it only for this, many processes simply could not be explained, and even those that could would ultimately rely on a number of other subjective processes which are social in their motive and/ or nature.

We should also note that the notion of 'property' is in many cases is inextricable from land ownership. Even when speaking of forms of property which are not themselves defined by geographic boundaries (movable goods), many items of consumption ultimately require a place where they get produced.

How and why labor can or should be considered as a fictitious commodity is best understood via example. So take for an example a company which employs a worker – a man – man who helps them develop a fancy condo next to where the worker lives – a thing which the worker knew was going to have the effect of changing his home and eventually pricing him out. While the worker benefits form the paycheck, he only does so by agreeing to act against his other interests and those of his communities. In this sense the worker has been coerced to sell his labor as the alternative is in often that he finds no or lesser earning employment and that, meanwhile, the condos get built anyway.

Naturally, many similar examples which we might come up with are likely to involve land ownership in some way or another, and this is no coincidence considering that land is arguably the most fundamentally fictitious of what we call commodities.

The Merina Kingdom; Monarchies, Servile Labor, and the Private Household

From sixteenth century until the late nineteenth century to the Merina kingdom was governed by monarchs or matriarchs. *fanompoana* was a central organizing principle of labor; it implied service to the king or queen. The principle of *fanompoana* created a hierarchy which, in the name of accomplishing work for his or her majesty, was exploited as a means to coerce individuals who were lower in the hierarchy of royal service to work for the benefit of those higher than themselves. *Andriana* were the noble class who were closest to the royal family and their status/ rank largely was measured by how prestigious was the service which they performed for the royal family. *Hova* were free commoners who still performed work in the name of the sovereign in some indirect capacity. To be wholly divorced from service to the royal family was tantamount to slavery as it implied that one answered to someone other than the sovereign (their *tompo*).

When studying the organizational principles of the Merina Kingdom David Graeber[40] defines *paradigmatic labor* to be varieties of work which tend to shape and defined what the general popular view of what work is or is not. As an example, in nineteenth century America the paradigm of work largely became factory work; it shaped the popular conception of what work was for the middle class. *emblematic labor* Graeber defines to be work which, regardless of how much time/ energy a person invests in it or how much income they actually derive from it, this particular task comes to define them in the eyes of others. A form of labor being considered paradigmatic need not preclude it from also being emblematic; the former is simply a more general way of expressing the popular conception of what work is (or is not) while the latter is a means of characterizing how individuals might derive social status or be organized according to the specific nature of their labor.

If the distinction between the two forms of labor seems obscure consider both a white collar professional and a construction worker. Assume both are employed by a company (respectively). If the white collar professional wears a suit and spends most of his days at the office, and if the construction worker wears high-visibility protective equipment each day to a construction site then these two workers fit two different paradigms of work is today. Though working remotely in your pajamas may quickly be becoming a new paradigm for this sort of work, for the sake of argument lets say this all is occurring prior to the COVID pandemic. In this case if the white collar professional instead works remotely and wears pajamas most days, then he no longer fits the paradigm of white-collar work. He does however, still have whatever specialized profession which he can label himself with, and so his work is still emblematic. Another example of work that would be emblematic but not paradigmatic would be a hunter. As for the construction worker, his work too might be considered emblematic in the context of skilled trades/ crafts. But if this construction worker happens to be a day-laborer whose only task is to carry things, then this would likely not be considered emblematic work.

The act of carrying does, however, strike to the heart of what the paradigm of work in the Merina Kingdom.

The term 'carrying' in the context of the Merina Kingdom may be taken in the metaphorical sense (e.g. carrying the burden of leadership), but more often it seems to have been taken in the literal sense. Who had to carry what was taken as a sign of rank; e.g. a younger brother carries the baggage of his elder brother, a slave carries the belongings of his *tompo*, a laborer of *hova* class carries bricks to help build the home of the king or queen, a woman carries water and babies, etc. Tasks which required actual construction/ production such as building royal tombs or palaces, iron work, or embroidering apparel for those of the royal classes were strictly reserved for members of the *andriana* class. To have a hand in the actual production process and not just the onerous work of harvesting and moving the necessary materials to where they needed to be was to be a creative member of a noble class; to carry objects for creators in the name of royal service was to be a commoner; to carry objects in the name of service which could not be construed as service to the sovereign was to be a slave.

But there were emblematic forms of labor among the commoners such as specific forms of farming, and these tasks were typically assigned by royalty on annual festivals. The assignment of these tasks had the capacity to cause commoners to either fight one another over the prestige of the task assigned to them or attempt to flee the kingdom for the drudgery of it.

Oratory [*kabary*] was another paradigm of work, and [in contrast to carrying] it too was viewed as an act of creativity alongside production. This was however, not a view peculiar to the Merina kingdom as, prior to the advent of television, newspapers, and social media, oratory (and also philosophy) was more commonly appreciated for its natural capacity to shape the views and directions of people, i.e. to define new possibilities or directions as well as to sway people to follow them; to create new realities. What was somewhat distinct about the Merina kingdom was the degree to which speaking was regulated. Who possessed the right to perform *kabary* as well as when and where they could do so (e.g. in legal proceedings or at communal assemblies) and on what topics were tightly regulated things which were tied to the rank rather than just oratorical ability of the speaker. Speaking was in contrast to carrying; those who spoke did not carry.

Though a democratic-republic may contrast starkly to a monarchy in some important ways, in other ways there are parallels which are often overlooked. For example, in America the concept of checks and balances is cornerstone of our government – an often hailed progressive achievement. Yet in a monarchy there are also means of achieving what is largely the same effect. In the case of the Merina kingdom this occurred through the imposition of rituals which surrounded the sovereign and constrained his or her ability to act individually. In the Merina kingdom little distinction what is work and what is ritual was conceptualized to begin with.

Though laborers were carefully divided between producers/ speakers [creators] vs. those who carried objects, the notion of 'producer' here is not easily compared to its modern usage in the context of political economy – a misapplication of which would typically lead to the act of carrying objects being classified as 'productive labor'. Whereas 'productive labor' might be classified by a Marxist as grunt work, the Merina Kingdom operated by what was essentially a caste system in which being a 'producer' reflected a higher status as it reflected a more prestigious service/ ritual to the royal household. We begin to see why Graeber introduced the term 'emblematic labor' as it is in this case the label more than the measurable amount of actual work or productivity which is of significance.

As one traverses the social ladder it is the nature of what is produced which mostly seems to characterize castes: the royal household does not produce *things*; it produces *people*. One thing that makes monarchies unique from am anthropological perspective is that, in this form of government alone, the act of reproduction and inheritance are 'on-stage' in the sense that the reproductive habits and acts of inheritance of the royal family are matters of public concern. Members of the noble *andriana* class produce/ create *things*. Commoners, or *hova* do not produce anything – regardless of how much work they do.

As noted by Graeber,

"What we call "societies" are always vast coordinated systems of ritualized labor. Always, too, the elementary unit of any such system is some kind of household...What makes monarchies unique is that, ..., the very top almost exactly resembles the bottom. Kingdoms not only begin with households, they also end with one...

The difference, of course, was that the royal household,..., was *only* about the creation of people, and did not involve all those other forms of production...that in ordinary households served as essential material elements for that process of tending, growing, and nurturing human beings. In fact, the tendency in those ordinary households is for what we would label "work", "play", "ritual", and "education" to be, not indistinguishable perhaps, or not usually, but in every way entangled, overlapping, and mutually entailed. In contrast, royal households could be seen as the first prefiguration of the modern consumer household, which at least ideally is set in a sphere entirely opposed to the "production" of material goods....Royal households largely divorce the making, shaping, and maintaining of people from the making, shaping, and maintaining of things. They also separate work, ritual, and play... " "

—David Graeber, *'The People are nursemaids of the king[40]. '*

Graeber further notes the potential for misapplication of political economic theories to monarchies such as the Merina kingdom in which the term 'production' had a very different implications,

"..., the very idea of a division between spheres of "production" (in workplaces) and "consumption" (at home) would simply make no sense...

Take, for instance, the commonplace notion that labor is basically about "production": that it's typically directed at making things, transforming the world by combining raw materials into finished products. This is simply assumed in most theoretical literature. But it's a very old assumption. Even a moment's reflection should make clear that nowhere in the world is most activity we would ordinarily refer to as "work" directed at making anything. This is true even if we restrict ourselves to work directed at material objects. Most such labor isn't aimed at producing things, but at cleaning or maintaining them or moving them around. A ceramic coffee cup is "produced" just once; it's washed and stacked a thousand times. Even if it's a disposable paper or styrofoam coffee cup, far more time and energy is spent transporting, storing, and disposing of it than in the relatively brief moment of its actual fabrication." "

—David Graeber, *'The People are nursemaids of the king[KINGS]. '*

For the majority of the nineteenth century the Merina kingdom transitioned from monarchs to matriarchs, and this largely had the effect of combating western influences. It also helped transform a system of servile labor into one perceived as 'caring labor'. As it turns out, a queen has the capacity transform the most onerous labor duties into an act which is perceived by those performing it as one of nurturing the queen (s manipulative as it sounds, it nevertheless had the desired effect). Rather than being seen as a motherly figure, Graeber argues this was because the queen was seen as a child.

Though a period of western colonization ensued by the end of the nineteenth century, citizens of the Merina kingdom continued to resist western influences. For decades christian missionaries could hardly sell people on the notion that working for wages was anything more than a newly contrived form of slavery.

