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BETTER.

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Business Email Compromise: Operation Wire Wire & New Attack Vectors

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Topics

- Introduction
- BEC Impact
- BEC Targets and TTPs
- Recon: How Attackers Collect Data on Targets
- Operation Wire Wire & New Attack Vectors
- Defending Against BEC
- Apply

What is BEC?

“Impersonation of executives or business contacts to obtain the transfer of funds or sensitive information”

Business Email Compromise (BEC) is:

- Scam targeting businesses working with foreign suppliers and/or businesses that regularly perform wire transfer payments.
- Involves use of an email account compromise (EAC) component that targets individuals who perform wire transfer payments.
- Scam puts business email accounts, personally identifiable information (PII), and employee wage and tax information at risk.

“Colvis”



Through the work he did in the Dallas area, he thiefed \$3.2 million using BEC scams.

Target Selection

Expedia Add your property Account My Lists 1 My Trips Support Español 简体中文

Flights Hotels Bundle and Save Cars Cruises Things to Do Vacation Rentals Deals Mobile

Roundtrip One Way Multi-city

Lagos, Nigeria (LOS) Houston, TX, United States 03/04/2019 03/22/2019 Search

Nearby airports Nearby airports

1 Traveler, All Airlines, Economy / Coach Show options

Select your departure to Houston Mon, Mar 4

Prices are roundtrip per person, include all taxes and fees, but do not include baggage fees.

1 Stop

Sort & Filter Clear Show flexible dates

Sort by Price (Lowest)

Stops

☒ 1 Stop (36)

☐ 2+ Stops (37)

Airlines included

☐ Delta (29)

☐ United (13)

☐ Lufthansa (10)

☐ Air France (9)

☐ British Airways (9)

From:

6:00pm - 4:40pm +1 29h 40m (1 stop) LOS - 5h 50m in DXB - IAH \$1,263 roundtrip Select

Emirates Very Good Flight (7.7/10) Details & baggage fees

12:55pm - 4:40pm +1 34h 45m (1 stop) LOS - 11h in DXB - IAH \$1,263 roundtrip Select

Emirates Good Flight (7.1/10) Details & baggage fees

11:55pm - 2:20pm +1 21h 25m (1 stop) LOS - 3h 50m in CDG - IAH \$1,281 roundtrip Select

Delta

Hertz

Earn \$50 off* a hotel stay with your rental. *Terms apply.

Scenario used for FBI CICP BEC Course

- Texas Energy Company Case coined the 'BEC' term
- This case is the scenario for FBI Cyber Investigator Certification Program (CICP) Training on the LEEP Portal

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BEC Impact

International Business Email Compromise Schemes



BEC Numbers




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- Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks have increased by 136% from December 2016 to May 2018.
- It ranks #1 in the IC3's 2017 Internet Crime Report for the volume of victim losses, representing nearly half (48%) of the total losses of the top 10 Internet crimes.
- In 2017, IC3 received a total of **301,580 complaints** with reported losses exceeding **\$1.4 Billion**.

Source: "2017 Internet Crime Report" https://pdf.ic3.gov/2017_IC3Report.pdf

Cost of a Data Breach in the U.S.



https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/DBIR_2018_Report_execsummary.pdf



Social Media Mining



- Names
- Gender
- Social security numbers
- Birthdays
- Addresses
- Driver's license #
- Zip Code

BEC Attack Examples

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- Google/Facebook \$100M Partner Invoice Scam
 - Evaldas Rimašauskas \$100 million to BEC attacks impersonating their server hardware supplier Quanta even from Google and Facebook
- MacEwan University \$11.8M Wire Transfer Fraud
 - Defrauded of \$11.8 million in a BEC attack impersonating a vendor of the university.
- New York Judge Loses Over \$1.5M in Real Estate Scam
 - A NY State Supreme Court judge lost over \$1.5 million in a BEC attack that impersonated her lawyer,

- Source: Symantec Attack Trends Report, 2018.

