

Introduction to Game Theory: Coalitional Games 联合的

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Reading

- **Recommended**
 - Shoham and Leyton-Brown: Chapter 12, sections 12.1-12.2

Overview

Coalitional Game Theory

- Basic modelling unit is **group** rather than individual agent.

- Transferable vs. non-transferable utility
 - Coalitional game with transferable utility (N, v) :
- transferable utility assumption
that the payoffs to a coalition
may be freely redistributed
among its members.

- N finite set of players:
- $v : 2^N \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ pay-off function ($v(\emptyset) = 0$)

- Fundamental questions:

- Which coalitions will form?
- How should coalition divide its pay-off among its members?

Classes of coalitional games

- **Super-additive game** Game (N, v) is super-additive iff

$$\forall S, T \subset N : S \cap T = \emptyset \implies v(S \cup T) \geq v(S) + v(T).$$

In particular: $v(S \cup i) \geq v(S) + v(i)$ for any $S \subset N \setminus \{i\}$.

- As a consequence, for super-additive game, the **grand coalition** has the highest pay-off of all coalitional structures:

$$v(N) = v(S \cup S^c) \geq v(S) + v(S^c) \geq v(S).$$

- Therefore focus on a **fair redistribution of total pay-off** among the members of the grand coalition.

Ways to allocate common benefits

Motivating example:

Both Bob and Cedric are *very* fond of Alice, who unfortunately lives far away. They invite her to visit and will gladly pay for her long-haul trip. The fares for roundtrips are as follows:

- $A \leftrightarrow B$: round trip visiting B: 900 Euros;
- $A \leftrightarrow C$: round trip visiting C: 1100 Euros;
- $A \leftrightarrow B \leftrightarrow C$: round trip visiting both B and C: 1600 Euros;

Combining the trips saves 400 Euros. How should that be redistributed between B and C?

Solution strategies: proportional vs. incremental

Some useful terminology


- Players i and j are **interchangeable** if their contributions to every coalition (subset) S is exactly the same:

$$\forall S \subset N \setminus \{i, j\} : v(S \cup i) = v(S \cup j)$$

- A player i is a **dummy player** if the amount he contributes to any coalition is exactly the amount he's able to achieve alone:

$$\forall S \subset N \setminus \{i\} : v(S \cup i) = v(S) + v(i)$$

How to fairly divide the benefits of coalition?



shapley_overview.png

Shapley's Axioms

- **Symmetry:** If i and j are **interchangeable** then:

$$\psi_i(N, v) = \psi_j(N, v).$$


- **Dummy Player:** will only get what he can achieve on his own:

$$\psi_i(N, v) = v(i).$$

- **Additivity:** Consider two games $G_1 = (N, v_1)$, $G_2 = (N, v_2)$ and combine them in a new game for which $v = v_1 + v_2$.
Then:

$$\psi_i(N, v_1 + v_2) = \psi_i(N, v_1) + \psi_i(N, v_2)$$

Shapley's Axioms



Shapley value

- Marginal contribution of player i to subset S :

$$\delta_i(S) = v(S \cup i) - v(S)$$

- Shapley value of player i : (denoting $\#N = n, \#S = s$)

$$\varphi_i(N, v) := \frac{1}{n} \sum_{S \subset N \setminus i} \binom{n-1}{s}^{-1} \delta_i(S)$$

- Amplification: see next slides!

Shapley Value: Amplification

- We focus on Shapley value $\varphi_i(N, v)$ for agent i ;
- For any existing coalition S not including i , i.e.

$$S \subset N_i := N \setminus i$$

we consider the value increment due to i joining:

$$\delta_i(S) = v(S \cup i) - v(S)$$

- The size $s := \#S$ of the possible coalitions S that i joins, can range between $0 \leq s \leq n - 1$.

Frame Title

- For fixed coalition size s there are

$$N_s := \binom{n-1}{s}$$

coalitions S of that size.

- Hence, the mean contribution $\overline{\Delta}_i$ of i to an existing coalition S of size s is given by:

$$\overline{\Delta}_i(s) := \frac{1}{N_s} \sum_{S: \#S=s} \delta_i(S) = \binom{n-1}{s}^{-1} \sum_{S: \#S=s} \delta_i(S).$$

Frame Title

- Finally, since $0 \leq s \leq n - 1$ we compute the **average over the n possible choices of s** . This average is the **Shapley value**:

$$\begin{aligned}\varphi_i &:= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{s=0}^{n-1} \bar{\Delta}_i(s) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{s=0}^{n-1} \binom{n-1}{s}^{-1} \sum_{S: \#S=s} \delta_i(S) \\ &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{s=0}^{n-1} \sum_{S: \#S=s} \binom{n-1}{s}^{-1} \delta_i(S) \\ &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{S \subset N \setminus i} \binom{n-1}{s}^{-1} \delta_i(S)\end{aligned}$$

- Double sum** above is actually **sum over all subsets $S \subset N \setminus i$** .