Emancipated Russian Serf Villages; Compartmentalizing Work and Village Life

Note: the following is an excerpt from an essay I wrote some years ago.

As noted by Eric Wolf[43] who made studying peasant societies his area of specialization, peasant communities have an almost natural propensity to develop notions of 'insiders' vs. 'outsiders' just as we've seen professionals do (hence it might be fair to just call it a human thing). Once again defining a traditional society as one which successfully transmits habits from one generation to the next, emancipated Russian serfs were an intensely traditional lot. The developing state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries found that peasants could not easily be enticed to giving up the 'old ways' of farming in favor of adopting more modern and productive means because peasants did not want to lose the culture and [village] autonomy which they identified with their old ways. To address the problem educated 'agronomists' (scientists of agriculture) were injected into the village with the supposed mission of improving farming techniques among peasants. But in reality the mission of the agronomist quickly became to change or to 'teach' the peasants a new way of living altogether.

More than just experts in soil and methods of cultivating it, agronomists were to be experts in how their techniques gave rise to the overall social functioning of the village. But to outside government agents 'social' in this case might boil down to being measured by simply how well workers of a village produce. The idea of applying statistical methods to both define and measure social progress was gaining influence, and what agronomists were focusing on was increasingly more a matter of what was produced and what was owned – the things which were easily recorded – rather than on making observations of the social dynamics of the village itself.

Pressured by nobles wishing to enforce the idea that peasants needed guidance on one hand yet faced with peasants who had learned all their techniques and established their own culture through hard earned experience on the other, the agronomist often made a fool of himself. At least one agronomists had the humility to admit to this; S.P. Fridolin confessed to an instance in which he had shown up to instruct a village on how to classify plants, yet he could not name the vegetables growing in their gardens. He preached about the proper way to birth a calf yet shied away from the fact that one was being born next door[44]. Others confessed that, beneath all the progressive intellectualism going around, agronomy was in fact being used to force another culture onto the peasants[45].

"The main thing is that they do not have the possibility to understand what the agronomist must teach them. They are not only unprepared to understand the life of nature, but they are even illiterate. . . Peasants are so undeveloped that they do not even understand the benefit of cooperatives. . . . Agriculture is a science about nature and life, and only knowledge of that life can give success; only competence to understand that life gives the possibility to manage a rational household. But peasants are fated to wander in the dark without the competence to think correctly, and without knowledge they are forced to starve on their rich land. "

—Agronomist Efremeva

If the cooperative was an open gate for the agronomist to find influence or outright control of people's lives, the village commune was the metaphorical equivalent of a closed one. An agronomist speaking to a communal village was likely to find a less than receptive audience – mocked even. Yet within a cooperative he was liable to find a receptive audience. The commune created a sort of bubble that inspectors and agronomists alike could not penetrate despite the official powers granted them. Hence beginning in the 1880's the commune became a target, but beginning with Pyotr Stolypin the government began to adopt the more surreptitious method of infiltrating villages and indoctrinating its inhabitants by means they could not consciously resist so long as they were unaware of the intended effect. Granting loans or other incentives through cooperatives or by the introduction of banks into peasant villages it was found had a professionalizing effect on its inhabitants. According to one peasant who observed the effect,

"The vast majority of our cooperative is composed not of comrades, but of borrowers, i.e., people who are completely estranged from the interests of the association, people who were induced to join the association and borrow by need alone. Such people are not at all interested in the affairs of the association. Their involvement amounts to how much they can 'grab' in loans. "

—Peasant response to survey about State Land Banks in Iaroslavl' province[47]

Simultaneous to this, class stratification – the creation of distinct economic and cultural classes – had arguably been taking root in the village. Many scholars debate exactly how to define it, some even doubt its existence. Regardless of whether it was manifesting in the peasant village, stratification was no longer an abstract concept; it had graduated to a label. To the divided agronomists, the zemstvos [state rather than village courts], the state government, and the landed nobility stratification became a unifying force as it presented them with a common enemy to blame for the deplorable state that the peasantry was living in. It also served as a sort of red-herring to their ulterior motive of destroying the commune. The cunning of financially savvy and business-minded kulaks [~ merchants from the peasant class] compounded with the ignorance of the helpless peasant toiling with his outdated tools in a desperate state of poverty proved fertile soil for the word 'capitalism' to grow into an outright accusation. The increase in cooperatives was depicted as a victory of producers; of rationality over irrationality, and every new co-op was a step toward freedom from the exploitation's of capitalism.

Cooperatives themselves were sources of factionalism among the peasants; opening a new co-op might entail excluding non-productive members or labeling others as kulaks. If divisiveness did

not occur naturally, officials always held loans and applications as bargaining chips to sway a given part of a village away from any influential individual or group within the village. Kulaks and other influential people within the village in turn would seek to gain influence over the village and turn them against inspectors.

Peasant board members of the co-op were either too illiterate to book-keep or too smart for the state to trust that they'd do anything other than take advantage of others. Field agents began to control if, when, and where a cooperative was founded according to their own agenda. They likewise sought to control its size and composition. Religion was barred from being any kind of determining factor as to who could join a cooperative, they were instead to be open to all except for differentiating between laborers vs. non-laborers.

Relating to several factors such as an increase in migration which created competition for land and reinforced an 'insider' vs. 'outsider' mentality among peasants, the increasingly progressive consciousness of the youth who wished to improve the state of the village via measures which directly clashed with the elders sense of traditionalism, and due to various state imposed legal changes occurring at the time, the average household size by the turn of the century dropped to approximately a third of what it had been at the abolishment of serfdom in 1861. Both land disputes and *Razdel* (household division) had increased dramatically between the years 1880 and 1890 indicating that peasants, though initially blindsided by all the articulated fine-print rules, felt the need to utilize courts and were adapting so as to be able to use them[46, 48]. A common phrase amongst peasants at the time was, "We are neither the first, nor the last to divide"'.

Trends in Professional Society that Parallel Domestication

As discussed in my second essay on guilds[24], a trend we've observed in America and elsewhere since the second half of the nineteenth century is the increasing specialization of work. Theories such as 'scientific management' (or *Taylorism*) in which plans for controlling the precise movements of workers were widely embraced by industries, and this helped normalize a hierarchical system of management in most forms of work – a method which continues to this day. More than just a means of controlling workers from a management perspective, the concept of specialization also came to be utilized as a means of establishing exclusivity among workers themselves. According to Harold Perkin[41], exclusivity is a quality of professional work which is more than a mere byproduct of enhanced specialization. Perkin instead argues that specialization was one means among others of achieving exclusivity, and this [a systematic means of creating exclusivity] along with the management of human capital (a thing which he compares to feudalism) are defining and prerequisite qualities of professionalized work. In other words, the drive to achieve exclusivity *causes* specialization, not the other way around. In technical disciplines this point may seem absurd and it is a point easily argued against, but when one goes to study the history of guilds and how guild practices gradually evolved into what we today call professional society, one does begin to see some truth to it, even though the mechanisms through which it operates may in some cases be subtle.

Certainly working together and having a sense of craftsmanship are both beautiful things. They are in fact two of three cornerstones of an influential theory of intrinsic motivation and well-being set forth by Richard Ryan and Edward Deci[32] who posit that competence, relatedness, and autonomy

are critical facets of psychological health. When we have these things we are intrinsically motivated to perform tasks; we do them because we *want* to. This can be paraphrased as saying that when people feel like they are good at what they do, when they are with whoever they identify as being their people [even if they are new people which we can relate to], and when they feel free, they experience intrinsic motivation towards tasks and achieve a state of psychological well-being. So one can see how craftsmanship and collaboration are vital components to an individuals health.

Nevertheless, it is unfortunately the case that the differences between collaboration and collusion in an effort to distinguish 'insiders' from 'outsiders' can be subtle. So too can the differences between being an expert craftsman because it brings an individual pleasure and weaponizing the notion of specialized skill be hard to distinguish from one another. This point is somewhat clarified by James Wilson,

> "An attorney who serves a client even when that service is likely to incur the displeasure of the bar association and law school professors is not a professional (though he or she may be an excellent attorney); by the same token, a physician who follows the procedures recommended by other physicians and by medical school professors even when it is not in the best interests of the doctor [or patient] is highly professional. "

> —James Wilson, *'Bureaucracy; What Governments Do And Why They Do It'*

The point here is that professionalizing a field of work involves forming or joining a group of people who collaborate [or collude depending on ones perspective] to make their field of work exclusive, and this has numerous parallels to [actually it was largely evolved from] guild practices. A better example which makes this subtle difference between whether specialization causes exclusivity or exclusivity causes specialization more clear is to be had by considering the field of social work.

In *From Poor Law to Welfare State* Walter Trattner details how the settlement house movement – a movement which was based on living with the poor in communal settings in an effort to gain the 'insider' perspective and treat their issues via a holistic approach (or to just accept them for who they are and give them a place in which they could thrive in their own unique way) – was deliberately sabotaged in favor of individualized case-work methods by social workers seeking to transform serving the poor into a profession. It was only by compartmentalizing the methods of social work that social workers could claim specialized expertise which only they could offer.

But how can one specialize in reforming the issues of the poor themselves? One may as well claim to specialize in life itself.

