From 04103096c1c3c54ef55e174778d2807f5b4070e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 13:44:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu/kvm: Provide UNTRAIN_RET_VM commit 864bcaa38ee44ec6c0e43f79c2d2997b977e26b2 upstream. Similar to how it doesn't make sense to have UNTRAIN_RET have two untrain calls, it also doesn't make sense for VMEXIT to have an extra IBPB call. This cures VMEXIT doing potentially unret+IBPB or double IBPB. Also, the (SEV) VMEXIT case seems to have been overlooked. Redefine the meaning of the synthetic IBPB flags to: - ENTRY_IBPB -- issue IBPB on entry (was: entry + VMEXIT) - IBPB_ON_VMEXIT -- issue IBPB on VMEXIT And have 'retbleed=ibpb' set *BOTH* feature flags to ensure it retains the previous behaviour and issues IBPB on entry+VMEXIT. The new 'srso=ibpb_vmexit' option only sets IBPB_ON_VMEXIT. Create UNTRAIN_RET_VM specifically for the VMEXIT case, and have that check IBPB_ON_VMEXIT. All this avoids having the VMEXIT case having to check both ENTRY_IBPB and IBPB_ON_VMEXIT and simplifies the alternatives. Fixes: fb3bd914b3ec ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814121149.109557833@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 11 +++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 7 ++----- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 76b7889a673fe..589d8e12a950b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -295,6 +295,17 @@ #endif .endm +.macro UNTRAIN_RET_VM +#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \ + defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO) + VALIDATE_UNRET_END + ALTERNATIVE_3 "", \ + CALL_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ + "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT, \ + __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH +#endif +.endm + .macro UNTRAIN_RET_FROM_CALL #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \ defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 252dded5b6f2e..433e95e25332a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1054,6 +1054,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT); mitigate_smt = true; break; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S index 265452fc9ebe9..ef2ebabb059c8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S @@ -222,10 +222,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run) * because interrupt handlers won't sanitize 'ret' if the return is * from the kernel. */ - UNTRAIN_RET - - /* SRSO */ - ALTERNATIVE "", "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT + UNTRAIN_RET_VM /* * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent @@ -362,7 +359,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run) * because interrupt handlers won't sanitize RET if the return is * from the kernel. */ - UNTRAIN_RET + UNTRAIN_RET_VM /* "Pop" @spec_ctrl_intercepted. */ pop %_ASM_BX