

# Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems

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# Kurt Gödel I

- Born: April 28, 1906 Brunn, Austria-Hungary
- Died: January 14, 1978 (aged 71) Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.
- Alma Mater: University of Vienna
- Member of the Vienna Circle



Figure: Kurt Gödel and Albert Einstein

# Kurt Gödel II

## Fun fact

Kurt Gödel and Albert Einstein were good friends. Although the quite large age difference and different subjects. They used to take walks from and to institute where they were working in Princeton. It was also quite fortuitous that both spoke german.

# A quick reminder of Axioms

## Definition (Axiom)

Statements that are true without a formal proof of them.

For example:

$$x = y \wedge y = z \implies x = z$$

"It is possible to draw a straight line from any point to any other point"

- Any mathematical system starts out with a set of axioms

# Completeness

## Definition (Complete)

A set of axioms is (syntactically, or negation-) complete if, for any statement in the axioms' language, that statement or its negation is provable from the axioms. [1]

# Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem

## The First Incompleteness Theorem

Given a set of initial axioms, which are not contradicting each other and also computably enumerable. Then, it is possible to define statements from the same language which are neither provable nor their negations.



# Computably Enumerable

## Computably Enumerable Language

A theory  $S = (\Sigma, \mathcal{P})$  is said to be computably enumerable if the signature  $\Sigma$  is decidable and the set  $\mathcal{P}$  is computably enumerable. Since  $\Sigma$  is decidable, so is the set  $\mathcal{L}_\Sigma$  of all formulae of the given language. When speaking about a computably enumerable theory  $S$ , we assume that some Turing machines defining  $\Sigma$  and  $P$  are fixed.

[2]

# Theories

- By theories  $S$  we mean first-order theories with equality, that is, theories defined by some signature  $\Sigma$  and a set  $\mathcal{P}$  of formulae of this signature which is closed under the logical successor (in the first-order predicate logic with equality). The formulae of  $\mathcal{P}$  are said to be *provable* in  $S$ .

[2]

# Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem

- **The goal is to have a set of axioms that is powerful enough to prove everything in mathematics.**
- The status quo is that we have some axioms that are unprovable. Wouldn't it just make sense to add these axioms to our system, that we have a complete system?
- To answer this question we actually have to take a look at the Gödel numbering.

# Gödel Numbering

- Gödel encoded every axiom with a unique natural number.
- He basically allowed mathematics to talk about itself.
- The so called "Gödelisierung" is not limited to axioms. You can encode every word  $\omega$  in a language  $L$ .
- You can compare this to a modern computer, every text you type is encoded, for example in ASCII. In the end it comes even down to an encoding of 0s and 1s.

A short side statement: those numbers can be absolutely huge.

# Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem

- Now back to our first question.
- We encode now the statement "This statement cannot be proved from the axioms".
- Since we can work with numbers now, we can set up an equation.
- **Remember** An equation is **always** true or false, in mathematics.

# Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem

- We start now by saying this statement is false.
- This means that "This statement is provable from the axioms" is true, but a provable statement must be true.
- So now we have started with something which we assumed was false and now we have deduced that it was actually true.
- We have got a contradiction.

# Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem

- Since we are assuming that mathematics is consistent we cannot have contradictions.
- That means it cannot be false.
- We now can conclude that it must be true, since an equation must always be true or false.
- Now we reinterpret what it says "This statement cannot be proved from the axioms". We have now a statement that cannot be proofed with the axioms of mathematics.

# Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem

- This is now really **important**: Within a system of mathematics with certain axioms we found a true statement within there which cannot be proved true with that system. We have proofed by working outside the system and looking in.
- Since it is true we can add that as an axiom. It is a true statement, so it will not make something which is consistent inconsistent.



# Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem

- Now back to our question. "Wouldn't it just make sense to add these axioms to our system, that we have a complete system?"
- We have just shown that it would be possible to add new axioms to the system. On the other hand we end up adding endless new axioms to our system. We are stuck in an endless loop.

# A Modern Approach

- Now we are getting more formal and take a look at modern proofs and approaches about the theorem.

