

# SecureMed: Secure Medical Computation Using GPU-Accelerated Homomorphic Encryption Scheme

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**Abstract**—Sharing the medical records of individuals among healthcare providers and researchers around the world can accelerate advances in medical research. While the idea seems increasingly practical due to cloud data services, maintaining patient privacy is of paramount importance. Standard encryption algorithms help protect sensitive data from outside attackers but they cannot be used to compute on this sensitive data while being encrypted. Homomorphic Encryption presents a very useful tool that can compute on encrypted data without the need to decrypt it. In this paper, we describe an optimized NTRU-based implementation of the GSW homomorphic encryption scheme. Our results show a factor of  $58 \times$  improvement in CPU performance compared to other recent work on encrypted medical data under the same security settings. Our system is built to be easily portable to GPUs resulting in an additional speedup of up to a factor of  $104 \times$  (and  $410 \times$ ) to offer an overall speedup of  $6085 \times$  (and  $24011 \times$ ) using a single GPU (or four GPUs), respectively.

**Index Terms**—FHE, GPU, homomorphic encryption, implementation, medical applications, NTRU, relational operations.

## I. INTRODUCTION

THE privacy of sensitive personal information is an increasingly important topic as a result of the increased availability of cloud services. These privacy issues arise due to the legitimate concern of a) having a security breach on these cloud servers or b) the leakage of this sensitive information due to an honest but curious individual at the cloud service provider. Standard encryption schemes try to address the first concern by devising encryption schemes that are harder to break, yet they don't solve the possible misuse of this sensitive data by the cloud service providers.

Homomorphic encryption (HE) presents a tool that can solve both types of privacy concerns. The clients are given the possibility of encrypting their sensitive information before sending it to the cloud. The cloud will then compute over their encrypted data without the need for the decryption key. By using HE,

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


Fig. 1. High level block diagram for the medical data/key-distribution system.

servers guarantee to the clients that their valuable information is never in the clear. A fully homomorphic encryption scheme (FHE) is an encryption scheme that allows evaluation of arbitrary functions on encrypted data.

In the era of Internet of Things (IoT), homomorphic encryption can be used to encrypt the data measured by wearable and portable medical devices prior to uploading them to the cloud. This can be very useful to help researchers and clinicians to conduct research or diagnose using this secure data. These devices can store public encryption keys produced by a centralized entity, which is also responsible for the distribution of secret keys to the hospitals through secure channels. The challenge here is that these portable devices have modest computing power compared to general purpose processors. Fortunately, these devices only need to encrypt the measurement data. Since performance of the encryption function is not time latency critical, these embedded processors can encrypt sensor data within seconds instead of milliseconds and still offer acceptable performance to real applications.

A proposed way to handle medical data measurements, analysis, and key distribution system is demonstrated in Fig. 1. A central medical authority, such as the Ontario Laboratories Information System (OLIS), will be responsible for generating secret and public keys. Public keys will then be distributed, using the wide-area network, among medical laboratories and downloaded to portable and wearable medical devices. The medical data generated by the medical personnel in laboratories and by patients using their devices will then be encrypted by the public key and uploaded to the cloud. All patient medical data

can be stored on the cloud servers safely as the HE scheme is provably secure against attacks. Analysts, administrators, or clinicians can run experiments on the encrypted medical data without having any secret keys. In order to finally decrypt the encrypted experiment results, the researchers will need to gain access to the secret keys from the key authority system using a secure channel. This secure channel can be a virtual private network (VPN), a secure physical flash drive, or any other secure way to gain access to the secret keys.

The first FHE scheme was proposed by Craig Gentry [1], [2]. Since then, we have seen rapid development in the theory and implementation of homomorphic encryption schemes. HE schemes can now be based on a variety of cryptographic assumptions – approximate greatest common divisors [3], [4], learning with errors (LWE) [5]–[8], Ring-LWE (RLWE) [9]–[12] and NTRU [13]–[17]. Simple computations such as matching entries in a database and computing on the matched items were impossible using standard encryption schemes until the work done in SHIELD [12] where multiple classification functions were implemented including searching in databases and computing on the result using a homomorphic encryption scheme.

The main contributions of this work is the introduction of a NTRU based version of SHIELD [12] to reduce its computational complexity by a factor of  $4.15 \times$ . Our GPU implementation of the HE scheme achieves a ciphertext (Ctxt) multiplication run time of 0.838 milliseconds, and the CPU implementation requires 87.8 milliseconds (See Table V for the design environment). Our CPU implementation achieves a speedup of  $58 \times$  over work in [18]. Our GPU implementation gives us a further  $104 \times$  (and  $410 \times$ ) speedup with overall speedup of  $6085 \times$  (and  $24011 \times$ ) over [18] using a single GPU (and four GPUs), respectively.

This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents related work. In Section III we introduce the improved encryption scheme. Some examples of secure medical applications are introduced in Section IV. Performance results are introduced in Section VI. Finally we conclude in Section VII.

## II. RELATED WORK

NTRU is a ring-based encryption scheme first proposed in [13]. Previous constructions of ring-based FHE schemes including NTRU are [5], [6], [11], [14], [15]. One of the drawbacks of these schemes is the need to maintain a so-called “modulus chain” which increases the size of the prime number and consequently increases the ring dimension for the same security level [19]. They also need to perform expensive modulus and key switching operations. In [14], [15], their homomorphic evaluations are on plaintexts mod 2 (binary arithmetic). Furthermore, the evaluation keys used in the Ctxt multiplication are in the GByte range which significantly limits their performance. The work in [20] is the closest one to our work since they also combined the NTRU scheme with GSW scheme concepts in [7]. Yet, in [20], they still require the flatten operation in the GSW scheme which leads to large memory usage and more computation time. They are also able to decrypt only a single bit from one polynomial and discard the remaining  $\ell - 1$  polynomials. Whereas in our implementation, we extract a single bit of the message out of each polynomial which helps us retrieve  $\ell$  bits messages. Moreover, in [20], since they use the flatten operation

and their matrices are broken down into bits, they execute matrix multiplication using circular convolution rather than using the NTT transform. This is reasonable in the case of bit-wise multiplication, but when they tried to reduce the computation and storage costs by grouping bits together, the circular convolution became much harder without the NTT transform.

