

A dramatic, high-contrast image of a stormy sky. Dark, heavy clouds are illuminated from within by bright, yellowish-white light, creating a sense of intense energy. Several jagged, bright yellow lightning bolts are visible, striking downwards from the clouds. The overall color palette is dominated by deep blues, purples, and oranges, giving it a cinematic and powerful appearance.


ForAllSecure

Binary Analysis

And Patching!

How can I fuzz better?

And improve overall coverage?



What is Coverage Analysis?



Line Coverage [?]

*requires debug symbols

→ Represents the percentage of source code lines hit by test cases out of the total



Function Coverage [?]

→ Represents the percentage of functions hit by test cases out of the total



Dynamic Block Coverage [?]

→ Represents the percentage of code blocks (sections of code with one entry and one exit point) hit by test cases out of the total

What is Coverage Analysis?

```
project: ffmpeg
target: ffmpeg
image: ghcr.io/xansec/ffmpeg:latest
advanced_triage: true
```

```
tasks:
  - name: exploitability_factors
  - name: regression_testing
  - name: behavior_testing
  - name: coverage_analysis
```

```
cmds:

  - cmd: /ffmpeg -i @@ -f null ignore.mp4
    env:
      LD_LIBRARY_PATH: /ffmpeg-libs
      dictionary: /dictionaries/mp4.dict
```

Viewing Coverage in Ghidra

1. Install Ghidra:

<https://ghidra-sre.org/>

<https://ghidra-sre.org/InstallationGuide.html#Platforms>


2. Install Dragon Dance.

```
$ git clone https://github.com/0xffffffffh/dragondance.git
$ cd dragondance
$ gradle -PGHIDRA_INSTALL_DIR=<your_ghidra_installation_dir>
```

3. Run Ghidra:

```
$ ./ghidraRun
```

Viewing Coverage in Ghidra



Viewing Coverage in Ghidra



`$ mayhem sync .`

or

Viewing Coverage in Ghidra

The screenshot displays the Ghidra CodeBrowser interface for the 'ffmpeg' binary. The left sidebar shows the 'Program Tree' with 'ffmpeg' selected, and the 'Symbol Tree' with 'entry' selected. The main window is divided into two panes: the left pane shows assembly code, and the right pane shows the decompiled C code.


Assembly Code (Left Pane):

```
0040804c 0f 2e c8 UCOPSS JMP, JMP
0040804f 0f 87 a3 JA LAB_00407f88
00408055 0e 05 39 MOV EAX, dword ptr [DAT_00631e24]
0040805b bf ff 00 MOV EDI, 0xffff
00408060 85 c0 TEST EAX, EAX
00408062 0f 44 3d CMOVZ EDI, dword ptr [DAT_00631e18]
00408069 e9 8a f6 JMP LAB_00407f88
0040806e 66 ?? 66h f SUBS AL, 0x66
00408070 90 ?? 90h f JNS
```


Decompiled C Code (Right Pane):

```
void entry(undefined8 param_1, undefined8 param_2, undefined8 param_3)
{
    undefined8 in_stack_00000000;
    undefined8 auStack8 [8];
    __libc_start_main(FUN_00407e8a, in_stack_00000000, &stack0x00000008, FUN_00421d60, FUN_00421e40,
        param_3, auStack8);
    do {
        /* WARNING: Do nothing block with infinite loop */
    } while( true );
}
```