The idea of specialization is inherently based upon reductionism; cutting a given issue up into many different parts that can be isolated [compartmentalized] then studied in detail one at a time. While this has obvious parallels to craftsmanship, in a professional context, the aim of specialization only becomes lucrative if and when it is exclusive, and this is a thing which can and in some cases does set it apart from simply becoming very good at a given trade [craftsmanship]. In the case of serving the poor the notion of a specialized professional who applies his or her expertise to solving peoples issues is in some ways incompatible with holistic approaches – approaches which consider individuals as inextricable parts of a larger group. Hence, Trattner and other authors on the subject have argued that the rise of individual casework as a means for addressing issues of the poor was a method which came to predominate social work not because it was superior to holistic methods, or

even that it worked very well at all for that matter, but because fragmenting the issue into isolated individuals in need of specialized attention enabled the field of social work to be professionalized. This point is reaffirmed in *The Poorhouse* by Walter Wagner in which he describes how an institution [the poorhouse] from which hospitals, prisons, and homeless shelters evolved from was false witnessed upon and castigated despite numerous accounts of people who found these places suitable to their needs – to the point that in some cases individuals would refuse to return to their family in preference of residing in poorhouses[42].

Hospitals, prisons, and homeless shelters of course went on to become industrial complexes in their own right, i.e. they were professionalized.

In the case of the judicial system the effects which compartmentalized professionalism have are particularly detrimental. For example, when detailing the effects of colonization on the kingdom of Toro [Uganda] Edward Winter notes about the newly installed judicial system, "Finally, the differing procedures and aims of the two systems cause people to prefer to have their cases heard within the community. As has been noted previously, the main purpose of the village judicial system is the restoration of the inter-personal relations which have been damaged in one way or another. The government courts administer justice based on premises. Thus, if a man in a village steals something from one of his neighbors and the case is taken to court of one of the chiefs, the latter is concerned only with the question of whether or not the man actually committed the theft. If he did he is sent to jail. No attention is paid to the relationship between the thief and his victim [or community]." Prior to colonization it was the norm in tribal judicial cases to in some way attempt to ameliorate and restore social relations and trust, not just between the individuals involved, but of the entire community which had been affected[42].

Closing Thoughts

There are a surprising number of parallels between the the systems of manual labor we are accustomed to today and the servile labor system of the Merina kingdom in which much care was taken to delineate between those who carried objects and those who created them. Take as an example a day-laborer on a construction sight. Though a history of unions and craft-trades is here not presented, there is a fairly detailed history to be had on how construction trades evolved in a manner which parallels the development of guilds and professional society. Over time craftsmen have collectively developed systems which allow them to both delineate and reinforce labels of who is a 'skilled' worker and who is not. Though the task might require little to no experience, and only a modicum of competence to perform, a day-laborer, *regardless* of his level of experience with such things, can be de facto if not explicitly prohibited from performing 'skilled' acts such as cutting a piece of drywall with a 'skills-saw' (which is about the most safe and easy to use electric saw there is) and for no reason other than that he has not gone to the trouble of labeling himself appropriately (e.g. he is not acknowledged to be performing 'emblematic' labor, or in modern professionalized terms, he is not certified). The mechanisms for delineating and reinforcing boundaries of 'insiders' vs. 'outsiders' can be even more evolved in the case of unions. Consequently, the day-laborers tasks are largely confined to the act of carrying materials, digging ditches, or doing demolition with a sledge-hammer. Though the effort involved in such work might be the most onerous in all of construction, it com-

mands almost not bargaining power (the pay for such work is often near minimum wage), there is surprisingly little merit attached to it, and consequently it offers such workers little prospect for upward mobility.

Day-labor being a thing in which individuals get to choose what jobs they take and when, this is all problematic for the legitimacy of any merit system as the concept of merit has been to some degree twisted so that a sacrifice in freedom is recognized as a form of merit. But there is no a prior reason that things like skill, hard work, or the accumulation of a consistent and reliable work record need to be kept so rigidly linked to a consistent and reliable willingness to sacrifice autonomy. Disguising such classist machinations as being a matter of merit or even job-safety[11] blurs the meaning of 'skill'. Needless to say, without the opportunity to try new things a worker will not expand his or her skill set, let alone be recognized for it. Of course, making this so is arguably an ulterior motive for the establishment of emblematic forms of labor in the first place. A dangerous trend in manual labor trades is that day-labor is becoming a regular form of employment, i.e. whereas it used to be a means for homeless persons to get some extra cash, today it is becoming more like a regular job. Yet day-labor has almost no merit attached to it; no matter how long one stays in it, not advancement or merit is attributed to the actions of the worker.

This is all to say that technology is being weaponized in such a way to wipe out the merit system for middle class laborers. In his influential novel *Darkness at Noon* Arthur Koestler described the 'theory of the masses' in which he posited that there is always a period of adaptation that follows the advent of any new technology. During this period of time in which the masses of people have yet to adapt to the newly introduced technology, rather than acting to benefit them, the technology is exploited in a way which is detrimental to the masses. We could speculate about how this Koestler's theory might play out with regard to artificial intelligence. More directly relevant to the topic of this essay is the mobilization of work. I hope I am only stating the obvious when I say there is more to being mobile than having internet connection. Considering how labor has always been and always will be intimately tied to social systems, what does it say that our labor is evolving (or devolving?) into a form where individuals isolate themselves and never have any *actual* contact with one another?

We will see I guess.

Anyway, the analysis of the Merina Kingom was an analysis of monarchies/ matriarchies – a form of government which in many if not most parts of Africa did not develop until the sixteenth century. A particularly interesting fact of African cultures prior to this is that a common sentiment among tribal cultures was that it is the spirits who owned the means of production rather than any

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[11]I'd not be the first to argue that the 'safety-first' movement was and remains weaponized so as to serve ulterior motives. Though I cannot recall the name of the book, one of the old books on labor which was written in the 1920's or 1930's pursued this point vociferously. I'll instead offer a hypothetical example which is based on my own experiences as a day-laborer, and it has to do with a dispatcher.

Now any good business person knows that a middle-man derives his income by maintaining his relevance to the transaction until he has derived whatever feasible profit from it he can. In the case of a dispatcher who sends a day-laborer to the job, they are of course accustomed to the fact that workers and the employers (or customers depending on how you wish to see it) sooner or later get to know one another. Before long, when the worker gets sick, instead of calling his dispatch office he may instead tell it directly to the employer of the day-labor service. Likewise, the employer, when he wishes to invite the day-laborer for another day or week of work, instead of ordering a worker through the dispatcher, he may instead ask the worker he knows to return and try to line it up with the dispatch office later.

The day-laborer and employer one day got ahead of themselves and the day-laborer agreed to work a day for the employer before he had cleared it through the dispatch office reminding him that "it is a matter of safety that you schedule any and all shifts through us first, because if you do not, then any injury you sustain will not be covered through workers comp."

individual[40].

A thing which has been avoided here is the concept of exchange (e.g. barter/ money). There is much to be said with regard to the relation between the development of the private household and the concurrent development of mediums of exchange. This will likely be a focus of future research for me. What we have seen however, is that labor is generally organized around whatever the prevailing form of household is. From this we might reasonably infer that, were the form of the prevailing household to change even to a modest extent, we should expect to see a corresponding shift in the nature of the job markets we participate in.

Part V: Physical Arguments

Equilibrium of a Heated Box

At a couple of points in this paper I have intentionally avoid use of the term 'equality' [of outcome] in favor of the term 'equilibrium' as equality in outcome has far lesser relevance to physical phenomena in observed nature. Of course there remains the question of equal opportunity, and we will see this feeds in somewhat naturally to the model. Yet the results [equilibrium] will suggest that, if opportunity is truly equal, the end effect would *not* be equality in outcome, in fact it would be the virtual opposite; extreme inequality, albeit *transient* in its nature, which is to say that individuals get cycled through periods of extreme wealth [excessive amounts of property] followed by periods of liberation [no property whatsoever].

Equilibrium is intimately tied to the concept of entropy which essentially governs all physical processes in the known universe. In fact, were we interested in nerdy physics arguments, the foundational premise of this essay [partitioning individuals and/ or groups] could be formulated in terms of entropy. The original title when I first wrote this essay was in fact 'de-partitioned housing' which was intended to be a reference to the partition function in thermal physics.

From physics we know that a thermally heated system only reaches equilibrium if and when it gives off as much heat as it takes in. Were we then to make the crude model of society that it is a box under which someone lit a fire, it could only reach equilibrium if whatever particles inside of it were allowed to cycle up to the top where they release their heat, at which point they return to the bottom to be re-heated. This of course could only happen if such particles are not partitioned from one another, i.e. every particle in the box has equal access to move about all areas within the box. The box would then constitute a truly 'shared space'.

The crude model highlights the difference between equality and equilibrium. Equality would imply particles at all times experience the same amount of heat – a thing virtually impossible to do when the system is subject to some external source of heat (because there heat must be transferred to the particles, and it is bound to be transferred to some particles before others). In contrast, equilibrium would imply that individual particles experience cycles of extreme heat followed by extreme cold such that the box is constantly taking in as much heat as it is giving off.

The external source of heat is a fitting addition to the model because, to put it bluntly, life often 'puts a fire under our ass'. In more scientific terms we could say that without an external source of heat (e.g. the sun) the system would simply dissipate its heat into space, go cold, and die, so the external source of heat is a necessary and warranted addition.

Equilibrium being the definition of a stable system, and [if history or the present state of things is to judge by] stability rather than equality being the thing which society mostly values, the crude model is of interest in a very general and philosophical sense. Economically speaking, the crude model would suggest that a society (or 'system') in which individuals are equally free and likely to experience the extreme gluttonous pleasures of monetary wealth and large amounts of *private* property as as they are the liberations of living without the responsibility of maintaining private property and the social contentment's of living communally (a thing which individuals often only

avail themselves to when living without private property). This would of course require that notions of inheritance be virtually non-existent, i.e. it would be a communal society.