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BEC Targets and TTPs

Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTPs)

International Business Email Compromise Schemes

BEC Common Targets

- Real Estate
- Legal Services
- B2B Commerce
- Database and W2 Theft



PII and W-2 Information Targets

- The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Stopped 6+ million suspicious returns in 2017
- These efforts prevented payment of \$11 billion in suspicious returns
- The IRS still paid out approximately \$5.1 billion in Stolen Identity Return Fraud (SIRF) in 2017


BEC Types



“Email Hacked”, “Credentials Stolen”



BEC Attack Timeline




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Recon: How Attackers Collect Data on Targets

International Business Email Compromise Schemes

Multiple Ways of Obtaining Information

- Professional cybercrime rings
- Malware
- Web compromise
- Access Control
- Open Source Intel Collection (OSIT)
- Social Engineering
- Social Media Mining
- Dark Web Mining



Source: ISACA State of Cyber Security 2017

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Social Engineering

- “From” field spoofing
 - From field appears to come from someone known, but actual sender address is different
- “Reply-To” field spoofing
 - Reply-To address field contains different email address (web mail)
- Sender spoofing
 - Address and From fields are faked, reply not expected - single phrase attack
- Visual domain spoofing
 - Homograph attack

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Dark Web Mining

Instant Messages

View instant messages from Skype, Facebook, WhatsApp, Line, iMessage, Viber, BBM and WeChat.

DroidJack - Welcome Sanju

Phone Number	Model	Manufacturer	Version	IP Address	ID
2...	C6725	kyocera	4.3	6...85	99...
...	SAMSUNG-SM-N90...	sams...		70.49.11	2...aa7

realtime-spy
monitor any pc - from anywhere.

your realtime-spy account information

Username: ?
Password: ?

Enter your given username/password above to start configuring your Realtime-Spy logging module.

Visit <http://realtime-spy.com/username> to view your logs. If you do not know your login information contact us at support@realtime-spy.com

realtime-spy's logging options

- ☒ Log Keystrokes
- ☒ Log Applications Ran
- ☒ Log Conversations
- ☒ Log Documents Opened
- ☒ Log Internet Connections
- ☒ Log Websites Visited
- ☒ Log Print Jobs

splash warning option

☒ Do not Alert User Realtime-Spy is running
☐ Alert User Realtime-Spy is running

activity log clearing schedule

Clear Logs every entries.
Logs will be cleared after the above number of entries are recorded.

[about](#) [help](#) [test](#) [create...](#)

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Office 365



Microsoft 365

Email Modification

Your domain's Microsoft Office 365 for Business account has been suspended.

Go to the sign-in page to reactivate your account, <https://portal.office.com>

Thank you for choosing to host your IT solutions with Microsoft.

Sincerely,
The Microsoft Office 365 Team

This is a mandatory service communication. To set your contact preferences for other communications,

This message was sent from an unmonitored email address.
Please do not reply to this message. Privacy | Legal

Microsoft Corporation | [One Microsoft Way](#),
[Redmond, WA 98052-6399](#)

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Operation Wire Wire & New Attack Vectors

International Business Email Compromise Schemes

Wire Wire Scam

- “BEC Hit List”
- Biggest losses compared to any other attack vector
- Billions of dollars lost
- ‘Slimwaco’ – CFO list of 200+ companies and 1000s of individuals targeted
- Global teams coordinating
- Over \$600 million lost in BEC attacks





Bryant Ortega

Timeline About Friends Photos More


About

To see what he shares with friends, [send him a friend request](#).

Overview

Work and Education


Agent at Health Insurance



Wire Wire Scam

- This case shows the increase in BEC target refinement
- "Huge Elite Limited" in Shanghai, China was the recipient of ill-gotten gains from Bryant Ortega.
- Natalie Armona was recruited having job as a Junior Processor at a lending firm





Operation WireWire

The FBI worked with partner agencies domestically and in multiple countries around the world in a large-scale, coordinated effort to dismantle international BEC schemes.

Coordinated Takedown

- Several U.S. federal authorities and police from other countries were involved
- Six-month investigation that lead to arrests of suspected scammers in the U.S. and overseas.
- 74 arrests in all:
 - 42 arrested were located in the U.S.
 - 29 in Nigeria and
 - 3 in Canada, Mauritius, and Poland.
- \$2.4 million seized
- \$14 million recovered

The Wire Wire Scam

- The Operation
 - Not a sophisticated technological attack
 - Increased effort and workflow of actors
 - Robust social connections between these actors
- The Takedown
 - Global cooperation
 - BEC awareness
 - Reporting will increase

Wire Wire Targets

- Target Lists:
 - Experian.com/small-business/mail-lists
 - InfoUSA.com
 - DatabaseUSA.com
 - ReferYes.com
 - Dark Web Marketplaces
 - eGrabber.com