Viewing Coverage in Ghidra



Viewing Coverage in Ghidra



Bonus: Google-Hacking

FFmpeg coverage

Directory: .././ffmpeg/

Date: 2022-02-11 13:08:24

Legend: low: >= 0% medium: >= 75.0% high: >= 90.0%

Exec Total Coverage
Lines: 251592 455529 55.2%
Branches: 141843 297437 47.7%

File	Lines	Branches
fftools/cmdutils.c	35.6% 438 / 1229	32.0% 333 / 1040
fftools/ffmpeg.c	74.2% 2037 / 2747	68.8% 1496 / 2173
fftools/ffmpeg_filter.c	77.5% 476 / 614	63.5% 301 / 474
fftools/ffmpeg_hw.c	14.2% 45 / 316	10.0% 18 / 180
fftools/ffmpeg_opt.c	58.7% 1181 / 2011	38.6% 961 / 2488
fftools/ffplay.c	0.0% 0 / 2073	0.0% 0 / 1431
fftools/ffprobe.c	75.3% 1559 / 2071	67.1% 864 / 1287
libavcodec/012v.c	86.2% 69 / 80	58.3% 21 / 36
libavcodec/4xm.c	84.3% 452 / 536	73.3% 209 / 285
libavcodec/8bps.c	70.1% 54 / 77	68.8% 22 / 32
libavcodec/8svx.c	75.0% 51 / 68	54.3% 19 / 35
libavcodec/a64multienc.c	0.0% 0 / 161	0.0% 0 / 104
libavcodec/aac_ac3_parser.c	97.9% 47 / 48	96.7% 29 / 30
libavcodec/aac_adtstoasc_bsf.c	50.0% 33 / 66	41.7% 15 / 36
libavcodec/aac_parser.c	100.0% 17 / 17	100.0% 2 / 2
libavcodec/aacoder.c	64.7% 354 / 547	63.6% 272 / 428
libavcodec/aacoder_trellis.h	100.0% 98 / 98	100.0% 42 / 42
libavcodec/aacoder_twoloop.h	96.6% 375 / 388	89.0% 340 / 382
libavcodec/aacdec.c	75.3% 198 / 263	57.4% 74 / 129
libavcodec/aacdec_fixed.c	43.3% 88 / 203	36.4% 32 / 88
libavcodec/aacdec_template.c	78.1% 1473 / 1885	70.9% 931 / 1314
libavcodec/aacenc.c	84.9% 553 / 651	73.1% 354 / 484
libavcodec/aacenc_is.c	100.0% 93 / 93	94.6% 53 / 56
libavcodec/aacenc_ltp.c	3.0% 4 / 133	1.2% 1 / 86
libavcodec/aacenc_pred.c	97.5% 193 / 198	87.3% 103 / 118
libavcodec/aacenc_quantization.h	94.3% 99 / 105	89.5% 68 / 76
libavcodec/aacenc_quantization_misc.h	100.0% 12 / 12	80.0% 8 / 10
libavcodec/aacenc_tns.c	96.1% 99 / 103	83.3% 75 / 90

source: <http://coverage.ffmpeg.org/>

Bonus: Google-Hacking

NATIONAL VULNERABILITY DATABASE**NVD**

VULNERABILITIES**SEARCH AND STATISTICS**

Q Search Results (Refine Search)

Search Parameters:

- Results Type: Overview
- Keyword (text search): ffmpeg
- Search Type: Search All
- CPE Name Search: false

There are **414** matching records.
Displaying matches **1** through **20**.

Sort results by: Publish Date Descending **Sort**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 > >>

Vuln ID	Summary	CVSS Severity
CVE-2020-23906	FFmpeg N-98388-g76a3ee996b allows attackers to cause a denial of service (DoS) via a crafted audio file due to insufficient verification of data authenticity. Published: November 10, 2021; 5:15:11 PM -0500	V3.1: 5.5 MEDIUM V2.0: 4.3 MEDIUM
CVE-2021-35504	Afian FileRun 2021.03.26 allows Remote Code Execution (by administrators) via the Check Path value for the ffmpeg binary. Published: October 05, 2021; 8:15:07 AM -0400	V3.1: 7.2 HIGH V2.0: 6.5 MEDIUM
CVE-2021-38094	Integer Overflow vulnerability in function filter_sobel in libavfilter/vf_convolution.c in Ffmpeg 4.2.1, allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service or other unspecified impacts. Published: September 20, 2021; 12:15:11 PM -0400	V3.1: 8.8 HIGH V2.0: 6.8 MEDIUM

source: <https://nvd.nist.gov/>

Fuzzing with Options

```
project: ffmpeg
target: ffmpeg
image: ghcr.io/xansec/ffmpeg:latest
advanced_triage: true
```

```
tasks:
  - name: exploitability_factors
  - name: regression_testing
  - name: behavior_testing
```

```
cmds:
```


```
- cmd: /ffmpeg -i @@ -vf "split [main][tmp]; [tmp] crop=iw:ih/2:0:0, vflip [flip];
[main][flip] overlay=0:H/2" -f null ignore.mp4
```

```
env:
```

```
LD_LIBRARY_PATH: /ffmpeg-libs
dictionary: /dictionaries/mp4.dict
```

How can I fuzz better?

And improve overall coverage?



What You'll Need

- Ghidra Installed (or a reverse engineering tool of your choice)
 - <https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra/releases>
- Ghidra "SavePatch.py" tool
 - https://github.com/schlafwandler/ghidra_SavePatch

The Problem

```
$ ./convert corpus/nsa-insignia-sm.png  
/tmp/out.png
```

Success!

```
$ ./convert corpus/nsa-insignia-crc-error.png  
/tmp/out.png
```

```
convert: IDAT: CRC error  
`corpus/nsa-insignia-crc-error.png' @  
error/png.c/MagickPNGErrorHandler/1713.
```

```
convert: no images defined `/tmp/out.png' @  
error/convert.c/ConvertImageCommand/3322.
```

Fail!



