# VE475 Intro to Cryptography Homework 4

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#### Ex1—-RSA setup

1. In RSA encryption and decryption, we first choose two different primes p and q, and calculate their product n and  $\varphi(n)$ .

Then choose an integer e that is coprime with  $\varphi(n)$ , and use the extended Euclidean algorithm to find the multiplication inverse d so that:

$$ed \equiv 1 \mod \varphi(n)$$

Thus for some integer k, we can describe ed as  $ed = k\varphi(n) + 1$  Then for  $c \equiv m^e \mod n$ , we can calculate:

$$c^d \equiv (m^e)^d \equiv m^{k\varphi(n)+1} \equiv m \cdot m^{k\varphi(n)} \ mod \ n$$

As we know that  $c^d \equiv m \mod n$ , we can easily deduce that  $m^{k\varphi(n)} \equiv 1 \mod n$ . According to Euler's Theorem, this formula is equivalent to m is coprime with n. Therefore, it is likely for n to be coprime with m.

2. As k is a multiple of  $\varphi(n)$ , let  $k = a\varphi(n)$ , a is some positive integer. Then:

(a) 
$$m^k \equiv m^{a\varphi(n)} \equiv (m^{\varphi(n)})^a \equiv 1^a \equiv 1 \mod n$$

As n = pq, we can get  $m^k \equiv 1 \mod pq$ . Since p and q are primes, we can conclude:

$$m^k \equiv 1 \mod p$$
 and  $m^k \equiv 1 \mod q$ 

(b) Firstly, if gcd(m, n) = 1, with the conclusion in (a), we can have:

$$m^{k+1} \equiv m \cdot m^k \equiv m \mod p$$

In the same way,  $m^{k+1} \equiv m \mod p$ .

Then if gcd(m,n) = p, we can have gcd(m/p,q) = 1, thus according to (a):

$$(\frac{m}{p})^{\varphi(q)} \equiv 1 \mod q$$

Since  $k = a\varphi(n)$ ,  $k = a\varphi(p)\varphi(q)$ , so we can get:

$$(\frac{m}{p})^k \equiv ((\frac{m}{p})^{\varphi(q)})^{a\varphi(p)} \equiv 1 \mod q$$

$$(\frac{m}{p})^{k+1} \equiv \frac{m}{p} \bmod q \equiv \frac{m}{p} \bmod n$$

Then we can calculate  $m^{k+1} \mod q$  as following:

$$m^{k+1} \equiv p^{k+1} \cdot (\frac{m}{p})^{k+1} \mod q$$
$$\equiv p^k \cdot m \mod q$$
$$\equiv (p^{\varphi(q)})^{a\varphi(p)} \cdot m \mod q$$
$$\equiv m \mod q$$

Since m = bp for some positive integer b,

$$m^{k+1} \equiv (bp)^{k+1} \equiv 0 \mod p \equiv m \mod p$$

Similarly, for gcd(m, n) = q, we can also prove that

$$m^{k+1} \equiv m \mod p$$
 and  $m^{k+1} \equiv m \mod q$ 

- 3. We know that  $ed \equiv 1 \mod \varphi(n)$ , then for some k which is a multiple of  $\varphi(n)$ , ed = k + 1.
  - (a) According to the conclusion in (2),

$$m^{ed} \equiv m^{k+1} \equiv m \mod p$$
 and  $mod q$ 

So we can conclude that  $m^{ed} \equiv m \mod n$ 

(b) From the above problems, we find that for any arbitrary m,  $m^{ed} \equiv m \mod n$ , so it is not necessary for gcd(m, n) = 1.

#### Ex2—-RSA decryption

For n=11413, we can decompose it as two primes p=101 and q=113, so we can calculate  $\varphi(n)$  as:

$$\varphi(n) = \varphi(p)\varphi(q) = (p-1)(q-1) = 11200$$

Then use extended Euclidean algorithm to calculate e's multiplication inverse of  $\varphi(n)$ .

