Supplementary Materials for:

Poverty and Divine Rewards:
The Electoral Advantage of Islamist Political Parties

Arab Barometer (Figure 1 in text)

Tables S1 and S2 present the countries, sample sizes, and dates for the two waves of the Arab Barometer used to create Figure 1 in the text. In wave 2, the trust in Islamists question was only asked in Egypt and Tunisia.

Table S1: Arab Barometer, Wave 2

Country	Sample Size	Date(s)
Egypt	1219	Jun-Jul 2011
Tunisia	1196	Sep-Oct 2011

Table S2: Arab Barometer, Wave 3

Country	Sample Size	Date(s)
Algeria	1220	Mar-Apr 2013
Egypt	1196	Mar-Apr 2013
Jordan	1795	Dec 2012-Jan 2013
Kuwait	1021	Feb-Mar 2014
Lebanon	1200	Jul 2013
Morocco	1116	Apr-Jun 2013 and Mar 2014
Palestine	1200	Dec 2012
Sudan	1200	Apr-May 2013
Tunisia	1199	Feb 2013

Questions used:

- Trust in Islamists:
  - "I will name a number of institutions, and I would like you to tell me to what extent you trust each of them: [mainstream Islamist party in respondent's country] (I trust it to a great extent; I trust it to a medium extent; I trust it to a limited extent; I absolutely do not trust it).

- Economic Strain
  - Monthly Household Income (scaled between 0-1)

- Controls:
  - Age
  - Gender (Female=1)
  - Religion (Muslim=1)
  - Marriage
  - Country fixed effects (model 3)

Table S3 presents the results. Model 1 is Egypt 2011, model 2 is Tunisia 2011, and model 3 is all non-civil war countries, 2010-2014 (see text).

Figure 1 (in text) created through the effects R package.

Table 3: Income and Islamism, Arab Barometer (OLS)

	DV: Trust in Islamists (1-4)		
	Egypt	Tunisia	All Countries
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Income	−2.198***	−1.446*	−0.577***
	(0.752)	(0.828)	(0.200)
Age	−0.018	0.159***	0.028***
	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.010)
Female	−0.049	−0.043	0.043**
	(0.074)	(0.084)	(0.021)
Muslim	0.316*	−0.129	0.462***
	(0.175)	(0.637)	(0.055)
Married	0.036	−0.167	0.052**
	(0.091)	(0.110)	(0.025)
Country FE			✓
Constant	3.005***	2.800***	2.444***
	(0.374)	(0.724)	(0.157)
Observations	1,004	790	10,330
R^2	0.013	0.023	0.069
Adjusted R^2	0.008	0.016	0.068

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Tunisia Electoral Returns (Figure 2 in text)

Unemployment data obtained from Tunisia's National Institute of Statistics. Ennahda vote shares extracted from the *Instance Superieure Independante pour les Elections* (ISIE) and obtained at http://tunisiaelectiondata.com/.

Table S4 presents the results. Given the sample size (number of governorates), these results do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p=0.123, p=0.155, and p=0.228, respectively). Yet, they serve the purpose of illustrating a surprisingly positive rather than negative trend between unemployment and Ennahda's vote share, even during its tenure.

Table 4: Ennahda Vote Share by Unemployment Rate

	Dependent variable:		
	Vote Share, 2011	Vote Share, 2014	Δ Vote Share, 2011-14
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unemployment, 2010	0.548		
	(0.343)		
Unemployment, 2014		0.683	
		(0.466)	
Δ Unemployment, 2010-14			0.414
			(0.335)
Constant	29.303***	17.636**	−9.205***
	(5.062)	(7.815)	(1.338)
Observations	27	27	27
R^2	0.093	0.079	0.058
Adjusted R^2	0.056	0.042	0.020

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Experiment 1: Materials and Methods

Experiment 1 was conducted in Tunis, Tunisia from May 31-June 3, 2016. Working with our local partner, One to One for Research and Polling, we rented an apartment at 9 Avenue de Madrid in the Bab el-Khadra neighborhood of Tunis to serve as our lab. The apartment was situated one block from the *Le Passage* bus and metro station on Avenue de la Liberte. Figure S1 shows the location of the apartment relative to the station.



