

# Dynamic Programming Approach to **Behavioral** Operations

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OIDD 934 Spring 2018



# What is *Behavioral Operations*?

Operations  
Management

Human Behavior  
/Emotions

+

“People are fully rational”      Biases, limited cognitive ability, ...

# What is *Behavioral Operations*?

## Supply Chain Capacity Allocation

*Adelman & Mersereau  
Management Science '13*

Memory

Operations  
Management

Human Behavior  
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## Revenue Management Dynamic Pricing

*Nasiry & Popescu  
Operations Research '11*


Loss Aversion

# Dynamic Capacity Allocation to Customers Who Remember Past Service

*Adelman & Mersereau, Management Science '13*

- Supplier sells a single good to a finite set of customers:  $1, 2, \dots, n$
- Capacity constraint of  $X_{\bar{t}} > 0$  units per period
- **Goal:** Maximize supplier's long-run average profit
- Model "goodwill" toward the supplier / customer's memory
- Trade-off margin, demand volatility, and memory
- Show that ADP policy outperforms Greedy

# MDP Formulation



- **Goodwill:** based on quality of past service  $\mathbf{G}_t^i$  entering period  $t$ , modeled as exponential smoothing of utilities from past fill rates.


$$G_{t+1}^i = \begin{cases} \beta^i G_t^i + u^i(x_t^i / y^i(G_t^i, D_t^i)) & \text{if } y^i(G_t^i, D_t^i) > 0, \\ \beta^i G_t^i & \text{if } y^i(G_t^i, D_t^i) = 0, \end{cases}$$

$\beta^i$ : (0,1): customer-specific memory parameter

$u^i$ : [0, 1] -> R+: nondecreasing c-specific utility function

$D_t$ : demands follow stationary dist, dependent across i, but independent across t

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$B^i: (0,1)$ : customer-specific memory parameter

$u^i: [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ : nondecreasing c-specific utility function

$D_t$ : demands follow stationary dist, dependent across  $i$ , but independent across  $t$

- **State space:**  $\mathcal{G} = \{\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n : u^i(0) / (1 - \beta^i) \leq G^i \leq u^i(1) / (1 - \beta^i) \forall i \in \mathcal{I}\}$
- **Action space:** allocations provided under each demand scenario

$$\mathcal{X}(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{D}) = \left\{ \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n : \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} x^i \leq \bar{X}, 0 \leq x^i \leq y^i(G^i, D^i) \forall i \in \mathcal{I} \right\}$$

# Challenges from MDP

Let  $\beta\mathbf{G} + \mathbf{u}(x/y(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{D}))$  be a vectorized representation of the expressions  $\beta^i G^i + u^i(x^i/y^i(G^i, D^i))$  for all  $i$ , which denote the next state. We can write the unichain optimality equations in two equivalent ways:

where  $h(\cdot) \in \mathbb{B}(\mathcal{G})$  is the bias function

$$h(\mathbf{G}) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{D}} \left[ \max_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{D})} \left\{ \sum_i r^i x^i - \rho + h\left(\beta\mathbf{G} + \mathbf{u}\left(\frac{\mathbf{x}}{\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{D})}\right)\right) \right\} \right] \\ \forall \mathbf{G} \in \mathcal{G}, \quad (1)$$

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- Capacity constraint makes it imp. to decompose problem by customers
- Stochastic demands lead to stochastic dynamics -> steady states needs to be characterized by complex joint probability distribution
- Using fill rate to measure service quality induces nonlinear state dynamics

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**However,**

- Capacity constraint makes it imp. to decompose problem by customers
- Stochastic demands lead to stochastic dynamics -> steady states needs to be characterized by complex joint probability distribution
- Using fill rate to measure service quality induces nonlinear state dynamics
- **Solution:** Switch = in (2) into  $\geq$  and get infinite-d LP

$$(D_0) \quad \inf_{\rho, h} \rho \quad (3a)$$

$$h(\mathbf{G}) \geq \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{D}} \left[ \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} r^i x^i(\mathbf{D}) - \rho + h\left(\beta\mathbf{G} + \mathbf{u}\left(\frac{\mathbf{x}(\mathbf{D})}{\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{D})}\right)\right) \right]$$


$$\forall (\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{x}) \in \mathcal{M}, \quad (3b)$$

$$h \in \mathbb{B}(\mathcal{G}), \rho \in \mathbb{R}. \quad (3c)$$

# Greedy Policy Can Be Bad

Myopic margin-greedy policy = allocates capacity based on margins alone without regard to goodwill.

$$\max \sum_i r^i x_t^i \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_i x_t^i \leq \bar{X}, \quad 0 \leq x_t^i \leq y_t^i \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{J}.$$




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- Goodwills are not maintained to be similar across customers




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**Better policies** strategically withhold capacity to keep customer goodwills within a manageable range, keep multiple customers ordering actively, and pooling demand variances across customers.