Based on [5], Halevi and Shoup designed a homomorphic encryption library [11], [21], but due to the need of additional large data structures and functions, the performance of their library was diminished. In [10] they implemented a variant of the RLWE FHE scheme. Our results also show considerable speedups over their implementation. Another homomorphic library was developed by Rohloff, Cousins, and Peikert [22]. In their paper they implement primary building blocks in hardware to accelerate their system. Presently, there are no performance results available with which to compare our library. Our work is a NTRU variant of SHIELD [12] which was based on RLWE. This resulted in a  $4 \times$  reduction in the ciphertext size and  $2 \times$  speedup in performance compared to [12]. Other researchers have proposed implementations but they were either an incomplete implementations of an HE scheme capable of only performing one multiplication operation [23], or based on other cryptographic assumptions such as approximate greatest common divisor, ideal lattices, etc.

Some applications analyzed in this paper were primarily inspired from [18], [24], [25]. The work in [18] exhibits slow running time. The work in [24] on the other hand has considerably faster running times but at the expense of having an incomplete implementation of the HE scheme that needs to provide the client with information about the depth of the computation made in order to correctly decrypt the result. The authors in [24] mentioned a slowdown by a factor of  $50 \times$  when using the complete HE implementation. This may raise security concerns from the server side due to the leakage of some of information about the applied function. In [26] Fujitsu laboratories used simple polynomial multiplication to compute correlation between different biometric samples but their performance is not representative since their function  $F = C_1 \times C_2$  needs only a single ciphertext multiplication. For a simple and general overview of homomorphic encryption concepts the reader is encouraged to read [27], [28].

## III. THE ENCRYPTION SYSTEM

*Notation:* For an odd prime number  $q$  we identify the ring  $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$  (or  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ ) with the interval  $(-q/2, q/2) \cap \mathbb{Z}$ . The notation  $[x]_q$  denotes reducing  $x$  modulo  $q$ . Our implementation uses polynomial rings defined by the cyclotomic polynomials  $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/\Phi_m(X)$ , where  $\Phi_m(X) = x^n + 1$  is the irreducible  $m$ th cyclotomic polynomial, in which  $n$  is a power of 2 and  $m = 2n$ . We let  $R_q = R/qR$ . Any type of multiplication including matrix and polynomial multiplication is denoted by the multiplication operator  $\cdot$ . Rounding up to the nearest integer is denoted by  $\lceil a \rceil$ . Matrices of rings are defined as  $A_{M \times N}$ , where  $A_{ij} \in R_q$  and  $M, N$  are the matrix dimensions.  $I_{\ell \times \ell}$  represents the identity matrix of rings.

### A. The Encryption Scheme

The parameters of the system are  $n$ , the degree of the number field;  $q$ , the modulus;  $\sigma_k$  and  $\sigma_c$ , the standard deviation of the

discrete Gaussian error distribution in the key space and ciphertext space respectively;  $\ell \triangleq \lceil \log q \rceil$  that governs the number of ring elements in a ciphertext. The setting of these parameters depends on the security level  $\lambda$  (e.g.,  $\lambda = 80$  or 128 bits) as well as the complexity of functions we expect to evaluate on ciphertexts.

**Bit Decompose Function “BD()”:** The bit decompose function  $BD(integer)$  takes an  $\ell$ -bit input integer, then outputs a row vector with size  $\ell$  containing the bit decomposition of this integer. Similarly,  $BD(polyynomial)$  takes an input polynomial of size  $n$ , where each coefficient is an  $\ell$ -bit integer, then outputs an  $\ell$ -sized row vector of polynomials (each of size  $n$ ) containing the bit decomposition of each coefficient of the input polynomial, yielding a matrix of size  $\ell \times n$ . Finally,  $BD(Matrix\ of\ polynomials)$  takes an input matrix of polynomials of size  $x \times y$  (each polynomial is of size  $n$  with integer coefficients), then outputs a matrix of polynomials expanded by a factor  $\ell$  in the column dimension, yielding a matrix of size  $x \times y\ell$ , where each consecutive  $\ell$  elements along the row contain the bit representation of each coefficient of each of the input polynomials. For example, the bit decompose of the input polynomial matrix  $B_{x \times y \times n}$  is  $BD(B_{x \times y \times n}) = \beta_{x \times y \ell \times n}$ . The reader should note that despite the fact that the polynomial coefficients of matrix  $\beta_{x \times y \ell \times n}$  are single bit values, the storage requirement of matrix  $\beta$  in CPU or GPU memory is not equal to  $x \times y\ell \times n$  bits. This is due to the fact that the smallest addressable unit of memory is a byte (i.e., Byte Addressable). Hence,  $\beta$  requires  $x \times y\ell \times n$  bytes of storage. This results in the further observation that the storage requirement of  $\beta_{x \times y \ell \times n}$  is  $8 \times$  the storage requirement of  $B_{x \times y \times n}$ .

**Bit Decompose Inverse Function “BDI()”:** As the name reveals, the  $BDI()$  function is the inverse of  $BD()$ . The  $BDI()$  function groups consecutive  $\ell$  coefficients along a row (the coefficients don't need to be binary), and outputs the integer corresponding to those  $\ell$  bits. Mathematically, the  $BDI()$  function can be defined as multiplying the *expanded* matrix of polynomials  $\beta_{x \times y \ell}$  from the right by the matrix  $\alpha_{y \ell \times y}$  defined in (1) (polynomial dimension  $n$  will be omitted from this point forward for clarity). Hence  $B_{x \times y} = BDI(\beta_{x \times y \ell}) = \beta_{x \times y \ell} \cdot \alpha_{y \ell \times y}$ .

$$\alpha_{y \ell \times y} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 2 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 2^{\ell-1} & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & 2 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 2^{\ell-1} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 2^{\ell-1} \end{pmatrix} \quad (1)$$

In this work, we present a NTRU variant of the encryption scheme presented in [12] in order to reduce computational com-

plexity and to speedup our operations, as will be detailed below. Our encryption system works as follows.