Fig. S1: Location of Lab (red pin) for Experiment 1

Figures S2a and S2b show the entrance of the lab and the surrounding neighborhood, respectively.

Fig. S2: Entrance of the lab (a) and surrounding neighborhood (b).

The lab featured four rooms. Two rooms were used by the research team and the One to One field management team, respectively. To eliminate any foreigner effects (Cillier 2015), members of our team remained in an observation room during the experiment and were not seen by respondents. The other two rooms, rooms A and B, were used for the experiments. Room A was a small room with four tables (see figure S3a). Room B was a large room with five tables (figure S3b, only half of the room). Each table had two chairs, one for the enumerator and one for the respondent. The facilities therefore allowed us to conduct nine surveys at a time.

Fig. S3: Room A (a) and Room B (b)

One to One for Research and Polling provided 12 enumerators: four men and eight women. All enumerators were young adults. Enumerator training was led by two senior staff members from One to One and consisted of a half day of walking enumerators through the survey and having them

practice on one another. During the experiment itself, One to One also implemented quality control procedures, walking by the enumerators as they were administering the survey to make sure they were asking the questions as written (see figure S4).

Fig. S4: Example of Quality Control

One to One recruited 253 Tunisian citizens from outside of the Passage station and the area surrounding the lab. Recruiters gave the following information:

Hello, I'm X from One to One for Research and Polling. Today we are conducting a study on general topics related to Tunisian society and we would like your opinions. Can you spare 15 minutes of your time?

Recruiters blocked explicitly on gender, ensuring each session was half men and half women. Recruiters were also told to select to the best of their ability from a diverse range of ages and backgrounds.

Pre-Treatment Questionnaire

Once in the lab, respondents were first asked a series of pre-treatment demographic questions. These included:

1. Age of Respondent
2. Gender of Respondent (marked by enumerator)
3. Which of the following categories best describes your current occupation?
    a. Work (1)
        i. If yes, do you work in Private or Public sector?
    b. Student (2)
    c. Housewife (3)
    d. Retired (4)
    e. Unemployed (5)
4. Did you grow up in an urban or a rural area?
    a. Rural (1)
    b. Urban (2)
    c. DK/NR [don't read] (3)

5. Marital Status [Check all that apply]
    a. Never married (1)
    b. Married (2)
    c. Separated (3)
    d. Divorced (4)
    e. Widow (5)
    f. Living with partner [don't read] (6)
    g. DK/NR [don't read] (7)
6. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
    a. Illiterate / no education (1)
    b. Primary (2)
    c. Intermediate (3)
    d. Secondary (4)
    e. BA degree (5)
    f. MA degree or higher (6)
    g. DK/NR [don't read] (7)
7. Please indicate if you own any of the following items:
    a. A car (1)
    b. A computer (2)
    c. A mobile phone (3)
8. Monthly household income (in TND)
    a. 0 - 100 (1)
    b. 101 - 200 (2)
    c. 201 - 300 (3)
    d. 301 - 400 (4)
    e. 401 - 500 (5)
    f. 501 - 600 (6)
    g. 601 - 700 (7)
    h. 701 - 800 (8)
    i. 801 - 900 (9)
    j. 901 - 1000 (10)
    k. 1001 - 2000 (11)
    l. More than 2000 (12)
    m. DK/NR [don't read] (99)

Treatment

Following the pre-treatment questionnaire, respondents were presented with the treatment: a modified coordination game. Respondents were told the following:

We are now going to play a game with another player, Hassan, who is located in our other site. He will be playing with us online through this tablet.