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 7467 \\ 0 & 1 & 11200 \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 11200 \\ 1 & 0 & 7467 \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 7467 \\ -1 & 1 & 3733 \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{pmatrix} -1 & 1 & 3733 \\ 3 & -2 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

So we find that d=3. Then we can calculate  $c^d \equiv m \mod n$ ,

$$5859 \equiv 5859 \ mod \ 11413$$

$$5859 \cdot 5859 \equiv 8990 \mod 11413$$

$$8990 \cdot 5859 \equiv 1415 \mod 11413$$

Therefore, the plaintext is 1415.

#### Ex3—-Breaking RSA

- 1. For RSA encryption and decryption, we calculate  $c \equiv m^e \mod n$  and  $m \equiv c^d \mod n$ . If the key is short, it is faster to encrypt and decrypt, saving time for senders and receivers. Therefore, it is why one would select short encryption or decryption keys.
- 2. This part is referred from wikipedia.

For G = gcd(p-1, q-1), define  $\lambda(n)$  as:

$$\lambda(n) = \text{lcm}(p-1, q-1) = \frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{G} = \frac{\varphi(n)}{G}$$

Since  $ed \equiv 1 \mod \varphi(n)$ , it is obvious that:

$$ed \equiv 1 \mod \lambda(n)$$

So there exist some positive integer K such that:

$$ed = K\lambda(n) + 1$$

$$ed = \frac{K}{G}(p-1)(q-1) + 1$$

Then define  $k = \frac{K}{\gcd(K,G)}$  and  $g = \frac{G}{\gcd(K,G)}$ , we can have:

$$ed = \frac{k}{q}(p-1)(q-1) + 1$$

Divided by dpq, we can get:

$$\frac{e}{pq} = \frac{k}{dq}(1-\delta), \text{ where } \delta = \frac{p+q-1-\frac{g}{k}}{pq}$$

It's common sense that p and q are very large primes, so that  $\delta \to 0$ . Therefore,  $\frac{e}{pq}$  is just a little bit smaller than  $\frac{k}{dg}$ . Let  $k_0 = \frac{k}{g}$ , and we also have:

$$edq = k(p-1)(q-1) + 1$$

So we can deduce that:

$$\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1) = \frac{ed-1}{k_0}$$

After that, we can apply continued fractions to get some approximate d and  $k_0$ . If we can find one d that is quite small, we can use the above equation to calculate  $\varphi(n)$ . Then we need to solve the following equation to get p and q:

$$x^{2} - (p+q)x + pq = 0$$

$$x^{2} - ((n-\varphi(n)) + 1)x + n = 0$$

$$x = \frac{((n-\varphi(n)) + 1) \pm \sqrt{((n-\varphi(n)) + 1)^{2} - 4n}}{2}$$

Then p and q are the two roots of the equation. Note that Wiener's theorem can apply when  $d < \frac{1}{3}n^{\frac{1}{4}}$ .

- 3. In order not to generate a weak decryption key, d should be larger than  $\frac{1}{3}n^{\frac{1}{4}}$ , where n represents for the production of p and q.
- 4. The code is attached in the folder ex3, with a readme file in it. For n = 317940011, we can calculate d which satisfies the constraint is:

$$d < \frac{1}{3}(n)^{\frac{1}{4}} = 44.51$$

After running the code, we can find d=4, 37, 41 which meet the condition. Then use the equation  $\varphi(n)=\frac{ed-1}{k}$  to calculate each  $\varphi(n)$ . After the whole computing, we find that only d=41 can result in p,q which are both integers. Therefore, we conclude that p=25523, q=12457 is the factorization of n=317940011.

### Ex4—-Programming

For details, please refer to the codes in folder *ex4*, with a readme file in it.