- 1) **Keygen( $1^\lambda$ ):** Choose two polynomials  $f_{1 \times 1}, g_{1 \times 1} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma_k}$  such that (a)  $f$  is invertible in the ring  $R_q$ ; and (b)  $f \equiv 1 \pmod{2}$ . This is done by simply sampling the polynomial  $f$  from the distribution  $D_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma_k}$  until it satisfies conditions (a) and (b).

The public key  $pk$  and the secret key  $sk$  can be computed from (2).

$$pk = h_{1 \times 1} = g_{1 \times 1} \cdot f_{1 \times 1}^{-1} \in R_q \quad sk = f_{1 \times 1} \in R_q \quad (2)$$

- 2) **Enc( $pk, m$ ):** The message space of our encryption scheme is  $R_q$ . Encrypt the plain text polynomial  $\mu \in R_q$  by calculating

$$C_{\ell \times 1} = \mu \cdot BDI(I_{\ell \times \ell}) + S_{\ell \times 1} \cdot h_{1 \times 1} + E_{\ell \times 1} \quad (3)$$

where  $S_{\ell \times 1}, E_{\ell \times 1} \leftarrow D_{R_q^{\ell \times 1}, \sigma_c}$  are sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution with standard deviation  $\sigma_c$ .

- 3) **Dec( $sk, C$ ):** Given the ciphertext  $C$ , the plaintext  $\mu \in R_q$  is restored by multiplying  $C$  by the secret-key  $f$  as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} C_{\ell \times 1} \cdot f_{1 \times 1} &= (\mu \cdot BDI(I_{\ell \times \ell}) \\ &\quad + S_{\ell \times 1} \cdot h_{1 \times 1} + E_{\ell \times 1}) \cdot f_{1 \times 1} \\ &= \mu \cdot BDI(I_{\ell \times \ell}) \cdot f_{1 \times 1} \\ &\quad + S_{\ell \times 1} \cdot h_{1 \times 1} \cdot f_{1 \times 1} + E_{\ell \times 1} \cdot f_{1 \times 1} \\ &= \mu \cdot BDI(I_{\ell \times \ell}) \cdot f_{1 \times 1} \\ &\quad + S_{\ell \times 1} \cdot g_{1 \times 1} + E_{\ell \times 1} \cdot f_{1 \times 1} \\ &= \mu \cdot BDI(I_{\ell \times \ell}) \cdot f_{1 \times 1} + error_{\ell \times 1}. \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

The decrypted Ctxt in (4) can be reformulated as in (5) and the bit representation of each coefficient  $\mu f_i$  of the  $\mu f$  polynomial can be represented as in (6).

$$\begin{aligned} C_{\ell \times 1} \cdot f_{1 \times 1} &= \mu f \cdot \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \\ \vdots \\ 2^{\ell-1} \end{bmatrix} + error_{\ell \times 1} \\ &= \begin{bmatrix} \mu f \\ 2\mu f \\ \vdots \\ 2^{\ell-1}\mu f \end{bmatrix} + error_{\ell \times 1} \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mu f_i &= \begin{bmatrix} (\mu f_i)_{\ell-1} & (\mu f_i)_{\ell-2} & \cdots & (\mu f_i)_2 \\ (\mu f_i)_1 & (\mu f_i)_0 \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

The result in (5) consists of an  $\ell \times 1$  vector of polynomials which are in the form  $\mu f, 2\mu f, \dots, 2^{\ell-1}\mu f$  in addition to the error vector. Ignoring the modular reduction effect for simplicity, which would effect only the lower bits, the

shifted versions of  $\mu f$  can be visualized as in (7).

$$\begin{bmatrix} \mu f \\ 2\mu f \\ \vdots \\ 2^{\ell-2}\mu f \\ 2^{\ell-1}\mu f \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} (\mu f)_{\ell-1} & \cdots & (\mu f)_1 & (\mu f)_0 \\ (\mu f)_{\ell-2} & \cdots & (\mu f)_0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ (\mu f)_1 & (\mu f)_0 & \cdots & 0 \\ (\mu f)_0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (7)$$

Note that the left most column of the result in (7) are the individual bits of the  $\mu f$  polynomial. This is true for each coefficient “ $i$ ” in the polynomial  $\mu f$ . This way we can successfully construct back  $\mu f$ , assuming that the error is less than  $q/2$ , which can then be multiplied by  $f^{-1}$  to recover  $\mu$ .

**Remark 1:** In addition to the ability to recover the message polynomial  $\mu$ , the  $\ell$  ring elements in the ciphertext facilitate and manage the noise growth in homomorphic operations (in particular, homomorphic multiplication) as we will describe shortly.

**1) Homomorphic Operations:** For input ciphertexts  $C_{\ell \times 1}$  and  $D_{\ell \times 1} \in R_q^{\ell \times 1}$  encrypting  $\mu_1$  and  $\mu_2$  respectively, homomorphic operations are defined as follows.

- 1) **ADD**( $C, D$ ): To add the two ciphertexts  $C_{\ell \times 1}$  and  $D_{\ell \times 1}$ , simply output  $C_{\ell \times 1} + D_{\ell \times 1}$ , which is an entry-wise addition.
- 2) **MULT**( $C, D$ ): To multiply the two ciphertexts  $C_{\ell \times 1}$  and  $D_{\ell \times 1}$ , output  $\text{BD}(C_{\ell \times 1}) \cdot D_{\ell \times 1}$ .

Correctness of homomorphic addition is immediate, however correctness is not that obvious for homomorphic multiplication. It is clear that the multiplication algorithm is asymmetric in the input ciphertexts  $C$  and  $D$ . That is, we treat the components of  $D$  as a whole, whereas the components of  $C$  are broken up into their “bit-wise decompositions”. This is a “feature” that is inherited from the work of BV [8]. It is shown below that this multiplication method is correct and gives a slow noise-growth rate.

