

Me

Cloud and Security enthusiast

Love automation, infrastructure-as-code, DevSecOps

SME for security related question / architecture (Network, IAM, Cloud, BeyondCorp, SSDLC, ...), security champions / guild.



Thanks Giulio for setting this up!

Today's talk is about

Discussing the complexity of collecting intelligence about the security issues of a product / infrastructure, and the challenges that are facing DevSecOps teams in prioritizing fixes.

Based on my personal experience.



Spoiler: I don't have all the answers (feedback welcome)

Systems security

There's no such thing as a secure software, or a secure operating system.

- Systems can be patched against known vulnerabilities (NVD, OSVDB, ...)
- What about unknown vulnerabilities ? (0day, darknets, ...)
- Vulnerabilities that have not been found yet



One line of defense is to collect as much information as possible about our products

Information can come at different stages


- 1) At Build / Release time
- 2) At scan-time (daily, weekly, ...)
- 3) At Pen-test-time (yearly / ISO27001)
- 4) (When your data are available on paste-bin)



You need to have visibility on all these stages (incl 4... / collecting intelligence)

Security of products is often linked to product releases

- Even with modern CI/CD workflows, security is assessed during the release stage.
- If you don't re-release often then the security posture of your products = security at release-time + all the vulnerabilities found in the meantime.
- Container-scanning usually don't make a lot of sense if you use latest versions at build-time.






At Build / Release time

Our findings can be summarized as follows: 1. The median value (when omitting the negligible and unknown vulnerabilities) is 26 vulnerabilities per image. 2. Most

Vulnerability Analysis of 2500 Docker Hub Images https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.02932.pdf

- Check your code (SAST, code quality)
- Ensure you're not leaking secrets in your commits (git-secrets)
- Scan you containers
- Make sure that your releases are as clean as possible





Pros / Cons

- + Catch issues early in the release-cycle
- + Context around the issue (problem with a library introduced with the new feature)
- Can slow down pipelines, sometimes needs to be moved to QA pipelines (Fuzzing, Deep container scanning, ...)
- Not always easy to handle false-positives
- Hard to get "always green" jobs (fatigue)



At scan-time

- Daily or weekly perimeter / vulnerability scan
- Daily container-registry-scans
- Daily web-app scans (OWASP top ten connected scans, ...)




Pros / Cons

+ Catch issues outside of the release-cycle

- Context is usually lost:
 - To whom does it belong?
 - Is it running in production?
 - Is it business-critical?

- Perimeter scans are usually operated by a different team. (or company).





At pen-test-time

- + Catch issues that automated tools would have missed
- + Things that computers can hardly do (yet)
 - Social-engineering
 - identify weak processes
- Frequency is not great
- Process is often painful (legal / mgmt, PR/PO, scoping, reports, ...)



Clean releases + continuous assessment over time + context





Defect-Management




Security Defect Management

- Usually all inside their own silo
 - Container scanning, perimeter scans, webapp testing, sast, K8s,

. . . .

Loss of context


WebUIs, emails





700 pages PDF reports





Security Defect Management

```
"vulnerabilities": [
    "name": "CVE-2019-14697",
    "description": "musl libc through 1.1.23 has an x87 float
    "nvd_score": 7.5,
    "nvd_score_version": "CVSS v2",
    "nvd_vectors": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P",
    "nvd_severity": "high",
    "nvd_url": "https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vul
    "vendor_score": 7.5,
    "vendor_score_version": "CVSS v2",
    "vendor_vectors": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P",
    "vendor_severity": "high",
```

<fname>os_fingerprint.nasl</fname>

<plugin_type>combined</plugin_type>

<plugin_name>OS Identification</plugin_name>

<plugin_modification_date>2013/04/01/plugin_modification_date>


<plugin_publication_date>2003/12/09</plugin_publication_date>

All these tools are usually generating computer-readable information.

```
"line": " api_key: 3b6311afca5bd8aac647b316704e9
                                                                       "offender": "api_key: 3b6311afca5bd8aac647b316704
                                                                        "commit": "2e951359cac53addbee56437da3ffb546e3dfe
                                                                        "repo": ".",
                                                                        "rule": "Generic Credential",
                                                                        "commitMessage": "Merge branch 'dev'\n",
<ReportItem port="0" svc name="general" protocol="tcp" severity="0" pluginID="11936" plu</pre>
<description>Using a combination of remote probes (TCP/IP, SMB, HTTP, NTP, SNMP, etc...)
                                                                                "cvssScore": 5.9,
                                                                                "description": "## Overview\r\n[com.google.gua
                                                                                "disclosureTime": "2018-04-25T07:28:15Z",
                                                                                "fixedIn": [
                                                                                  "24.1.1-android",
                                                                                  "24.1.1-jre"
```



Security Defect Management (with Defect Dojo a proposal)





Defect Management at release-time


Proposal: track the defects outside the CI/CD pipelines.




2. Dedup

Both can now be flagged, inside the defect-management system


- Not always easy to handle false-positives
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Defect Management at scan-time






Defect Management at scan-time

Proposal:

- 1. Give context to your security defects
- 2. Scan what make sense
- 3. Aggregate data close to the defects that are coming from CI/CD pipelines


Ex for containers:

 Scan only containers that are running in production.





Defect contextualization example (K8s + Docker)





Ultimately we should have

- A system that aggregates all the information about our products
- That is easy to integrate inside existing teams tools:
 - Gitlab, Jenkins, Jira, ...
- That can give visibility to a broad category of users (devs, po, ciso, ...)
- That is easy to use



Questions, Ideas?







KUDELSKI SECURITY