Investigating the Binary

```
$ ldd ./convert
```

```
linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffd497a9000)
libMagickCore-7.Q16HDRI.so.10 => /usr/lib/libMagickCore-7.Q16HDRI.so.10 (0x00007f04676c8000)
libMagickWand-7.Q16HDRI.so.10 => /usr/lib/libMagickWand-7.Q16HDRI.so.10 (0x00007f0467589000)
libc.so.6 => /usr/lib/libc.so.6 (0x00007f04673bd000)
liblcms2.so.2 => /usr/lib/liblcms2.so.2 (0x00007f046735b000)
libraqm.so.0 => /usr/lib/libraqm.so.0 (0x00007f0467354000)
liblqr-1.so.0 => /usr/lib/liblqr-1.so.0 (0x00007f0467344000)
libxml2.so.2 => /usr/lib/libxml2.so.2 (0x00007f04671d4000)
libfontconfig.so.1 => /usr/lib/libfontconfig.so.1 (0x00007f0467185000)
libfreetype.so.6 => /usr/lib/libfreetype.so.6 (0x00007f04670bb000)
libXext.so.6 => /usr/lib/libXext.so.6 (0x00007f04670a6000)
libX11.so.6 => /usr/lib/libX11.so.6 (0x00007f0466f65000)
libbz2.so.1.0 => /usr/lib/libbz2.so.1.0 (0x00007f0466f52000)
```

Bash Wizardry

```
$ for file in $(ldd ./convert | sed -e 's/.*> \(.*\) (.*\/\1/g'); do grep "CRC error" $file; done
```

```
grep: linux-vdso.so.1: No such file or directory
```

← (this is just lazy stream editing)

```
grep: (0x00007fff8434c000): No such file or directory
```

```
grep: /usr/lib/libpng16.so.16: binary file matches
```

← hey! there it is

Let's use Ghidra to analyze this library!



Finding the Error Code

The image shows a debugger window with three main panes. The top-left pane is a search results window titled "Search Text - 'CRC error' [Listing Display Match] - (libpng16.so.16)". It contains a table with columns: Locals, Label, Namespace, and Preview. The table lists several entries, including "00119f...", "0011a...", "0012c...", and "0012c7...", all with a preview of "ds 'CRC error'".

The top-right pane displays assembly code for the function "FUN_00119f70". The code includes instructions like "MOV", "XOR", "TEST", "JZ", "MOV", "CALL", and "JNZ". It also shows cross-references (XREF) to other labels and functions. The bottom-left pane shows a disassembly view with addresses, hex values, and assembly instructions, including "LEA", "MOV", "CALL", and "SUB".

The bottom-right pane shows the decompiled code for the function "FUN_00119f70". The code is in C-like syntax and includes comments like "/* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */". It shows the function's logic, including a loop that checks for a "CRC error" and a warning message.

Finding the Error Code

This
looks
bad :(

```
0011a04b 74 98      JZ      LAB_00119fe5

LAB_0011a04d
0011a04d 48 8d 35    LEA      RSI,[s_CRC_error_0012c726]    XREF[1]: 00119fe3(j)
                                         = "CRC error"
0011a054 48 89 ef    MOV      RDI,RBP
0011a057 ff 15 1b    CALL     qword ptr [->png_chunk_error]          undefined png_chunk_error()
                                         bb 01 00

LAB_0011a05d
0011a05d ff 15 35    CALL     qword ptr [-><EXTERNAL>:.__stack_chk_fail] XREF[1]: 0011a00b(j)
                                         undefined __stack_chk_fail()
                                         bc 01 00

-- Flow Override: CALL_RETURN (COMPUTED_CALL_TERMINATOR)

0011a063 66          ??      66h    f
0011a064 66          ??      66h    f
0011a065 2e          ??      2Eh    .
0011a066 0f          ??      0Fh
0011a067 1f          ??      1Fh
0011a068 84          ??      84h

27 LAB_0011a04d:
28     png_chunk_error(param_1,"CRC error");
29     goto LAB_0011a05d;
30 }
31 }
32 else {
33     if ((*((uint *) (param_1 + 0x130) & 0x200) != 0) goto LAB_0011a04d;
34 }
35     png_chunk_warning(param_1,"CRC error");
36     uVar1 = 1;
37 }
38 if (local_30 == *(long *) (in_FS_OFFSET + 0x28)) {
39     return uVar1;
40 }
41 LAB_0011a05d:
42     /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
43     __stack_chk_fail();
44 }
45
```