The correctness of the multiplication operation is evident from the decryption operation in (8). Matrix dimensions are removed for clarity.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{BD}(C) \cdot D \cdot f &= \text{BD}(C) \cdot (\mu_2 \cdot \text{BDI}(I) + S_2 \cdot h + E_2) \cdot f \\ &= \text{BD}(C) \cdot (\mu_2 \cdot \text{BDI}(I) \cdot f + S_2 \cdot g + E_2 \cdot f) \\ &= \mu_2 \cdot C \cdot f + \text{BD}(C) \cdot (S_2 \cdot g + E_2 \cdot f) \\ &= \mu_2 \cdot (\mu_1 \cdot \text{BDI}(I) \cdot f + S_1 \cdot g + E_1 \cdot f) \\ &\quad + \text{BD}(C) \cdot (S_2 \cdot g + E_2 \cdot f) \\ &= \mu_2 \cdot \mu_1 \cdot \text{BDI}(I) \cdot f + \mu_2 \cdot (S_1 \cdot g + E_1 \cdot f) \\ &\quad + \text{BD}(C) \cdot (S_2 \cdot g + E_2 \cdot f) \\ &= \mu_2 \cdot \mu_1 \cdot \text{BDI}(I) \cdot f + \mu_2 \cdot \text{error}_1 \\ &\quad + \text{BD}(C) \cdot \text{error}_2 \\ &= \mu_2 \cdot \mu_1 \cdot \text{BDI}(I) \cdot f + \text{error}. \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

Note that the last line in (8) is the encryption of  $\mu = \mu_2 \cdot \mu_1 \cdot f$ . Note also that  $\text{BD}(C_{\ell \times 1}) \cdot \text{BDI}(I_{\ell \times \ell}) = I_{\ell \times \ell} \cdot C_{\ell \times 1} = C$ .

**Noise Analysis:** Correct decryption depends crucially on the ciphertext noise being bounded. Thus, it is important to understand how homomorphic operations increase ciphertext noise.

Let  $C$  be a fresh ciphertext. We make the following observations, after [8].

- 1) Homomorphic addition of  $v$  ciphertexts increases the noise by a factor of  $v$ , in the worst case. In practice, since the coefficients of the error polynomials follow a Gaussian distribution, the factor is closer to  $O(\sqrt{v})$ .
- 2) Homomorphic multiplication is significantly more interesting. Multiplication of two fresh ciphertexts  $Z_1 = C_1 \times C_2$  where  $C_1 = \text{Enc}(\mu_1)$  and  $C_2 = \text{Enc}(\mu_2)$ , with the messages  $\mu_i$  bounded by  $\kappa$  and error bounded by  $B$ , increases the error ( $E_2$ ) to  $E_2 = O(B \cdot \|\kappa\|_1 + B \cdot n \log q)$  in the worst case, and  $E_2 = O(B \cdot \|\kappa\|_1 + B \cdot \sqrt{n \log q})$  in practice. Here,  $\|\kappa\|_1$  denotes the  $\ell_1$  norm of the message polynomial  $\mu$ . Multiplying by another fresh Ctxt  $Z_2 = Z_1 \times C_3$  increases the error to  $E_3 = E_2 \cdot \|\kappa\|_1 + B \cdot n \log q$ . Substituting with  $E_2$

$$\begin{aligned} E_3 &= (B \cdot \|\kappa\|_1 + B \cdot n \log q) \cdot \|\kappa\|_1 + B \cdot n \log q \\ &= B \cdot \|\kappa\|_1^2 + B \cdot \|\kappa\|_1 \cdot n \log q + B \cdot n \log q \\ &= B \cdot (\|\kappa\|_1^2 + (\|\kappa\|_1 + 1) \cdot n \log q) \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

Following this analysis, multiplying  $L$  sequential Ctxts will increase the error to

$$\begin{aligned} E_L &= B \cdot (\|\kappa\|_1^{L-1} + (\|\kappa\|_1^{L-2} + \|\kappa\|_1^{L-3} + \cdots + 1) \\ &\quad \cdot n \log q) \\ &= B \cdot (\|\kappa\|_1^{L-1} + \frac{1 - \|\kappa\|_1^{L-1}}{1 - \|\kappa\|_1} \cdot n \log q) \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

**How to Set Parameters:** We base the security of our system relying on the analysis in [17], [19], and [29]. Let  $f$  be the function that we are evaluating that computes the multiplication of  $v$  ciphertexts. Let  $\text{error}_f(B, n, q)$  denote how much the error grows when evaluating a function  $f$  on ciphertexts in  $R_q$  with an initial error of magnitude  $B$ . For correct decryption, we need

$$\text{error}_f(B, n, q) < q/2 \quad (11)$$

Since error grows slower in our scheme relative to other FHE schemes [18], [24], [25], and since there is no need for a chain of moduli to control the noise growth,  $q$  can be set to be correspondingly smaller for the same security level. Following the analysis of Lindner and Peikert [19], for a security level of  $\lambda$  bits, we need

$$n > \log(q/\sigma)(\lambda + 110)/7.2 \quad (12)$$

Since our  $\log q$  is smaller relative to [18], [24], [25], we can set our  $n$  to be smaller, for the same security level  $\lambda$ . In turn, since we now have a smaller  $n$ , our new  $\text{error}_f(B, n, q)$  is smaller, leading to an even smaller  $q$ , and so on. The optimal parameters are obtained by solving both the above inequalities together.

We are aware that the analysis done in [19] was made by using the older BKZ not the new, more efficient, BKZ 2.0 algorithm [30]. This is because Lindner-Peikert equations result in more conservative parameters than the ones from BKZ 2.0, as reported in [31], [32].

