Security Testing: Assignment #7

Tool Vulnerability Report

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Vulnerabilities 2,3,4,6,10,53

Brief Analysis

Files: maketop.php,header.php

VARIABLE	RESULT
schoolname	false positive

Explanation

Explanation

```
$query = mysql_query("select schoolname from schoolinfo")
    or die("Unable to retrieve school name: " . mysql_error());

$schoolname = mysql_result($query,0);
```

Listing 1: header.php load of schoolname

As we can see from the query, the field that can be the source of the vulnerability is *schoolname*, so we have to check if and where a injection can be made over that field.

Listing 2: header.php store of schoolname

Inside the application we have only one *UPDATE* statement, which is contained in header.php. However we can notice that the input for schoolname is sanitized through the **htmlspecialchars()** function call. So no injection is possible and then the vulnerability can be classified as a false positive.

Vulnerabilities^(*)

Brief Analysis

VARIABLE	AFFECTED PAGES ^(*)	RESULT
page	all	positive
page2	all	positive
selectclass	11,37,76,87,89,165,180,181,183,194,200,201,309,316	positive
student	13,142,194	positive
semester	13	positive
delete	37,41,44,76,85,111,115,149,161	positive
assignment	76	positive
onpage	146,183,257,260,268,273,283,288,293,309,320	positive

(*) 11: AddAssignment.php — 13: AddAttendance.php — 16: AddAnnouncements.php — 18: AddUser.php — 19: AddTerm.php — 37: EditAssignment.php — 41: EditAnnouncements.php — 44: EditGrade.php — 63: AddTeacher.php — 70: AddStudent.php — 71: AddSemester.php — 76: EditGrade.php — 85: EditSemester.php — 87/88: ViewClassSettings.php — 90: ViewStudents.php — 93: AddParent.php — 111: EditTeacher.php — 115: EditStudent.php — 126: ViewCourses.php — 138: StudentViewCourses.php — 141: AddClass.php — 142: ParentViewCourses.php — 146/147/148: ViewAnnoucements.php — 149: EditUser.php — 161: EditParent.php — 165: StudentMain.php — 180: TeacherMain.php — 181: ViewStudents.php — 183/184: ViewAssignments.php — 186/241: AdminMain.php — 191: DeficiencyReport.php — 194: ParentMain.php — 200/201: ViewGrades.php — 212: PointsReport.php — 130: VisualizeClasses.php — 238: VisualizeRegistration.php — 239: EditClasses.php — ManageAnnouncements.php — 260: ManageTerms.php — 268. ManageTerms.php — 272: ManageAttendance.php — 273: ManageTeachers.php — ManageUsers.php — 288: ManageParents.php — 293: ManageStudents.php — 299: Registration.php — 309: ManageAssignments.php — 316: ManageGrades.php — 320: ManageClasses.php

Explanation

These parameters are used to process the web-application flow through. The problem is that the page which receive these values through a POST, do not validate them and they are put inside a the *value* of a *input* element. So an XSS attack can be done by injecting a string inside that POST parameter. In the following subsections I will show the portion of code which is affected by the attack.

page

```
<input type='hidden' name='page' value='$page'>
```

Listing 3: AddAssignment.php load of page

page2

```
<input type='hidden' name='page2' value='$page2'>
```

Listing 4: AddAssignment.php load of page2

selectclass

```
<input type='hidden' name='selectclass' value='$_POST[selectclass]' />
```

Listing 5: AddAssignment.php load of selectclass

student

```
<input type='hidden' name='student' value='$_POST[student]' />
```

Listing 6: AddAttendance.php load of student

$\mathbf{semester}$

```
<input type='hidden' name='semester' value='$_POST[semester]' />
```

Listing 7: Add Attendance.php load of student

delete

```
$id = $_POST["delete"];
```

Listing 8: EditAssignment.php load of delete

```
<input type='hidden' name='assignmentid' value='$id[0]'>
```

Listing 9: EditAssignment.php read of delete

assignment

```
<input type='hidden' name='assignment' value='$_POST[assignment]' />
```

Listing 10: EditGrade.php load of assignment

onpage

```
<input type='hidden' name='onpage' value='$_POST[onpage]'>
```

Listing 11: ViewAnnouncements.php load of onpage

Vulnerabilities 30,31,207

Brief Analysis

 $Files:\ View Assignments. php, Manage Assignments. php$

VARIABLE	RESULT
coursename	true
assignment[5]	positive

Explanation

coursename

In ManageClasses we have the 3 queries which do insertion and one which do an update inside the database table:

Listing 12: ManageClasses.php insert1 of coursename

Listing 13: ManageClasses.php insert2 of coursename

Listing 14: ManageClasses.php insert3 of coursename

Listing 15: ManageClasses.php update of coursename

No sanitization is made over the \$_POST[title], so an xss can be injected.

