

FedCC: Federated Learning with Consensus Confirmation for Byzantine Attack Resistance (Student Abstract)

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Abstract

In federated learning (FL), a server determines a global learning model by aggregating the local learning models of clients, and the determined global model is broadcast to all the clients. However, the global learning model can significantly deteriorate if a Byzantine attacker transmits malicious learning models trained with incorrectly labeled data. We propose a Byzantine-robust FL algorithm that, by employing a consensus confirmation method, can reduce the success probability of Byzantine attacks. After aggregating the local models from clients, the proposed FL server validates the global model candidate by sending the global model candidate to a set of randomly selected FL clients and asking them to perform local validation with their local data. If most of the validation is positive, the global model is confirmed and broadcast to all the clients. We compare the performance of the proposed FL against Byzantine attacks with that of existing FL algorithms analytically and empirically.

Introduction

As the distributed computing and storage system increases, federated learning (FL) is widely used in various machine learning applications. In the FL, clients share learning results using their own data to a federated server without sharing their original data, and the server aggregates the clients' learning results by averaging. However, Byzantine clients can impede global model learning in a FL environment where various clients freely participate in generating a single global model. This is because Byzantine clients maliciously train adversarial data or send incorrect learning parameters to the server.

In (Lyu, Yu, and Yang 2020), the authors provided surveys of the FL threats about the Byzantine attacks. In (Blanchard et al. 2017), for the robustness of the Byzantine attack, the authors proposed the Krum aggregation algorithm. The Krum selects a client model with the closest similarity with other clients' models as a global model using the Euclidean distances. In (Yin et al. 2018), the authors proposed trimmed mean and median aggregation rules more Byzantine-robust than the averaging aggregation rule. The trimmed mean rule aggregates the model parameters of the clients and removes the largest and smallest parameters. A server that employs




Figure 1: The proposed federated learning process.

the median aggregation rule takes the median of the model parameters of the clients.

FL with Consensus Confirmation

We propose federated learning with consensus confirmation (FedCC) to make the FL system robust to Byzantine attacks. The FL server performs a consensus-based validation procedure before it broadcasts the global model to investigate whether or not a newly aggregated global model is beneficial to most clients. First, a set of clients are selected randomly and asked to perform the consensus-based validation. Then, if the majority of the selected clients agree, the new global model is broadcast to the entire FL network.

Figure 1 depicts the proposed FL procedure in a round r . To begin, the FL server chooses at random from m clients the uploaded local learning results of n clients who train their own data. Secondly, the server aggregates the selected learning results from n clients to decide a candidate global weight \tilde{w}_r . Thirdly, the server randomly selects l clients for a consensus confirmation out of m clients and transmits a candidate global weight \tilde{w}_r to them. The l clients compare test accuracies of models updated with the \tilde{w}_r and a previous weight w_{r-1} using their own training data, then the consensus clients transmit the confirmation results to the server. Fourthly, the server confirms and decides a global weight w_r . If the majority of the consensus clients submits the comparing results that the w_{r-1} has higher test accuracy than the \tilde{w}_r , the server defines the w_r to the w_{r-1} . Fifthly, the server broadcasts the global weight w_r to clients, and the clients load the global weight on their own model.




Figure 2: Byzantine attack success probability.

The proposed FedCC’s consensus-based validation algorithm reduces the impact of Byzantine attackers in clients on global learning performance degradation. Suppose there is at least one Byzantine attacker in a training group. In that case, a global weight easily becomes polluted because the global weight is obtained by aggregating results from every client in the training group. In the case of the aggregation rule averaging client results, when there are k Byzantine attackers in m clients and the server selects n clients for training, the Byzantine attack success probability is given by

$$P_{\text{attack}} = 1 - \frac{C(m-k, n)}{C(m, n)}, \quad (1)$$


where $C(\cdot)$ is a combination function. In case that uses the proposed consensus-based validation algorithm selecting l consensus clients, the Byzantine attack success probability is given by the following equation

$$P_{\text{attack}, CC} = \sum_{x=\lceil \frac{l}{2} \rceil}^l \frac{C(k, x) \cdot C(m-k, l-x)}{C(m, l)}. \quad (2)$$


In the proposed FedCC algorithm, the probability that global weight becomes polluted is given by $P_{\text{FedCC}} = (1 - P_{\text{attack}}) \cdot P_{\text{attack}, CC} + P_{\text{attack}} \cdot P_{\text{attack}, CC} = P_{\text{attack}, CC}$. When there is at least one Byzantine attacker in the training group and more than half of the attackers in the consensus group, the attackers succeed in transmitting the positive consensus conformation results causing the broadcasting of the polluted global weight. Even in case that there are no attackers in the training group, if there are more than half of the attackers in the consensus group, the attackers can transmit the negative consensus conformation results causing the convergence of global weight to be delayed. Figure 2 shows the Byzantine attack success probability of normal FL and proposed FL using Python simulations. For each simulation case, we set $m = 100$, $n = 10$, $l = 10$ and iterated 100,000 times. This simulation result shows that the proposed consensus confirmation algorithm achieves a significantly lower attack success probability than the normal FL.

Experiments and Conclusion

We tried out displaying the performance of the proposed FedCC operations. The FL algorithms are implemented with Pytorch in the experiment, and the MNIST dataset is



(a) Without attacks



(b) Under Byzantine attack

Figure 3: Accuracy of the federated learning algorithms.

used. The MNIST dataset is distributed to clients in a non-independent and identical manner (non-IID). Clients and servers both have convolutional neural networks with the same structure. The Byzantine attackers replace all training labels y to $(9 - y)$ and train this incorrect dataset. We set $m = 100$, $n = 10$, $k = 20$, $l = 10$. The result values are the average of 5 times iterations. Figure 3 shows the test accuracy for FedCC, FedAVG, and Median rules of rounds in normal and attack situations. As shown in Figure 3(a), if no attack exists, the proposed FedCC shows similar test accuracy to the FedAVG and higher performance than the Median rule. However, when there are Byzantine attackers in clients, as shown in Figure 3(b), the test accuracy of the FedCC is more stable and higher than other algorithms.

In conclusion, we have proposed a FedCC scheme for Byzantine attack resistance and demonstrated that the proposed FedCC outperforms previous FL algorithms in terms of attack resistance and learning performance.

Acknowledgments

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