To protect our NTRU scheme against Subfield Lattice Attacks [29], the “perfect immunity”, as described by the authors, can



**TABLE I**  
PARAMETER SELECTION AND KEYS/CTXT SIZES

Parameter	NTRU (This work)
$\lambda$	173
$n$	1024
$\ell$	31
$\sigma_k$	25
$\sigma_c$	10
SK size	$n \times \ell = 3.968$ KBytes
PK size	$n \times \ell = 3.968$ KBytes
Ctxt size	$\ell \times n \times \ell = 123.008$ KBytes

**TABLE II**  
BLOOD PRESSURE CLASSIFICATION

Category	Systolic mm Hg	Diastolic mm Hg
Hypotension	< 90	< 60
Desired	90 – 119	60 – 79
Prehypertension	120 – 139	80 – 89
Stage 1 hypertension	140 – 159	90 – 99
Stage 2 hypertension	160 – 179	100 – 109
Hypertensive emergency	$\geq 180$	$\geq 110$

be achieved when

$$\sqrt{2} \cdot \sigma_k^2 \cdot \hat{n} > \sqrt{\hat{n}q/\pi e} \quad (13)$$

where  $\hat{n} = n/2$ . Fixing  $q$  and  $\hat{n}$ , the parameter  $\sigma_k$  should satisfy (14).

$$\sigma_k > \sqrt{\frac{q}{2\hat{n}\pi e}} \quad (14)$$

which results in the condition that  $\sigma_k$  should be larger than or equal 23. The vulnerability factor<sup>1</sup> (15) is a ratio which represents the extent to which this NTRU scheme is vulnerable to subfield lattice attacks. The scheme is immune when  $F < 1$ .

$$F = \frac{\sqrt{\hat{n}q/\pi e}}{\sqrt{2}\sigma_k^2\hat{n}} \quad (15)$$

We set  $\sigma_k = 25$  to achieve vulnerability factor  $F = 0.79$ . Table I summarizes our final parameter selection.

Our encryption scheme is also immune against the recent attack on NTRU in [33]. Using the data in [33] (Table II, Fig. 1), which use polynomials  $f$  and  $g$  sampled from  $[-1, 0, 1]$ , to extrapolate a generalized equation for the minimum  $\log(q)$  below which the algorithm in [33] fails<sup>2</sup>, results in (16).

$$\min(\log(q)) = 1.0127e^{0.3867 \log(n)} \quad (16)$$

Substituting  $\log(n) = 10$  in (16) results in  $\min(\log(q)) = 48$  bits which offers a safe margin from the  $\log(q) = 31$  bits used in this work. In addition, we sample the polynomials  $f$  and  $g$  from a Gaussian distribution with standard deviation  $\sigma_k = 25$ , not from  $[-1, 0, 1]$ . This improves our security level since it is directly proportional to  $\sigma$ , as can be deduced from (12) and (15).

<sup>1</sup>Equation (13) only indicates sufficiency to achieve perfect immunity, but it does not indicate to what extent the encryption scheme is vulnerable against subfield lattice attacks. This is represented by the vulnerability factor  $F$  in (15).

<sup>2</sup>We use the points in Table II / Fig. 1 in [33] with  $\log(r) = 1$  and 2 to get the worst case  $\min(\log(q))$ .

#### Function 1: Secure Blood Pressure Classification.

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Input: Encrypted Blood Pressure Sys\_Enc, Dia\_Enc  
Output: Blood Pressure Classification  
Sys\_Ref = [90, 120, 140, 160, 180]  
Dia\_Ref = [60, 80, 90, 100, 110]  
For each number “i” in the reference lists {  
    Res\_Sys += Check\_Greater(Sys\_Enc, Sys\_Ref[i]);  
    Res\_Dia += Check\_Greater(Dia\_Enc, Dia\_Ref[i]);  
}  
Return Res\_Sys and Res\_Dia

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## IV. CANDIDATE APPLICATIONS

We chose to outline some candidate applications, first outlined in [18], [24], [25], in order to be able to compare the performance of our method.

### A. Relational Operations

Originally, homomorphic addition and multiplication were the only available operations that can be applied on encrypted data. Afterwards, [12], [25] implemented a homomorphic equality operation through comparing individual bits of the encrypted data. Homomorphic relational operations  $>$  and  $<$  can enable new applications. The idea was originally presented in [34] where they introduced the idea of conditional gates. Later in [25] they applied this idea to homomorphic encryption. The relational operations  $a > b$  results in one bit only, which is equal to 1 if  $a > b$ , and 0, otherwise. Individual bits of each input  $a$  and  $b$  are encrypted and denote them as  $a_i$  and  $b_i$ , respectively. Assume we have  $k$ -bit numbers, we start with the least significant bit and the output is given by  $z_k$ , where

$$z_0 = 0 \quad z_{i+1} = (1 - (a_i - b_i)^2)z_i + a_i(1 - b_i). \quad (17)$$

if any of the two inputs were not encrypted, the complexity of (17) can be greatly reduced. For example, if  $b$  is not encrypted, the resulting equations will be

$$z_0 = 0, \quad z_{i+1} = \begin{cases} (1 - a_i)z_i + a_i & \text{if } b_i = 0 \\ a_i z_i & \text{if } b_i = 1 \end{cases} \quad (18)$$

**1) Blood Pressure Test:** As a proof of concept of the benefits of the homomorphic relational operations, a secure blood pressure application was built. The application simply accepts the encrypted systolic and diastolic pressures and returns the blood pressure classification according to Table II.

To implement this blood pressure example, we compare the input blood pressure to multiple ranges to decide the blood pressure classification. This can be simply done using Function 1. The Res\_Sys and Res\_Dia parameters in Function 1 will each contain an encrypted number ranging from 0 to 5 indicating the classification of the input encrypted blood pressure measurements compared to the blood pressure range in the systolic Sys\_Ref and diastolic Dia\_Ref reference lists, respectively.

It is worth mentioning that the relational operation applications are numerous. The blood pressure example is just an illustrative example of its usefulness and power. For example, calculating the CHADS<sub>2</sub> Score for Atrial Fibrillation Stroke Risk is straightforward [35] in a similar manner.

**2) Framingham Coronary Heart Disease Risk Score (FCRS):** The FCRS is an algorithm used to estimate the 10-year cardiovascular risk of a person. For more information about this algorithm, the reader is referred to [36], [37]. The algorithm is based on several factors, including sex, age, cigarette smoking, total cholesterol, high-density lipoprotein (HDL) cholesterol, and systolic blood pressure. Each variable is compared against a range of numbers and a score is assigned for each range and added to the overall Framingham score. For example, if a man's age was  $\geq 50$  years, 6 points are added to the total score.