#### Ex5—-Simple questions

- 1. For some ciphertext c, we can calculate  $c \cdot 2^e \mod n$ . After decryption, we can get  $2m \mod n$ . Finally, we just need to halve the result to get the plaintext.
- 2. No, it doesn't. No matter how many exponents is used, if n remains the same, the factorization will never change, so the attack procedure and difficulty will not change.
- 3. Knowing that  $516107^2 \equiv 7 \mod n$ , and  $187722^2 \equiv 4 \cdot 7 \mod n$ , we can have:

$$4 \cdot 516107^2 - 187722^2 \equiv 0 \mod n$$
$$(2 \cdot 516107 + 187722)(2 \cdot 516107 - 187722) \equiv 0 \mod n$$
$$1219936 \cdot 844492 \equiv 0 \mod n$$
$$(2 \cdot 2 \cdot 2 \cdot 2 \cdot 2 \cdot 38123)(2 \cdot 2 \cdot 211123) \equiv 0 \mod n$$

Since *n* is the product of two odd primes, we can deduce that  $38123 \cdot 211123 \equiv 0 \mod n$ .  $38123 = 67 \cdot 569$ ,  $211123 = 11 \cdot 17 \cdot 1129$ .

Therefore, by trying every combination of 67, 569, 11, 17, 1129, we can finally factorize n as:

$$n = 569 \cdot 1129 = 642401$$

4. If we use n which can be factorized into three prime numbers p, q and r, then:

$$\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)(r-1)$$

For a public key e, we should also find a private key d so that:

$$ed \equiv 1 \mod \varphi(n)$$

$$m^{ed} \equiv m \ nod \ n$$

However, if we use n to be the same number of digits as which is used for two-prime factorization, it is obvious that the three primes would be smaller, which means the factorization will be found out more efficiently.

If the three primes have the similar numbers of digits as the two-prime factorization, n, e and d would be too large, which will be very hard to solve.

5. First, we can calculate  $\varphi(97) = 97 - 1 = 96 = 2^5 \cdot 3$ . So if an element  $x \in U(\mathbb{Z}/97\mathbb{Z})$  is a generator, then:

$$x^{\frac{96}{2}} \equiv x^{48} \not\equiv 1 \mod 97$$
  
 $x^{\frac{96}{3}} \equiv x^{32} \not\equiv 1 \mod 97$ 

We can easily calculate that  $2^{48} \equiv 1 \mod 97$ ,  $3^{48} \equiv 1 \mod 97$ , and  $4^{48} \equiv 1 \mod 97$ . For 5, using the modular exponentiation for  $5^{48} \mod 97$  as the table below:

i	$d_i$	power mod 97
5	1	$1^2 \cdot 5 \equiv 5 \bmod 97$
4	1	$5^2 \cdot 5 \equiv 28 \bmod 97$
3	0	$28^2 \equiv 8 \bmod 97$
2	0	$8^2 \equiv 64 \bmod 97$
1	0	$64^2 \equiv 22 \bmod 97$
0	0	$22^2 \equiv 96 \bmod 97$

So  $5^{48} \equiv 96 \mod 97 \not\equiv 1 \mod 97$ .

Similarly, we can calculate  $5^{32} \equiv 35 \mod 97$ . Therefore, 5 is the smallest generator of  $U(\mathbb{Z}/97\mathbb{Z})$ .

6. For group  $G = U(\mathbb{Z}/101\mathbb{Z})$ :

(a) For p = 101, which is a prime, we can calculate  $\varphi(p) = 101 - 1 = 100 = 2^2 \cdot 5^2$ . Then if an element x is a generator,

$$x^{\frac{100}{2}} \equiv x^{50} \not\equiv 1 \mod 101$$

$$x^{\frac{100}{5}} \equiv x^{20} \not\equiv 1 \bmod 101$$

Then for the element 2, using the modular exponentiation method, we can have:

$$2^{50} \equiv 100 \ mod \ 101$$

$$2^{20} \equiv 95 \ mod \ 101$$

Therefore, we prove that 2 is a generator of G.

(b) Knowing that  $\log_2 3 = 69$ , and  $\log_2 2 = 1$  we can calculate  $\log_2 24$  as:

$$\log_2 24 = \log_2(3 \cdot 8)$$
$$= \log_2 3 + 3\log_2 2$$
$$= 69 + 3 = 72$$

Therefore,  $\log_2 24 = 72$ .

(c) Knowing that  $\log_2 5 = 24$ , thus:

$$\log_2 24 = \log_2 125$$
  
=  $3 \log_2 5$   
=  $3 \cdot 24 = 72$ 

Therefore,  $\log_2 24 = 72$ .