[Hand over envelope] *In this envelope is 5 dinars. You will use this money to play the game. The idea behind the game is that you have the opportunity to multiply your money by 4 times.*

This would require you to give us the 5 dinars. If Hassan also chooses to give his 5 dinars, the money will be immediately multiplied by 4 and you will each receive half of it. So if you donate 5 dinars and if Hassan deposits another five dinars, the ten dinars will be multiplied by 4 to 40 and you will each end up a total of 20 dinars, 15 more

dinars that you started with. But if Hassan doesn't donate his 5 dinars, you will lose your 5 dinars. It is in your interest and Hassan's interest to both donate 5 dinars, and you both will benefit if you both comply.

Do you understand the game? [If no, reread directions].

Would you like to donate your money? [Yes / No]

Figure S5 presents the payoff structure in this coordination game. If the respondent decides to play, Hassan's actions would determine whether the respondent wins 20 dinars or loses everything, both his 5 dinars and the chance of winning an additional 15. We hypothesize that those who lose should be economically strained relative to those who won.



Fig. S5: Payoffs in Coordination Game

While we told respondents that Hassan was another player, in reality, he was fictitious and permitted the randomized creation of winners and losers (a fact we revealed at the end of the survey). Of the 253 respondents recruited, 209 decided to play the game. Of these 209, 102 won the game while 107 lost (see Table S5).

Table S5: Treatment Conditions, Experiment 1

Treatment	N
Win	102
Lose	107
Refused to Play	44
Total	**253**

Descriptive Statistics

Table S6: Descriptive Statistics, Experiment 1

Variable	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.	NA's
Trust in Nahda	1	1	1	1.96	3	4	5
Divine Rewards	1	1	2	2.67	5	5	1
Age	18	23	27	31.84	37	75	18
Female	0	0	0	0.50	1	1	0
Income	2	7	11	9.05	11	12	1

Education	1	4	4	4.34	5	6	1
Ownership	0	2	2	2.23	3	3	0
Urban	0	1	1	0.79	1	1	0
Married	0	0	0	0.24	0	1	0
Unemployed	0	0	0	0.20	0	1	0
Female Enum	0	1	1	0.78	1	1	0

Matching

We compare those who lost the game to those who won. However, there was slight imbalance in demographic covariates between these two treatment conditions (see figure S6). Respondents who won were significantly more rural than those who lost. We therefore generate covariate balancing propensity scores (Imai et al. 2010) and employ full matching to balance the treatment groups. We matched respondents on the following demographics: age, gender, car/computer/phone ownership, income, education, urban, marriage, unemployment, student, employment, and enumerator gender. Results remain significant or close to significant without matching (see paper, footnote 15 for details).



Fig. S6. Covariate Balance, Experiment 1 (Unmatched)

For figure 5 in the manuscript, we also conduct analyses on a subset of the sample: poor respondents who do and do not rely on God. Figure S7 shows that after matching, covariates remain balanced even when sub-setting in this fashion:



Fig. S7. Covariate Balance among poor who rely on God (a) and do not rely on God (b), Experiment 1 (Matched then Sub-setted)

Post-Treatment Questionnaire

The post-treatment questionnaire included measurements of our two dependent variables. First, respondents were asked for their level of trust in Ennahda:

1. *I will name a number of institutions, and I would like you to tell me to what extent you trust each of them.*
    a. *Ennahda*
        i. *I trust it to a great extent*
        ii. *I trust it to a medium extent*
        iii. *I trust it to a limited extent*
        iv. *I absolutely do not trust it*

Second, respondents were asked for their level of reliance on divine rewards:

2. *As you know, fighting injustice is difficult and time consuming and can bring real costs to people who speak up for their rights. Some people believe that fighting injustice is never worth the costs, and that we should just rely on God's compensation in the afterlife.*

   On a scale on 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to the belief that "fighting injustice is never worth the cost, and we should just rely on God's compensation in the afterlife" and 5 is "fighting injustice is always worth the cost, and we should not just rely on God's compensation in the afterlife," where do you stand?

Results

Table S7 presents the main results (figures 3-5 in the text).