To implement this algorithm, the relational operations described in Section IV-A are not sufficient because it gives a "1" if the input is larger than a certain number and "0" otherwise. If we have an input " $b$ " compared against " $a$ " as a lower bound and " $c$ " as an upper bound, we need to implement  $a < b < c$  function which gives only a "1" if " $b$ " is within this range and "0" otherwise.

The straight-forward way to implement  $a < b < c$ , is to implement it in two steps, namely  $a < b$  and then  $b < c$  and multiply the results. The only downside to this approach is that in our encryption scheme, in fact all GSW derived schemes in general, the homomorphic multiplication is asymmetric preventing the possibility of multiplying two non-fresh Ctxts. We mean by non-fresh Ctxts the Ctxts that contain results of Ctxt multiplications. In order to overcome this challenge, we reformulated the equations for  $a < b < c$  such that they always multiply fresh Ctxts by an accumulator.

" $a < b < c$ " *Reformulated:* As mentioned, to implement such a function we could multiply the results of individual relational operations. We used this idea to re-format the equations needed to implement this function. For a  $k$ -bit input " $b$ " with encrypted bits  $[b_0, b_1, \dots, b_{k-1}]$  compared against " $a$ " and " $c$ " (encrypted or unencrypted) we can implement the function  $a < b < c$  as follows: First we define for bit "0"

$$x_0 = b_0(1 - a_0) \quad y_0 = c_0(1 - b_0) \quad z_0 = 0. \quad (19)$$

and then for each bit " $i$ "

$$\begin{aligned} x_{i+1} &= (1 - (b_i - a_i)^2)x_i + b_i(1 - a_i) \\ y_{i+1} &= (1 - (c_i - b_i)^2)y_i + c_i(1 - b_i) \\ z_{i+1} &= (1 - (b_i - a_i)^2)(1 - (c_i - b_i)^2)z_i \\ &\quad + (1 - (b_i - a_i)^2)c_i(1 - b_i)x_i \\ &\quad + (1 - (c_i - b_i)^2)b_i(1 - a_i)y_i \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

where  $x_i, y_i, z_i$  are accumulators,  $b_i$  is encrypted bit  $i$  of input  $b$ , and  $a_i, c_i$  are the bits of the lower and upper bounds, respectively.  $z_k$  will contain the result of the relational operation. In the case that  $a_i$  and  $c_i$  are plaintexts, (20) can be further simplified as in (18).

It is worth mentioning that the number of Ctxt multiplications needed for this circuit, in the case of plaintext  $a$  and  $c$ , are 8 multiplications per bit, compared to only 2 Ctxts multiplications per bit for other HE schemes that supports multiplying two non-fresh Ctxts.

## B. Encrypted Genomic Data

In [24] the authors described statistical algorithms used in genomic association studies. In this paper, we briefly summarize

TABLE III  
GENOTYPE/PHENOTYPE CORRELATION MATRIX

	AA	Aa	aa
Unaffected	$z_{00}$	$z_{01}$	$z_{02}$
Affected	$z_{10}$	$z_{11}$	$z_{12}$

some of their algorithms namely the Pearson Goodness-of-Fit test and the Cochran-Armitage test for Trend (CATT). For more information about equation derivations we refer the reader to [24].

In order to implement the algorithms presented in [24], genotypes and phenotypes are encoded and encrypted as follows:

*Genotype Encoding:* As in [24], a table containing genotype information is constructed in which each row corresponds to genotype information about a single person. For bi-allelic genes, each person's gene is encoded using three ciphertexts  $c_{AA}, c_{Aa}, c_{aa}$ . These ciphertexts will encrypt a "1" only in the case that the equality statement in (21) is satisfied, otherwise they encrypt "0". For the case that the person's genotype at the specified locus is not known, all Ctxts will encrypt "0".

$$\begin{aligned} c_{AA} &= Enc(\text{gene} == AA) \\ c_{Aa} &= Enc(\text{gene} == Aa) \\ c_{aa} &= Enc(\text{gene} == aa) \end{aligned} \quad (21)$$

*Genotype/Phenotype Correlation Encoding:* We modified the phenotype encoding compared to [24] in order to reduce pre-computation time and to have less noise in the final encrypted result. This will allow us to further compute on the resulting ciphertext if needed. We generate a correlation matrix between genotypes  $\{AA, Aa, aa\}$  and phenotypes  $\{\text{affected}, \text{unaffected}\}$  to generate a  $3 \times 2$  correlation matrix with Ctxts encrypting a "1" at a single location corresponding to this person's genotype/phenotype condition, "0" otherwise, as shown in Table III. If the genotype or phenotype of this person is unknown, then all Ctxts will be encrypting a "0".

**1) Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Test:** This test is used to check if a gene is in Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium (HWE). The HWE is responsible for testing if the gene allele frequencies are independent. Assume  $A$  and  $a$  are two alleles in a given gene, and that  $N_{AA}, N_{Aa}$ , and  $N_{aa}$  are the corresponding number of genotypes  $AA, Aa$ , and  $aa$ , respectively, as in (23). Let  $N = N_{AA} + N_{Aa} + N_{aa}$  be the total number of genotypes. Since homomorphic division is expensive to perform, in [24] they simplified the computations needed and computed the following parameters homomorphically

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha &= (4N_{AA}N_{aa} - N_{Aa}^2)^2 & \beta_1 &= 2(2N_{AA} + N_{Aa})^2 \\ \beta_2 &= (2N_{AA} + N_{Aa})(2N_{aa} + N_{Aa}) & \beta_3 &= 2(2N_{aa} + N_{Aa})^2 \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

where  $N_{ij}$  can be computed as

$$N_{AA} = \sum_i c_{AA}^{(i)} \quad N_{Aa} = \sum_i c_{Aa}^{(i)} \quad N_{aa} = \sum_i c_{aa}^{(i)} \quad (23)$$