Of course living life with no private property whatsoever is not a thing which many would depict as 'liberation' or associate with some holistic form of communalism. To this end I must defer the reader to the authors note where it is suggested that what has made life without private property such a miserable picture in the first place is largely the unwillingness by the surrounding domestic society to allow communalism to grow amongst those with little to no resources of their own. To be without the crippling fear of losing what is owned, yet to nevertheless experience a feeling of security and social satisfaction – this is rightfully said to be liberating as it is likely to be an alien experience to many today.

Picking Yourself up By Your Bootstraps

A striking contrast between communal and domestic society is to be had in how people within them perceive concepts of ownership and production in an overly individualistic fashion, often overlooking the innumerable acts of inheritance we've all been subjected to throughout our life. To this end I will close with a nerdy physics examination of a phrase which has for generations been tossed around in modern domestic society; 'pick yourself up by your own bootstraps'.

Classical mechanics is the study of physics which deals with every-day sized objects moving at every day speeds [so too large for quantum mechanical effects to take place and too slow for relativistic ones].

According to the laws of classical physics, because internal forces of an object cancel, no body can move its center of mass by simply pressing or pulling on one part of itself, rather it must evoke an *external* force to do so. Imagine an astronaut floating in space trying to get back to her ship; she can twirl herself around by pushing on her own body but her center of mass will remain stationary and she'll get no closer to the spaceship. If, however, she has some kind of booster which creates a force on her only by ejecting mass of some kind [ergo, the ejected mass could not be considered a part of her bodily 'system'] or if she simply had a rope to pull on then she'll begin to move in the direction of the ship. Analogously, when we 'pick ourselves up by our bootstraps' what we are *actually* doing is creating a sort of torque about our center of mass which 'twirls' us in a vertical direction, but the only reason our center of mass goes upward in this awkward maneuver is because we are simultaneously directing the force generated from the torque of our body into the ground; we push on the ground and [by the law of equal and opposite forces] the ground pushes back. Now force is proportional to both mass and acceleration, hence the earth, having a very large mass, has an imperceptibly small acceleration 'downward' while we, having a very small mass, have a noticeable acceleration 'upward'.

It is and always has been the land which picks us up, hence the irony [more like hypocrisy] of the phrase 'pick yourself up by your own bootstraps' is that we take land from one another, and we then claim to have 'earned' land itself and to have done things for ourselves when in reality all we've done is use whats already been *given* to *all* of us in a clever fashion so that it looks like we did it alone. As the saying goes, 'be careful what you wish for'; many of us, should we fail to create a family, end up living alone.

Conclusion

There was a time when many if not most cultures throughout the world would perceive the idea of wage labor as being on par with slavery, and in fact wage labor did evolve directly from medieval serfdom. Even as recent as the nineteenth century in America citizens were keenly aware of the parallel, so much so they engaged in what was in terms of military casualties the most costly war in U.S. history [the civil war]. In terms of popular consensus, the civil war was not necessarily fought to free slaves, rather it was in response to the newly emerging concept of wage labor which, if slavery were allowed to coexist along side of it, would threaten to allow whites to devolve into slavery alongside of African-Americans. The distinction between wage labor and slavery was not clear to people, and in fact in the time just prior to the civil war there can be found a number of examples in which plantation owners had entertained the idea of forcing white people to perform labor when African-Americans were in short supply, albeit for a wage. But these were times when peoples perception of labor was still in a somewhat native and natural form, untouched by warped notions of 'producer' vs. 'consumer' or 'owner' vs. 'laborer'. Work was probably seen by people as being more of a natural extension of their community, and it was communalism which shaped and defined work, not vice-versa. Only by dividing a community is it possible to reverse this natural relation.

Were we to define feudalism as a life which is governed by contract, it can be argued that we are still living in a feudal society. One cannot so much as rent a place without being compelled to consign themselves to this one place for a twelve month period. Employment contracts are traced such that future employment may rely on a persons ability and willingness to fulfill their previous employment contracts, and it is the individuals willingness to fulfill this contract rather than to what ends it served which may be what is primarily considered. Of course labor likely always relied to some extent on reputation, but there is an appreciable difference between a socially transmitted reputation and a modern resume. The former would take into account the *context* of the work, e.g. 'he helped my community achieve its goal' is not the same as 'he showed up every day on time and did the work required of him' (regardless of to what or whose ends it served outside of the company). Returning the example of the construction worker who is incentivized to help a company gentrify his own neighborhood[12], in this case the context in which labor was performed has been sorely overlooked, and a good word from the company employing the worker amounts to a reassurance that the worker will not stand up for himself. Violating legal contracts can hang over a person head for the rest of their life. As argued briefly in part IV – a point which is cliche' enough to almost not even warrant an argument – domestic judicial systems fall far short of addressing root causes as (similar to the case of social work) they try too hard to remedy problems on an individual basis, essentially extrapolating the individual offender from the context of the community which helped shape them.

Going back further in time, there was once a time when it was far more common for people to place items of high value into the graves of their departed kin – a thing which is in stark contrast to today's culture in which inheritance through legal wills is more commonly emphasized. For the interested reader there is in fact a lot to be said about the act of burying the dead; many anthropologists have argued that burial practices/ beliefs had much to do with the origins of society. Though I've avoided the concept of burial practices, inheritance and the profound paradigm shift it underwent

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[12]See part IV

has been touched upon.

There is however, one connection I'd like draw attention to in this regard.

Once again note that a traditional culture is one in which habits/ norms are successfully transmitted from one generation to the next, and that we live in a progressive culture as is evident in how generations typically try to set themselves apart from those who came before them any way they can. A common house-party (or schools for that matter[13]) exemplifies how our communal spaces are so commonly divided between young and old[er] people. My personal experience leads me to feel that there is *some* critical link between the interplay of young and old and communalism – the tribal instinct which we are so clearly driven to satiate. And there is likely something to be said about just how fundamental this relation is by the fact that it was common practice of our ancient ancestors to have spiritual beliefs/ rituals/ customs which revolved around *their* [dead] ancestors and their grave sites.

When one goes to read about the behaviors of apes they are likely to find that mating privileges influence much of ape social interactions. Though we may like to think we've evolved from that, here it has been argued that much of 'civilized' human behavior revolves around the concept of inheritance, and this is not a very big evolution from mating privileges. Preeminent forms of inheritance evolved from inheritance according to what tribe one belonged (communal forms of inheritance) to inheritance by direct descent (domestic forms of inheritance). It is likely the case that the transition was both incentivized and facilitated by the advent of private property. The results were a transformation away from matrilineal, communal, and often polygymous societies in which notions of individual land ownership and private property scarcely existed. Such societies were capable of organizing themselves by more natural mechanisms and of addressing their social ills in a collective and meaningful fashion. In order to legitimize the notion of private property and its inheritance by direct descent, what human societies transformed into is what has been loosely referred to as 'domestic society' in which the nuclear family replaces tribalism, individuals are governed as members of some well defined geographic territory rather than as members of a social group, and the notion of private property has an overwhelming influence on their life; from how they collectively define labor to what cultures they create (or fail to create). In such a society basic human needs tend to get reduced to commodities, social ills go largely unaddressed and broken communities remain unhealed despite an effective system of dealing with individual criminal acts.

With regard to modern environmental issues, it is tempting to scapegoat the damage humans have caused on the technological tools we use. At first glance this argument makes a lot of sense. But when we consider that the prehistoric act of dividing ourselves from one another in favor of establishing our own private property/ domicile has been affecting our habits for a *very* long time, it also makes a lot of sense to say that more recent technological advances were merely catalysts which have allowed a pre-existing problem to grow out of proportion. A survey of domestic society quickly reveals two hundred foot tall landfills that are so dense an apple cannot even decompose; the large number of trees we cut down and animal/ insect families we affect in the creation of our homes and claiming of our territories; the consumerist cultures we've normalized in which we buy more/ sell more, share close to nothing, throw much of it away, then drive five thousand pound

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[13]as argued in my other essay, a primary function of schools is social conditioning rather than education, so these places can rightfully be considered here as there is no a priori reason we ought to condition our kids in a way which separates them from close, continuous, and unconstrained contact with their elders.

gas-guzzling death machines to the mall so we can repeat the process; wars so large in scale they can encompass entire continents. One can easily argue that many if not all of these things not only could, but probably would be improved in some way were people more communal in their ways of living as many of the ends we seek to achieve are largely *social* in their nature, only natural and efficient means of achieving these social needs has been largely obstructed. What remains is a very inefficient and unsustainable means of achieving these ends.

'The lump of labor fallacy' in which it is [falsely] believed that adding more people to an economy causes a scarcity of jobs comes to mind. What is found instead is that when we add more people to an economy they simply create more economy. Likewise, when we add more technology people seem to only create more need for technology. Ergo, adding more technology in hopes it will one day remedy the problems of society is a logical argument I cannot seem to follow.

The construction of buildings (and walls which divide us) themselves are not usually considered a form of technology for the simple fact that the concept of a building has been around for millennia. But going back to prehistoric times it can be said that the advent of buildings/ partition walls were the original, and arguably the most impactful technology ever contrived by humans. If it is the habit of constructing these buildings and domesticating ourselves which is the root of our unwillingness to adopt sustainable habits, then consider that more technological advances will only further catalyze the long dormant effect of domestication.