Table 7: Effect of Losing (v. Winning) the Coordination Game among the poor (OLS)

	Dependent variable:		
	Trust in Ennahda	Divine Rewards	Trust in Ennahda (among those who rely)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Losing	0.625***	0.918***	0.834***
	(0.211)	(0.343)	(0.306)
Constant	1.636***	2.386***	1.553***
	(0.145)	(0.236)	(0.236)
Observations	97	97	52
R^2	0.084	0.070	0.130
Adjusted R^2	0.075	0.060	0.112

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Multiple Comparisons Correction

Given that we have multiple comparisons, we implement the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to test for false positives. All three tests remain statistically significant after adjusting their p-values using the BH procedure, the Holm's procedure, or the Bonferroni correction (Table S8).

Table S8: Multiple Comparisons Corrections, Experiment 1

Comparison	***P*-value**	**BH**	**Holm's**	**Bonferroni**
Trust in Ennahda (among poor)	0.0039	0.0087	0.012	0.012
Reliance on Divine Rewards (among poor)	0.0087	0.0087	0.017	0.026
Trust in Ennahda (among poor who rely on God)	0.0087	0.0087	0.017	0.026

Experiment 2: Materials and Methods

Experiment 2 was conducted in Tunis, Tunisia between January 27 and February 1, 2017. As before, we rented an apartment close to the *Le Passage* bus and metro station on Rue de Sparte. Figure S9 shows the location of the lab relative to the station.



Fig. S9. Location of lab (blue pin) in Experiment 2

Figures S10a and S10b show the entrance of the lab and the surrounding neighborhood.

Fig. S10: Entrance of the lab (a) and surrounding neighborhood (b).

The apartment consisted of a large foyer and three rooms (see Figure S11), each of which featured three desks. We could therefore conduct 9 surveys at a time.

Fig. S11. Set-up of Lab

One to One recruited 401 respondents for experiment 2. In addition to the standard text from experiment 1, recruiters also asked whether the respondent made less than the national median of 1000 dinars per month. Once in the lab, respondents were first asked the same series of pre-treatment questions as in experiment 1. In addition, enumerators recorded the observed religiosity of the respondent, noting if the respondent—if female—wore the *hijab* (veil), or—if male—had a religious beard or a *zabiba* (a prayer bump on forehead).

Treatments

In experiment 2 we implemented a "parallel design" experiment (Imai et al. 2013), manipulating both the treatment (economic strain) as well as the mediator (reliance on divine rewards) through two separate treatments. To induce strain, we used the same scenario-based procedure used in Mani et al. (2013). Respondents were randomly assigned to either a "hard" or "easy" condition and walked through the following 4 scenarios. Numbers reflect the hard treatment condition, with easy figures in parentheses:

> We are now going to present you with several hypothetical scenarios. We would like you to pretend that they are realistic and think through how you may respond to them in reality.
>
> **Scenario 1**
> The economy is going through difficult times; suppose your employer needs to make substantial budget cuts. Imagine a scenario in which you received a 50% (5%) cut in your salary. Given your situation, would you be able to maintain roughly your same lifestyle under those new circumstances? [Y/N] If not, what changes would you need to make? Would it impact your leisure, housing, or travel plans? [Y/N]
>
> **Scenario 2**
> Imagine that an unforeseen event requires of you an immediate TND 4,500 (TND 100) expense. Are there ways in which you may be able to come up with that amount of money on a very short notice? [Y/N] How would you go about it? Would it cause you long-lasting financial hardship? [Y/N] Would it require you to make sacrifices that have long-term consequences? If so, what kind of sacrifices? [Open-ended]
>
> **Scenario 3**
> Imagine that your car is having some trouble, and requires a TND 3,000 (TND 200) service. Unfortunately, you don't have auto insurance. You now need to decide the following:
> (1) Pay the full amount in cash. This may require liquidating savings.
> (2) Take out a loan, which you can pay back in monthly installments. A typical such loan may require monthly payments of roughly TND 300 (TND 20) a month for 12 months, which would amount to about TND 3,600 (TND 360) total.
> (3) Take a chance, forego the service, and hope that the car lasts for a while longer. Of course, this leaves open the possibility of breakdown, or even greater expenses in the long run.

