

# Class 5

# Hash Functions

A hash function is a function that takes an arbitrary string of bits and transform them into a uniform (fixed - size) result.

$h$  is a hash function used in digital signatures.

$h(m)$  is signed instead of signing a message  $m$  directly.

Reduces the computational work, faster.

Custom outputs 128 and 1024 bits.

Hash function must be secure:

$$\begin{aligned} m_1 &\rightarrow h(m_1) \\ m_2 &\rightarrow h(m_2) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{if } h(m_1) &= h(m_2) \\ \text{then,} \\ m_1 &= m_2 \end{aligned}$$

# Hash Functions

Hash function or *message digest*.

Can be used as in cryptographic pseudorandom number generator to create several keys from a single shared secret.



# Security of Hash Function

Must be one way function

*if  $m_1 = h(m_1)$   
there is not a  $y$  such as,  
 $h(m_1) = y$*

Collision resistance property

Not collision free

*Collision*  
*if  $m_1 = m_2$   
then,  
 $h(m_1) = h(m_2)$*

# Security of Hash Function

## Definition 4

The ideal hash function behaves like a random mapping from all possible input values to the set of all possible output values

## Definition 5

An attack on a hash function is a non-generic method of distinguishing the hash function from an ideal hash function.

# Real Hash Functions

Secure Hash (SHA) family: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.

SHA3 Relatively recently published standard by NIST (08/05/2015). Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions.

Iterative hash functions:

Using the padding rule to fill the last block divide the input into a sequence of fixed-size blocks

$m_1, \dots, m_k$

512 bits/block length, last block shows the inputs length.

$H_0$ , fixed value

$$H_i = h'(H_{i-1}, m_i)$$

$H_k$  last block hash function outcome

# Message Digest 5 (MD5)

MD5 is a 128 bit hash function (Ron Rivest, 1992).

MD5 non secure it is already broken.

To compute MD5, in general:

1. Split the message into blocks of 512 bits, last block include the length and is padded.
2. 4 words of 32 bits / words result of the split each state of 128 bits
3. Uses a compression function ***h'*** mixes the message block and the state, 4 rounds in total. A combination of XOR, AND, OR and addition used to mix on 32 bits words ( efficient on 32-bit CPUs).
4. The input stat and result are added together to produce the output of ***h'***

# Message Digest 5 (MD5)

If a hash size of 128 bit in MD5 is used is insufficient. Why?

$$N = 2^{128},$$

*Birthday Paradox*

$$\sqrt{N^{128}} = 2^{64}$$

Work from Wang and YU showed a faster collision finding.



# Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1)

Designed by NSA and standardized by NIST.

SHA -1 release/published by NIST after NSA and fixed a weakness with SHA-0

SHA-1 main issue is the 160 bit result size. Is this bad, why?

# Secure Hash Algorithm

## SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA 512

NIST publish in 2001 and updated in 2004 by including another hash a collection of functions know as SHA-2 family of functions.

Designed to be implemented with 128, 192, 256 bit key size of AES and the 3DES 112 bit key size.

SHA-2 family slower than SHA-1.

# SHA-3

Took nine years to the NIST to release SHA-3

64 submissions worldwide of proposed algorithms.

Is a new Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS (202). Permutation-based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions.

Based on KECCAK algorithm (winning algorithm).

Consist of four cryptographic hash functions and two extendable-output functions; SHA3-224 (is length 224 bits digests), SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512.

Extendable Output Function (XOF) is a function on bit strings in which the output can be extended to any desired length. SHAKE128 (Secure Hash Algorithm” with “KECCAK) and SHAKE256, 128 and 256 are the security strengths.

# Hash Functions weaknesses

## Length Extensions

For a message ***m***

$$m \rightarrow m_1 \dots m_k$$

and hashed to value ***h(m)***

Consider now ***m'***

$$m' \rightarrow m_1 \dots m_{k+1}$$

The first ***k*** blocks of the message ***m*** is a subset of ***m'***. So:

$$h(m') = h'(h(m), m_{k+1})$$

*The Length extension is presented as there is no special processing at the end of the hash function computation.*

# Hash Functions weaknesses

What is Alice sends a message to Bob and wants to authenticate it by sending

$$h(m) = h(X || m), \text{ where :}$$

$X$  : secret know to Bob and Alice

$m$  : the message

$h$  is a not ideal function

Eve can append text to the message  $m$ , updated the authentication code to match the new message.

# Hash Functions weaknesses

## Partial-Message Collision

Inheriting the iterative structure of most hash functions.

$m$  : the message

$h(m) = h(m || X)$ , where :

$X$  : the authentication key

Considering a perfect hash function of size  **$n$**  bits  
attacker would choose  $m$  to get the system to authenticating  
as

$$h(m) = h(m || X)$$

Using the birthday attack Eve can find  $m$  and  $m'$  with the same value

$$h(m) = h(m' || X)$$

If the attack succeeds, it is an iterative hash function; if the attack fails, it is the ideal hash function.

# Weakness Fix

The goal is to have a hash function that behaves as` a random mapping.

Tradeoff between detailed design and complexity

SHA-3 addresses this as they are designed to include resistance against collision, preimage, and second preimage attacks.