# Approximate DP Approach

Based on a polynomial approximation of the optimal bias function  $h$  of  $D_0$

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$$h(\mathbf{G}) \geq E_D \left[ \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} r^i x^i(\mathbf{D}) - \rho + h \left( \beta \mathbf{G} + \mathbf{u} \left( \frac{\mathbf{x}(\mathbf{D})}{\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{D})} \right) \right) \right] \quad \forall (\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{x}) \in \mathcal{M}, \quad (3b)$$

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$$h(\mathbf{G}) \approx \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} w_k \phi_k(\mathbf{G}) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{j=1}^N w_{ij} \cdot (G^i)^j$$

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Upperbounds average reward of any policy (10b)

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**Dual**

$$(P_\phi) \quad \sup_{\mu} \sum_{(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{x}) \in M} \mathbb{E}_D \left[ \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} r^i x^i(\mathbf{D}) \right] \mu(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{x}), \quad (11a)$$

$$\sum_{(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{x}) \in M} \left[ \phi_k(\mathbf{G}) - \mathbb{E}_D \left[ \phi_k \left( \beta \mathbf{G} + \mathbf{u} \left( \frac{\mathbf{x}(\mathbf{D})}{\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{D})} \right) \right) \right] \right] \cdot \mu(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{x}) = 0 \quad \forall k \in \mathcal{K}, \quad (11b)$$

$$\sum_{(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{x}) \in M} \mu(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{x}) = 1, \quad (11c)$$

$$\mu \geq 0, M = \text{supp}(\mu) \subset \mathcal{M}, |M| < \infty, \quad (11d)$$

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**Upperbounds average reward of any policy** (10b)

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**THEOREM 2 (DUALITY).** Suppose  $\{\phi_k\}_{k \in \mathcal{K}}$  are continuous functions on  $\mathcal{G}$ . Then  $(P_\phi)$  is solvable, and  $\sup(P_\phi) = \inf(D_\phi)$ .

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**Solved using column generation for a given dual price vector and price**

# Optimal ADP Policy

- Given demand realization  $\mathbf{D}$ , customers are in goodwill state  $\mathbf{G}$ , optimal dual variables  $\mathbf{w}^*$  from solving  $(P_{\text{phi}})$ , the supplier solves

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\mathbf{x}} \quad & \sum_{i \in \mathcal{J}} \left( r^i x^i + \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} w_k^* \phi_k \left( \mathbf{\beta G} + \mathbf{u} \left( \frac{\mathbf{x}}{\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{D})} \right) \right) \right) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{i \in \mathcal{J}} x^i \leq \bar{X}, \quad 0 \leq x^i \leq y^i(G^i, D^i) \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{J}, \end{aligned}$$

or possibly a  
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version of this problem

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
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- Linear Approx.  $u^i(f) = f$  and linear basis function  $\phi_i(G^i) = G^i$   
Optimization becomes simple LP with an index solution: allocate capacity to customers in decreasing order of the customer indices



$$r^i + \frac{w_i^*}{y^i(G^i, D^i)} \quad \text{until capacity is exhausted.}$$

# Conclusions


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


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



Longer memory can have + or – (ambiguous) impact on expected orders

Goodwills are important when  $D$  variance increases and memories become shorter



ADP policy maintains more balanced goodwills  
Goodwill-sensitive:  
prioritize customers by “adjusted margins”



	Name	Artist	Price	
1	Boom Boom Pow	Black Eyed Peas	\$1.29	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
2	Poker Face	Lady GaGa	\$1.29	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
3	Right Round	Flo Rida	\$1.29	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
4	The Climb	Miley Cyrus	\$0.99	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
5	Day 'n' Nite	Kid Cudi	\$0.99	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
6	Kiss Me Thru the Phone (feat. ...	Soulja Boy Tell 'Em	\$1.29	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
7	Gives You Hell	The All-America...	\$1.29	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
8	You Found Me	The Fray	\$0.99	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
9	Blame It (feat. T-Pain)	Jamie Foxx	\$0.99	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
10	Love Sex Magic (feat. Justin Ti...	Clara	\$1.29	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
11	Just Dance	Lady GaGa & Col...	\$1.29	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
12	I Love College	Asher Roth	\$0.99	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
13	Halo	Beyoncé	\$0.99	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
14	Sugar (feat. Wynter)	Flo Rida	\$1.29	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
15	If U Seek Amy	Britney Spears	\$0.99	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
16	My Life Would Suck Without You	Kelly Clarkson	\$1.29	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
17	Dead and Gone (feat. J... <small>EXPLICIT</small>	T.I.	\$0.99	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
18	Don't Trust Me	3OH!3	\$0.99	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
19	Jai Ho! (You Are My Destiny) [f...	A. R. Rahman & ...	\$1.29	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>
20	Second Chance	Shinedown	\$0.99	<a href="#">BUY SONG</a>