How would you go about making this decision? Would it be an easy or a difficult decision for you to make? [Easy, Difficult]
Which option did they choose? [1-3]

Scenario 4
Suppose you have reached the point where you must replace your old refrigerator. The model you plan to buy offers two alternative financing options:
(1) You can pay the full amount in cash, which will cost you TND 1000 (TND 200).
(2) You can pay in 12 monthly payments, of TND 100 (TND 20) each, which would amount to a total of TND 1200 (TND 240).
Which financing option would you opt for? [1 or 2]
Would you have the necessary cash on hand? [Y/N]
Would the interest be worth paying in this case? [Y/N]

In addition to the strain treatment, we also manipulated reliance on divine rewards by playing a recording of the Qur'an. We played Surah 33 (*Al-Ahzab*), a 25-minute chapter, on repeat (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-TEttomY1cg). The recordings played from tablets set up in each room, and were audible through the room. The recordings were playing throughout the session. Table S9 presents the 4 treatment conditions in experiment 2.

Table S9: Treatment Conditions, Experiment 2

Treatment	N
"Easy" scenarios + No Quran	95
"Hard" scenarios + No Quran	106
"Easy" scenarios + Quran	104
"Hard" scenarios + Quran	96
Total	**401**

Descriptive Statistics

Table S10: Descriptive Statistics, Experiment 2

Variable	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.	NA's
Vote Nahda	0	0	0	0.16	0	1	0
Divine Rewards	1	2	3	3.35	5	5	3
Stress	1	1	2	1.78	2	4	1
Age	18	23	34	38.31	52	88	18
Female	0	0	0	0.48	1	1	0
Income	1	4	6	6.41	9	10	6
Education	1	2	4	3.33	4	6	1
Ownership	0	0	1	0.85	1	2	0
Urban	0	1	1	0.76	1	1	0
Never Married	0	0	0	0.47	1	1	0
Unemployed	0	0	0	0.20	0	1	0
Student	0	0	0	0.25	1	1	0
Female Enum	0	1	1	0.86	1	1	0

Covariate Balance

Demographics covariates were perfectly balanced between our two primary comparisons: easy v. hard scenarios in the No Quran condition, and easy v. hard scenarios in the Quran condition (see Figures S12a and S12b). There is slight imbalance between the 201 No Quran v. 200 Quran respondents: those receiving the Quran were more likely to be married (Figure S12c). Because covariates are balanced in our main treatment (the easy v. hard scenarios), we do not use matching in experiment 2. However, results are robust to controlling for marriage.

(a)



(b)



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

Fig. S12. Covariate Balance, Experiment 2 (Unmatched). Hard v. easy scenarios in the no Quran condition (a); hard v. easy in the Quran condition (b); no Quran v. Quran (c).

Post-Treatment Questionnaire

We focus on three post-treatment questions: voting for Ennahda, reliance on divine rewards, and stress. First, instead of trust in Ennahda, we asked about their vote choice:

If elections were held tomorrow, who would you vote for?

a. Ennahda
b. Nidaa Tounes
c. Reform Front
d. Mashrou' Tunis
e. Jabha Chaabia
f. Al-Irada
g. Other: _____
h. Don't know

Second, we asked a question about reliance on divine rewards, this time placed explicitly in the context of economic shocks:

Some people believe that when they lose money or experience other shocks, they should rely on God's compensation in the afterlife and not worry too much about losses in this life. Other people do not believe they should just rely on God's compensation in the afterlife and instead worry more about losses in this life. Which of these two best describes you:

On a scale on 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to the belief that "they should rely on God's compensation in the afterlife and not worry too much about losses in this life" and 5 is the belief and "they should not just rely on God's compensation in the afterlife and instead worry more about losses in this life" where would you place your own view?