Shapley's theorem

Shapley (1951)

Given a coalitional game (N, v) , the **Shapley values** $\varphi_i, i = 1, \dots, n$ specifies the **unique distribution** of the total value $v(N)$ that is both

- **efficient**, i.e. $\sum_i \varphi_i = v(N)$
- **satisfies Shapley's axioms**,
i.e. *Symmetry, Dummy Player and Additivity.*

Shapley value: Alternative computation method

To keep notation simple we focus on three agents ($n = 3$):

- Suppose we are interested **Shapley value φ_1** for agent 1:
- Any permutation of 123 (e.g. 231) represents the **sequence in which agents join the coalition**, e.g.:

$$231 : \emptyset \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 23 \rightarrow 231$$

$$312 : \emptyset \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 31 \rightarrow 312$$

- For each permutation, we compute the **marginal contribution of agent 1 upon joining**, e.g.

$$231 : \delta_1 = v(231) - v(23) \quad \& \quad 312 : \delta_1 = v(31) - v(3)$$

- The **Shapley value** is obtained by **averaging the δ -values over all $n! = 3! = 6$ permutations**.

Shapley value: worked example

An AI expert (E) developed a powerful new algorithm. However, in order to implement his ideas, he needs to create a startup and hire a programmer (P) for 2 years. An angel investor (A) provides funding. The value that each coalition of these three stakeholders (E, P, A) can generate satisfies the following rules:

- Without both investor and expert, no value can be generated.
- If he has no assistance from a programmer, the expert's value equals 3, but if he can delegate the programming and focus on R&D, his value rises to 10.
- The value created by the programmer is 5. This is in addition to the rise in value of the expert.

The startup is sold to a large software company for serious money.
How to split this money fairly among the three stakeholder?

Shapley value: Method 1

Shapley value computation: $\#N=n=3$, $\#S=s$

$$\varphi_i = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{S \subset N: i \in S} \binom{n-1}{s}^{-1} \delta_i(S)$$

Expt (E)

$$\underline{s=0} \rightarrow S=\emptyset \Rightarrow \delta_E(S) = v(E) - v(\emptyset) = 0.$$

$$\hookrightarrow \binom{n-1}{s} = \binom{2}{0} = 1$$

$$\underline{s=1} \rightarrow \delta_E(A) = v(AE) - v(A) = 3$$

$$\delta_E(P) = v(EP) - v(P) = 0$$

$$\hookrightarrow \binom{n-1}{s} = \binom{2}{1} = 2$$

$$\underline{s=2} \rightarrow \delta_E(AP) = v(APE) - v(AP) = 15$$

$$\hookrightarrow \binom{n-1}{s} = \binom{2}{2} = 1$$

$$\varphi_E = \frac{1}{3} \left[\frac{1}{1} \cdot 0 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 3 + \frac{1}{1} \cdot 15 \right] = \frac{11}{2}$$

Shapley value: Method 2

	E	P
A <u>E</u> <u>P</u>	$v(AE) - v(A) = 3$ 3 0	$v(AEP) - v(AE) = 12$ 15 3
A <u>P</u> <u>E</u>	$v(APE) - v(AP) = 15$ 15 0	$v(AP) - v(A) = 0$
<u>E</u> A <u>P</u>	$v(E) - v(\phi) = 0$	$v(AEP) - v(EA) = 12$
<u>E</u> <u>P</u> A	$v(E) - v(\phi) = 0$	$v(EP) - v(E) = 0$
<u>P</u> A <u>E</u>	$v(AEP) - v(AP) = 15$ 15 0	$v(P) - v(\phi) = 0$
<u>P</u> <u>E</u> A	$v(EP) - v(P) = 0$	$v(P) - v(\phi) = 0$
	33	24

$$\varphi_E = \frac{33}{6} = \frac{11}{2} \quad \varphi_P = \frac{24}{6} = 4$$

$$\left(\varphi_A = \frac{11}{2} \right) \quad \text{Notice: } \frac{11}{2} + \frac{11}{2} + 4 = 15$$

Figure: Notice distribution is efficient: $\varphi_E + \varphi_A + \varphi_P = 15 = v(N)$