# Dynamic Pricing with Loss-Averse Consumers and Peak-End Anchoring

Nasiry & Popescu, Operations Research '11

	Name	Artist	Price	
1	Boom Boom Pow	Black Eyed Peas	\$1.29	BUY SONG
2	Poker Face	Lady GaGa	\$1.29	BUY SONG
3	Right Round	Flo Rida	\$1.29	BUY SONG
4	The Climb	Miley Cyrus	\$0.99	BUY SONG
5	Day 'n' Nite	Kid Cudi	\$0.99	BUY SONG
6	Kiss Me Thru the Phone (feat. ...	Soulja Boy Tell 'Em	\$1.29	BUY SONG
7	Gives You Hell	The All-America...	\$1.29	BUY SONG
8	You Found Me	The Fray	\$0.99	BUY SONG
9	Blame It (feat. T-Pain)	Jamie Foxx	\$0.99	BUY SONG
10	Love Sex Magic (feat. Justin Ti...	Clara	\$1.29	BUY SONG
11	Just Dance	Lady GaGa & Col...	\$1.29	BUY SONG
12	I Love College	Asher Roth	\$0.99	BUY SONG
13	Halo	Beyoncé	\$0.99	BUY SONG
14	Sugar (feat. Wynter)	Flo Rida	\$1.29	BUY SONG
15	If U Seek Amy	Britney Spears	\$0.99	BUY SONG
16	My Life Would Suck Without You	Kelly Clarkson	\$1.29	BUY SONG
17	Dead and Gone (feat. J... EXPLICIT	T.I.	\$0.99	BUY SONG
18	Don't Trust Me EXPLICIT	3OH!3	\$0.99	BUY SONG
19	Jai Ho! (You Are My Destiny) [f...	A. R. Rahman & ...	\$1.29	BUY SONG
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- In repeated purchases, consumers form price expectations.
- Operationalize RF in a dynamic pricing context and study how memory and anchoring process influences pricing strategies.
- Solves DP with nonsmooth reward and transition functions.

# Modeling Reference Prices

- Utility = acquisition + transaction utilities (**mental accounting**)
- D increases in the reference gap  $r - p$  (**prospect theory**)

$$\begin{aligned} d(p, r) &= d_0(p) - \lambda(p - r)^+ + \gamma(r - p)^+ \\ &= \begin{cases} d_0(p) + \lambda(r - p), & \text{if } p \geq r; \\ d_0(p) + \gamma(r - p), & \text{if } p \leq r. \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

Loss aversion is captured by  $\lambda \geq \gamma > 0$ . We assume that the base demand,  $d_0(p)$ , is nonnegative, bounded, continuously differentiable, and decreasing in price, and the base profit  $\pi_0(p) = p d_0(p)$  is nonmonotone and strictly concave. The firm's short-term profit is denoted  $\pi(p, r) = p d(p, r)$ . All our results extend for a nonzero marginal cost  $c$ .

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- Peak-end rule:** Consumers anchor on a reference price  
= weighted average of lowest + most recent prices

Reference price      (0,1]: how much relying on low prices

$$r_t = \theta m_{t-1} + (1 - \theta)p_{t-1}, \quad m_{t-1} = \min(m_{t-2}, p_{t-1})$$

Minimum price      Most recent price

# The Model

- Firm maximizes infinite horizon B-discounted revenues:

$$J(m_0, p_0) = \max_{p_t \in \mathbf{P}} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} \pi(p_t, \theta m_{t-1} + (1 - \theta)p_{t-1}),$$

where  $m_t = \min(m_{t-1}, p_t)$ ,

- Prices are bounded to  $[0, \bar{p}]$  and at price  $\bar{p}$  there is no demand.
- Implicitly assume that lowest prices can be remembered indefinitely. Insights remain valid even when consumers forget/update.
- **Bellman equation:**

$$\begin{aligned} J(m_{t-1}, p_{t-1}) = \max_{p_t \in \mathbf{P}} & \left\{ \pi(p_t, \theta m_{t-1} + (1 - \theta)p_{t-1}) \right. \\ & \left. + \beta J(\min(p_t, m_{t-1}), p_t) \right\} \end{aligned}$$