Finally, respondents were asked for their level of stress:

Right now, how are you feeling?

a. *Very relaxed*
b. *Somewhat relaxed*
c. *Somewhat stressed*
d. *Very stressed*

In addition, we asked two questions to counter an alternative mechanism: that strained individuals may turn to Islamists in the hopes of receiving material benefits in this life. After selecting a party that they would vote for, respondents were asked for their level of agreement with the statements:

1. This party cares for the poor more than other parties
2. This party will be more likely than others to provide public goods and services to people like me

Results

Table 11 presents the main results (figures 6-7 in the text).

Table 11: Effect of Hard (v. Easy) Scenarios among the poor, no Quran (OLS)

	Dependent variable:		
	Voting for Ennahda	Divine Rewards	Stress (among those who don't rely)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hard Scenarios	0.177**	0.613*	0.825***
	(0.077)	(0.342)	(0.258)
Constant	0.104*	3.083***	1.708***
	(0.057)	(0.251)	(0.160)
Observations	105	104	39
R^2	0.048	0.031	0.217
Adjusted R^2	0.039	0.021	0.196

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Model 3 demonstrates that poor respondents who did not rely on divine rewards expressed greater stress in the hard scenarios compared to the easy ones. Self-reported stress was asked on a 1-4 scale from "very relaxed" to "very stressed."

To provide evidence that the Qur'an alleviated the economic strain induced by the hard scenarios, we compare respondents' reporting of their level of stress. Figure S13 presents the results. The first two dots represent those who participated in the experiments without the Qur'an playing in the background. For the poor who did not rely on divine rewards, the hard scenarios caused significantly more stress (~13% of the 1-4 scale) than the easy scenarios (p=0.028, model 3 above). For the poor who did rely on rewards, however, the hard scenarios were no more straining than the easy ones. Finally, for those who we primed to rely on God rewards through the Qur'an, the hard scenarios were also no more straining than the easy ones. These results suggest that reliance on divine rewards, whether self-reported or experimentally primed, may alleviate the strain caused by the treatment.



Figure S13: Effect of the Hard Scenarios on Self-Reported Stress (Experiment 2). The reference group is respondents receiving the easy scenarios. Bold lines represent 90% confidence intervals; crosshatches indicate 95%.

As preparation for the Baron and Kenny (1986) mediation analysis on data from the single experiment on page 27 in the manuscript, Figure S14 shows that among the poor, the mediator, reliance on divine rewards, is correlated with the dependent variable, voting for Ennahda:



Figure S14: Effect of Reliance on Divine Rewards on Voting for Ennahda (Experiment 2). Bold lines represent 90% confidence intervals; crosshatches indicate 95%.

To counter alternative explanations regarding redistribution of wealth, Figure S15 demonstrates that those receiving the hard scenarios were not significantly more likely to think their chosen party will care for the poor or provide goods and services than those in the easy condition. Similarly, those voting for Ennahda were not significantly more likely to say these than those voting for other parties.



Figure S15: Null Effects for Redistributive Explanations (Experiment 2). Level of agreement with statement "my party is more likely to care for the poor" (a) and "my party is more likely to provide goods and services to people like me" (b). Bold lines represent 90% confidence intervals; crosshatches indicate 95%.

Causal Mediation Analysis

We run a parallel design causal mediation analysis using data generated by the second set of experiments. We randomly assigned participants to different scenarios ("easy" or "hard") to manipulate their level of strain, as well as to whether the Qur'an is playing during their session in order to manipulate the mediator. Here, we discuss the assumptions behind our analysis, as outlined in Imai et al. (2013). Our setup maintains the consistency assumption (that respondents do not realize that the intent of the Qur'an is to increase their support for Ennahda), since in Muslim-majority countries like Tunisia, the Qur'an is routinely playing on the radio, in cafes, in taxis, etc., and as such is seen as 'normal' when playing in the lab. As indicated in the text, we relax the no treatment-mediator interaction assumption, as it is plausible that the effect of reliance on divine rewards on support for Islamism depends on one's level of strain. We therefore use the **multimed** function in R, employing the scenarios as the 'treatment' and the Qur'an as the 'experiment' in a parallel design. The 95 percent confidence intervals around the causally mediated effect do not cross 0 (see Figure S16), with a calculated *P*-value of 0.033. Figure S16 also reports the sensitivity analysis to violations of the homogenous interaction assumption.