Having spent a fair amount of time in demolition and construction, and also having completed a masters degree in Physics at an institutions which specialized in material science, a particular example I like to draw attention to is how dramatically the materials we construct buildings with have transformed in recent decades. I am ashamed to admit I have helped gut out a lot of older buildings in Portland, OR which used to have more of a sense of history and craftsmanship than it does today; 70 year old homes with intricate and unique designs that were constructed of 'old-wood', bricks, copper, and iron. I've helped demolish a number of buildings which were composed of things like basalt stone that had been imported all the way from China or limestone from some other part of the world, 120 year old brick and motor structures, 'shanghai-tunnels', robust beams or columns, and intricate designs that were, like the homes, all unique. What replaces these buildings is largely plastic or some synthetic material which is lighter and was fabricated in some lab or factory overseas. These materials and the technology we use to put them together have dramatically reduced the time it takes to construct domiciles and other buildings. Simultaneously, they've also robbed the laborer of a sense of craftsmanship and pride in what they are building. They've also undermined the culture and gentrified the neighborhood these workers and others have to live in.

In terms of evolutionary biology, it would probably make little sense to reduce the innate drive towards communalism to simply being around others. In recent times the term 'social capital' has gained popularity, and it is recognized that the development of trust between individuals is one defining facet of social capital. A notion which I believe strikes even closer to the heart of what communalism is 'compassion' which, by the latin roots of the word means to share struggle with others. As elaborated on in the harsh critique of the nuclear family in the closing of part I, it is a lack of compassion which I believe has resulted in a low level of trust between individuals. More importantly, in my own experience (see authors note) I found compassion to be a weapon which was capable of affecting a most powerful transformation in my outlook – a complete and immediate paradigm shift – during what was the most difficult of times. It had the power to transform difficult

and shameful situations into ones of contentment and joy. I observed it had the power to flip my perspective like a light switch as well as to create trust and and a sense of kinship between individuals in a remarkably short amount of time.

All too often compassion is confused with sympathy, and this would imply that it is some sort of selfless mental act which requires no physical effort. But by the above definition compassion is neither a selfless act nor one which can be conveniently performed from the convenience of ones own mind. If a truly selfless act exists, evolutionary biologists have yet to fathom what it could be as every act can in some way be argued to serve ones own interest in some way or another. And there is nothing inherently wrong with this. A concept which was popularized by Alexis De Tocqueville in his influential work *Democracy in America* was the *principle of enlightened self interest* in which Tocqueville argued that both the interests of society at large and of the individual could be best served by instead seeking to serve the interest of others which form a symbiotic relation with the acting individual(s). The principle essentially implies what is merely a different means of achieving a selfish ends, albeit it would require an 'enlightened' understanding of how one individual relates to another for this ends to be achieved.

Author's Note: Communalism and 'Homelessness'

> "*My breakfast is straight out the medicine cabinet A remedy for the aftermath of my habits Sometimes it's the ones who try to help That hurt the most I feel like we're playing tug of war, and I'm the rope And I'm stretched to the limit, but you keep on pulling And I'm gonna lose my goddamn mind* "
>
> —Days N' Daze, *'Misanthropic Drunken Loner'*

> "*I got love for my brother, but we can never go nowhere Unless we share with each other We gotta start makin' changes Learn to see me as a brother instead of two distant strangers And that's how it's supposed to be...* "
>
> —Tupac Shakur, *'Changes'*

By now the reader may feel disappointment as I've carefully avoided proposals of any kind as to how to 'reinvent communalism'. But this is not without reason.

What originally motivated me to read all the works I have about communal living and domestication was that I spent some time living outside while clawing my way through my undergraduate degree in my early to mid twenties. Contrary to my expectations, I ended up meeting a lot of great people. And I happened to land in a town (Eugene, OR) which had one of the better shelters in the country in the sense that it had equal day-room to dorm space and 'guests' were permitted access to the day-room for most of the day. There were very few jobs in Eugene at the time, and I was through with working in restaurants so I did day-labor which back then paid $8/hr$ and was very slow in the winter, so my prospects for getting on my feet were slim. I in the shelter initially but the way people were treated eventually irked me, and soon after realizing it was possible to attend school while living in a shelter it was a short step to realizing I could sleep outside and do it if needed.

Many things I did were communal in their nature. Eating meals, sleeping, socializing with hundreds of different people. Work was communal in the sense that day-laborers would pool into the office and wait for hours together to be dispatched for jobs. We'd hang out and drink coffee, watch the news, and 'bullshit' with one another. Before wages went up and dispatch became an an android app most day-laborers were of the unhoused type. Most all the people I associated with were in their fifties, and I found they had a lot of interesting stories to tell. Despite the fact that many of them had maybe not lead the most productive lives, I found that my respect for them grew nevertheless because of their willingness to let go and just *be*. Perhaps more than that, for some reason I still don't fully understand, I trusted them.

But this was back when the state of Oregon was still a hole on the map – a condition I think proves conducive to allowing alternative cultures to grow in a somewhat holistic fashion. As is the way of things, all good things come to an end – either that or my perception of things changed. Soon after I migrated to the city of Portland, over the years it began to grow and become like other large towns (and this was a thing many lifelong locals seemed to resent). 'Gentrification' was for years the headline of every news article. Despite my best efforts to change the world, the community I

developed a sense of kinship with for a time began to change. What was left at the end of it was more or less what you'll find in most every other major city; drugs, mental illness, crime, distrust, and hostility rather than compassion and kinship amongst those living outside – all this mixed with a pervasive smell of urine.

Having an insiders view of both the before and after, a thing which stood out to me was that, more than any other tangible thing to do with the unhoused community that changed through it all, it was the communal spaces which the unhoused once had access to which they had been systematically deprived of. To have 100 strangers sleeping next to one another unencumbered by the use of tents or physical barriers of any kind can be compared to the military drill of falling backwards in hopes that your partner catches you in that it requires a willingness to be vulnerable and has the effect of producing a certain kind of trust between people; it is a generator of social capital. It is unfortunately very rare that cities embrace such circumstances like people sleeping en masse in public. Curiously, as professed in his autobiography, Malcolm X was a self-proclaimed hostile racist towards whites until the day he found himself sleeping next to people – 'brothers and sisters' he then called them – of all races during his pilgrimage to Mecca.

Allen bloom once wrote that, " The most successful tyranny is not the one that uses force to assure uniformity but the one that removes the awareness of other possibilities, that makes it seem inconceivable that other ways are viable, that removes the sense that there is an outside." Let us here take 'outside' in the most literal sense of sleeping outside. On a psychological level perhaps it is whatever part of the brain that processes the tribal instinct and/ or empathy which is triggered by sleeping in commune with the insects or others who surround you. Maybe there is some scientific explanation to do with how the molecules of fresh-air or the moon-light affects a person. Maybe it is the simple vulnerability of sleeping exposed to others such that you have to trust them in order to close your eyes and find rest which holds such psychological power. Whatever it is, I've found there are few more powerful means of slicing through the anxieties which tend to accumulate in the domestic life by doing a simple thing like sleeping outdoors and exposed to ones surroundings (i.e. no tent). From an evolutionary perspective it is entirely reasonable to say that sleeping indoors simply is not healthy for people.

From the hobos perspective this psychological tyranny takes the form of depriving them of any sense of belonging. By systematically dismantling any and all outlets of community among the unhoused and replacing these outlets with more tangible forms of charity, the hobo is left to drown in a perpetual feeling of feeling more than outnumbered, but of feeling truly alone. It is only then that a sense of shame and anxiety sets in. I suggest the term 'cultural confidence' to describe what is like a game of tug-a-war, the object of which is to attain cultural confidence, i.e. the collective sense that 'my kind' of people belong here and yours do not; that 'my kind' of activities ought to be normalized and accepted, but yours should not; that my congretations ought to be institutionalized while yours should be dismantled and outlawed.

Among anthropologists [something like] what I've chosen to call 'cultural confidence' has been referred to as *social congruence*. Most every society tends to strive for some degree of social congruence. Despite progressive proclamations of 'diversity' this mechanism seems to remain strongly intact. Usually, by 'diversity' what is actually being implied is assimilation; people of many different colors or who come from varying backgrounds have the right and ability to assimilate into a one-size-fits-all way of living. For those who either refuse or for whatever reason cannot make this

transition all that needs to be done in order to justify the tyranny of the majority is that it be shown the individual(s) 'chose' not to assimilate, but that they were able and had opportunity to do so.

The genius of the US government was that, to some degree, it was designed to protect individuals from the tyranny of the majority; from social congruence; from the need to fit in with what can be a vicious game of popularity. Yet there is more that can and which should be done to this end.

It is someone insane to think that one is so hard pressed to find the opportunity to sleep outdoors or next to strangers in sanitary and acceptable conditions. Stipulations against this are a *normative* expectation imposed by cities; they have little to do with the health or safety of anyone. Portland was evidence of this. There were two locations where ~ 100 people per night once used to find refuge (safety in numbers) with one another – one was shut down and the other was fenced off. though one of them admittedly had a rat problem, ironically this was the officially organized outdoor shelter, but it was the unofficial one – a bridge with a public underpass (a sidewalk) which ran underneath it which was kept surprisingly clean prior to the year 2016 when it was first targeted. Individuals would come in around 8 p.m. to take for themselves a 3 ft. wide piece of the sidewalk next to one another, they'd leave by 7 a.m. as city workers asked them to, and once or twice a week the city would clean the sidewalk. The effect was on some nights almost weird in how peaceful it could be. Travelers would strum their guitars and domestic folks would come down to mingle with the unhoused, often allowing their children to hand out bags of supplies or food.