# Thanks to Loss Aversion...

- $J(m,p)$  is increasing in both arguments.
  - Transitions and profit per stage are increasing. Also, intuitive.
- Loss aversion allows us to rewrite kinked profit  $\pi(p,r)$  as the minimum of two smooth profit functions.

$$\pi_k(p, r) = [d_0(p) + k(r - p)]p = \pi_0(p) + k(r - p)p, \text{ for } k \in \{\lambda, \gamma\}$$

LEMMA 1. *The short-term profit is*  
 $\pi(p, r) = \min(\pi_\lambda(p, r), \pi_\gamma(p, r))$   
*and it is supermodular in  $(p, r)$ .*

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- We can re-write the Bellman equation as:

$$J(m_{t-1}, p_{t-1}) = \max_{p_t \in \mathbf{P}} \left\{ \min(\pi_\lambda, \pi_\gamma)(p_t, r_t) + \beta J(\min(p_t, m_{t-1}), p_t) \right\};$$
$$r_t = \theta m_{t-1} + (1 - \theta)p_{t-1}$$

- Optimal pricing policy  $p^*(m_{t-1}, p_{t-1})$  solves the above equation.
- $(m, p)$  is a steady-state if  $p^*(m, p) = p$  / optimal state path is constant.

LEMMA 1. *The short-term profit is  $\pi(p, r) = \min(\pi_\lambda(p, r), \pi_\gamma(p, r))$  and it is supermodular in  $(p, r)$ .*

# Solution Approach

## 1. Characterize the **steady states**

- Identify smooth upper-bound problems & characterize their steady states

$$J_m^\nu(p_{t-1}) = \max_{p_t \in \mathbf{P}} \{(1-\nu)\pi_\lambda(p_t, \theta m + (1-\theta)p_{t-1}) + \nu\pi_\gamma(p_t, p_{t-1}) + \beta J_m^\nu(p_t)\} \geq J(m, p)$$

- Match steady states of original problem with those of these smooth relaxations and show that no other steady states exists

## 2. Characterize the **transient properties** of the optimal policy


- Starting at any initial state  $(m_0, p_0)$ , price paths remain in the same region as initial  $m_0$
- Within each region, the optimal price paths are monotone, so the prices converge monotonically to a steady state in the corresponding region.

# Optimal Policy

Optimal price path converges monotonically to a steady-state price (or is constant).

**PROPOSITION 1.** *Given any  $(m_0, p_0)$ , the optimal price path of Problem (3) converges monotonically to a steady-state price, which is (a)  $p_\lambda^{**}(m_0)$ , if  $m_0 \in \mathbf{R}_1$ ; (b)  $m_0$ , if  $m_0 \in \mathbf{R}_2$ ; and (c)  $\bar{m}$ , if  $m_0 \in \mathbf{R}_3$ . In particular, the optimal pricing policy,  $p^*(m, p)$ , is increasing in both  $m$  and  $p$ , and the set of steady states of Problem (3) is  $\{(m, p_\lambda^{**}(m)) \mid m \in \mathbf{R}_1\} \cup \{(m, m) \mid m \in \mathbf{R}_2\}$ .*

**Figure 1.** Steady states (bold line) and generic optimal price paths (arrows) for each region of Problem (3).




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- Oscillating prices not LR optimal
- Steady-state price depends only on  $m_0$
- Firm ignoring reference effects forgoes profit by overcharging customers.

**Figure 1.** Steady states (bold line) and generic optimal price paths (arrows) for each region of Problem (3).



# Summary

## Supply Chain Capacity Allocation

*Adelman & Mersereau  
Management Science '13*

### Memory

- Memories matter particularly when # customers is small-moderate, high demand volatility, short memories.
- ADP policy dominates greedy policy by managing expectations, pooling demand volatilities
- When goodwill matters, mechanisms that link goodwill to profits.

## Revenue Management Dynamic Pricing

*Nasiry & Popescu  
Operations Research '11*

### Loss Aversion

- Operationalize peak-end rule in a dynamic pricing context.
- Constant pricing policy is optimal.
  - Similar to Su 2007, Gallego & van Ryzin 1994, and Celik et al 2009
- Behavioral regularities ensure prices will converge to steady-state (initial low expectation affects SS price)