# Parameters of the Proofs

All of the modern proofs of Gödel's theorem do have the following five parameters:

- 1 the choice of a specific basic formal system  $T$ ;
- 2 the choice of a universal computation model on some family  $U$  of objects of  $T$ , where by such a model  $I$  mean any mathematically rigorous definition of the notion of a *computably enumerable* set of elements of  $U$  (or of a computable function from  $U$  to  $U$ );

# Parameters of the Proofs

- 3 the choice of a Gödel numbering, that is, an encoding of the syntax of the theory  $T$  by objects in  $U$ ;
- 4 a proof of the enumerability of the system  $T$  (in the sense of the chosen computation model and the Gödel numbering);
- 5 a presentation of an example of an expressible non-computably enumerable set (together with the proof of its expressibility and non-enumerability).

[2]

# Parameters of the Proofs - Examples

To prove Gödel's theorem, various authors have considered the following computation models:

- 1 *computably enumerable* sets as projections of primitive recursive relations (Gödel);
- 2 the Herbrand–Gödel computable functions and partial recursive functions (Kleene);
- 3 elementary formal systems (Smullyan);
- 4 Turing machines;
- 5  $\Sigma$ -definable relations (Ershov) and others.

[2]

# Simplified Proofs

We note immediately that many authors of simplified proofs of Gödel's theorem neglect some of these points due to their intuitive clearness, using, as a rule, an informal concept of algorithm and some of the forms of the Church–Turing thesis. For example, the enumerability of the Peano arithmetic is intuitively clear. At the same time, an "honest" proof of this statement needs programming in the framework of the chosen computation model, that is, significant technical work in general.

[2]

# What did Gödel actually do?

- Choosing the apparatus of primitive recursive functions, Gödel managed quite effectively with the problem.
- In our opinion there are still no complete proofs of Gödel's theorem that are essentially simpler than his own proof.

[2]

# Gödel's Plan

This proof is based on the technical notion of *representability* of a *function* in a theory  $T$  and in the construction of an arithmetical formula asserting its own unprovability. The plan of Gödel's proof can be described as follows: [2]



# Gödel's Plan

- 1 the proof of the fact that the proof predicate  $\text{Prf}_T(x, y)$  for the theory  $T$  is primitive recursive;
- 2 the proof of the fact that every primitive recursive function is representable in  $T$ , which implies the decidability in  $T$  of the predicate  $\text{Prf}_T(x, y)$ ;

# Gödel's Plan

- 3 the construction of a formula  $\psi$  such that

$$T \vdash \psi \leftrightarrow \neg \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner)$$

, where  $\text{Prf}_T(x)$  stands for the provability formula  $\exists y \text{Prf}_T(x, y)$ , and where we use the representability in  $T$  of the substitution function.

The proof is completed with the following argument, which shows that if  $T$  is  $\omega$ -consistent, then the formula  $\psi$  is unprovable and irrefutable in  $T$ .

[2]

# Some Explanations for the Proof

## Definition ( $\omega$ -consistent)

A theory  $T$  is said to be  $\omega$ -consistent if there is no formula  $\varphi(x)$  (where the variable  $x$  ranges over the natural numbers) such that the following conditions hold simultaneously:

- $T \vdash \exists x \varphi(x)$
- $T \vdash \neg \varphi(\underline{0}), \neg \varphi(\underline{1}), \dots$

[2]

## Some Explanations for the Proof

For any formula  $\psi$  of the language of  $T$  denote by  $\varphi[\psi]$  the formula  $\underline{m}$ , where  $m = \lceil \psi \rceil$  stands for the Gödel number of  $\psi$ . As always, we assume that the Gödel numbering of the formulae is computable.

### Lemma

*Let  $T$  be an arithmetical theory containing  $R$ . Then for any formula  $\psi(x)$  of the language of  $T$  there is a formula  $\psi$  with the same free variables besides  $x$  as those of  $\varphi$  such that*

$$T \vdash \psi \leftrightarrow \varphi[\psi]$$

[2]

# Dive Deeper

If you are interested to see the complete proofs i would suggest to check out the following resources.

- Gödel incompleteness theorems and the limits of their applicability. I by L. D. Beklemishev. Pages 29 - 33. [2]
- Or you can even take a look a the original paper of Kurt Gödel himself. [3]

# Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem

- Now we are going to look at the mostly overlooked second theorem of Kurt Gödel.

# Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem

- The first theorem asserts that there is a sentence which is neither provable nor refutable in the theory  $P$  under consideration.

## The Second Incompleteness Theorem

The second theorem asserts that for this sentence one can take a formalization in  $P$  of the statement that the theory  $P$  itself is consistent.

# A not so Formal Explanation

- A consistent math system cannot prove its own consistency.
- Can you remember the first informal proof? We proofed it outside the system of mathematics. [▶ take a look again](#)



# Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem

- We now try get an understanding of it with a very informal approach.
- For this we take the Halting problem into consideration.
- The Halting problem and the second incompleteness theorem are similar.
- The first theorem says that: any sufficiently expressive math system must be either incomplete or **inconsistent**.
- In a consistent system we can prove at most one statement.  
For example, if a cow can fly or not.

# What we are trying to do now

- 1 Assume that mathematic system is consistent
- 2 Create a program foo
- 3 Analyze foo
- 4 Find out that mathematics system is incomplete

# The Program foo

- foo iterates over every mathematical proof.

```
function foo (M : program) {  
  for each proof p {  
    if (p proves M(M) LOOPS)  
      return;  
    if (p proves M(M) HALTS)  
      loop();  
  }  
}
```

# The Program foo

- What will now happen if we put foo into foo like this foo(foo)?

```
function foo (foo : program) {  
  for each proof p {  
    if (p proves foo(foo) LOOPS)  
      return;  
    if (p proves foo(foo) HALTS)  
      loop();  
  }  
}
```

# foo inside foo

- The program now should loop or halt.
- We will now take a look on both possibilities.

# The Program Loops

- If the program loops we end up here:

```
if (p proves foo(foo) LOOPS)
    return;
```

- so foo halts.
- If a program halts there is a proof that it does so (step through the program until it returns).

# The Program Halts

- If the program loops we end up here:

```
if (p proves foo(foo) HALTS)
  loop();
```

- foo loops indefinitely.
- It is approved that the program loops (step through the program until it loops indefinitely).

## What does this mean now?

- We have both proofs that the program halts and loops and this contradicts our assumption of consistency. Therefore neither can be true.
- We end up that we cannot prove within our system if  $\text{foo}(\text{foo})$  loops or halts. Our system is therefore incomplete.
- But what does  $\text{foo}(\text{foo})$  actually do? It loops over every possible math proof endlessly.



# The Parameters of the Proof

- 1 Recursive arithmetization of the syntax of the language of  $T$ .
- 2  $\Sigma_1$ -definability of the recursively enumerable predicates.
- 3 Provability in  $T$  of true  $\Sigma_1$  sentences of the language of arithmetic.
- 4 Diagonalization.
- 5 Provability in  $T$  of some of the properties of the *Provability* predicate  $Bew_T$ .

Please note that the first four parameters were also used for proofing the first theorem. The fifth one, which is actually harder to prove is the crucial step for the second and stronger theorem.

[4]

## How to make a formal proof of this

- For a short proof you could use the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The proof was done by T.Jech in 1994.

### Theorem

*If ZF is consistent, then  $ZF \not\vdash CON(ZF)$*





- If you are interested in this proof, or some other versions take the following paper into consideration [4].

# The Take Home Messages are

- **First theorem:** Any sufficiently expressive math system must be either incomplete or inconsistent.
- **Second theorem:** A consistent math system cannot prove its own consistency.
- Gödel's second theorem placed in doubt the possibility of realizing the most important thesis of the so called *Hilbert programme*. [2]

## Further reading if you are interested

- <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/>
- <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-goemldels-proof/>
- [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286918416\\_On\\_the\\_philosophical\\_relevance\\_of\\_Godel's\\_incompleteness\\_theorems](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286918416_On_the_philosophical_relevance_of_Godel's_incompleteness_theorems)

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-  L. D. Beklemishev, “Gödel incompleteness theorems and the limits of their applicability. i,” *Russian Mathematical Surveys*, vol. 65, no. 5, p. 857, 2010.
-  K. Gödel, “Über formal unentscheidbare sätze der principia mathematica und verwandter systeme i,” *Monatshefte für mathematik und physik*, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 173–198, 1931.
-  J. Bagaria, “A short guide to gödel’s second incompleteness theorem,” *Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofia*, pp. 5–15, 2003.