# Short term fix or workaround

Definition 6. Let  $h$  be an iterative hash function. The hash function  $h_{\text{DBL}}$  is defined by:

$$h_{\text{DBL}} := h(h(m) || m)$$

Disadvantages is processing slowness and message pre-stage in buffer to perform computations



# Efficient short term fix

Definition 7 Let **h** be an iterative hash function, and let **b** denote the block length of the underlying compression function. The hash function **h<sub>d</sub>** is defined by

$$h_d(m) := h(h(O^b || m))$$

and has a claimed security level of **min(k, n/2)** where k is the security level of **h** and **n** is the size of the hash result.

# Choosing a hash function

Recommended by the class text authors

From


SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512

To SHAd

In any case SHA-3 is here, so it is sensible to start using this family hash.

# Message Authentication Codes

Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a system that detects tampering/modifications with messages.



$k_a$ : authentication key.

$m$ : plaintext message.

$a$ : Message Authentication Code (MAC) or Tag  $T$

$h(k_a, m)$ :  $h$  is the MAC function or  $\text{MAC}(k_a, m)$

# The Ideal MAC and MAC security

**Definition 8.** An ideal MAC function is a random mapping from all possible inputs to  $n$ -bit outputs.

**Definition 9.** An attack on a MAC is a non-generic method of distinguishing the MAC from an ideal MAC function.

# Chaining Block Cipher (CBC)-MAC

## CBC-MAC

A block cipher (CBC) is used to create a MAC, the message  $m$  is encrypted and the last block of cipher text is kept.

So

For a message  $P_1, \dots, P_k$

$$H_0 := IV$$

$$H_i := E_k(P_i \oplus H_{i-1})$$

$$MAC := H_k$$

Common definition of CBC-MAC requires the IV to be fixed at 0

Never use the same key for encryption and authentication

## CBC-MAC

Different collision attacks limit the security to half the length of the block size.

A collision attack

Let  $M$  be a CBC-MAC function. Knowing  $M(a)=M(b)$  leads to know  $M(a||c)=M(b||c)$ .

**c** consists of a single block

$$M(a || c) = E_k(c \oplus M(a))$$

$$M(b || c) = E_k(c \oplus M(b))$$

So  $M(a)=M(b)$

## CBC-MAC

The attacker collect large number of MAC values for a large number of messages, based on the birthday paradox.

Attacker find **a** and **b** for which  $M(a)=M(b)$ .

Attacker could get the sender to authenticate  $a||c$ , then he can replace the message with  $b||c$  and not changing the MAC value.

# Implementing CBC-MAC

1. Construct a string **s** from the concatenation of **l** and **m**, where **l** is the length of **m** encoded in a fixed-length format.
2. Pad **s** until the length is a multiple of the block size.
3. Apply CBC-MAC to the padded string **s**.
4. Output the last ciphertext block, or part of that block. Do not output any of the intermediate values.

Instead of using CBC-MAC directly use CMAC



# CMAC

Standardized by NIST is based on CBC-MAC.

CMAC similar to CBC-MAC with the difference that CMAC treats the last block in a different manner.

CMAC XORs one of two special values (derived from CMAC key ) into the last block prior the last block cipher encryption. CMAC key dependency in the length of messages and the cipher's block length.

# Keyed-Hash based MAC

If the goal is to have a MAC behaving as a random mapping as a function of the key and the message why don't we use them with hash functions?

HMAC calculates

Here **a** and **b** are specified constants.

$$h(K \oplus a || h(K \oplus b || m))$$

Works with any iterative function

HMAC with SHA-1 less insecure than SHA-1.

HMAC avoids key recovery attacks that would reveal K to the attacker.

HMAC is limited by n/2 bit security

HMAC with SHA-256 a 128 bit security level.

# Galois MAC

GMAC efficient in implementation of hardware and software.

Designed for 128 bit block ciphers.

GMAC authentication function takes three values as input:

key, message and a nonce

GMAC uses a universal hash function, especial mathematical function to compute the input message. Then encrypts the output with a block cipher in CTR mode to obtain the tag(MAC).

The IV is created using a function of its nonce.

# GMAC

Only provides 64 bits of security.

Do not use GMAC for short MAC values.

# Choosing a MAC

As recommended by Authors in the book[1], a possible option is to use HMAC-SHA-256 due to system constraints (64-96 bit MAC values) a security factor might need to be reduced to 64 bits.

SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are NIST approved cryptographic hash functions [2].

Hash Function	SHA3-224	SHA3-256	SHA3-384	SHA3-512
Block Size (bytes)	144	136	104	72

# MAC usage

Preventing the reply attack

Including state of the communication  $d$

General solution is to use  $d||m$

Horton principle “Authenticate what is meant, not what is said”

Authentication should include, protocol identifier, version number message identifier, sizes of various fields.

Layered OSI protocol and authentication isolation

# Bibliography

- [1] Ferguson, Niels; Schneier, Bruce; Kohno, Tadayoshi (2011-02-02). Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and Practical Applications (p. 84). Wiley. Kindle Edition.
- [2] [http://www.nist.gov/manuscript-publication-search.cfm?pub\\_id=919061](http://www.nist.gov/manuscript-publication-search.cfm?pub_id=919061)