## (In)secure software

## Lecture plan

- Introduction and Attacker MO
- Software and web app security
- System security
- Crypto
- Network security
- Reactive security
- Outro

## Today's agenda

Part 1 – Some common and notable bugs

 Part 2 – Fuzzing, or how to automate bug finding

### **Definitions**

- A bug is a fault in a program that produces an incorrect or unexpected result, or causes it to behave in unintended ways
  - Bugs are plentiful, but not all bugs put the program at risk
- A vulnerability is bug that manifests as an opportunity for malicious use of the program
  - Not all vulnerabilities can be exploited for evil exploitable vulnerabilities are what matters
- Bottom line, **vulnerabilities** gets **exploited** to run code that downloads and installs **malware**, more or less

## Case study

# An Adobe Flash Oday is being actively exploited in the wild

Adobe plans to have a fix for the critical flaw next week.


DAN GOODIN - 2/3/2018, 12:34 AM

- https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/02/theres
  -a-new-adobe-flash-0day-and-up-and-coming-hackers-are-exploit
  ing-it/
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-4877
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?name=C
   VE-2018-4877&vector=AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/416.html
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common\_Vulnerability\_Scoring\_S ystem#Impact\_metrics

## Most CVEs in 2017

	Product Name	Vendor Name	Product Type	Number of Vulnerabilities
1	Android	Google	os	<u>692</u>
2	Linux Kernel	<u>Linux</u>	os	<u>407</u>
3	Iphone Os	Apple	os	<u>344</u>
4	<u>Imagemagick</u>	<u>Imagemagick</u>	Application	<u>341</u>
5	Windows 10	Microsoft	os	<u>255</u>
6	Windows Server 2016	Microsoft	os	<u>239</u>
7	Mac Os X	<u>Apple</u>	os	<u>236</u>
8	Windows Server 2008	Microsoft	os	<u>231</u>
9	Windows Server 2012	Microsoft	os	223
10	Windows 7	Microsoft	os	<u>217</u>

## Top CVEs exploited (2015)



Source: HP Cyber Risk Report 2016

## Where's the bug?

#### 1.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main () {
    int i;
    printf("Enter a value: ");
    scanf("%d", &i);
    if (i < 0)
       goto fail;
    if (i > 100)
       goto fail;
        goto fail;
    if (i%2 == 0)
        goto fail;
    return;
fail:
   printf("Fail\n");
    return;
}
```

## Problem

```
$ ./1.out
Enter a value: 2
Fail

$ ./1.out
Enter a value: 3
Fail
```

#### 1fix.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main () {
    int i;
    printf("Enter a value: ");
    scanf("%d", &i);
    if (i < 0)
       goto fail;
    if (i > 100)
       goto fail;
       //goto fail;
    if (i\%2 == 0)
        goto fail;
    return;
fail:
   printf("Fail\n");
    return;
```

## Apple iOS Goto Fail

```
static OSStatus
 2
3
     SSLVerifySignedServerKeyExchange(SSLContext *ctx, bool isRsa, SSLBuffer signedParams,
                                       uint8 t *signature, UInt16 signatureLen)
 4
5
6
         OSStatus
                          err;
 7
         if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &serverRandom)) != 0)
 8
 9
              goto fail;
         if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0)
10
11
              goto fail;
12
              goto fail;
13
         if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.final(&hashCtx, &hashOut)) != 0)
14
              goto fail;
15
16
17
     fail:
         SSLFreeBuffer(&signedHashes);
18
         SSLFreeBuffer(&hashCtx);
19
20
         return err;
```

```
2.c
```

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main ()
{
   char buf[20] = "http://www.diku.dk";
   char shh[30] = "mumstheword";
   char out[64];
   int chars;
  printf("Buffer contents: %s\n", buf);
  printf("Chars to copy: ");
   scanf("%d", &chars);
  memcpy(out, buf, chars);
  printf("Copied: ");
   fwrite(out, chars, 1, stdout);
  printf("\n");
   return(0);
```

#### Problem

```
$ ./2.out
Buffer contents: http://www.diku.dk
Chars to copy: 12
Copied: http://www.d

$ ./2.out
Buffer contents: http://www.diku.dk
Chars to copy: 50
Copied: http://www.diku.dk@"OL@H@"mumstheword
```

## Explanation

void \* memcpy ( void \* destination, const void \* source, size\_t num );
 Copies num bytes from the location pointed by source to the location pointed by destination

memcpy(out, buf, chars);
 User inputted


#### 2fix.c