**TABLE IV**  
AFFECTED/UNAFFECTED GENES STATISTICS

	$AA$	$Aa$	$aa$	Sum
Unaffected	$N_{00}$	$N_{01}$	$N_{02}$	$R_0$
Affected	$N_{10}$	$N_{11}$	$N_{12}$	$R_1$
Sum	$C_0$	$C_1$	$C_2$	$N$

these parameters are then sent to the client to compute the final deviation test statistic

$$X^2 = \frac{\alpha}{2N} \left( \frac{1}{\beta_1} + \frac{1}{\beta_2} + \frac{1}{\beta_3} \right) \quad (24)$$

**Cochran-Armitage Test for Trend (CATT):** This study is used to determine if an allele is associated to a disease or not. The test can be computed as

$$X^2 = \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \quad (25)$$

where

$$\alpha = N \left( \sum_{i=0}^2 w_i (N_{0i} R_1 - N_{1i} R_0) \right)^2 \quad (26)$$

$$\beta = R_0 R_1 \left( \sum_{i=0}^2 w_i^2 C_i (N - C_i) - 2w_1 w_2 C_1 C_2 \right) \quad (27)$$

$$N_{xy} = \sum_i z_{xy}^{(i)}, \quad \text{where } x \in \{0, 1\}, y \in \{0, 1, 2\} \quad (28)$$

where  $w_i$  are predetermined weights  $\in \{0, 1, 2\}$  as described in [24],  $N_{ij}$  represents the number of individuals who are affected/unaffected with a certain disease and have genotype  $ij$  as in (28). The parameters  $N_{ij}$ ,  $R_i$ ,  $C_i$  are described in Table IV.

### C. Predictive Analysis

Predictive equations can be used to check for different diseases. In order to compute the predictive equation, patients' information must be used. To protect such information, homomorphic encryption can be used to encrypt these data and privately compute the regression equations [18]. To demonstrate the logistic regression analysis, in [18] they used a model that predicts the likelihood of having a heart attack in an unspecified period. The predictive model is given by the following logistic regression function

$$P(x) = \frac{e^x}{e^x + 1} \quad (29)$$

where  $x$  is represented as

$$x = 0.072 \cdot a + 0.013 \cdot sys - 0.029 \cdot dia + 0.008 \cdot chol - 0.053 \cdot ht + 0.021 \cdot wt \quad (30)$$

where  $a$  is the age,  $sys$  is the systolic blood pressure,  $dia$  is the diastolic blood pressure,  $chol$  is the cholesterol level,  $ht$  is the height,  $wt$  is the weight.

To implement the exponential expression in (29), a Taylor series can be used up to an acceptable order to result in a sufficient

**TABLE V**  
DESIGN ENVIRONMENT

Item	Specification
CPU	Intel Core-i7 5930K
# of CPU Cores	4
# of Threads	8
CPU Frequency	3.5 GHz
Cache Size	15 MB
System Memory	32 GB DDR4
Operating System	Windows 8.1 64-bits
Programming IDE	Visual Studio 2012 Ultimate edition
GPU	NVIDIA GeForce GTX980
Maxwell Version	GM204
# of CUDA Cores	2048
GPU Core Frequency	1126 MHz
GPU Memory	4 GB
GPU L2 Cache	2 MB

accuracy. In [18] they represented (29) up to degree 7

$$P(x) = \frac{e^x}{e^x + 1} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4}x - \frac{1}{48}x^3 + \frac{1}{480}x^5 - \frac{17}{80640}x^7 + O(x^9) \quad (31)$$

Since homomorphic encryption relies on integer arithmetic, (30) and (31) can be normalized with appropriate accuracy to the following

$$z = 72 \cdot a + 13 \cdot sys - 29 \cdot dia + 8 \cdot chol - 53 \cdot ht + 21 \cdot wt \quad (32)$$

$$F(z) = 40320 + 20160z - 1680z^3 + 168z^5 - 17z^7 \quad (33)$$

Inputs to (32) and (33) are represented as integer numbers and encoded in binary format in adjacent polynomial slots. When these binary polynomials are multiplied together, they result in a correct output as was described in [18]. Multiplication by constants in (32) were implemented through sequential additions. To compute the correct output, the result of (32) is sent back to the client to be re-encrypted and applied to (33) to compute the final result. Again, for more details, refer to [18].

## V. SECURITY AGAINST ATTACKS

Our homomorphic encryption scheme and algorithms, and indeed all known FHE schemes, are proven secure in the IND-CPA sense (i.e., under a chosen plaintext attack). This is the standard notion of security for FHE schemes as in [1], [2], [6]. The algorithms in Section IV are secure against external attackers. They are also secure against an honest but curious server that wants to learn the underlying encrypted data without trying to actively change it. It is trivial that any homomorphic encryption scheme can be broken by CCA2 (i.e., if the adversary can make decryption queries after the challenge). It can also be broken by CCA1 attacks [38] (i.e., if the adversary can make decryption queries, but only before the challenge). The correctness of any FHE algorithm relies on the honesty of the server that it will execute the exact algorithm.

TABLE VI  
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PARAMETERS IN THIS WORK AND IN [12], [18], [24]

Parameter	This Work	SHIELD [12]	[18]	[24]
Base Scheme	NTRU	RLWE	NTRU	NTRU
Polynomial Dimension “ $n$ ”	1024	1024	16384	8192
Modulus Bit Width “ $\log q$ ”	31	31	512	384
Plaintext Modulus	$2^{30}$	$2^{30}$	$2^{40}$	$2^{n+1}$
Key Standard Deviation “ $\sigma_{key}$ ”	25	10	1	1
Effective Security Level “ $\lambda$ ” (12)	173	157	120	44
Vulnerability Factor “ $F$ ” (15)	0.79	N/A	$3 \times 10^{7.4}$	$2.3 \times 10^{5.5}$
Ctxt Size	$n \cdot \log^2 q = 123$ KB	$4 \cdot n \cdot \log^2 q = 492$ KB	$n \cdot \log q = 1024$ KB	$n \cdot \log q = 384$ KB
Key Size	$n \cdot \log q = 3.9$ KB	$2 \cdot n \cdot \log q = 7.9$ KB	$n \cdot \log q = 1024$ KB	$n \cdot \log q = 384$ KB
Evaluation Key	N/A	N/A	$n \cdot \log^2 q = 512$ MB	Required but not used
Need to Disclose Circuit Depth?	No	No	No	Yes