In ViewAssignments.php and ManageAssignments.php we have the read of the tainted value:

```
$query = mysql_query("SELECT coursename FROM courses WHERE courseid = '$_POST[selectclass]'
") or die("ManageAssignments.php: Unable to get the course name - ".mysql_error());
$coursename = mysql_result($query,0);
```

Listing 16: ViewAssignment.php load of coursename

```
$query = mysql_query("SELECT coursename FROM courses WHERE courseid = '$_POST[selectclass]'
    ") or die("ManageAssignments.php: Unable to get the course name - ".mysql_error());
$coursename = mysql_result($query,0);
```

Listing 17: ManageAssignments.php load of coursename

So far it seems legit to say that an XSS attack can be done over this vulnerability, having a look to the forms which are the source of the insertions and updates, we can see that a limit of 20 chars is set for the field:

```
<input type='text' name='title' maxlength='20' />
```

Listing 18: AddClass.php form field

```
; rest 'name='title' maxlength='20' value='$class[0]' />
```

Listing 19: EditClass.php form field

Anyway we know that such restriction can be by-passed by intercepting the requests and modify them on-the-fly. We can even have a closer look to the database structure:

```
coursename varchar(20) NOT NULL default '',
```

Listing 20: Sql structure of the field

In fact, the field *coursename* is restricted to 20 chars even in the database structure. Anyway we can inject a string of the form $\langle a | href \rangle a \langle /a \rangle$, which is 12 chars long, and so satisfies the length constraints.

assignment[5]

This vulnerability was not reported by pixy, but I want to show that it could be a potential problem. The source of this vulnerability is the value of the column *assignmentinformation* of the table *assignments*. The page *ManageAssignments.php* can do an insertion inside that table and the value passed is not validated:

Listing 21: ManageAssignments.php store of assignment[5]

Later on, the injected value can be read from the *ViewAssignments.php* page and no validation is done:

Listing 22: ViewAssignments.php load query for assignment[5]

Listing 23: ViewAssignments.php variable read of assignment[5]

Brief Analysis

File: header.php

VARIABLE	RESULT
schoolname	false positive

Explanation

The schoolname is taken directly from the database without any validation:

```
$query = mysql_query("select schoolname from schoolinfo")
    or die("Unable to retrieve school name: " . mysql_error());

$schoolname = mysql_result($query,0);
```

Listing 24: Load of schoolname

Anyway, there is just one way to update the schoolname and is through this query:

Listing 25: update of schoolname

In the query the schoolname is sanitized through htmlspecialchars, so no injection is possible.

Brief Analysis

File: Login.php

VARIABLE	RESULT
text	positive

Explanation

The sitetext is taken directly from the database without any validation:

```
$query = mysql_query("select sitetext from schoolinfo");
$text = mysql_result($query,0);
```

Listing 26: Login.php load of text

The problem is represented by the fact that even the update of such entry is not validated:

Listing 27: header.php store of text

Brief Analysis

File: ManageSchoolInfo.php

VARIABLE	RESULT
page	true
page2	true
numperiods	false positive
numsemesters	false positive
phone	true
address	true
schoolname	false positive

Explanation

The analysis of the section $Vulnerabilities^{(*)}$ can also fit for page and page2. Moreover, Vulnerabilities 2,3,4,6,10,53 explains the result over schoolname.

numperiods, numsemesters

```
$query = mysql_query("SELECT numsemesters FROM schoolinfo")
    or die("ManageSchoolInfo.php: Unable to retrieve NumSemesters " . mysql_error());

$numsemesters = mysql_result($query,0);

$query = mysql_query("SELECT numperiods FROM schoolinfo")
    or die("ManageSchoolInfo.php: Unable to retrieve NumPeriods " . mysql_error());

$numperiods = mysql_result($query,0);
```

Listing 28: ManageSchoolInfo.php load of numperiods and numsemesters

The load of the two values is not validated and that's why the software highlight the case, moreover we have a not validated update over the table:

Listing 29: header.php store of numperiods-numsemesters-phone-address

The database schema tell us that no injection is possile, because the interested columns are set as int(3):

```
CREATE TABLE schoolinfo (
  schoolname varchar (50) NOT NULL default ',',
  address varchar (50) default NULL,
 phonenumber varchar (14) default NULL,
  sitetext text,
  sitemessage text,
  currenttermid int (11) default NULL,
  numsemesters int(3) NOT NULL default '0',
  numperiods int(3) NOT NULL default '0'
  apoint double (6,3) NOT NULL default '0.000',
  bpoint double (6,3) NOT NULL default '0.000',
  cpoint double (6,3) NOT NULL default '0.000',
  dpoint double (6,3) NOT NULL default '0.000',
  fpoint double (6,3) NOT NULL default '0.000',
 PRIMARY KEY (schoolname)
 ENGINE=MyISAM;
```

Listing 30: Sql schema for schoolinfo

phone

```
$query = mysql_query("SELECT phonenumber FROM schoolinfo")
  or die("ManageSchoolInfo.php: Unable to retrieve PhoneNumber" . mysql_error());

$phone = mysql_result($query,0);
```

Listing 31: ManageSchoolInfo.php load of phone

The load works as for the two field above, but this time the result can be addressed as a *true* thanks to the database schema (*Listing 30*). In this case the column has type varchar(14), which is more sensitive than int, and as said in *Vulnerabilities 30,31,207*, the smaller xss that we can apply - even if useless - is about 12 chars long.

address

```
$query = mysql_query("SELECT address FROM schoolinfo")
  or die("ManageSchoolInfo.php: Unable to retrieve School Address " . mysql_error());
$address = mysql_result($query,0);
```

Listing 32: ManageSchoolInfo.php load of address

This time the database schema cannot help us, because the field type is varchar(50), so an injection is possible. However it seems that the only page which reads from that field is the page itself - ManageSchoolInfo.php -, which puts the content as value in a form field. Still, I will consider it as a positive result, because if in a future deployment the value will be displayed in an another page, the vulnerability will became exploitable.

Brief Analysis

File: Login.php

VARIABLE	RESULT
message	true
page	true

Explanation

The analysis of the section $Vulnerabilities^{(*)}$ can fit for page.

message

```
$query = mysql_query("select sitemessage from schoolinfo");

$message = mysql_result($query,0);
```

Listing 33: Login.php load of sitemessage

Listing 34: header.php store of sitemessage

Brief Analysis

File: ManageSemesters.php

VARIABLE	RESULT
term	true

Explanation

```
$query2 = mysql_query("SELECT title FROM terms WHERE termid='$smstr[1]'");
$term = mysql_result($query2,0);
```

Listing 35: ManageSemesters.php load of term

In the portion of code above, we can see the core of the vulnerability, infact *title* is taken from the database and granted to be safe.

Listing 36: ManageTerms.php store of term

Unfortunately, we have this update operation which can modify title and is not validated.

Brief Analysis

File: AddClass.php

VARIABLE	RESULT
page	true
page2	true
fullyear	true

Explanation

The analysis of the section $Vulnerabilities^{(*)}$ can also fit for page and page2.

fullyear

<input type='hidden' name='fullyear' value='\$_POST[fullyear]' />

Listing 37: AddClass.php load of fullyear

This attack is almost the same of the page one.

Brief Analysis

File: ReportCards.php

VARIABLE	RESULT
data	true

Explanation

```
$sql = mysql_query("SELECT coursename, q1points, q2points, totalpoints, aperc, bperc, cperc
, dperc, fperc, secondcourseid, semesterid FROM courses WHERE courseid = $cid[0]
$clause");
while($class = @mysql_fetch_row($sql))
```

Listing 38: ReportCards.php fetch of data from the database

Here the data from the database are fetched and put into a variable (\$class), which later is used to print into the pdf document.

```
pdf_show_xy($pdf, "$class[0]", 55, $start);
```

Listing 39: ReportCards.php load of data

```
$data = pdf_get_buffer($pdf);

// Close up the db connection //
mysql_close($dbcnx);

header('Content-type: application/pdf');
header('Content-disposition: attachment; filename=ReportCard.pdf');
header('Content-length: '. strlen($data));
echo $data;
```

Listing 40: ReportCards.php read of data

As long as seen at *Vulnerabilities 30,31,207*, *coursename* can be injected with malicious strings which can lead to an xss vulnerability. In this case the pdf generated can contain such malicious string.