Since then I've come to consider it an almost fundamental contrast between domestic and communal cultures that, whereas congregating in quietude is a norm for the latter, the former seldom seems to do so without the need to make loud noises. Why this is so is maybe because domestic forms of congregation typically require a much higher degree of normative expectations, e.g. how one dresses, that they listen to loud music, drink alcohol, watch sports, etc. There are surprisingly few outlets for domestic congregation to occur which do not place some minimal amount or even no normative expectations on one another as some prerequisite to bringing people together. While it is easy to see this as some basis of what it means to be 'civilized', it is nevertheless would seemingly require an arbitrary definition of of the word. In either case I have found it to be a much less genuine means of socializing.

There were also a few public parks or bunkhouses (a hotel with shared rooms – like a boardinghome) which the city found some excuse or another to shut down. Coincidentally, the places shut down always seemed to coincide with the development of a fancy hotel being constructed nearby. In the years to follow the use of tents on public sidewalks became the norm, and Portland, Oregon found itself making national headlines for what a cesspool it had devolved into.

The use of tents seemed to foster a territorial attitude amongst people surviving outside. And the privacy afforded by tents certainly gave opportunity if not incentive [isolation which breeds shame, loneliness, and a pervasive feeling of being outnumbered by domestic society] for degenerate behavior such as drug use and hoarding [possibly stolen] goods.

The 'housing-first' strategy demonstrates both the irony of professionalized social work and the cultural conflict which exists between communal forms of living and domestic society. Support for the former claim follows from justifying the second.

Researchers on the issue of homelessness are keenly aware that the 'proof' that the housing-

first strategy actually works at reducing the NET population of unhoused is inconclusive; we know it works for a number of individuals, but being as unhoused populations tend to persist or even grow in numbers we must infer this strategy only swaps out *who* become homeless. The evidence in support of housing first is further tainted by the fact that individuals who receive housing are not tracked beyond a year or two, so we cannot rightfully make conclusions about its long term efficacy. Those who advance the housing first model are aware of this fact. In the words of Martha R. Burt, author of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Developments 1996 report *Strategies for Preventing Homelessness*, "By definition, the intent of prevention is to stop something from happening. The worse the effects of what one is trying to prevent, the more important it is to develop effective prevention strategies, and the more one is willing to accept partial prevention if complete prevention is not possible." Nevertheless, phraseology such as "housing first is a proven model" or 'we know what works – housing first" are shamelessly injected into public meetings at city and state levels across the country. And agents of housing first at the federal level persist in going so far as to essentially bribe community shelters, telling them that if they do not help them to advance the housing-first model then their organizations will not be eligible to receive federal funds. This poses a moral problem for many shelter operators as they more than most are aware that A) houselessness is not a thing which can be 'solved' and therefore B) resources are better spent being targeted and the *whole* community rather than at providing a lucky few individuals with housing vouchers.

This all makes it understandable why government agencies which advance the housing first strategy tend to emphasize the idea of 'getting everyone on the same page'. Adolf Hitler once said that if you tell a big lie often enough, it will become true.

There is a notable difference between how legitimate researchers present their conclusions and how these conclusions have been weaponized by federal and state agencies to advance their agenda. For example, researchers may agree that houselessness is a *clinical* issue meaning the results of treatment are highly contingent on the place of treatment. But this is a fairly general thing, and one can easily imagine communal places as being a form of treatment as well, but this is a method which has been sorely – intentionally? – overlooked. Rather than giving an objective and thorough trial to all strategies as the scientific method would require, federal and state homeless agencies instead warp the conclusion that houselessness is a clinical issue into the irrefutable 'proven' truth that it is a private housing issue. Meanwhile, research on shelters has devolved in quality such that simply making a few phone calls to ask a few standardized questions or having a brief tour of a facility has become acceptable methodology for publishing papers which policy in turn gets based on within government agencies.

If the results are to judge by, neither the unhoused nor the communities which have to deal with them win in all of this. But 'homelessness' has been transformed into a big business for federal and state agencies – it has been professionalized. They are the only winners I see in this. The genius of the hustle is that a lack of results only becomes grounds for them to ask for more tax dollars, as though a lack of funding was to blame for why the housing-first strategy has not produced results after decades of throwing *billions* of dollars at it. Meanwhile, I once knew a lady (may she rest in peace) who ended up getting her head ran over by a dump truck because, in lieu of any sanctioned and safe communal sleeping areas, she tried to find rest behind a dumpster.

Again, it says a lot about our society that one cannot go out and sleep next to other humans – even were they willing to pay for it. This I think more than anything is why we live in such a low-trust

society.

Anyways, another thing researchers have found to be an acceptable hypothesis is that home-lessness (or as I prefer 'houselessness') results from social failure. For me as a young man it was an inability to trust others, my family moved away, being overworked and underpaid, a desire to go elsewhere – all mixed in with a good-ole fashioned heart-break which made me willing take the leap and to let go on such a level. But there are also some scientific arguments to be considered. For example, it is widely acknowledged that the influences which a person is subject to as a baby or young child have a disproportionate effect on the development of their brain. For this I can only give my own subjective account. Having been raised in part by my father who resorted to drugs, alcohol, and SSD checks upon being diagnosed with a terminal disability, I was from a young age exposed to many questionable influences. It is the smell of the lowliest places and the peasants which inhabited them that seems to linger for me. Olfaction (smell) being tied directly to the limbic system, this is perhaps why I felt surprisingly at home whenever I'd walk into a crowd of unhoused people – why I felt I could trust them.

As noted in the conclusion of the above essay I found compassion to be a weapon which was capable of altering my entire perception of both myself and my surroundings, one which enabled me to overcome my initial sense of shame and classism. Perhaps it was only me, but I got the drift that I was not alone in that it established trust among people who like myself as a young man had difficulty trusting others. And it (compassion) gave rise to the concept of confluent love; love which transcends individual sexual desires; kinship.

This all helps explain how and where my fetish with communalism first began to germinate.

It is not at all uncommon among the unhoused for an intense sense of brotherhood to arise, and this makes it a peculiar form of communalism in that there are little to no reciprocal expectations – reproductive or normative – placed on others, yet there nevertheless arises a sense of kinship which can be as strong as it is comforting. A number of times I've encountered individuals who opt to use the term 'street-family'. In my own experience there is something profoundly liberating about this form of kinship; to feel like a small part of a whole which in no way binds you. So taken did I become with the feeling I've come to see it as the feeling which llikely inspired much metaphysical/ spiritual thought, e.g. 'oneness' and 'detachment' are two prevalent themes in Buddhism. It is confluent love [love that transcends the sexual/ reproductive drive] which characterizes kinship among the unhoused, and this can lossely be compared to the overcomming of desire – a theme central to Hinduism. And there are obvious parallels to the concept of 'brotherly love' which Jesus – a homeless wanderer – supposedly preached.

There are other facets of the issue which are harder to put to words. There is for example, a sort of unwinding of the personality which has been shaped from childhood by domestic norms – arguably unnatural constraints on the human condition. I observed this 'loosening up' effect on myself as a 21 year old man as I did in others. For an extreme example, I once observed an exceptionally healthy, fit, and clean looking young man who was new to 'street life' go from that to wearing a dress and pushing a shopping cart all in the span of a single month. It is sort of a social game which is being played between the unhoused and domestic society which surrounds them; and personal and group identity plays a big part in it. As noted in the essay about peasant demographics throughout history, there are 'insiders' vs. 'outsiders', and the longer a person stays in that life the more this

outlook seems to take a hold on them – to the point of making them paranoid.

Recall the buffalo dance which was described in the 'Animalism' section of part II. To me at least, the buffalo dance represents a subtle yet profound contrast between domestic and communal forms of living, namely the willingness and ability of individuals to deconstruct their own ego/ identity – to let it dissolve like salt in the ocean. So perhaps next time we see a young man in a dress pushing a shopping cart we are to understand that he is no longer who he is. Exactly what he has become I dare not presume, but in his own mind he is probably not who he was. Many unhoused people I suspect are trying to forget their past, or lack thereof. For some, domestic society simply never worked. Once they fall to the other side of bottom and learn there is a sort of underground world in which they find some of the things they failed to find in the domestic life, it becomes all the more harder to pull them back. As pathetic as all this may seem, it is no less sad to go through life without having experience the joys of finding true kinship or the liberation of realizing that life without property is not the end of the world – that unorthodox forms of happiness exist, or to live ones entire life controlled by the fear of what *should* turn out to be a trivial thing; not being able to pay the rent. It is unfortunately the case that domestic society has seemingly opted to make life without property a very difficult and shameful thing, but it is important to understand that it is not *inherently* so, and I will soon attempt to explain this as best I can.

For years I advocated for so-called 'bunker-housing' being available on the rental market, arguing that people were homeless not helpless, they needed options rather than help, and that shelters treated them like animals and were overly restrictive in terms of access to the facility (both in terms of accessible space and times of day). And I argued along the lines of the aforementioned principle of enlightened self-interest; to achieve your own interest by instead pursuing the interests of another. I attempted to appeal to middle-classes with the idea that there were peripheral benefits to communal methods in dealing with unhoused populations; the monopoly of private living would be broken and consumer leverage in these markets would improve; a sharing economy would improve employee leverage in labor markets; mobility for people who were in-between jobs or looking to relocate would be easier if there were more efficient means of securing a temporary place. I argued that if there were equal day-room to dorm space, 24 hr. access to all parts of the facility, individual rather than collective accountability (a thing which quickly leads to *everyone* getting micromanaged and treated like some sort of prisoner) then these places would not have such a negative image to those from the domestic classes.