TABLE VII  
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN THIS WORK AND THE WORK IN [12], [18], [24]

Operation	This Work (1024, 31) (CPU) (msec)	This Work (1024, 31) (GPU) (msec)	SHIELD [12] (1024, 31) (GPU) (msec)	GPU Speedup over SHIELD	Work in [18] (16384, 512) (CPU) (sec)	GPU Speedup over [18]	Work in [24] (8192, 384) (CPU) (sec)	GPU Speedup over [24]
<b>Encrypt</b>	23	0.16	23	$143 \times$	0.58	$3625 \times$	0.78	$4875 \times$
<b>Decrypt</b>	5	1	5	$5 \times$	0.55	$550 \times$	0.74	$740 \times$
<b>Add</b>	0.25	0.07	0.2	$2.85 \times$	0.001	$14.29 \times$	0.003	$42.86 \times$
<b>Multiply</b>	87.8	0.838	3.477	$4.15 \times$	5.1	$6085.92 \times$	0.24	$286.4 \times$

The tuple  $(n, \log q)$  is written below each scheme

## VI. PERFORMANCE RESULTS

### A. Design Environment

A summary of the specifications of the system used to implement our work for the purpose of benchmarking is found in Table V.

Table VI summarizes the sets of parameters used for our library compared to [12], [18], [24]. We mean by the *Effective Security Level* that we substitute the reported parameters of each encryption scheme in (12) and get the resulting  $\lambda$ . The following is a further explanation of why our parameters are smaller than the others despite the fact that we all derived our parameters from [19]. Our work and SHIELD [12] have the same  $n$  and  $\log q$  because they are both based on [7]. The difference in the Ctxt and key sizes are due to the translation from the RLWE to the NTRU schemes. On the other hand, the work in [18] and [24] are both based on [31]. In [31],  $\log q$  increases with the circuit depth as well as with the number of least significant bits reserved for the plaintext  $\log t$  (the condition for correctness is  $q > 2 \cdot t \cdot \text{error}$ ). In our scheme,  $\log q$  increases only with the circuit depth, as we encode our plaintext in the most significant bit of each of the  $\log q$  polynomials (the condition for correctness is  $q > 2 \cdot \text{error}$ ). Also since we use the asymmetric property of the Ctxt multiplication in our favor, our noise growth, as well as our parameters, are smaller for the same circuit depth. We would like to point out that in [24], they did not use the 512 MB evaluation key as in [18] to speedup their ctxt operations. This came at the expense that they generate a different secret decryption key for different circuits with different circuit depth. Also, the large  $\log q$  used in [18], [24] along with the very small distribution used in the key generation,  $\chi_{key} = \{-1, 0, 1\}$ , make these schemes very vulnerable to the subfield lattice attacks in [29].

Table VII summarizes the performance results of the homomorphic operations for our library compared to the [12], [18], [24]. It can be seen from this table that we have a  $58 \times$  speedup for the multiplication operation of our CPU implementation compared to work in [18]. By additionally exploiting the parallelizable properties that our HE library has, we get another  $104 \times$  speedup by distributing the HE computations on the GPU cores. This resulted in an overall  $6085 \times$  speedup for the multiplication operation compared to work in [18] and a  $286 \times$  compared to [24].

### B. Scalability

After exploring the parallelism in our system, we further explored the ability for its scalability across multiple GPU instances. Experiments were made using four GPUs cards connected to the same CPU to measure the loss in performance due to cross GPU communication. By partitioning large problems into small ones, we managed to schedule the work among all four GPUs to get a speedup of  $3.946 \times$ , which indicates that we managed to hide almost all the communication overhead.

### C. Candidate Applications Performance

The performance results of the Pearson Goodness-of-fit test and the CAAT test described in Section IV-B1, the predictive analysis described in Section IV-C, and the relational operations and blood pressure application described in Section IV-A1 are summarized in Table VIII. We would like to point out that the reported results for the work in [25] corresponds to the ring  $Z_{14}$ , this is because in our blood pressure example we need to add more than two numbers to get the final correct result.



TABLE VIII  
CANDIDATE APPLICATIONS PERFORMANCE IN MILLISECONDS

Application	This Work (1024, 31)	Work in [24] (8192, 384)	Speedup over [24]	Work in [18] (16384, 512)	Speedup over [18]	Work in [25]	Speedup over [25]
Pearson Goodness-of-fit Test	8.452	1360	$160.9 \times$	NA	NA	NA	NA
CAAT	22.28	3630	$162.9 \times$	NA	NA	NA	NA
Predictive Analysis (32)	0.77	NA	NA	196	$254.5 \times$	NA	NA
Predictive Analysis (33)	13.69	NA	NA	80,000	$5834.7 \times$	NA	NA
Relational Operation	$t_1 = 2.514 \times k$	NA	NA	NA	NA	$t_2 = 30.75 \times k$	$12.2 \times$
Blood Pressure	$6 \times t_1$	NA	NA	NA	NA	$6 \times t_2$	$12.2 \times$

The parameter  $k$  in the relational operation application represents the number of bits used to represent the numbers being compared. The tuple  $(n, \log q)$  is written below each scheme.

## VII. CONCLUSION

We formulated, optimized, and implemented an NTRU-based variant of the HE scheme of [7], [8], [12] which achieves much slower growth of noise, and thus much better parameters than previous HE schemes. Compared to the work in [18], our GPU implementation (GM204 Maxwell architecture) achieves a speedup of  $6085 \times$  in Ctxt multiplication, which represents the bottleneck for most HE schemes. Representative medical applications, namely Pearson Goodness-of-fit test [24], Cochran-Armitage test for trend (CATT) [24], predictive analysis [18], and relational operations [25] were implemented and scored speedups of  $160.9 \times$ ,  $162.9 \times$ ,  $80000 \times$ , and  $12.2 \times$ , respectively.

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