7. First, we are going to prove that 3 is a generator of  $U(\mathbb{Z}/137\mathbb{Z})$ . Since p=137 is a prime, we can easily calculate:

$$\varphi(p) = 137 - 1 = 136 = 2^3 \cdot 17$$

Knowing that  $3^6 \equiv 44 \ mod \ 137$  and  $3^{10} \equiv 2 \ mod \ 137$ , thus:

$$3^{\frac{136}{2}} \equiv 3^{68} \equiv (3^6)^3 \cdot (3^10)^5 \equiv 44^3 \cdot 2^5 \equiv 136 \mod 137$$

$$3^{\frac{136}{17}} \equiv 3^8 \equiv 3^6 \cdot 3^2 \equiv 44 \cdot 9 \equiv 122 \mod 137$$

Therefore, 3 is a generator of  $U(\mathbb{Z}/137\mathbb{Z})$ .

Moreover, we can transform the expression in question as:  $\log_3 44 = 6$ , and  $\log_3 2 = 10$ . Then we need to calculate  $\log_3 11$  as the equation below:

$$\log_3 11 = \log_3(44 \div 2^2)$$
$$= \log_3 44 - 2\log_3 2$$
$$= 6 - 2 * 10 = -14$$

Therefore, x = 136 + (-14) = 122.

- 8. Knowing that  $G = U(\mathbb{Z}/11\mathbb{Z})$ :
  - (a) As  $6^5$  is small, we can directly calculate:

$$6^5 \equiv 7776 \equiv 10 \ mod \ 11$$

Therefore,  $6^5 \equiv 10 \mod 11$ .

(b) Since p = 11 is a prime, we can calculate  $\varphi(p) = 11 - 1 = 10 = 2 \cdot 5$ . Then use the calculation below:

$$2^{\frac{10}{2}} \equiv 2^5 \equiv 10 \mod 11$$

$$2^{\frac{10}{5}} \equiv 2^2 \equiv 4 \bmod 11$$

Therefore, we can see that for any prime q which satisfies q|(p-1),  $2^{\frac{p-1}{q}} \not\equiv 1 \mod 11$ , so 2 is a generator of G.

(c)

$$2^{x} \equiv 6 \mod 11$$
$$(2^{x})^{5} \equiv 6^{5} \mod 11$$
$$(2^{5})^{x} \equiv 10 \mod 11$$
$$(-1)^{x} \equiv -1 \mod 11$$

Then we can obviously see that x is odd.

## Ex6—-DLP

1. In hw4-ex5, we have proved that  $3^{32768} \not\equiv 1 \mod 65537$ , so 3 is a generator of  $U(\mathbb{Z}/65537\mathbb{Z})$ , and  $3^{65536} \equiv 1 \mod 65537$ .

For  $3^x \equiv 2 \mod 65537$ :

$$(3^x)^{16} \equiv 2^{16} \equiv -1 \mod 65537$$

$$(3^x)^{32} \equiv 2^{32} \equiv 1 \mod 65537$$

Thus we can find that 65536|(32x) and  $65536 \nmid (16x)$ , which yields that:

$$2048 \mid x$$
 and  $4096 \nmid x$ 

Proof done.

2. Since  $2048 \mid x$  and  $4096 \nmid x$ , we know that x = 2048a, where a is an odd integer. We also know that  $65536 \div 2048 = 32$ , thus there are 16 possible choices of x.

First, we can apply modular exponentiation method to calculate  $3^{2048}$  mod 65537.

i	$d_i$	power mod $65537$
11	1	$1^2 \cdot 3 \equiv 3 \bmod 65537$
10	0	$3^2 \equiv 9 \bmod 65537$
9	0	$9^2 \equiv 81 \ mod \ 65537$
8	0	$81^2 \equiv 6561 \ mod \ 65537$
7	0	$6561^2 \equiv 54449 \ mod \ 65537$
6	0	$54449^2 \equiv 61869 \ mod \ 65537$
5	0	$61869^2 \equiv 19139 \ mod \ 65537$
4	0	$19139^2 \equiv 15028 \ mod \ 65537$
3	0	$15028^2 \equiv 282 \ mod \ 65537$
2	0	$282^2 \equiv 13987 \ mod \ 65537$
1	0	$13937^2 \equiv 8224 \ mod \ 65537$
0	0	$8224^2 \equiv 65529 \ mod \ 65537$