Asumming that somehow government agencies could be swayed to stop bribing shelter providers into abiding by the housing first agenda, to this day I am not convinced such flexible 'middle-ground' options such as bunk-housing being available on the rental market (tenant rights and responsibilities stipulated, and with no requirements that tenants also opt into some program which attempts to convert transients to a more sedentary existence) would not be feasible. What I do know [now] is why it does not matter.

A thing I observed time and again is that if and when a healthy and holistic dynamic does begin to develop among those living outside, it will seemingly be targeted even more than would isolated pockets of pure and disgusting degeneracy. It is almost as if the latter is the preferred outcome.

Certainly the image of a cowboy is not what usually comes to mind when most people think of the common hobo. Yet when we look for a demographic in this day and age which might be compared

the the figure which dominated the imagination of Americans for over a century, contrary to what a some farmers who wear a 'cowboy hat' and spurs on their boots might insist, this comparison is probably as close to valid as we can find. The concept of a cowboy was originally inspired by the *Vaquero* which was the Spanish term for a herder of cows. Vaquero – like true cowboys – often slept outside or in bunkhouses; they were *nomads*. This is in distinct contrast to the domestic life, so much so that for years I attempted to characterize my arguments by relating the ideas presented thus far to the concept of a nomad. This however, I think misses some critical facets of the issue. Both 'communalism' and 'nomad' are subjective in the sense that definitions are bound to vary, yet in most of these definitions we will find one commonality; life devoid of stagnant/ immovable/ sedentary property. As one book I once read[14] argued, it was the development of the fence and farm which proved to be the beginning of the end of the *true* cowboy. Regardless of the fact that 'cowboy hats' and spurs might serve a functional purpose, there is nevertheless irony in a sedentary farmer who presents himself as a cowboy.

So too has Americas century long fetish as well as respect for the nomad seemingly ran its course.

In the book *The First Domestication: How Wolves and Humans Coevolved* in which it is almost defensively argued that the bias treatment which domestic society [particularly 'Eurocentric' societies] has given towards wolves is to blame for them being artificially differentiated from their domesticated counterparts (dogs), and that this in turns has been used to justify the vilification of wolves, Raymond Pierotti closes by quoting Cesar Millan on how there exists a perceivable difference between unhoused and housed dogs – as though some of the conditioning effects of domestication simply wore off of the former,

> "I think that dogs that live with homeless people often have the most fulfilling, balanced lives....These dogs don't exactly look like AKC champs, but they're almost always well behaved and nonaggressive. Watch a homeless person walking with a dog and you will witness a good example of pack leader–pack follower body language...The dog follows either beside the human or just behind her....Dogs don't know the difference between organic and regular dog food, they don't think about groomers, and in nature, there aren't any vets....Homeless people...walk from place to place, pick up cans, and seek a meal and a warm place to sleep. This lifestyle might be unacceptable to many humans, but for a dog this is the ideal, natural routine that nature created for him. He is getting the consistent amount of primal exercise that he needs....He is free to travel....Exploration is a natural animal trait....Balance in a dog's life isn't created by giving them material things...[but] by allowing them to fully express the physical and psychological parts of their being. Living with a homeless person, a dog migrates [and]...works for food. "
> —Millan, C. and M.J. Peltier, *'The Natural, Everyday Guide to Understanding and Correcting Common Dog Problems'*

All things considered, in the end I concluded it is a cultural conflict between domestic society and what often proves to be the beginnings of communalism among unhoused populations. It is a cultural conflict which can be traced back thousands of years to the advent of agriculture and private property. So even were my spirited idea feasible in a practical sense, it would nevertheless fail for cultural reasons.

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[14]unfortunately I forget the name of the book

Though I did not know it when it happened, there came a particular day when the foundations of my idealism were shook – perhaps undermined altogether. It was one of numerous city hall meetings which I had attended in my mid-twenties, but this was one of particular significance; a $500 million dollar bond to support affordable housing development in the Portland area was up for a vote. Large groups of housing advocates showed up in force. I thought it a golden opportunity to try to get advocates to consider an alternative approach to addressing their own housing issues by instead considering alternative approaches to addressing those of others (the unhoused) through my 'bunker-housing' idea. Before and after I had my chance to testify I watched as person after person asked for what by then had come to seem to me as essentially the same thing that had been tried numerous times before, both in Portland and in other cities, and always with the same result; more of the same (private 'affordable' apartments) being developed under the presumption that supplying more will reduce demand which will reduce rents, yet in a relatively short amount of time rents just keep going up and gaining leverage against gentrifying processes is more often forgotten about before it is established. Pleas for private housing in my mind began to amount to this; "I want mine". The seagulls in the movie *Finding Nemo* who say repeatedly the only word they know ('*mine*') started to run through my head. Its not that selfishness is a bad thing which makes it so unappealing – again, evolutionary biologists have serious doubts as to whether any truly selfless motive actually exists. What I found distasteful was instead the utter disregard for the principle of enlightened self-interest among the private housing advocacy groups strategy. Considering others [in this case the unhoused] is not selfless so much as it can simply be a means of diversifying ones own selfish strategy; it can open the door to both seeing and attacking ones own problems in a different way. Yet from this experience and others I slowly began to accept that reasonable arguments often tend to die a quiet death, not because they are wrong, but because they are simply unpopular. There is no 'us' in private housing, but there does seem to be a limit to how flexible (and consequently intelligible or effective) the strategies such groups come up with can really be.

Thankfully, I eventually discovered feminist literature. It was entirely unexpected to me that communalism would prove intimately related to feminism, but out of respect for the principle of enlightened self interest I shamelessly ran with it when I found that it did.

As for shoving some well specified model down the readers throat – some model which would help us 'reinvent communalism', that I've come to think this runs contrary to the foundational concept of shared space and communalism. We cannot create a plan or design a structure to facilitate these things, at best we can only take a step back and allow what has already been given to us to take root and grow as it natural does.

As suggested in the essay, I see domestication – or even more fundamentally the act of physically dividing ourselves from one another – as a prehistoric addiction. How radical or ridiculous this thought is I am unsure. But what a graduate physics professor of mine does come to mind; "in physics, we define beauty to be something which explain so much in so little". And I know that even speculative criticism of domestication is eerily unpopular in the literature. Prevalent though, are scapegoat theories such as global warming in which the evils of humanity are pinned on technology that we use to live our chosen lifestyles rather than our unwillingness to live in more natural and sustainable ways in the first place.

Only if and when, probably through some group psychological mechanism I cannot fathom, domestic society begins to undue its habits will the phenomena of 'homelessness' disappear, and

even then it will only be because the division between what is a housed vs. an unhoused person begins to blur such there is is only people.

A thing that could have been another physical argument in part V is that the domestication process constitutes what is, in the lingo of thermodynamics, an *irreversible process* which is a process that will get worse before it gets better. Like an explosion, there is no stopping it; all one can do is wait for it to play out. Indeed, it seems no stretch to say that domestic society is trying to fight entropy itself. Such a thing is, as all physicists know, ultimately a losing battle, and I've admittedly become somewhat of a pessimist in that I think it [domestication] has the capacity as it does not seem to grant much room for any alternative ways of living to grow under its shadow until it simply runs out of motive force.

We could go so far as to compare all of this to the scenario the biblical figure Jesus was describing when he claimed that nothing short of Armageddon would change the ways of man. The natural euphoria of communalism might then be seen as the heaven on earth which was lost. In fact such a comparison might be warranted on the grounds that this scenario is in no way exclusive to Christianity, but is rather one which has arisen in numerous and isolated cultures the world over. *Messianism* is an emerging field of study which has demonstrated how common it is that some discerning person comes along with the right qualities to gain a following (e.g. wisdom, a powerful gift of speech, and the right circumstances for people to be receptive to what he/ she has to say). This person (a prophet) inevitably comes to the conclusion that humans will not change unless or until some sort of catastrophe forces them to do so (the prophesy). Property and the compartmentalization of communalism, the heightened individualism, and the 'mineness' which it inevitably causes seems to me one of the very few if not the only thing that has altered the course of the human race so profoundly so as to make it fit what these prophets were describing.

On a more optimistic note, it seems feasible to say that human societies have evolved/ are evolving from forming groups which are based on placing reciprocal reproductive expectations on one another into placing normative expectations on one another. And this may be an indication that we are evolving towards forms of congregation/ group formation/ communalism which require minimal to no normative expectations on one another. Then again, it may indicate that, as technology makes life easier, we simply will continue to contrive ever more frivolous and stupid normative expectations to place on one another.

A particular spark of optimism I see is feminism. Were feminist movements to again return to seeking to restore communalism instead of simply redefining the role of who is the breadwinner within the nuclear household, this has great potential for affecting meaningful change (for more than just women).

Naturally, communalism seems to thrive in its purest forms among those with little to no resources of their own. But a disheartening thing is to observe that those on the very bottom can be among the last to desire change. In what amounted to closer to ten years of activism, I was mostly alone in my cries for reinventing communalism. Hobos, though they clearly thrive off the sense of communalism when it is allowed to grow in a natural fashion, will throw up their tents and divide themselves from one another if and when they are allowed to.

In the end I accepted that the world changes in its own time, and in the meantime there is no shame in seeking a way to make money off it all.

