

Protocol Audit Report

Version 1.0

Keyword

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Protocol Summary

Protocol does X, Y, Z

Disclaimer

Keyword makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	High	H	H/M	M
	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

Audit Details

Scope

Roles

Executive Summary

Issues found

Findings

High

[H-1] Storing the password onchain makes it visible to anyone, and no longer private.

Description: All data stored on-chain is visible to anyone and can be read directly from the blockchain. The `PasswordStore : s_password` variable is intended to be a private variable and only accessed through the `PasswordStore : getPassword` function which is intended to be only called by the owner of the contract.

We show one such method of reading any data off blockchain below.

Impact: Anyone can read the private password, breaking the functionality of the protocol.

Proof of Concept:

The below test case shows how anyone can read the password directly from the blockchain.

1. Create a local blockchain network

```
1 make anvil
```

2. Deploy the contract on-chain

```
1 forge script script/DeployPasswordStore.s.sol:DeployPasswordStore --rpc
  -url http://localhost:8545 --private-key 0
  xac0974bec39a17e36ba4a6b4d238ff944bacb478cbcd5efcae784d7bf4f2ff80 --
  broadcast
```

3. Read from storage We use 1 because `s_password` is stored at #1 index in storage.

```
1 cast storage {Address here} 1 --rpc-url http://127.0.0.1:8545
```

You'll get an output like this 0x6d7950617373776f72640000000000000000000000000000000000000000000014

Now parse that hex to a string with cast parse

```
1 cast parse-bytes32-string 0
    x6d7950617373776f726440000000000000000000000000000000000000000014 (
    you will put your own hex value here)
```

You will get an output of

```
1 myPassword
```

Recommended Mitigation: Due to this bug the whole architecture of the contract should be rethought.

[H-2] PasswordStore::setPassword has no access controls, meaning that anyone can change the password, not only the owner.

Description: The `PasswordStore : : setPassword` is set to be an external function that should be accessed only by the owner of the contract, but the function misses an access control feature, so any non-owner could change the password.

Impact: Anyone can set/change the password of the contract, severely impacting its purpose.

Proof of Concept: Add the following to the `PasswordsStore.t.sol` test file.

```
1 function testAnyoneCanSetPassword(address randomAddress) public {
2     vm.assume(randomAddress != owner);
3     vm.prank(randomAddress);
4     string memory expectedPassword = "myNewPassword";
5     passwordStore.setPassword(expectedPassword);
6
7     vm.prank(owner);
8     string memory actualPassword = passwordStore.getPassword();
9     assertEquals(actualPassword, expectedPassword);
10 }
```

Recommended Mitigation: Add an access control conditional to the `setPassword` function.

```
1  if (msg.sender != s_owner) {
2      revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
3  }
```

Informational

[I-1] The PasswordStore::getPassword natspec indicates a parameter that doesn't exist, causing the natspec to be incorrect.

Description:

```
1  /*
2      * @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.
3  @>  * @param newPassword The new password to set.
4      */
5      function getPassword() external view returns (string memory) {}
```

The `PasswordStore::getPassword` function signature is `getPassword()` while the natspec says it should be `getPassword(string)`

Impact: The natspec is incorrect

Recommended Mitigation: Remove the incorrect natspec.

```
1  - * @param newPassword The new password to set.
```