Finding the Error Code

```

00119fcd 85 c0      TEST     EAX,EAX
00119fcf 74 29      JZ       LAB_00119ffa
00119fd1 8b 85 30    MOV     EAX,dword ptr [RBP + 0x130]
00119fd7 01 00 00    TEST     byte ptr [RBP + 0x21b],0x20
00119fe0 75 68      JNZ      LAB_0011a048
00119fe3 f6 c4 04    TEST     AH,0x4
00119fe3 74 68      JZ       LAB_0011a04d

LAB_00119fe5
00119fe5 48 8d 35    LEA     RSI,[s_CRC_error_0012c726]
00119fec 48 89 ef    MOV     RDI,RBP
00119fef ff 15 c3    CALL    qword ptr [->png_chunk_warning]
00119ff5 b8 01 00    MOV     EAX,0x1

LAB_00119ffa
00119ffa 48 8b 8c    MOV     RCX,qword ptr [RSP + local_30]
0011a002 64 48 2b    SUB     RCX,qword ptr FS:[0x28]
0011a00b 75 50      JNZ      LAB_0011a05d
0011a00d 48 81 c4    ADD     RSP,0x418
0011a014 5b        POP     RBX
0011a015 5d        POP     RBP
0011a016 41 5c     POP     R12
0011a018 41 5d     POP     R13
0011a01a c3        RFT
  
```


```

15  if (uVar2 == param_2) {
16      FUN_00119e60(param_1,auStack1080,uVar2);
17      break;
18  }
19  param_2 = param_2 - 0x400;
20  FUN_00119e60(param_1,auStack1080,0x400);
21  } while (param_2 != 0);
22  }
23  uVar1 = FUN_00119ea0(param_1);
24  if ((int)uVar1 != 0) {
25      if ((*byte *)(param_1 + 0x21b) & 0x20 == 0) {
26          if ((*uint *)(param_1 + 0x130) & 0x400 == 0) {
27              LAB_0011a04d:
28                  png_chunk_error(param_1,"CRC error");
29                  goto LAB_0011a05d;
30          }
31      }
32      else {
33          if ((*uint *)(param_1 + 0x130) & 0x200 != 0) goto LAB_0011a04d;
34      }
35      png_chunk_warning(param_1,"CRC error");
36      uVar1 = 1;
37  }
38  if (local_30 == *(long *) (in_FS_OFFSET + 0x28)) {
39      return uVar1;
40  }
41  LAB_0011a05d:
42      /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
43  __stack_chk_fail();
44  }
45  }
  
```

This returns! Not so bad :)

Can we make the program *a/ways* do this?

Patching the Instruction



The screenshot displays a debugger's assembly view with a list of instructions and their addresses. A context menu is open over the instruction at address 00119fd1, which is highlighted in blue. The menu includes options like 'Bookmark...', 'Clear Code Bytes', 'Copy', 'Paste', 'Patch Instruction', and 'Create Function'. The 'Patch Instruction' option is currently selected and highlighted in dark blue. To the left of the assembly list, a diagram shows a memory layout with a vertical bar and a horizontal line, indicating the memory address range. The assembly list shows instructions for LAB_00119fc4, LAB_00119fe5, and LAB_00119ffa. The instruction at 00119fd1 is 'MOV EAX, dword ptr [RBP + 0x21b]', which is the target of the patching operation.

```
00119fc4 48 89 ef    MOV     RDI, RBP
00119fc7 67 e8 d3    CALL   FUN_00119ea0
00119fcd 85 c0       TEST    EAX, EAX
00119fcf 74 29       JZ      LAB_00119ffa
00119fd1 8b 85 30    MOV     EAX, dword ptr [RBP + 0x21b]
00119fd7 f6 85 1b    TEST    byte ptr [RBP + 0x21b], 0
00119fde 75 68       JNZ     LAB_0011a048
00119fe0 f6 c4 04    TEST    AH, 0x4
00119fe3 74 68       JZ      LAB_0011a04d
00119fe5 48 8d 35    LEA     RSI, [s_CRC_error_0012c]
00119fec 48 89 ef    MOV     RDI, RBP
00119fef ff 15 c3    CALL   qword ptr [->png_chunk]
00119ff5 b8 01 00    MOV     EAX, 0x1
00119ffa 48 8b 8c    MOV     RCX, qword ptr [RSP + 0x21b]
```

Context Menu:

- Bookmark... Ctrl+D
- Clear Code Bytes C
- Clear With Options
- Clear Flow and Repair
- Copy Ctrl+C
- Copy Special...
- Paste Ctrl+V
- Comments
- Instruction Info...
- Modify Instruction Flow...
- Patch Instruction Ctrl+Shift+G**
- Processor Manual...
- Processor Options...
- Create Function F
- Create Thunk Function

Patching the Instruction

00119fcd	te tt tt	85 c0	TEST	EAX, EAX
00119fcf		74 29	JMP	0x00119ffa
00119fd1		8b 85 30		
		01 00 00		
00119fd7		f6 85 1b		
		02 00 00 20		
00119fde		75 68		
00119fe0		f6 c4 04	JMP	
00119fe3		74 68	JMPF	

eb 29

e9 26 00 00 00

66 e9 27 00

48 e9 25 00 00 00

JMP

JMPF

Patching the Instruction

```

0011a043 80      ??      80h
0011a044 00      ??      00h
0011a045 00      ??      00h
0011a046 00      ??      00h
0011a047 00      ??      00h

0011a048 f6 c4 02 LAB_0011a048      XREF[1]: 00119fde(j)
0011a04b 74 98      JZ      AH,0x2
                                LAB_00119fe5

0011a04d 48 8d 35 LAB_0011a04d      XREF[1]: 00119fe3(j)
                                = "CRC error"
0011a054 48 89 ef      LEA     RSI,[s_CRC_error_0012c726]
0011a057 ff 15 1b      MOV     RDI,RBP
                                bb 01 00
                                CALL    qword ptr [->png_chunk_error]
                                undefined png_chunk_error()

0011a05d ff 15 35 LAB_0011a05d      XREF[1]: 0011a00b(j)
0011a060 bc 01 00      CALL    qword ptr [-><EXTERNAL>:.__stack_chk_fail]
                                undefined __stack_chk_fail()

-- Flow Override: CALL_RETURN (COMPUTED_CALL_TERMINATOR)

0011a063 66      ??      66h      f
0011a064 66      ??      66h      f
0011a065 2e      ??      2Eh      .
0011a066 0f      ??      0Fh
0011a067 1f      ??      1Fh
0011a068 84      ??      84h
0011a069 00      ??      00h
0011a06a 00      ??      00h

```

```

2 void FUN_00119f70(undefined8 param_1,uint param_2)
3
4 {
5     uint uVar1;
6     long in_FS_OFFSET;
7     undefined auStack1080 [1032];
8     long local_30;
9
10    uVar1 = param_2 & 0x3ff;
11    local_30 = *(long *)(&in_FS_OFFSET + 0x28);
12    if (param_2 != 0) {
13        do {
14            if (uVar1 == param_2) {
15                FUN_00119e60(param_1,auStack1080,uVar1);
16                break;
17            }
18            param_2 = param_2 - 0x400;
19            FUN_00119e60(param_1,auStack1080,0x400);
20        } while (param_2 != 0);
21    }
22    FUN_00119ea0(param_1);
23    if (local_30 != *(long *)(&in_FS_OFFSET + 0x28)) {
24        /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
25        __stack_chk_fail();
26    }
27    return;
28 }
29

```


Writing the File

Script Manager [CodeBrowser: binpatch:/libpng16.so.16]

Edit Help

Script Manager - 7 scripts (of 256)

In T...	Stat...	Name	Description	Key	Category	Modified
<input type="checkbox"/>		AskScript.java	An example of asking for user input...		Examples	07/08/2021
<input type="checkbox"/>		AskScriptPy.py	An example of asking for user input...		Examples->...	07/08/2021
<input type="checkbox"/>		AutoVersionTrackingScript.java	An example of how to create Versio...		Examples->...	07/08/2021
<input type="checkbox"/>		CountAndSaveStrings.java	Counts the number of defined strin...		CustomerSu...	07/08/2021
<input type="checkbox"/>		CreateAppliedExactMatchingSessio...	An example of how to create Versio...		Examples->...	07/08/2021
<input type="checkbox"/>		OpenVersionTrackingSessionScript...	An example of how to open an exis...		Examples->...	07/08/2021
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		SavePatch.py	Write the selected memory (includi...		Memory	11/08/2021

Scripts

- Analysis
- ARM
- Assembly
- Binary
- C++
- Cleanup
- CodeAnalysis
- Conversion
- CustomerSu
- Data
- Data Types
- Examples
- FunctionID
- Functions
- FunctionSta
- Images
- Import
- Instructions
- iOS
- Iteration
- Languages



ForAllSecure

questions?

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thank you



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