Being a proponent of free-markets – a financial engineer and stock trader no less – may seem at odds with being an advocate for the unhoused. But in what experience I have with this demographic a thing I picked up on is that, despite numerous attempts to sell voters on the notion that the primary goal of policy should be getting the unhoused back inside of their own private dwelling, it was a want for freedom, opportunity to find refuge in those who are currently in the same boat as they are [compassion], a desire to live as they pleased, and the desire for domestic society to respect these things which seemed to be much more of a concern for the unhoused themselves. To this end I think free-markets go hand-in-hand with free-birds. This might seem cruel as it comes across as though I'm saying that the more people are free to live outside in the gutter the better off free-market capitalists are, but what I actually mean is this; the day it becomes illegal to sleep outside and/ or a persons ability to find safety and comfort in the presence of others is obstructed (in many ways it already has been), this is the day that alarm bells ought to be going off in our heads because these are basic things humans have done for eons prior to domesticating themselves. I believe these things are, at the most fundamental level, bulwarks against even further intrusions of government into many other rights that we enjoy.

As Karl Marx noted almost two hundred years ago; *capital is a social relation*. It means different things to different people, and for those attempting to weave their own little world which exists on the other side of bottom we ought to be cautious about imposing the domestic view of what is of value (a view I think largely rests on the a priori assumption that private property is some sacred principle according to which we all should organize ourselves). Likewise, the issue of unhoused people reflects a deeply unaddressed need in society to rethink our collective notion of work as it can easily be argued that available forms of work largely serve to fit a person back into the domestic life – a thing which clearly has not met the needs of many.

Like why or how the human species *collectively* opted (or bullied one another [the remaining minority] into?) to domesticate ourselves in the first place, why communalism remains such a blatantly – seemingly intentionally – overlooked facet of the unhoused issue is a thing which likely cannot begin to be understood without delving into the murky waters of group psychology. My favorite book – one I recommend to the reader – is Gustave Le Bon's *The Crowd: a Study of the Popular Mind* which is a seminal work written over two hundred years ago, and this is a thing which I find only gives it more credibility when compared to modern works of psychology that tend to substitute hard earned ethnographic observations of crowds in their natural state (a thing which has become increasingly hard to observe in an age of so many regulated activities) with scattered bits of scientific facts about the human brain – the most complex and still poorly understood organism in the known universe. Here I will settle only for claiming that, though it may sound paranoid, the concept of 'tyranny of the majority' will prove all too real to anyone who lingers too long on the front lines of the battle between the housed and unhoused.

In the end the prevailing strategy for addressing the unhoused issue typically devolves into one which prioritizes the agenda of re-assimilating the unhoused into domestic society rather than asking if such a thing is the most sensible and realistic goal to pursue in the first place.

And it is curious how evolved these strategies have become. In *Regulating the Poor: The Foundations of Public Welfare* F. Piven and R.A. Cloward for example, argued that charitable systems have historically been more of a means of reinforcing the collectively accepted notion of work and of quelling social uprisings more than a means of helping those in need. According to the authors,

whenever social movements threaten to disrupt the social order, charitable systems are deployed to pacify the masses. Yet the handouts are usually just below the minimal amount one who is willing to work would obtain, so charity is deployed in such a way that it provides incentive to work. Once social unrest abides, the charitable measures are largely withdrawn from any person who is of working age/ ability and the act of seeking charity is reprimanded. In the middle ages begging was often outlawed – in some cases on pain of death which would be a public display meant to deter prospective charity dependents. This of course feeds into the development of the well known 'poor-laws' in which working laborers bargaining powers were artificially suppressed when conditions favored them so as to keep the scales tipped in favor of landed nobles who they worked for. How the bargaining powers of domestic laborers seeking to earn their keep relates to charitable giving can be summed up in the words of Piven; "The more welfare draws people out of the work-force, the more bargaining power for laborers is enhanced"

And so it makes the one-sided approach to dealing with unhoused populations even more nonsensical; rather than seeing this population as a necessary compliment – a safeguard even – to the bargaining powers and rights of domestic workers, even such workers who stand to benefit from the absence of competition in their respective labor markets are indoctrinated with the popular notion that it would somehow be best if those outside all got into the same boat as them!?!?

A popular line of attack seems to be that 'they chose to be homeless', and this I must challenge with what seems to me a more realistic depiction of choice.

Choices are contextual; one does not 'choose' to live unhoused so much as they choose what seems to them the better of two circumstances at a given time. From here one 'chooses' to see good side of the situation rather than being overcome by the shame and misery of it. As is the way things go, from here inertia takes over; the individual has by this point found a means of survival, and they are quite naturally likely to continue to utilize it so long as it serves its purpose – this is in a way what many of us do. But by 'purpose' we must acknowledge there is much more to the equation than simply having a roof over ones head. Whereas an individual may have found social failure and a lack of freedom in the domestic existence, if such a person were to largely define their purpose as overcoming these things, and if they happen to have had the strange experience of having managed to do so via unorthodox means of living, then it is more rightfully said that such a person has simply learned to achieve their purpose(s) through some other means.

So much to do with 'homelessness' seems to be a big miscommunication. And this is a shame considering just how directly the issue strikes to the heart of communalism in society – a thing which is central to *all* of our lives, and from which we all stand to benefit from, if only we learn to see the ways in which the interests of those living the domestic life are connected to those of those living without property. And this alludes to something I probably did not do justice to in the above essay; the two forms of living can be complimentary rather than opposed.

Perhaps it ought to be the mental well-being, the safety, and the *community* of the unhoused which we ought to be primarily concerned with rather than compartmentalizing the issue so that we see individuals rather than communities, then try to 'solve' their lives by simply shoving them back into smaller and lesser versions of our own – arguably the very lifestyle which didn't work for some of them in the first place.

Upon reflection of all that has here been written, the flaw with the housing first strategy, or just

the general supposition that the 'problem' with 'homelessness' is the inability to house people, is that a home is not a home without a family. From its inception millenia ago the private home has and remains a means to an ends, and that ends is family. But the nuclear family was never a universal thing, and it is unlikely to ever be a thing which works for everyone or is what every person wants or needs at all times in their life. For unhoused populations it can be said for many that they came from broken families. Housing then comes at the cost of breaking ties with the 'street family' they've developed – the only family left to them.

This all brings us to what is a critical point to the essay; the connection between communalism and labor.

In the above essay we've seen that labor markets in most all societies tend to organize around the prevailing form of household, which for us today in the US mostly equates to work being organized around the private home. By now the reader may appreciate that this amounts to saying that our job markets are essentially organized around the nuclear family. The man acting as breadwinner for the family is natural in the sense that women are the reproductive unit and therefore are the natural object at which resources are directed, and this is a fact she can put some degree of trust in. Were the woman to act as breadwinner (she increasingly is) there would not be a reciprocal and reliable source of trust and cohesion between man and woman; it would (and it increasingly does) act to catalyze the dismemberment of the nuclear family. On her part, the woman acts as a mans impetus to perform work; she is his reason for performing labor. Though work may become usurious, overly restrictive of a mans autonomy, deleterious to his sense of community, or though it may limit his sense of competence – though work may stifle most all of the factors of intrinsic motivation in regards to his own person and his surrounding community, so long as the accepted paradigm of work manages to respect and act to empower a mans sense of family, then it will provide him impetus to work. When this social contract is violated it, and when there is no sort of tribe to substitute for the nuclear family, it has a demoralizing effect on a mans impetus to perform work. Without *some* sort of family for which he can work, there is simply little reason for a man to work.

On her part (and this is a sentiment that seems to be increasingly prevalent among successful women today), the woman might question the purpose of corporate values, e.g. why a person is expected to prioritize their job over their personal life or why they are expected to care about activities that are mostly devoid of reason beyond making money. If it is true (and I do not presume this to be any certainty – merely my conjecture) that a woman does not experience the same biological drive to support a man as a man does a woman, then it could be said that, whereas a man can find intrinsic motivation by the thought that he is working to support a complete family unit, a woman would suffer extrinsic motivation in the same position.

That the US gave individuals incentive to work partly explains its economic success. Another factor to be considered is the idea of merit; that the efforts of the individual would be recognized and rewarded; that there was a ladder to be climbed. Though 'pick yourself up by your bootstraps' may be a fiction, as we've seen by now, fiction can serve an organizational purpose, and this alludes to the dangers of communalism; when the fiction of merit is dispelled, and when the artificial organizational scheme of the nuclear family and patriarchies are no longer imposed, people may lose incentive to work. A glance at our genetic cousins (apes) who live communally and spend most of the day simply lounging around is testament that this is a somewhat natural mechanism. And though I

maintain that there is a fundamental difference between communalism and communism[15], it is also a point that is evident in the history of communist governments, but this is a point that warrants closer examination because communist governments undermined merit systems but they did so in unnatural way other than via the natural way of communalism.

With regard to houselessness (and this I think strikes to the real heart of the matter of communalism), for those with little to no prospects of or interests in future reproductive success and/ or who for whatever reason lack a family of there own, organizing labor around the nuclear family leaves surprisingly little incentive to participate in the work force.

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[15]communism being a form of governance that owns and controls property, communalism being a social form of organization that is contrary to government to begin with. The former is a contrived plan, the latter is a natural principle. Prior to domestication people were dealt with as members of a social group. When domestication ensued people were dealt with as members of a geographic territory, and this made possible what we call governmental systems today. More fundamentally, I prefer the explanation that when you keep people separate, they will act separate, and this is what communist forms of government tried to do; make people treat property as communal despite them living separately. In contrast, communalism is to allow people to live together, and if it so happens that notions of private property (and government) tend to dissipate as a result of this, then this is a result of a natural principle rather than some contrive plan.

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