```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main ()
{
   char buf[20] = "http://www.diku.dk";
   char shh[30] = "mumstheword";
   char out[64];
   int chars;
  printf("Buffer contents: %s\n", buf);
  printf("Chars to copy: ");
   scanf("%d", &chars);
   if (chars > sizeof(buf)) chars = sizeof(buf);
  memcpy(out, buf, chars);
  printf("Copied: ");
   fwrite(out, chars, 1, stdout);
  printf("\n");
   return(0);
```

## The Heartbleed Bug



 Vulnerability in the popular OpenSSL cryptographic software library





Server

Mas connected.

User Bob has

connected. User

Mallory wants 500
letters: bird. Serve

master key is

31431498531054.

User Carol wants to

change password

"password 123"

"password 123"

"password 123"

"password 123"

"password 123"

#### What to do

- Simple fix
  - Add bounds check


- Knock-on effects
  - Change passwords
  - Revoke certificate
  - Generate new keys
  - Issue new certificate
  - Compromised?


# You know it's bad when there's a XKCD



I MEAN, THIS BUG ISN'T
JUST BROKEN ENCRYPTION.

IT LET'S WEBSITE VISITORS
MAKE A SERVER DISPENSE
RANDOM MEMORY CONTENTS.





#### Shellshock

A family of bugs in the Unix Bash shell



#### Shellshock

Command to set environment variable


Real command

env x='() { :;}; echo vulnerable' bash -c "echo testing"

Tacked-on arbitrary command that will be executed by Bash

# How to set the environment variable?

- Attack vectors include
  - CGI-based web server
  - OpenSSH server
  - Qmail server
  - DHCP clients



#### Heartbleed vs Shellshock

- Introduced 2011
- Found 2014
- Affects millions
- Easily exploitable
- Random reads

- Introduced 1981
- Found 2014
- Even more millions
- Easily exploitable
- Complete control

## 3.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{

    printf("Current time: ");
    fflush(stdout);
    system("date");
    return 0;
}
```

### Problem

```
$ ./3.out
Current time: Sun May 1 23:47:47 CEST 2016
$ export PATH=`pwd`:$PATH
$ echo -e '#!/bin/sh\necho "Hello"' > date
$ chmod 700 date
$ ./3.out
Current time: Hello
```

## 3fix.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{

    printf("Current time: ");
    fflush(stdout);
    system("/bin/date");
    return 0;
}
```

## Real-world example: PlugX

- PlugX drops
  - A legitimate NVIDIA file (NvSmart.exe)
  - A malicious DLL (NvSmartMax.dll)
- Normally, NvSmart.exe would load a legitimate NvSmartMax.dll
- But, if a (malicious) version the DLL file is located in the same directory, this will load instead

## 4.pl

```
#!/usr/bin/perl

open(FH, $ARGV[0]);

while(<FH>)
{
    print $_;
}

close(FH);
```

### Problem

```
$ ./4.pl 4.pl
#!/usr/bin/perl

open(FH, $ARGV[0]);

while(<FH>)
{
    print $_;
}

close(FH);

$ ./4.pl 'ls -l 4.pl|'
-rwx----- 1 user user 79 May 1 10:45 4.pl
```

## Explanaition

- According to the Perl documentation
  - If filename ends with a "|", filename is interpreted as a command which pipes output

## 4fix.pl

```
#!/usr/bin/perl

open(FH, "< ".$ARGV[0]); #force read open with '<'
while(<FH>)
{
    print $_;
}

close(FH);
```

### 5.C

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
    char buffer[64];
    strncpy(buffer, argv[1], sizeof(buffer));
    printf("You entered: ");
    printf(buffer);
    printf("\n");
}
```

## Problem

```
$ ./5.out A
You entered: A

$ ./5.out %s
You entered: You entered:
$ ./5.out %x
You entered: 510a2000


$ ./5.out %x%x
You entered: 437a00041569e0
```

#### 5fix.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
    char buffer[64];
    strncpy(buffer, argv[1], sizeof(buffer));
    printf("You entered: ");
    printf("%s", buffer);
    printf("\n");
}
```

## Format string in sort.exe



```
#include <string.h>

void foo (char *bar)
{
    char c[12];
    strcpy(c, bar);
}

int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
    foo(argv[1]);
}
```

## Problem

- \$ ./6.out A
- \$ ./6.out AAAAAAAAAAAAA


## 6fix.c

```
#include <string.h>

void foo (char *bar)
{
    char c[12];
    strncpy(c, bar, sizeof(c));
}


int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
    foo(argv[1]);
}
```

## Stack-based buffer overflow



## Stack-based buffer overflow

\$ ./buffer1 hello




### Stack-based buffer overflow

```
$ python -c 'print "A"
  * 24' | ./buffer1

Segmentation fault

$ python -c 'print "A"
  * 20+"\x08\x35\xc0\x80"'
  | ./buffer1

Segmentation fault
```



### Shellcode


execve("/bin/sh") is shellcode

 Shellcode is machine code used as the payload in the exploitation of a vulnerability to get a shell

 Processor architecture specific: x86, PowerPC, ARM, x64, etc.

## NOP sled

 Improving the odds with a No Operation (NOP) slep



#### Some counter-measures

- Stack canaries
  - Check stack not altered when function returns

- Data execution prevention (DEP)
  - Prevent the execution of data on the stack or heap
- Address space layout randomization (ASLR)
  - Rearrange memory positions to make successful exploitation more difficult

## Okay so you've found a bug

## Vulnerability marketplace options





**SECURITY RESEARCHERS** and **HACKERS** now have a multitude of options available to sell their **BUGS** 




#### WHITE MARKET

Bug-bounty programs, hacking contests, and direct vendor communication provide opportunities for responsible disclosure.



#### **GRAY MARKET**

Some legitimate companies operate in a legal gray zone within the zero-day market, selling exploits to governments and law enforcement agencies in countries across the world.



#### **BLACK MARKET**

Flaws can be sold to highest bidder, used to disrupt private or public individuals and groups.