The sensitivity analysis helps to validate the homogenous interaction assumption. For the lower bound of the ACME to cross 0, the sensitivity parameter σ, representing the degree of heterogeneity in the interaction between the treatment and mediator, would need to be greater than 0.1302, or about 97.5% of the largest possible value (0.1336) given the data. An alternative sensitivity parameter, $\tilde{R}^2$, similarly suggests that for the ACME to be 0, interaction heterogeneity would need to explain 96.5% of the total variation in the likelihood of voting for Ennahda. In their re-evaluation of three major studies, Imai and Yamamoto (2013, p. 161) find that even an $\tilde{R}^2$ of 15.9% implied "reasonably robust" results.

```
Estimates under the Homogeneous Interaction Assumption:
              Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper
ACME (treated)   0.2378       0.0230         0.45
ACME (control)   0.2203       0.0069         0.43
ACME (average)   0.2291       0.0170         0.44
ADE (treated)   -0.0387      -0.1824         0.10
ADE (control)   -0.0562      -0.1924         0.08
ADE (average)   -0.0474      -0.1848         0.09
Total Effect     0.1815       0.0358         0.31

Sensitivity Analysis:
Values of the sensitivity parameters at which ACME first crosses zero:
              sigma(bounds) sigma(CI) R2s(bounds) R2s(CI) R2t(bounds) R2t(CI)
ACME (treated)        0.1267    0.0299      0.9000  0.0500      0.9145    0.05
ACME (control)            NA    0.0189          NA  0.0200          NA    0.02
ACME (average)        0.1302    0.0267      0.9500  0.0400      0.9653    0.04
Values of the sensitivity parameters at which ADE first crosses zero:
             sigma(bounds) sigma(CI) R2s(bounds) R2s(CI) R2t(bounds) R2t(CI)
ADE (treated)       0.0267    0.0000      0.0400  0.0000      0.0406       0
ADE (control)       0.0299    0.0000      0.0500  0.0000      0.0508       0
ADE (average)       0.0299    0.0000      0.0500  0.0000      0.0508       0
```

Fig. S16. Parallel Design Causal Mediation Analysis: Effect of Treatment on Islamism mediated by Reliance on Divine Rewards among poor respondents.

The average direct effect (ADE) of strain on Islamism (i.e., the portion *not* operating through divine rewards) was not significant, suggesting alternative mechanisms are unlikely. However, it is possible that playing the Qur'an induced other religious mechanisms – such as **increased piety** or support for **Islamic law (*shari`a*)** – that may be wrapped up in respondents' desire for divine rewards. To address this possibility head-on, we add two variables as potential alternative mechanisms in the **multimed** function: how often respondents pray all five prayers on time (5-point scale from "always" to "never"), and respondents' support for *shari`a* (a composite variable averaging their support for Islamic law in general, in the penal code, in personal status law, and in inheritance law). When accounting for both of these variables, the mediated effect of strain running through divine rewards remains significant (p=0.026).

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Causal Mediation Analysis with Confounding by an Alternative Mechanism

Estimates under the Homogeneous Interaction Assumption:
              Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper
ACME (treated)   0.2231       0.0273         0.42
ACME (control)   0.2130       0.0185         0.41
ACME (average)   0.2182       0.0247         0.41
ADE (treated)   -0.0574      -0.1949         0.08
ADE (control)   -0.0675      -0.2046         0.07
ADE (average)   -0.0623      -0.1979         0.07
Total Effect     0.1556       0.0382         0.29

