

# Natural Interaction for Bot Detection

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# Overall

Bot detection: determining whether the user is human or computer program.

- Two traditional categories of bot detection methods
  - Human interactive proofs (HIPs): CAPTCHA
  - Human observational proofs (HOPs): input analysis
- Novel approach to bot detection
  - Human subtlety proofs (HSPs)

# Overall

## Motivation

Bot detection is very useful.

- Some bots are employed to register for free email accounts, which are used to send spam.
- Some bots, or so-called 'plug-ins', are used in massively multiuser online games (MMOGs) to gain an edge over human players, which violates the fairness and balance of the game.
- Plugins for ticket-buying, scripts for course-selection ...

# Human Interactive Proofs

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Sometimes, CAPTHAs are too easy for both humans and bots to recognize. However, if the difficulty is raised intending to distinguish humans from bots, it may lower user experience.

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- OCR
- Machine-learning-based attacks
- Cheap human labor
  - \$1000 per million CAPTCHAs, 2005
  - RMB 6000 per million CAPTHCAs, 2017
- Re-posting CAPTCHAs, unwitting human labor

# Human Interactive Proofs

## Variants of CAPTCHA

- Speech with noise
- Image identification
- Mathematical problem solving

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Figure: Variants of CAPTCHAs

# Human Observational Proofs

## Method & Attack

Human observational proofs are transparent to users. They will not feel the existence of bot detection.

- Key stroke and mouse movement analysis
  - Example: anti-cheating systems in online games

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Attack:

- Imitation attacks:
  - scripted actions
  - pre-recorded macros



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Example:





Figure: Google's No CAPTCHA ReCAPTCHA

# Human Subtlety Proofs

## Principles

Users will react to errors in some ways, which can be identified.

- ① gaze fixation → tap → pause (to verify)
- ② gaze fixation → tap → return to missed targets
- ③ use peripheral vision to locate targets
- ④ plan → tap

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Users are sensitive to the difference in error rates.

# Human Subtlety Proofs

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


Figure: mean inter-keystroke interval for different word types

# Conclusions

## Comparison

	HIPs	HSPs	HOPs
Type	active	active	passive
Accuracy	high	medium	low
User Experience	bad	medium	good
Implementation	easy	hard	medium

**Table:** Comparison of HIPs, HSPs, HOPs



# Conclusions

- HSPs combine the strengths of HIPs and HSPs, having a high accuracy with little impact to user experience.
- HSPs can be designed to be natural.
- HSPs can not only distinguish humans from bots, but also determine the type of users.
- However, HSPs sometimes mistakenly identify human users as bots, usually because of their special customs.

# References

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- [2] Hindle, Abram, M. W. Godfrey, and R. C. Holt. Reverse Engineering CAPTCHAs. *Reverse Engineering, 2008. Wcre '08. Working Conference on IEEE*, 2008:59-68.
- [3] Motoyama M., Levchenko K., Kanich C., Mccoy D., Voelker G. M., and Savage S. Re: CAPTCHAs-Understanding CAPTCHA-Solving Services in an Economic Context. *Usenix Security Symposium, Washington, Dc, Usa, August 11-13, 2010, Proceedings DBLP*, 2010:435-462.
- [4] Von A. L., Maurer B., Mcmillen C., Abraham D., and Blum M. "reCAPTCHA: human-based character recognition via Web security measures." *Science*, 321.5895(2008):1465.

# Q & A