“Capture leads & prospects from any webpage, find & add any missing field (email/phone/...), update, de-dupe, merge & segment any prospect list”

Wire Wire Victim Profile

- Title companies
- Consulting firms
- IT Providers
- Legal Services
- Banks
- Transportation

Wire Wire Scenarios: Romance & Employment

- “Romance scams,” which lull victims to believe that their online paramour needs funds for an international business transaction, a U.S. visit or some other purpose
- “Employment opportunities scams,” which recruits prospective employees for work-from-home employment opportunities where employees are required to provide their PII as new “hires”
- Are significantly overpaid by check whereby the employees wire the overpayment to the employers’ bank

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Defending Against BEC

International Business Email Compromise Schemes

Why is this a problem?

- Traditional security solutions rely on the following:
 - Anti-malware, Link Detection, Reputation, Content Analysis
- Messages are usually hand crafted
 - Little to detect
 - High reward warrants the additional effort

Security & Training Awareness is Flawed

- Should users be your first AND last line of defense?
- How diligent are your users?
- Training time = lost productivity?
- Ongoing training costs

Defending Against Scams

Awareness is key:

- Carefully scrutinize all emails
- Educate and train employees
- Verify vendors
- Know your customers
- Confirm requests
- Report it to the Internet Criminal Complaint Center (IC3) at:
<https://www.ic3.gov/default.aspx>

Prevent Users Becoming Victims

- Identify similar domain names (**abc_company.com** != **abc-company.com**)
- **Flag** different 'Reply-To' address
- Color-code **internal** from **external** email
- Use 'known approved' details only
- Authenticate requests by phone
- Create 'two step' approval process for changes, much like 2fa

Technology Solutions

- Separate analysis of sender email(s), First part(s), Domain(s)
- Email message headers dynamic matching and scoring
- Implement SPF, DKIM, and DMARC at your organization
- Monitor VIP names most likely to be impersonated
- Visual spoofing detection engine,
 - e.g. **apple** != **aqqle**, **Charm** -> **Charrn**

Protect Accounts and Data

- Create intrusion detection system (IDS) rules that flag e-mails similar to company e-mail (*abc_company.com* would flag *abc-company.com*)
- Create e-mail rules to flag e-mail where the “reply” e-mail address differs from the “from” e-mail address
- Color code virtual correspondence (internal vs. external accounts)
- Verify changes in vendor payment location by adding 2fa
- Confirm requests for transfers of funds by using phone verification as part of a 2fa using only previously known numbers
- Carefully scrutinize all e-mail requests for transfer of funds

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Apply

International Business Email Compromise Schemes

An abstract graphic on the right side of the slide, consisting of numerous overlapping circles and dots in a lighter shade of purple, creating a sense of motion and complexity.

Key Indicators of BEC

- Large wire or funds transfer to a recipient the company has never dealt with in the past.
- Transfers initiated near the end of day (or cut-off windows) and/or before weekends or holidays.
- Receiving account does not have a history of receiving large funds transfers in the past.
- Receiving account is a personal account, whereas the company typically only sends wires to other businesses.

Strategies to Apply

- BEC attack awareness training for internal staff (Account Managers, BSA, Fraud, Wire Room, etc.)
- Implement SPF, DKIM, and DMARC at your organization
- Create a list of known good domains used by your organization and business partners, and use a domain name permutation algorithm to create a list of similar domain names
- Create a network or email policy to block recently registered domains

Summary

- Traditional BEC methods (still successfully used)
 - Bogus Invoice
 - CEO Fraud
 - Social Engineering
 - Account Compromise
 - Attorney Impersonation
- BEC workflow and attack vectors are improving and expanding:
 - Large quantities of data exposure leaves people vulnerable
 - Actors are leveraging the data exposure, combining it with multiple sources, and are able to both refine and expand target lists
 - BEC is easy to execute and on the rise

If You Want to Know More

- <https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/business-e-mail-compromise>
- <https://www.IC3.gov>
- <https://www.ic3.gov/media/2016/160614.aspx>
- <https://www.cisecurity.org/press-release/national-isacs-fbi-uss-and-symantec-collaborate-to-fight-business-email-compromise/>

The background of the slide is a solid purple color. On the right side, there is a complex, abstract pattern of thin, curved lines in shades of blue, cyan, and orange, with small dots at various points along these lines, resembling a network or a stylized globe. The lines and dots are more densely packed on the right side and become sparser towards the left.

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Thank you!
Questions?

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