Sensitivity Analysis:
Values of the sensitivity parameters at which ACME first crosses zero:
              sigma(bounds) sigma(CI) R2s(bounds) R2s(CI) R2t(bounds) R2t(CI)
ACME (treated)        0.1195    0.0305      0.7700  0.0500      0.7818    0.05
ACME (control)        0.1299    0.0305      0.9100  0.0500      0.9239    0.05
ACME (average)        0.1241    0.0305      0.8300  0.0500      0.8427    0.05
Values of the sensitivity parameters at which ADE first crosses zero:
             sigma(bounds) sigma(CI) R2s(bounds) R2s(CI) R2t(bounds) R2t(CI)
ADE (treated)       0.0360    0.0000      0.0700  0.0000      0.0711       0
ADE (control)       0.0385    0.0000      0.0800  0.0000      0.0812       0
ADE (average)       0.0360    0.0000      0.0700  0.0000      0.0711       0
```

Fig. S17. Parallel Design Causal Mediation Analysis accounting for alternative religious mechanisms.

Multiple Comparisons Corrections

Given that we have multiple comparisons, we implement the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to test for false positives. All tests remain statistically significant or marginally significant after adjusting their p-values using the BH procedure, or the more conservative Holm's procedure (Table S12). Under the Bonferroni correction, however, several tests lose significance.

Table S12: Multiple Comparisons Corrections, Experiment 2

Comparison	*P*-value	BH	Holm's	Bonferroni
Voting for Ennahda (poor, no Qur'an)	0.0242	0.045	0.073	0.097
Reliance on Divine Rewards (poor, no Qur'an)	0.0756	0.0756	0.076	0.302
Stress (poor who do not rely on rewards, no Qur'an)	0.00281	0.011	0.011	0.011
Parallel Mediation, ACME (poor)	0.033	0.045	0.073	0.134

Voting to Please God

After respondents selected the party they would vote for, they were asked:

We would like to ask about your reasons for voting for this party. Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following reasons [randomize order]:

Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree

a) *Allah will be more pleased if I vote for this party than other parties*
b) *This party will implement shari'a law more than other parties*
c) *This party cares for the poor more than other parties*
d) *Members of this party are more honest and trustworthy than other parties*

e) This party will defend the revolution more than other parties
f) This party will be more likely than others to provide public goods and services to people like me

You agreed or strongly agreed with the following statements: _____. Could you please rank these reasons in order of importance.

Table S13, model 1 demonstrates that poor Ennahda voters are about 21% more likely than Nidaa Tounes voters to strongly agree that pleasing Allah is an important consideration in deciding which party to vote for.

To evaluate how Ennahda voters rank pleasing Allah relative to other factors affecting vote choice, models 2 and 3 implement the Heckman Selection model (see text). The first stage, model 2, predicts who gets to rank pleasing Allah (i.e., who agreed with this statement), and the second stage, model 3, predicts who ranked pleasing Allah among their top two factors. Results suggest that poor Ennahda voters are also 31% more likely to rank pleasing Allah among their top two factors influencing vote choice.

Table 13: Voting to Please Allah (among poor)

	Model and DV:		
	OLS	*Heckman*	
	Strongly Agree	Selection (Agree)	Outcome (Rank)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ennahda	0.210*	0.244	0.313*
	(0.124)	(0.338)	(0.186)
Jabha Chaabia	0.079	−0.137	
	(0.138)	(0.365)	
Irada	0.024		
	(0.214)		
Nidaa Tounes			0.227
			(0.162)
Treatment		−0.406	
		(0.291)	
Quran		0.650**	
		(0.293)	
Constant	0.310***	0.341	−0.007
	(0.075)	(0.290)	(0.249)
Observations	91	90	90
R^2	0.033		0.056
Adjusted R^2	−0.0003		0.004
σ		0.519	
ρ			0.626
Inverse Mills Ratio			0.325 (0.336)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Of the five other options given as factors motivating vote choice, the only other one that differentiated Ennahda voters from voters of secular parties was a belief that this party is more likely to implement Islamic law (*shari`a*). However, even support for *shari`a* tended to be driven by a desire for divine rewards. In explaining why they supported *shari`a*, 77% of respondents chose "because they are the will of Allah and that will earn me Allah's favor in the afterlife." Only 15% chose "because they are better laws for society, and will make my life better in this world," while the remaining 8% said both.[1] In short, even those voters who support Ennahda for its religious policies may do so in order to please God.