Therefore, we just need to calculate  $(-8)^a \equiv 2 \mod 65537$ , where  $a = 1, 3, \dots, 31$ .

$$(-2)^{3a} \equiv 2 \mod 65537 \Rightarrow 2^{3a} \equiv -2 \mod 65537$$

We know that  $2^{17} \equiv -2 \mod 65537$ , thus we need to calculate an integer b, such that  $17 + 32b \equiv 0 \mod 3$ , while  $17 + 32b \leq 93$ .

After simple computing, we get b=2, and the corresponding a=27. Therefore,  $x=2048\cdot 27=55296$ .

3. For simple Pohlig-Hellman algorithm, it cannot solve the question because  $65536 = 2^{16}$ , which contains only one prime, thus it is impossible use the CRT to combine the results.

However, we can apply the optimized Pohlig-Hellman algorithm. Since  $2048 \mid x$ , and  $4096 \nmid x$ , we can write x as:

$$x = 2^{11} + a_0 2^1 2 + a_1 2^1 3 + a_2 2^1 4 + a_3 2^1 5$$

where  $a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3$  take the value 0 or 1. Then we can calculate  $a_0$  as:

$$\left(\frac{3^x}{3^{2048}}\right)^{\frac{2^{15}}{2^{12}}} \equiv 3^{a_0 2^{15} + a_1 2^{16} + a_2 2^{17} + a_3 2^{18}}$$

Since  $3^{16} \equiv 1 \mod 65537$ , then the above equation can be expressed as:

$$3^{a_02^{15}} \mod 65537$$

We can easily find that  $3^{2048} \equiv -8 \mod 65537$ , which has a multiplicative inverse  $8192 = 2^{13}$ . Thus:

$$\left(\frac{3^x}{3^{2^{11}}}\right)^{\frac{2^{15}}{2^{12}}} \equiv (2 \cdot 2^{13})^8 \equiv 2^{16} \equiv -1 \mod 65537$$

So  $a_0 = 1$ . Similarly, for  $a_1$ ,

$$3^{a_1 2^{15}} \equiv \left(\frac{3^x}{3^{2^{11} + 2^{12}}}\right)^{\frac{2^{15}}{2^{13}}} \equiv (2 \cdot 2^7)^{2^2} \equiv 1 \bmod 65537$$

So  $a_1 = 0$ . For  $a_2$ :

$$3^{a_2 2^{15}} \equiv \left(\frac{3^x}{3^{2^{11} + 2^{12}}}\right)^{\frac{2^{15}}{2^{14}}} \equiv (2 \cdot 2^7)^2 \equiv -1 \mod 65537$$

So  $a_2 = 1$ . For  $a_3$ :

$$3^{a_3 2^{15}} \equiv \left(\frac{3^x}{3^{2^{11} + 2^{12} + 2^{14}}}\right)^{\frac{2^{15}}{2^{15}}} \equiv 2 \cdot 2^1 5 \equiv -1 \ mod \ 65537$$

So  $a_3 = 1$ . Therefore,  $x = 2^{11} + 2^{12} + 2^{14} + 2^{15} = 55296$ .

4. 65537 is a prime that can be expressed as  $p^k + 1$  where p is a quite small prime. Suppose we have some  $c^x \equiv p \mod p^k + 1$ , then  $c^{kx} \equiv -1 \mod p^k + 1$ ,  $c^{2kx} \equiv 1 \mod p^k + 1$ . If c is a generator, we can easily find that  $c^{p^k} \equiv 1 \mod p^k + 1$ , so  $p^k \mid 2kx$  and  $p^k \nmid kx$ , thus:

$$\frac{p^k}{2k} \mid x$$
 and  $\frac{p^k}{k} \nmid x$ 

So there only exist a little possibility for deciding x. Therefore, such primes are not fitting a cryptographic context.